Special Report No 4/2009#The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC development cooperation
Date: 2009-03-19
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: Cotonou Agreement, EU law, cooperation policy, development aid, development policy, opinion of the Court of Auditors

EUROPEAN COURT 
OF AUDITORS

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THE COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT
OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ 
INVOLVEMENT IN EC DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION

EN

 
 
 
 
Special Report No 4  

 2009

THE COMMISSION’S 
MANAGEMENT 
OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS’ INVOLVEMENT 
IN EC DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION

(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC)

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

2

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi
1615 Luxembourg
LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-45410
Fax +352 4398-46430
E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu
Internet: http://www.eca.europa.eu

Special Report No 4  

 2009

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009

ISBN 978-92-9207-273-5

© European Communities, 2009

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Belgium

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

CONTENTS

3

Paragraph

I–VII 

1–12 

1–4 

5–6 

7–9 

10–12 
10 
11–12 

13–17 

18–83 

18–35 

20–29 
30–35 

36–68 

37–41 
42–50 
51–62 
63–68 

69–83 
70–74 
75–83 

84–92 

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 INTRODUCTION

 CONTEXT OF THE AUDIT

 BUDGETARY SIGNIFICANCE

 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

 KEY DOCUMENTS
 THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON DEVELOPMENT
 COMMUNICATIONS AND GUIDELINES

 AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

 OBSERVATIONS

 DOES THE COMMISSION ADEQUATELY ENSURE THAT NSAs ARE INVOLVED EFFECTIVELY 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROCESS?
 PREPARATION OF COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS
 THEMATIC PROGRAMME ON NON-STATE ACTORS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

 DO THE COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EFFICIENTLY ENSURE THAT ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED 
BY NSAs ARE RELEVANT AND LIKELY TO PRODUCE THE INTENDED RESULTS?
  SELECTION PROCEDURES
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION PROCEDURES
 MONITORING INCLUDING TOOLS AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NSA ACTIVITIES
 PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

 DOES THE COMMISSION ADEQUATELY ENSURE THE PROVISION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT TO NSAs?
 STRATEGY FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF NSAs
 PROGRAMMES ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF NSAs

 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I — CONTRACTED AMOUNTS WITH NSAs

ANNEX II — MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT RELATED TO NSAs

ANNEX III — LIST OF THE PROGRAMMES, PROJECTS AND LOCAL CALLS FOR PROPOSALS EXAMINED

ANNEX IV — DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACTORS VISITED ON THE SPOT

REPLY OF THE COMMISSION

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

5

ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)

ALA: Asia(n) and Latin America(n)

CONCORD: European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development

CRIS: Common RELEX information system (computer application)

CSO: Civil society organisation

CSP: Country strategy paper

DCI: Development cooperation instrument

EC: European Community

EDF: European Development Funds

EIDHR: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights

ENGO: European NGO

ENPI: European neighbourhood and partnership instrument

EU: European Union

EuropeAid: European Commission’s Cooperation Office

Logframe: Logical framework matrix

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

NSA: Non-state actor

PADOR: Potential applicant data online registration (computer application)

RELEX: Directorate-General for External Relations

Southern NSAs: NSAs from the beneficiary countries (the South)

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

6

EXECUTIVE 
REPLY OF THE 
SUMMARY
COMMISSION

I.
The  term  ‘non-state  actors’  (NSAs),  as  used 
in  this  report,  covers  all  aspects  of  society 
that  do  not  form  part  of  the  private  sector 
o r   t h e   s t a t e ,   i n c l u d i n g   n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l 
organisations  (NGOs) 1.  The  Cotonou  Agree-
m e n t   w i t h   t h e   A C P   g r o u p   o f   s t a t e s ,   a n d 
E U   l e g i s l a t i o n ,   p r o v i d e   f o r   s u c h   n o n - s t a t e 
actors to play multiple roles in development 
cooperation, notably participating in policy 
dialogue  as  well  as  implementing  projects. 
Support  for  capacity  development  is  envis-
aged  to  help  NSAs  to  fulfil  these  roles.  The 
EU funds directly attributed to NSAs in 2007 
were  approximately  915  million  euro,  10  % 
o f   t h e   t o t a l   a i d   t o   d e v e l o p i n g   c o u n t r i e s 
(general budget and EDF).

II.
T h e   C o u r t ’ s   a u d i t   c o n s i d e r e d   t h e   t w o 
m a i n   r o l e s   o f   N S A s   a n d   a s k e d   w h e t h e r   t h e 
Commission:

 —

 —

a d e q u a t e l y   e n s u r e s   t h a t   N S A s   a r e 
involved effectively in the development 
cooperation process;

h a s   e f f i c i e n t   m a n a g e m e n t   s y s t e m s   t o 
e n s u r e   t h a t   a c t i v i t i e s   i m p l e m e n t e d   b y 
NSAs are relevant and likely to produce 
the intended results;

 —

a d e q u a t e l y   e n s u r e s   t h e   p r o v i s i o n   o f 
capacity development to NSAs.

1 

In the Cotonou Agreement the definition of non-

state actors also includes the private sector. This report, 

however, takes the usage of the Development Cooperation 

Instrument (DCI — Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the 

European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 

2006 establishing a financing instrument for development 

cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41)), which excludes 

profit-making bodies. Article 24(2) of the DCI gives a fuller 

list of types of organisation. Although there is evident 

wide agreement on the typical characteristics of NGOs, 

there is no uniform definition (the United Nations and 

the World Bank both publish working definitions), and 

none was needed in order to carry out this audit since it 

is more useful to apply the broader concept of NSAs in 

development (equivalent to civil society as a whole).

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

7

EXECUTIVE 
REPLY OF THE 
SUMMARY
COMMISSION

VII.
The report’s main recommendations are that 
the Commission should:

 —

 —

strengthen  and  provide  more  guidance 
on  its  procedures  for  involving  NSAs  in 
the development cooperation process;

c o n t i n u e   m e a s u r e s   a l r e a d y   i n   t r a i n 
t o   i m p r o v e   t h e   C a l l   f o r   P r o p o s a l s 
procedure;

 —

enhance the targeting of monitoring and 
support by Delegations;

 —

 —

 —

 —

ensure sufficient guidance for both Dele-
g a t i o n   a n d   N S A   s t a f f   o n   p e r f o r m a n c e 
indicators;

t o   i m p r o v e   s u s t a i n a b i l i t y ,   c o n s i d e r 
using a mix of instruments (and not only 
projects) when working with NSAs;

d e v e l o p   a   s t r a t e g y   f o r   c a p a c i t y   d e v e l -
o p m e n t   o f   N S A s   i n   A L A   c o u n t r i e s   a n d 
reconsider  the  disparity  in  approach  as 
between ACP and ALA countries;

e x a m i n e   a d d i t i o n a l   w a y s   o f   d e l i v e r i n g 
t h e   c a p a c i t y - d e v e l o p m e n t   p o l i c y   a i m s 
such  as  use  of  partnership  agreements, 
m u l t i - d o n o r   f u n d i n g ,   a n d   c a s c a d i n g 
g r a n t s   i n   o r d e r   t o   b e t t e r   r e a c h   g r a s s -
roots organisations.

III.
T h e   C o u r t   f o u n d   t h a t ,   d e s p i t e   t h e   C o m -
m i s s i o n ’ s   a t t e m p t s   t o   i n v o l v e   N S A s   i n   t h e 
d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n   p r o c e s s ,   t h i s 
involvement has been limited and falls short 
o f   t h e   s u s t a i n e d   a n d   s t r u c t u r e d   d i a l o g u e 
envisaged by the EU legislation and the Com-
mission’s own guidelines (see  paragraphs 18 
to 35).

IV.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n ’ s   m a n a g e m e n t   s y s t e m s 
generally ensure that projects implemented 
by  NSAs  are  relevant  and  are  likely  to  pro-
d u c e   t h e   i n t e n d e d   r e s u l t s .   B u t   t h e   C a l l   f o r 
proposals procedure does not always assure 
timely completion of project design, there is 
insufficient  guidance  for  NSAs  on  the  prac-
tical  application  of  the  financial  rules,  and 
t h e r e   a r e   i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s   i n   t h e   i n  t e r  p r e t -
ation  and  application  of  procedures.  There 
is insufficient monitoring, and prospects for 
sustainability are poor partly because of the 
s h o r t   p r o j e c t   d u r a t i o n   ( s e e   p a r a g r a p h s   3 6 
to 68).

V.
C a p a c i t y - d e v e l o p m e n t   p r o g r a m m e s   a r e 
developed and form part of a strategy in most 
A C P   c o u n t r i e s ,   w h e r e ,   u n d e r   t h e    C o t o n o u 
Agreement,  they  are  implemented  in  coop-
eration with the partner governments. How-
ever there is a significant disparity between 
t h i s   a p p r o a c h   a n d   t h a t   i n   A s i a n   a n d   L a t i n 
A m e r i c a n   b e n e f i c i a r y   c o u n t r i e s ,   f o r   w h i c h 
strategies have not yet been developed (see 
paragraphs 69 to 74).

VI.
T h e   f i r s t   r o u n d   o f   c a p a c i t y - d e v e l o p m e n t 
programmes  were  found  to  be  highly  rele-
vant to the needs of NSAs in the beneficiary 
countries. However, they did not reach their 
full  potential  mainly  because  management 
procedures led to delays that worsened the 
prospects for effectiveness and sustainabil-
ity. The programmes are also faced with the 
inherent contradiction of supporting capac-
i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t   o f   t h e   N S A s   m o s t   i n   n e e d 
by  means  of  a  procedure  (Calls  for  Propos-
a l s )   w h i c h   i s   d e s i g n e d   t o   s e l e c t   t h e   b e s t -
performing NSAs (see paragraphs 75 to 83).

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

8

CONTEXT OF THE AUDIT

The EU’s approach to development cooperation, reflecting the evolv-
ing international consensus, has undergone a series of changes over 
the  last  decade,  both  at  the  policy  level  and  as  regards  funding.  EC 
policy  now  involves,  to  varying  degrees,  a  range  of  partners  whose 
characteristics and roles have progressively developed. The Commis-
sion  works  increasingly  in  partnership  with  a  large  range  of  bodies 
including, or representing, non-state actors.

2  One main reason was that 

European NGOs had better 

capacity to deal with the 

Commission requirements than 

NSAs from beneficiary countries, 

which were formerly rather sparse 

and weak.

3  Capacity development is 

the process by which people 

and organisations create and 

strengthen their ability to perform 

tasks and produce outputs, to 

define and solve problems, and to 

make informed choices over time.

The term ‘non-state actors’ (NSAs) covers all aspects of society that do not 
form part of the private sector or the state. In the field of development 
cooperation,  non-state  actors  include  non-governmental  organisa-
tions (NGOs) and also community-based organisations, farmers’ asso-
ciations, business or professional associations, environmental groups, 
universities,  trade  unions,  chambers  of  commerce,  and  foundations 
as well as churches or faith groups. The term non-state actors is often 
used as a synonym of civil society organisations, and it is in that sense 
that it will be used in this report (see also footnote 1 in the Executive 
Summary).  In  the  past,  NGOs  and  in  particular  European  NGOs  were 
the EU’s main NSA partners 2. However, there is now a strong emphasis 
on  involving  NSAs  from  the  partner  or  beneficiary  countries  (often 
called ‘Southern NSAs’).

NSAs fulfil a variety of functions in the EU development cooperation 
field as a whole, of which the two main roles are:

(a) 

policy dialogue, encompassing all representational, advocacy and 
watchdog functions vis-à-vis governments and donors;

(b) 

implementation of development programmes and projects which 
directly provide benefits for the poor.

The legislation envisages the Commission working with NSAs in three 
main  ways:  by  enhancing  their  policy  dialogue  role  through  involv-
ing  them  in  its  development  cooperation;  by  funding  development 
p r o g r a m m e s   a n d   p r o j e c t s   i m p l e m e n t e d   b y   N S A s ;   a n d   b y   s u p p o r t -
i n g   c a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t 3,   m a i n l y   f o r   S o u t h e r n   N S A s ,   t o   e n a b l e 
them  to  play  both  roles.  Under  the  devolution  process,  Commission 
D e l e g a t i o n s   n o w   p l a y   t h e   l e a d i n g   r o l e   i n   r e l a t i o n s   w i t h   N S A s   a n d 
m a n a g e   a b o u t   8 0   %   ( b y   n u m b e r )   o f   t h e   p r o g r a m m e s   a n d   p r o j e c t s 
concerned.

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

 
 
 
 
9

5. 

6. 

BUDGETARY SIGNIFICANCE

It is difficult to trace the financial flow of the EC funds channelled through 
N S A s   a s   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   l a c k s   c o m p r e h e n s i v e   d a t a 4.   N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
d e v e l o p m e n t   f u n d s   d i r e c t l y   a t t r i b u t e d   t o   N S A s   w i t h   n o   i n t e r m e d i -
ary 5 have gradually increased over the last decade, reaching, in 2007, 
approximately  10  %  of  the  combined  general  budget  and  European 
Development  Fund  (EDF)  aid  to  developing  countries  (see  Graph  1 
and Annex I).

Traditionally, EC support to NSAs has been mainly provided by the the-
matic  budget  lines 6,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  through  the  geographic 
b u d g e t   l i n e s 7  a n d   t h e   E D F   ( A n n e x   I ) .   T h e   m a i n   f u n d i n g   s o u r c e   h a s 
b e e n   t h e   ‘ C o - f i n a n c i n g   w i t h   N G O s ’   p r o g r a m m e   ( t h e n   r e s t r i c t e d   t o 
E u r o p e a n   N G O s )   w h i c h ,   e s t a b l i s h e d   i n   1 9 7 6   w i t h   2 , 5   m i l l i o n   e u r o , 
rose  to  about  200  million  euro/year  in  the  mid-1990s,  representing 
23 % of the total funding from the Commission to NSAs in 2007.

G R A P H   1

EVOLUTION OF PAYMENTS MADE TO NSAs* 
DURING THE PERIOD 2000–07

o
r
u
e

n
o

i
l
l
i

m
n

i

1 000

800

600

400

200

0

4  See paragraph 52.

5  Excluding humanitarian and 

emergency aid (see paragraph 17) 

and excluding grants to 

international organisations (which 

may ultimately use NGOs/NSAs 

for implementing actions).

6  Thematic programmes are 

specific subjects or types of 

development activity, which are 

specifically provided for by the 

legislation and are programmed 

separately from the geographic 

programmes. They include: 

human and social development; 

environment and sustainable 

management of natural resources, 

including energy; non-state actors 

and local authorities; food security; 

and migration and asylum.

7  Geographic programmes 

encompass the cooperation in 

development activity with partner 

countries and regions, determined 

on a geographical basis.

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

EDF

Budget

Total

Year

*  EU spending directly to development NSAs as first recipients of the payment.

Source: Commission Services.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

 
 
 
 
10

8  OJ L 213, 30.7.1998, p. 1.

9  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006.

10  Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 

of the European Parliament and 

of the Council of 24 October 

2006 laying down general 

provisions establishing a European 

Neighbourhood and Partnership 

Instrument (OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, 

p. 1).

7. 

8. 

9. 

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Commission has for many years funded European NGOs’ own ini-
t i a t i v e s   ( u n d e r   c o - f i n a n c i n g   p r o c e d u r e s )   a s   w e l l   a s   u s i n g   N G O s   a s 
implementers of EU aid. Council Regulation (EC) No 1658/98 8 set out 
the rules on co-financing operations with European NGOs in fields of 
interest to the developing countries.

As regards the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, the 
Cotonou  Agreement,  signed  in  June  2000,  introduced  a  substantial 
reorientation in the relationship between the EU and NSAs. The ACP 
countries and the European Community legally committed themselves 
to involving NSAs in all phases of the cooperation process (formula-
tion, implementation, review and evaluation) and to providing funds 
f o r   s t r e n g t h e n i n g   t h e   c a p a c i t y   o f   N S A s   t o   e n a b l e   t h e m   t o   p l a y   t h e 
new role of partners in development cooperation (see Annex II).

For other countries, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 9 and 
t h e   E u r o p e a n   N e i g h b o u r h o o d   a n d   P a r t n e r s h i p   I n s t r u m e n t   ( E N P I ) 1 0, 
which  replaced  the  existing  regulations  from  January  2007,  contain 
specific provisions dealing with the role of NSAs in development. The 
DCI also includes a new thematic programme for non-state actors and 
local  authorities  in  development,  of  which  the  main  objective  is  to 
provide capacity development (replacing the previous ‘Co-financing 
with NGOs’ programme — see paragraph 6).

B O X   1

THE ‘EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON DEVELOPMENT’ — 
PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

‘Th  e EU supports the broad participation of all stakeholders in countries’ development and encourages all parts of society 
to take part. Civil society, including economic and social partners such as trade unions, employers’ organisations and 
the private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors of partner countries in particular play a vital role as promoters of 
democracy, social justice and human rights. Th  e EU will enhance its support for building capacity of non-state actors 
in order to strengthen their voice in the development process and to advance political, social and economic dialogue. 
Th  e important role of European civil society will be recognised as well; to that end, the EU will pay particular attention 
to development education and raising awareness among EU citizens.’

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

 
 
 
11  As explained in paragraph 2, 

NSAs is used here as synonym 

of civil society.

12  The standards are set out 

in the conclusions of the 

Commission’s Communication 

on the participation of non-state 

actors in EC development policy 

(COM(2002) 598 final).

11

KEY DOCUMENTS

THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON DEVELOPMENT

10. 

In December 2005, with the ‘European Consensus on Development’ the EU 
made a high-level political declaration which recognises and strength-
ens the principle of participation of NSAs in countries’ development, 
and made a commitment to support developing the capacity of NSAs 
to fill this role 11.

COMMUNICATIONS AND GUIDELINES

11. 

In May 2003, the Council adopted 12 a certain range of standards that 
C o m m i s s i o n   s e r v i c e s   s h o u l d   m e e t   i n   o r d e r   t o   a s s u r e   a n   a d e q u a t e 
level of NSA consultation and participation:

(a) 

promotion of NSA involvement in the preparation of the National 
Development Strategy or poverty strategy papers by the national 
authorities;

(b) 

N S A s   s h o u l d   b e   c o n s u l t e d   s y s t e m a t i c a l l y   t h r o u g h o u t   t h e 
 programming process;

(c) 

all areas of interest should be represented in consultations;

(d) 

c l e a r   a n d   c o m p r e h e n s i v e   i n f o r m a t i o n   t o   b e   p r o v i d e d   t o   N S A s 
i n   g o o d   t i m e   s o   a s   t o   a l l o w   t h e m   t o   p r e p a r e   t h e i r   e f f e c t i v e 
participation;

(e) 

c a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t   i s   e s s e n t i a l   t o   e n a b l e   N S A s   t o   p l a y   a 
 constructive role in the development process;

(f) 

enhanced coordination with Member States and other donors;

(g) 

t h e   E C   t o   c o n t i n u e   t o   e n c o u r a g e   N S A s   t o   p a r t i c i p a t e   i n   t h e 
 implementation of cooperation projects and programmes;

(h) 

the  EC  to  keep  its  existing  relations  with  NSAs  as  implementing 
partners and as implementers of their own initiatives.

12. 

In November 2004 the Commission released guidelines for all Commis-
sion  Delegations  on  NSA  involvement  in  the  development  process, 
which  complement  those  already  issued  for  ACP  Delegations.  These 
guidelines apply to the 2007–13 Country Strategy Papers.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

 
 
 
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

12

13. 

The Court’s audit addressed the Commission’s management of NSAs’ 
involvement  in  development  cooperation,  taking  into  account  their 
t w o   m a i n   r o l e s ,   a s   p a r t n e r s   i n   E C   d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n   a n d   a s 
i m p l e m e n t i n g   a c t o r s   ( s e e   p a r a g r a p h   3 ) .   T h e   a u d i t   a p p r o a c h e d   t h i s 
through the three following questions:

(a) 

Does  the  Commission  adequately  ensure  that  NSAs  are  involved 
effectively in the development cooperation process?

(b) 

Do the Commission’s management systems efficiently ensure that 
activities implemented by NSAs are relevant and likely to produce 
the intended results?

(c) 

Does the Commission adequately ensure the provision of capacity 
development to NSAs?

14. 

15. 

The Court took as a starting point the standards and guidelines referred 
to in paragraphs 11 and 12 above. They set out an approved basis for 
t h e   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   o f   t h e   E U ’ s   p o l i c y   t o   e n s u r e   N S A   p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
in EC development cooperation, and therefore serve as overall audit 
criteria for this audit.

T h e   m a i n   a u d i t   w o r k   c a r r i e d   o u t   t o   a n s w e r   t h e s e   q u e s t i o n s   w a s   a s 
follows:

(a) 

a  review  of  documentation  on  EC  policy  and  programming  con-
c e r n i n g   N S A s ,   t o g e t h e r   w i t h   r e p o r t s   o n   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   ( s e e 
paragraph 24);

(b) 

on-the-spot  missions  to  Commission  Delegations  in  Bangladesh, 
E t h i o p i a ,   P e r u   a n d   S o u t h   A f r i c a   t o   e x a m i n e   C o m m i s s i o n   p r o -
c e d  u r e s   a n d   a c t i v i t i e s   i n c l u d i n g   f i v e   p r o g r a m m e s   o f   c a p a c i t y -
development support, seven local calls for proposals and 16 indi-
vidual projects (see Annex III);

(c) 

desk reviews covering two programmes of capacity-development 
support in Mali and Uganda;

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(d) 

interviews  with  more  than  60  local  and  international  NSAs,  with 
central and local authorities in partner countries, technical assist-
ance  units  and  other  donors,  and  with  some  European  NSA  plat-
f o r m s   a n d   n e t w o r k s ,   t o   c o l l e c t   i n f o r m a t i o n   o n   t h e   l e v e l   o f   N S A 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n   i n   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n   p r o c e s s ,   a n d   o n 
their experience of the Commission’s procedures to support such 
participation (see Annex IV);

(e) 

benchmarking  with  the  development  assistance  agencies  of  the 
Netherlands and Sweden.

The audit covered consultation with NSAs from the year 2000 onwards 
(date of signature of the Cotonou Agreement), together with a sample 
of projects and programmes that were in progress in 2007.

13  The last three annual reports of 

the Court on the implementation 

of the budget (2007: Chapter 8, 

External aid, Development and 

Enlargement; 2006 and 2005: 

Chapter 8, External actions), and 

on the activities funded by the 

European Development Funds 

(concerning the financial years 

2005, 2006 and 2007), and the 

Special Report No 10/2008 — 

EC Development Assistance to 

Health Services in sub-Saharan 

Africa (http://www.eca.europa.eu).

16. 

17. 

The results of recent Court audits involving observations on NSAs in 
d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n 1 3  w e r e   a l s o   t a k e n   i n t o   a c c o u n t ,   a s   w e l l 
a s   t h e   r e c e n t   C o m m i s s i o n   I n t e r n a l   A u d i t   S e r v i c e   a u d i t   o n   N G O s   i n 
 E u r o p e A i d   a n d   i t s   f o l l o w - u p .   T h e   a u d i t   a l s o   t o o k   i n t o   a c c o u n t   t h e 
fact  that  the  Commission  is  currently  carrying  out  an  evaluation  of 
EC  aid  delivery  through  civil  society  organisations.  According  to  its 
terms of reference, the evaluation focuses on NSAs as implementers 
(channels by which EC aid is delivered). The Court’s audit has exam-
ined the broader question of the Commission’s involvement of NSAs 
in all phases of EU development cooperation.

The audit focused on the NSA roles in development cooperation and 
d i d   n o t   e x t e n d   t o   h u m a n i t a r i a n   o r   e m e r g e n c y   a i d ,   b e c a u s e   t h a t   i s 
a  separate  field  with  specific  strategy  and  management  systems.  It 
did  not  include  comparison  between  various  channels  (private  sec-
tor, UN, banking systems) in the field of efficiency and effectiveness, 
n o r   c o m p a r a t i v e   a n a l y s i s   o f   t h e   i m p a c t   o f   N S A   a c t i o n s   i n   v a r i o u s 
 intervention sectors.

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OBSERVATIONS

14

18. 

19. 

DOES THE COMMISSION ADEQUATELY ENSURE 
THAT NSAs ARE INVOLVED EFFECTIVELY 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROCESS?

The systematic involvement of NSAs in development cooperation is widely 
r e c o g n i s e d   a s   a   m e a n s   o f   p r o m o t i n g   o w n e r s h i p   a n d   p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
core  principles  of  EU  development  policy,  and  of  tapping  practical 
local knowledge and experience as an input to programming. This is 
reflected in policy as stated in the ‘European Consensus on Develop-
ment’ (see Box 1).

14  Communication from the 

Commission: General principles 

and minimum standards for 

consultation of interested parties 

by the Commission, COM(2002) 

704 final, 11.12.2002.

In order to assess the adequacy of the Commission’s involvement of 
NSAs,  the  Court  examined  two  fundamental  consultation  processes 
concerning:

(a) 

t h e   p r e p a r a t i o n   o f   c o u n t r y   s t r a t e g y   p a p e r s   f o r   A C P ,   A s i a n   a n d 
Latin American countries;

(b) 

t h e   p r e p a r a t i o n   o f   t h e   s t r a t e g y   p a p e r   f o r   t h e   n e w   t h e m a t i c 
 programme for NSAs and local authorities in development.

PREPARATION OF COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS

20. 

The  Court  assessed  the  existence  of  a  sustained  and  structured  dia-
logue, the completeness of the guidelines for consulting NSAs (para-
graph 12), and the level of compliance with these guidelines and with 
the  Commission’s  general  principles  and  standards  for  consultation 
of interested parties 14:

(a) 

the existence of clear institutional mechanisms;

(b) 

the inclusion of relevant NSAs;

(c) 

that the time provided for NSA participation was sufficient;

(d) 

the adequacy of the preparatory process;

(e) 

w h e t h e r   c l e a r   f e e d b a c k   o n   t h e   r e s u l t s   o f   t h e   d i a l o g u e   w a s 
given;

(f) 

t h e   e x i s t e n c e   o f   s u f f i c i e n t   E C   r e s o u r c e s   f o r   a n   e f f e c t i v e 
dialogue.

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15  COM(2000) 212 final, 

the European Community’s 

Development Policy, point 5.2.

21. 

22. 

NSAS’ INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS DOES NOT MEET THE GUIDELINES

Although it was already EC policy to consult with NSAs 15, in three of 
t h e   f o u r   c o u n t r i e s   a u d i t e d   ( t h e   e x c e p t i o n   w a s   S o u t h   A f r i c a ) ,   l i t t l e 
e v i d e n c e   w a s   f o u n d   o f   N S A   i n v o l v e m e n t   i n   t h e   p r e p a r a t i o n   o f   t h e 
2 0 0 2 – 0 6   c o u n t r y   s t r a t e g y   p a p e r s   ( C S P s )   d u e   t o   l a c k   o f   a d e q u a t e 
records  at  Commission  Delegations.  In  South  Africa  there  had  been 
limited consultations. Since then, there has been a genuine attempt, 
in Ethiopia, starting with the joint annual reviews of the strategy from 
2004  and  continuing  with  the  2007–13  CSP,  to  operate  a  sustained 
and  structured  tripartite  dialogue  between  the  government,  the  EC 
and representatives of NSAs (see Box 2).

By contrast, in Bangladesh and Peru — and as before in South Africa — 
the  Delegations  did  not  systematically  involve  NSAs  in  the  2007–13 
programming process except for holding ad hoc consultations. These 
typically  took  the  form  of  one-day  seminars  at  which  presentations 
were made and ideas gathered from the NSAs present, rather than a 
sustained dialogue. Moreover, in Peru and South Africa, no evidence 
was found that the results of these consultations were incorporated 
in the country strategy papers. The audit noted other weaknesses in 
the consultation process: there was an absence of clear mechanisms 
for managing the consultations (e.g. absence of an action plan with 
a stable and predictable schedule of consultations over time), delays 
i n   d i s t r i b u t i n g   d o c u m e n t s ,   l a t e   i n v i t a t i o n s ,   c o n s u l t a t i o n s   a t   a   l a t e 
stage in the programming process, limited choice of NSAs, difficulty 
for NSAs to comment on the proposals, and insufficient feedback to 
NSAs on the results of the consultations.

B O X   2

EXAMPLE OF A GOOD APPROACH TO STRUCTURING DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT, THE EC AND NSAs

Ethiopia: the Cotonou Task Force

In 2003, a group of national and international NGOs and networks operating in Ethiopia organised themselves into the 
so-called Cotonou Task Force (CTF) to engage in dialogue with the Delegation and the Government on EC development 
cooperation. Th  e Delegation and Government have eff ectively engaged in an active dialogue and consultation with the 
Cotonou Task Force, especially for the Joint Annual Reviews from 2004 onwards and for the formulation of the new 
country strategy paper for the 10th EDF.

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16  Including the exceptional case 

of Guatemala (see Box 3).

17  This assessment is supported 

by the results of a consultation 

exercise by the European 

Economic and Social Committee 

on NSAs’ and local authorities’ 

participation in the elaboration 

of the 10th EDF Country Strategy 

Papers in ACP countries.

18  Council Regulation (EEC) 

No 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on 

financial and technical assistance 

to, and economic cooperation with 

the developing countries in Asia 

and Latin America 

(OJ L 52, 27.2.1992, p. 1).

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

For all four Delegations audited, the involvement of NSAs in the devel-
opment process was limited to the definition of the overall strategy 
and  did  not  therefore  go  beyond  to  include  (as  the  guidelines  pre-
scribe) consultation on sectoral strategies and involvement of NSAs 
in  project  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation  in  each  area 
of development.

In addition, the Court analysed information held by Commission head-
quarters 16,  which  showed  similar  weaknesses  for  other  Delegations. 
A l t h o u g h   t h e r e   w a s   s o m e   k i n d   o f   c o n s u l t a t i o n   i n   v i r t u a l l y   a l l   A C P 
countries, Commission headquarters only considered the involvement 
o f   N S A s   s a t i s f a c t o r y   i n   r e l a t i o n   t o   t h e   g u i d e l i n e s   ( i . e .   i n v o l v e m e n t 
going  beyond  ad  hoc  consultations)  in  half  of  them 17.  Likewise,  for 
the 24 Asian and Latin American (ALA) countries reviewed, the Court 
f o u n d   t h a t   t h e r e   w a s   g e n e r a l l y   s o m e   f o r m   o f   c o n s u l t a t i o n   b u t   t h e 
involvement of NSAs went beyond ad hoc consultations in only four 
of the Latin American countries and in none in Asia.

The involvement of NSAs was greater in the ACP countries, under the 
remit of the Cotonou Agreement — under which NSAs have the right 
to be involved — than in Asian and Latin American countries. Before 
t h e   n e w   D C I   i n   2 0 0 7 ,   t h e   f o r m e r   A L A   r e g u l a t i o n 1 8  d i d   n o t   r e q u i r e 
involvement of NSAs on cooperation policies and strategies.

Commission staff experienced practical difficulties in engaging with 
NSAs. It was found, inter alia, that: (i) involvement with NSAs depends 
very much also on the stance of the partner country government; (ii) 
i t   i s   d i f f i c u l t   t o   k n o w   w h i c h   a r e   t h e   r e l e v a n t   N S A s   t o   e n g a g e   w i t h ; 
(iii)  when  engaging  with  NSAs  (either  individually  or  as  a  platform) 
the issues of their representativity and accountability arise; (iv) many 
NSAs do not have the capacity and/or the resources to engage in the 
d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n   p r o c e s s   a n d   w i l l   n o t   p a r t i c i p a t e   i f   t h e y 
know they have little chance of receiving funds as a result; (v) NSAs 
do not always advocate the views of the most marginalised groups.

27. 

Even where there have been substantial efforts to engage with NSAs 
problems of implementation meant that the results were not always 
successful (see Box 3).

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28. 

29. 

SPECIFIC TRAINING AND DETAILED GUIDANCE ON HOW TO INVOLVE NSAS NEED 
TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED

The limited involvement of NSAs in many cases, and widespread weak-
nesses  in  the  timing  and  the  way  the  consultations  were  organised, 
show that translating the ambitious goal of involving NSAs in all EC 
development cooperation into reality remains a major challenge. For 
many Delegation staff, NSA involvement is mostly limited to service 
d e l i v e r y   o r   t o   ‘ o n e - s h o t ’   c o n s u l t a t i o n s   a t   c e r t a i n   m o m e n t s   o f   t h e 
programming cycle. The Commission has not yet invested sufficient 
time and resources to really engage Delegation staff with NSAs at all 
levels. Specific training is to be further developed.

The guidelines in use by the Commission at the time of the audit (see 
paragraph  12)  recognise  many  of  the  issues,  but  except  for  recom-
mending a mapping study to identify relevant NSAs and assess their 
representativity, they do not set out detailed instructions, for example 
concerning  key  issues  such  as  the  role  of  NSAs  in  the  aid  effective-
ness agenda, and the participation of NSAs in the definition of sector 
strategies including budget support.

B O X   3

EXAMPLE OF DIFFICULTIES IN INVOLVING NSAs IN EC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Guatemala: the ‘Mesodiálogo’

Th  e Mesodiálogo was launched in 2000 with the participation of the Commission Delegation, Member States, Government, 
European NGOs and NSAs from Guatemala. Th  e aim was to support implementation of the 2002–06 country strategy 
paper (CSP), through direct involvement in identifi cation, implementation and monitoring of the CSP programmes. 
Around 150 organisations and 800 people, organised into working groups, participated in the process, which included 
draft ing of strategic documents, accompanying identifi cation and formulation missions, creation of regional networks, 
etc. However, the organisational burden for the Delegation, the feeling that the Mesodiálogo was exceeding its role by 
intervening in topics that were exclusive competences of the EC, and the lack of clear government ownership and guar-
antees of sustainability, led to a progressive decline in the process which was fi nally closed in 2005.

Sources: RELEX/L3 Working document on involvement of NSAs in the programming process in the countries of Asia 
and Latin America; EC aid to Guatemala — Background Country Study Paper, December 2006; and Desk Study, August 
2006 commissioned by CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité/International Coop-
eration for Development and Solidarity) and Caritas Europa.

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30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

THEMATIC PROGRAMME ON NON-STATE ACTORS 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

This new programme 19 is the successor of the former co-financing with 
E u r o p e a n   N G O s   a n d   d e c e n t r a l i s e d   c o o p e r a t i o n   p r o g r a m m e s ,   a n d , 
l i k e   i t s   p r e d e c e s s o r s ,   i s   o n e   o f   t h e   m o r e   i m p o r t a n t   a n d   s t a b l e   E C 
sources  of  financing  for  the  activities  of  NSAs  and  support  of  their 
own initiatives.

In drawing up the strategy papers for such thematic programmes the Com-
mission  is  required  to  consult  other  development  actors,  including 
representatives of NSAs and local authorities, at an early stage of the 
programming process 20. European NGOs (ENGOs) through CONCORD 21 
have traditionally been heavily involved in dialogue on the manage-
m e n t   o f   t h e   N G O   c o - f i n a n c i n g   p r o g r a m m e .   T h e   n e w   p r o g r a m m e   i s 
also open to NSAs and local authorities from partner countries which 
thus should also be involved in the consultation.

After establishing the strategy paper for this programme, Commission 
headquarters requested Delegations to produce, on the basis of fur-
ther consultations with local NSAs, concept notes assessing the rele-
vance of the programme for their partner countries and justifying the 
appropriate level of expenditure. The Court examined the effective-
ness of both phases of consultation, again using as criteria those set 
out in the Commission’s 2002 communication (see paragraph 20).

For the overall strategy, the Commission ran an online public consult-
ation,  aimed  at  both  European  NSAs  and  those  originating  from  the 
p a r t n e r   c o u n t r i e s   ( S o u t h e r n   N S A s ) ,   t h r o u g h   a   q u e s t i o n n a i r e   p u b -
lished on the Commission’s website and sent to Delegations 22. At the 
European  level,  viewed  in  the  context  of  routine  ongoing  contacts 
between the Commission and CONCORD, this method of consultation 
was effective. However, consultation of Southern NSAs was not organ-
ised effectively. The questionnaire was sent out to ACP Delegations, 
which were expected to inform NSAs of the consultation and pass the 
questionnaire on to them. However, the timing of the consultation — 
a t   t h e   p e a k   l e a v e   p e r i o d   f o r   D e l e g a t i o n   s t a f f   —   w a s   i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
and so short as to be impracticable 23 (the ACP Delegations visited for 
this audit, Ethiopia and South Africa, were not able within the short 
deadline to consult NSAs). Furthermore, such a request was not sent 
to Delegations in ALA countries, and thus NSAs in ALA countries were 
not made aware that the consultation was running.

19  One of the programmes 

provided for by the Development 

Cooperation Instrument 

(see paragraph 9).

20  Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) 

No 1905/2006.

21  The European NGO 

Confederation for Relief and 

Development (CONCORD) was 

set up in January 2003 as the 

representative and interlocutor 

body contemplated in Regulation 

(EC) No 1658/98 laying down the 

NGO co-financing programme. 

It regularly engages in dialogue 

with the EU institutions, and 

coordinates cooperation between 

NGOs. Its 22 national associations 

(platforms) and 20 international 

thematic networks represent 

over 1 600 NGOs.

22  It was also sent directly to 

CONCORD, the European Economic 

and Social Committee, the 

Committee of Regions, and the 

Council of European Municipalities 

and Regions for dissemination 

among their members.

23  It was launched on 31 July 2006 

and ran to 11 September. This 

is less than the eight weeks 

prescribed as a minimum period 

for consultation.

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34. 

35. 

For  the  second  phase,  due  to  delays  in  adopting  the  DCI  regulation 
a n d   t h e   s t r a t e g y   p a p e r ,   D e l e g a t i o n s   h a d   o n l y   a   m o n t h   t o   p r e p a r e 
the  concept  notes  and  most  of  them  could  not  involve  NSAs  in  any 
structured  way.  In  Bangladesh  an  ad  hoc  workshop  with  NSAs  took 
place. For Peru, however, the Delegation did not consult NSAs 24, and 
a review of a sample of concept notes (Angola, Chile, Malawi, Namibia 
and  Nepal)  provided  further  evidence  of  lack  of  consultations  with 
NSAs on this programme.

24  For Ethiopia and South Africa, 

their respective Commission 

Delegations decided not to 

participate in this programme.

25  On sustainability in practice, 

see paragraphs 63 to 68.

In the Court’s view the Commission gave too little attention to methods 
of consultation with Southern NSAs. Very active facilitation by Delega-
tions — in addition to the passive method of placing a questionnaire 
on the Internet — is evidently necessary in many countries, and was 
partly  envisaged  (for  the  ACP  countries)  but  not  fully  implemented 
anywhere. Furthermore, attention was not given to the potential limi-
tations of consulting the potential recipients of grants about priority 
areas, a consultation in which they could hardly be disinterested; and 
alternatives such as networks, umbrella and regional bodies were not 
explored.

DO THE COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
EFFICIENTLY ENSURE THAT ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED 
BY NSAs ARE RELEVANT AND LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
THE INTENDED RESULTS?

36. 

The Court audited the management systems for NSA grant contracts 
at  Commission  headquarters  as  well  as  on  the  spot  at  four  Delega-
tions, including examination of 16 individual projects (see Annex III). 
The audit covered the procedures for selecting projects, control and 
supervision  arrangements,  the  monitoring  done  and  the  tools  used 
for this, and the question of sustainability.

SELECTION PROCEDURES

37. 

The aim of the audit of selection procedures was to determine the extent 
t o   w h i c h   t h e   p r o c e d u r e s   a p p l i e d   e n s u r e d   t h e   s e l e c t i o n   o f   p r o j e c t s 
that were relevant, timely and likely to be sustainable 25.

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THE CALL FOR PROPOSALS PROCEDURE PROMOTES FAIR COMPETITION 
BUT CAN STILL BE CUMBERSOME IN OPERATION AND DOES NOT ASSURE TIMELY 
COMPLETION OF PROJECT DESIGN

38. 

The standard selection procedure has been, since 2000, by means of 
calls  for  proposals.  Although  the  procedure  is  recognised  as  allow-
ing  fair  competition  among  NSAs  and  therefore  should  improve  the 
likelihood of selecting relevant projects, it continues to represent an 
administrative challenge for both the Commission and for applicant 
N S A s .   C a l l s   f o r   p r o p o s a l s   r a i s e   c o n s i d e r a b l e   i n t e r e s t   a m o n g   N S A s 
and the number of funding requests has always greatly exceeded the 
available funds 26. This has led to lengthy procedures and required the 
assistance of external experts. Also, calls under the co-financing with 
NGOs  programme  have  been  too  general  and  unfocused,  increasing 
the likelihood of less relevant applications being transmitted. Finally, 
the  implementation  of  the  detailed  procedures  can  be  cumbersome 
for small NSAs.

26  For a budget of 284 million euro 

for the 2007–08 calls for proposals 

under Thematic programmes 

managed at central level by 

EuropeAid, 4 565 applications 

were received, amounting to total 

requests for 3 650 million euro. 

After a first selection based on a 

concept note, 1 088 applications 

amounting to 989 million euro 

passed to the second stage of 

selection, and only 212 were finally 

selected.

27  For example, because only 

European languages are used, 

or because newspapers are 

not rapidly distributed to 

remote areas.

39.  Whereas the calls for proposals audited generally led to the selection 
of  relevant  projects,  the  audit  showed  that  for  the  projects  audited 
the average time between the submission of proposals and the actual 
signing of contracts was more than a year, making it difficult for NSAs 
to  plan  effectively.  The  Court  also  found  that  the  methods  used  to 
advertise the calls (mainly through the Internet and newspapers) were 
not always suited for reaching relevant NSAs at grass-roots level 27.

40. 

The Court welcomes that the Commission has taken measures in 2006 and 
2007  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  Call  for  Proposals  procedure, 
although it is not yet possible to assess the full effects. The measures 
include:

(a) 

introduction of the restricted procedure which allows a first selec-
t i o n   o f   a p p l i c a n t s   b a s e d   o n   a   s h o r t   c o n c e p t   n o t e ,   w i t h   t h e   f u l l 
proposal (including project design) being submitted to a second 
stage of selection;

(b) 

t h e   c o m b i n e d   u s e   o f   t w o   y e a r s ’   b u d g e t   i n   a   s i n g l e   c a l l   f o r 
proposals;

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(c) 

the introduction of an online registration service (PADOR)  reducing 
duplication of work for applicants;

(d) 

the increasing use of ‘tailor-made’ local calls for proposals where 
the objectives have been adapted to the local situation and locally-
based organisations have more chance of being selected.

41. 

However, problems with project design, which may profoundly affect the 
effectiveness  and  sustainability,  remain  widespread.  For  several  of 
the projects audited, insufficient preparation for the formulation of 
activities meant that the first year of the projects had to be devoted to 
project design (carrying out diagnostics, identification of beneficiar-
ies, studies). This reduced the time available for effective implemen-
tation, making the project more vulnerable to delays, and worsening 
the  prospects  for  sustainability.  The  example  in  Box  4  serves  as  an 
illustration.

B O X   4

EXAMPLE OF POOR PROJECT DESIGN

Promotion of the incorporation of women micro-entrepreneurs and family-based economic units 
in the formal labour system — Peru

Th  e local NGO partner implemented this project in four regions including Junin which was visited by the Court in 
February 2008, and where the NGO did not have a previous presence. Although a results oriented monitoring exercise 
as recently as 2007 had not forecast such problems, the Court found no evidence that the NGO had involved the rel-
evant public authorities in the design of the project activities. Nor did the NGO coordinate with the existing networks 
and organisations supporting the micro-enterprises in the region. During the project implementation the local NGO 
partner had to contract one such network to carry out basic research to identify potential benefi ciaries and economic 
opportunities. Th  e project design was based on the idea that it would be replicated and expanded by the public authori-
ties. However, the Court found that the relevant authorities were either not involved in the project at all, did not work 
as they were supposed to, or did not have enough fi nancial and human resources to take over the project activities.

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CONTROL AND SUPERVISION PROCEDURES

42. 

The aim of the audit of the Commission’s control and supervision proced-
u r e s   w a s   t o   d e t e r m i n e   t h e   e x t e n t   t o   w h i c h   t h e y   e n s u r e d   a   s m o o t h 
implementation of NSA project activities. While numerous evalu ations 
have  found  that  stakeholders  find  procedures  cumbersome 28,  which 
has  also  been  a  matter  of  concern  to  Parliament 29,  the  Court  recog-
nises  the  efforts  made  by  the  Commission  to  address  the  problem. 
H i g h   l e v e l   i n i t i a t i v e s   t a k e n   b y   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   i n c l u d e   s e t t i n g   u p 
a n   i n t e r - s e r v i c e   c o m m i t t e e   t o   s i m p l i f y   p r o c e d u r e s ,   s t r e n g t h e n i n g 
t h e   d i a l o g u e   b e t w e e n   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a n d   C O N C O R D   o n   f i n a n c i a l 
a n d   c o n t r a c t u a l   i s s u e s   ( l e a d i n g   t o   a   R e a d e r   o n   t h e   s t a n d a r d   g r a n t 
contract) and issuing new practical guides and simplified forms and 
documents. The devolution of the thematic programmes has  generally 
also helped improve the dialogue between the EC and NSAs.

43. 

The control and supervision procedures were operating correctly in many 
r e s p e c t s ,   b u t   t h e r e   r e m a i n   s o m e   s p e c i f i c   p r o b l e m s   w h i c h   l e a d   t o 
errors 30.

44. 

45. 

THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO NSAS ON HOW TO APPLY THE RULES IN PRACTICE 
HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT

Practical guidance on how to apply the EC’s financial and contractual 
r u l e s   n e e d s   t o   t a k e   i n t o   a c c o u n t   t h e   t u r n o v e r   o f   s t a f f   i n   t h e   C o m -
mission’s Delegations and, within NSAs, a limited level of knowledge 
about  these  rules.  Among  the  methods  used  to  improve  knowledge 
are training courses held in the Delegations for both staff and bene-
f i c i a r i e s ,   a n d   t h e   e n d o r s e m e n t   o f   a   h a n d s - o n   g u i d e   p r o d u c e d   i n 
cooperation with CONCORD (the so-called Reader on standard grant 
contracts).

The training is useful but for the beneficiaries mostly consists only of 
o n e - d a y   w o r k s h o p s   a f t e r   t h e   c o n c l u s i o n   o f   t h e   c a l l s   f o r   p r o p o s a l s . 
The Court found this to be insufficient to ensure that the NSAs ‘insti-
t u t i o n a l i s e ’   t h e   k n o w l e d g e   r e q u i r e d   t o   a p p l y   t h e   r u l e s   c o r r e c t l y   i n 
the course of a typical project implementation period.

28  The issue was also raised 

in a letter from CONCORD 

to Commissioner Nielson of 

17 March 2004 on the impact 

of the financial regulation and 

its derived documents and 

procedures on NGOs.

29  The European Parliament in 

the 2004 discharge stated that it: 

‘regrets [ ... ] the vastly increased 

complexity of the new procedures, 

which are cumbersome and take 

far too long to implement, points 

out the need for real simplification, 

while not losing sight of the 

original objective’ (Resolution 

of the European Parliament with 

comments forming an integral 

part of the decision on the 

discharge for implementation 

of the European Union general 

budget for the financial year 2004, 

Section III — Commission 

(OJ L 340, 6.12.2006, p. 5), 

point 185).

30  Similar findings resulted from 

the Court’s DAS audits: see the 

Court’s Annual Reports concerning 

the financial year 2007 on the 

implementation of the budget, 

paragraph 8.9; and on the 

European Development Funds 

(EDFs), paragraph 22.

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46. 

The audit found little evidence that the Reader was used by Delegation 
staff  or  by  beneficiary  NSAs.  Its  non-legally-binding  nature  may  be 
one of the reasons why staff in Delegations decided against using it 
as a standard reference document.

31  For instance paragraph 8.24 

in Chapter 8 of the Court’s Annual 

Report concerning the financial 

year 2007 (OJ C 286, 10.11.2008, 

p. 182).

47.  When changes in the Practical Guide and contract conditions occur (the 
Practical Guide has been modified five times in last seven years) they 
have  not  been  communicated  systematically  to  the  grantees.  More-
o v e r ,   t h e r e   h a v e   b e e n   i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s   i n   t h e   i n t e r p r e t a t i o n   o f   t h e 
rules, which meant that grantees in some instances have been asked 
by the Commission to operate under new conditions even when they 
were not applicable retrospectively.

48. 

49. 

PROJECT AUDITS WERE NOT ALWAYS OF SUFFICIENTLY HIGH QUALITY

For several of the projects examined in this audit, shortcomings were 
noted in the quality of project audits. They did not effectively detect 
errors  affecting  the  eligibility  of  transactions  at  grantee  and  imple-
menting partner level. The specific assessments of EDF and external 
actions  in  the  context  of  the  Court’s  annual  reports 31  noted  similar 
shortcomings in project audits.

In an effort to address these shortcomings the Commission has developed 
revised  terms  of  reference  to  ensure  that  the  audit  work  is  compre-
hensive, which became obligatory for project contracts from Febuary 
2006.  For  the  projects  audited,  it  was  too  early  to  assess  the  effect 
of this change.

INCONSISTENCIES IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF PROCEDURES 
LED TO UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS ON NSAS

50. 

The  audit  noted  that  some  practical  administrative  problems  in  the 
 management of grant contracts persist, including:

(a) 

i n c o n s i s t e n t   i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s   o f   t h e   r u l e s   o f   o r i g i n   f o r   s u p p l i e s 
purchased under EC-financed contracts, which may have burdened 
NSAs unnecessarily (example in Box 5);

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(b) 

difficulty for NSAs in obtaining tax exemption or recovering taxes 
in some partner countries;

(c) 

the  requirement  to  use  an  EC-notified  exchange  rate  (instead  of 
t h e   r a t e   i n   f a c t   o b t a i n e d ) ,   t h a t   c o u l d   p e n a l i s e   p r o j e c t s   i n   s o m e 
circumstances;

(d) 

delays by the Commission in approving payment requests, which 
might result in project delays;

(e) 

a d d i t i o n a l   r e q u i r e m e n t s   i n c o n s i s t e n t l y   i m p o s e d   o n   p r o j e c t s   b y 
Delegations,  adding  unnecessary  administrative  burdens  on  the 
N S A s ,   s u c h   a s :   ( i )   a d d i t i o n a l   p e r i o d i c   r e p o r t s   o r   a u d i t   r e p o r t s ; 
(ii)  the  use  of  separate,  specific  bank  accounts  for  each  project; 
( i i i )   p a y m e n t   o p t i o n s   d i f f e r e n t   f r o m   t h e   o n e   l a i d   d o w n   i n   t h e 
general conditions (e.g. smaller instalments).

B O X   5

EXAMPLE OF INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RULES OF ORIGIN

Purchases of motorcycles — the case of Ethiopia

Japanese vehicles are generally preferred by NGOs in Ethiopia because their quality is reliable under local conditions. 
However, the Delegation invited NGOs within the framework of Food Security projects to consider Chinese vehicles 
also, partly because it believed that derogation was needed for Japanese but not for Chinese vehicles.

Refl ecting the Delegation’s assumptions on the derogation rules, one NGO purchased 10 Chinese motorcycles without 
requesting derogation. As several of these broke down the NGO on 14 December 2006 requested permission and dero-
gation from the rules of origin to buy an additional two motorcycles of more robust Japanese manufacture, which was 
initially rejected by the Delegation. On 11 September 2007, the Delegation eventually did accept the request when it was 
resubmitted with a request for a budget amendment.

Meanwhile, the Court found that the Delegation had consulted Headquarters in April 2007 when both parties had con-
cluded that derogation was not required for Japanese goods purchased in Ethiopia under a thematic budget line, while 
derogation was and always had been required for Chinese goods.

Th  e rules, however still appear to be open to diff ering interpretations32.

32  Under the Council Regulations on access to Community external assistance, especially Articles 3(2), 3(3) and 5 and 

Annex II, projects financed by the thematic programmes in Ethiopia could benefit as from 28 December 2005 from goods 

originating both from Japan and China without any request for derogation, since Ethiopia is classified as a least-developed 

country. Contrary to this, goods specifically originating from China require a request for derogation in case of a grant 

contract financed by the EDF. The EDF regulation also allows purchase of goods, irrespective of their origin, on the local 

market up to 30 000 euro.

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51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

MONITORING INCLUDING TOOLS AND ASSESSMENTS 
OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NSA ACTIVITIES

Effective monitoring is an essential part of the management of projects, for 
which the Commission uses a number of tools and procedures. The aim 
of the Court’s audit was to determine, in the light of the existing Com-
mission procedures, if: (i) the IT systems provide the necessary manage-
ment  information  to  take  decisions  and  monitor  NSA  activities;  (ii)  a 
management reporting system is in place; (iii) Delegations ad equately 
monitor the projects, receive sufficient feedback from external moni-
toring  and  evaluations,  and  follow  up  on  them;  (iv)  suitable  tools  for 
assessing outputs and results of activities are used; (v) adequate tools 
for assessing the long-term impact of activities are used.

THE COMMISSION’S COMPUTERISED INFORMATION SYSTEM, CRIS, 
HAS NOT BEEN USED TO ITS FULL POTENTIAL

As noted in paragraph 5, there is at present no readily available source 
of data in EuropeAid concerning NSA funding in the field of develop-
ment cooperation. The data in the Common RELEX Information System 
(CRIS)  is  incomplete  and  the  identification  of  operators  unreliable. 
It  provides  little  information  in  the  form  of  analysis  and  syntheses 
of  the  state  of  play  for  ongoing  and  completed  projects,  including 
a s s e s s m e n t s   a n d   c o n c l u s i o n s .   T h e   C R I S   I m p l e m e n t a t i o n   R e p o r t ,   a 
m o n i t o r i n g   t o o l ,   d o e s   n o t   f u l l y   m e e t   u s e r s ’   n e e d s   a n d   i s   o f t e n   n o t 
properly used.

PROJECT REPORTS HAVE NOT ALWAYS PROVIDED AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT 
OF THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION

N S A s   b e n e f i t i n g   f r o m   a   g r a n t   m u s t   p r o v i d e   t e c h n i c a l   a n d   f i n a n c i a l 
r e p o r t s ,   w h i c h   s h o u l d   a l l o w   f o r   a   c o m p a r i s o n   b e t w e e n   t h e   p r o j e c t 
proposal and what was achieved during the reporting period. For half 
of  the  projects  audited  these  reports  did  not  present  a  comprehen-
sive  assessment  of  the  state  of  implementation.  In  general,  reports 
tended to underemphasise the most challenging issues and focus on 
the positive achievements.

Under the current procedures, NSAs have to apply a logical framework, 
including  quantitative  performance  indicators 33.  However,  for  13  of 
16 projects audited, the technical reports did not provide a direct com-
parison between the expected and achieved results using the logical 
framework. Hence the Logframes in several of the projects audited were 
gradually losing their relevance as tools for project monitoring.

33  Logical Framework Approach 

and Logical Framework Matrix 

(the Logframe) are analytical and 

management tools widely used 

in development cooperation by 

donors and partner governments. 

The typical design of a Logframe 

involves tasks such as formulating 

SMART indicators (Specific, 

Measurable, Achievable, Relevant 

and Timed), identifying adequate 

sources of verification, setting 

realistic targets for each indicator, 

and collecting baseline values for 

later measurement of progress 

and results achieved. An adequate 

performance-monitoring system 

would therefore include regular 

collection of data on the actual 

results. NSAs are sometimes also 

asked to collect data and report 

not only on inputs, processes and 

outputs, but also on mid-term 

outcomes and long-term impacts.

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55. 

56. 

The Court noted in its benchmarking exercise that some agencies apply 
a quality assurance mechanism with respect to Logframes, including 
quantitative and qualitative performance indicators.

INSUFFICIENT PROJECT FIELD VISITS CARRIED OUT BY COMMISSION STAFF

Proper monitoring of projects by Delegations includes regular and direct 
contacts  with  the  NSA  partners,  and  discussions  on  implementation 
i s s u e s   a f f e c t i n g   p r o j e c t   p e r f o r m a n c e .   T h e   a u d i t   e x a m i n e d   t o   w h a t 
e x t e n t   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   c a r r i e d   o u t   p h y s i c a l ,   o n - s i t e   i n s p e c t i o n s   o f 
projects including checking the accounts and supporting documents 
of  projects  in  the  offices  of  the  grant  beneficiaries  and  their  imple-
menting partners. The Court found that the level of on-site controls 
was insufficient.

57.  Moreover, many NSAs interviewed expressed regret about the lack of 
o n - s i t e   s u p p o r t   f r o m   t h e   D e l e g a t i o n s .   T h e i r   r e s p o n s e s   s u g g e s t e d 
that many errors related to the financial and contractual rules could 
b e   a v o i d e d   b y   o n - s i t e   c h e c k s   a t   t h e   a p p r o p r i a t e   p o i n t   i n   t i m e ,   a s 
 incorrect practices would become visible and could be rectified.

58. 

59. 

Six out of the 16 audited projects had not been visited by Delegation 
staff at all. For the projects visited, there was generally no systematic 
pattern. Sometimes visits were made in connection with events organ-
i s e d   b y   t h e   N S A s ,   s o m e t i m e s   t h e y   w e r e   m a d e   j o i n t l y   w i t h   e x t e r n a l 
m o n i t o r i n g   m i s s i o n s .   I n   s o m e   c a s e s   s p e c i f i c   a n d   c o n c r e t e   p l a n s   t o 
carry  out  field  visits  at  defined  stages  of  the  projects’  lifetime  were 
indeed laid down. However, in all these cases the plans were not fully 
implemented  due  to  a  lack  of  resources.  There  was  no  standard  for 
the monitoring reports established by the Delegations visited by the 
Court. Before December 2007, staff had no operational guidelines for 
project monitoring.

Projects may also be selected for external monitoring through the results-
oriented  monitoring  missions  of  the  Commission  (ROM).  This  tech-
nique, however, does not compensate for an absence of monitoring at 
operational level: most projects involving NSAs have an EC contribu-
tion of less than 1 million euro, and under the ROM system only about 
10 % of projects below this value are selected for monitoring.

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60. 

61. 

62. 

EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS HAVE NOT PROVIDED ADEQUATE ASSESSMENTS 
OF THE IMPACT OF NSA PROJECTS

NSA grant contracts generally provide for external evaluations at the 
end of the project and/or at mid-stage. The standard terms of refer-
ence  for  evaluations  are  not  compulsory  for  this  type  of  evaluation, 
and there is a risk of conflict of interest as under current practice the 
contracting of evaluators is done by the beneficiaries. The Court noted 
in benchmarking that certain development agencies operate a quality 
assurance  mechanism  with  respect  to  evaluations   commissioned  by 
the beneficiary NSAs.

34  The last generation of grant 

contracts signed in Peru already 

foresees this.

The evaluations carried out, together with the other assessment and 
reporting instruments currently in use (NSAs’ reports, field visits and 
ROM reports), do not provide adequate assessments of the impact of 
NSAs’  individual  projects.  This  is  either  because  the  objectives  are 
expressed  in  such  broad  terms  that  they  cannot  be  associated  with 
measurable indicators of impact, or because the means of verification 
are inadequate or too costly.

The Commission is moving towards results-based management with more 
e m p h a s i s   o n   m e a s u r i n g   t h e   i m p a c t   a n d   r e s u l t s   a n d   e v a l u a t i n g   t h e 
added value of its development cooperation. This puts greater pres-
sure on NSAs to develop systems to monitor not only outputs but also 
outcomes  and  impacts 34,  and  requires  that  more  practical  guidance 
i s   p r o v i d e d   b y   C o m m i s s i o n   s e r v i c e s   t o   e n s u r e   t h a t   L o g f r a m e s   a n d 
performance indicators are appropriate and remain relevant.

PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

63. 

The project selection process includes the assessment of sustainability, 
that is of the prospects for the project results to be permanent. The 
Commission has recently introduced ex post results-oriented monitor-
ing that covers sustainability and impact at project level.

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64.  While the 16 projects audited have achieved or are likely to achieve good 
results in the short term, their prospects for sustainability were much 
less positive. At the time of the Court’s audit, sustainability was uncer-
tain for 12 of the projects, either because of a lack of funds after the 
end of the project or due to inadequate institutional arrangements. 
An example of the latter is provided in Box 6.

35  The average period for the 

projects audited was 37 months, 

extensions included.

65. 

66. 

67. 

The prospects for sustainability for the remaining four projects were good 
not  because  they  were  intrinsically  sustainable,  but  rather  because 
they are run by international NGOs with long-term commitment, which 
a r e   a b l e   t o   s e c u r e   f u n d i n g   f r o m   o t h e r   s o u r c e s   t h a n   t h e   E u r o p e a n 
Union.

Long-term commitment and funding, together with the need to ensure 
institutional arrangements allowing the relevant stakeholders to take 
over the activities, are essential elements of sustainability. The Court’s 
a u d i t   h a s   s h o w n   t h a t   p r o j e c t   d u r a t i o n   i s   g e n e r a l l y   i n s u f f i c i e n t   t o 
ensure  sustainability  even  after  extensions 35.  In  addition  the  actual 
implementation period is in practice often shortened by late start-up 
(see paragraph 41).

The current project approach is also faced with the potential contradic-
tion of using short-term interventions to address structural problems 
that need long-term commitment. Sustainability is especially a prob-
lem  for  the  capacity-development  element  of  projects  because  this 
t y p i c a l l y   r e q u i r e s   s o c i a l   a n d   a t t i t u d e   c h a n g e s   w h i c h   r e q u i r e   m u c h 
more time than is generally available for project implementation.

B O X   6

SUPPORT TO POLICING OF CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE EASTERN 
CAPE (SOUTH AFRICA) — VICTIM FRIENDLY CENTRES

Whereas the South African police authorities were able to continue to cover the running costs of the care centres for 
victims of violence aft er the project ended, there was a risk that volunteers working in the centres would not be available 
in the future as the Social Welfare Department had not yet assumed the responsibility for their supervision and training 
as foreseen in the project design.

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68. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

The Court noted in its benchmarking exercise that other development 
agencies avoid some of the problems of poor design and short project 
d u r a t i o n   b y   u s i n g   a   r a n g e   o f   i n s t r u m e n t s   i n   a d d i t i o n   t o   s p e c i f i c 
p r o j e c t s ,   i n c l u d i n g   l o n g - t e r m   f r a m e w o r k   p a r t n e r s h i p   a g r e e m e n t s 
with competitively selected NSAs 36.

36  Several development agencies 

use framework partnership 

agreements which typically run 

for four to eight years.

37  Capacity-development 

support to NSAs is meant to 

strengthen their role as partners 

in development cooperation (see 

paragraph 8 and Box 1) but it 

also includes training in project 

management to improve the 

quality of their projects and to 

increase their capacity to apply for 

and raise funds from donors.

DOES THE COMMISSION ADEQUATELY ENSURE 
THE PROVISION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT TO NSAS?

This section addresses the question whether the Commission has translated 
both  the  legal  requirements  and  the  policy  statements  on  capacity-
development  support  for  NSAs  into  a  strategy  in  all  the  beneficiary 
countries and regions, and carried it out through relevant activities 
effectively implemented.

STRATEGY FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF NSAs

Capacity development is intended to strengthen NSAs’ role both as part-
n e r s   i n   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t   p r o c e s s   a n d   a s   i m p l e m e n t i n g   a c t o r s 3 7.   I n 
order to support it effectively, and to ensure coherence and comple-
mentarity with other programmes and donors, the Commission needs 
to devise a strategy for each country setting out which NSAs, sectors 
and themes should be targeted, and what working methods to use.

The Court examined whether such a strategy existed for the ACP coun-
tries (where the provision of capacity development to NSAs is bind-
ing),  and  for  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries,  where  the  former 
A L A   r e g u l a t i o n   d i d   n o t   m e n t i o n   c a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t .   T h e   C o u r t 
also examined whether the entry in force in January 2007 of the DCI, 
w h i c h   r e p e a l e d   t h e   A L A   r e g u l a t i o n   a n d   m e n t i o n s   t h e   p r o v i s i o n   o f 
capacity development to NSAs, has meant any change in the existing 
strategies.

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72. 

73. 

EXISTENCE OF TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES

Following the signature of the Cotonou Agreement (see paragraph 8), 
i n   m o s t   o f   t h e   A C P   c o u n t r i e s   s t r a t e g i e s   h a v e   b e e n   d e v e l o p e d   a n d 
programmes  set  up  for  capacity  development  of  NSAs,  financed  by 
t h e   E U 3 8.   F o r   A s i a n   a n d   L a t i n   A m e r i c a n   c o u n t r i e s   t h e r e   a r e   n e i t h e r 
particular strategies for EC-supported capacity development of NSAs 
nor such programmes 39. This difference does not result from an over-
all  assessment  of  needs,  but  mainly  reflects  the  fact  that  capacity-
d e v e l o p m e n t   s u p p o r t   t o   N S A s   i n   A C P   c o u n t r i e s   i s   l e g a l l y   r e q u i r e d , 
whereas for ALA countries it was not.

The DCI, applicable since 2007 for ALA countries, includes capacity-
development  for  NSAs  in  the  areas  of  cooperation  covered  by  geo-
graphic programmes and sets out as an important principle that these 
programmes should be the normal instrument for providing support, 
since they are based on assessments of needs and strategic partner-
ships  with  governments.  Thematic  programmes,  on  the  other  hand, 
are only to be used if the geographic programmes are not appropriate, 
for example in countries with difficult partnerships 40 or having popu-
lation groups out of reach of mainstream services and resources and 
excluded from the policymaking process. Despite this clearly stated 
p r i n c i p l e ,   t h e r e   h a s   b e e n   n o   c h a n g e   i n   t h e   w a y   i n   w h i c h   c a p a c i t y -
development support is funded in ALA countries since the entry into 
force of the DCI, and the existing support continues to be funded by 
t h e   t h e m a t i c   p r o g r a m m e   ( n o n - s t a t e   a c t o r s   a n d   l o c a l   a u t h o r i t i e s   i n 
development).

74. 

The lack of a particular strategy is further underlined by the fact that 
f o r   A s i a n   a n d   L a t i n   A m e r i c a n   c o u n t r i e s ,   w h e r e   f u n d s   f o r   N S A   c a p -
acity development are more limited, the possibilities to mainstream 
involvement of and support to NSAs in the main sectoral programmes 
financed in these countries (e.g. health or education) have neverthe-
l e s s   n o t   b e e n   f u l l y   e x p l o r e d .   T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   i s   p r e p a r i n g   a   d o c u -
ment 41 with the aim of producing guidelines for Delegations that will 
help to address this issue.

38  In the ACP countries there are 

around 46 capacity-development 

programmes in 43 countries, 

amounting to 226 million euro.

39  There are some exceptions 

usually resulting from highly 

specific circumstances such 

as Bangladesh because it 

has a very large NGO sector 

(206 000 organisations) or 

Colombia because of its internal 

armed conflict.

40  Situations of difficult 

partnership are defined as those 

where for one of the following 

reasons the usual cooperation 

instruments cannot be fully used 

to support initiatives undertaken 

by stakeholders other than central 

governments: (1) countries where 

cooperation has been suspended; 

(2) countries where the authorities 

are not committed to objectives 

of poverty reduction and to other 

basic principles of development 

policy, including good governance 

and participation of NSAs and 

decentralised authorities; 

(3) countries where the dialogue 

on participatory approaches 

to development is very limited.

41  The participation of NSAs in 

poverty-reduction strategies, 

sector approaches and monitoring 

of project implementation 

(draft paper of EuropeAid E.4, 

August 2008).

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PROGRAMMES ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF NSAs

T h e   C o u r t   e x a m i n e d   s e v e n   p r o g r a m m e s   a m o u n t i n g   t o   7 2 , 1   m i l l i o n 
e u r o   ( A n n e x   I I I )   t o   a s s e s s   t h e i r   r e l e v a n c e   a n d   h o w   e f f i c i e n t l y   t h e y 
h a v e   b e e n   i m p l e m e n t e d 4 2.   T h e s e   p r o g r a m m e s   c o m b i n e   c a p a c i t y -
d e v e l o p m e n t   a c t i v i t i e s   w i t h   t h e   f u n d i n g   o f   a   s e r i e s   o f   s m a l l 
projects.

42  Due to the late start of the 

programmes, it was generally too 

early to assess their effectiveness.

43  Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Peru, 

South Africa, and Uganda.

The Court examined whether the programmes started on time, whether 
they  were  implemented  within  reasonable  timescales,  and  whether 
the management procedures were sufficiently flexible and suited local 
realities, especially of small and community-based organisations.

PROGRAMMES ARE RELEVANT ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LACK OF DETAILED SITUATION 
ASSESSMENTS IN ALA COUNTRIES

The programmes examined were found relevant and addressed clear 
needs and priorities of the NSAs. The Commission guidelines recom-
mend  that  Delegations  should  carry  out  a  detailed  situation  assess-
ment  or  ‘mapping  study’  to  identify  in  each  country  representative 
NSAs  and  assess  their  capacities,  constraints  and  potential,  as  well 
the work of other donors. However, in the ALA countries, where the-
matic programmes are in practice the main instrument for the provi-
sion of capacity-development support to NSAs, the value of mapping 
s t u d i e s   i s   l e s s   s t r o n g l y   p e r c e i v e d .   F o r   t h e   s i x   c o u n t r i e s   r e v i e w e d 4 3 
only Delegations in ACP countries (Ethiopia, Mali and Uganda) have 
undertaken full mapping studies and their quality varies.

DELAYS IMPINGE ON THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAMMES

Inherent features of the programmes, the effects of which had not been 
s u f f i c i e n t l y   f o r e s e e n ,   l e d   t o   s i g n i f i c a n t   d e l a y s   i n   s i x   o f   t h e   s e v e n 
p r o g r a m m e s   e x a m i n e d .   M o s t   i m p o r t a n t   w a s   t h e   c u m u l a t i v e   e f f e c t 
o f   t h e   l e n g t h y   m a n a g e m e n t   p r o c e d u r e s   r e q u i r e d   f i r s t   t o   c o n t r a c t 
international technical assistance, then for the technical assistants to 
prepare calls for proposals, and finally to evaluate proposals and sign 
the  grant  contracts.  A  second  factor  was  the  tripartite  management 
structure, involving government, NSAs and Commission Delegations. 
Although this structure is essential to ensure ownership it entails long 
debates and negotiations both to build initial consensus amongst the 
parties concerned and to implement it.

75. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

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79. 

80. 

81. 

These delays effectively limit the period of implementation of the activ-
i t i e s ,   e s p e c i a l l y   t h o s e   o f   t h e   g r a n t e e s ,   l e a d i n g   t o   d e c o m m i t m e n t 
o f   f u n d s   a n d   c a n c e l l a t i o n   o f   a c t i v i t i e s ,   a n d   p a r t i c u l a r l y   t o   r e d u c -
t i o n   o f   t h e   l i f e s p a n   o f   p r o j e c t s ,   t h u s   d a m a g i n g   t h e   p r o s p e c t s   f o r 
 sustainability 44 (see paragraph 83(b)).

44  In the case of the Ariane 

programme in Mali, the lifespan of 

the projects for the two last calls 

for proposals had to be reduced 

to only six months.

45  For example, in Ethiopia 

only 11 (5 %) out of 208 applicants 

were selected in the first call, 

all either international 

or capital-based NGOs.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CALLS FOR PROPOSALS DOES NOT ALWAYS FAVOUR 
THE NSAS MOST IN NEED OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Since capacity development of NSAs is the focus of these programmes, the 
process of project selection must target beneficiaries that, being pre-
cisely those lacking in certain organisational capacities, may have dif-
ficulty meeting the many requirements prescribed by EC proced ures. 
The Court found that even though many applications were received, in 
the outcome calls for proposals tended to favour the best-resourced, 
mainly urban-based, organisations over under-resourced and mainly 
rural-based organisations 45.

Delegations, in the framework of geographic programme implementation, 
drew lessons from these first experiences for the subsequent calls: (i) 
encouraging partnerships between weak NSAs and stronger ones; (ii) 
funding strong NSAs to train and mentor wider groups of weaker NSAs; 
(iii)  selecting  remote  regions;  (iv)  allocating  funds  by  geographical 
distribution.  However,  the  Commission  action  does  not  address  all 
the  concerns  originally  set  out  in  the  Commission’s  communication 
and  guidelines  (see  paragraphs  11  and  12),  which  mention  the  aim 
of  reaching  out  to  as  large  a  proportion  of  the  populations  as  pos-
sible, and emphasise that special attention will be given to small and 
grass-roots  organisations,  especially  in  countries  that  cover  a  large 
g e o g r a p h i c a l   a r e a   a n d   w h e r e   m a n y   g r o u p s   a n d   a r e a s   a r e   i s o l a t e d 
from the consultation and decision-making process.

TOO EARLY TO ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 
OF MOST OF THE CAPACITY-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

82. 

Due to the late start of the programmes, it was generally too early to 
a s s e s s   t h e i r   e f f e c t i v e n e s s .   W h e r e   m i d - t e r m   e v a l u a t i o n s   h a v e   b e e n 
conducted, good results have generally been reported.

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83. 

However, in the ACP programmes examined 46, the Court found indica-
tions  that  the  following  aspects  require  further  attention  from  the 
Commission:

46  The ACP capacity-development 

programmes, resulting from a 

consistent strategy, have common 

(a) 

since the programmes combine capacity-development work with 
the funding of a series of small projects, the specialised technical 
assistance teams, which have particular competences in capacity 
development, also have to carry out routine project management 
administration 47. As regards capacity development, the teams have 
concentrated  on  training  in  project  management  rather  than  on 
enhancing  NSAs’  skills  in  policy  analysis,  advocacy  work,  watch-
dog  functions,  promoting  human  rights,  promoting  networking, 
etc.,  thus  underemphasising  the  policy  dialogue  role  (see  para-
graph 3(a)), which is also part of the capacity-development agenda 
defined in the Cotonou Agreement 48;

(b) 

the  Court  found  that  impact  and  sustainability  are  insufficiently 
addressed in these programmes. The overall funding was too low, 
and in some cases too scattered over too many small projects to 
have a significant impact. Project duration was short, ranging from 
as little as six months to a maximum of 24 months, whereas, since 
capacity development is a long-term process, the Court considers 
that a longer implementation period is needed.

organisational characteristics 

including the use of technical 

assistance. By contrast the few 

ALA programmes were established 

ad hoc and vary in structure.

47  In Mali, the Court found 

that technical assistance had 

duplicated the call for proposals 

and project-control procedures 

by contracting additional 

external assistance to evaluate 

proposals but reassessing itself 

the evaluations made. The reason 

was that technical assistance did 

not want to incur financial risk (it 

was asked to provide a financial 

guarantee for the running of the 

programme).

48  Under Article 4 of the Cotonou 

Agreement non-state actors are to 

’be provided with 

capacity-building support in 

critical areas in order to reinforce 

the capabilities of these actors, 

particularly as regards organisation 

and representation, and the 

establishment of consultation 

mechanisms including channels of 

communication and dialogue, and 

to promote strategic alliances’.

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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS

34

THE COMMISSION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY 
ENSURE THAT NSAs ARE INVOLVED EFFECTIVELY 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROCESS

Through its Delegations the Commission has tried to involve NSAs in the 
preparation of country strategies in virtually all beneficiary countries. 
However, in many cases the involvement has been limited to one-day 
seminars rather than the sustained and structured dialogue envisaged 
by the EU legislation and the Commission’s own guidelines. There are 
widespread weaknesses in the detailed consultation procedures.

As regards the new thematic programme on NSAs, Southern NSAs were not 
adequately involved either in the overall or the local strategies, even 
though this is a programme primarily designed for these actors.

84. 

85. 

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S   O N   I N V O L V E M E N T   O F   N S A S

The Commission should make further efforts to strengthen the involve-
ment of the relevant NSAs in its development cooperation process. This 
involvement should go beyond the definition of the country strategies 
and include sectoral strategies and projects.

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   s h o u l d   t a k e   t h e   f o l l o w i n g   s t e p s   t o   s t r e n g t h e n   t h e 
process by:

 —

identifying the relevant NSAs;

 —

establishing  clear  and  predictable  schedules  of  consultations,  for 
both geographic and thematic strategy papers;

 —

providing the necessary documentation and enough time for NSAs 
t o   p r e p a r e   t h e m s e l v e s   p r o p e r l y ,   a n d   f e e d b a c k   o n   t h e   r e s u l t s   o f 
these consultations;

 —

d e v e l o p i n g   f u r t h e r   g u i d a n c e   a n d   t r a i n i n g   f o r   t h e   D e l e g a t i o n 
staff.

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THE COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GENERALLY 
ENSURE THAT ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY NSAs 
ARE RELEVANT AND LIKELY TO PRODUCE THE INTENDED 
RESULTS, BUT THERE ARE SHORTCOMINGS

The Call for proposals procedure can still be cumbersome and in oper-
ation does not ensure sufficient attention for, and timely completion 
of, project design.

There is insufficient guidance and training for NSAs on the practical 
a p p l i c a t i o n   o f   t h e   f i n a n c i a l   r u l e s ,   a n d   i n c o n s i s t e n t   i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
as well as specific practical problems persist.

There are weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation.

Prospects for long-term sustainability are poor mainly because of the 
s h o r t   p r o j e c t   d u r a t i o n ,   l a c k   o f   l o n g - t e r m   f u n d i n g   a n d   i n a d e q u a t e 
institutional arrangements.

86. 

87. 

88. 

89. 

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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S   O N   M A N A G E M E N T 
O F   A C T I V I T I E S   I M P L E M E N T E D   B Y   N S A s

49  Paragraph 8.18 in Chapter 8 

of the Court’s Annual Report 

concerning the financial year 2007.

Selection procedures

 —

M e a s u r e s   a l r e a d y   i n   t r a i n   t o   i m p r o v e   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   o f   t h e   C a l l 
f o r   P r o p o s a l s   p r o c e d u r e   s h o u l d   b e   c a r r i e d   t h r o u g h   w i t h   p a r t i c u -
l a r   e m p h a s i s   o n   a s p e c t s   t h a t   c o u l d   h e l p   t o   a s s u r e   g o o d   p r o j e c t 
design.

Control and supervision procedures

 —

Besides resolving outstanding issues, the Commission should ensure 
that  guidance  and  support  on  procedures  are  more  accessible  to 
the potential beneficiaries.

 —

The Court would like to reiterate its view that there is scope for pre-
venting errors relating to financial and contractual rules by means of 
enhanced targeting of monitoring and support by Delegations 49.

Monitoring

 —

In light of its intended move to results-based management the Com-
mission should ensure that sufficient resources, guidance and exper-
tise are available to both Delegations and NSAs to develop, apply, 
m o n i t o r   a n d   r e p o r t   o n   q u a n t i t a t i v e   a n d   q u a l i t a t i v e    p e r f o r m a n c e 
indicators.

Sustainability

 —

In order to improve sustainability, the Commission should consider 
the  use  of  a  mix  of  instruments  when  working  with  NSAs  and  not 
only projects.

 —

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   s h o u l d   c a r r y   o u t   s e l e c t i v e   p o s t - i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
r e v i e w s   o f   t h e   s u s t a i n a b i l i t y   a n d   l o n g - t e r m   i m p a c t   o f   N S A 
projects.

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37

THERE IS A STRATEGY FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
OF NSAS IN ACP COUNTRIES BUT NOT YET FOR MOST 
OF THE ALA COUNTRIES

90. 

A strategy does not exist for most of the ALA countries. Unlike in the ACP 
countries, where geographic programmes are used, in ALA countries 
there is too much dependence on the thematic programme on NSAs 
f o r   f u n d i n g   c a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t .   I n   t h e   C o u r t ’ s   v i e w   t h i s   i s   n o t 
appropriate  because  it  is  contrary  to  the  principle  stated  in  the  DCI 
Regulation  that  geographic  programmes  should  be  used  whenever 
possible.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S   O N   S T R A T E G Y   D E V E L O P M E N T

The Commission should develop strategies for capacity development of 
NSAs in ALA countries setting out which NSAs, sectors and themes are 
to be targeted, what working methods will be used, and how coherence 
with  other  programmes  is  assured.  It  should  reconsider  the  disparity 
in the approach as between ACP and ALA countries.

ALTHOUGH THE CAPACITY-DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES ARE RELEVANT THEY HAVE NOT 
REACHED THEIR FULL POTENTIAL

91. 

The audited programmes were found highly relevant although needs 
a s s e s s m e n t s   i n   t h e   f o r m   o f   c o m p r e h e n s i v e   ‘ m a p p i n g   s t u d i e s ’   w e r e 
not carried out for the ALA countries. The programmes have not, how-
ever,  reached  their  full  potential  mainly  because  their  management 
procedures and structures are inherently complex. The consequences 
of  this  were  not  fully  appreciated  from  the  start,  and  the  resulting 
d e l a y s   h a d   a   d i r e c t   i m p a c t   b y   r e d u c i n g   t h e   t i m e   a v a i l a b l e   f o r   t h e 
active life of projects, so worsening their prospects for effectiveness 
and sustainability.

92. 

These programmes are faced with the potential contradiction of sup-
p o r t i n g   c a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t   o f   t h e   N S A s   m o s t   i n   n e e d   b y   m e a n s 
o f   a   p r o c e d u r e   ( C a l l   f o r   P r o p o s a l s )   w h i c h   i s   d e s i g n e d   t o   s e l e c t   t h e 
best-performing NSAs.

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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S   O N   I M P L E M E N T A T I O N 
O F   C A P A C I T Y - D E V E L O P M E N T   P R O G R A M M E S

The Commission should take full account of their inherent complexity 
when  planning  these  programmes.  It  should  also  consider  the  inter-
action between the necessarily complex structures and the legal frame-
work, and devote resources to examining ways of delivering the policy 
aims within this constraint.

A l t e r n a t i v e s   t o   t h e   c u r r e n t   p r o c e d u r e s   s h o u l d   b e   e x p l o r e d ,   b o t h   t o 
allow a more strategic approach (such as a better use of the capabilities 
of  technical  assistance,  use  of  partnership  agreements,  multi-donor 
f u n d i n g )   a n d   t o   b e t t e r   r e a c h   t h e   g r a s s - r o o t s   o r g a n i s a t i o n s   ( s u c h   a s 
the use of cascading grants).

This Report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its 
meeting on 18 and 19 March 2009.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da Silva Caldeira
President

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A N N E X   I

CONTRACTED AMOUNTS WITH NSAs

A c c o r d i n g   t o   E u r o p e A i d ,   t h e   c o n t r a c t e d   a m o u n t s   w i t h   N S A s   i n 
2006  and  2007  can  be  estimated  at  836,43  and  915,26  million  euro 
( excluding Humanitarian aid 1), as follows: 

1  NGOs have been actively 

cooperating in the implementation 

of humanitarian aid actions 

since the 1990s. DG ECHO 

has long-term Framework 

Partnership Agreements with 

DOMAIN

Year 2006

Year 2007

the ECHO funding goes to NGOs 

(about 353 million euro in 2007).

(million euro)

a list of NGOs. About 50 % of 

Thematic Programmes

NGO Co-fi nancing

Decentralised Cooperation

Human Rights and Democracy

Environment

Food Security

Gender Equality

Health

Anti-Personnel Landmines

Migration and Asylum

Illicit Drugs

Rehabilitation/Refugees

Other Programmes

Geographical Programmes

Asia

Latin America

Mediterranean

Tacis

Total General Budget

European Development Fund

555,04

200,10

6,30

97,28

59,14

74,84

2,90

91,64

4,99

16,28

1,57

17,02

0,45

73,92

19,62

3,55

45,49

5,26

646,43

190,00

430,11

207,89

0,18

40,72

21,08

109,26

0,85

25,60

8,97

15,56

0,00

21,64

18,1

164,00

116,93

4,26

6,85

35,96

633,85

281,41

GRAND TOTAL

836,43

915,26

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A N N E X   I I

MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT 
RELATED TO NSAs

Article 4:

… the parties recognise the complementary role of and potential for 
contributions by non-state actors and local decentralised authorities 
to the development process. To this end, … non-state actors and local 
decentralised authorities shall, where appropriate:

 —

b e   i n f o r m e d   a n d   i n v o l v e d   i n   c o n s u l t a t i o n   o n   c o o p e r a t i o n   p o l -
i c i e s   a n d   s t r a t e g i e s ,   o n   p r i o r i t i e s   f o r   c o o p e r a t i o n   e s p e c i a l l y   i n 
a r e a s   t h a t   c o n c e r n   o r   d i r e c t l y   a f f e c t   t h e m ,   a n d   o n   t h e   p o l i t i c a l 
dialogue;

 —

be provided with financial resources, …, in order to support local 
development processes;

 —

 —

b e   i n v o l v e d   i n   t h e   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   o f   c o o p e r a t i o n   p r o j e c t   a n d 
p r o g r a m m e s   i n   a r e a s   t h a t   c o n c e r n   t h e m   o r   w h e r e   t h e s e   a c t o r s 
have a comparative advantage;

b e   p r o v i d e d   w i t h   c a p a c i t y - b u i l d i n g   s u p p o r t   i n   c r i t i c a l   a r e a s   i n 
order to reinforce the capabilities of these actors, particularly as 
regards organisation and representation, and the establishment 
of consultation mechanisms including channels of communication 
and dialogue, and to promote strategic alliances.

Article 6: 

1.  The actors of cooperation will include:

  —  non-state:

(a)  private sector;

(b)   e c o n o m i c   a n d   s o c i a l   p a r t n e r s ,   i n c l u d i n g   t r a d e   u n i o n 

organisations;

(c)   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   i n   a l l   i t s   f o r m s   a c c o r d i n g   t o   n a t i o n a l 

characteristics.

2.  R e c o g n i t i o n   b y   t h e   p a r t i e s   o f   n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l   a c t o r s   s h a l l 
d e p e n d   o n   t h e   e x t e n t   t o   w h i c h   t h e y   a d d r e s s   t h e   n e e d s   o f   t h e 
population, on their specific competencies and whether they are 
organised and managed democratically and transparently.

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A N N E X   I I

Article 7: Capacity building

T h e   c o n t r i b u t i o n   o f   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   t o   d e v e l o p m e n t   c a n   b e   e n h a n c e d 
b y   s t r e n g t h e n i n g   c o m m u n i t y   o r g a n i s a t i o n s   a n d   n o n - p r o f i t   n o n -
governmental organisations. This will require:

 —

e n c o u r a g i n g   a n d   s u p p o r t i n g   t h e   c r e a t i o n   a n d   d e v e l o p m e n t   o f 
such organisations;

 —

establishing arrangements for involving such organisations in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of development strategies 
and programmes.

Article 10:

provides that greater involvement of civil society organisations shall 
be associated with this [political] dialogue. 

Article 19: Principles and objectives

1.  …

2.  … 

3.  G o v e r n m e n t s   a n d   n o n - s t a t e   a c t o r s   i n   e a c h   A C P   c o u n t r y   s h a l l 
i n i t i a t e   c o n s u l t a t i o n s   o n   c o u n t r y   d e v e l o p m e n t   s t r a t e g i e s   a n d 
 community support thereto. 

Article 33: Institutional development and capacity building

…   C o o p e r a t i o n   s h a l l   s p a n   a l l   a r e a s   a n d   s e c t o r s   o f   c o o p e r a t i o n   t o 
foster the mergence of non-state actors and the development of their 
capacities; and to strengthen structures for information, dialogue and 
consultation  between  them  and  the  national  authorities,  including 
at regional level.

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A N N E X   I I

Article 57:

… Without prejudice to the provisions above, eligible non-state actors 
may also be responsible for proposing and implementing programmes 
and projects in areas concerning them …

Article 58: Eligibility for financing

… Non-state actors from ACP states and the Community which have 
a   l o c a l   c h a r a c t e r   s h a l l   b e   e l i g i b l e   f o r   f i n a n c i a l   s u p p o r t   u n d e r   t h i s 
Agreement,  according  to  the  modalities  agreed  in  the  national  and 
regional indicative programmes.

Article 4 of Annex IV: 

t h e   d r a f t   i n d i c a t i v e   p r o g r a m m e   s h a l l   c o n t a i n :   …   t h e   t y p e s   o f   n o n -
state actors eligible for funding, in accordance with the criteria laid 
d o w n   b y   t h e   C o u n c i l   o f   M i n i s t e r s ,   t h e   r e s o u r c e s   a l l o c a t e d   f o r   n o n -
state  actors  and  the  type  of  activities  to  be  supported,  which  must 
be not-for-profit; … 

Article 5 of Annex IV: 

…  [the  joint  annual  review]  shall  in  particular  cover  an  assessment 
of: … the use of the resources set aside for non-state actors.

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A N N E X   I I I

LIST OF THE PROGRAMMES, PROJECTS AND LOCAL CALLS 
FOR PROPOSALS EXAMINED

LIST OF PROGRAMMES OF NSAs’ CAPACITY-DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

Domain

Project description

Country/region

ALA

ALA

EDF

EDF

EU-Andean Community in Action with Andean civil society

Andean Community

Small Initiatives by Local Innovative NGOs (SMILING)

Bangladesh

Civil Society Fund

Appui et Renforcement des Initiatives des Acteurs 
Non-Etatiques (ARIANE)

Ethiopia

Mali

South Africa

Support to Civil Society Advocacy Programme (CSAP)

South Africa

South Africa

Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa (FHR)

South Africa

EDF

Civil Society Capacity Building Programme

Uganda

TOTAL AMOUNT

LIST OF NSA PROJECTS

Domain

Project description

Country/region

EIDHR

ONG

ONG

Food Security

Food Security

Promotion of Human Rights of Indigenous People 
in Bangladesh — NGO: IPDS

Underprivileged Children Preparatory Education Project — 
NGO: Secours catholique

Advancing Rural capacity in Haor (ARCH) — NGO: Concern 
World Wide

Food Security Increased through Rights Promotion and 
Sustainable Livelihoods Training (FOSHOL) — 
NGO: Action Aid

Preservation of Farm Resources and Improvement of Food 
Security for the Vulnerable Rural Families of Damot Gale 
and Kachira Bira — NGO: Inter Aide

ONG

Woreda Capacity Building — NGO: Farm Africa

Food Security

Food Security Capacity Building in Shashogo and Alaba 
Woredas — NGO: LVIA

EIDHR

EIDHR

Gender

Social Integration of Menja Ethnic Minorities of Chena and 
Gimbo Woredas — NGO: ActionAid

Promotion of practices of respect and defence of human 
rights for the reduction of torture and rehabilitation of victims 
of political violence — NGO: CAPS

Promotion of the incorporation of women micro-
entrepreneurs and family-based economic units in the formal 
labour system — NGO: M. Manuela Ramos

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Peru

Peru

EU contribution 
(Euro)

4 100 000

8 000 000

10 000 000

7 000 000

10 000 000

25 000 000

8 000 000

72 100 000

EU contribution 
(Euro)

88 587

253 179

471 970

2 322 170

700 000

1 096 597

630 500

90 000

94 415

665 458

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A N N E X   I I I

LIST OF NSA PROJECTS

Domain

Project description

Country/region

ONG

ONG

ONG

ONG

Integration of poor micro-enterprises, with competitive 
potential, into the economic activity of local and regional 
markets — NGO: Oxfam Novib

Institutional strengthening and promotion of the local 
economy to fi ght poverty in the department of Junín — 
NGO: Frères des Hommes

Peru

Peru

Access to social security rights in South 
Africa — NGO: DanChurch

The Salesian Youth Capacity Building Project — 
NGO: Coop. Mission au Developpement

South Africa

South Africa

Support to Policing of Crimes against Women and Children 
in Eastern Cape — NGO: FAMSA

Support to Policing of Crimes against Women and Children 
in Eastern Cape — NGO: NICRO — Victim Support

LIST OF LOCAL CALLS FOR PROPOSALS

South Africa

South Africa

South Africa

South Africa

EU contribution 
(Euro)

1 500 000

715 780

587 820

400 000

59 204

85 435

TOTAL AMOUNT

9 761 115

Domain

Call for proposals description

Country/region

EU contribution 
(Euro)

Food Security

Food Security 2003 Call for proposal 

EIDHR

EIDHR

European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
Call for proposals — Micro-projects Bangladesh — 2006

2006 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) micro-projects programme for the campaign 
‘Promoting the democratic process’

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

Ethiopia

Food Security

2005 Food Security Programme — Allocation for NGOs

Ethiopia

EIDHR

EIDHR

2005 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
micro-projects programme

2006 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) micro-projects programme

Peru

Peru

South Africa

Support to Policing of Crimes against Women and Children 
in Eastern Cape

South Africa

4 500 000

525 000

975 000

5 000 000

575 000

380 000

750 000

TOTAL AMOUNT

12 705 000

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A N N E X   I V

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACTORS VISITED ON THE SPOT

Country*

Ethiopia

State bodies 
(including local 
authorities)

NGOs

North

South

Other NSAs

Other donors

Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Development

Inter Aid

LVIA

Acord

Hundee

Cotonou Task Force

Canada (CIDA)

EOC-DIDAC

Sweden (SIDA)

CAFOD/Trocaire

Farm Africa 

ARRD-AFM

Ministry of Capacity 
Building

Water Resource 
Development and 
Natural Resources 
Development 
Offi  ces in Alaba and 
Dale Gale Woredas 
(Districts)

Oxfam GB

CISP

German Agro 
Action

Bangladesh

Comptroller and 
Auditor General

ActionAid 
Bangladesh

Ministry of Foreign 
Aff airs

Caritas 
Bangladesh

Ministry of Finance 
(Economic Relations 
Division)

NGO Aff airs Bureau

Concern 
Worldwide

Save the Children 
US

BRAC 

Indigenous 
Peoples’ 
Development 
Services

Noakhali Rural 
Development 
Society

Private Rural 
Initiative 
Programme (PRIP 
Trust)

*  See Annex III for details of the projects and calls for proposals examined.

Irish Aid

UK (DFID)

Australia (AusAID)

Canada (CIDA)

Netherlands

UK (DFID)

UNDP (United 
Nations 
Development 
Programme)

World Food 
Programme

Woreda (District) 
Development 
Association in Konso

Derashe Peoples’ 
Development 
Association

Bedene Irrigation 
Cooperative in 
Alaba Woreda

Kebele Iddirs in Dale 
Gale Woreda

Federation of NGOs 
in Bangladesh

Defuliapar School 
Management 
Association

Bhubankura School 
Management 
Association

East Barahipur 
Farmers’ Group

Ramkrishnopur 
Farmers’ Group

Livestock Services 
Centre Ewajsbalia

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A N N E X   I V

Country*

Peru

South Africa

State bodies 
(including local 
authorities)

Regional 
Administration 
for Work and 
Employment 
Promotion Junin

Provincial Council of 
Huancayo

Town Council of 
Tarma

Town Council of 
Palca

Civil Society 
Advocacy 
Programme (CSAP)

Commission for 
Gender and Equality 
(CGE)

SA Human Rights 
Commission 
(SAHRC)

State Policy in Port 
Elizabeth

Ministry of Finance 
(Department 
for International 
Cooperation 
Development)

Ministry of Justice 
(unit in charge of 
donor coordination) 
in Pretoria

NGOs

North

South

Other NSAs

Other donors

Oxfam Novib,

CAPS

Copeme

Belgium 

Assoc. Frères des 
Hommes

Mov. Manuela 
Ramos

German Agro 
Action

Idesi

Adec/Atc

Action for the 
Children

Coremype Junin

Spain (AECI)

Chamber of 
Commerce Junin

UNDP

Two women’s 
associations Puente 
Piedra

Farmers’ association 
Huallquin

Craftmen’s 
Association 
Huancayo

Shoemakers’ 
Association 
Huancayo

Community 
Committee  San 
Juan Lurigancho

Community 
Association 
Paucamarca

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Netherlands

UK (DFID)

UN offi  ce on drugs 
and crime

Salesian Centre, 
Cape Town

Southern Africa 
AIDS Trust

Black Sash 
National

FAMSA

NICRO

Victim Friendly 
Centre, Port 
Elizabeth

Foundation for 
Human Rights 
(FHR)

Africa Institute of 
South Africa

Centre for Police 
Studies

Institute for Security 
Studies

Khulumani Support 
Group

Lawyers for Human 
Rights

South Africa 
Institute for 
International Aff airs

SOS

Tsogang Sechaba

*  See Annex III for details of the projects and calls for proposals examined.

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REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION
COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.
The evolving context rightly recalled by the 
Court  should  however  be  considered  in  all 
its aspects.

T h e r e   a r e   i n d e e d   t h e   e v o l v i n g   a p p r o a c h e s 
d i s c u s s e d   w i t h i n   t h e   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   c o m -
munity  of  Donors  and  to  some  extend  with 
recipient Governments but there are also tre-
mendous changes in the number and quality 
of NSAs — international and local — present 
in the development playing field (please also 
refer to point 18 below).

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   n o t e s   t h a t   t h e r e   i s   n o 
a g r e e d   d e f i n i t i o n   o f   t h e   t e r m   n o n   g o v e r n -
mental organisations and is ready to discuss 
this  issue  with  the  European  Parliament  in 
line  with  their  request  (point  19,  discharge 
2006).

T h e   d i f f e r e n t   l e g a l   f r a m e w o r k s   o f   E D F   a n d 
G e n e r a l   B u d g e t   d e s e r v e   t o   b e   c o n s i d e r e d 
a l s o   f o r   t h e   p r o v i s i o n s   c o n c e r n i n g   t h e 
 activities to be implemented by NSAs.

III.
A   v e r y   s i g n i f i c a n t   i n c r e a s e   i n   i n t e r a c t i o n 
between Commission Delegations and local 
N S A s   h a s   o c c u r r e d   s i n c e   t h e   d e c o n c e n t r a -
tion of the relevant programmes and, espe-
c i a l l y ,   t h e   m a n a g e m e n t   b y   D e l e g a t i o n s   o f 
local calls for proposals.

S e v e r a l   o t h e r   f a c t o r s   w h i c h   i n f l u e n c e   N S A 
involvement in the development  cooperation 
process must be mentioned:

 •

 •

 •

 •

d i f f e r e n c e s   b e t w e e n   g e o g r a p h -
i c a l   ( b u d g e t   a n d   E D F )   a n d   t h e m a t i c 
programmes;

p a r t n e r   g o v e r n m e n t s   p r i o r i t i e s   a n d 
ownership;

aid effectiveness agenda;

changes within the NSA world (number, 
quality and type).

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IV.
T h e   s e l e c t i o n   p r o c e d u r e s   a p p l i e d   b y   t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n   a i m   t o   i d e n t i f y   t h e   p r o p o s a l s 
that  would  maximise  the  overall  effective-
ness of the programme through considering, 
in addition to the criteria mentioned by the 
Court,  the  feasibility  and  cost-efficiency  of 
the proposed actions as well as the financial 
a n d   o p e r a t i o n a l   c a p a c i t y   o f   t h e   a p p l i c a n t 
and partners.

T h e   C a l l   f o r   P r o p o s a l s   m e c h a n i s m   r e s u l t s 
i n   w i d e   p u b l i c a t i o n ,   t r a n s p a r e n c y ,   c l e a r 
guidelines  and  consistent  interpretation  of 
 procedures and financial rules.

T h e r e   a r e   a   n u m b e r   o f   t h e   e x   p o s t   e v a l u -
ations and monitoring exercises conducted 
b y   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n ,   w h i c h   l o o k   a l s o   a t   t h e 
 s u s t a i n a b i l i t y   o f   t h e s e   a c t i o n s   a t   p r o j e c t 
level.

VI.
Despite the fact that former ALA regulation 
d i d n ’ t   f o r m a l l y   e n v i s a g e   c a p a c i t y   b u i l d i n g 
s u p p o r t   t o   N S A s ,   v a r i o u s   s t u d i e s   a n d   p r o -
grammes are being carried out in this issue 
in both Latin America & Asia.

A   s i g n i f i c a n t   n u m b e r   o f   p r o j e c t s /
programmes in Asia and Central Asia which 
a r e / w i l l   b e   i m p l e m e n t e d   t h r o u g h   n o n -
g o v e r n m e n t a l   o r g a n i s a t i o n   h a v e   b e e n 
adopted  in  2007  and  2008.  While  their  pri-
m a r y   o b j e c t i v e   i s   t o   c o n t r i b u t e   t o   p o v e r t y 
eradication, improvement of access to social 
services and improvement of governance and 
rule of law, they support non state actors in 
pursuance of these goals.

VII.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   i s   s t r e n g t h e n i n g   t h e 
involvement of NSAs by:

V.
As  observed  by  the  Court,  the  issue  of  NSA 
e n g a g e m e n t   i s   t r e a t e d   i n   d i f f e r e n t   w a y s 
under the Cotonou Agreement compared to 
the Regulations applicable to non-ACP coun-
tries. This also extends to the availability of 
funding for in-country capacity-building of 
NSAs. And thus funding for capacity-building 
of  NSAs  in  non-ACP  countries  is  essentially 
limited to the thematic programme.

 •

 •

 •

better knowledge management through 
P A D O R   a n d   b e t t e r   d i s s e m i n a t i o n   o f 
knowledge through CISOCH;

l a u n c h i n g   o f   p i l o t   m a p p i n g   s t u d i e s 
designed, if possible, in close  cooperation 
with government;

i m p r o v i n g   p r e d i c t a b i l i t y   a n d   t r a n s -
p a r e n c y   r e l a t e d   t o   t h e   c o n s u l t a t i o n 
process.

W i t h i n   t h e s e   l i m i t a t i o n s ,   s i g n i f i c a n t   w o r k 
h a s   b e e n   i n i t i a t e d   t o   b r i n g   f o r w a r d   i n   a 
m o r e   s y s t e m a t i c   m a n n e r   t h e   i n t e r a c t i o n 
with  NSAs,  and  an  assessment  exercise  was 
undertaken  by  HQs  with  regard  to  engage-
m e n t   w i t h   N S A s   ( r e p o r t   p r o v i d e d   t o   t h e 
Court).

The Commission will continue with the simpli-
fication of calls for proposal, shortening the 
p r o c e d u r e   a n d   p r o m o t i n g    i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
at local level.

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T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   b e l i e v e s   t h a t   t h e   c o n t r o l 
system in place ensure a sound financial and 
contractual monitoring.

Delegation and NSA staff will continue to be 
trained, including on the use of performance 
indicators.

A mix of instruments is being considered in 
view of the regulatory framework created by 
t h e   F i n a n c i a l   R e g u l a t i o n s ,   E D F ,   D C I ,   E I H D R 
and ENPI.

C a p a c i t y   d e v e l o p m e n t   s h o u l d   p r e f e r a b l y 
b e   c h a n n e l l e d   t h r o u g h   g e o g r a p h i c   p r o -
grammes,  the  principle  of  alignment  of  aid 
requires  that  partner  country  governments 
define strategies, sectors and themes within 
this  context.  The  Commission  will  continue 
to promote the involvement of NSAs.

M o r e   a n d   m o r e   i n t e r a c t i o n   i s   s t r u c t u r a l l y 
o r g a n i s e d   b e t w e e n   d i f f e r e n t   i n s t r u m e n t s 
and  programmes  to  allow  a  better  comple-
m e n t a r i t y   w i t h   a c t i v i t i e s   s u p p o r t e d   b y   t h e 
b i l a t e r a l ,   t h e m a t i c   a n d   r e g i o n a l   c o n t e x t s . 
I n   a d d i t i o n ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   p a r t i c i p a t e s 
actively  in  the  donors’  coordination  mech-
a n i s m s .   T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   i s   o f   t h e   o p i n i o n 
that other channels such as the extension of 
the sub-granting must be considered.

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INTRODUCTION

2.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   n o t e s   t h a t   t h e r e   i s   n o 
a g r e e d   d e f i n i t i o n   o f   t h e   t e r m   n o n   g o v e r n -
mental organisations and is ready to discuss 
this  issue  with  the  European  Parliament  in 
line  with  their  request  (point  19,  discharge 
2006).

5.
Please refer to reply to paragraph 52.

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

OBSERVATIONS

18.
Since its early days the Commission has been 
c h a m p i o n i n g   t h e   r o l e   o f   N S A s   i n   d e v e l o p -
ment and has developed supporting policies 
and financing activities for facilitating their 
involvement.  Reference  texts  such  as  com-
munications  and  guidelines  highlighted  by 
the  Court  are  a  clear  demonstration  of  this 
importance.

The  ‘European  Consensus  on  Development’ 
r i g h t l y   r e c a l l e d   b y   t h e   C o u r t   s h o u l d ,   h o w -
ever, be considered in all its aspects.

T h e r e   a r e ,   i n d e e d ,   e v o l v i n g   a p p r o a c h e s 
( a l i g n m e n t   t o   p a r t n e r   g o v e r n m e n t s   p r i o r -
ities, ownership, harmonisation …) but there 
are also tremendous changes in the number 
a n d   q u a l i t y   o f   N S A s   —   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   a n d 
local — present in the development field.

This  evolution  is  paramount  to  understand 
the  possibilities  and  limits  of  NSA  involve-
m e n t   i n   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n 
process.

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M o r e o v e r   m e t h o d s   a r e   s h a r p l y   d i f f e r e n t 
when dealing within a bilateral context from 
m e t h o d s   o f   w o r k s   a p p l i e d   w i t h i n   t h e m a t i c 
programs.

21.
Although  not  legally  obliged,  the  Commis-
s i o n   c o n f i r m s   t h a t   a s   f a r   a s   p o s s i b l e   i t   h a s 
always  tried  to  consult  with  NSAs,  this  was 
a political objective where local conditions 
were conducive to such consultations.

There has been increased consultation effort 
w i t h   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   u n d e r t a k e n   b y   t h e   E C   i n 
t h e   c o u r s e   o f   t h e   2 0 0 7 – 1 3   p r o g r a m m i n g 
exercise compared with previous exercises. 
Furthermore, the need for close consultation 
o f   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   h a s   b e e n   r e i t e r a t e d   i n   t h e 
g u i d e l i n e s   f o r   t h e   m i d - t e r m   r e v i e w   o f   t h e 
2007–13 Strategy Papers.

At the time of the preparation of the 2002–06 
CSP,  there  was  no  general  legal  obligation 
for  programming  in  Asia  and  Latin  America 
t o   i n v o l v e   N S A s   a n d   d e v o l u t i o n   w a s   a t   i t s 
b e g i n n i n g .   T h e   D e l e g a t i o n s   v i s i t e d   b y   t h e 
Court  were  devolved  in  the  three  different 
waves (1 st South Africa and Mali, 2 nd Ethiopia 
a n d   P e r u ,   a n d   t h i r d   B a n g l a d e s h )   a n d   t h u s 
f o r   s o m e   o f   t h e m ,   t h e   p r e p a r a t i o n   o f   t h e 
C S P   w a s   e s s e n t i a l l y   c a r r i e d   o u t   u n d e r   t h e 
responsibility of HQ.

See also reply to paragraph 22.

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22.
T h e   l e v e l   o f   i n v o l v e m e n t   o f   t h e   v a r i o u s 
s t a k e h o l d e r s   i n   t h e   p r o g r a m m i n g   p r o c e s s 
i n   h e a v i l y   d e p e n d e n t   o n   t h e   s p e c i f i c   s i t u -
a t i o n   o f   e v e r y   c o u n t r y   a n d   t h e   a p p l i c a b l e 
legal framework of cooperation. Within the 
bilateral  cooperation  and  accordingly  with 
t h e   c o n c l u s i o n s   o f   t h e   P a r i s   D e c l a r a t i o n 
and of the European Consensus, when even 
p o s s i b l e   t h e   p a r t n e r   g o v e r n m e n t s   s h o u l d 
be the in driving seat and this should more 
a n d   m o r e   b e   u p   t o   t h e m   t o   o r g a n i s e   t h e 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s   o f   t h e   v a r i o u s   s t a k e h o l d e r s . 
The Commission is obviously supporting any 
c o n s u l t i n g   p r o c e s s   b u t   f i n a l   p r i o r i t i e s   a n d 
objectives have to be owned by the partner 
country and not imposed.

The NSAs consultation process followed for 
the preparation of the Peru CSP represented 
the  first  attempt  at  a  structured  approach, 
a t   a   t i m e   w h e n ,   u n d e r   t h e   t h e n - p r e v a i l i n g 
AL Regulation, no consultation was formally 
r e q u i r e d .   T h i s   a p p r o a c h   w i l l   b e   b u i l t   u p o n 
in future programming exercises.

23.
G u i d e l i n e s   a r e   o r i e n t a t i o n   p a p e r s .   T h e y 
have to be implemented when possible in a 
p r a g m a t i c   m a n n e r   t a k i n g   i n t o   a c c o u n t   t h e 
specific context.

24.

The situations of ACP and DCI countries are 
n o t   c o m p a r a b l e   a s   t h e   p o l i t i c a l   a n d   l e g a l 
framework contexts are very different. There 
is on the one hand a mutual agreement of all 
ACP and EU countries for matters concerning 
t h e   i n v o l v e m e n t   o f   N S A s   a n d   o n   t h e   o t h e r 
hand a DCI regulation decided by EU only.

25.
T h i s   i s   i n   l i n e   w i t h   t h e   l e g a l   b a s i s   a n d 
requirement in force at the time.

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26.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   a n d   w o u l d   l i k e   t o 
e m p h a s i s e   t h e s e   e s s e n t i a l   c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
s h o u l d   b e   b o r n e   i n   m i n d   t h r o u g h o u t   t h e 
report:

 —

 —

The Commission signals in particular that 
despite the difficulties for NSA involve-
m e n t   D e l e g a t i o n s   h a v e   s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
made efforts to engage on dialogue with 
NSAs.

These difficulties are all inherent weak-
n e s s e s   o f   t h e   N S A s   c o m m u n i t y ,   w h i c h 
i s   n o t   a   h o m o g e n e o u s   b l o c ,   a n d   l a c k s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n   a n d   r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s . 
T h e s e   f a c t o r s   —   c o u p l e d   w i t h   n a t i o n a l 
legislative  and  regulatory  issues  in  the 
p a r t n e r   c o u n t r i e s   a r e   a n o t h e r   m a j o r 
stumbling block precluding the involve-
ment of the NSA community ‘as one’ into 
the EC’s development cooperation.

27.
See replies to paragraphs 24–26

S i n c e   2 0 0 4 / 0 5   E u r o p e A i d   h a s   p r o v i d e d 
tailor-made  upstream  guidance  during  the 
instruction phase of NSAs programmes, and 
downstream  during  implementation.  Dele-
gations  are  also  provided  with  operational 
guidance: firstly through its intranet where 
g u i d e l i n e s   a n d   g o o d   p r a c t i c e s   a r e   p o s t e d ; 
secondly  through  regional  seminars  where 
knowledge about commitment in dialoguing 
w i t h   N S A s   a n d   e x c h a n g e s   w i t h   c o l l e a g u e s 
are enhanced and finally through studies.

In addition, EuropeAid organised in 2008 var-
ious  seminars  designed  to  provide  training 
to Delegations and CSOs on thematic opera-
t i o n s   m a n a g e m e n t   a n d   C S O    c o n s u l t a t i o n s 
(total cost EUR 900 000):

 —

E C   i n t e r n a l   t r a i n i n g s
:   t h r e e   s e m i n a r s 
( B r u s s e l s ,   T b i l i s i   a n d   A d d i s   A b a b a ) 
g a t h e r i n g   i n   t o t a l   1 8 5   r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
o f   a l m o s t   7 0   D e l e g a t i o n s   +   f o u r   t r a i n -
i n g   s e s s i o n s   o r g a n i s e d   i n   B r u s s e l s 
(120  representatives of Delegations and 
HQ)

The  Guatemala  example  illustrates  the  dif-
ficulties in, and need for, establishing a def-
inition of the legal limitations of a sustained 
consultation process with civil society.

 —

28.
T r a n s l a t i n g   t h e   a m b i t i o u s   g o a l s   o f   i n v o l v -
i n g   N S A s   i n   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t   c o o p e r a t i o n 
is  a  major  challenge.  This  is  however  to  be 
understood  as  a  major  ‘political  challenge’ 
much more that a commitment to ensure the 
involvement  of  each  and  every  NSA  from  a 
specific country.

The Commission would like to stress that as 
far  as  NSAs  are  concerned,  there  is  no  one 
size fits all for training as the NSAs ‘architec-
ture’ varies immensely between countries.

 (open to represent-
EC trainings for SCO
a t i v e s   o f   E u r o p e a n   &   l o c a l   S C O ) :   t h r e e 
regional seminars (Porto  Alegre, Yaoundé, 
Manila) gathering 49 representatives of 
28 Delegations and 193  representatives 
of European & local SCOs.

These events enabled both HQ and Delega-
tions to revive the ‘civil society focal points 
network’ used to disseminate  methodological 
tools in-house.

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I n   2 0 0 9 ,   i n   a d d i t i o n   t o   t h e   o r g a n i s a t i o n   o f 
five other Regional seminars, EuropeAid will 
make operational the Civil Society Helpdesk 
(CISOCH) established at the end of 2008 and 
i n t e n d   t o   d e v e l o p   a n   o n l i n e   t o o l   t h a t   w i l l 
strengthen both coordination of the differ-
ent services of the Commission and dis sem-
in ation of ‘best practices’ as far as NSAs are 
concerned.

29.
N S A   i n v o l v e m e n t   i n   a i d   e f f e c t i v e n e s s   w a s 
n o t   o n   t h e   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   p o l i t i c a l   a g e n d a 
w h e n   t h e   g u i d e l i n e s   w e r e   d r a f t e d   i n   2 0 0 4 . 
Taking stock of the impact of this recent evo-
lution on civil society and on the practice of 
the  Commission,  EuropeAid  has  developed 
a  draft  guidance  document  on  the  issue  of 
civil society participation in new aid modal-
ities, including general budget support and 
s e c t o r   p r o g r a m m e s   i m p l e m e n t e d   t h r o u g h 
budgetary aid (see point 74 where the Court 
also takes stock of this evolution).

31.
The  consultation  process  is  very  heavy  and 
time-consuming.  In  order  to  respect  dead-
lines and a centralised and accessible tech-
nical tool has to be put in place, in order to 
provide  a  quick  and  common  access  to  the 
same ‘space’ of discussion.

The ‘Civil Society Helpdesk (CISOCH)’, under 
the  form  of  a  documental  database  (‘wiki’), 
will provide part of the solution.

33.
See replies to paragraphs 21 and 69.

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34.
T h i s   i s   i n d e e d   t h e   r e s u l t   o f   t h e   l a t e   l e g a l 
a d o p t i o n   o f   t h e   r e g u l a t i o n   w h i c h   w i l l   n o t 
occur again on condition the partner coun-
tries are willing to actively take part in this 
process.

After the Court’s audit, most of the Delega-
tions  (including  Peru)  consulted  NSAs,  and 
this procedure will continue for next years.

35.
The fundamental purpose was to secure the 
widest possible coverage of countries under 
the thematic programme.

I n   a d d i t i o n   s e e   a l s o   r e p l i e s   t o   p a r a g r a p h s : 
21, 22, 31, 84 and 85.

38.
A s   o f   1 . 1 . 2 0 0 3   t h e   F i n a n c i a l   R e g u l a t i o n s 
r e q u i r e   b y   d e f a u l t   t h e   u s e   o f   ‘ c a l l   f o r   p r o -
posals’ to award grant contracts. The insuf-
f i c i e n c y   o f   t h e   a v a i l a b l e   b u d g e t   i s   o n   t h e 
o n e   h a n d   a   s i g n   o f   i t s   s u c c e s s   a n d   o n   t h e 
o t h e r   h a n d   u n a v o i d a b l e   i n   t e r m   o f   s c a r c e 
f i n a n c i a l   r e s o u r c e s   f o r   e x t e r n a l   a i d .   W i t h 
r e f e r e n c e   t o   t h e   o l d   N G O   c o - f i n a n c i n g 
p r o g r a m m e   a n d   a t   t h e   e x p l i c i t   r e q u e s t   o f 
t h e   E u r o p e a n   P a r l i a m e n t   h a d   t o   s t e p u p 
t h e   i n c l u s i v e n e s s   c h a r a c t e r   a n d   f o s t e r   t h e 
NGOs’ right of initiative and thus could not 
h a v e   a   m o r e   f o c u s e d   a p p r o a c h   ( s e e   r e p l y 
to paragraph 35). We could concur that the 
d e t a i l e d   p r o c e d u r e s   a r e   c u m b e r s o m e   b u t 
w e   a r e   o b l i g e d   t o   r e s p e c t   t h e   c o m p u l s o r y 
regulatory framework to foster sound finan-
cial management. Although there is no clear 
definition of a ‘small NGO’ the existing data 
s h o w s   t h a t   N G O s   o f   a l l   d i f f e r e n t   s i z e s   p a r -
ticipate in the Calls of proposals in an appli-
cants  (leader)  capacity  or  partner  capacity. 
This  is  all  the  more  true  as  from  2006  with 
the introduction of the Concept Notes there 
has been a decrease in the proposal submis-
s i o n    r e q u i r e m e n t s   a t   t h e   f i r s t   s t a g e   o f   t h e 
procedure.

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39.
The deadlines are imposed by the regulatory 
framework and although within the allowed 
m a r g i n   f o r   f l e x i b i l i t y ,   i m p o r t a n t   i m p r o v e -
ments  have  been  made.  While  the  projects 
a u d i t e d   b y   t h e   C o u r t   r e l a t e   t o   a   p r e v i o u s 
period,  the  current  average  delay  between 
the  submission  of  proposals  and  the  actual 
signing  of  contracts  is  now  much  less  than 
a year.

It is hereby also reminded that the existing 
regulatory framework for publicising Call for 
proposals, concern the legal minima; hence 
c r e a t i v e   i m a g i n a t i o n   o f   o p e r a t i o n a l   a c t o r s 
can be useful for additional means for pub-
licity.  Accordingly,  in  addition  to  the  legal 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,   i n f o r m a t i o n   o n   t h e   C a l l   f o r 
P r o p o s a l s   i s   n o r m a l l y   c h a n n e l l e d   t h r o u g h 
bulletins or other means by NGOs platforms. 
I n   a d d i t i o n ,   f o r   m o r e   t h a n   a   y e a r   E u r o p e -
Aid has been systematically sending e-mails 
t o   u m b r e l l a   o r g a n i s a t i o n s   f o r   i n f o r m a t i o n 
 dissemination purposes.

R e a c h i n g   l o c a l   N S A s   a t   g r a s s - r o o t s   l e v e l 
r e m a i n s   a   m a j o r   c h a l l e n g e .   L o c a l   C a l l s   f o r 
P r o p o s a l s   p u b l i s h e d   b y   D e l e g a t i o n   s i n c e 
2007 will help meet this challenge.

H o w e v e r ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n ,   a l t h o u g h   i t   i s 
adapting its tools to ensure the enforcement 
o f   t h e   p u b l i c i t y   r e q u i r e m e n t s ,   s t a t e s   t h a t 
t h e r e   a r e   l i m i t s   t o   i t s   p o s s i b i l i t y   t o   r e a c h 
all  NSAs  at  grass-roots  level  for  its  services 
and is wondering if this is the Commission’s 
role.

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REPLY OF THE 
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40.
The Commission welcomes the positive appre-
ciation of the Court regarding the measures 
taken in view of improving the efficiency of 
the Call for Proposals procedures.

(a) 

Experience shows that this new method 
has generally obtained good results (see 
p o i n t   3 9 ) .   I n d e e d ,   t h e   r e s t r i c t e d   p r o -
c e d  u r e   a l r e a d y   s i m p l i f i e s   t h e   s e l e c t i o n 
procedure.

(b) 

This system provides a longer and more 
m a n a g e a b l e   t i m e   f r a m e   f o r   a l l   p a r t i e s . 
This increases the possibility of foresee-
ing our actions both for the Commission 
i n t e r n a l   u s e   o f   r e s o u r c e s   a s   w e l l   a s   f o r 
the  NSAs  in  order  to  plan  their  strategy 
and investments for the submission.

(c) 

PADOR (Potential Applicant Data Online 
R e g i s t r a t i o n )   s i m p l i f i e s   a n d   d e c r e a s e s 
the selection time process.

(d) 

Indeed, the possibility of adapting calls 
for proposals increases the efficiency of 
the  process  in  selecting  relevant  NSAs, 
as demonstrated by the first experiences 
in local calls for proposals.

41.
In  selecting  proposals,  evaluators  carefully 
c h e c k   t h e   p r e s e n c e   o f   s o m e   e l e m e n t s   o f 
t h e   l o g f r a m e   a p p r o a c h   i n   t h e   f u l l   a p p l i c a -
t i o n   ( p r e p a r a t o r y ,   s t a k e h o l d e r s   a n d   p r o b -
lems  analysis  as  well  as  the  analysis  of  the 
o b j e c t i v e s   a n d   s t r a t e g i e s   o f   t h e   p r o j e c t 
proposal).

F o r   c e r t a i n   t y p e s   o f   p r o j e c t ,   c a r r y i n g   o u t 
diagnostic identification of beneficiaries or 
studies can be an inherent part of the project 
i t s e l f :   a i m i n g   f o r   i n s t a n c e   a t   e m  p o w e r i n g 
g r a s s - r o o t s   o r g a n i s a t i o n s   a n d   i m p r o v i n g 
ownership.

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44.
The different viewpoints of representative of 
the NSAs and Delegations should be analysed 
in view of the different roles. Considerations 
concerning the management of the Delega-
t i o n ’ s   s t a f f   t u r n o v e r   i n   a   d e v o l v e d   c o n t e x t 
are  independent  from  NSAs  but  are  closely 
m o n i t o r e d   b y   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   t o   e n s u r e 
c o n t i n u i t y   o f   s e r v i c e   a n d   m a i n t e n a n c e   o f 
level  of  quality.  However,  the  ‘zero  growth 
in  staff’  policy  combined  with  the  increase 
of funds and the new opening of Delegations 
is creating organisational stress.

E u r o p e A i d   a r r a n g e s   t r a i n i n g   c o u r s e s   i n 
 B r u s s e l s   f o r   s t a f f   ( b a s i c   l e v e l   a s   w e l l   a s 
a d v a n c e d )   o n   g r a n t s   p r o c e d u r e s   e v e r y 
q u a r t e r .   T r a i n i n g   a n d   w o r k s h o p s   a r e   a l s o 
regularly  given  at  regional  seminars  (Brus-
s e l s   a n d   i n - c o u n t r y ) .   A n   e - l e a r n i n g   c o u r s e 
(basic level) is being developed during 2009 
s o   t h a t   m o r e   s t a f f   i n   d e l e g a t i o n s   c a n   h a v e 
a c c e s s   t o   t r a i n i n g .   E u r o p e A i d   h a s   r e c e n t l y 
published  FAQs  on  the  intranet,  which  also 
covers grants. There are plans to hold joint 
seminars  with  Concord  members  (train  the 
trainers), information days are organised on 
the occasion of many Calls for proposals.

45.
The geographic programmes usually provide 
s p e c i f i c   c a p a c i t y   t o   N S A s   o n   i m p l e m e n t a -
tion rules in the framework of a more global 
capacity-building  strategy.  Capacity  build-
ing on these issues is therefore more regular 
and built on a longer-term vision.

As far as trainings is concerned, please refer 
t o   p o i n t   2 8   ( S e m i n a r s   a n d   C I S O C H   —   C i v i l 
Society Helpdesk).

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   w o u l d   l i k e   t o   n o t e   t h a t 
t h i s   p r o j e c t   w a s   m o n i t o r e d   i n   2 0 0 7 ,   b y   a n 
external  independent  evaluator,  as  part  of 
t h e   r e s u l t s - o r i e n t e d   m o n i t o r i n g   e x e r c i s e , 
o b t a i n i n g   d i f f e r e n t   c o n c l u s i o n s   a b o u t   t h e 
‘project design’.

The project was qualified as highly relevant 
and  with  a  good  quality  design  (b  =  good). 
Also the potential sustainability is qualified 
as  A  (=  very  good);  the  alliance  with  Minis-
try of Labour and Employment is mentioned 
a s   o n e   o f   t h e   m a j o r   a c h i e v e m e n t s   o f   t h e 
project, at the same time as a real closeness 
with the local and regional authorities.

The  ROM  exercise  is  one  of  the  most  useful 
working  instruments  for  Delegations  moni-
toring follow-up tasks. In addition, there was 
a  monitoring  of  the  project  in  2006,  at  the 
beginning of the action.

42.
The Commission makes sure that CONCORD 
r e a d e r s   a r e   p u b l i s h e d   o n   t h e   E u r o p e A i d 
intranet  page  and  it  has  been  addressed  to 
a l l   S u b - d e l e g a t e d   A u t h o r i s i n g   O f f i c e r s   b y 
separate note.

43.
The Commission attaches the highest atten-
tion to continuously improve its control sys-
tems and has introduced over the past years 
n u m e r o u s   m e a s u r e s   t o   f u r t h e r   r e  i n f o r c e 
t h e m ,   a m o n g   w h i c h   t h e   n e w   t e r m s   o f   r e f -
erence  for  mandatory  expenditure  verifica-
t i o n s   f o r   g r a n t   c o n t r a c t s   ( F e b r u a r y   2 0 0 6 ) 
and for audits launched by the Commission 
(October 2007).

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N e w   r u l e s   h a v e   s y s t e m a t i c a l l y   b e e n   p r e -
sented to and clarified with CONCORD, e.g. in 
the context of the elaboration of Readers.

In some cases, upon request of the NSAs, the 
Commission has authorised the application 
o f   m o r e   f l e x i b l e   r u l e s   w h e n   t h e y   w e r e   n o t 
automatically  applicable  retroactively  (e.g. 
n o t e   2 2 2 3 8   o f   1 6 . 8 . 2 0 0 5   o n   e x c h a n g e   r a t e 
reference).

48.
In its Annual Reports, the Court has noticed 
i m p r o v e m e n t s   i n   t h e   a u d i t   s y s t e m   d u e   t o 
recent measures introduced by the Commis-
s i o n .   A t   t h e   s a m e   t i m e ,   m o s t   o f   t h e   a u d i t 
reports reviewed by the Court in the frame-
w o r k   o f   t h e   D A S   2 0 0 7   w e r e   l i n k e d   t o   c o n -
t r a c t s   s i g n e d   b e f o r e   F e b r u a r y   2 0 0 6 .   A s   a 
c o n s e q u e n c e ,   t h e   n e w   T e r m s   o f   R e f e r e n c e 
set up by EuropeAid for expenditure verifica-
tions of grant contracts and put into force for 
new contracts signed as from this date were 
not applicable in the cases analysed. The aim 
of these new Terms of Reference is precisely 
to detect errors such as the ones mentioned 
by  the  Court.  The  Commission  expects  that 
the  effects  of  these   improvements  become 
more and more visible.

49.
T h e   n e w   t e r m s   o f   r e f e r e n c e   f o r   e x t e r n a l 
‘financial  audits’  (i.e.  agreed  upon  pro ced-
u r e   o f   e x p e n d i t u r e   v e r i f i c a t i o n )   l a u n c h e d 
by the beneficiaries in compliance with the 
requirements  of  their  EC  grant  are  in  force 
f o r   a l l   n e w   s t a n d a r d   c o n t r a c t s   s i g n e d   a s 
from  February  2006  (as  stated  above  under 
p o i n t   4 8 ) .   T h e   n e w   t e r m s   o f   r e f e r e n c e   f o r 
t h e   a u d i t s   l a u n c h e d   b y   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n 
w e r e   a p p l i c a b l e   f r o m   O c t o b e r   2 0 0 7 .   W h i l e 
the  use  of  the  former  depends  on  the  date 
of signature of the contract, the latter were 
immediately applicable.

46.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   c o n s i d e r s   t h a t   t h e   n o n -
legally-binding  nature  of  the  Reader  is  not 
n e c e s s a r i l y   t h e   r e a s o n   i t   i s   n o t   u s e d .   T h e 
Commission  publishes  the  CONCORD  Read-
ers on the EuropeAid intranet page and they 
h a v e   b e e n   c o m m u n i c a t e d   t o   a l l   S u b - d e l e -
gated Authorising Officers.

Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that  assessment 
of factual findings and decisions in individ-
u a l   c a s e s   r e m a i n   t h e   r e s p o n s i b i l i t y   o f   t h e 
responsible authorising officer.

The Commission is also developing new tools 
w h i c h   a i m   t o   p r o v i d e   a   o n e - s t o p   s h o p   f o r 
t h e   F r e q u e n t l y   A s k e d   Q u e s t i o n s   a n d   o t h e r 
information needs (CISOCH).

47.
Communications have always been provided 
in  a  timely  manner  and  as  appropriate  and 
in  most  cases,  the  modifications  have  been 
i m p l e m e n t e d   t o   a d d r e s s   t h e   r e q u e s t   m a d e 
by NSAs via CONCORD.

The Practical Guide (PRAG) has to be adapted 
whenever  the  legislator  proceeds  to  modi-
f i c a t i o n s   o f   t h e   l e g a l   b a s e s   ( b u d g e t / E D F ) , 
or of the financial legal framework (FR & IR) 
(e.g. autonomous IR revision of 08/06, 2007 
new legal bases, 2007 revised FR & IR, 2008 
new Annex IV EDF).

A n y   m o d i f i c a t i o n s   a r e   t h o r o u g h l y   d i s  s e m -
i n  a t e d   a n d   a l w a y s   m a d e   p u b l i c   t h r o u g h 
t h e   I n t e r n e t   ( a l s o   t h r o u g h   i m p o r t a n t   m e s -
s a g e s ,   t e c h n i c a l   f i c h e s ,   a n d   m o d i f i c a t i o n s 
listings).

Nevertheless,  even  in  the  case  of  those  up-
dates of the PRAG, on the basis of the princi-
ple pacta sunt servanda, concluded contracts 
(and  the  attached  applicable  General  Con-
ditions  thereof)  go  on  applying  as  initially 
agreed and their interpretation respects the 
rules applicable when concluded.

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(d)
T h e   a p p r o v a l   o f   t h e   i n t e r i m   p a y m e n t   i s 
s u b j e c t   t o   t h e   a n a l y s i s   a n d   a p p r o v a l   o f 
r e p o r t s   a n d / o r   d o c u m e n t s   a s   r e q u i r e d   b y 
the  Financial Regulations.

(e)
On the one hand there has been harmonisa-
tion of financial and contractual procedures; 
on  the  other  hand  there  is  the  discretional 
j u d g e m e n t   o f   t h e   r e s p o n s i b l e   A u t h o r i s i n g 
Officer for sound financial management.

In particular:
for  the  additional  periodic  reports  or  audit 
reports, the specific environment of project-
management that may require more frequent 
or in-depth information; for the use of sepa-
r a t e   s p e c i f i c   b a n k   a c c o u n t s   ( v e r y   a p p r e c i -
ated to ease tasks of funds-tracking in case 
of  audit  and  to  identify  interest  pertaining 
to  the  EC),  the  relevant  general  conditions 
enable the beneficiary to have an account or 
sub-account which identifies the funds paid 
by the Contracting Authority and allows the 
calculation of the interests yielded on such 
f u n d s .   I f   p a y m e n t   o p t i o n s   d i f f e r   f r o m   t h e 
s t a n d a r d s   f o r e s e e n   b y   t h e   G e n e r a l   C o n d i -
tions,  the  specific  working  environment  or 
specific  project  may  require  a  reduction  of 
t h e   p r e - f i n a n c e d   f u n d s   b y   t h e   r e s p o n s i b l e 
Authorising Officer for a better risk-control 
a n d   s o u n d   f i n a n c i a l   m a n a g e m e n t .   I n   f a c t , 
t h e   r e s p o n s i b l e   A u t h o r i s i n g   O f f i c e r   m a y 
b e   o b l i g e d   t o   r e d u c e   t h e   a m o u n t s   o f   t h e 
p r e - f i n a n c i n g   p a y m e n t s   a n d / o r   t o   o b t a i n 
f u r t h e r   i n f o r m a t i o n / c l a r i f i c a t i o n   p r i o r   t o 
authorising them as foreseen by the  general 
conditions.

50.
(a)
Responsible  Authorising  Officer  —  Current 
legal bases no longer allow for such misun-
d e r s t a n d i n g s   s i n c e   t h e   l e g a l   e n v i r o n m e n t 
with  regards  to  rules  of  origin  is  now  more 
s e t t l e d   a n d   u s e r   f r i e n d l y .   A n n e x   A 2   o f   t h e 
Practical  Guide  lists  in  a  user  friendly  man-
n e r   a l l   c o u n t r i e s   e l i g i b l e   u n d e r   e a c h   l e g a l 
base.

(b)
T h e   a p p l i c a b l e   r u l e s   a r e   c o n t a i n e d   i n   t h e 
l e g a l   b a s e s   a n d   t r a n s p o s e d   t o   s t a n d a r d 
Financing Agreements (when applicable).

DCI and EIHDR Regulations forbid the finan-
cing  of  local  taxes  by  EU  funds  and  thus  in 
the framework of the mid-term review of the 
legal  bases,  the  Commission  is  proposing  a 
d r a f t   p r o v i d i n g   f o r   m o r e   f l e x i b i l i t y   o n   t h e 
issue of taxes.

F u r t h e r m o r e   D e l e g a t i o n s   s e r v i c e s   t r y   t o 
a s s i s t   l o c a l l y   i n   t h e   a r e a   o f   t a x   e x e m p t i o n 
by taking appropriate measures vis-à-vis the 
b e n e f i c i a r y   c o u n t r y ,   w h e n e v e r   a l l o w e d   b y 
t h e   l o c a l   l e g a l   f r a m e w o r k   ( e . g .   t h e i r   N S A s 
s t a t u s   o f t e n   d o e s n ’ t   a l l o w   t h e   e x e m p t i o n 
procedure).

(c)
T h e   e x c h a n g e   r a t e   s y s t e m   b y   i t s   n a t u r e   i s 
likely  to  produce  exchange  losses  or  gains. 
The special nature of the grant contract and 
the need for a reliable and accessible source 
of exchange rate reference when a reference 
is set in the contract.

F o r   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n ,   t h e   a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
burden  related  to  the  practical  application 
and the calculation in cases where the grant 
b e n e  f i  c i a r  i e s   u s e   s u c h   e x c h a n g e   r a t e   s y s -
tems are minor in comparison to the clarity, 
t r a n s p a r e n c y   a n d   f r a u d - p r e v e n t i n g   e f f e c t 
provided by such a system.

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COMMISSION

52.
Work is underway to improve the:

 —

q u a l i t y   o f   d a t a   i n   C R I S   w i t h   d a t a 
 dictionary and data flow;

 —

quality and number of reports, lists and 
s t a t i s t i c s   t h r o u g h   t h e   D a t a W a r e H o u s e 
tool.

N e w   m o d u l e s   a r e   b e i n g   i n t r o d u c e d   t o 
 complete CRIS:

 —

PADOR and administrative data in order 
to  know  better  our  partners  and  to  get 
a more ‘horizontal’ approach;

 —

Audit module;

 —

Prospect  module:  online  registration  of 
proposals, evaluation and follow up;

 —

P u b l i c a t i o n :   o n l i n e   a c c e s s   o f   a l l   c a l l s 
launched by EuropeAid.

In  2008,  the  Commission  published  the  list 
of  final  beneficiaries  for  2007  and  this  will 
continue.

53.
Project follow-up is being strengthened via 
training  and  guidance;  standard  format  for 
reports  are  available  in  the  contract.  Infor-
m a t i o n   i n   t h e   r e p o r t s   a r e   c o m p l e t e d   w i t h 
o t h e r   s o u r c e s   o f   i n f o r m a t i o n   s u c h   a s   R O M 
reports and field visits.

54.
I n   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n ’ s   v i e w ,   t h e   L o g f r a m e 
a p p r o a c h   i s   a   v e r y   i m p o r t a n t   p a r t   o f   t h e 
majority of the projects.

H o w e v e r ,   t h e   q u a n t i f i c a t i o n   o f   r e s u l t s   i s   a 
costly mechanism often disproportionate for 
the small-scale projects.

55.
Performance  indicators  have  been  the  sub-
ject of many studies carried out not only by 
t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   b u t   a l s o   b y   v a r i o u s   N S A s , 
r e s e a r c h   c e n t r e s ,   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   o r g a n i s a -
t i o n s   a n d   o t h e r   d o n o r s   a n d   i t   i s   v e r y   d i f f i -
cult to define them in a consensual way and 
t o   p e r f o r m   a   g e n e r a l l y - r e c o g n i s e d   b e n c h -
marking.

H o w e v e r ,   f o r   s o m e   v e r y   s p e c i f i c   d o m a i n s , 
benchmarking might be possible. During its 
quality  check  of  programmes  and  projects, 
E u r o p e A i d   a s s e s s e s   t h e   r e l e v a n c e   o f   t h e 
q u a n t i t a t i v e   a n d   q u a l i t a t i v e   i n d i c a t o r s 
c o n t a i n e d   i n   t h e   l o g f r a m e s   o f   N S A s ’   p r o -
g r a m m e s .   A   l i s t   o f   q u a n t i t a t i v e   a n d   q u a l i -
t a t i v e   i n d i c a t o r s   h a s   b e e n   p o s t e d   o n   t h e 
Intranet in order to guide Delegations when 
drafting or checking Logframes.

56.
Many support and control activities are car-
ried out by HQ and the Delegations 1, among 
w h i c h   f i e l d   v i s i t s .   A l l   t h e s e   m e c h a n i s m s 
represent  important  elements  in  the  whole 
control and support process of the projects 
implemented by NGOs/NSAs.

F i e l d   v i s i t s   h a v e   t o   b e   c o n s i d e r e d   i n   t h e i r 
i n t e r a c t i o n   w i t h   t h e   o t h e r   m o n i t o r i n g   a n d 
c o n t r o l   a c t i v i t i e s   a s   w e l l   a s   i n   t h e   c o n t e x t 
of  the  availability  of  the  human  resources, 
keeping  in  mind  the  huge  number  and  var-
iety of organisations of the civil society with 
which EuropeAid works.

1  These include, among other things, checks on the 

internal management capacities of the implementing 

partners prior to signing the contracts, [development of 

a series of standardised guides and manuals to be used 

by these partner/s], ex ante and/or ex post checks on 

the transactions carried out by them, regular monitoring 

missions and field visits, expenditure verifications by 

external auditors before making the final payment, 

training sessions and replies to any request for advice or 

information.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

57.
Delegation staff are available to answer the 
questions local organisations may have with 
regard to the rules in force when contracting 
with  the  EC.  Manuals  and  training  material 
are also available to Delegation staff.

On-the-spot  visits  by  staff  delegations  can 
i m p r o v e   t h e   s i t u a t i o n .   H o w e v e r ,   s p e c i f i c 
controls, like financial or system audits, are 
established to efficiently deal with financial, 
accounting and expenditure documentation 
issues.

58.
G u i d e l i n e s   f o r   p r o j e c t   i n t e r n a l   m o n i t o r i n g 
w e r e   d r a f t e d ,   p u b l i s h e d   a n d   d i s s e m i n a t e d 
to the delegations in December 2007.

59.
The  ROM  methodology,  which  is  one  of  the 
e l e m e n t s   o f   t h e   c o n t r o l   s y s t e m ,   i n c l u d e s 
s a m p l i n g   o f   t h e   d e v o l v e d   p r o j e c t s   a s   w e l l 
as sampling of the centrally managed ones, 
often of higher contractual amount.

A n n u a l   R O M   m o n i t o r i n g   m i s s i o n s   a l w a y s 
i n c l u d e   N S A   p r o j e c t s .   T h e   l i s t   o f   p r o j e c t s 
t o   b e   m o n i t o r e d   i s   a g r e e d   c o n s e n s u a l l y 
between EuropeAid, the Delegation and the 
ROM monitors.

EuropeAid is working to strengthen its moni-
toring methodology and is consulting other 
d o n o r s   o n   t h e   p o s s i b i l i t y   o f   e s t a b l i s h i n g   a 
joint monitoring methodology based on the 
Accra and Paris declarations.

58

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

60.
There  are  ToRs  for  evaluations  available  on 
t h e   E u r o p e A i d   w e b s i t e   a n d   t h e y   p r o v i d e 
guidance for intermediate, final and ex post 
evaluations. The Commission asks services to 
respect  the  structure  of  the  document.  The 
C o m m i s s i o n   r e m i n d s   t h a t   f o r   e v a l u a t i o n s 
t h e   d e c i s i v e   e l e m e n t   m u s t   b e   t h e   q u a l i t y 
and  professionalism  of  the  entity  recruited 
f o r   t h e   t a s k .   T h e   l a t t e r   e n s u r e s   o b j e c t i v e 
evaluations.

61.
T h e   i m p a c t   i s   o n e   o f   t h e   f i v e   D A C   c r i t e r i a 
d e f i n i t e l y   c o r r e s p o n d i n g   t o   E C   r e q u i r e -
m e n t s   f o r   e v a l u a t i o n   o f   p r o j e c t s   a n d   p r o -
g r a m m e s .   M o r e o v e r ,   t h e   i m p a c t   i s   t a k e n 
i n t o   c o n s i d e r a t i o n   d u r i n g   t h e   m o n i t o r i n g 
of EC operations. EuropeAid has developed 
a methodology for ex post ROM that aims to 
measure the impact and sustainability of all 
EC-funded projects.

Indeed, thematic projects are normally much 
s m a l l e r   s c a l e   a n d   s o m e t i m e s   t h e   m e a n s   o f 
verification (baseline data and ex post data) 
are  too  costly  in  comparison  to  the  cost  of 
the action itself. However, with reference to 
EIHDR  for  instance,  evaluations  carried  out 
a t   p r e s e n t   o f t e n   c o v e r   a   g r o u p   o f   p r o j e c t s 
and always try to include recommendations 
per  project,  even  when  they  are  ex  post,  as 
they can be used as lessons learnt for future 
actions.

62
On guidance on Logframe and performance 
i n d i c a t o r s ,   p l e a s e   r e f e r   t o   p o i n t s   5 4   a n d 
55.

63.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   w i t h   t h e   f a c t   t h a t 
sustainability has to be checked ex ante and 
e x   p o s t .   A s   a   r e s u l t ,   e x   p o s t   R O M   a r e   c a r -
r i e d   o u t   t w o   y e a r s   a f t e r   t h e   c o m p l e t i o n   o f 
projects. (Please refer also 64 & 65).

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REPLY OF THE 
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67.
A   m a t r i x   o f   t o o l s   i s   u s e d   o n   t h e   b a s i s   o f 
t h e   p o s s i b i l i t i e s   o f f e r e d   b y   t h e   r e g u l a t o r y 
a n d   o p e r a t i o n a l   f r a m e w o r k   w h i l e   p r o j e c t 
a p p r o a c h   r e m a i n s   t h e   m o s t   u s e d   w i t h 
NSAs.

Flexibility is required as regards implemen-
t a t i o n   p e r i o d s .   T h i s   i s   t h e   c a s e   f o r   h u m a n 
rights promotion where short-term projects 
can contribute to structural changes.

68.
The evaluation process used by the Commis-
sion should ensure that selected projects are 
well designed. However, to a certain extent, 
and, in some specific contexts, short projects 
m i g h t   n o t   b e   a l w a y s   s u s t a i n a b l e .   I t   i s   t h e 
r e a s o n   w h y   E u r o p e A i d   t h r o u g h   i n c r e a s e d 
k n o w l e d g e   o f   t h e   p a r t n e r s   v i a   P A D O R   i s 
c o m p l e m e n t i n g   t h e   p r o j e c t - a p p r o a c h   w i t h 
partner-approach.

69.
The  issue  of  NSA  engagement  is  treated  in 
d i f f e r e n t   w a y s   u n d e r   t h e   C o t o n o u   A g r e e -
m e n t   c o m p a r e d   t o   t h e   R e g u l a t i o n s   a p p l i c -
able to non-ACP countries. This also extends 
to the availability of funding for in-country 
capacity building of NSAs. Thus funding for 
capacity building of NSAs in non-ACP coun-
t r i e s   i s   e s s e n t i a l l y   l i m i t e d   t o   t h e   t h e m a t i c 
programme.

W i t h i n   t h e s e   l i m i t a t i o n s ,   s i g n i f i c a n t   w o r k 
h a s   b e e n   i n i t i a t e d   t o   b r i n g   f o r w a r d   i n   a 
more systematic manner the interaction with 
NSAs, and a assessment exercise was under-
t a k e n   b y   H Q s   w i t h   r e g a r d   t o   e n g a g e m e n t 
with NSAs (report provided to the Court).

A qualitative study based on projects moni-
tored by ROM has been realised in 2008 iden-
t i f y i n g   1 7   f u n d a m e n t a l   a s p e c t s   f o r   p r o j e c t 
performance. It will be published in 2009.

64.
Even if sustainability of projects is essential, 
t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a c k n o w l e d g e s   t h a t   s o m e 
l o c a l   a n d   g r a s s - r o o t s   N S A s   d o   n o t   a l w a y s 
h a v e   t h e   c a p a c i t y   t o   e n s u r e   t h i s   s u s t a i n -
ablity. The Commission underlines the need 
to ensure, at the same time, the sus tain abil-
ity of our projects and the main objective to 
s t r e n g t h e n   l o c a l   N S A s .   F o r   t h i s   r e a s o n   t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n   i s   e n c o u r a g i n g   g e n u i n e   p a r t -
nerships  between  European  (rather  strong) 
NSAs & local (rather weak) actors.

65.
A   r e a l   a d v a n t a g e   o f   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   N G O s   i s 
their diversification of funding. However, a 
possible way of correcting this situation is to 
encourage real partnerships between strong 
(international) NGO and rather weak (local) 
NGOs. In EuropeAid Calls for Proposals pro-
cedure, is a possibility for applicants to elab-
o r a t e   ‘ c o n s o r t i u m s ’   i n v o l v i n g   a   l e a d e r   a n d 
partners organisations. NSAs (international 
ones  especially)  should  be  able  and  willing 
t o   f a v o u r   t r a n s f e r   o f   k n o w l e d g e   b e t w e e n 
themselves.

66.
T h e   F i n a n c i a l   R e g u l a t i o n s   i m p o s e   t h e   C a l l 
f o r   P r o p o s a l s   m e c h a n i s m   f o r   a c t i o n   g r a n t s 
w h i l e   l i m i t i n g   t o   o n e   y e a r   t h e   o p e r a t i n g 
g r a n t s :   l o n g - t e r m   c o m m i t m e n t   a n d   f u n d -
ing  against  the  regulatory  framework.  That 
said, the project duration has no time limits 
imposed by the Financial Regulations.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

70.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   w i t h   t h e   f a c t   t h e 
regional  and  national  strategies  to  support 
NSAs  should  be  carried  out.  The  evaluation 
r e c e n t l y   c o n d u c t e d   o n   ‘ C i v i l   s o c i e t y   a s   a 
channel for aid delivery’ has led to a similar 
c o n c l u s i o n .   A l o n g   t h i s   l i n e ,   s e v e r a l   s t u d -
ies and regional seminars (Central America, 
Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, East-
ern Africa and Central Asia) to be conducted 
i n   2 0 0 9   o n   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   w i l l   p u t   a   s p e c i f i c 
e m p h a s i s   o n   t h i s   i s s u e ,   i n   a   p e r i o d   w h e r e 
t h e   m i d - t e r m   r e v i e w   o f   i n s t r u m e n t s   a n d 
 programmes will be conducted.

H o w e v e r ,   t h e   s e t t i n g   u p   o f   s p e c i f i c   s t r a t -
e g i e s   f o r   e a c h   c o u n t r y   ( m a p p i n g )   a r e   c o n -
ditioned  by  the  budget  &  human  resources 
available.

72.
Despite the fact that former ALA regulation 
d i d n ’ t   f o r m a l l y   e n v i s a g e   c a p a c i t y   b u i l d i n g 
s u p p o r t   t o   N S A s ,   v a r i o u s   s t u d i e s   a n d   p r o -
grammes are being carried out on this issue 
in both Latin America & Asia.

A s i a :   s e v e r a l   p r o j e c t s / p r o g r a m m e s   i n   A s i a 
a n d   C e n t r a l   A s i a   w h i c h   a r e / w i l l   b e   i m p l e -
mented  through  non-governmental  or gan-
isa tion have been adopted in 2007 and 2008. 
While  their  primary  objective  is  to  contrib-
ute to poverty eradication, improvement of 
a c c e s s   t o   s o c i a l   s e r v i c e s   a n d   i m p r o v e m e n t 
of governance and rule of law, they support 
non-state actors in pursuance of these goals. 
T h i s   i s   t h e   c a s e   n o t a b l y   i n   A f g h a n i s t a n , 
China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

60

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

L a t i n   A m e r i c a :   E u r o p e A i d   s e r v i c e s   h a v e 
recently  sensitised  all  Delegations  in  Latin 
America about the importance of mappings. 
I n   a d d i t i o n ,   a   m e t h o d o l o g i c a l   n o t e   w i l l   b e 
p r o d u c e d   o n   h o w   t o   f e e d   d i a l o g u e   a n d 
co operation through geographic or thematic 
instruments.

A C P :   a   r e c e n t   s t u d y   h a s   b e e n   l a u n c h e d   t o 
i n t r o d u c e   m o r e   l i g h t   i n t o   t h i s   i s s u e   a l s o 
f o r   t h e   E D F   ( E t u d e   d e   c a p i t a l i s a t i o n   d e s 
p r o g r a m m e s   d ’ a p p u i   a u   r e n f o r c e m e n t   d e s 
capacités des acteurs non-etatiques sous le 
9 e FED).

73.
It  is  not  possible  to  fully  achieve  the  main 
objectives of the DCI in two years time. How-
ever,  as  explained  above  (72),  various  pro-
grammes supporting NSAs are, indeed, being 
implemented in some ALA countries. This is 
because the funding of NSA capacity build-
ing  under  the  geographical  programmes  of 
the  DCI  is  only  possible  if  it  is  identified  — 
as  a  result  of  the  dialogue  with  the  partner 
c o u n t r y   —   a s   a   p r i o r i t y   s e c t o r   f o r   t h e   E C 
cooperation programme.

74.
A s   m e n t i o n e d   b e f o r e ,   E u r o p e A i d   s e r v i c e s 
have prepared a draft document on the issue 
o f   p a r t i c i p a t i o n   o f   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   i n   n e w   a i d 
m o d a l i t i e s .   T h i s   d o c u m e n t   c o n t a i n s   o p e r -
a t i o n a l   r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s   a b o u t   t h e   e n t r y 
p o i n t s   f o r   t h e   i n v o l v e m e n t   o f   c i v i l   s o c i e t y 
in  macroeconomic  and  sector  programmes, 
the instruments to be used according to the 
context in which the programme will operate 
and  the  type  of  capacity  building  required 
f o r   c i v i l   s o c i e t y   t o   e f f e c t i v e l y   p a r t i c i p a t e . 
This document will be further developed in 
2009. This second phase will aim at refining 
the methodology proposed and at providing 
good operational practices.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

77.
T h e   n e c e s s i t y   o f   e l a b o r a t i n g   a   m a p p i n g 
largely depends on the context in the coun-
t r y   c o n c e r n e d .   I n   t h e   c a s e   o f   B a n g l a d e s h 
f o r   i n s t a n c e ,   g i v e n   t h e   n u m b e r   o f   N S A s   i n 
 Bangladesh formal mapping is not possible 
but  the  Delegation  has  good  knowledge  of 
the local NSAs and their capacity.

78.
B e s i d e   t h e   t i m e   f r a m e   d e t e r m i n e d   b y   t h e 
r e g u l a t o r y   f r a m e w o r k   a n d   t h e   b u i l d i n g   o f 
the project social structure, increased atten-
tion is, and will be, provided to timely pro-
cedural  management.  The  Commission  can 
continue its efforts in training and guidance 
but only for the steps under its control.

79.
Implementation of the actions can always be 
extended before its conclusion if necessary. 
For certain sensitive situations, extension of 
t h e   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   d u r a t i o n   i s   n e c e s s a r y 
a n d   p o s s i b l e   f o r   t h e   s o u n d   f i n a n c i a l   m a n -
a g e m e n t   o f   t h e   p r o j e c t .   T h e   e f f e c t   o f   d e -
commitment of funds in the General Budget 
and the EDF is not the same.

80.
It is important to remember that the or gan-
i s a  t i o n s   a p p l y i n g   f o r   a   C a l l   f o r   p r o p o s a l s 
must  also  be  able  to  implement  the  opera-
tional and financial components of the con-
tract that could be subsequently awarded.

61

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

A c c o r d i n g l y ,   i n   o r d e r   t o   g u a r a n t e e   t h e 
f i n a n c i a l   i n t e r e s t s   o f   t h e   i n s t i t u t i o n   t h e 
E v a l u  a t i o n   C o m m i t t e e s   m u s t   c o n s i d e r   t h e 
f i n a n c i a l   a n d   o p e r a t i o n a l   c a p a c i t y   o f   t h e 
a p p l i c a n t s   a n d   p a r t n e r s   i n   r e l a t i o n   t o   t h e 
s i z e ,   s c o p e   a n d   b u d g e t   o f   t h e   p r o p o s e d 
a c t i o n .   T h e   p o s s i b i l i t i e s   g i v e n   b y   t h e   C a l l s 
f o r   P r o p o s a l s   l a u n c h e d   i n   t h e   c o n t e x t   o f 
t h e   n e w   C o  o p e r a t i o n   I n s t r u m e n t s   t o   s u b -
mit project proposals for amounts as low as 
EUR 20 000 have increased the possibilities 
of small rural-based organisations to partici-
pate successfully in the respective calls.

Reaching rural-based organisations is a very 
d i f f i c u l t   t a s k ,   a n d   h a s   b e e n   a c h i e v e d   b y   a 
number  of  Delegations  through  decentral-
i s e d   i n f o r m a t i o n   s e s s i o n s   o r   p u b l i c a t i o n s 
on websites, newspapers, etc. It is true that 
calls for proposals are ill-suited to small and 
grass-roots organisations but the procedure 
i s   c o m p u l s o r y   u n d e r   t h e   p r e s e n t   F i n a n c i a l 
Regulation. Moreover, there are also limits to 
the need and the capacity of the  Commission 
to reach such entities.

Currently, the existing but very limited pos-
sibilities for sub-granting make it possible to 
reach some of these grass-roots-level organ-
isations  and  also  to  contribute  to  capacity 
building.

T h i s   d i f f i c u l t y   h a s   b e e n   m a t c h e d   i n   g e o -
g r a p h i c   p r o g r a m m e s   w h e r e   c a l l s   f o r   p r o -
p o s a l s   a r e   n o r m a l l y   p a r t   o f   a   m o r e   g l o b a l 
c a p a c i t y - b u i l d i n g   s t r a t e g y .   H o w e v e r   t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n   i s   o f   t h e   o p i n i o n   t h a t   o t h e r 
channels  such  as  the  extension  of  the  sub-
g r a n t i n g   a s   p r o p o s e d   b y   t h e   r e p o r t   o f   t h e 
Court of Auditors must be considered.

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REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS

84.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   w i t h   t h e   p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t   N S A s   m u s t   b e   f u l l y   i n v o l v e d   i n   t h e 
development  cooperation  process,  but  this 
l e v e l   o f   i n v o l v e m e n t   d i f f e r s   a c c o r d i n g   t o 
t h e   v a r i o u s   l e g a l   b a s e s   c o n s i d e r e d .   I n   t h e 
framework  of  the  Cotonou  Agreement,  the 
need for consultations is agreed and legally 
binding  both  for  the  Commission  and  Part-
ner  States.  For  DCI  countries,  the  Commis-
sion  applies  an  EU  regulation:  EU  efforts  to 
consult effectively NSAs have to be matched 
by the willingness of national authorities to 
do so.

F u r t h e r m o r e ,   i n   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n ’ s   v i e w , 
these  texts  should  also  however  be  framed 
w i t h i n   n e w   r e a l i t i e s   s u c h   a s   a l i g n m e n t   t o 
p a r t n e r s ’   g o v e r n m e n t s ,   a n d   o w n e r s h i p .   E C 
action in support to NSAs takes indeed into 
a c c o u n t   t h e   d u a l   r e a l i t y   o f   s u p p o r t i n g   t h e 
right  of  initiative  of  Civil  society  organisa-
tions and the rising need of ensuring ‘align-
ment’ to partners governments priorities.

See also response to paragraphs 24 to 26.

85.
I n   t h e   p r o g r a m m i n g   p h a s e   o f   t h e   n e w 
N S A & L A   p r o g r a m ,   t h e   E C   d u l y   c o n s u l t e d 
D e l e  g a t i o n s   v i a   c o n c e p t   n o t e s .   T w o   m a i n 
correlated factors explain the limited south-
ern NSAs consultations:

81.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s   a n d   g u i d e l i n e s   f o r   s t a f f 
m e n t i o n e d   b y   t h e   C o u r t   c o n t a i n   p o l i t i c a l 
o b j e c t i v e s   n o t   c o m m i t m e n t s .   N e v e r t h e -
less, through the launching of local call for 
p r o p o s a l s   a n d   o f   n e w   w a v e s   o f   c a p a c i t y -
building programmes in the context of geo-
g r a p h i c a l   p r o g r a m m e s ,   g o o d   p r o g r e s s   h a s 
already been achieved in favour of a better 
 involvement of local NSAs.

Local organisations need time to get familiar 
w i t h   t h e   n e w   g e o g r a p h i c   p r o g r a m m e s   a n d 
procedures, thereby avoiding errors and mis-
understandings. Improvement is also linked 
t o   t h e   e n l a r g e d   n e w   t a s k s   o f    D e l e g a t i o n s 
within the new instruments.

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   q u e s t i o n s   w h e t h e r   i t   c a n 
e f f e c t i v e l y   i n v o l v e   t h e   m a j o r i t y   o f   g r a s s -
roots  and  community-based  organisations, 
even if this would be relevant to the develop-
ment cooperation process. The Commission 
s h o u l d   i n s i s t   t h a t   p a r t n e r   c o u n t r y   g o v e r n -
m e n t s   p l a y   t h e   l e a d i n g   r o l e   i n   p r o m o t i n g 
N S A s ’   a c t i v e   i n v o l v e m e n t   i n   d e v e l o p m e n t 
issues.

83.
(a)
The new backbone strategy of EuropeAid on 
‘Reforming cooperation Technical Coopera-
tion and Project Implementation Units’ pro-
motes a better differentiation, in the design 
of technical cooperation, between manage-
m e n t   t a s k s   a n d   t h e   p r o v i s i o n   o f   t h e m a t i c 
e x p e r t i s e   w h i c h   c a l l s   f o r   d i f f e r e n t   t y p e s 
of  experts’  profiles.  More  attention  is  thus 
drawn to the quality of the latter.

(b)
See replies to paragraphs 63 to 68.

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REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

I n   t h e   n e a r   f u t u r e ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   w i l l 
strengthen the involvement of NSAs by:

 •

 •

i m p r o v i n g   i t s   k n o w l e d g e   o f   r e l e v a n t 
N S A s   t h r o u g h   t h e   l a u n c h i n g   o f   p i l o t 
m a p p i n g   s t u d i e s   d e s i g n e d ,   i f   p o s s i b l e , 
i n   c l o s e   c o o p e r a t i o n   w i t h   g o v e r n m e n t 
( n a t i o n a l   a u t h o r i t i e s   s h o u l d   r e m a i n 
t h e   m a i n   s t a k e h o l d e r s   i n   c h a r g e   o f 
t h e    e l a b o r a t i o n   o f   s u c h   s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l 
mapping);

i m p r o v i n g   p r e d i c t a b i l i t y   a n d   t r a n s p a r -
e n c y   r e l a t e d   t o   t h e   c o n s u l t a t i o n   p r o -
cess by elaborating, as often as possible, 
s p e c i f i c   c a l e n d a r s   a n d   c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
material to facilitate the interaction with 
NSAs.

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   i n t e n d s   a l s o   t o   i m p r o v e 
guidance for Delegation staff with the launch-
ing of a Civil Society Helpdesk  (CISOCH): an 
online capitalisation and dissemination tool 
d e s i g n e d   t o   p r o v i d e   C o m m i s s i o n   s e r v i c e s 
( D e l e g a t i o n s   a n d   H e a d q u a r t e r s )   a n d   N S A s 
with clear and coherent information on and 
f o r   c i v i l   s o c i e t y .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   p l e a s e   r e f e r 
also to point 28 related to specific guidance, 
seminars and training planned.

86.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a c k n o w l e d g e s   t h a t ,   e s p e -
cially for local NSAs, calls for proposals may 
b e   c u m b e r s o m e .   H o w e v e r ,   t h i s   p r o c e d u r e 
i s   u n d e r   t h e   p r e s e n t   r e g u l a t i o n   t h e   o n l y 
legal  possible  system  and  is  compulsory  to 
be  used  for  the  award  of  grant  contract.  It 
i s   n e e d e d   t o   e n s u r e   b o t h   t h e   s o u n d   m a n -
agement  of  operations  and  the  equality  of 
 treatment between candidates.

 •

 •

the new ‘opening’ towards southern NSAs 
c e r t a i n l y   r e q u e s t e d   a   q u i c k   a d a p t a t i o n 
from Delegations (who had to deal with 
a   n e w   k i n d   o f   s t a k e h o l d e r )   b u t   m a i n l y 
from the local NSAs themselves;

d e l a y s   i n   t h e   a p p r o v a l   o f   t h e   D C I   n o t 
of  the  Commission’s  responsibility  pre-
vented the organisation of genuine and 
r e l e v a n t   c o n s u l t a t i o n s   i n   D e l e g a t i o n s 
during its first year of application.

I n   t h e   v e r y   n e a r   f u t u r e   ( i n   t h e   f r a m e w o r k 
o f   t h e   m i d - t e r m   r e v i e w   &   u p c o m i n g   l o c a l 
calls for proposals), the Commission will do 
its best to improve consultations. The Com-
m i s s i o n   h o w e v e r ,   w o u l d   l i k e   t o   s t r e s s   t h a t 
i t   i s   h a r d l y   f e a s i b l e   t o   r e a c h   a l l   t h e   l o c a l 
stakeholders.  We  should,  for  instance,  rec-
ognise  that  the  Commission  cannot  ef fect-
ive ly involve the majority of grass-roots and 
community-based organisations, even if they 
would be very relevant to the development 
cooperation process.

Recommendations on involvement 
of NSAs
The Commission reiterates that the inclusion 
of NSAs is one of the main cornerstones of its 
action. However, this involvement has to be 
balanced  with  the  cooperation  with  sover-
eign States. NSAs inclusion will be strongly 
s u p p o r t e d ,   b u t   c a n n o t   b e   i m p o s e d ,   b y   t h e 
Commission.

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REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

89.
As stated in point 64, the Commission agrees 
t h a t   s u s t a i n a b i l i t y   o f   p r o j e c t s   i s   e s s e n t i a l 
and acknowledges the complexity involved 
in ensuring simultaneously the sustainabil-
i t y   o f   a c t i o n s   f u n d e d   a n d   t h e   s t r e n g t h e n -
ing of local NSAs. Integrated and long-term 
approaches are being implemented through 
geographic programs designed in close col-
laboration with the partner state (especially 
i n   t h e   f r a m e w o r k   o f   t h e   C o t o n o u   a g r e e -
ment).  As  far  as  thematic  programmes  and 
instruments are concerned, the Commission 
would like to underline their specific added 
value.  Thematic  operations  have  been  cre-
ated and supported by the European Parlia-
ment in order to:

 •

 •

enable the EU to operate even in case of 
very difficult partnerships;

a d d r e s s   a   s p e c i f i c   i s s u e   w o r l d w i d e 
a s   o p p o s e d   t o   a   r e g i o n a l   o r   n a t i o n a l 
concern.

This  illustrates  the  willingness  of  the  EU  to 
spread its common political/strategic  values 
a r o u n d   t h e   w o r l d   ( p r o t e c t i o n   o f   h u m a n 
rights, protection of environment etc).

 —

 —

The  Commission  will  continue  with  the 
new practice of call for proposals at local 
level. It will also extend the use of PADOR 
as a knowledge management tool.

In order to improve accessibility, coher-
ence,  transparency  and  standardisation 
o f   p r o c e d u r e s ,   a   t o o l   c a l l e d   ‘ C I S O C H ’ 
i s   b e i n g   d e v e l o p e d   t o   e n s u r e   a   b e t t e r 
guidance and support Additional Human 
Resources for the Delegations would be 
necessary  if  the  control  system  is  to  be 
modified  and  based  on  the  on-the-spot 
visits by Commission staff.

I n   o r d e r   t o   r e a c h   l o c a l   o r g a n i s a t i o n s   m o r e 
e a s i l y   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   h a s   s i m p l i f i e d   t h i s 
procedure, it has also introduced the PADOR 
database  which  is  contributing  to  a  reduc-
t i o n   i n   t h e   d e l a y s   b e t w e e n   t h e   l a u n c h   o f 
calls and the signature of the contracts.

87.
The  Commission  is  doing  its  best  on  train-
ing and specific guidance. Furthermore, the 
C o m m i s s i o n   w i l l   e n s u r e   t h e   o p t i m u m   d i s -
s e m i n a t i o n   o f   p r a c t i c a l   t o o l s   w h i c h   h a v e 
been  made  available  to  the  Delegations.  In 
addition, with the launch of the Civil Society 
H e l p d e s k   ( u s i n g   a n   i n t e r a c t i v e   W e b   t o o l ) , 
t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   w i l l   p r o v i d e   s t a k e h o l d e r s 
with a user-friendly synthesis of its legal and 
f i n a n c i a l   i n s t r u m e n t s .   ( S e e   p a r a g r a p h s   2 8 , 
31 and 46).

88.
I n   t h e   l a s t   f e w   y e a r s ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n 
d e v o l v e d   t h e   r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s   o f   p r o j e c t 
implementation  to  Delegations  in  order  to 
ensure improved monitoring and evaluation 
c a p a c i t y   i n   c o u n t r y .   M o r e o v e r ,   t h e   C o m -
m i s s i o n   i s   t h e   o n l y   d o n o r   t o   c o m p l e m e n t 
i t s   i n t e r n a l   m o n i t o r i n g   c a p a c i t y   t h r o u g h 
s e v e n   r e g i o n a l   e x t e r n a l   r e s u l t s   o r i e n t e d 
monitoring contractors.

In order to further improve implementation 
and  monitoring,  the  Commission  has  taken 
the initiative of consulting other donors on 
the  development  of  a  joint  monitoring  sys-
tem based on the Paris Declaration and the 
Accra Agenda.

E v a l u a t i o n   i s   a   s t a n d a r d   f e a t u r e   f o r   a l l 
projects/programs.  The  EC  is  also  develop-
ing an IT database for its project evaluation 
t o   e n h a n c e   t h e   d i s s e m i n a t i o n   o f   l e s s o n s 
l e a r n t   a n d   b e s t   p r a c t i c e s   f o r   i m p r o v e d 
 implementation and future project design.

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REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

91.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s recog-
nition of the high relevance of the financed 
projects.

92.
T h e   t w o   i s s u e s   a r e   n o t   i n   c o n t r a d i c t i o n : 
selection  of  the  most  appropriate  NSAs  for 
the  implementation  of  the  action  does  not 
p r e c l u d e   t h e   s u p p o r t   f o r   s p e c i f i c   c a p a c i t y 
development need, which could concern the 
same  entity  or  a  different  one,  with  a  view 
to time improvement.

With  the  Geographical  programmes,  which 
a r e   c o m p l e m e n t a r y   t o   t h e   T h e m a t i c   p r o -
g r a m m e s ,   i t   i s   a l s o   p o s s i b l e   t o   r e a c h   t h e 
less  efficient  NSAs,  for  instance  in  terms  of 
capacity building.

The  Commission  is  fully  aware  of  the  com-
plexity. More and more interaction is struc-
t u r a l l y   o r g a n i s e d ,   e . g .   b y   t h e   i n v o l v e m e n t 
a n d   e m p o w e r m e n t   o f   t h e   G e o g r a p h i c a l 
Directorate in the preparation and delivery 
of Thematic programs to allow a better com-
p l e m e n t a r i t y   w i t h   a c t i v i t i e s   s u p p o r t e d   b y 
t h e   b i l a t e r a l   a n d   r e g i o n a l   c o n t e x t s .   W h i l e 
t h e r e   i s   a   p o l i t i c a l   w i l l i n g n e s s   t o   e n s u r e 
inclusion of grass-roots organisations, there 
are clear limits, inherent to:

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 

the respect of the organisational set up 
of sovereign states;
the  respect  of  sound  financial  manage-
ment as per the Financial regulation;
the availability of human resources;
the time constraint;
t h e   e n o r m o u s   n u m b e r   o f   p o t e n t i a l 
actors.

T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   b e l i e v e s   t h a t   t h e   c o n t r o l 
system in place ensure a sound financial and 
contractual monitoring.

D e l e g a t i o n   a n d   N S A   s t a f f   w i l l   c o n t i n u e   t o 
be trained, including on the use of perform-
a n c e   i n d i c a t o r s .   H o w e v e r ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n 
u n d e r l i n e s   t h e   f a c t   t h a t   t r a i n i n g   a l l   N S A s 
potentially interested in participating in EC 
programmes is clearly out of reach.

 —

A mix of instruments is being considered 
in view of the regulatory framework cre-
ated  by  the  Financial  Regulations,  EDF, 
DCI, EIHDR and ENPI.

 —

The Commission has developed a meth-
odology for ex post ROM with the aim of 
measuring the impact of projects.

90.
The  situation  for  ACP  is  very  different  from 
ALA countries where the formal involvement 
of NSAs is more recent.

Furthermore,  as  in  the  vast  majority  of  DCI 
countries, the national authorities have not 
i d e n t i f i e d   N S A   c a p a c i t y   b u i l d i n g   a s   a   p r i -
o r i t y .   G e o g r a p h i c   p r o g r a m m e s   c a n n o t   b e 
used for this purpose, leaving the thematic 
 programme as the only option.

In line with the statement of the Court that 
capacity development should preferably be 
c h a n n e l l e d   t h r o u g h   G e o g r a p h i c   p r o g r a m s , 
t h e   p r i n c i p l e   o f   a l i g n m e n t   o f   a i d   r e q u i r e s 
t h a t   p a r t n e r   c o u n t r y   g o v e r n m e n t s   d e f i n e 
s t r a t e g i e s ,   s e c t o r s   a n d   t h e m e s   w i t h i n   t h i s 
context. (cf. Paris Declaration on aid ef fect-
i v e  n e s s   a n d   t h e   E u r o p e a n   C o n s e n s u s   f o r 
development  and  the  conclusion  of  Accra). 
The Commission will undoubtedly continue 
to promote the involvement of NSAs.

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

67

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

European Court of Auditors

Special Report No 4/2009

The Commission’s management of Non-State Actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

2009 — 65 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm

ISBN 978-92-9207-273-5

Special Report No 4/2009 — The Commission’s management of non-state actors’ involvement in EC Development Cooperation

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IN  THIS  SPECIAL  REPOR T,  THE  EUROPEAN  COUR T  OF  AUDITORS 

A N A LYS E S  H O W  T H E  E U R O P E A N  CO M M I S S I O N  E N S U R E S  T H AT 

N O N - S TAT E   AC TO R S   ( N S As )   A R E   I N V O LV E D   I N   D E V E LO PM E N T 

COOPERATION, CONSIDERING THEIR ROLES IN POLICY DIALOGUE AND 

AS IMPLEMENTERS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

T H E   R E P O R T   F I N D S   S O M E   A S P E C T S   O F   T H E   C O M M I S S I O N ’ S 

MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURES THAT NEED IMPROVING. IT MAKES 

A SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT INCREASING THE EFFECTIVE 

I N V O LV E M E N T  O F  N S As  I N  T H E  D E V E LO PM E N T  CO O P E R AT I O N 

PROCESS,  BE T TER  ENSURING THAT  AC TIVITIES  IMPLEMENTED  BY 

NSAs ARE RELEVANT AND PRODUCE THE INTENDED RESULTS, AND 

ENHANCING THE PROVISION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT TO NSAs 

MOST IN NEED.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

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ISBN 978-92-9207-273-5