Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety COM(2008) 790 final — 2008/0231 (CNS)
Date: 2009-06-10
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: ESC opinion, EU aid, EU financing, cooperation policy, nuclear safety, technical cooperation








C_2009306EN.01005601.xml










16.12.2009   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 306/56





Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety

COM(2008) 790 final — 2008/0231 (CNS)

(2009/C 306/13)
On 30 January 2003, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty on the


‘Proposal for a Council (Euratom) Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations’


‘Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste’


(COM(2003) 32 final — 2003/0021 (CNS) — 2003/0022 (CNS)).
The Committee issued an opinion on these proposals on 26 March 2003.
On 4 June 2009, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee on the amended version of one of these directives:


‘Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety’


in order to elicit its comments in an opinion complementing that of 26 March 2003.
The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 20 May 2009. The rapporteur was Mr DANTIN.
At its 454th plenary session, held on 10 and 11 June 2009 (meeting of 10 June), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 100 votes, with three abstentions.
1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1


There is now a renewed interest in nuclear energy, for economic reasons and as a result of the need to diversify energy supplies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.












1.2


An extremely high level of safety and exemplary transparency are prerequisites for the existence and development of nuclear power.












1.3


In this context, the Committee welcomes the directive, judging that it has a considerable technical and strategic interest for the safety of the population, those working in the nuclear industry and the environment, whilst giving the Member States the freedom to choose whether or not to use this type of energy.












1.4


The EESC appreciates that nuclear energy will also be developed outside the borders of the European Union, sometimes in countries where the technological and risk management culture is less advanced than in the Member States. In view of this, the Committee would like the EU to play a proactive role and to have the capability to make proposals on nuclear safety issues beyond its borders, as it does in relation to the ‘climate package’.












1.5


Nuclear safety must be ‘a worldwide public good’, since a nuclear accident can have an impact on populations and the environment at a great distance from the state where it occurs. In this regard, by making compliance with the fundamental safety principles approved by all IAEA states mandatory, which is the objective of the directive, the EU will put itself in the position of being able to export its ‘safety model’ beyond its borders.












1.6


The Committee considers that the focus on obliging Member States to establish totally independent national safety authorities, making licence holders fully responsible and ensuring that information on these issues is transparent, is the best approach, and therefore wishes this aspect of the directive to be retained and for the approach to remain based on a very high level of responsibility.












1.7


The EESC is particularly interested in the question of building, maintaining and developing skills in the Member States, particularly those which have little or no experience with nuclear energy. These Member States must address this question without delay, in particular by developing the necessary training opportunities. In addition, the EESC suggests that consideration be given to European certification of competence in the field of nuclear power, and that training relates to the technical management as well as to the health aspects of nuclear accidents.












1.8


The Committee stresses that safety is also a question of industrial culture and behaviour; it is not solely a matter of drawing up regulations and restrictions.




2.   Introduction









2.1


The nuclear industry developed considerably in the EU following the fuel crisis in 1973 and the need to harmonise safety practices soon became apparent.












2.2


The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the technological problems of nuclear safety (1) gave the Commission a role as a catalyst in initiatives taken at international level in the field of nuclear safety.












2.3


A second Council Resolution was adopted in 1992 (2), in which the Council reaffirmed the intentions of the 1975 Resolution and invited Member States to continue and intensify their efforts towards the harmonisation of safety issues. In its ruling of 10 December 2002 in Case C-29/99, the European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's remit to legislate in the field of nuclear safety.












2.4


On 30 January 2003, under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission proposed a directive on the safety of nuclear facilities (3), on which the Committee issued an opinion (4).












2.5


In the absence of a majority, the Council did not adopt this directive, but the consultation process continued with the creation of the Council Working Party on Nuclear Safety in 2004.












2.6


The Commission now intends to give fresh impetus and consideration to the implementation of a Community framework for nuclear safety.




3.   Objectives, approach and key elements of the new draft directive









3.1


The general objective of the proposal is to achieve, maintain and continuously improve nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the regulatory bodies. Its scope of application is the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned. The right of each Member State to decide to use nuclear energy or not is recognised and fully respected.












3.2


The approach of the directive on nuclear safety is to introduce Community regulations incorporating a set of principles already included in the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety, that has been accepted by all the Member States and to supplement them with additional safety requirements for new nuclear power reactors.












3.3


The aim is therefore to render binding the internationally endorsed nuclear safety principles (IAEA, CSN, WENRA…), which are currently applied on a voluntary basis.




4.   General comments









4.1


Energy from nuclear fission currently represents around 14,6 % of the primary energy consumed in the European Union and 31 % of the electricity generated. For the Member States which have recourse to it (fifteen (5) of the twenty-seven) it is the energy source with the least fluctuation in prices and one of the lowest production rates of CO2. However, the use of nuclear power is controversial even in some countries which use it and still more so in the Member States which have not made it a part of their energy mix, for fear, in particular, of the radio-active pollution that could result from possible safety breaches and the management of nuclear waste.












4.2


In accordance with the perspectives contained in the Committee's opinion on The issues involved in using nuclear power in electricity generation
 (6), there is now a renewed interest in nuclear energy, both for economic reasons and due to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (policies on combating climate change). Within the EU, some Member States which had decided to abandon nuclear power are now reconsidering their decisions.












4.3


If the revival of nuclear power is to be accepted by the public, the highest possible level of safety must be guaranteed.












4.4


This ‘worldwide’ renewal of interest raises the issue of nuclear safety in new ways, in particular in relation to organisation and monitoring. Nuclear safety must be ‘a worldwide public good’ and therefore, the response also needs to be ‘worldwide’ since the risks of nuclear power are not confined within the borders of the states using this technology.












4.5


The European Union can play a pivotal role in moving towards this objective, in view of the use of nuclear power within its territory and its industrial know-how. The European Union can set an example, as it does in the area of climate change, starting by taking steps to unify its own regulations and safety organisations internally and by identifying and overcoming the obstacles to doing so.












4.6


In this context, the Commission's directive comes at an opportune moment. The European Economic and Social Committee welcomes the directive and feels that it has a considerable technical and strategic interest for the safety of the population, those working in the nuclear industry and the environment, both in the Member States which have opted for nuclear power and in those which have not done so.












4.6.1


The Committee agrees with the Commission's new in approach, which, in order to obtain a wider consensus, makes the Member States and their national regulators fully responsible. There are differences between the Member States in terms of history, organisation and practice and an approach which focuses on obliging them to respect the common rules drawn up within the IAEA, establish genuinely independent regulators and make licence holders fully responsible and allow them no possibility of delegating their responsibility, is certainly the one which all the various parties currently find the most acceptable and which is best able to guarantee the safety of nuclear installations.












4.6.2


The Committee also feels that the directive represents a step forward in terms of improving safety. There will be a need for sustained and ongoing reflection in order to understand and take account of the changes, additions or modifications that may need to be made to reflect developments in contexts, techniques and organisational approaches.












4.6.3


The Committee welcomes the fact that, both in the main provisions and in Article 5 of the draft directive, the text under consideration focuses specifically on the need for transparent and reliable information for the population, in connection with the decision-making process. To that effect, the Aarhus Convention (7) on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters could be a reference for civil society players.












4.6.4


Moving beyond this and the substance of the draft directive itself, it will be necessary to take account of and internalise the fact that safety is not solely a matter of rigorous addition of technical and industrial regulations. It is also to do with a culture, i.e. a collection of practices which make safety a central concern and, above and beyond the requisite compliance with procedures, also incite continual exploration into ways of increasing safety and identifying both internal and external factors which might undermine it. This culture cannot be built in a day and must be shared by industrialists, operators and regulators as much as by political decision-makers, if it is to be fully effective.












4.7


Moves to improve safety may run up against limitations in relation to electronuclear technologies, stemming from a lack of experience and know-how and from a poorly adapted scientific and technological environment. A major effort will therefore have to be made in relation to training (8). Intra-European exchanges of theoretical and practical knowledge could be organised and support measures put in place to respond more effectively, particularly in relation to the requirements on training and human resources, set out in Articles 4, 7 and 9. European certification for training, qualifications and skills in nuclear power and nuclear safety must be developed.












4.8


The European Nuclear Energy Forum initiated by the Commission and supported by the March 2007 European Council brings together high level representatives from public authorities, Members of the European Parliament, representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, and representatives of electricity producers, the nuclear industry, consumers, finance, and civil society. It provides a framework for expertise and discussion on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. In January 2009 it issued a number of proposals and comments (9) on the draft directive and the Committee believes that, in view of their quality and their importance in terms of acceptance from citizens and their representatives, these should be drawn on.




5.   Specific comments

5.1   Scope and substance of the directive

The Committee agrees with the reference to the IAEA's fundamental safety principles (SF-1, 2006) and the requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. However, it wishes to clarify which parts of these fundamental principles correspond specifically to the aim of this directive. This should take the form of an Appendix to the directive as presented in point 6 of this opinion and appended to it. This will clarify the draft directive and will also allow some of its articles to be simplified.
5.2   Article 1

The Committee suggests a more explicit wording in Article 1: the directive ‘aims to establish a European Framework for regulating nuclear safety, which defines the fundamental principles with which legislation and regulations on nuclear safety established at national level must comply, so as to ensure that nuclear safety is maintained and improved continuously in the Community and that the role of the regulatory bodies is strengthened.’
5.3   Article 2









5.3.1


Definition (1) ‘nuclear installation’: the Committee suggests that the term ‘radioactive waste’ be added after ‘spent fuel storage facility’ to read, ‘spent fuel and radioactive waste storage facility’.












5.3.2


Definition (8) ‘regulatory body’: the Committee urges the Commission to adhere strictly to the definition set out in the IAEA Safety Glossary published in 2007: ‘An authority or a system of authorities designated by the government of a State as having legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, including issuing authorisations, and thereby regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.’












5.3.3


Definition (10) ‘new power reactors’: the Committee would prefer a reference to installations built following the implementation of the directive. Developments that occur at the beginning of the construction process can be taken into account by licence holders. On the other hand, post-construction changes will be more difficult to make if the installation was not designed and built to do so. The existence of certain specific cases of power stations whose construction has been halted and needs to be resumed leads the Committee to suggest the following wording: ‘ “new power reactors”, nuclear reactors whose construction is authorised (or whose construction is resumed after a break of at least 5 years) following the directive’s entry into force’.




5.4   Article 3









5.4.1


The Committee suggests that this article should begin by defining the framework, which is the general aspect of safety, and then the responsibility for enacting it. It also proposes that reference to the withdrawal of authorisation in the event of breaches of the safety rules be made in this article, since it is part of the general framework and strengthens the authority of the regulatory body. Consequently, there would no longer be a need for a specific article on this topic (Article 8). The Committee draws attention to the fact that the Commission has the power to check how the directive has been transposed and can if necessary launch an infringement proceeding against any Member State which has not complied with the principles of the directive.












5.4.2


Article 3 would then be worded as follows:






1.



‘Member States shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations. This shall include national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control of nuclear installations, the prohibition of their operation without a licence and a system of regulatory inspection including the necessary enforcement, which shall include the power to suspend and withdraw licences. It is imperative that regulatory bodies have the power to withdraw licences in the case of serious or repeated breaches of the safety rules in a nuclear installation.’











2.



‘Member States must ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the licence, under the control of the regulatory body, throughout the lifetime of the said installation, until such point as it is no longer subject to the safety regulation. This responsibility of the licence holder cannot be delegated. The safety management and control measures to be implemented in a nuclear installation must be proposed by the licence holder and submitted to the regulatory body for approval. They must be implemented by the licence holder under the supervision of the regulatory body’.









5.5   Article 4, paragraph 1









5.5.1


The Committee attaches great importance to the independence of the regulatory body and would prefer the following wording: ‘Member States shall guarantee that the regulatory body, whose sole objective is safety, is effectively independent of all bodies whose task is to promote or operate nuclear installations. It must be free from any influence that may affect its regulatory duties.’ The reference to ‘bodies that justify societal benefits of nuclear power’ adds nothing to the idea of promoting nuclear installations and, if this reference is maintained, bodies that campaign against the use of nuclear power would also need to be mentioned.




5.6   Article 4, paragraph 3

The Committee suggests that two paragraphs in the proposal, Article 4 paragraph 3 and Article 4 paragraph 4, be combined in a new wording: ‘The regulatory body shall deliver licences in the light of the evidence provided by the applicant proving that the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, extension of the operating life, quality and number of staff, up to and including decommissioning, comply with the safety requirements, conditions and rules in force. It shall monitor the proper fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by the licence holder with respect to nuclear safety’.
5.7   Article 4, paragraph 4

Deleted and incorporated in the new Article 4 paragraph 3.
5.8   Article 4, paragraph 6

A sixth paragraph should be added to give further clarifications on the cooperation between regulatory bodies within the EU: ‘National regulatory bodies shall exchange best practice of regulation and develop a common understanding of the international requirements adopted.’
5.9   Article 5

‘Transparency’: the Committee emphasises how important this article is in order to address the criticism frequently levelled at the nuclear industry with regard to secrecy and in view of the fact that information on the operation of nuclear installations is of concern to all Member States, whether or not they use nuclear energy within their territory, since they are responsible for protecting their citizens in view of the cross-border character of nuclear risk.
5.10   Article 6, paragraph 1

The Committee suggests that a more specific reference be made to the IAEA’s safety fundamentals, by referring to the appendix already mentioned above. Article 6 paragraph 1 would therefore be given a new wording: ‘With regard to the siting, design, construction, use and decommissioning of nuclear installations, Member States shall apply the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standard Series No. SF-1 (2006), specified in the appendix.’
5.11   Article 6, paragraph 2

This article, which is not precise enough in its references to WENRA and the HLG, poses a problem: how can a Member State be obliged to take account of future results not defined in terms of content and timescale at the time the directive is adopted? The Committee proposes that this paragraph be deleted, since respect for fundamental safety principles and the development or a culture of safety evolve over time in accordance with scientific and technical progress.
5.12   Article 7

This article covers the responsibility of licence holders. However, since the directive is addressed to the Member States, the Committee suggests that the aspects not directly connected with the role of the Member States be moved to an appendix. Article 7 would then read:


Obligations of licence holders: Member States shall guarantee that licence holders are responsible for the design, construction, use and decommissioning of their nuclear installations, in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 6.

5.13   Article 8

Has been integrated into Articles 3 and 4 and has therefore been deleted from this place in the text.
5.14   Article 10

The title, ‘Priority to safety’ may lead to confusion since it suggests that Member States which do not adopt measures stricter than those set out in the directive are not giving priority to safety, or that the directive itself does not do so. The Committee proposes that the wording be changed to ‘Strengthening safety’.
5.15   Article 11

Article 11 concerns the submission of periodic reports on the impact of the directive to the Commission, which are both desirable and necessary. The Convention on Nuclear Safety already makes provision for reporting at specific intervals and the Committee considers that all reports should follow a common calendar, so as to simplify and coordinate procedures.
This article would then be worded as follows: ‘Member States shall report to the Commission on the implementation of this directive at the same time and at the same intervals as the national reports they submit to the review meetings of contracting parties to the Convention on nuclear safety. On the basis of these reports, the Commission shall present a report to the Council on progress made with the implementation of this Directive, accompanied, where appropriate, by legislative proposals’.
6.   Proposal for an appendix to the directive









6.1


The objective of the Appendix to the directive is:






—


to define obligations for nuclear operators that cannot be imposed by the directive since it is only binding on the Member States;










—


to define, on the basis of the IAEA’s ten fundamental principles, what the directive intends to make binding on the Member States.
















6.2


It incorporates six principles:












6.2.1


Member States shall ensure that responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the licence;












6.2.2


Responsibility and management for safety must be established at the highest levels of the enterprise;












6.2.3



Safety assessments shall be carried out from the beginning of the construction of a nuclear installation and throughout its lifetime;












6.2.4


Member States shall ensure that nuclear installations are optimised to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved;












6.2.5


Member States, without exception, shall ensure that all practical efforts are made to prevent and mitigate nuclear incidents and accidents;












6.2.6


Member States, without exception, shall ensure that arrangements are made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear accidents in accordance with Directive 96/29.





Brussels, 10 June 2009.

The President
of the European Economic and Social Committee
Mario SEPI




(1)  OJ C 185 of 14 August 1975, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 172 of 8 July 1992, p. 2.

(3)  COM(2004) 526 final (revised version).

(4)  OJ C 133 of 6.6.2003, p. 70–74.

(5)  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

(6)  OJ C 110 of 30.4.2004 pp 77-95.

(7)  An international convention negotiated in the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and signed by 40 of the 55 UNECE countries.

(8)  OJ C 175 of 28.7.2009, p. 1–7.

(9)  See the document of the European Nuclear Energy Forum's Sub-Group on Harmonisation on the Proposal for a European Directive on Nuclear Safety.


Appendix
to the opinion (TEN/377) of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety
COM(2008) 790 final — 2008/0231 (CNS)

APPENDIX TO THE DIRECTIVE
 (1)


SAFETY OBJECTIVE


The fundamental safety objective is to protect the workers and the general public from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, which may be caused by the nuclear installations

To ensure the protection of the workers and the general public, the nuclear installations shall be operated so as to achieve the highest standards of safety that can reasonably be achieved taking into account economical and social factors.
Besides the protection of people laid down in the Euratom Basic Standards (Directive 96/29), measures shall be taken






—


to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source and










—


to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.




The fundamental safety objective shall be taken into account for all nuclear installations and for all stages over the lifetime of the nuclear installation.

SAFETY PRINCIPLES


1.   Principle 1: Responsibility for safety


Each Member State shall ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.

Each Member State shall ensure that the licensee has implemented provisions for:






—


Establishing and maintaining the necessary competences;










—


Providing adequate training and information;










—


Establishing procedures and arrangements to maintain safety under all conditions;










—


Verifying appropriate design and the adequate quality of nuclear installations;










—


Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive material that is used, produced or stored;










—


Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive waste that is generated,




to fulfil the responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation.
These responsibilities shall be fulfilled in accordance with applicable safety objectives and requirements as established or approved by the regulator body, and their fulfilment shall be ensured through the implementation of a management system.

2.   Principle 2: Leadership and management for safety


Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in all organizations concerned with nuclear safety.









2.1


Leadership in safety matters shall be demonstrated at the highest levels in an organization. An effective management system shall be implemented and maintained, which has to integrate all elements of management so that requirements for safety are established and applied coherently with other requirements, including those for human performance, quality and security, and so that safety is not compromised by other requirements or demands.
The management system also shall ensure the promotion of a safety culture, the regular assessment of safety performance and the application of lessons learned from experience.












2.2


A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned shall be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes:






—


Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels;










—


Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety;










—


Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regard to safety.
















2.3


The management system shall recognize the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organizations. To prevent safety significant human and organizational failures, human factors shall be taken into account and good performance and good practices shall be supported.





3.   Principle 3: Assessment of Safety


Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments shall be carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its lifetime. A graded approach shall be used taking in account the magnitude of the potential risks arising from the nuclear installation.









3.1


The regulatory body shall require an assessment on nuclear safety for all nuclear installations, consistent with a graded approach. This safety assessment shall involve the systematic analysis of normal operation and its effects, of the ways in which failures might occur and of the consequences of such failures. The safety assessments shall cover the safety measures necessary to control the hazard, and the design and engineered safety features shall be assessed to demonstrate that they fulfil the safety functions required of them. Where control measures or operator actions are called on to maintain safety, an initial safety assessment shall be carried out to demonstrate that the arrangements made are robust and that they can be relied on. An authorization for a nuclear installation shall only be granted by a member state once it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the safety measures proposed by the licensee are adequate.












3.2


The required safety assessment shall be repeated in whole or in part as necessary later in the conduct of operations in order to take into account changed circumstances (such as the application of new standards or scientific and technological developments), the feedback of operating experience, modifications and the effects of ageing. For operations that continue over long periods of time, assessments shall be reviewed and repeated as necessary. Continuation of such operations shall be subject to these reassessments demonstrating that the safety measures remain adequate.












3.3


Within the required safety assessment precursors to accidents (an initiating event that could lead to accident conditions) shall be identified and analysed, and measures shall be taken to prevent the occurrence of accidents.












3.4


To further enhance safety, processes shall be put in place for the feedback and analysis of operating experience in own and other facilities, including initiating events, accident precursors, near misses, accidents and unauthorized acts, so that lessons may be learned, shared and acted upon.





4.   Principle 4: Optimization of safety


Member States shall ensure that nuclear installations are optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably practicable be achieved without unduly limiting their operation.









4.1


The optimization of safety shall require judgements to be made about the relative significance of various factors, including:






—


The likelihood of the occurrence of foreseeable events and the resulting consequences;










—


The magnitude and distribution of radiation doses received;










—


Economic, social and environmental factors arising from the radiation risks.










—


The optimization of safety also means using good practices and common sense as far as is practical in day to day activities.









5.   Principle 5: Prevention and mitigation


Member States shall ensure that all practical efforts are made to prevent and mitigate nuclear incidents and accidents in its nuclear installations.









5.1


Each Member State shall ensure, that the licensees engages all practical efforts:






—


to prevent the occurrence of abnormal conditions or incidents that could lead to a loss of control;










—


to prevent the escalation of any such abnormal conditions or incidents that do occur; and










—


to mitigate any harmful consequences of an accident,




by implementing ‘defence in depth’.












5.2


The application of the defence in depth concept shall ensure that no single technical, human or organizational failure could lead to harmful effects, and that the combinations of failures that could give rise to significant harmful effects are of very low probability.












5.3


Defence in depth shall be implemented through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would all have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to workers or the general public. The levels of defence in depth shall include:






a)


an adequate site selection










b)


an adequate design of the nuclear installation, consisting of






—


High quality of design and construction










—


High reliability of components and equipment










—


Control, limiting and protection systems and surveillance features










—


appropriate combination of engineered safety features














c)


an adequate organisation with






—


An effective management system with a strong management commitment to safety culture










—


Comprehensive operational procedures and practices










—


Comprehensive accident management procedures










—


Emergency preparedness arrangements













6.   Principle 6: Emergency preparedness and response


Members States shall ensure that arrangements are made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear installations accidents according to Directive 96/29.



(1)  This text incorporates part of the document of the European Energy Forum's Sub-Group on Harmonisation on the proposal for a European Directive on Nuclear Safety.