Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union : an EU CRBN Action Plan - Summary of the impact assessment {COM(2009) 273 final} {SEC(2009) 790}
Date: 2009-06-24
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: energy consumption, energy policy, energy saving, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiobiology, report

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 24.6.2009 
SEC(2009) 791 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the 
European Union – an EU CRBN Action Plan  

SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT  

{COM(2009) 273 final} 
{SEC(2009) 790} 

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SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

1. 

THE CBRN POLICY PACKAGE 

In  accordance  with  the  December  2007  Council  Conclusions  on  addressing  chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks and on bio-preparedness, which invited the 
Commission to continue its work in the CBRN field and agreed with its intention to propose 
relevant policy measures in 2009, the Commission intends to adopt a package of proposals on 
CBRN in June 2009. 

The overall objectives of the CBRN package are to fight terrorism by complementing relevant 
measures taken at Member State level, to address gaps in the field and to promote the sharing 
of information and exchange of best practices between Member States. It should also assist in 
identifying  measures  to  reduce  the  terrorist  threat  in  the  chemical,  biological  and 
radiological/nuclear fields. 

The  package  was  developed  following  a  long  and extensive  consultation  process.  The  main 
driving force behind the formulation of the Action Plan has been the CBRN Task Force. This 
Task  Force,  set  up  in  February  2008,  comprised  over  200  members  representing  national 
authorities and organisations. A total of 15 meetings were organised over the course of 2008 
to address the different CBRN strands. The Task Force’s final report was published in January 
2009 and contained 264 separate recommendations, confirming not only that there is still a lot 
of  work  to  be  done,  but  also  that  there  is  a  strong  consensus  among  experts  on  how  the 
existing issues could best be tackled.  

Furthermore,  several  Commission  services  have  been  actively  involved  in  the  work  of  the 
CBRN  Task  Force.  Among  all  the  DGs  involved  in  this  exercise,  DG  ENTR,  DG  SANCO 
and  DG  TREN,  along  with  the  JRC,  played  a  particularly  active  role  in  the  chemical, 
biological and radiological/nuclear fields, respectively. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

In order to define the CBRN problem in the EU, a series of variables, including the overall 
level  of  the  CBRN  threat  and  the  potential  costs  of  terrorist  or  other  incidents  involving 
CBRN material, have to be taken into consideration. 

2.1. 

Assessment of specific problems 

The CBRN problem assessment focuses on issues relating to CBRN prevention, detection and 
preparedness/response.  

2.1.1.  Problems relating to CBRN prevention, detection and preparedness/response 

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• 

A  wealth  of  international  and  EU  legislation  and  agreements  exists,  but  there  are 
several differences in implementation among the Member States. 

Gaps  and  duplications  exist  in  current  information  sharing  and  cooperation 
initiatives. 

There  are  various  legal  and  practical  constraints  to  EU  cooperation  on  combating 
CBRN terrorist threats. 

Standards  with  regard  to  personnel  security  differ  between  Member  States,  which 
have different procedures for background checks and personnel vetting. 

While a lot of research is undertaken in some areas, a number of research needs are 
currently not adequately addressed. 

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• 

The open-source publication of scientific findings and research funding practices do 
not take security issues sufficiently into account. 

2.1.2.  CBRN prevention 

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A  lot  of  CBRN  material  is  relatively  easy  to  obtain  and  can  be  weaponised.  This 
involves predominantly chemical substances and to a lesser extent biological agents 
and radiological sources. 

There  is  insufficient  coordinated  control  of  the  markets  for  CBRN  material,  and 
Member  States  have  varying  approaches  and  standards  for  the  monitoring  and 
surveillance of CBRN materials and transactions. 

2.1.3.  CBRN detection 

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• 

There are differences in the level of national detection capabilities and preparedness. 

There  are  no  harmonised  minimum  detection  standards  on  which  Member  States 
could build and there is as yet no European testing, trialling and certification scheme.  

2.1.4.  CBRN preparedness and response 

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• 

• 

There  are  significant differences across  Member  States  in the quality of the CBRN 
emergency  and  response  plans  of  supply  chain  actors,  high-risk  sites  or  critical 
infrastructure  operators.  The  security  aspects  are  often  not  explicit  or  not  well 
integrated in the plans. 

There are significant gaps in the training of first responders to react to CBRN events 
investigation  or 
in  Member  States.  Precautions  with 
decontamination are too often not covered. 

forensic 

regard 

to 

The  extent  and  coverage  of  medical  countermeasures  in  place  varies  between  the 
Member States.  

2.2. 

Subsidiarity and proportionality principles 

The  subsidiarity  principle  is  satisfied  as  the  measures  the  CBRN  package  cannot  be 
undertaken  by  any  single  EU  Member  State  and  must  therefore  be  addressed  at  EU  level. 
Although security issues are to a large extent a national competence, there are several reasons 
why some of them need to be tackled at EU level: 

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• 

The  root  of  the  problem  is  an  international  phenomenon.  Many  of  the  existing 
security initiatives and legislation are international in character. 

A  variety  of  security  measures  currently  exist  in  the  Member  States.  Potentially, 
since  no  internal  borders  exist,  lower  standards  of  security  in  one  Member  State 
might allow the malicious use of CBRN material in another. 

There are potential economies of scale to be generated through the identification and 
dissemination  of  good  practice  at  international  and  EU  level.  In  particular,  good 
practice in the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation needs to be tackled 
at EU level. 

The EU is well-placed to lead and to act as a catalyst for this cooperation, and the envisaged 
activities in the CBRN field are in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.  

Assessment of the proportionality of a policy to combat terrorism is extremely difficult. The 
arbitrary and apparently irrational nature of terrorism means that its threat and consequences 
are difficult to predict. On the other hand, the potential  negative effects of a terrorist  attack 
using  CBRN  materials  are  significant,  in  terms  of  financial  losses,  longer-term  economic 

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consequences,  loss  of  life  and  casualties,  social  disruption  and  overall  well-being.  Well-
targeted and relevant action in this field to prevent such attacks from happening, to identify 
planned  attacks  and  to  appropriately  deal  with  the  consequences  of  an  attack  is  therefore 
justified. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES  

Given the problems identified in section 2 above, the CBRN Action Plan aims to achieve the 
general and specific objectives set out in Table 3. 

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Table 3: CBRN objectives 

General horizontal objective 

1. To improve the EU’s capacity to counter CBRN threats 

Specific horizontal objectives 

1.1 To increase effective 
international cooperation, 
coordination and dialogue on 
CBRN 

1.2 To raise awareness and increase 
knowledge and information sharing 
on CBRN 

1.3 To reduce, where possible, 
judicial, legal and jurisdictional 
barriers and constraints 

1.4 To improve 
personnel security 

1.5 To strengthen and 
prioritise research on 
CBRN 

1.6 To increase 
awareness of security 
implications in funding 
decisions 

1.7 To increase awareness 
of security aspects in 
publishing 

Objectives — Prevention  

Objectives — Detection 

Objectives — Preparedness and response  

General 

Specific 

General 

Specific 

General 

Specific 

2. To increase the security of 
CBRN material and the safety of 
citizens and possible targets  

2.1 To prevent access to 
legitimately produced and used 
CBRN material by terrorists or 
other criminals  

3. To increase the chances of 
detection and identification of 
CBRN materials before and 
after terrorist incidents 

3.1 To improve detection and 
identification capacity and 
capability 

4. To reduce to a minimum the 
effects of terrorist incidents 
involving CBRN materials  

4.1 To improve response and 
emergency planning and 
protocols, also at EU level 

2.2 To improve monitoring and 
control over CBRN materials  

2.3 To improve overall awareness 
of the potential dangers and risks, 
contributing to a high ‘security 
culture’ 

3.2 To develop an EU approach 
towards detection and 
identification 

4.2 To develop an EU approach 
towards response and emergency 
planning 

4.3 To ensure ongoing information 
flows in the event of CBRN 
emergencies 

4.4 To increase the chances of 
finding and prosecuting terrorist 
and other criminals 

4.5 To enhance national and EU 
countermeasures and on-the-
ground response capacity 

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4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The specific impact assessment approach focuses on two main policy options: 

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assessment of the status quo; 

assessment of relevant CBRN actions for the preferred policy option: 

Altogether, a total of 147 possible actions are identified, of which: 

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99 actions are considered uncontroversial; 

34 actions are considered potentially controversial and are assessed in detail; 

14  actions  are  considered  unfeasible  and  are  excluded  from  the  preferred  policy 
option. 

5. 

PREFERRED OPTION 

Based on the screening and detailed assessment of the different possible actions, the preferred 
policy option includes a total of 133 actions, organised into the four main strands: Horizontal; 
Prevention; Detection; and Preparedness and Response. 

Table 4: Actions by strand and type 

Prevention 

Detection 

Preparedness and 
response 

Actions applicable to 
prevention, detection, 
and preparedness/ 
response 

Total 

Horizontal  C 

B 

R/N 

Total 

13

10

17

1

15  

7

7

3

19

57

5

23

6

23

21 

2 

6 

1 

30 

58

20

24

31

133

5.1.  Main impacts of the preferred policy option 

5.1.1.  Financial and economic impacts 

Most  of  the  133  actions  included  in  the  preferred  policy  option  are  expected  to  have  low 
financial  costs,  incurred  at  both  EU  and  national  levels  by  various  stakeholders  and  over 
several years. Such costs would cover, for example, studies, mapping activities, identification 
and dissemination of good practices, participation in networks, meetings and other events.  

It is estimated that around 18 actions could have a high financial cost, for the funding of new 
research, the establishment of a comprehensive early warning system and capacity, putting in 
place security plans/security management systems for facilities and the establishment of EU-
wide  testing,  trialling  and  certification  schemes  for  detection  systems  and  equipment.  The 
exact costs are difficult to estimate, as many of these actions would require further feasibility 
work to provide a more accurate assessment of the costs and benefits.  

The expected costs of implementing the Action Plan are difficult to assess precisely, as these 
will depend on several factors, e.g. the length of the EU lists. It is worth noting, however, that 
even if the overall cost could run into several tens of millions of euros, this would be divided 

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between different implementation levels (i.e. the Commission, EU agencies and 27 Member 
States)  and  spread  over  several  years.  While  some  actions  would  start  immediately,  several 
would only be launched as from 2011. This will provide sufficient time to adequately plan for 
such  costs.  The  existing  financial  programmes  for  the  period  until  2013,  in  particular  the 
specific  programme  ‘Prevention,  Preparedness  and  Consequence  Management  of  Terrorism 
and  other  Security-Related  Risks’  and  the  specific  programme  ‘Prevention  of  and  Fight 
against Crime’, will be able to offer financial support for implementation of the actions.  

5.1.2. 

Social impacts 

Most of the actions included in the preferred policy option are not expected to have serious 
social  effects.  Clearly,  however,  the  overall  positive  social  effect  of successfully  countering 
CBRN threats is improved public health and security, in terms of a reduction in casualties and 
long-term health problems, reduced levels of fear and an increased perception of safety. 

Several  actions  would  also  have  a  positive  effect  on  governance,  as  they  would  enhance 
institutional cooperation and communication, improve the organisation of information flows 
or help to establish protocols, etc. 

Around  ten  of the actions  could have negative social impacts. The possible negative effects 
concern  interference  with  the  fundamental  rights  to  private  life  and  to  the  protection  of 
personal data. However, the content and actual implementation of the actions can be designed 
in such a way as to avoid these effects. 

5.1.3. 

Impacts on fundamental rights 

Potential issues in relation to fundamental  rights have  been identified in five of the  actions. 
Two  of  these  involve  measures  to  increase  security  for  visiting  staff  from  third  countries. 
These could, if not handled with care, negatively affect the non-discrimination principle and 
academic  freedom.  Background  checks  and  vetting  requirements  can  negatively  affect  the 
freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work. On the other hand, mutual 
recognition of vetting procedures throughout the EU could facilitate taking up work in similar 
areas in other Member States. 

There  are  also  three  actions  that  deal  with  notifying  and  reporting  suspicious  transactions. 
These  might  involve  interference  with  the  private  lives  of  individuals  and  their  right  to 
protection of personal data. Provided that adequate protection of personal data is ensured, the 
content and actual implementation of the actions can be designed so as to avoid these effects. 

5.2. 

Benefits of the preferred policy option 

5.2.1. 

Increasing effective international cooperation, coordination and dialogue on CBRN 

The  preferred  policy  option  will  make  a  positive  contribution  towards  increasing  the 
effectiveness of international cooperation, coordination and dialogue on CBRN. Several of the 
actions would lead to: 

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better  mapping  of  existing  international  cooperation  and  coordination  mechanisms 
addressing CBRN issues; 

increased cooperation with relevant agencies at international, EU and national level; 

improved identification and exchange of good practices with international, European 
and national partners; 

improved communication with the public. 

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5.2.2.  Reducing, judicial, legal and jurisdictional barriers and constraints 

Several  actions  included  in  the  preferred  policy  option  would  contribute  to  improving 
personnel security by: 

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introducing  common  graduated  criteria  for  background  checks  and  vetting 
procedures; 

improving  the  identification  and  exchange  of  good  practices  in  the  area  of  security 
checks; 

strengthening  management  structures  in  CBRN  facilities,  so  that  personnel  are 
adequately and regularly appraised and monitored. 

5.2.3. 

Improving monitoring and control over CBRN materials 

The preferred policy option includes a number of actions to improve monitoring and control 
over CBRN materials in terms of accounting, information exchanges and reporting on threats, 
losses and other incidents, transport, and import and export: 

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increased  compliance  with  international  obligations  and  use  of  existing  monitoring 
and control mechanisms; 

improved licensing, registration and delivery control to ensure that CBRN substances 
are appropriately recorded and monitored; 

improved  communication  and  information  exchange  on  threat  levels,  thefts,  losses 
and incidents; 

enhanced control over the transport of CBRN materials; 

increased focus on high-risk CBRN sources. 

5.3. 

The EU added value 

Terrorism  is  international  in  character  and  the EU  has  shared  borders,  allowing  terrorists  to 
move freely within the EU. The cooperation proposed by the preferred policy option ranges 
from  the  exchange  of  experiences  and  good  practices  in  some  actions  to  the  exchange  of 
information  and  intelligence  with  operational  significance  in  others.  These  actions  could  all 
help reinforce channels for bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Member States.  

5.3.1.  Expected take-up among relevant stakeholders 

The  expected  take-up  among  relevant  stakeholders  is  very  high,  due  to  the  fact  that  all  the 
actors  that  are  to  implement  the  Action  Plan  participated  actively  in  its  development  in  the 
course of the wide EU consultation, in particular in the CBRN Task Force. 

Such an approach has ensured that all relevant stakeholders have ownership of the actions to 
be implemented. In order to ensure maximum take-up, the intention is to continue to build on 
the community established by the CBRN Task Force. 

5.3.2.  Holistic / framework approach at EU level 

The purpose of the preferred policy option is to create an initial horizontal framework as the 
starting point for targeted initiatives in the future. The choice of instrument (133 actions) is 
the  result  of  a  1½  year  period  of  consultation  with  experts  from  the  Member  States, 
Commission services, academia and industry. 

An  additional  advantage  of  the  single  approach  chosen  is  that  it  allows  for  synergies  to  be 
identified. Many of the actions identified as necessary by the experts are applicable to all the 

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different materials covered — this means that similarities in methodology can be used to take 
certain actions forward and increase efficiency.  

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