Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Communication on nuclear non-proliferation
Date: 2009-03-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: international security, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety, the EU's international role

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 26.3.2009 
COM(2009) 143 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Communication on nuclear non-proliferation 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Communication on nuclear non-proliferation 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  political  context  in  recent  years  has  led  the  international  community  to  focus 
attention  on  the  reduction  of  proliferation  risks  at  the  UN,  G8  and  in  other 
international  fora.  With  the  renewed  global  interest  in  nuclear  energy  and  the 
growing  number  of  countries  looking  into  possibilities  to  engage  a  civil  nuclear 
energy  programme,  there  is  an  even  clearer  need  to  strengthen  international 
guarantees of non-proliferation.  

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)1 sets out the general framework to address the 
non-proliferation  challenge  and  entrusts  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA) to play a key role in this area. The UN Security Council acts as authority of 
last resort to address the cases of major breaches to non-proliferation commitments. 

The  European  Union,  the  Community  and  their  Member  States  act,  within  their 
respective  competences,  in  multiple  ways  in  this  area,  comprising  actions  in  the 
framework  of  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  as  well  as  those 
founded on the Community Treaties. In this way, the EU can provide a considerable 
contribution to addressing the non-proliferation challenge also at global level, based 
on  its  extensive  experience  in  dealing  with  nuclear  power  and  the  range  of 
instruments at its disposal.  

In  its  recent  Communication  on  "Addressing  the  international  challenge  of  nuclear 
safety  and  security"2,  the  Commission  announced  that  it  would  address  to  the 
Council and the Parliament a specific Communication on the various EU instruments 
available  in  the  field  of  nuclear  non-proliferation,  in  particular  under  the  Euratom 
Treaty. 

The  purpose  of  this  Communication  is  therefore  to  set  out  the  global  context 
highlighting  the  need  for  strengthened  international  guarantees  of  non-proliferation 
(Section 2), to present the main available EU instruments in this field, in particular 
those under the Euratom Treaty, (Section 3), and the possible ways these instruments 
could  be  used  to  develop  –  in  close  coordination  with  the  IAEA  –  stronger 
international guarantees of non-proliferation (Section 4).  

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Opened for signature in July 1968, the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 189 parties 
have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. 
Commission Communication on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security", 
COM (2008) 312 final of 22.5.2008. 

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2. 

GLOBAL  CONTEXT:  THE  NEED  FOR  STRENGTHENED  INTERNATIONAL  GUARANTEES 
OF NON-PROLIFERATION  

Rising  energy  demand at global level, coupled  with concerns on security of supply 
and the recognition that there is a general need to reduce CO2 emissions in order to 
mitigate the effects of climate change, prompts a renewed interest in nuclear energy 
worldwide.  

From  the  outset  it  should  be  stated  that  the  international  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 
acknowledges  the  right  of  all  NPT  Parties  to  develop  and  use  nuclear  energy  for 
peaceful purposes.  

The proliferation risk from the use of nuclear energy essentially may come from two 
specific  nuclear  activities,  namely  enrichment  of  uranium  and  the  reprocessing  of 
spent  nuclear  fuel.  These  activities  require  very  complex  and  costly  technologies 
which  can  only  be  economically  justified  if  a  market  demand  exists  from  a  large 
number of nuclear power plants.  

In  the  present  context  of  growing  interest  for  nuclear  energy,  the  international 
community  must  do  everything  possible  to  minimize  the  risks  of  nuclear  security 
incidents and/or diversion of either nuclear materials or technology to non-peaceful 
uses. Therefore, the international community should ensure that conditions continue 
to be met regarding nuclear non-proliferation, including the norms of the NPT and of 
the IAEA.  

At global level, the key international actor in preventing nuclear proliferation is the 
IAEA  with  its  safeguards  activities  deriving  from  the  NPT  and  the  enhanced 
safeguards  regime  based  on  the  Comprehensive  Safeguards  Agreements  and 
Additional Protocols, and the right to possess fissile nuclear materials. Recent global 
actions  in  this  area  include  an  initiative  endorsed  by  the  G8  Summit  2008, 
highlighting  the  importance  of  non-proliferation/safeguards,  safety  and  security 
("3S")  in  the  development  of  nuclear  energy3;  the  US  initiative  Global  Nuclear 
Energy  Partnership  (GNEP),  the  International  Project  on  Innovative  Nuclear 
Reactors  and  Fuel  Cycles  (INPRO)  and  the  Global  Initiative  to  Combat  Nuclear 
Terrorism. 

In  addition  to  the  NPT,  a  United  Nations  Convention  was  adopted  in  2005 
concerning  the  suppression  of  acts  of  nuclear  terrorism4.  The  Nuclear  Suppliers 
Group  also  plays  a  significant  role  in  particular  through  the  implementation  of 
Guidelines for nuclear exports (see also Section 3.2). 

In  the  EU,  several  instruments  are  available  to  further  nuclear  non-proliferation 
objectives  (Section  3  below).  In  addition,  the  EU  has  the  world  technological 
leadership for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuels. In this context it 
is  important  to  highlight  that  the  European  markets  for  enriched  uranium  and  the 
reprocessing of spent fuel are competitive, reliable and transparent.  

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Report  on  International  Initiative  on 3S  Based  Nuclear Energy  Infrastructure, G8  Summit,  Hokkaido, 
Japan, 9.7.2008. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005. 

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In its Communication on "An Energy Policy for Europe"5, the Commission identified 
the  promotion  of  non-proliferation  as  one  of  the  key  priorities  to  be  pursued  by  an 
effective external EU energy policy. The importance of non-proliferation for the use 
and  future  development  of  nuclear  energy  was  reaffirmed  in  the  Communication 
updating the Nuclear Illustrative Programme6 in the context of the Second Strategic 
Energy  Review7.  In  this  respect,  the  Commission  highlighted  the  need  for 
strengthening  cooperation  between  Euratom  and  the  IAEA  in  order  to  achieve  the 
desired international effect. In this context, a Joint Statement was signed on 7 May 
2008  between  the  Commission  and  the  IAEA8  to  reinforce  mutual  cooperation  on 
nuclear energy. 

Recently  the  European  Parliament  reaffirmed  the  particular  importance  of  the 
Euratom  Treaty  in  connection  with  the  commitment  of  Member  States  which  use 
nuclear  energy  to  complying  with  international  security  and  non-proliferation 
standards9. 

3. 

MAIN EU INSTRUMENTS IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION AREA  

To  further  its  nuclear  non-proliferation  objectives,  the  EU  has  several  instruments 
available, mainly in the CFSP framework, the EC and the Euratom Treaty. 

In the context of the CFSP, non-proliferation is a key policy objective, in particular 
since 2003 when the EU adopted a European Security Strategy10 followed by the EU 
strategy  against  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD)11.  The 
report  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  Security  Strategy  approved  in 
December  200812,  together  with  the  New  Lines  for  Action  in  combating  the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction endorsed by the Council (GAERC) on 
8–9  December  200813,  confirmed  that  WMD  threats  have  further  increased  and 
remain  a  high  concern  on  the  EU  political  agenda.  It  is  clear  that  the  Commission 
will  play  an  important  role  in  implementing  the  New  Lines  for  Action  through 
different  Community  instruments  and  policies.  The  EU  has  also  provided  its  full 
backing to the UN Security Council Resolution 154014, and Council Joint Actions are 
on-going in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actions. 

Furthermore,  Community  instruments,  based  on  the  EC  Treaty  as  well  as  the 
Euratom  Treaty,  in  particular  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation 

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COM (2007) 1 final, 10.1.2007. 
COM(2008) 776 final, 13.11.2008. 
COM(2008) 781 final, 13.11.2008. 
Press release IP/08/719, 7.5.2008. 
European  Parliament  report  on  conventional  energy  sources  and  energy  technology,  A6-0348/2007 
final, 26.9.2007. 
"A Secure Europe in a Better World", adopted by the European Council on 12.12.2003. 
Council document 15708/03, 12.12.2003. 
Council document S407/08, 11.12.2008. 
Council document 17172/08, 17.12.2008. 
On  the  prevention  of  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  adopted  by  the  UN  Security 
Council on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004). 

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(INSC15), the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA16) and the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS17)  allow  for  non-proliferation  cooperation  with  third  countries.  Coherence  and 
synergies  among  all  EU  instruments,  and  particularly  with  the  Instrument  for 
Stability, is essential to support an effective implementation of the WMD strategy. 

Through  the  Instrument  for  Stability,  the  Commission  supports  third  countries  to 
develop  training  and  assistance  in  the  Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological  and 
Nuclear  (CBRN)  fields.  The  focus,  so  far,  has  been  on  the  countries  of  the  former 
Soviet  Union.  In  2009–2011,  EU  assistance  will  be  consolidated  there  while  being 
extended to new regions of concern, including South-East Asia, the Middle East and 
parts of Africa, in particular in the nuclear and biological fields. The implementation 
of the UNSC Resolution 1540 will be furthered by supporting the IAEA (nuclear fuel 
bank  initiative),  engaging  former  WMD  scientists,  tackling  nuclear  smuggling  – 
including deceptive financial practices – and contributing to a more efficient export 
control  system  and  border  monitoring.  Regional  CBRN  "centres  of  excellence", 
relying  on  JRC  expertise,  will  be  instrumental  in  this  context.  With  around  300 
million  EUR  for  the  period  2007–2013,  the  Instrument  for  Stability  is  a  major 
instrument  on  non-proliferation  seeking  to  develop  a  CBRN  safety  and  security 
culture throughout the world, together with other EU instruments. 

As  from  its  origins  the  main  objective  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  was  the  peaceful 
development  of  nuclear  energy.  Therefore  many  provisions  of  the  Treaty  cover 
activities and institutions which contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear materials, 
including at international level, where the Community may negotiate and enter into 
agreements  with  third  States  and  international  organizations  (Chapter  10  Euratom). 
The main Euratom related activities linked to the non-proliferation objective are the 
following: 

3.1. 

Safeguard activities 

Euratom Safeguards were established by Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty already a 
decade  before  the  NPT  was  opened  for  signature.  The  Commission  has  the 
responsibility  to  verify  that  fissile  nuclear  materials  (plutonium,  uranium  and 
thorium)  are  not  diverted  from  their  intended  uses  as  declared  by  the  Community 
users,  either  those  in  the  nuclear  industry  such  as  nuclear  reactor  operators  and 
operators of enrichment and reprocessing plants or those outside the nuclear industry, 
such as research centres and medical institutes. Nuclear safeguards (inspections and 
related  nuclear  material  accountancy)  form  the  first  line  of  defence  against  the 
diversion of nuclear materials from declared activities to non-peaceful purposes. 

Since the entry into force of the NPT, the IAEA has been given the role of ensuring 
that nuclear non-proliferation commitments are met at the global level.  

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Council  Regulation  (EURATOM)  No  300/2007  of  19  February  2007  establishing  an  Instrument  for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ L 81, 22.3.2007. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006. 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1717/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  15  November  2006 
establishing an Instrument for Stability, OJ L 327, 24.11.2006. 

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The  Euratom  safeguards  system  acts  as  a  collective  system  of  accounting  for  and 
control of nuclear material for all the EU Member States18, for internal purposes and 
under the safeguards agreements with the IAEA. These basic safeguards agreements 
have been concluded between Member States of the European Union, Euratom and 
the IAEA. 

Inspectors  from  the  IAEA  therefore  also  inspect  nuclear  facilities  in  the  EU.  Both 
IAEA and Euratom inspectorates work in close co-operation to apply safeguards in 
the  EU.  Inspection  activities  are  carried  out  in  full  coordination  using  common 
equipment.  Nonetheless,  each  inspectorate  draws  its  independent  conclusions  from 
inspection activities. 

The  close  co-operation  with  the  IAEA  extends  to  the  implementation  in  the 
Community of the Additional Protocols to the safeguards agreements with the IAEA, 
which  complement  the  IAEA  safeguards  system,  enabling  it  to  detect,  beyond 
diversion of declared materials, undeclared nuclear activities. 

An Additional Protocol to each of the respective safeguards agreements is in force in 
all  EU  Member  States.  The  Commission  closely  follows  the  transition  of  the  few 
remaining new Member States with respect to their adherence to the corresponding 
trilateral safeguards agreement including the Additional Protocol between Euratom, 
the IAEA and the non-nuclear-weapon States in the EU and the resulting suspension 
of their bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 

The Commission also supports the transfer of methodologies for safeguards through 
the  implementation  of  various  Community  instruments.  Since  the  mid  1990's,  the 
Commission's TACIS and now INSC programmes support in particular the transfer 
of  methodology  in  nuclear  material  accounting  in  the  CIS  countries,  and  the 
Commission is preparing to do the same in other third countries. 

3.2. 

Health and safety, physical protection, illicit trafficking and export controls 

On the  basis  of  the health and  safety provisions (Chapter 3 Euratom), there is well 
established  legislation  on  shipments  of  radioactive  substances  between  Member 
States19,  on  the  control  High-activity  Sealed  Radioactive  Sources  and  Orphan 
Sources20  and  the  Shipment  Directive21  complementing  it.  All  these  provide  for 
licensing,  authorisation  and  notification  procedures  which  aim  to  guarantee  that 
radioactive  materials  are  not  possessed,  used  or  transported  without  appropriate 
regulatory control. 

Moreover,  Euratom  has  acceded  to  the  international  Convention  on  the  Physical 
Protection  of  Nuclear  Material22,  and  negotiated  amendments  to  the  Convention 
regarding  matters  covered  by  Community  competence.  Physical  protection  extends 

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Including the nuclear material in the civil nuclear fuel cycle of the nuclear-weapon States. 
Council  Regulation  (Euratom)  No  1493/93,  of  8  June  1993,  on  shipments  of  radioactive  substances 
between Member States. OJ L 148, 19.6.1993. 
Council  Directive  2003/122/Euratom,  of  22  December  2003,  on  the  control  of  high-activity  sealed 
radioactive sources and orphan sources. OJ L 346, 31.12.2003. 
Council  Directive  2006/117/Euratom,  of  20  November  2006,  on  the  supervision  and  control  of 
shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. OJ L 337, 5.12.2006. 
INFCIRC/274/Rev.1 

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to  the  fields  of  transport  of  dangerous  goods  and  maritime  security,  which  are 
relevant for the transport of nuclear or radioactive materials. 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Commission  through  the  Instrument  for  Stability 
supports  projects  aiming  at  fighting  against  illicit  trafficking.  In  this  context,  the 
Border Management Working Group permits the coordination with the USA and the 
IAEA.  

The Council Regulation 1334/200023, which is directly applicable in Member States, 
is  the  Community  instrument  that  enables  Member  States  to  implement  their 
commitments to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Commission also participates in 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group as an observer and chairs the committee set up by the 
regulation,  which  addresses  all  implementation  issues.  The  Commission  regularly 
makes proposals to update and/or to better align this regulation with our international 
commitments. In 2006, the Commission proposed a reform of the Community regime 
of  export  controls  of  dual  use  items  in  order  to  strengthen  its  efficiency,  to 
criminalize the most serious violations and to align it on the provisions of UNSCR 
1540 regarding transit and brokering. 

Within the broader CBRN context, the Commission is in the process of developing a 
policy  on  CBRN  security  fully  taking  into  account  the  Council  Conclusions  of 
December  2007  on  addressing  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  risks. 
This  policy  is  expected  to  be  put  forward  in  mid-2009.  From  February  2008  to 
January 2009, a CBRN Task Force has been working at EU level in order to identify 
concrete  actions  which  need  to  be  taken  in  order  to  strengthen  CBRN  security  in 
Europe.  This  Task  Force  was  composed  of  experts  from  the  Member  State 
authorities, the private sector, Europol, Eurojust and the European institutions. 

3.3. 

Euratom Supply Agency 

The  current  contribution  of  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency24  to  non-proliferation 
consists mainly of the following: 

–  Authorising  the  conclusion  of  supply  contracts,  when  nuclear  materials  are 

physically imported into the Community or exported from the Community; 

–  Checking that supply contracts are concluded only for peaceful end-uses and that 

all supply contracts include a safeguards clause; 

–  Export  authorisation  procedures  for  nuclear  materials  produced 

Community25. 

in 

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Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual-use items and technology. 
Chapter 6 of the Treaty establishes the Supply Agency and provides for its right of option on materials, 
conclusion of supply contracts by the Agency and for security of supply.  
In  granting  its  authorisation  the  Commission  takes  into  account  in  particular  the  following  criteria: 
utilisation  for  non  explosive  purposes;  application  of  IAEA  guarantees;  application  of  physical 
protection measures; application of specific conditions for a retransfer to another non-nuclear-weapon 
third State, as well as for subsequent retransfers of this type. 

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Another important point is the possibility to create commercial or security stocks of 
nuclear materials, in accordance with Article 72 of the Euratom Treaty. 

The Community exercises the right of ownership with respect to "all special fissile 
materials  which  are  produced  or  imported  by  a  Member  State,  a  person  or  an 
undertaking  and  are  subject  to  the  safeguards"  (Chapter  8  of  the  Treaty).  With 
ownership comes also responsibility for safeguards in a broad sense which includes 
physical protection measures. 

3.4. 

Research and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 

The  specific  provisions  on  research  (Chapter  1  of  Euratom)  are  the  basis  for  all 
nuclear Community research programmes, among which proliferation resistance can 
be  addressed  in  the  development  of  innovative  reactor  concepts.  Beyond  specific 
safeguards-related  activities,  the  other  areas  of  the  Euratom  Research  and  Training 
Programme  are  also  open  for international cooperation, which  can be supportive to 
the non-proliferation objectives of this Communication. 

Established by the article 8 of the Euratom Treaty, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
has always been a major actor in support to both the Commission and the IAEA. The 
JRC has been entrusted with the development of methodologies and technologies for 
the  implementation  of  safeguards,  the  training  of  both  Commission  and  IAEA 
inspectors and the implementation of the European support programme to the IAEA.  

As leading body in the fight against illicit trafficking, the JRC was asked to assist in 
the transfer of the "acquis communautaire" to new Member States by training their 
authorities and experts during the enlargement process. 

The  establishment  of  the  two  on-site  laboratories  at  both  European  reprocessing 
facilities  in  France  and  the  UK  and  its  major  contribution  to  the  one  in  Japan,  in 
collaboration with the IAEA, has conferred to the JRC a recognised competence in 
the safeguarding of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Furthermore, the JRC has been 
entrusted  with  the  technical  implementation  of  the  TACIS  Programme  on  nuclear 
security. Starting in 1994, through the TACIS programme, the Commission has also 
provided a significant support to the Science and Technology Centres in Moscow26 
and Kiev27 which have the objective to limit the proliferation of sensitive knowledge 
obtained  by  scientists  in  the  framework  of  WMD  programmes.  Peaceful  research 
activities,  to  which  70 000  scientists  have  taken  part,  have  been  successfully 
supported.  Continued  support  to  programmes  for  the  redirection  of  weapons 
scientists in CIS countries and other regions is being provided by the Instrument for 
Stability. 

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27 

The International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow deals with the employment and 
redirection  of  former  weapons  scientists  from  Russia,  Armenia,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan.  It  is  operated  jointly  with  the  beneficiary  states  and  the  EU,  US,  Canada, 
Japan, Korea and Norway. 
The  Science  and  Technology  Centre  of  Ukraine  (STCU)  in  Kiev  deals  with  the  employment  and 
redirection of former weapons scientists from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. 
It is operated jointly with the beneficiary states and the EU, US and Canada. 

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4. 

THE POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD 

The  European  Union  could,  within  the  respective  competences,  develop  the 
following key actions in the field of non-proliferation: 

–  Strengthening  support  for  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  its  safeguards  and  the 

Additional Protocol;  

–  Extending  cooperation  with  key  nuclear  countries  through  bilateral  Euratom 
agreements,  in  coordination  with  measures  taken  on  the  basis  of  the  May  2008 
Communication28; 

–  Contributing to the development of an international system of guaranteed supply 
of  nuclear  fuel  for  countries  willing  to  develop  nuclear  energy  without  having 
their own nuclear fuel cycle facilities.  

4.1. 

Strengthening  the  support  for  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  and  nuclear 
safeguards 

A  key  priority  for  non-proliferation  is  to  maintain  and  intensify  the  support  for  the 
NPT and nuclear safeguards. 

The  European  Union,  the  Community  and  their  Member  States,  acting  within  their 
respective  competences,  should,  in  close  cooperation  with  the  IAEA,  pursue  their 
efforts to strengthen and promote the credibility of the NPT regime by developing a 
shared  approach  towards  the  risks  of  proliferation,  in  particular  towards  those 
countries  that  are  either  not  party  to  the  NPT  or  are  party  to  it  but  do  not  provide 
sufficient guarantees for its implementation. 

In this context concrete measures should also cover in particular the following areas, 
making full use of all available instruments in a complementary way: 

–  Reinforcing  an  international  framework  for  sensitive  activities  related  to  the 

nuclear fuel cycle; 

–  Contributing to the implementation of the "New lines for action by the European 
Union in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems", which 
include provisions with the view to strengthening export controls and reinforcing 
the capacity to fight illicit trafficking; 

–  Examining the most appropriate sanctions in case of violation of non proliferation 

commitments either by third countries or by EU exporters. 

The  European  Union,  the  Community  and  their  Member  States,  acting  within  their 
respective competences, could facilitate this process and strengthen their support for 
the NPT in all areas of their competence. Key measures could include: 

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Commission Communication on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security", 
COM (2008) 312 final, 22.5.2008. 

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–  Reinforced  cooperation  with  the  IAEA  in  the  field  of  international  safeguards, 
where  the  Commission  can  build  on  a  large  number  of  highly  trained  Euratom 
nuclear inspectors with experience of working jointly with the IAEA, and on its 
experience  in  applying  safeguards  on  civil  nuclear  material  in  nuclear-weapon 
States. 

–  Full  compliance  with  the  enhanced  NPT  regime  should  be  an  objective  when 
closer  cooperation  is  sought  between  the  Community  and  third  countries,  in 
particular for concluding bilateral Euratom cooperation agreements in the field of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Section 4.2). Instruments such as the Instrument 
for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC)  and  the  Instrument  for  Stability  (IfS) 
could be mobilised for assisting these countries within their respective domains; 

–  Full  compliance  with  the  enhanced  NPT  regime  should  be  an  important 
consideration when establishing multilateral fuel supply guarantees (Section 4.3). 

In future, it is expected that due to the increasing number of countries developing or 
wishing to develop a nuclear power programme, the IAEA will face a considerable 
challenge  that  will  mobilise  all  its  means.  Ways  could  be  sought  to  enhance  the 
Euratom technical support and assistance to the IAEA in its tasks, while respecting 
the competencies of both organisations. 

4.2. 

Extending  cooperation  with  key  nuclear  countries  through  bilateral  Euratom 
agreements 

Until now Euratom cooperation agreements in peaceful uses of nuclear energy have 
been concluded mainly with major suppliers (USA, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan) 
or customers (Japan). 

The  conclusion  of  a  bilateral  Euratom  cooperation  agreement  in  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy  should  become  a  priority  with  all  key  countries  wishing  to  have 
significant nuclear trade with the EU Member States and/or EU industry. Taking into 
account the renewed interest in nuclear energy, the EU could contribute by engaging 
Euratom  agreements  with  third  countries  to  guaranteeing  a  high  level  of  nuclear 
security  and  to  ensure  that  all  countries  are  committed  to  purely  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear energy. 

In the Euratom agreements various conditions are inserted regarding safeguards and 
the  Additional  Protocol  as  well  as  all  relevant  international  conventions  (covering 
such  aspects  as  nuclear  safety,  waste  management,  physical  protection).  When 
negotiating and signing Euratom international agreements, the Community will thus 
seek to obtain the adherence of its partners to all relevant international conventions. 

Likewise,  in  all  new  Euratom  agreements,  or  when  amending  existing  agreements, 
the  Community  seeks  commitments  from  the  other  Party  that  all  transfers  of 
materials or equipment covered by the agreement, are done according to the Nuclear 
Suppliers  Group  guidelines.  In  this  way,  conditions  could  be  attached  for  the 
retransfer of Community origin products to third countries, thus reducing the risk of 
diversion of materials or technology to unwanted destinations. 

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4.3. 

Contributing  to  the  development  of  an  international  system  of  guaranteed 
supply  of  nuclear  fuel  for  countries  willing  to  develop  nuclear  energy  without 
having their own nuclear fuel cycle facilities 

The  reduction  of  the  proliferation  risk  requires  a  strict  control  of  the  nuclear  fuel 
cycle. At the same time, it is important to grant legitimate access to nuclear fuel to 
countries willing to develop nuclear energy under safe and secure conditions. In this 
context  various  proposals,  including  from  Member  States,  have  been  made 
concerning  guaranteed  supply  of  nuclear  fuel  for  countries  that  forego  having  their 
own nuclear fuel cycle facilities. 

The  European  Union  could  make  a  significant  contribution  to  international 
cooperation  in  this  field,  since  Europe  has  the  most  advanced  and  secure 
technologies  in  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle,  especially  in  uranium  enrichment  and 
reprocessing  activities  which  are  the  most  sensitive  parts  in  terms  of  proliferation 
risks. 

In this regard, the Council in its conclusions on 8 December 200829 took the decision 
in principle to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank under the control of 
the IAEA, to which the European Union could contribute up to 25 million EUR, once 
the  conditions  and  modalities  for  the  bank  have  been  defined  and  approved  by  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  IAEA.  At  the  same  time,  the  Council  welcomed  the 
readiness  of  the  Commission  to  contribute  to  this  project  through  relevant 
Community  instruments.  In  order  to  speed  up  the  decision  making  process,  a 
mandate  could  be  given  to  the  Commission  to  contribute  to  the  definition  of  the 
conditions and modalities for establishing the fuel bank. One of the main advantages 
of a multilateral approach would be to encourage new market entrants to voluntarily 
abstain from making complex and costly investments which are disproportionate to 
their needs, while bringing additional guarantees to fuel supply security. 

In actively contributing to the development of such an initiative, the European Union 
could  make full  use  of  available  Euratom30 and other Community instruments such 
as the Instrument for Stability and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety and should take 
into account both the provisions of international agreements, the Euratom Treaty and 
the good functioning of the European nuclear market. 

Since  the  security  of  supply  for  nuclear  fuels  is  essential  for  guaranteeing  non-
proliferation,  in  particular  to  prevent  the  spread  of  sensitive  technologies,  such  as 
enrichment, the Euratom Supply Agency should become a key actor in this process.  

29 
30 

2914th General Affairs Council meeting, 8 December 2008. 
The  provisions  on  joint  undertakings  (Chapter  5  Euratom)  could  provide  a  possible  model  for  the 
establishment  of  a  multilateral  nuclear  cycle  facility. The  participation by  third  states  or  international 
organisations  in  the  financing  or  management  of  Joint  Undertakings  is  expressly  foreseen,  thereby 
permitting the participation of non-EU parties. 

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