Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) - Impact Assessment {COM(2008) 820 final} {SEC(2008) 2963}
Date: 2008-12-03
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, diplomatic protection, foreign national, international law, right of asylum, third country

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 3.12.2008 
SEC(2008) 2962 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

accompanying the 

Proposal for a  

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person 

(recast)  

Impact Assessment 

{COM(2008) 820 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2963}

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED 
PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 3 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 6 

2.1. 

Scope of the problem ................................................................................................... 6 

2.2.  What is the issue or the problem that may require action? .......................................... 6 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? ........................................... 23 

Does the EU have the power to act?. ......................................................................... 24 

Consultation of interested parties............................................................................... 25 

OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................... 26 

General objectives...................................................................................................... 26 

Specific objectives ..................................................................................................... 26 

Operational objectives................................................................................................ 27 

LIST OF SUB-OPTIONS ........................................................................................ 28 

Status quo................................................................................................................... 28 

Sub-options for ensuring smooth operation of the procedure.................................... 28 

Sub-options for ensuring that disputes are tackled in an efficient way...................... 30 

Sub-options for preventing further overburdening of Member States ....................... 31 

Sub-options for strengthening the legal safeguards for asylum-seekers.................... 32 

Sub-options regarding family unity and vulnerable groups....................................... 34 

Assessment of the sub-options and identification of the preferred option.......... 36 

Assessment of the preferred option ........................................................................ 54 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................. 59 

Annex 1 — Assessment of the status quo................................................................................ 61 

Annex 2 — Summary of the preferred policy option .............................................................. 63 

Annex 3 — Statistical data ...................................................................................................... 67 

Annex 4 — Glossary................................................................................................................ 77 

Annex 5 — The likely administrative costs of the preferred policy option ............................ 80 

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Lead DG: 

Justice, Freedom and Security 

1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Background 

1.1.1.  Policy context 

The  Commission’s  Work  Programme  for  20081  included  as  one  of  its  strategic  initiatives  the 
adoption  of  a  proposal  for  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  343/2003  on  the  criteria  and 
mechanisms  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  for  examining  an  asylum  application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (the Dublin Regulation).2 Together 
with  the  proposal  for  revising  the  Reception  Conditions  Directive,  this  proposal  is  intended  to 
contribute to the second stage of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), as called for in 
the  Hague  Programme  of  November  2004.  A  road  map  has  been  prepared  for  this  strategic 
initiative.3  

Following  the  lifting  of  internal  borders  between  Member  States,  a  mechanism  to  determine 
responsibility for asylum applications lodged in the Member States was needed in order to ensure 
that in an area of free movement of persons each asylum application is examined by one Member 
State  (therefore  avoiding  the  situation  of  ‘asylum-seekers  in  orbit’,  where  no  Member  State  is 
willing  to  accept  responsibility  for  examining  an  application)  and  to  prevent  abuse  of  asylum 
procedures  in  the  form  of  multiple  applications  submitted  by  the  same  person  in  several  Member 
States with the sole aim of extending his or her stay.  

Arrangements for determining responsibility for considering asylum applications were initially part 
of  the  intergovernmental  Schengen  Convention,  and  were  then  replaced  by  the  Convention 
determining  the  State  responsible  for  examining  applications  for  asylum  lodged  in  one  of  the 
Member States of the European Communities4 (the Dublin Convention). 

The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam,  which  altered  the  legal  basis  and  procedure  for  asylum,  required  the 
Dublin  Convention  to  be  replaced  with  a  Community  legal  instrument.  The  conclusions  of  the 
Tampere  European  Council  of  October  1999  stated  that  a  CEAS,  based  on  the  full  and  inclusive 
application  of  the  Geneva  Convention,  should  include,  in  the  short  term,  inter  alia,  a  clear  and 
workable method for determining the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application, as part of a fair and efficient asylum procedure.5 

Rules  to  this  end  were  laid  down  in  the  Regulations  comprising  what  is  known  as  the  Dublin 
system:  Council  Regulation  343/2003/EC  of  18  February  20036  (the  Dublin  Regulation),  its 
implementing Commission Regulation  1560/2003 of  2  September 20037 (which together replaced 
the  Dublin  Convention),  Council  Regulation  2725/2000/EC  of  11  December  20008  (the  Eurodac 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 

COM(2007) 640. 
CLWP reference No: 2008/JLS/022. 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/clwp2008_roadmap_strategic_initiatives.pdf. 
OJ C 254, 19.08.1997, p.1. 
Presidency conclusions, Tampere European Council, paragraphs 14 and 15. 
OJ L 50, 25.2.2003, p.1. 
OJ L 222, 5.9.2003, p.3. 
OJ L 316, 15.12.2000, p.1. 

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Regulation)  and  its  implementing  Regulation  407/2002/EC  of  28  February  2002.9  The  Dublin 
Regulation was considered the first  cornerstone  of  the  CEAS  and  was  based  on  the  same  general 
principle  as  the  Dublin  Convention,  namely  that  the  responsibility  for  examining  an  application 
should  lie  with  the  Member  State  that  played  the  greatest  part  in  the  applicant’s  entry  into  and 
residence  within  the  territory  of  the  Member  States,  apart  from  exceptions  designed  to  protect 
family unity.  

The Hague Programme further expanded on the Tampere objectives and called for the Commission 
to  conclude  an  evaluation  of  the  first  stage  of  the  asylum  acquis  and  to  submit  the  second-stage 
instruments and measures to the Council and the European Parliament with a view to their adoption 
before the end of 2010. The Commission Policy Plan for the CEAS (‘the Policy Plan’), adopted on 
17  June  200810,  defined  a  road-map  for  the  coming  years  and  listed  the  measures  that  the 
Commission  intends  to  propose  in  order  to  complete  the  second  stage  of  the  CEAS,  including  a 
proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation.  

1.1.2.  Organisation and timing, consultation and expertise 

With  a  view  to  preparing  for  the  second  stage  of  asylum  legislation,  as  called  for  by  the  Hague 
Programme,  the  Commission  launched  an  evaluation  process  of  the  results  achieved  in  the  first 
stage of the establishment of the CEAS. 

Regarding  the  Dublin  system,  the  Commission  followed  a  two-track  approach  to  evaluating  its 
application.  

Firstly,  a  comprehensive  technical  evaluation  was  undertaken  based  on  Article  28  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation and Article 24(5) of the Eurodac Regulation11, which required the Commission to report 
on their application after three years of operation and to propose, where appropriate, the necessary 
amendments.  The  Evaluation  Report  issued  by  the  Commission  on  6  June  2007  (‘the  Evaluation 
Report’) was based on a wide range of contributions from Member States, including answers to a 
detailed questionnaire sent by the Commission in July 2005, regular discussions in expert meetings 
and statistics. Contributions from other stakeholders were also carefully considered, in particular the 
Evaluation  Report published by  the UNHCR in April 200612 as well as  critical  reports  from civil 
society organisations, such as the report by the ECRE/ELENA network published in March 2006.13 

Secondly,  the  Commission  considered  that  before  proposing  any  new  initiative,  an  in-depth 
reflection  and  debate  with  all  relevant  stakeholders  on  the  future  architecture  of  the  CEAS  was 
necessary. On 6 June 2007, it therefore presented a Green Paper14
 on the future of the CEAS (‘the 
Green  Paper’)  aiming  to  identify  the  possible  options  for  shaping  the  second  stage  of  the  CEAS. 
While  the  Evaluation  Report  served  as  a  technical  assessment  for  the  Dublin  system,  the 
consultation  based  on  the  Green  Paper  served  as  a  policy  evaluation.  The  response  to  the  public 

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13 
14 

OJ L 62, 5.3.2002, p.1. 
COM(2008) 360, SEC(2008) 2030. 
In  order  to  provide  a  complete  picture  of  the  overall  functioning  of  the  Dublin  system,  the  Commission 
presented a single evaluation covering the Dublin and the Eurodac Regulations as well as their implementing 
rules. 
UNHCR, The Dublin Regulation, a UNHCR discussion paper, April 2006. 
ECRE/ELENA, Report on the application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe, March 2006. 
COM(2007) 301. 

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consultation included 89 contributions from a wide range of stakeholders,15 including 20 Member 
States,  regional  and  local  authorities,  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee, the UNHCR, academic institutions, political parties and a large number of NGOs. The 
issues  raised  and  the  suggestions  put  forward  during  the  consultation  provided  the  main  basis  for 
the preparation of the Policy Plan and have also been taken into account in the preparation of the 
present proposal. 

Furthermore,  several  expert  meetings  were  organised  between  October  2007  and  July  2008  with 
Member  States,16  NGOs  and  the  UNHCR,17  lawyers  and  judges,18  and  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament19 in order to seek their opinion on the improvements needed to the Dublin Regulation. 
Member States were also consulted on the main issues the Commission intended to address in order 
to tackle the shortcomings identified in the application of the Dublin Regulation at the Immigration 
and Asylum Committee meeting on 5 March 2008.  

The Commission ordered an external study (‘the external study’) to support the preparation of the 
Impact  Assessment.  The  problem,  objectives  and  policy  options  assessed  were  based  on  the 
Evaluation  Report  on  the  Dublin  system,  an  analysis  of  the  contributions  to  the  Green  Paper,  the 
outcome of the expert meetings as well as contributions from the contractor. Important data were 
also  collected  from  literature  reviews,  such  as  reports  by  the  UNHCR,  ECRE  and  Save  the 
Children. The report of the European Parliament on the evaluation of the Dublin system20
 has also 
been taken into consideration. 

This  report  also  incorporates  comments  submitted  during  an  inter-service  steering  group  meeting 
attended by representatives of the RELEX, SANCO, EAC and ELARG Directorates-General on 20 
June  2008.  The  Directorates-General  consulted  have  had  also  the  opportunity  to  submit  their 
comments on the final text of the Commission’s proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation during 
the inter-service consultation procedure. 

1.2. 

The Impact Assessment Board 

The  Commission’s  Impact  Assessment  Board  (IAB)  was  consulted  on  the  draft  final  Impact 
Assessment report and issued its opinion on 7 October 2008.21 The IAB considered that ‘the report 
is generally of good quality and proportionate to the issues it deals with’. The IAB also formulated a 
number  of  recommendations,  which  have  been  taken  into  account  in  this  report.  The  main 
recommendations were: (i) Specify the number of Member States affected by the various problems 
and the policy options and where possible the number of asylum-seekers involved; (ii) Clarify the 
modalities of two of the preferred policy options, namely the policy option regarding the suspensive 

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16 

17 
18 

19 

20 
21 

The 89 contributions received are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/gp_asylum_system/news_contributions_asylum_syst
em_en.htm . An analysis of the contributions is attached in Annex 1. 
Meetings were held within the Dublin contact committee on 19 October 2007, and with a selected number of 
Member States on 12 February 2008. 
Meetings organised on 18 February 2008 and 29 April 2008. 
The meeting with lawyers took place on 17 March 2008 and the meeting with judges took place on 10 July 
2008. A broad range of issues were discussed at these meetings (Asylum Procedures Directive and practical 
cooperation), including Dublin-related issues. 
5 March 2008, this meeting was organised in connection with the Policy Plan, but Dublin-related issues were 
discussed as well. 
P6_TA-PROV(2008)0385, 02.9.2008. 
The opinion will be available here: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/cia_2008_en.htm. 

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effect of an appeal and the policy option regarding the suspension of Dublin transfers in limited and 
well-defined circumstances; (iii) Assess the proportionality of individual options rather than that of 
the preferred package as a whole. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Scope of the problem 

From 2006 until the first half of 2007, out of approximately 183 200 asylum applications (lodged in 
those  Member  States  applying  the  Dublin  system  at  that  time)  Member  States  reported  having 
received  nearly  39 000  Dublin  requests  (21.3%)  and  sending  out  nearly  46 700  (25.5%).22
  Of  the 
incoming requests received in that period, around 23 000 requests were accepted (59%) and around 
12 500 of these were transferred to the responsible Member State (54.5%).23 

Although the number of asylum-seekers in the EU-27 has almost halved since 2003 (from a total of 
337 235 to 186 890 in 2007 — -45%), it should be noted that the figures for 2007 reveal an increase 
in the numbers of those seeking protection in Europe. Assuming that this trend continues, the scale 
of  the  problem  would  increase  as well,  since  more  asylum  applicants  could  fall  under  the  Dublin 
system. 

As already stated in the Evaluation Report on the Dublin system, shortcomings in the availability 
and/or  comparability  of  the  existing  statistical  data  make  comparisons  and  analysis  very  difficult. 
Therefore,  this  report  could  not  provide  statistical  data  for  all  of  the  problems  identified.  In 
particular,  the  data  on  the  number  of  asylum-seekers  potentially  affected  by  these  problems  are 
limited. However, in particular for the problems relating to the protection of asylum-seekers (such 
as  the  detention  of  asylum-seekers  subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure  or  family  reunification 
problems), it is important to highlight that, even if the number of potential asylum-seekers affected 
was limited, the policy measures presented would still be justified given that fundamental rights are 
at stake.  

2.2.  What is the issue or the problem that may require action? 

The  Evaluation  Report  concluded  that  overall,  the  objectives  of  the  Dublin  system,  notably  to 
establish  a  clear  and  workable  mechanism  for  determining  responsibility  for  asylum  applications, 
have  to  a  large  extent  been  achieved.  Nevertheless,  it  also  identified  a  number  of  deficiencies 
mainly  related  to  the  practical  application  and  effectiveness  of  the  system,  including  issues 
concerning the protection afforded to asylum seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. 

Problems regarding the current level of protection given to asylum seekers falling under the Dublin 
procedure were also pointed out in the contributions received on the Green Paper as well as in the 
reports by the UNHCR and various NGOs. At the same time, the report of the European Parliament 
on  the  evaluation  of  the  Dublin  system  identified  a  number  of  problems  and  made  a  series  of 
recommendations,  primarily  relating  to  the  need  to  strengthen  the  protection  aspect  of  the  Dublin 
instrument. 

22 

23 

See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of what is meant by incoming and outgoing requests. A significant 
mismatch  is  evident  between  the  numbers  of  incoming  and  outgoing  requests  submitted  under  the  Dublin 
Regulation.  This  may  be  explained  by  different  definitions  of  registration  used  by  Member  States  or  by  the 
incompleteness of some of the data provided. 
Given the unavailability of data on the number of accepted and effected outgoing requests, only the incoming 
data could be taken into account in the calculations. For detailed statistical data on this subject see Annex 3. 

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This  initiative  aims  to  address  those  concerns  and  others  that  emerged  during  the  consultation 
process.  

2.2.1.  Unclear  or 

inadequate  operational  provisions  of 

the  Dublin  Regulation  are 
counterproductive  for  the  efficiency  of  the  system  and  create  hardship  for  asylum-
seekers  

The Evaluation Report and the consultation process identified a number of issues that impede the 
fully  efficient  operation  of  the  system,  thus  creating  practical  difficulties  for  Member  States  in 
implementing it and having a negative impact on asylum-seekers. 

The following main deficiencies have been identified: 

a.  Delays  in  the  procedure  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible,  with  corresponding 
hardship  for  the  asylum-seeker(s)  concerned  as  a  result  of  delayed  access  to  the  asylum 
procedure.  

The  Dublin  Regulation  sets  various  time  limits  for  the  procedure  to  determine  the  Member  State 
responsible.  The  overall  objective  is  to  ensure  that  Member  States  decide  quickly  on  who  is 
responsible  in  order  to  guarantee  the  rapid  processing  of  asylum  applications.  As  found  in  the 
Evaluation  Report  and  in  consultation  with  stakeholders,  while  most  of  the  time  limits  under  the 
Dublin  Regulation  are  appropriate,  there  are  three  instances  where  the  time  limits  appear  to  be 
inadequate, leading to delays in the procedure for determining the Member State responsible. The 
first concerns requests to take back an asylum-seeker who has already filed an application in one 
Member  State  and  then  moved  to  another  (Article  16).  The  second  concerns  requests  to  bring 
together  family  members  and  other  dependent  relatives  on  humanitarian  grounds  (Article  15). 
The  third  concerns  requests  for  information  needed  for  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation 
(Article 21).24 

Regarding take-back requests, the Regulation does not set time limits for submitting such requests 
to  the  Member  State  presumed  to  be  responsible  but  only  for  replying  to  such  requests.  As 
highlighted in the Evaluation Report, the absence of time limits for submitting this type of request is 
seen by several Member States as being detrimental to the efficiency of the system. The UNHCR 
mentioned  cases  where  it  took  more  than  three  months  from  the  moment  the  asylum  claim  was 
lodged for the authorities to make a request to another Member State to take back the individual.25 
For  requests  on  humanitarian  grounds,  the  Regulation  does  not  set  any  time  limits  for  making 
such requests or for replying to them, leading to different interpretations on the part of the Member 
States:  while  some  consider  that  the  deadlines  for  take-charge  requests26  should  apply,  others 
consider  it  impossible  to  apply  time  limits  to  requests  on  humanitarian  grounds,  as  the 
circumstances  for  reuniting  family  members  can  be  unpredictable.  However,  the  impossibility  of 
setting a time limit can only apply to the submission of requests on humanitarian grounds and not to 
the reply to such requests. In practice, as stated in the Evaluation Report, most Member States that 
apply the humanitarian clause complained that they did not receive any reply at all to their requests, 
possibly because, among other things, there is no time limit for a reply to be provided. For requests 
for information, the time limit for replying to them is six months. As information sharing between 
Member  States  is  essential  for  implementation  of  the  Regulation,  several  Member  States  and  the 

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26 

For further explanations of these terms, see glossary in Annex 4. 
UNHCR report, p.37. 
See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 

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UNHCR argued that the current time limit is too long.  Long  delays  in  responding to requests for 
information could also in some cases make it impossible for the requesting Member State to respect 
the  time  limit  for  making  a  request  to  take  charge  of  an  asylum-seeker  (3  months),  therefore 
resulting  in  it  becoming  responsible  by  default  for  examining  the  application  in  accordance  with 
Article 17(1) of the Regulation. This is because, before submitting a request, Member States have to 
possess clear proof or information indicating that the requested Member State is responsible.  

In conclusion, as a result of inadequate time limits, delays occur in the procedure for determining 
responsibility,  with  a  negative  impact  on  both  Member  States  (for  instance  the  wrong  Member 
States  could  be  deemed  responsible  by  default,  as  explained  above)  and  asylum-seekers  (the 
examination of the merits of their claims will be delayed, with the corresponding uncertainty and 
anxiety). 

Although it is not feasible to indicate the number of Member States where this problem occurs and 
the  number  of  asylum-seekers  potentially  affected,  as  this  is  a  general  problem  linked  with  the 
functioning of the system, it possibly concerns most Member States and most asylum-seekers.  

b. Despite a sizeable increase, the limited number of implemented transfers remains an important 
flaw of the system, since its efficiency is mainly based on the timely transfer of asylum-seekers to 
the Member State responsible for examining their applications 

The Dublin Regulation lays down several rules regarding the transfer of asylum-seekers from the 
Member State where they are staying to the Member State responsible. In particular, transfers have 
to  be  carried  out  as  soon  as  practically  possible,  after  consultation  between  the  Member  States 
involved  and  within  at  most  six  months  (which  may  be  extended  to  one  year  in  the  case  of 
imprisonment and to 18 months if asylum-seekers abscond) of the acceptance of a request. A series 
of  practical  arrangements  between  Member  States  are  also  set  out  in  the  Dublin  Implementing 
Regulation,  such  as  on  how  transfers  may  be  carried  out  (i.e.  on  voluntary  basis,  by  supervised 
departure or under escort) and on cooperation on transfers between Member States. 

However,  despite  the  existing  rules,  Member  States  often  encounter  practical  difficulties  in 
implementing accepted transfers and a large number are not carried out. Between March 2003 and 
December 2005 (the reference period for the Evaluation Report), implemented transfers represented 
52.28%  of  outgoing  acceptances  and  40.04%  of  incoming  acceptances.27
  This  represents  a 
considerable  increase  in  comparison  with  the  number  of  transfers  under  the  Dublin  Convention, 
where only 27% of outgoing acceptances and 25.62% of incoming acceptances were followed by 
transfers. However, the number of implemented transfers still remains low in comparison with the 
number of acceptances: in 2006, implemented transfers represented 61.3% of outgoing acceptances 
and 54.4% of incoming acceptances. This is further confirmed by the data for the first half of 2007 
(outgoing  transfers  were  57.61%  of  accepted  requests  while  incoming  transfers  accounted  for 
53.6% of accepted requests).28 

As illustrated in the Evaluation Report, all Member States reported a lower number of transfers than 
acceptances.  The  Evaluation  Report  showed  that  Lithuania,  Estonia  and  Malta  carried  out  all 
accepted  transfers,  but  as  the  numbers  were  very  low  they  cannot  be  considered  to  be  of  any 
statistical significance.29 One group of Member States had outgoing transfer rates much higher than 

27 
28 
29 

See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of the terms. 
For further information on transfers, see Tables I, II, III, IV in Annex 3. 
The assessment is based on the analysis of outgoing transfers. 

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the average of 52.28%. The Czech Republic with 91.51% had the highest rate. This was followed 
by a group of Member States with rates higher than 70%, namely the United Kingdom (88.43%), 
Iceland  (84.61%),  Luxembourg  (75.65%)  and  the  Netherlands  (73.13%).  In  three  Member  States 
the rate was between 50% and 70%, namely in Norway, Germany and Ireland. In Finland, Greece, 
Italy,  Slovenia,  Hungary,  Portugal,  Spain,  Slovakia  and  Austria  the  rate  was  below  the  average 
(between 15 and 32%). The lowest proportion of effected transfers was seen in Austria, where only 
14.9% of all accepted outgoing requests were followed by effected transfers. 

In 2006, Estonia, Cyprus and Iceland carried out all accepted requests, but given the low numbers in 
question these data are not very relevant from a statistical point of view.30 The United Kingdom had 
the  highest  transfer  rate  with  97.06%,  followed  by  the  Czech  Republic  with  91.10%  and  Finland 
with  90.59%.  The  Member  States  with  rates  higher  than  70%  were  Luxembourg  (83.22%)  and 
Denmark  (73.72%).  In  five  Member  States  the  rate  was  between  50%  and  70%,  namely  in 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Norway. In Austria, Slovenia, Greece and France, the 
rate  was  between  40%  and  48%.  In  Italy,  Hungary  and  Slovakia  the  rate  was  between  19%  and 
26%.  Finally,  the  Member  State  with  the  lowest  proportion  of  effected  outgoing  transfers  was 
Spain, with only 14%. 

The  Evaluation  Report  showed  that  certain  Member  States  in  particular  frequently  exchanged 
asylum-seekers  between  themselves.  For  instance,  in  the  second  half  of  2005,  Germany  accepted 
383  requests  from  Austria,  while  Austria  accepted  190  requests  from  Germany.  The  Dublin 
Regulation  does  not  provide  for  Member  States  that  frequently  exchange  asylum-seekers  due  to 
various  factors,  such  as  their  geographical  situation,  to  limit  the  number  of  asylum-seekers  to  be 
transferred  by  agreeing  to  ‘cancel’  an  equal  number  of  transfers  so  as  to  carry  out  a  one-way 
transfer of a limited number of persons.  

From the perspective of the sending Member State (the Member State which did not implement the 
transfer),  non-effected  transfers  mean  a  waste  of  the  financial  and  human  resources  used  in  the 
procedure  for  determining  responsibility.  On  top  of  this  there  are  the  costs  of  assuming 
responsibility  by  default.  However,  the  receiving  Member  State  (the  one  normally  responsible) 
would  be  relieved  of  the  costs  of  receiving  asylum-seekers  and  examining  their  applications. 
Finally, non-effected transfers are also problematic in view of the political objectives of the system, 
which is to establish the responsibility of a Member State for examining an application on the basis 
of objective criteria. From this point of view, if decisions are not followed by transfers, the Dublin 
Regulation  could  for  instance  be  seen  as  failing  to  address  the  phenomenon  of  secondary 
movements.  

From the standpoint  of applicants, if  transfers are not carried  out, they would  in principle remain 
within  the  Member  State  of  their  choice,  although  the  period  for  gaining  access  to  the  asylum 
procedure as such might be longer than if they had been transferred without delay to the responsible 
Member  State.  However,  in  certain  circumstances,  a  failed  transfer  might  also  be  to  the 

30 

Data submitted by some Member States (in 2006 by Lithuania and Poland) show the number of transfers to be 
higher than the number of accepted requests. The former should normally coincide with the latter or be lower. 
This  discrepancy  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  some  Member  States  might  not  register  requests  accepted 
implicitly (in accordance with Articles 18(7) and 20(1)(c) of the Dublin Regulation). Therefore, data provided 
by  these  Member  States,  included  in  Annex  3,  should  be  considered  with  caution.  In  the  calculation  of  the 
average rate of effected transfers, the number of transfers for these Member States has been considered equal 
to the number of accepted requests. 

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disadvantage  of  asylum-seekers,  for  instance  when  this  would  prevent  them  from  reuniting  with 
members of their family in the responsible Member State. 

This problem appears to be due to two sets of factors. One concerns insufficient coordination and 
disagreement between Member States on the practical arrangements for transfers, due in some cases 
to  a  lack  of  detail  in  the  legal  text.  For  instance:  Member  States  often  choose  different  days  and 
times  when  asylum-seekers  can  be  transferred;  they  do  not  always  exchange  relevant  information 
prior to undertaking a transfer; there is a lack of clarity on who is to pay the transportation costs; 
there are no rules in the Dublin Regulation on the procedure to follow in the event of erroneous 
transfers (where Member States transfer the wrong person) or in the case of decisions overturned 
on appeal after the person has been already transferred.  

The second set of factors explaining the limited number of implemented transfers concerns mainly 
the actions of asylum-seekers. The Evaluation Report mentioned three main causes in this regard: 

•  Absconding  of  asylum-seekers  after  the  decision:  i.e.  where  an  asylum-seeker  decides  to 
disappear after announcement of the transfer decision, in order to avoid being transferred. This 
appears to be essentially linked to the existence of pull factors in the Member State where they 
are,  such  as  positive  perception  of  the  asylum  system  in  terms  of  reception  conditions  and 
recognition  rates,  the  fact  that  a  large  community  of  the  same  origin  is  living  in  the  same 
Member  State,  etc.  Some  Member  States  pointed  out  that  asylum-seekers  are  encouraged  to 
abscond  by  a  rule  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  (Articles  19(4)  and  20(4))  under  which  the 
responsibility of a Member State ceases after 18 months in cases where asylum-seekers abscond, 
with the result that they are able to remain within the Member State of their choice. 

•  The  suspensive  effect  of  appeals  against  transfer  decisions:  i.e.  where  the  transfer  is 
suspended  and  the  person  can  remain  in  that  Member  State  until  a  decision  is  taken  on  the 
appeal. However, the number of such cases should be limited, given that Member States have a 
low rate of appeal and suspensive effect seems to be rarely granted (see also section 2.1.4.b). 

•  Illness,  trauma  or  voluntary  return  of  asylum-seekers  to  their  country  of  origin  are  other 
causes of non-effected transfers. There are no statistics on how many transfers were not carried 
out because of these reasons.  

c. Non uniform application and divergences between Member States regarding the circumstances 
and procedures for applying certain rules and criteria of the Dublin Regulation affect the proper 
functioning of the system 

As demonstrated in the Evaluation Report, a number of rules and criteria established by the Dublin 
Regulation  are  not  clear  and/or  are  not  applied  in  a  uniform  manner  by  the  Member  States.  This 
mainly  concerns  the  cessation  of  responsibility  clauses  and  the  discretionary  clauses  (the 
sovereignty and humanitarian clauses). Disputes arising from the non-uniform application of these 
clauses not only affect the efficiency of the system but are also detrimental to asylum-seekers, since 
they create delay and uncertainty. 

Regarding  the  cessation  of  responsibility  clauses:  the  principle  is  that  the  responsibility  of  a 
particular Member State to take charge of or take back applicants to examine their application for 
asylum, or to return third-country nationals whose applications have been previously rejected, is not 
indefinite. The Dublin Regulation thus contains a series of provisions setting out the circumstances 
where responsibility ceases. As shown in the Evaluation Report, three of these instances have been 

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identified as causing particular problems in Member States: Articles 4(5), 16(3) and 16(4),31 which 
state that the responsibility of a Member State ends if, among other things, it can be proved that the 
applicant has left the territories of the Member States for at least three months or that the applicant 
has been expelled.  

In particular, the following problems have been identified: 

- from the wording of these Articles, it is not clear which Member State bears the burden of proof, 
i.e. is it the requested Member State (meaning the responsible Member State asked to take charge 
or  take  back  an  asylum  applicant  but  which  refuses  to  do  so  by  invoking  a  cessation  of 
responsibility clause) which has to provide evidence that the person has effectively left the country 
or has been expelled or is it the requesting Member State that has to prove that the person has not 
left the territory or has not been expelled; 

- the consequences of the cessation of responsibility are not clear, i.e. it is not clear what happens if 
a new application is lodged in the same Member State after the cessation of responsibility; 

- the expressions ‘state in which he may lawfully travel’ and ‘adopted and actually implemented’ in 
Article 16(4) give rise to difficulties of interpretation among Member States. For instance, for some 
Member States (at least three), the notion of ‘state in which he may lawfully travel’ does not include 
the Member States, for others it does not include the Schengen States and for others (at least four) it 
includes  all  possible  countries  where  a  person  may  legally  travel.  Regarding  the  expression 
‘adopted and actually implemented’ it is not clear for instance if it is sufficient to deliver a request 
to leave the country or if the person actually has to leave the country.  

Divergent interpretations have also been observed in the application of the discretionary clauses, 
which allow Member States to derogate from the criteria for determining responsibility.  

Regarding the sovereignty clause (Article 3(2)): the principle is that each Member State retains 
the  right  to  examine  any  asylum  application  submitted  to  it,  even  if  it  is  not  the  Member  State 
responsible  under  the  criteria  laid  down  in  the  Regulation.  Firstly,  it  has  emerged  from  the 
consultation that there is some confusion among the Member States about their obligation to first 
carry out the procedure to determine responsibility before applying the sovereignty clause, despite 
the fact that this obligation seems to be clearly established under the Regulation.32 

The  application  of  the  sovereignty  clause  without  carrying  out  the  procedure  to  determine 
responsibility could be seen in certain circumstances as being less resource-intensive for Member 
States than launching the Dublin procedure. However, for asylum-seekers, the application of the 
sovereignty  clause  without  carrying  out  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility  could  have 
negative  consequences,  notably  when  this  would  prevent  them  from  rejoining  family  members  in 
another Member State (in cases where as a result of the procedure for determining responsibility, 
the responsible Member State is the one where family members of the asylum-seeker are staying, in 
accordance with the current Articles 6, 7 or 8).  

31 
32 

See glossary in Annex 4 for further explanation of these Articles. 
The obligation to first carry out the procedure to determine responsibility can be inferred from Article 4: ‘The 
process of determining the Member State responsible under this Regulation shall start as soon as an application 
for asylum is first lodged with a Member States’ and from the introductory part of Article 3(2): ‘By way of 
derogation from paragraph 1, each Member State may examine an application for asylum lodged with it by a 
third-country  national,  even  if  such  examination  is  not  its  responsibility  under  the  criteria  laid  down  in 
this Regulation.’ The obligation to inform the concerned Member States about the taking of responsibility can 
be read in the last part of Article 3(2).  

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The  fact  that  the  Dublin  Regulation  does  not  require  the  consent  of  the  asylum-seeker  for  the 
application  of  the  sovereignty  clause33  is  another  linked  problem,  since,  as  mentioned  in  the 
Evaluation Report, in some cases the asylum-seeker might not necessarily implicitly consent with 
the application of this clause and would prefer the designation criteria to be strictly applied, notably 
when this would allow him or her to rejoin family members in another Member States. 

Secondly, some confusion exists with regard to the obligation to inform the other Member States 
about the decision to apply the sovereignty clause (final part of Article 3(2)). It is also not clear by 
which  means  such  information  has  to  be  transmitted.  If  the  Member  State  making  use  of  this 
discretionary  power  does  not  inform  the  other  Member  States  about  the  taking  of  responsibility, 
there  is  a  risk  that  simultaneous  procedures  are  carried  out  in  several  Member  States  on  a  single 
application, which is obviously inefficient and resource-consuming and against the objectives of the 
system. 

Finally,  another  issue  that  has  proved  to  be  problematic  in  practice  concerns  the  circumstances 
under which the sovereignty clause can be used, which are not specified in the Regulation. Member 
States  apply  it  for  different  reasons,  ranging  from  humanitarian  to  purely  practical.  For  example, 
Austria,  Finland  and  Ireland  apply  it  if  there  is  a  risk  of  violation  of  Article  3  of  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Germany  and  Italy  apply  it  when  processing  a  claim  under  an 
accelerated procedure would be less resource-intensive than launching a transfer request under the 
Dublin  procedure.  This  clause  was  designed  to  respond  to  situations  which  are  not  explicitly 
provided  for  in  the  Regulation,  so  Member  States  have  flexibility  in  applying  it.  However, 
experience has shown that in some cases the sovereignty clause has been used against the interest of 
asylum-seekers,  in  particular  when  this  has  been  for  practical  reasons,  as  highlighted  by  the 
UNHCR.34  

Regarding the humanitarian clause (Article 15): the principle is that any Member State, even if it 
is  not  the  Member  State  responsible  under  the  criteria  set  out  in  the  Regulation,  may,  on 
humanitarian grounds, in particular based on family or cultural considerations, bring together family 
members  and  other  dependent  relatives  in  order  to  examine  their  applications  for  asylum,  at  the 
request of another Member State.  

Regarding  the  procedure  for  applying  the  humanitarian  clause,  Member  States  have  been 
confronted with several difficulties, due in particular to the fact that: 

-  the  Regulation  is  not  clear  about  which  Member  State  can  make  a  request  on  humanitarian 
grounds  (i.e.  any  Member  State  as  outlined  in  Article  15(1)  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  or,  as  laid 
down in Article 13(1), the Member State carrying out the procedure to determine responsibility, or 
the Member State responsible);  

-  the  Regulation  does  not  contain  an  explicit  obligation  to  justify  a  refusal  to  accept  a  request  on 
humanitarian grounds;  

-  the  practical  arrangements  are  not  working  satisfactorily  or  are  not  comprehensive  enough,  e.g. 
there are no clear arrangements for obtaining the consent of the persons involved in the procedure; 

- it is difficult to obtain proof of the family link and/or the dependency situation; 

33  
34 

This obligation figured however in the Dublin Convention. 
UNHCR report, p.31. 

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Other problems related to the application of this clause are identified and explained in points 2.2.2. 
and 2.2.5.  

As  a  result  of  the  lack  of  clarity  and  comprehensiveness  of  this  provision,  its  application  varies 
widely  from  one  Member  State  to  another35,  and  is  subject  to  disagreements  between  Member 
States. Those primarily affected are the asylum-seekers themselves, who might be prevented from 
being reunited with family members or dependent relatives for humanitarian reasons (see also point 
2.2.2).  

As the Dublin procedure, with one exception (the sovereignty clause), always involves at least two 
Member  States,  it  is  self-evident  that  non-uniform  interpretation  of  its  provisions  may  hinder  the 
procedure for determining responsibility. 

2.2.2.  Disputes between Member States concerning the application of the Dublin rules are not 

tackled in an efficient way 

Member States often encounter problems in practice and have divergent views on the application of 
the Regulation, as is also highlighted in the Evaluation Report. In some cases, this seems to be due 
to  the  lack  of  clarity  of  the  legal  text  (see  for  instance  the  point  above  on  the  cessation  of 
responsibility).  In  some  other  cases,  this  is  linked  with  the  high  level  of  proof  Member  States 
require  for  the  application  of  certain  provisions  (for  instance  those  relating  to  family  unity). 
Lengthy disputes or disagreements compromise the objective of the system, which is to determine 
the Member State responsible as quickly as possible in order to guarantee the rapid processing of 
asylum applications. In some cases, moreover, Member States appear to give up on resolving their 
disputes,  which  obviously  has  a  detrimental  effect  both  on  one  of  the  Member  States  involved 
(which will have to examine the application despite the fact that the correct implementation of the 
Dublin  rules  could  designate  another  Member  State  as  responsible)  and  on  asylum-seekers  (in 
particular if not reunited with members of their family). 

Based on the significant number of questions Member States regularly raise on the interpretation of 
various  provisions  of  the  Regulation  (some  of  which  are  discussed  at  informal  Dublin  experts’ 
meetings),  the  majority  of  Member  States  can  be  considered  to  have  divergent  views  on  the 
application of certain provisions of the Regulation. 

The Dublin Regulation does not contain a general mechanism for settling disputes or differences of 
opinion  between  Member  States  concerning  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  The  conciliation 
mechanism in Article 14 of the Implementing Regulation has a limited scope (as it only applies to 
disputes  on  the  humanitarian  clause),  and  its  decisions  are  not  binding.  For  these  reasons,  the 
conciliation  mechanism  has  never  been  used  by  Member  States,  despite  the  fact  that  they  often 
cannot agree on the need to bring family members together or on the place where this should occur. 
The  fact  that  the  conciliation  mechanism  for  the  humanitarian  clause  is  not  used  diminishes  the 
chances of relatives to be reunited on humanitarian grounds, which in some cases, as mentioned in 
the  Evaluation  Report,  could  amount  to  a  breach  of  the  fundamental  right  to  family  unity  as 
enshrined  in  Article  7  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  in  Article  8  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights.  

35 

As  shown  in  the  Evaluation  Report,  some  (such  as  Estonia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Slovenia, 
Iceland)  have  never  made  use  of  it  and  others  (such  as  Greece,  Spain,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Hungary)  have 
applied it in very few cases, while Poland has based 50% of its requests on this provision. 

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Some of the practical difficulties Member States encounter with the implementation of the Dublin 
Regulation are discussed during the informal meetings the Commission organises twice a year with 
Dublin experts from all Member States and with the participation of the UNHCR. However, there is 
no structured follow-up to these discussions and the conclusions reached are not binding. Therefore, 
their real impact is questionable.  

2.2.3.  Transfers  under  the  Dublin  procedure  could  contribute  to  further  overburdening 

Member States facing particular pressure 

The  IA  on  the  Policy  Plan  showed  that  the  distribution  of  asylum  applicants  between  Member 
States  remained  substantially  unequal  in  2006,  so  some  Member  States  can  undeniably  be 
considered to be ‘overburdened’ when the flow of asylum-seekers they receive is compared to the 
size  of  their  population.  Two  main  reasons  have  been  identified  for  the  overburdening  of  certain 
Member  States:  geographical  situation  (this  would  apply  to  countries  like  Malta,  Cyprus,  Greece 
and Slovakia) and a ‘positive perception’ of the asylum system (for countries like Sweden, Belgium 
and  Austria,  with  relatively  good  reception  conditions  for  asylum-seekers  and  higher  recognition 
rates).  

As regards the impact of the Dublin procedure on national asylum systems, the Evaluation Report 
has  demonstrated  that  the  Dublin  mechanism  did  not  increase  or  decrease  the  total  number  of 
asylum-seekers  by  more  than  5%  in  most  Member  States.  However,  in  the  case  of  Poland,  the 
increase  was  around  20%  and,  in  the  case  of  Slovakia,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Hungary  and  Portugal, 
around  10%.  In  2005,  the  incoming  transfers  under  the  Dublin  System  were  equally  balanced 
between border and non-border Member States36
 and data from 2006 seem to confirm this finding. 
In 2005, the number of incoming transfers to external border countries was 3 055, while there were 
5 161  incoming  transfers  to  Member  States  without  an  external  border.  In  2006,  border  countries 
received 3 050 incoming transfers as against 4 984 received by non-border countries.37 

Based  on  the  available  statistical  data,  transfers  seem  to  be  mainly  towards  countries  that  can  be 
considered to be relatively ‘under-burdened’ from a demographic point of view. There were some 
exceptions  for  2006,  however:  Greece  and  Malta  (considered  as  ‘overburdened’  from  a 
demographic  point  of  view)  and  the  Slovak  Republic  (considered  as  ‘averagely  overburdened’). 
Therefore, it can be stated that, overall, the Dublin system has a redistributive impact on national 
asylum systems, and is not in itself a cause of particular asylum pressure or overburden on Member 
States. In some cases, however, there is a risk that Dublin transfers place an even greater burden on 
Member States that are already facing a slight or large overburden. 

As also highlighted in the Evaluation Report, the Dublin System may de facto result in additional 
burdens  on  Member  States  that  have  limited  reception  and  absorption  capacities  and  that  find 
themselves under particular migratory pressure.  

In  cases  of  pre-existing  deficiencies  of  the  asylum  systems  of  some  Member  States  and  in 
exceptional situations of particular pressure, transfers under the Dublin Regulation, which allocates 

36 

37 

For  assessing  the  impact  of  Dublin  transfers  on  the  Member  States,  the  Evaluation  Report  considered  as 
border countries those countries with sea borders exposed to migration flows (‘Southern border’) and those 
with  land  borders  with  third  countries  (‘Eastern  border’).  Finland  is  an  exception  to  the  principle,  as  it  has 
borders with Russia but is considered a non-border country because of the lack of migration flows on its border 
with  Russia.  Non-border  countries  are  those  countries  without  land  borders  with  third  countries  (except 
borders with Switzerland) and without sea borders exposed to migration flows. 
See Table V in Annex 3. 

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in most cases responsibility to the first country of entry (in accordance with Article 10(1)), may add 
to the burden of those Member States and in some cases can result in the concerned Member States 
not being able to guarantee an appropriate standard of protection (see also section 2.2.4).  

Another  situation  where  Dublin  transfers  could  create  further  overburdening  for  certain  Member 
States is where they receive a considerably higher number of asylum applications than the average, 
as a result of the ‘positive perception’ of their asylum systems by asylum applicants. For instance, 
in  Sweden,  the  number  of  asylum  applications  by  Iraqi  citizens  increased  from  2 330  in  2005  to 
8 950 in 2006 and to 18 560 in 2007. 

For the time being, there is no mechanism in the Dublin Regulation to prevent, in cases of particular 
pressure on certain Member States, Dublin transfers further adding to the burden of those Member 
States  and  possibly  creating  the  risk  of  breaching  the  protection  standards  under  the  EU  asylum 
acquis.  

2.2.4.  Transfers  under  the  Dublin  procedure  could,  in  exceptional  circumstances,  result  in 

asylum-seekers not receiving an adequate standard of protection  

For the Dublin system to function adequately, all Member States have to provide harmonised and 
adequate  standards  of  protection  for  asylum-seekers.  However,  as  demonstrated  in  the  IA  on  the 
Policy Plan, at this stage of the CEAS, there are still significant differences between the Member 
States  in  terms  of  procedures  for  granting  international  protection  and  reception  conditions  for 
asylum-seekers. The asylum system and practice of some Member States is not always adequate, so 
returns  under  the  Dublin  procedure  could  sometimes  result  in  asylum-seekers  not  receiving  an 
adequate standard of protection.  

The return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation is one recent example that can 
be mentioned in this context. As evidenced by the UNHCR in a report from April 200838, Greece 
seems  to  face  considerable  structural  and  qualitative  shortcomings  with  its  asylum  system  and 
practice,  with  a  substantial  number  of  asylum-seekers  facing  serious  challenges  in  accessing  and 
enjoying effective protection in Greece. The UNHCR has therefore advised the Member States to 
refrain  from  returning  asylum-seekers  to  Greece  until  further  notice  and  to  examine  themselves 
those applications (i.e. applying the sovereignty clause in Article 3(2)). 

Member States have reacted differently to the uncertain asylum situation in Greece and the calls by 
the UNHCR and various NGOs to suspend Dublin returns: one State has suspended all returns to 
Greece  but  without  taking  responsibility  for  those  cases  and  examining  them,  at  least  three  other 
States have suspended the return of only vulnerable groups, while the majority of States appear to 
continue to send asylum-seekers to Greece.  

Under  the  current  Regulation,  the  Commission  does  not  have  concrete  tools  to  provide  proper 
assistance in such situations and to propose a uniform line to be adopted by all Member States.  

Moreover, besides Greece, reception conditions are of concern in at least three other Member States 
(Austria,  France  and  Spain),  which  do  not  apply  the  Reception  Conditions  Directive  to  asylum-
seekers  under  the  Dublin  procedure.39  For  the  period  2005-2006  the  average  number  of  affected 

38 
39 

UNHCR position on the return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation, 15 April 2008. 
Odysseus Academic Network, Comparative Overview of the Implementation Directive 2003/9 of 27 January 
2003  laying  down  Minimum  Standards  for  the  Reception  of  Asylum  Seekers  in  the  EU  Member  States. 

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applicants  per  year  in  these  three  Member  States  was  approximately  7 300  (figure  based  on  the 
number of outgoing Dublin requests sent by these Member States during the period). 

Regarding  the  number  of  Dublin  asylum-seekers  potentially  affected  by  this  problem  in  Greece, 
based  on  the  number  of  transfers  between  January  2005  and  June  2007,  approximately  1 200 
asylum-seekers who were previously under the Dublin procedure could have been affected by the 
problem of poor reception conditions. 

These data have to be used with great caution. They just give an indication of the potential number 
of asylum-seekers that could have received an inadequate level of protection in the Member States 
mentioned.  There  are  no  statistics  available  as  to  the  exact  number  of  asylum-seekers  in  this 
situation.  

2.2.5. 

Inadequate information and legal safeguards for asylum-seekers  

Accurate and comprehensive information about the rules and implications of the Dublin procedure 
as well as adequate legal safeguards are essential for the protection of the rights of asylum-seekers 
subject to the Dublin procedure and in order to improve the prospects of them respecting the system 
rather than trying to evade it.  

The  Evaluation  Report  and  the  consultation  process  identified  the  following  flaws  in  the  Dublin 
Regulation in this regard: 

a. Often, asylum-seekers are not properly informed about the Dublin procedure and their rights 
under it  

Article  3(4)  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  obliges  Member  States  to  inform  the  asylum-seeker  ‘in 
writing  in  a  language  he  or  she  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  understand  regarding  the 
application  of  [the]  Regulation,  its  time  limits  and  its  effects’.  Despite  the  existence  of  this  legal 
obligation, the Evaluation Report has emphasised the general lack of awareness of asylum-seekers 
of  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility  and  the  fact  that,  in  many  cases,  they  do  not 
understand why they are sent to a country other than the one of their choice. The communication 
policy varies widely from one Member State to another, with certain Member States having good 
information  tools  while  others  providing  only  a  low  level  of  information  and/or  in  an  inadequate 
form.  

As regards the form in which the information has to be provided, although Article 3(4) requires 
Member States to inform applicants in writing, at least five Member States appear not to do so.40 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  legal  text  is  silent  on  the  need,  in  some  cases,  to  provide  information 
also in other forms than in writing, might lead to practices that do not accommodate the needs of 
persons who might be unable to make use of a written text. As regards the language in which the 
information is provided, data gathered in 2006 indicate that some Member States (such as Slovakia, 
UK, Norway, Germany, and Austria) make information available in more than 15 languages, while 
others  provide  translations  in  fewer  than  10  languages  (such  as  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Romania). 
There  are  also  divergent  practices  regarding  the  stage  of  the  procedure  when  information  is 
provided to asylum-seekers, with some Member States informing them at the very beginning of the 

Concerning  the  level  of  reception  conditions  in  the  Member  States,  see  the  IA  on  the  Directive  […/.../EC] 
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, SEC (2008) 2944. 
UNHCR report, p.13. 

40 

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procedure (or even  before receiving  an application  for asylum, such as  Greece),  some both at the 
beginning and during the procedure (such as Lithuania and the Netherlands), some only during the 
interviews (such as Cyprus), and some only when there are indications that another country might 
be  responsible  for  the  asylum  application.41  As  far  as  the  content  is  concerned,  the  too  general 
requirement  obliging  Member  States  to  inform  asylum-seekers  about  ‘the  application  of  the 
Regulation,  its  time  limits  and  its  effects’  leads  to  cases  where  important  aspects  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation are not covered. For instance, as highlighted by the UNHCR, some Member States do 
information  about  family  reunification  possibilities  or  about  humanitarian 
not  provide 
considerations, or do not explain the time limits for the procedure.  

It  is  self-evident  that  without  timely,  accurate  and  comprehensive  information  about  the  Dublin 
procedure,  asylum-seekers  cannot  effectively  exercise  their  rights.  The  Evaluation  Report  also 
showed  that  the  lack  of  awareness  of  asylum-seekers  of  the  Dublin  procedure,  in  particular  the 
consequences  of  making  a  second  application  in  a  different  Member  State,  could  be  one  of  the 
reasons why the issue of secondary movements has not been so far adequately tackled.  

b. The effectiveness of the right to remedy for asylum-seekers is not fully guaranteed 

Although  the  Dublin  Regulation  has  been  conceived  as  an  instrument  addressing  mainly  the 
relationship  between  Member  States  and  therefore  does  not  contain  general  provisions  regulating 
the  relationship  between  Member  States  and  individuals,42  it  does  provide  some  procedural 
safeguards,  directly  linked  to  Dublin  transfer  decisions.  For  example,  Member  States  have  the 
possibility to allow under their national legislation the right to appeal a transfer decision (Articles 
19(2) and 20(1)(e)) together with the suspensive effect of an appeal, which suspends the carrying 
out of a transfer until a decision on the appeal has been taken.  

However,  as  pointed  out  in  particular  by  the  UNHCR  and  NGOs  and  also  mentioned  in  the 
Evaluation Report, this right to remedy is not considered effective for several reasons, in particular: 

•  Although in practice all Member States allow for the possibility to appeal or review a transfer 
decision, asylum-seekers do not always appear able to make effective use of it. The Evaluation 
Report  showed  that,  apart  from  Austria  and  Norway,  most  Member  States  have  a  low  rate  of 
appeal. This is due in particular to the fact that transfer decisions are communicated to asylum 
applicants  only  very  shortly  before  the  transfer  takes  place43  and  to  the  fact  that  asylum 
applicants  do  not  have  rapid  access  to  legal  aid.  There  are  also  noteworthy  differences  in  the 
form and content of the transfer decisions issued by the Member States, partly due to the lack of 
detail  in  Articles  19(1),  (2)  and  20(1)(e),  which  for  instance  leave  open  the  procedure  for 
informing asylum applicants about the transfer decision (i.e. orally or in writing, language to be 
used, etc.) and do not say much about the content of transfer decisions (e.g. they do not explicitly 
require decisions to include information on appeal or review possibilities).  

41 
42 

43 

Based on information provided by Member States within the Dublin Contact Committee, November 2006. 
In general, the duties and rights tying Member States and asylum-seekers are addressed by other EU asylum 
instruments,  in  particular  by  the  Reception  Conditions  Directive,  which  applies  throughout  the  asylum 
procedure and therefore also throughout the Dublin procedure. 
The UNHCR reported that in the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany and Luxembourg, for instance, 
transfers take place on the same day or shortly after when the asylum-seeker is notified of the transfer decision, 
allowing very little time to prepare an appeal. 

EN 

17 

   EN 

                                                 
•  As underlined in the Evaluation Report, the suspensive effect of an appeal or review is rarely 
granted, meaning that in most cases, despite lodging an appeal against the transfer decision, the 
asylum applicant will be transferred to the Member State supposedly responsible before a final 
decision  has  been  taken  on  the  appeal.  The  conditions  under  which  suspensive  effect  can  be 
granted differ from Member State to Member State, but usually this happens in cases of serious 
illness or risk of breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the Regulation 
does not indicate whether any judicial review of transfer decisions should be limited only to the 
interpretation of the Dublin criteria and the respect of its procedural rules or whether it could be 
extended  to  the  examination  of  the  legal  and  factual  situation  of  the  receiving  Member  State, 
based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,44 Member States have the 
obligation  to  ensure  that  Dublin  transfers  do  not  result  in  a  violation  of  international  human 
rights  law,  in  particular  the  principle  of  non-refoulement45,  as  laid  down  in  Article  33  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  and  in  Article  19  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights.  In  view  of  the 
continued inequalities in the level of protection across the EU, a non-suspensive appeal may in 
certain  cases  lead  to  asylum-seekers  being  transferred  to  a  place  where  they  do  not  enjoy  the 
same standard of protection. Problems also have been encountered where suspensive effect was 
not  granted  (and  therefore  the  transfers  were  enforced),  but  the  decision  to  transfer  was 
overturned  on  appeal.  The  Regulation  has  no  rules  on  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in  these 
cases. Such situations delay the process and create uncertainties for asylum-seekers.  

c. Custodial measures are commonly used by several Member States with corresponding hardship 
for the asylum-seekers involved, especially where vulnerable groups are concerned 

The Reception Conditions Directive states in Article 7(3) that Member States may, where necessary 
for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order, confine an applicant to a particular place in 
accordance  with  their  national  law.  According  to  Article  18  of  the  Asylum  Procedures  Directive, 
Member States may not hold persons in detention solely because they are asylum applicants. If they 
are  held  in  detention,  Member  States  must  ensure  the  possibility  of  speedy  judicial  review. 
However,  the  Dublin  Regulation  contains  no  provisions  specifically  concerning  the  detention  of 
Dublin applicants. 

As pointed out in the Evaluation Report, several Member States commonly detain asylum-seekers 
subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure  throughout  the  process  for  determining  responsibility  or 
immediately after announcement of the final decision (United Kingdom, Iceland, Luxembourg, and 
Netherlands)  in  order  to  avoid  possible  absconding.  The  Czech  Republic  usually  detains  all 
migrants  even  if  they  have  lodged  an  application  for  asylum.  Norway  and  Ireland  also  apply 
detention but in a more limited way. Detention pending transfer appears in some cases to take place 
even if applicants for asylum indicate their willingness to return or to be transferred to the Member 
State responsible. For instance, the UNHCR has reported the case of a family, including at least one 
minor, who despite their agreement to be reunified with their extended family in another Member 
State, were nevertheless detained. In some  cases, detention appears  to be wrongly used simply to 
accelerate the Dublin procedure under Article 17(2), which allows a Member State to claim urgency 
in receiving a reply to its request in the case of detention.  

The  principle  of  non-detention,  i.e.  asylum-seekers  should  not  be  detained  solely  on  account  of 
being asylum-seekers, as enshrined in the Asylum Procedures Directive, should be applicable to all 
asylum-seekers,  including  those  coming  under  the  Dublin  procedure.  The  detention  of  asylum-

44 
45 

T.I. v UK, application No 43844/98, Admissibility decision of 7 March 2000. 
See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

                                                 
seekers per se does not infringe that principle if used in limited and justified cases. However, given 
that the legal instruments dealing with the issue of detention are not clear about the grounds, limits 
and procedural guarantees to be respected where asylum-seekers, including those under the Dublin 
procedure, are detained, it is very difficult to assess whether the practice of some Member States on 
this matter, as criticised by the UNHCR, NGOs and the Council of Europe, among others,46 does or 
does not comply with current EU or international standards.47  

The  harsh  impact  on  the  individuals  concerned  is  self-evident,  in  particular  where  persons  with 
medical  needs,  women  and  children  are  detained.  For  Member  States,  it  is  evident  that  detaining 
most  Dublin  cases  puts  a  strain  on  their  detention  capacities  and  involves  considerable  costs. 
Regarding the detention of children, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated that 
‘detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or 
on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof.’48  

It is not possible to estimate the number of detained asylum seekers under the Dublin procedure due 
to  the  fact  that  Member  States  either  do  not  provide  for  such  data  or  the  available  data  are  not 
comparable since they also include other third-country nationals in detention. 

d. The principle of effective access to the asylum procedure once the procedure for determining 
responsibility is completed and asylum-seekers are transferred to the Member State responsible is 
not fully guaranteed  

The  Dublin  Regulation  in  its  Article  3(1)  establishes  the  general  principle  under  which  asylum-
seekers  subject  to  a  Dublin  transfer  decision  must  have  full  access  to  the  asylum  procedure  once 
transferred  to  the  Member  State  responsible,  meaning  that  Member  States  have  to  make  a  full 
assessment of the protection needs of these asylum-seekers. However, the Regulation is not clear in 
several  respects,  in  particular  whether  the  principle  applies  to  cases  both  under  the  first  instance 
procedure and under the appeal procedure. It is not clear from Article 16(1) whether, for example, 
in the case of a withdrawal of the application in the responsible Member State and submission of a 
new  application  in  a  different  Member  State,  the  asylum-seeker,  upon  being  returned  to  the 
responsible Member State under the Dublin rules, should be able to have the examination of his or 
her  case  completed.  The  Asylum  Procedures  Directive  contains  general  provisions  dealing  with 
procedures  at  first  instance  and  appeal  procedures,  which  generally  do  not  tackle  the  specific 
situation of asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. 

Based on the Evaluation Report as well as reports from the UNHCR and NGOs, it can be stated that 
asylum-seekers  subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure  are  in  some  cases  unable  to  have  their  asylum 
claims assessed on merits or to lodge an appeal where a negative first-instance decision was issued 
in the responsible Member State. For instance, Greece was until April 2006 suspending and closing 

46 

47 

48 

Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, made the following comments 
about  the  Dublin  system:  ‘I  am  concerned  by  the  fact  that  some  EU  Member  States  detain  asylum-seekers 
when  their  transfers  are  under  way  to  the  Member  State  responsible  for  examining  their  application,  in  the 
context of the Dublin II Regulation. The “Dublin II Regulation” should be revised in order to reflect the basic 
principle  of  non-detention  of  asylum  seekers.  An  effective  EU-wide  monitoring  system  is  also  necessary  so 
that places used for detaining asylum seekers are under constant surveillance by an independent organ. Special 
attention, in this context, should be paid to the widely used detention in airport (transit) areas.’ 
For  instance  Article  6  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights,  and  Article  5  of  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights. 
United  Nations  Committee  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child,  General  Comment  No  6  (2005),  CRC/GC/2005/6, 
paragraphs 61-63. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

                                                 
the  claims  of  those  asylum-seekers  who  left  their  place  of  residence  without  authorisation.  These 
cases  could  be  re-opened  and  examined  on  their  merits  only  in  very  limited  circumstances.  As  a 
consequence, asylum-seekers risked being removed from Greece to their country of origin without 
any  substantive  examination  of  their  claim,  in  possible  violation  of  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement.49 Research by the UNHCR and ECRE also revealed other cases where other Member 
States appeared to close or reject asylum claims or presume them withdrawn due to the absence of 
asylum-seekers from their territories (such as Ireland and the Netherlands), or cases where asylum-
seekers did not have the opportunity to have their applications assessed in appeal, due to the fact 
that a negative first-instance decision was issued during their absence and they were returned to that 
State  under  Dublin  rules  after  the  time  limits  for  appeal  had  lapsed  (as  in  Austria,  Belgium, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).  

Another problematic aspect is the provision in Article 3(3) whereby Member States retain the right, 
under  their  national  law,  to  send  an  asylum  applicant  to  a  third  state.  This  provision  can  be 
interpreted as allowing Member States to apply the ‘safe  third country’ concept (now included in 
the Asylum Procedures Directive) to countries outside the Dublin system. However, the reason why 
this  Article  does  not  include  any  explicit  reference  to  the  ‘safe  third  country’  concept  but  rather 
refers to Member States’ national law is that at the time the Dublin Regulation was adopted, such a 
concept  was  not  yet  part  of  the  EU  asylum  acquis.  However,  with  the  adoption  of  the  Asylum 
Procedures Directive, this notion became part of the EU legislative framework governing asylum. If 
Member States continue to apply this provision based on their national law, there is a clear risk of 
infringing the Asylum Procedures Directive. In concrete terms, problems can arise for example in 
cases  where  the  Member  State  to  which  a  transfer  request  is  made  were  to  apply  the  safe  third 
country concept where the requesting state would not do so because it did not consider that the third 
country  could  be  regarded  as  safe  for  the  applicant.  This  has  given  rise  to  concerns  about  ‘chain 
refoulement’.50 

2.2.6.  Family  unity  and  the  interests  of  children  and  other  vulnerable  groups  are  not 

sufficiently ensured by Member States  

a. Asylum-seekers under the Dublin procedure could in some cases be prevented from reuniting 
with family members 

Family links play an important role in determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
asylum application. The Regulation contains several binding provisions meant to protect the unity 
of a family, namely Articles 7, 8 and 14. Moreover, the discretionary clauses (the sovereignty and 
humanitarian  clauses)  aim  to  avoid  situations  where  family  members  not  strictly  meeting  the 
definitions in the binding provisions would be separated due to the strict application of the Dublin 
criteria.  

However, in practice, reports from the UNHCR and NGOs as well as the Evaluation Report show 
that asylum-seekers are or could in some cases be prevented from reuniting with members of 
their families. This obviously creates hardship for the families concerned, and could increase the 
level of secondary movements as asylum-seekers could be pushed into illegality. In addition, such 
practices  may  violate  the  right  to  family  life  and  the  rights  of  the  child  (Articles  7  and  24  of  the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights).  

49 

50 

The Greek authorities have meanwhile adopted new legislation guaranteeing respect for the principle of access 
to the asylum procedure. 
See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

                                                 
This is due either to restrictive practices on the part of Member States (for example, as indicated in 
the Evaluation Report, the fact that they usually require too high a level of proof for the family link 
or the fact that they do not apply the discretionary clauses very often) and/or legal gaps (such as the 
fact that the humanitarian clause does not fully oblige Member States to bring together dependent 
relatives or does not provide for the possibility to bring together relatives who are not necessarily 
dependent).  The  restrictive  definition  of  ‘family  members’  —  as  the  spouse,  minor  unmarried 
children, the father, mother or guardian when the applicant is a minor and unmarried — as well as 
certain  procedural  limitations  (such  as  the  fact  that  asylum-seekers  can  be  reunited  with  a 
member of their family who has applied for asylum in another Member State only if that member of 
the  family  has  not  yet  received  a  first  decision  regarding  the  substance  of  his/her  application)  or 
‘status’ limitations (such as the fact that asylum seekers cannot be reunited with members of their 
family  who  are  legally  resident  in  other  Member  States  on  grounds  other  than  that  of  being 
refugees, such as for instance being beneficiaries of subsidiary protection), coupled with the non-
application  by  Member  States  of  the  discretionary  provisions,  can  result  in  the  separation  of 
relatives. The situation of children is of particular concern. 

The  Dublin  Regulation  does  not  apply  for  the  time  being  to  applicants  for  and  beneficiaries  of 
subsidiary protection51, as at the time of its adoption, the concept of subsidiary protection was not 
yet part of the EU asylum acquis. The concept was incorporated, however, with the adoption of the 
Qualification Directive.52 In practice, all Member States have already introduced a single procedure 
for  applying  for  international  protection  (i.e.  without  distinguishing  between  applications  for 
asylum  and  for  subsidiary  protection),  so  the  fact  that  applicants  for  subsidiary  protection  are 
currently  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  should  not  create  difficulties  in 
practice.  In  other  words,  concerns  that  the  application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  could  be 
undermined  by  those  seeking  protection  being  able  to  evade  its  terms  by  claiming  subsidiary 
protection and therefore not coming under the procedure for determining responsibility could only 
exist if in practice Member States had not already opted for a single procedure. However, the fact 
that  the  beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation  means  that  asylum-seekers  can  be  excluded  from  some  of  the  family  reunification 
provisions  (e.g.  an  asylum-seeker  currently  cannot  be  reunited  with  a  family  member  who  is  a 
beneficiary  of  subsidiary  protection  in  another  Member  State).Given  that  Member  States  are 
increasingly  granting  international  protection  in  subsidiary  forms,53  the  probability  of  asylum-
seekers being prevented from reuniting with beneficiaries of subsidiary protection is high. 

b. The needs of vulnerable groups under the Dublin procedure are not sufficiently addressed 
The  issue  of  protecting  vulnerable  groups  and  other  persons  with  special  needs  throughout  the 
asylum  procedure,  thus  including  the  Dublin  procedure,  is  in  principle  tackled  by  the  Reception 
Conditions Directive. However, in order to respond to the particular needs of this group of people in 

51 

52 

53 

Under the Qualification Directive, a ‘“person eligible for subsidiary protection” means a third country national 
or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a 
stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm (…), and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country’ [Article 2 (e)]. 
Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals  or  stateless  persons  as  refugees  or  as  persons  who  otherwise  need  international  protection  and  the 
content of the protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004). 
Between  2003  and  2006,  the  proportion  of  positive  decisions  under  the  Geneva  Convention  did  not  change 
significantly (5.09% vs 7%), but the percentage of positive decisions granting subsidiary forms of protection 
more than tripled (from 4.57% in 2003 to 15.24% in 2006). 

EN 

21 

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the  context  of  the  Dublin  procedure,  some  elements  are  also  addressed  in  the  Dublin  Regulation. 
Several  protection  gaps  have  nonetheless  emerged,  concerning  primarily  the  treatment  of 
unaccompanied minors and other persons with special needs such as people who are suffering from 
trauma or particular illnesses or are torture survivors.  

Regarding  the  treatment  of  unaccompanied  minors  under  the  Dublin  procedure,  there  are 
concerns  that  their  claims  are  not  always  handled  in  line  with  their  best  interests,  meaning  in 
particular  that  in  some  cases  they  are  prevented  from  reuniting  with  their  families.54  The  Dublin 
Regulation does already include several provisions aiming to guarantee that Member States respect 
the best interests of the child in implementing the Dublin procedure, in accordance with Article 24 
of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  Article  3  of  the  UN  Convention  of  the  Rights  of  the 
Child. Under Article 6, when unaccompanied minors apply for asylum, the Member State where a 
member of their family is legally present is responsible for examining their claim, provided that this 
is in the best interest of the child. If no family member is legally present, the Member State where 
the  asylum  application  is  lodged  is  responsible.  Under  Article  15(3),  if  the  asylum-seeker  is  an 
unaccompanied minor who has a relative or relatives in another Member State who can take care of 
him or her, Member States must if possible unite the minor with his or her relatives, unless this is 
not in the minor’s best interest. While Article 6 obliges Member States to reunite unaccompanied 
minors  with  members  of  their  nuclear  family,  Article  15  only  allows  Member  States  to  reunite 
them with their extended family.  

Several legal gaps and divergent interpretations have been identified during the evaluation process, 
such as: 

-  Article  6  is  unclear  in  respect  of  the  different  types  of  transfers  that  an  unaccompanied  minor 
could  be  subject  to.  While  the  great  majority  of  Member  States  appear  to  consider  that  an 
unaccompanied  minor  cannot  be  subject  to  a  take-charge  procedure  for  reasons  other  than  family 
reunification,  some  (such  as  Greece  and  Hungary)  reported  having  received  frequent  requests  to 
take charge of unaccompanied minors on account of irregular border crossing or issuance of a visa. 
Confusion also exists in respect of the possibility to send back unaccompanied minors to a country 
where they have previously applied for asylum, in cases where they cannot be reunited with their 
family.  As  highlighted  in  the  Evaluation  Report,  some  Member  States,  such  as  Norway,  refrain 
from making requests to take back unaccompanied minors. 

-Article 6 does not explicitly require a ‘best interest’ determination in all transfers involving minors, 
but limits it only to situations where minors may be reunited with their families.  

-Because of the semi-compulsory nature of Article 15(3) (‘Member States shall if possible unite the 
minor’),  Member  States  might  not  reunite  minors  with  members  of  their  extended  family  (as 
opposed to the nuclear family in Article 6) who could take care of them, even when this would be in 
their best interests.  

The Evaluation Report highlighted shortcomings in the availability of data regarding the number of 
unaccompanied minors subject to the Dublin procedure, due to the fact that only few Member States 
provided such data. However, based on the available data (in the Netherlands, during the reporting 
period,  out  of  654  requests  to  other  Member  States  to  take  charge  of  an  asylum-seeker,  16 

54 

UNHCR  provides  evidence  of  cases  where,  for  example,  a  minor  was  prevented  from  reuniting  with  his 
parents based on the fact that he had previously applied in a different Member State and that, despite his age, 
he  was  mature  enough  to  be  excluded  from  the  application  of  Article  6.  In  one  case  this  led  a  minor  to 
seriously injure himself while trying to avoid the transfer and reunite with his parents. 

EN 

22 

   EN 

                                                 
concerned unaccompanied minors, and out of 754 requests from other Member States to take charge 
of  an  asylum-seeker,  10  concerned  unaccompanied  minors)  the  Evaluation  Report  concluded  that 
there are a number of unaccompanied minors subject to the Dublin procedure. Therefore, it can be 
considered that at least these people could have been affected by the above-mentioned problems. 

Regarding other asylum-seekers with special needs, the consultation process revealed that they 
are not adequately protected under the Dublin Regulation. For instance, people who suffer traumas, 
persons  with  medical  needs,  etc.  may  see  themselves  subject  to  a  transfer  to  a  Member  State 
responsible for dealing with their claims but which cannot provide them with adequate treatment. 
Another issue of concern is the fact that there are cases where Member States do not share relevant 
information  before  a  transfer  is  carried  out,  notably  on  the  medical  condition  of  the  person  to  be 
transferred.  The  consequences  of  failure  to  share  relevant  information  can  be  fatal  for  the 
individuals concerned, such as in one case revealed by the UNHCR where the applicant committed 
suicide. The Regulation does not include explicit provisions addressing these issues.  

2.3. 

How would the problem evolve, all things being equal 

The existing EU measures do not satisfactorily address the problems described above.  

Due to the complexity of the Dublin Regulation, there is still room for improvement and alignment 
of Member States’ practices, on the basis of the mutual trust and cooperation on which the Dublin 
system is founded. However, the past years of implementation have shown that the existing forms 
of  practical  cooperation  among  Member  States  in  order  to  align  their  interpretation  and  practical 
understanding  of  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  are  not  sufficient  to  address  the  problems 
identified with the system in a comprehensive way.  

The  fact  that  the  Dublin  Regulation,  as  part  of  the  first  stage  of  the  CEAS,  was  the  result  of  a 
sensitive political compromise, adopted by unanimous vote in the Council, meant that the final text 
contained  many  ambiguities  and  legislative  gaps.  This  explains  why  there  is  still  much  scope  for 
improving the existing instrument. Examples of situations that would remain problematic under the 
status quo are: 

-The efficient functioning of the mechanism: the absence of adequate time limits, the fact that the 
procedures and circumstances for the application of certain clauses are not clear, the fact that there 
is no effective mechanism for tackling disputes between Member States, the lack of comprehensive 
rules on transfers, etc., will continue to hinder the system from fully achieving its objectives. 

-  Response  to  situations  of  particular  pressure:  the  fact  that  there  is  no  mechanism  in  the  Dublin 
Regulation  to  suspend  transfers  to  a  particular  Member  State  confronted  with  an  exceptional 
situation of migratory pressure would create a further burden for this Member State, which might 
then not be in the position to provide asylum-seekers with an adequate standard of protection. Only 
an  EU  mechanism  that  all  Member  States  would  together  apply  in  circumstances  of  particular 
pressure can be expected to provide the affected Member State with adequate solidarity.  

- Level of protection granted to people subject to the Dublin procedure: the fact that asylum-seekers 
often  are  not  properly  informed  about  the  Dublin  procedure,  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  right  to 
remedy is not fully guaranteed, that custodial measures are increasingly used by Member States on 
a systematic basis, that the management of vulnerable groups is not properly ensured and that the 
unity of asylum-seekers’ families is not always guaranteed will continue to have a negative impact 
both on asylum-seekers’ rights and on the effectiveness of the system, since people will try to avoid 

EN 

23 

   EN 

the  system  rather  than  comply  with  it.  This  is  therefore  likely  to  contribute  to  an  increase  in  the 
level of ‘asylum shopping’.  

If no action at EU level is taken, the identified problems will continue to persist, since the present 
wording  of  the  Regulation  is  insufficient  to  ensure  optimum  effectiveness  of  the  system  and 
protection  of  people  in  need  of  international  protection.  Member  States  could  decide  to  follow 
certain interpretations of their own, which might interfere with the correct and uniform application 
of the Dublin Regulation, thus resulting in serious divergences and creating legal uncertainty.  

2.4. 

Does the EU have the power to act? 

2.4.1.  EU right to act and subsidiarity  

Title IV of the EC Treaty (‘TEC’) on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons confers certain powers on these matters on the European Community. These 
powers must be exercised in accordance with Article 5 TEC, i.e. if and in so far as the objectives of 
the  proposed  action  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States  and  can,  therefore,  by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 

More specifically, the current legal basis for Community action regarding criteria and mechanisms 
for  determining  which  Member  State  is  responsible  for  considering  an  application  for  asylum 
submitted  by  a  national  of  a  third  country  in  one  of  the  Member  States  is  established  in  Article 
63(1)(a) TEC.  

The reasons and need for  a common  intervention at EU level are clearly expressed  in  the section 
below. 

2.4.2.  Transnational nature of the problem 

Based on the preferred policy option of the IA on the CEAS, the results of the wide consultations 
conducted on the Green Paper on the CEAS and various expert meetings, a clear need emerges for 
EU joint action to ensure a more efficient and protective Dublin system. 

The  need  for  a  mechanism  to  determine  responsibility  for  asylum  applications  lodged  in  the 
Member States resulted directly from the progressive establishment of an area of free movement for 
persons  and  in  order  to  prevent  the  phenomena  of  ‘asylum-seekers  in  orbit’  (where  no  country 
accepts  responsibility  for  deciding  whether  to  give  asylum  or  not)  and  ‘asylum  shopping’  (where 
asylum-seekers  apply  for  asylum  in  several  Member  States  in  order  to  extend  their  stay  in  the 
Member  States).  This  mechanism  establishes  mutual  rights  and  obligations  mainly  between 
Member  States.  By  their  very  nature,  these  rights  and  obligations  could  not  be  established  by 
Member States acting alone, but only at Community level. 

It  is  therefore  clear  that  the  problems  identified  with  the  application  of  this  mechanism  are  of  a 
transnational  nature  and  cannot  be  tackled  by  Member  States  acting  in  isolation,  but  only  by 
adequate  and  streamlined  coordination  at  EU  level.  For  example:  a  common  procedure  could  not 
operate without common time-limits clearly identified in a Community instrument; the phenomena 
of  ‘asylum-seekers  in  orbit’  and  ‘asylum-shopping’  can  be  prevented  only  by  coordinated  EU 
action;  etc.  Only  action  at  EU  level  could  guarantee  that  the  Regulation  will  be  uniformly 
interpreted and applied by Member States, this being essential for the adequate functioning of the 
system,  which  by  definition  requires  the  involvement  of  more  than  one  Member  State  in  the 
procedure.  

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Moreover, the competence of the EU must be also recalled when it comes to solidarity, given the 
indisputable need for a coordinated EU approach to tackle situations where the application  of the 
Dublin system could further overburden Member States facing particular pressure.  

The EU actions discussed in this impact assessment will not go beyond what is required in terms of 
adding  value  at  EU  level.  The  proportionality  of  the  options  will  be  carefully  assessed  so  as  to 
determine  whether  or  not  they  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives  set  out  in 
section 3. 

2.5. 

Consultation of interested parties 

The  following  main  findings  regarding  the  improvements  needed  to  the  Dublin  system  emerged 
from  the  replies  to  the  Green  Paper  on  the  future  CEAS  and  from  the  consultations  held  by  the 
Commission with various stakeholders, as noted in point 1.1.2: 

•  Member State governments generally support the current Dublin system, although they agree 

that improvements are needed on a number of issues, such as: 

–  extension of the scope of the Regulation to include applicants for and beneficiaries of subsidiary 

protection; 

–  the need to clarify several clauses in the Regulation, such as the cessation of responsibility clause 

and the discretionary clauses; 

–  the need to improve the performance of the Dublin mechanism in carrying out transfers; 

–  the  need  for  better  exchange  of  information  prior  to  a  transfer  being  carried  out,  in  particular 

medical information; 

–  the need to improve the effectiveness of the conciliation mechanism, in general by providing a 
handbook on solutions reached in the past within expert meetings or bilaterally between Member 
States;  

–  some Member States recognise the necessity of, or explicitly request, more measures for burden 

sharing (i.e. through financial solidarity and asylum expert teams); 

–  the need to build and strengthen legal safeguards in the Dublin Regulation (supported only by a 

limited number of Member States); 

–  the need to improve Commission Regulation 1560/2003 implementing the Dublin Regulation. 

•  UNHCR  and  NGOs,  while  generally  agreeing  on  the  need  to  have  a  system  for  allocating 
responsibility, argue for a fundamentally different approach, based on allocation of responsibility 
according to where the asylum application is made. However, in the absence of a political will 
for  such  an  important  change,  a  number  of  improvements  are  proposed  for  the  system  in  the 
short term, such as: 

–  clarifying that Dublin claimants should have access to the asylum procedure in all circumstances; 

–  clarifying that the Reception Conditions Directive fully applies to Dublin cases; 

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–  providing detailed and complete information to applicants for international protection about the 

Dublin procedure;  

–  offering an effective remedy against a Dublin decision, in particular granting suspensive effect 

for appeals against Dublin transfers; 

–  broadening  the  family  unity  criteria  (extending  the  definition  of  family  member;  allowing 
reunification  at  any  stage  of  the  asylum  procedure;  allowing  reunification  not  only  with 
recognised  refugees,  but  also  with  beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection  as  well  as  other  legal 
residents such as naturalised refugees); 

–  ensuring that the best interests of the child are always taken into account; 

–  restricting to the greatest extent possible the detention of Dublin claimants; 

–  reducing time limits for replies to requests and for transfers; 

–  clarifying transfer conditions and ensuring compliance with human rights; 

–  introducing burden sharing measures. 

•  The  European  Parliament  has  issued  an  own-initiative  report  in  reply  to  the  Commission’s 
Evaluation Report of the Dublin system, in which a number of improvements to the system are 
suggested, most of them similar to those proposed by the UNHCR and NGOs. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

General objectives 

The  general  objectives  of  Community  intervention  in  the  future  development  of  measures  to 
determine responsibility in the second stage of the CEAS are as follows: 

1. 
To  ensure  that  the  needs  of  applicants  for  international  protection  are  comprehensively 
addressed  under  the  mechanism  for  determining  responsibility,  and  to  increase  the  system’s 
efficiency in order to reduce the time and resources spent by Member States; 

To contribute to better address situations of particular pressure on Member States’ reception 

2. 
facilities and/or asylum procedural capacities. 

3.2. 

Specific objectives 

The proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation(s) should pursue the following specific objectives: 

1. 

2. 

To ensure that the procedure for determining responsibility operates smoothly;  

To ensure that disputes between Member States are tackled in an efficient way;  

To prevent further overburdening of Member States confronted with situations of particular 

3. 
pressure and to ensure that asylum-seekers receive an adequate standard of protection; 

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To strengthen the legal safeguards for asylum-seekers and enable them to better defend their 

4. 
rights;  

To ensure respect for the right to family unity and to improve the management of vulnerable 

5. 
groups in order to address their special needs. 

3.3. 

Operational objectives 

A non-exhaustive list of operational objectives is suggested below. 

The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 1: 

To  establish  adequate  time  limits  for  take-back  requests,  for  requests  for  information  and 

1a. 
requests on humanitarian grounds; 

To clarify the practical arrangements for transfers, such as the issue of who has to pay the 

1b. 
transportation costs; 

To  clarify  the  circumstances  and  procedures  for  applying  the  discretionary  clauses 

1c. 
(humanitarian and sovereignty) and the cessation of responsibility clause. 

The following operational objective will contribute to achieving specific objective 2: 

2. 

To establish an effective dispute settlement mechanism. 

The following operational objective will contribute to achieving specific objective 3: 

To  establish  a  mechanism  to  prevent  Member  States  experiencing  particular  pressure  on 
3. 
their asylum systems from being further overburdened because of Dublin transfers and to prevent 
Dublin transfers resulting in asylum-seekers not receiving an adequate standard of protection. 

The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 4: 

To further specify the information Member States have to provide to asylum-seekers and the 

4a. 
form and timing for doing so and to introduce the obligation to hold a specific Dublin interview;55 

To  strengthen  several  provisions  of  the  Regulation  to  ensure  that  the  right  of  remedy  is 

4b. 
effective; 

4c. 
To clarify several provisions of the Regulation to ensure that in all cases the Member State 
responsible proceeds to the full assessment of the protection needs of the asylum applicant and to 
clarify the exception from the principle of access to the asylum procedure; 

4d. 
To define clear and limited exceptional circumstances under which asylum-seekers subject 
to the Dublin procedure can be detained, with due consideration given to the situation of minors, in 
order to comply with the principle that asylum-seekers may not be detained solely because they are 
asylum-seekers. 

The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 5: 

55 

This operational objective will also contribute towards specific objective 1. 

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   EN 

                                                 
5a. 

To extend the right to family reunification; 

To  further  specify  the  rules  applicable  to  unaccompanied  minors,  in  particular  to  better 

5b. 
define the best interests of children in accordance with their rights; 

To extend the scope of the humanitarian clause to allow for reunification with the extended 

5c. 
family; 

To  establish  a  mechanism  for  the  sharing  of  relevant  information  between  Member  States 

5d. 
before a transfer is carried out, notably on the medical condition of the persons to be transferred. 

4. 

LIST OF SUB-OPTIONS  

Status Quo 

The existing legal framework would remain unchanged and ongoing activities in the Member States 
would  continue.  The  Commission  would  continue  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation.  

4.1. 

Ensuring that the procedure for determining responsibility operates smoothly 

1) Legislate:  

- Delays in the procedure for determining the Member State responsible 

The following sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives: 

a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to: 1) fix a time limit for requesting a Member State to take back 
an  asylum-seeker,  which  should  be  shorter  than  the  deadline  for  requesting  to  take  charge 
(currently  3  months)  when  the  request  is  based  on  evidence  from  the  EURODAC  database;  2) 
reduce  the  deadline  for  responding  to  requests  for  information  from  6  to  4  weeks  and  oblige 
Member  States  to  justify  any  delays  in  replying  —  moreover,  a  Member  State  not  respecting  the 
time limit for replying to an information request should not be able invoke the expiry of the time 
limit for submitting a take-charge/take-back request as grounds for refusing such a request if that 
Member State is determined to be responsible; and 3) make the deadline for replying to requests on 
humanitarian grounds identical to the deadline for replying to take-charge requests (2 months) and 
set no deadline for submitting a request;  

b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to: 1) make the time limit for requesting a Member State to take 
back an asylum-seeker identical to the time limit for take-charge requests (3 months) regardless of 
whether  the  request  is  based  on  evidence  from  EURODAC  database  or  not;  2) keep  the  current 
deadline of 6 weeks for responding to requests for information, but explicitly state that this should 
be  a  maximum  and  moreover  provide  for  it  to  be  further  shortened  by  means  of  administrative 
bilateral agreements; and 3) make the deadline for both making a request and replying to a request 
on humanitarian grounds identical to that for replying to take-charge requests (2 months); 

- Limited number of implemented transfers 

Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘d’ are complementary. Sub-option ‘c’ is an alternative to the others. 

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a. Amend the Dublin Regulation and Implementing Regulation56 in order to establish in particular 
that the transferring Member State is to bear the transfer costs, and to clarify the consequences in 
the case of erroneous transfers or where a transfer decision is overturned on appeal after the person 
has already been transferred; 

b.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  allow  Member  States  to  conclude  bilateral  arrangements  for 
‘cancellation’ of the exchange of equal numbers of asylum-seekers in well-defined circumstances in 
order  to  simplify  and  rationalise  the  transfer  process.  To  ensure  that  such  arrangements  are  in 
conformity with the Regulation, they should be approved by the Commission; 

c.  Amend  the  principles  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  replace  the  current  system  of  physically 
transferring asylum-seekers, when not against their best interests, with a compensation mechanism 
whereby the Member State responsible for examining the application transfers a financial amount to 
the  Member  State  where  the  applicant  is  physically  located.  The  procedure  for  determining 
responsibility  would  still  be  carried  out,  but  instead  of  asylum-seekers  being  transferred  to  the 
responsible  Member  State,  they  would  remain  on  the  territory  of  the  Member  State  where  they 
applied for asylum or were found to be illegally staying, except when the transfer is necessary for 
reasons of family unity or, in the case of children, in the best interest of the child. The amount to be 
transferred by the responsible Member State would be based on a monthly cost per asylum-seeker 
calculated for each Member State; 

d.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  abolish  the  rule  contained  in  Articles  19(4)  and  20(2)  under 
which the responsibility of a Member State ceases after a period of 18 months if an asylum-seeker 
absconds.  That  means  that  an  asylum-seeker  who  reappears  even  after  18  months  will  still  be 
subject to transfer towards the Member State responsible.  

- Clarify the circumstances and procedure for applying the cessation of responsibility clause 
and the discretionary clauses 

The following sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives: 

a.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  clarify  in  particular  that  for  the  cessation  of  responsibility 
clauses it is the requested Member State57 which has to prove that the third-country national left 
the  territory  of  the  EU  (in  the  case  of  Article  16(3))  or  has  been  expelled  (in  the  case  of  Article 
16(4)). Regarding the sovereignty clause, it should be clarified that the Member State applying it 
has to inform the other Member States of the application of the clause, information which should be 
sent  both  via  the  existing  bilateral  secure  network  DubliNet  and  the  EURODAC  database.  The 
circumstances  for  the  application  of  the  sovereignty  clause  should  be  left  open,  but  it  should  be 
specified  that  it  may  be  used  mainly  for  humanitarian  reasons.  Moreover,  the  condition  of  the 
applicant’s  consent  for  the  application  of  the  clause  should  be  reintroduced.  Regarding  the 
humanitarian clause, the Member State able to make a request on humanitarian grounds should be 
clearly identified in the Regulation, Member States should be obliged to justify a refusal to accept a 
request  on  humanitarian  grounds,  and  practical  arrangements  for  obtaining  the  written  consent  of 
persons to be reunited should be included in the Implementing Regulation. Other modifications to 
the humanitarian clause are included in option 1a) for objective 4.1 (as regards deadlines), options 
1b) for objective 4.5 (vulnerable groups and family unity), and option 1b) for objective 4.2. 

56 
57 

A proposal for amending the Implementing Regulation may be submitted at a later stage. 
Meaning the Member State who has been requested to take charge of or take back an asylum applicant but who 
refuses to do so by invoking the cessation of responsibility clause. 

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b.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  clarify  in  particular  that  for  the  cessation  of  responsibility 
clauses it is the requesting Member State which has to prove that the third-country national has 
left the territory of the EU (in the case of Article 16.3) or has been expelled (in the case of Article 
16(4)). Regarding the sovereignty clause, the Member State that applies it should inform only the 
Member States potentially involved in the Dublin procedure of the application of the clause, using 
the existing bilateral secure network ‘DubliNet’. Under this option, the circumstances for applying 
the  sovereignty  clause  should  be  exhaustively  identified  (limited  to  humanitarian  cases)  and  the 
consent of the asylum-seeker will not be required. Another modification to the sovereignty clause is 
included in option 1b) for objective 4.3. Regarding the humanitarian clause, it should be specified 
that  any  Member  State  can  make  a  humanitarian  request,  that  there  is  no  obligation  to  justify  a 
refusal on humanitarian grounds and that the practical arrangements for obtaining written consent 
will be left to the Member States applying the clause to decide on a case-by-case basis.  

2) Practical cooperation: 

The following sub-option ‘a’ is complementary to the legislative sub-options addressing the issue of 
‘limited number of implemented transfers’. Sub-option ‘b’ is complementary to the legislative sub-
options for ‘clarifying the circumstances and procedure for applying the cessation of responsibility 
clause and the discretionary clauses’.  

a. Identify and disseminate best practices in performing transfers of asylum-seekers via meetings of 
experts. Encourage greater practical cooperation between Member States, in particular on the days 
and times chosen for transferring asylum-seekers under the Regulation. 

b. Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain 
answers  to  questions  raised  by  Member  States’  experts  on  the  application  of  the  Regulations  in 
concrete  cases.  This  should  be  developed  by  the  Commission  in  cooperation  with  the  Member 
States during expert meetings. The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases.  

4.2. 

Ensuring that disputes between Member States are tackled in an efficient way 

1) Legislate 

Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘e’ are alternatives. Sub-option ‘d’ is complementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 

a.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  create  an  independent  structure/body  with  the  role  of  settling 
disputes  on  all  issues  regarding  the  application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  (with  its  decision  to  be 
binding) as well as with an advisory/consultation role; 

b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to include a conciliation mechanism for all matters of dispute on 
the application of the Dublin Regulation; 

c.  Create  the  structure  referred  to  under  a)  within  the  future  European  Asylum  Support  Office 
(EASO). This option would imply giving the EASO decision-making powers; 

d. Use the EASO expertise in order to provide support for the application of the Dublin Regulation 
(gathering information, support to monitoring etc), with no decision-making powers; 

e. Amend only the Dublin Implementing Regulation to keep the current conciliation mechanism for 
humanitarian cases but make its decisions binding. 

EN 

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   EN 

2) Practical cooperation: 

Sub-option ‘a’ is an alternative to ‘b’ but complementary to the legislative sub-options.  

a. Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain 
answers  to  questions  raised  by  Member  States’  experts  on  the  application  of  the  Regulations  in 
concrete  cases.  This  should  be  developed  by  the  Commission  in  cooperation  with  the  Member 
States during expert meetings. The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases; 

b. Use the current informal Dublin expert meetings to solve disputes between Member States, with 
the Commission proposing a solution and the Member States not in dispute voting, but the results of 
the vote would not be binding.  

4.3. 

Preventing  further  overburdening  of  Member  States  confronted  with  situations  of 
particular pressure 

1) Legislate 

Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complementary, while ‘c’ and ‘d’ are alternatives to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 

a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish a provision for suspending Dublin transfers in limited 
and well-defined circumstances in order to respond to two different situations: the first is the case 
where  a  Member  State  is  faced  with  an  exceptional  situation  of  particular  pressure  on  its  asylum 
system  and  where  Dublin  transfers,  if  undertaken,  would  aggravate  this  situation;  the  second 
concerns  the  case  where  there  are  concerns  that  the  standards  of  protection  in  a  certain  Member 
State  are  not  in  conformity  with  the  EU  acquis  on  asylum,  so  in  order  to  adequately  protect  the 
asylum-seekers  concerned,  Dublin  transfers  towards  that  particular  Member  State  should  be 
suspended.  This  would  be  a  general  mechanism,  meaning  that  all  Member  States  would  stop 
transfers to a specific Member State and as a result would become responsible for dealing with the 
asylum applications of those persons whose transfers have been suspended.  

Regarding the procedure for taking such a decision, the affected Member State (for the first case) 
and  the  concerned  Member  State  (for  the  second  case)  should  send  a  motivated  request  to  the 
Commission which should include, among other things, relevant information regarding the asylum 
situation in a particular Member State which could justify a suspension of transfers. For the second 
case  under  discussion,  it  is  important  that  the  Commission  keeps  the  right  to  decide  to  suspend 
transfers  even  in  the  absence  of  a  request  in  that  sense  from  a  Member  State.  Based  on  a  careful 
assessment of the asylum situation in that particular Member State, as well as after examining other 
factors  such  as  the  potential  consequences  of  such  a  decision  for  the  other  Member  States,  the 
Commission  may  decide  to  suspend  transfers  towards  that  Member  State,  after  which  it  has  to 
communicate  the  decision  to  the  Member  States  and  the  Council,  in  line  with  the  relevant 
comitology  rules.  In  view  of  the  urgency  of  the  situations  under  discussion,  any  decisions  in  this 
respect would have to be taken promptly and therefore very short time limits need to be established. 
The decision to suspend transfers in exceptional cases of particular pressure could justify granting 
the special emergency financial support already available under the European Refugee Fund, should 
the Member State facing particular pressure make a request for  assistance. The  suspension would 
last for 6 months, which could be extended for a further 6 months if the grounds for suspension still 
persist.  

b.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  allow  for  an  overburdened  Member  State  to  request  another 
Member  State  bilaterally  to  apply  the  sovereignty  clause  and  therefore  take  responsibility  for 

EN 

31 

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asylum  applicants  for  whom  the  overburdened  Member  State  would  be  responsible  under  the 
Dublin  criteria  (i.e.  those  asylum-seekers  would  not  be  transferred  any  longer).  The  discretionary 
nature of the sovereignty clause would still be retained, meaning that the requested Member State 
would be free to accept such a request or not. The Commission should be notified of the use of this 
mechanism in order to ensure adequate monitoring. 

c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to allow an overburdened Member State to unilaterally decide not 
to  accept  transfers  of  asylum-seekers  from  other  Member  States  in  exceptional  situations  of 
particular  pressure.  The  notion  of  ‘particular  pressure’  should  be  clearly  defined  by  the 
Commission. 

d. Define a principle of structural solidarity based on a financial compensation mechanism regulated 
at  EU  level  (based  on  a  monthly  cost  per  asylum-seeker  and  applicant  for  subsidiary  protection 
calculated  for  each  Member  State)  that  transfers  resources  from  a  fund  managed  at  EU  level  to 
those Member States suffering an excessive burden. To this end, the maximum burden that can be 
tolerated by a Member State would need to be defined (based on an index to be determined in line 
with the reception capacities of the Member States);  

2) Practical cooperation: 

This sub-option is partially alternative to the legislative sub-options. 

a.  Set  up  asylum  expert  teams  coordinated  at  EU  level  to  assist  Member  States  that  would  be 
overburdened by the  high  number of Dublin transfers. However, this option should apply if there 
has been no decision to suspend returns (under 1a) or where such a decision has been taken for a 
temporary period until the situation is stable in the affected Member States. 

4.4. 

Strengthening  the  legal  safeguards  for  asylum-seekers  and  enabling  them  to  better 
defend their rights  

- Information  

1) Legislate 

Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives, sub-option ‘c’ is complementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 

a.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  further  specify  the  form  (which  should  be  age-appropriate), 
language and content of information and the stage of the procedure when it should be provided to 
asylum-seekers.  The  general  information  about  the  Dublin  procedure  should  be  given  to  all 
asylum-seekers  upon  lodging  their  applications.  During  the  Dublin  procedure,  Member  States 
should  provide  further  specific  information  to  those  asylum-seekers  for  which  another  Member 
State  accepted  responsibility,  such  as  information  on  available  legal  remedies  against  a  transfer 
decision and entities that may provide legal assistance. Moreover, Member States should be obliged 
to  hold  a  specific  Dublin  interview  with  asylum-seekers  subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure,  during 
which,  if  need  be,  they  should  be  informed  orally  about  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  The 
interview  must  be  held  in  good  time,  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  lodging  of  an  application  for 
international protection. 

b. As in option a), amend the Dublin Regulation to further specify the form, language and content of 
information  and  the  stage  of  the  procedure  when  it  should  be  provided  to  asylum-seekers.  The 
general  information  about  the  Dublin  procedure  should  be  given  to  all  asylum-seekers  upon 

EN 

32 

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lodging  their  applications.  Unlike  with  option  a),  no  further  specific  information  would  be 
provided to those asylum-seekers  for whom another Member State accepted responsibility and no 
Dublin interview would be held. 

c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to provide for a standard EU-wide multilingual leaflet about the 
Dublin  procedure,  to  be  agreed  under  the  comitology  procedure.  Based  on  the  different  leaflets 
already existing in several Member States on the Dublin procedure, the Commission would propose 
a standard information leaflet to be discussed and decided upon in comitology meetings. The leaflet 
would in particular include information on the Dublin rules, the rights of asylum-seekers under the 
Dublin procedure, and the remedies available. Member States would have to ensure the translation 
of the leaflet (for instance using EU funding) in the languages most frequently used or understood 
by  asylum-seekers  entering  their  territories.  The  different  language  versions  should  be  exchanged 
between Member States. Member States may include further details in the leaflet adapted to their 
national contexts. 

2. Practical cooperation: 

This sub-option is an alternative to the legislative sub-option ‘c’. 

a.  The  same  leaflet  mentioned  under  1c)  would  be  discussed  and  agreed  at  Dublin  experts’ 
meetings, rather than in the comitology procedure. 

- Effective right to remedy  

1. Legislate: 

Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ are alternatives. 

a.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  establish  an  automatic  suspensive  right  of  appeal  against  a 
Dublin  transfer  decision,  which  entails  the  right  to  remain  in  the  territory  until  a  final  decision  is 
taken  on  the  appeal.  In  addition,  clarify  the  right  to  legal  assistance  and  further  specify  the 
procedure for notification of transfer decisions to asylum-seekers, in particular as regards the time, 
form and content of such notifications;  

b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish the right to appeal against a Dublin transfer decision 
and the right for an asylum-seeker to request suspensive effect of the appeal and to remain in the 
territory  until  a  decision  is  taken  on  the  request  for  suspensive  effect.  As  in  option  a),  clarify  the 
right  to  legal  assistance  and  further  specify  the  procedure  for  notification  of  the  decision,  in 
particular as regards the time, form and content of such notifications; 

c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish the right to appeal against a Dublin transfer decision 
and  to  oblige  the  courts  to  examine  on  their  own  initiative  the  need  to  temporarily  suspend 
enforcement of a transfer decision (i.e. whether applicants should remain in the territory pending the 
outcome  of  their  appeal).  The  criteria  the  courts  should  use  in  deciding  on  the  need  to  suspend 
enforcement of a transfer decision, pending the outcome of an appeal, will be left to the Member 
States.  In  addition,  as  in  option  a),  clarify  the  right  to  legal  assistance  and  further  specify  the 
procedure for notification of the transfer decision to the asylum-seeker, in particular as regards the 
time, form and content of such notifications.  

- Custodial measures  

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Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ are alternatives. 

a.  Include  a  provision  in  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  forbid  detention  of  Dublin  claimants  under  all 
circumstances; 

b. Include a provision in the Dublin Regulation to reiterate the principle that asylum-seekers may 
not  be  detained  solely  on  account  of  their  status as  asylum-seekers  and  to  forbid  the  detention  of 
asylum-seekers subject to Dublin procedure except as an extraordinary measure of final resort, after 
a  transfer  decision  has  been  notified  to  the  person  concerned  and  where  any  other  non-custodial 
measures  are  unlikely  to  achieve  satisfactory  results,  in  particular  because  there  are  objective 
reasons to believe that there is a risk of the person concerned absconding. The detention of minors 
should  be  forbidden  unless  this  is  in  their  best  interest,  for  instance  for  family  reasons.  Such  a 
provision would also clarify that asylum-seekers detained under the Dublin procedure would enjoy 
the  same  standards  of  protection  as  those  laid  down  in  the  Asylum  Procedures  Directive  and  the 
Reception Conditions Directive.  

c. Amend the Asylum Procedures Directive/the Reception Conditions Directive to include a specific 
provision on the detention of Dublin applicants, with the content of b) above. 

- Principle of effective access to the asylum procedure and its exception  

Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives. 

a.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  in  order  to  clarify  that  an  asylum-seeker  subject  to  the  Dublin 
procedure shall in all circumstances have an effective access to the asylum procedure. In particular, 
it  would  be  laid  down  that  Member  States  would  have  to  revoke  any  decision  to  discontinue  the 
examination of an application after its withdrawal by the applicant and ensure that the examination 
of the application is completed. Moreover, in view of ensuring coherence between the Dublin and 
the  Asylum  Procedures  Directive,  several  issues  regarding  the  access  to  appeal  procedures  for 
asylum-seekers  under  the  Dublin  procedure  may  need  to  be  further  clarified  in  the  context  of  the 
upcoming proposal amending the Asylum Procedures Directive. Regarding the issue of sending an 
asylum-seeker to a third-country, this right would be retained, but only after careful examination of 
the safe third-country criteria set out in Article 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.  

b.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  in  order  to  clarify  that  an  asylum-seeker  subject  to  the  Dublin 
procedure  must  have  access  to  the  asylum  procedure  only  in  the  first  instance  without  further 
specifications  as  provided  under  option  a).  Retain  the  right  of  Member  States  to  send  an  asylum-
seeker to a third country without modification, i.e. in accordance with its national law (not with the 
Asylum Procedures Directive) and in compliance with the Geneva Convention. 

4.5. 

Ensuring  respect  for  family  unity  and  improving  the  management  of  vulnerable 
groups in order to address their special needs 

1) Legislate 

-  Vulnerable  groups  (unaccompanied  minors  and  other  persons  with  special  needs,  such  as 
people suffering from trauma, particular illnesses, etc.) 

Sub-option  ‘a’  is  an  alternative  to  ‘b’.  Sub-option  ‘c’  is  an  alternative  to  ‘d’,  but  both  are 
complementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish a separate procedure for determining responsibility in 
cases concerning vulnerable groups, notably unaccompanied minors. Such a procedure should in 
particular include shorter deadlines than those applicable to normal cases, and Member States have 
to designate specific authorities to deal only with these cases.  

b. Amend the Dublin Regulation and the Dublin Implementing Regulation in order to further clarify 
and strengthen the applicability of the Dublin rules to unaccompanied minors in accordance with 
the  UN  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child.  This  option  would  aim,  among  other  things,  to: 
clarify  the  applicability  of  the  principle  of  the  ‘best  interests  of  the  child’  in  determining  the 
responsible  Member  State;  make  compulsory  the  right  of  unaccompanied  minors  to  reunite  with 
relatives who can take care of them; and include rules on information sharing (such as on age and 
level of education) and on the representation of unaccompanied minors throughout the procedure. 
However, the procedure for determining responsibility as such would remain unchanged, meaning 
in  particular  that  the  same  deadlines  for  making  and  responding  to  requests  would  continue  to 
apply.  

c.  Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  include  new  criteria  under  which  vulnerable  persons  should 
never be subject to a Dublin transfer decision unless this is in their best interests (such as where a 
person with medical needs has to be transferred to a Member State that has the necessary medical 
treatment facilities). 

d. Amend the Dublin Regulation and the Implementing Regulation to include different provisions to 
take better account of the situation of asylum-seekers with special needs, such as a new provision 
obliging  Member  States  to  exchange  relevant  information  (such  as  medical  information)  before 
carrying out Dublin transfers (and introducing a standard form for the information to be exchanged, 
to be annexed to the Implementing Regulation).  

2) Practical cooperation 

Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complementary to the legislative sub-options. 

a.  Member  States  to  provide  staff  involved  in  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility  with 
appropriate training, in particular so that they can appropriately handle cases involving vulnerable 
groups. 

b. Set up a network of Member State experts dealing with minors.  

Legislate: 

- Family reunification  

Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives. 

a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to extend the right to family reunification by including applicants 
for  and  beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection  within  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  Moreover,  the 
current  restrictive  definition  of  family  members  should  be  fully  enlarged  to  encompass,  for 
instance, siblings, unmarried couples in a genuine and stable relationship in accordance with their 
national  law,  dependants,  families  set  up  during  flight  and  in  exile  etc.  The  extension  of  the 
definition  would  mean  that  Member  States  would  be  obliged  to  reunite  all  extended  relatives, 
regardless of whether they are dependent or not.  

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35 

   EN 

b.  As  in  option  a),  amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  extend  the  right  to  family  reunification  by 
including  applicants  for  and  beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection  within  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation.  In  addition,  the  Regulation  would  extend  the  right  to  reunification  to  dependent 
relatives. The definition of ‘family member’ would be enlarged, but only in order to ensure respect 
for  the  principle  of  the  best  interests  of  the  child  (e.g.  the  principle  would  remain  that  children 
should  be  unmarried  to  be  considered  part  of  the  family,  but  when  it  is  in  their  best  interests, 
married children may be considered to be family members;58 in the case of a child asylum-seeker, 
minor  unmarried  siblings  would  be  included  as  members  of  the  family,  etc.).  Moreover,  the 
application  of  the  humanitarian  clause  would  be  extended  to  relatives  who  are  not  necessarily 
dependent  on  one  another  in  a  strict  sense  (such  as  adult  siblings  could  be).  As  the  humanitarian 
clause is a discretionary provision, Member States would have the possibility but not the obligation 
to reunite extended (non-dependent) relatives.  

5. 

ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  POLICY  SUB-OPTIONS  AND  IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  PREFERRED 
OPTION 

For the assessment of the status quo, see Annex I. 

Administrative costs are presented in Annex V. However, this impact assessment does not include 
implementation  costs  as  the  data  submitted  by  Member  States  on  the  application  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation do not allow such costs to be identified. 

5.1. 

Ensuring that the procedure for determining responsibility operates smoothly 

Legislation 

–  Delays  in  the  procedure  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  (because  of 

inadequate time limits) 

Regarding the time limits for take-back requests: firstly, given that take-back requests will in most 
cases be based on evidence obtained from the EURODAC database, there should be no difficulty in 
establishing time limits. This should be feasible both for a take-back request based on a subsequent 
asylum  application  (made  by  the  same  applicant  in  the  requesting  Member  State)  and  where  an 
applicant  was  found  to  be  illegally  staying  in  the  requesting  Member  State  but  without  applying 
again for asylum there, given that in both cases EURODAC database can be checked (for the first 
case Member States have the obligation to check the EURODAC database whereas in the second 
case  it  is  left  at  Member  States’  discretion)  in  order  to  verify  whether  the  person  concerned  has 
lodged a previous application in a different Member State. Secondly, regarding the duration of the 
time limit: a deadline shorter than for a take-charge request is feasible given that, in most cases, the 
requesting  Member  State  will  be  able  to  search  and  quickly  find  out  in  the  EURODAC  database 
whether  the  person  concerned  had  previously  applied  for  asylum  in  another  Member  State. 
However,  the  deadline  should  not  be  too  short  either,  in  order  to  accommodate  situations  where, 
because  of  the  bad  quality  of  fingerprints,  the  requesting  Member  State  might  need  to  undertake 
additional checks. Where the take-back requests are based on other evidence than EURODAC, the 
deadline should be longer since it should in principle take longer in order to identify the Member 
State responsible. In this case, the same deadline as for take charge requests could be applied. 

58 

For example, a married child may be in a forced marriage or separated from the spouse. 

EN 

36 

   EN 

                                                 
Regarding  replies  to  requests  for  information,  a  deadline  of  4  instead  of  6  weeks  is  more 
reasonable, as replies are often necessary in order to allow Member States to identify the Member 
State  responsible  and  submit  take-charge  requests  in  particular.  Several  Member  States  and  the 
UNHCR have indeed argued for shortening this deadline. In order to ensure compliance with the set 
time-limit,  it  is  important  to  oblige  Member  States  to  justify  any  delays  in  the  reply.  Moreover, 
although it is difficult to apply a general sanction for failing to meet the deadline, it is important to 
lay down a rule to prevent Member States misusing this provision (i.e. deliberately not providing a 
reply to an information request, in order to prevent the requesting Member State from meeting the 
time  limit  for  submitting  a  request).  Although  the  text  of  the  Regulation  is  not  clear  on  the 
possibility  to  conclude  bilateral  agreements  to  shorten  the  time  limits  for  replying  to  information 
requests,  some  Member  States  have  done  so  and  have  information  requests  dealt  with  within  4 
weeks. This is clear proof that a reduction of the time limit is feasible. The use of the same time 
limit  by  all  Member  States  will  obviously  contribute  to  a  more  efficient  procedure,  so  it  is 
preferable  to  lay  down  this  obligation  in  the  legal text  instead  of  having  it  dealt  with  by  bilateral 
agreements.  

In  the  case  of  humanitarian  requests,  the  establishment  of  a  time  limit  for  replying  to  such 
requests  will  bring  certainty  for  the  requesting  Member  State  and  asylum-seekers  regarding  the 
outcome of the procedure. However, it would not be feasible to fix a time limit for sending requests 
on  humanitarian  grounds  as  well,  as  the  circumstances  for  reuniting  family  members  under  the 
humanitarian clause can be unpredictable.  

All  the  above-mentioned  deadlines  could  entail  some  additional  costs  in  terms  of  personnel  and 
procedures in order to comply with them.  

Taking  into  account  the  above  arguments,  the  preferred  policy  measure  to  address  the  issue  of 
delays  in  the  procedure  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  is  policy  option  a).  For 
Member  States,  it  is  less  time-consuming  and  prevents  disputes.  For  asylum-seekers,  faster 
determination of responsibility will lead to quicker examination of their claims, therefore reducing 
the  uncertainty  and  anxiety  due  to  delays  in  the  procedure  and  potentially  easing  the  integration 
process in the responsible Member State. At the same time, a swifter procedure could help prevent 
secondary  movements  of  asylum-seekers  who,  due  to  delays  in  decisions  and  the  resulting 
insecurity, could decide to move to another Member State, for instance to rejoin family members on 
their  own.  As  this  option  introduces  new  obligations,  it  will  affect  those  Member  States  that  in 
practice have considerable delays in dealing with requests. Regarding requests for information, this 
option will only affect those Member States that have not concluded bilateral agreements to shorten 
the time limits. 

Policy  option  a)  is  proportionate  to  the  set  objective,  since  it  is  based  on  the  existing  time  limits 
adapted  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  specificities  of  each  measure.  In  particular:  1)  the  time 
limit for requesting an asylum-seeker to be taken back will use as a benchmark the time limit for 
take-charge  requests;  2)  the  implementation  impact  of  reducing  the  time  limit  for  requests  for 
information (from 6 to 4 weeks) will be insignificant; 3) the time limit for replying to a request on 
humanitarian grounds will be the same as the time limit already set for take-charge requests. 

–  Limited number of implemented transfers 

The financial compensation mechanism (option c) could in principle eliminate the inefficiencies 
linked  with  carrying  out  physical  transfers  (except  when  transfers  are  still  necessary  to  ensure 
family unity or if they are in the best interests of a child applicant), since the physical transfers will 

EN 

37 

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be replaced by financial transfers, ensuring a more streamlined and certain outcome for the Dublin 
procedure. Applicants’ needs and interests would be further taken into account (they would remain 
in principle in the Member State of their choice, so their integration would be in principle facilitated 
and  the  phenomenon  of  secondary  movements  could  be  reduced)  and  their  protection  would 
improve  since  many  protection  related  issues  are  linked  to  physical  transfers  (information  on 
transfers, continuity in the protection of vulnerable groups, etc.).  

However,  this  option  has  a  number  of  considerable  difficulties  and  negative  impacts.  Firstly,  it 
would not meet the current political objectives of the Dublin system and could increase the asylum 
pressure on the most ‘attractive’ Member States, with possible negative financial consequences and 
negative  perceptions  in  society  and  therefore  negative  impacts  on  the  integration  of  applicants. 
Legal uncertainties would arise, in particular as far as ‘take-back’ cases are concerned, with the risk 
of  having  applications  examined  twice  (e.g.  when  an  applicant  applies  for  asylum  in  a  second 
Member State while his or her previous application is still being examined in a first Member State, 
in which case the second Member State would keep him or her on its territory instead of returning 
the  person  to  the  first  Member  State  for  completing  the  examination  of  his  or  her  application). 
Moreover,  such  a  mechanism  could  be  subject  to  abuse  (for  instance,  it  could  be  seen  as  a  ‘pull’ 
factor  encouraging  movement  to  a  particular  state  for  economic  reasons  and  lodging  an  asylum 
application there in order to ensure non-removal). For these reasons, this policy measure could also 
be considered as not fully respecting the principle of proportionality. 

From  a  financial  point  of  view,  additional  and unpredictable  administrative  expenses  (beyond  the 
financial  compensation  received)  could  occur  for  those  Member  States  having  to  manage  greater 
numbers of people. Moreover, the trade-off between physical and financial transfers (the financial 
compensation  received  may  be  lower  than  the  cost  of  transferring  the  applicants  and  vice  versa), 
might  create  implementation  difficulties,  since  some  Member  States  could  for  instance  end  up 
facing  higher  costs  by  transferring  funds  to  another  Member  State  than  if  they  received  and 
managed these people themselves.  

The abolition of the cessation of responsibility clause (option d), meaning that an asylum-seeker 
who  absconded  but  reappeared  after  18  months  would  still  be  subject  to  transfer  to  the  Member 
State  responsible,  is  not  expected  to  bring  about  a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of  the 
implemented  transfers  and  therefore  make  the  system  more  efficient.  Experience  with  the  former 
Dublin Convention, which did not impose such limits, showed that asylum-seekers can go missing 
even  without  the  existence  of  such  limits.  This  option  would  most  likely  lead  to  a  precarious 
situation for asylum-seekers, who could abscond anyway and would only be pushed into illegality. 
Of  the  17  Member  States  that  expressed  their  views  on  this  matter,  only  6  would  like  to  see  this 
change made in the Dublin Regulation. The 11 others as well as the UNHCR were not in favour.  

Under  option  a),  a  series  of  practical  arrangements  for  transfers,  e.g.  on  the  issue  of  costs  or  the 
consequences of an erroneous transfer or of overturning of a decision on appeal after the person has 
been already transferred, would be incorporated or further clarified in the Dublin Regulations. This 
would eliminate the doubts or disputes between Member States on these issues, so transfers could 
be expected to be more swiftly implemented. In addition, the financial and human resources used in 
the  procedure  to  determine  responsibility,  which  would  normally  be  wasted  in  the  case  of  non-
implemented  transfers,  would  be  used  more  efficiently.  This  option  will  also  greatly  benefit 
applicants, ensuring more certainty about the outcome of the procedure and about their rights (e.g. 
in the case of erroneous transfer, applicants would be sent back and the examination of their claims 
would  be  guaranteed;  under  no  circumstances  would  they  themselves  have  to  bear  the  cost  of 

EN 

38 

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transfer, etc.). These clarifications have in general been welcomed both by civil society and by the 
Member States.  

The option regarding the possibility for Member States to conclude bilateral agreements to cancel 
the exchange of equal numbers of asylum-seekers (option b) could have a positive impact both in 
terms  of  the  efficiency  of  the  system  and  as  regards  the  protection  of  applicants’  interests.  For 
Member States, such agreements would reduce the workload and operating costs of the departments 
responsible for transfers. For asylum-seekers, they would remain in most cases within the Member 
State of their choice, where they would probably be more likely to integrate. Moreover, secondary 
movements after transfers could be further reduced.  

However, this option, already part of the initial Commission’s proposal for the Dublin Regulation, 
was  rejected  during  the  negotiations  in  the  Council,  among  other  things  because  of  the  lack  of 
objective  criteria  for  selecting  the  candidates  for  actual  transfers  and  the  fact  that  Member  States 
would  face  too  much  litigation  from  asylum-seekers  complaining  about  legal  uncertainty.  During 
the  consultations  for  the  current  proposal,  this  idea  was  generally  not  welcomed  by  the  Member 
States,  for  the  same  reasons  as  expressed  before.  This  option  was  rejected  by  the  European 
Parliament as well. 

Taking into account the above arguments, the preferred policy measure to address the issue of the 
limited number of implemented transfers is policy option a), which will clarify the practical rules 
Member States have to comply with when implementing transfers. This measure is therefore in line 
with the principle of proportionality, since it does not introduce new obligations for Member States. 

–  Clarifying  the  circumstances  and  procedure  for  applying  the  cessation  of  responsibility 

clause and the discretionary clauses 

Regarding  the  cessation  of  responsibility  clauses,  Member  States  generally  agreed  during  the 
expert meetings that the requested Member State (the one asked to take charge of or take back an 
applicant but who refuses to do so by invoking a cessation of responsibility clause) bears the burden 
of proof, i.e. has to deliver evidence that the person concerned has effectively left the territory of the 
EU or has been expelled. This seems to be the correct legal solution. 

Regarding  the  procedure  for  applying  the  sovereignty  clause:  informing  via  'DubliNet'  the  other 
Member  States  potentially  involved  in  a  concrete  Dublin  case  of  the  decision  to  apply  the 
sovereignty  clause  would  avoid  procedures  relating  to  the  same  asylum-seeker  being  carried  out 
simultaneously  in  several  Member  States.  However,  this  will  still  entail  the  risk  of  carrying  out 
repeated procedures regarding other possible applications the same person could lodge in the future 
in  other  Member  States  (different  from  the  ones  involved  in  the  past).  This  would  be  inefficient, 
resource-consuming and against the political objectives of the system. It is therefore important that 
once  a  Member  State  takes  responsibility  in  accordance  with  this  provision,  it  also  uses  the 
EURODAC database for the transmission of this information, which will ensure that all potentially 
involved Member States in the future will be informed in an efficient manner that another Member 
State already accepted responsibility, eliminating therefore the risk of multiple procedures. 

Regarding  the  circumstances  for  applying  the  sovereignty  clause,  providing  an  exhaustive  list 
would not be appropriate, given that it would be difficult for legislation to cover all situations that 
can arise in practice. Moreover, the nature of the clause, which is discretionary, would be changed. 
However, it is important to clarify the nature of the provision which has been conceived in order to 
be used mainly for humanitarian reasons.  

EN 

39 

   EN 

In addition, reintroducing the obligation to obtain the consent of the asylum-seeker concerned by 
the application of the sovereignty clause would ensure that the clause will not be applied when it 
goes against the interests and fundamental rights of the person concerned. During the consultation 
process, the European Parliament, the UNHCR and NGOs as well as a minority of Member States 
which  expressed  their  opinion  on  this  issue  (4  out  of  19)  welcomed  the  reintroduction  of  the 
consent, which was seen as a crucial element ensuring that the clause is not used in a manner which 
would  undermine  the  provisions  pertaining  to  family  reunification  in  particular.  The  majority  of 
Member  States  consider  however  that  such  an  obligation  would  cause  additional  administrative 
burden  and  legal  difficulties  since  the  procedure  will  become  more  complicated.  Despite  this 
opposition, it is first considered that since the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers are at stake, the 
need to ensure adequate protection for asylum-seekers overrides the practical concerns expressed by 
the  majority  of  Member  States.  In  addition,  given  that  the  Regulation  already  obliges  Member 
States  to  ensure  that  asylum-seekers  give  their  approval  for  the  application  of  certain  provisions 
related to family unity (e.g. Article 7 and 8), it is considered that introducing this obligation also for 
the  application  of  the  sovereignty  clause  should  not  create  a  disproportionate  burden  on  Member 
States. Finally, there is no evidence to demonstrate that Member States were indeed confronted with 
practical difficulties in this respect under the Dublin Convention which required the consent of the 
asylum-seeker. 

Regarding the humanitarian  clause,  specifying that any Member State  could make humanitarian 
requests and that refusals do not have to be justified, while leaving the practical arrangements for 
obtaining written consent to be decided by the Member States concerned on a case-by-case basis, 
would  not  satisfactorily  address  the  objectives  of  making  the  system  operate  more  smoothly  and 
better  protecting  the  rights  of  the  persons  concerned  to  family  reunification,  as  the  rules  would 
continue to be unclear or not uniformly applied. During the consultation process, experts generally 
agreed  that  these  objectives  could  be  achieved  better  by  clearly  identifying  those  Member  States 
that can make a request on humanitarian grounds, by obliging Member States to justify a refusal to 
accept a humanitarian request and by including rules on obtaining the written consent of the persons 
involved.  

Taking  into  account  the  above  arguments,  the  preferred  policy  measure  to  address  the  issue  of 
unclear  circumstances  and  procedures  for  applying  the  above-mentioned  clauses  is  policy  option 
a).  The  clarifications  proposed  under  this  option  are  expected  to  make  the  procedure  for 
determining  responsibility  run  more  smoothly.  Member  States  will  have  a  better  idea  of  the 
circumstances in which the clauses can be applied and the procedure to follow. This will also help 
prevent disputes between Member States, which affect the proper functioning of the system. At the 
same  time,  as  delays  and  uncertainties  in  the  procedure  will  be  reduced,  the  rights  of  asylum-
seekers  subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure  will  be  better  taken  into  account,  in  particular  as  far  as 
family  reunification  is  concerned,  under  both  the  humanitarian  and  sovereignty  clauses.  For 
instance, the probability of the humanitarian clause being applied will increase, since any refusal to 
apply it will have to be duly justified.  

Moreover, the preferred policy option does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the stated 
objective since: 1) the clarification regarding the cessation of responsibility clauses seems to be in 
line with the interpretation given in most Member States; 2) the application of both the sovereignty 
and  humanitarian  clauses  remains  discretionary,  with  the  proposed  changes  aiming  to  better 
regulate their application so that appropriate consideration is given to asylum-seekers’ rights. 

The implementation of this policy measure would incur some financial and administrative costs, to 
cover  in  particular  the  sometimes  additional  procedures  for  the  discretionary  clauses.  This  is  the 

EN 

40 

   EN 

case, for instance, for the obligation to justify refusal of a humanitarian request, or the procedure to 
obtain the consent of applicants on the application of the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses. In 
some  cases,  however,  Member  States  already  apply  these  procedures  in  practice,  in  line  with  the 
spirit of the Regulation, so the clarifications are not expected to increase costs in all cases. At the 
same time, the costs of disputes or delays in the application of these clauses or potential duplicated 
procedures  would  be  reduced  and  thus  give  rise  to  savings.  Finally,  the  protection  aspect  of  the 
clarifications overrides the financial considerations.  

Practical cooperation: 

The policy measures coming under practical cooperation are expected to offer considerable support 
to  Member  States  in  applying  the  Regulation  in  general  and  in  particular  in  the  application  of 
difficult clauses such as those mentioned above. They complement the legislative measures set out 
above,  which  together  will  adequately  tackle  the  current  problems  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the 
system and the protection of individuals. The creation of a handbook, as an immediately consultable 
reference for Member States, allowing for more uniform and timely application of the Regulation, 
was welcomed by Member States during the consultation process. Although soft-law measures, they 
are expected to greatly contribute to achieving the objectives, so both policy measures are identified 
as the preferred options. 

5.2. 

Ensuring disputes between Member States are tackled in an effective way 

Legislation: 

Improving  the  existing  conciliation  mechanism  set  up  by  the  Implementing  Regulation  only  for 
disputes  on  the  humanitarian  clause,  by  making  its  decisions  binding  (policy  option  e),  is  not 
expected  to  satisfactorily  address  the  objective  of  ensuring  that  all  disputes  are  tackled  in  an 
effective way and therefore improve the efficiency of the procedure for determining responsibility. 
Indeed, the proposed improvements to the conciliation mechanism would only ensure that disputes 
concerning the application of the humanitarian clause would be tackled in an effective way, since 
Member States would have to comply with the decisions of the conciliation mechanism. However, 
the  proposal  to  make  its  decisions  binding  might  encounter  legal  and  political  difficulties. 
Moreover, the resolution of disputes in other fields of application of the Regulation would remain at 
the discretion of Member States, with the consequence that no effective solution would be ensured. 
This  would  continue  to  hinder  the  objective  of  having  a  speedy  Dublin  procedure,  in  view  of  a 
quick access to the examination on the merits of applications.  

Policy  option  b)  would  ensure  that  Member  States  have  the  legal  possibility  to  use  the  existing 
conciliation  mechanism  for  disputes  on  any  matter  related  to  the  application  of  the  current 
Regulation. Member States could therefore be more inclined to make use of this mechanism, given 
that, as stated in the problem definition, one of the reasons for this mechanism never being applied 
so far is its limited scope. However, given that such a mechanism will not be binding, its use might 
remain limited. This is because, as stated in the problem definition, its non-binding nature may be 
another reason why Member States have not used this mechanism.  

The creation of an independent structure/body with both an advisory/consultation role and a role in 
settling  disputes  on  all  issues  concerning  the  application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  (with  binding 
decisions) (policy options a) and c)) would considerably improve the efficiency of the procedure 
for  determining  responsibility,  by  ensuring  that  all  matters  of  dispute  are  settled  in  an  effective 
way  by  a  competent  independent  body  and  that  its  decisions  are  complied  with  by  the  Member 

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States. Moreover, such a body would play an important advisory/consultation role, for instance by 
making recommendations on matters relating to the application of the Dublin Regulation with the 
aim  of  ensuring  more  uniform  application.  Regarding  the  institutional  framework  for  the 
operation of such a body, while policy option a) proposes the creation of a new structure under the 
Dublin Regulation (which could follow, for instance, the model of the Article 29 Working Party on 
the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data59),  policy  option  c) 
provides  for  such  a  structure  to  be  set  up  within  the  future  European  Asylum  Support  Office 
(EASO).  Policy  option  d)  has  a  more  limited  role  for  the  EASO,  which  will  not  have  decision 
making powers but only a supporting role (gathering information, support to monitoring etc.). 

Although  the  creation  of  an  independent  structure/body  (a)  is  expected  to  achieve  the  general 
objective  of  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility  and  better 
addressing  the  needs  and  rights  of  applicants  for  international  protection,  it  would  encounter 
considerable difficulties as far as the feasibility of implementation is concerned, with disagreements 
on  the  composition  and  role  of  the  body.  Moreover,  the  proposal  to  make  its  decisions  binding 
might  encounter  legal  and  political  difficulties.  In  addition,  there  is  a  risk  of  duplication  of  work 
between this body, the existing committees (the comitology committee set up by Article 27 of the 
Dublin  Regulation)  and  the  informal  Dublin  Contact  Committee  (informal  meetings  of  Dublin 
experts).  Moreover,  in  terms  of  financial  feasibility,  the  creation  of  the  new  body  would  require 
additional financial resources.  

As for the role that the EASO could play in order to facilitate application of the Dublin Regulation, 
this  will  have  to  be  decided  in  the  context  of  the  proposal  on  the  EASO,  which  will  undergo  a 
separate  IA.  Without  prejudging  that  decision,  it  is  considered  that  the  EASO  could  play  an 
important supporting role for the application of the Dublin Regulation (policy option d).  

Given the above arguments, the preferred policy options are b) and d). Although policy option b) 
might have limited use, it appears to be the only one that is legally and politically feasible at this 
stage. From the consultation process, it emerged that several Member States were in favour of this 
option. Moreover, the envisaged measure is in line with the principle of proportionality, since it is 
based  on  an  existing  mechanism  whose  scope  will  merely  be  extended  as  stated  above.  Policy 
option d) would have to be reassessed in a separate IA, but at this stage it is considered that it could 
support the mechanism to be set up in the Dublin Regulation.  

Practical cooperation: 

Policy  option  b),  which  consists  of  using  the  current  informal  Dublin  experts’  meetings  to  solve 
disputes between Member States, is not expected to bring about any considerable improvement over 
the  status  quo.  Firstly,  using  an  informal  framework  for  solving  disputes  between  Member  States 
might be difficult to achieve. Moreover, the solutions reached during those meetings would at best 
be perceived as a form of political pressure on the Member States in dispute, since decisions would 
not be binding.  

Policy option a), which envisages the creation of a handbook (the same as that referred to under 
point  1),  would  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  mechanism  for  determining  responsibility  by 
providing  an  immediately  consultable  reference,  which  would  in  principle  help  prevent  disputes 
between  Member  States  by  ensuring  more  uniform  and  timely  application  of  the  Regulation,  or 
enable disputes to be solved in an efficient manner by the Member States involved. The preferred 

59 

Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50. 

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policy option for practical cooperation is therefore policy option a). Although, as with policy option 
b), the handbook would be non-binding, it is considered that it can gain a morally binding character 
by being a permanent reference for Member States.  

5.3. 

Preventing further overburdening of Member States facing particular pressure 

Legislate: 

Under policy option c), overburdened Member States subject to particular asylum pressures could 
unilaterally  decide  to  block  incoming  transfers  of  applicants  for  which  they  are  responsible.  This 
option  would  benefit  the  affected  Member  State,  which  would  no  longer  have  to  deal  with  these 
asylum  applications,  as  well  as  the  applicants,  since  they  would  remain  within  Member  States 
capable in principle of dealing with them adequately. However, considerable difficulties would be 
encountered in the application of such a mechanism. Firstly, providing a comprehensive definition 
of  the  term  ‘particular  pressure’  to  include  all  situations  that  could  occur  in  practice  is  a  cross-
cutting  issue,  which  might  be  politically  difficult  to  deal  with  it  only  in  the  Dublin  context. 
Secondly,  there  are  concerns  that  such  a  mechanism  could  be  abused  by  Member  States 
‘pretending’ to be overburdened, which would disrupt the proper functioning of the Dublin system. 
Consequently, this policy measure could also be considered as not fully respecting the principle of 
proportionality. Finally, financial and administrative costs would arise for those Member States no 
longer able to transfer the asylum-seekers and thus obliged to examine their applications, with the 
consequence  that  they  could  themselves  become  overburdened.  For  asylum-seekers,  not  being 
transferred  to  overburdened  Member  States  would  in  principle  ensure  better  protection  of  their 
rights and needs, although they could in some cases be prevented from being reunited with family 
members present in the overburdened countries.  

Under policy option d), the financial compensation mechanism to be regulated at EU level would 
provide  resources  to  overburdened  Member  States  in  order  to  improve  their  reception  and 
processing  capacities  (i.e.  more  asylum  personnel  and  construction  of  temporary  reception 
structures)  for  coping  with  Dublin  transfers  that  could  add  to  the  pressure.  The  definition  at  EU 
level of an appropriate indicator for situations of particular pressure would facilitate the application 
of  this  mechanism.  However,  this  option  presents  considerable  difficulties  in  terms  of 
implementation  and  financial  feasibility.  Firstly,  as  also  explained  for  policy  option  c),  the 
definition  of  ‘particular  pressure’  might  encounter  difficulties.  Moreover,  Member  States  (in 
particular those with less than the average EU burden) are likely to be reluctant to bear additional 
costs  to  support  Member  States  that  have  been  determined  to  be  responsible  but  are  facing 
particular  pressure.  Moreover,  there  would  be  concerns  that,  given  the  unpredictable  and  sudden 
emergence  of  situations  of  particular  pressure,  overburdened  Member  States  may  not  be  able  to 
make  the  best  use  of  these  additional  resources  within  a  short  period  of  time,  also  because  their 
physical reception capacities are limited. Regarding applicants, they might be negatively perceived 
by the receiving societies, as they will be seen as adding to already existing migratory pressures. 

Policy  options  a)  and  b)  are  complementary  as  the  former  sets  up  a  general  (compulsory) 
mechanism  to  suspend  Dublin  transfers  and  the  latter  provides  for  a  bilateral  (discretionary) 
mechanism.  Suspending  transfers  as  a  general  mechanism  would  avoid  further  overburdening 
those  Member  States  with  limited  asylum  reception  facilities  and/or  procedural  capacities,  and 
would also guarantee adequate protection for people in need of international protection. Moreover, 
by  obliging  the  Member  States  suspending  transfers  to  examine  the  applications  of  the  asylum-
seekers concerned, the Member State under pressure would be better able to remedy the exceptional 
asylum  situation  (as  asylum-seekers  would  no  longer  be  transferred)  and  the  needs  of  the  people 

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involved would be better addressed since their access to the asylum procedure would not be further 
delayed.  The  emergency  financial  support  that  could  be  triggered  by  the  suspension  of  transfers 
following a request for assistance from the Member State under particular pressure would enable it 
to  manage  the  situation  of  particular  pressure  or  to  improve  the  level  of  protection  offered  to 
asylum-seekers  in  a  more  efficient  way,  and  could  limit  the  period  under  which  a  suspension  of 
transfers is needed.  

Given the unpredictability of asylum flows and possible changes in national asylum contexts, it is 
very difficult to estimate how often such decisions to suspend transfers would be taken in practice. 
However, based on past statistical data for certain Member States facing particular pressure, mainly 
because of their geographic location, a general approximation of the number of suspended transfers 
can be provided. For instance, if transfers of asylum-seekers to Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus had 
been suspended in 2006, it can be stated that, based on the number of accepted incoming transfers 
for  that  year,  provided  in  Annex  3,  a  total  of  2 498  asylum-seekers  (1 179  transferred  to  Greece, 
1 159 to Italy, 33 to Cyprus and 127 to Malta) would have remained in the other Member States.  

The procedure envisaged for the suspension of Dublin transfers would ensure that decisions can be 
taken  rapidly,  since  it  will  be  for  the  Commission  to  decide  whether  it  is  justified  to  suspend 
transfers  and  since  very  short  time  limits  for  taking  such  decisions  will  be  set  up.  A  different 
procedure whereby the decision would be taken by the Member States in a committee (such as the 
regulatory procedure established in Article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC) or by the Council 
would  require  much  longer  time  frames  and  would  therefore  not  address  the  concerned  crisis 
situations in a smooth and adequate way. The fact that any decision to suspend transfers will have to 
be reasoned and include,  among other things, an assessment of the situation in the Member State 
affected and the consequences of suspension for the other Member States is a guarantee that such 
decisions could not be taken on a systematic basis, which could endanger the smooth running of the 
Dublin procedure. In addition, the procedure established would ensure the possibility for Member 
States to contest the Commission's decision. 

The  6  months  period  of  suspension,  which  could  be  extended  with  further  6  months  when  the 
grounds for suspension still persist, is considered to be a reasonable time limit to allow for a change 
in the circumstances of the Member State concerned by the suspension. This time limit would also 
prevent  major  disruptions  in  the  functioning  of  the  system,  and  would  guarantee  that  the  Dublin 
system will continue to run smoothly after that period. 

During the consultation process, no clear position was taken by the Member States. Although this 
measure is considered to have a highly political relevance, it would only be applied in limited and 
well-defined  circumstances.  Therefore,  no  strong  concerns  are  expected  on  the  part  of  Member 
States. 

Regarding  the  bilateral  mechanism,  no  major  implementation  difficulties  are  foreseen,  since  its 
application  would  be  left  to  the  complete  discretion  of  Member  States.  Such  a  mechanism  is  less 
political  as  it  involves  only  two  Member  States  and  does  not  require  a  decision  at  EU  level,  so 
would be easier to implement than the general mechanism. Member States would be able to apply it 
even  if  the  circumstances  pertaining  in  a  given  Member  State  do  not  give  rise  to  a  high  level  of 
concern, as would be the case for option a). Therefore, the threshold for applying option b) is lower 
than  for  applying  option  a).  In  practice,  option  b)  could  be  applied  when  a  Member  State  under 
particular  pressure  were  to  receive  a  significant  number  of  asylum-seekers  from  a  particular 
Member State (and only a limited number from the other Member States). This mechanism could be 
applied  independently  of  the  implementation  of  policy  option  a)  (e.g.  if  a  general  decision  to 

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suspend transfers is taken by the Commission for Member State A, bilateral agreements could still 
be concluded for other Member States equally under pressure but not meeting the threshold required 
for  a  general  decision;  conversely,  if  no  general decision  is  taken  by  the  Commission  to  suspend 
transfers  to  Member  State  A,  the  other  Member  States  could  still  decide  to  agree  bilaterally  to 
suspend  transfers  to  A).  However,  the  real  impact  of  such  a  mechanism  is  highly  questionable, 
because of its voluntary nature.  

In  the  case  of  both  options  a)  and  b),  financial  and  administrative  costs  would  arise  for  those 
Member  States  suspending  transfers  (in  principle  less  burdened  than  those  to  which  the  transfers 
will be suspended) and therefore having to bear all the costs of taking on the asylum applications. 
However, if transfers were not suspended, there is also the risk that applicants would illegally move 
from the overburdened Member States, so additional costs could still arise to address these irregular 
movements. The originally responsible Member State would make long-term savings as it would no 
longer  have  to  incur  the  costs  of  dealing  with  asylum  applications  if  the  other  Member  States 
suspended the transfers. 

The  suspension  of  transfers  would  not  automatically  lead  to  the  granting  of  assistance  from  the 
emergency measures fund under the ERF, but would only serve as justification for such assistance, 
following a request from the Member State facing particular pressure. The budgetary impact for the 
ERF  would  thus  depend  on  each  individual  case,  taking  into  consideration  the  existence  of  other 
possible applications for the emergency fund with a view to ensuring the equitable distribution of 
funds. In 2008, the Commission received two applications for the emergency fund, from Italy and 
in order to improve its reception capacities and 
Malta. Malta applied  for  approximately €400 000 
Italy applied for €19 million to better cope with  the surge in asylum flows in 2008. Any decision on 
the allocation of funding would have to accommodate the needs of both Member States and comply 
with the total amount available for emergency measures under the ERF for 2008, i.e. €10 million. 
Given the above arguments, policy option a) is the preferred legislative policy option. This option is 
proportionate  to  the  objective  of  preventing  further  overburdening  of  Member  States  facing 
particular  pressure  and  ensuring  adequate  protection  for  asylum-seekers,  since  the  circumstances 
under which it can be applied are limited and the special procedure for deciding to suspend transfers 
will guarantee that this will not happen in unjustified cases.  

Practical cooperation: 

Alongside  the  preferred  legislative  policy  option,  the  creation  of  asylum  expert  teams  would  be 
extremely  useful  for  addressing  situations  of  particular  pressure, and  is  therefore  identified  as  the 
preferred  practical  cooperation  option.  Asylum  expert  teams  would  assist  existing  personnel  in 
overburdened Member States to cope with the flows of asylum-seekers, in particular those resulting 
from incoming Dublin transfers. This option would help ensure adequate protection for applicants 
sent  to  overburdened  Member  States  as  well  as  the  smooth  operation  of  their  asylum  systems, 
preventing their breakdown due to additional numbers of asylum-seekers.  

The  creation  of  asylum  expert  teams  would  incur  financial  and  administrative  costs  in  order  to 
recruit  professionals  in  this  area  and  provide  them  with  appropriate  training  on  how  to  deal  with 
situations of particular pressure. There would also be the additional expenses of sending the experts 
to overburdened Member States and supporting them there.  

These impacts will be further assessed in the context of the IA for the proposal on the EASO, which 
will address the issue of setting up asylum expert teams from a wider perspective (not only in the 
Dublin context). 

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5.4. 

Strengthening  the  legal  safeguards  for  asylum-seekers  and  enabling  them  to  better 
defend their rights  

Legislate: 

–  information  

Both policy options a) and b), by providing more accurate and comprehensive general information 
about the Dublin procedure to all asylum-seekers upon lodging an application, would considerably 
increase  their  awareness  of  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility,  which  on  the  one  hand 
would allow them to better defend their rights (such as the right to family reunification) and on the 
other  hand  would  encourage  a  more  cooperative  attitude  on  their  part  and  help  reduce  secondary 
movements.  The  obligation  to  hold  an  interview  is  not  only  an  additional  guarantee  for  asylum-
seekers  under  the  Dublin  procedure,  ensuring  for  instance  that  they  will  receive  adequate 
information about the procedure and their rights, but is also expected to considerably facilitate the 
procedure  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible.  Indeed,  Member  States  will  have  the 
opportunity to gather all necessary information on the context in which an asylum-seeker arrived in 
the  Member  States,  essential  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible.  Arranging  the 
interview  in  good  time  will  ensure  its  effectiveness.  At  least  5  Member  States  already  hold 
interviews  with  Dublin  asylum-seekers,  so  at  least  for  those  Member  States  no  implementation 
difficulties should arise. 

Unlike  option  a),  however,  option  b)  does  not  call  for  the  provision  of  specific  information  to 
asylum-seekers  during  the  Dublin  procedure  and  does  not  provide  for  the  obligation  to  hold 
interviews with asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. As it provides for a lower level of 
information than policy option a) and it does not require Member States to hold Dublin interviews, 
option  b)  will  offer  a  less  adequate  level  of  protection  for  asylum-seekers  throughout  the  Dublin 
procedure and will not facilitate the procedure for determining the Member State responsible. 

In  terms  of  financial  feasibility,  both  options  a)  and  b)  would  incur  increased  costs,  as  Member 
States would have to adapt their existing information methods to the new legal requirements (as set 
out in the administrative cost assessment in Annex 5). For policy option a), additional costs would 
be  incurred  to  provide  further  specific  information  to  applicants  and  to  hold  Dublin  specific 
interviews. However, savings would be made in the long term, as the information provided would 
foster  a  more  cooperative  and  compliant  attitude  on  the  part  of  applicants,  which  would  in  turn 
ensure smoother functioning of the procedure. Moreover, the interviews would also reduce the time 
spent  in  identifying  the  responsible  Member  State,  ensuring  therefore  a  more  efficient  procedure. 
Finally, there seems to be general agreement among stakeholders on the need to increase the level 
and quality of information provided to asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. 

Given the above arguments, the preferred policy option is policy option a). This option does not go 
beyond  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  the  set  objective,  given  in  particular  that  the 
obligations it provides for are already part of the practice of several Member States. 

Regarding policy option c), given the fact that it proposes the same solution as the policy measure 
for practical cooperation, only adopted in a different form, it is considered below. 

Practical cooperation 

As a complementary measure to the preferred legislative option a), a standard EU-wide multilingual 
leaflet  about  the  Dublin  procedure  and  applicants’  rights  under  it,  which  would  have  to  cover  at 

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least the requirements of  the Regulation, would be an important guarantee that all  applicants will 
receive adequate and similar information in all Member States, leading to better protection of their 
rights. In order to ensure that national issues are adequately taken into account, Member States may, 
if they so wish, include further details in the leaflet adapted to their national contexts. 

From an institutional point of view, this information tool could be conceived and agreed either in 
the comitology procedure (policy option c) or in practical cooperation (policy option a). It would 
in  principle  take  less  time  to  conceive  and  adopt  it  under  practical  cooperation  than  under 
comitology,  which  is  a  formal  procedure  requiring,  among  other  things,  compliance  with  certain 
preliminary legal requirements (i.e. the proposal amending the Dublin Regulation — the parent text 
— would have to provide for adopting such a leaflet in the comitology procedure and only after the 
adoption  of  that  proposal  in  the  co-decision  procedure,  could  the  proposed  text  be  agreed  in  the 
comitology procedure). However, a text adopted in the comitology procedure has the advantage of 
being binding, which is not the case for a measure adopted under practical cooperation. Moreover, 
under practical cooperation, there is a risk that some Member States might not agree with such an 
initiative  or  with  the  content  of  the  leaflet.  Consequently,  some  Member  States  could  continue  to 
inform asylum-seekers inadequately, so the objective of better protecting asylum-seekers would not 
be adequately met by policy option a). In contrast, policy option c) will achieve that objective.  

In  terms  of  financial  feasibility,  both  options  would  incur  costs  to  ensure  that  all  Member  States 
distribute the leaflet widely. National adaptations of the leaflet to take account of national contexts 
might incur additional costs. Costs would also arise for the translation of the leaflet, but Member 
States could use EU funding for this purpose. Moreover, synergies would be achieved if Member 
States exchange among themselves the different language versions they possess.  

Given the above arguments, the preferred option here is policy option c). This option does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the set objective. The Regulation in force already provides for 
a committee to assist the Commission in the implementation of certain provisions. The adoption of 
a leaflet under the comitology procedure will therefore not require the creation of a new committee 
and will fall within the competence of the committee already in place. 

Legislate  

–  Effective right to remedy  

Under  policy  option  c),  the  right  to  appeal  a  transfer  decision  would  be  legally  confirmed,  thus 
providing  a  solid  legal  safeguard  for  asylum-seekers  subject  to  transfer  decisions.  Moreover,  the 
fact  that  the  courts  would  be  obliged  to  examine  on  their  own  initiative  the  need  to  temporarily 
suspend  the  enforcement  of  a  transfer  decision  would  provide  an  important  legal  guarantee  for 
asylum-seekers. In assessing the need to suspend a transfer decision, courts should generally look at 
the  nature  of  the  rights  at  stake  and  the  individual  circumstances  of  each  case  (e.g.  a  person’s 
physical  state  or  mental  capacity,  risk  of  violation  of  the  principle  of  non-refoulement,  risk  of 
infringing the right to family reunification, the reception conditions in the receiving Member State, 
etc.).  As  also  highlighted  in  the  problem  definition,  in  the  rare  cases  where  suspensive  effect  is 
currently granted, this is done in the event of serious illness of the person to be transferred or where 
there is a risk of breaching the European Convention of Human Rights if the transfer goes ahead. 
Given the different situations that could arise in practice in view of the particular circumstances of 
each  individual  case,  and  given  that  this  concerns the administrative law and practice  of Member 
States,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  specify  in  the  Regulation  the  grounds  under  which  courts 
should decide to suspend the enforcement of a transfer decision.  

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This  option  also  has  the  advantage  of  adequately  responding  to  the  concern  to  have  a  balanced 
procedure in terms of efficiency and protection, since an appeal will not automatically suspend the 
implementation of the transfer decision (as in policy option a), but only when the competent courts 
deem it necessary, in a case-by-case assessment.  

Indeed,  while  policy  option  a)  offers  an  absolute  guarantee  of  protection  for  asylum-seekers,  it 
could have a negative impact on the smooth operation of the system, as all transfers against which 
appeals are lodged will be suspended. This would bring about considerable delays in the procedure 
and could have negative consequences for the asylum-seekers themselves, if the examination of the 
merits  of  their  applications  is  delayed.  Moreover,  there  is  a  risk  that  if  appeals  are  automatically 
suspensive, they could be lodged only as a stalling tactic (for the sole reason of prolonging the stay 
within the Member State where the application was lodged), circumventing the entire system. This 
is also a risk for policy options b) and c), but is much more limited than in policy option a), as the 
authorities are expected to take quick decisions on the matter. 

Finally, policy option b) is less protective than policy option c), as the need to suspend the transfer 
of  an  asylum-seeker  will  not  be  examined  automatically  by  the  competent  courts,  but  only  at  the 
request of asylum-seekers, who might not necessarily be in the position to make such a request (for 
example because they might not have the required legal counselling). 

Therefore,  the  only  option  that  would  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of  the  right  to  remedy,  thus 
improving the protection of applicants while also taking into account the specificities of the Dublin 
procedure, is policy option c), which is therefore the preferred option. In comparison to the status 
quo,  the  preliminary  procedural  guarantees  of  the  right  to  appeal  would  be  clarified  and 
strengthened  (improved  notification  procedure,  right  to  legal  assistance,  etc.),  which  would 
substantially  improve  the  situation  of  applicants,  who  will  be  provided  with  adequate  means  in 
order to understand the decision and possibly exercise their right to remedy. The efficiency of the 
system would be increased as well, since for instance a decision recognising the suspensive effect of 
an appeal would avoid additional time and resources being spent on bringing back the applicant if 
the  decision  is  overturned  on  appeal  and  would  prevent  secondary  movements  (i.e.  the  applicant 
returning irregularly while the appeal process is under way). 

Since, as stated in the problem definition, most Member States do not seem to effectively safeguard 
the  right  to  remedy,  they  will  have  to  bring  their  policies  into  line  with  the  proposed  preferred 
policy option. 

In  terms  of  costs,  a  legally  confirmed  right  to  appeal  would  not  entail  any  further  costs  since  it 
would  just  confirm  the  existing  practice  of  Member  States.  The  obligation  to  decide  on  the 
suspensive effect of an appeal would entail both administrative costs for the judicial procedure and 
the costs of the prolonged stay in the Member State where the right to appeal is exercised. However, 
as  explained  above,  in  the  case  of  suspensive  effect,  savings  could  arise  because  the  costs  of 
returning  transferees  due  to  overturned  decisions  would  be  avoided.  Costs  would  also  arise  for 
strengthening  the  preliminary  procedural  guarantees  (in  particular  legal  assistance  and  better 
notification),  in  particular  for  those  Member  States  that  currently  do  not  provide  adequate 
guarantees.  The  Member  States  most  affected  by  these  costs  could  be  the  non-border  countries, 
since they account for the highest number of outgoing transfers.  

Regarding  the  number  of  asylum-seekers  who  might  have  suspensive  effect  granted  for  their 
appeals,  based  on  the  number  of  accepted  incoming  Dublin  transfers  in  2006  (figures  given  in 
Annex 3), it can be concluded that if all asylum-seekers subject to a transfer decision were to appeal 

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against  it  and  if  the  courts  were  to  decide  in  all  cases  to  grant  suspensive  effect,  a  maximum  of 
14 768 asylum-seekers could have benefited from this measure in all Member States in 2006.  

However,  these  data  have  to  be  used  extremely  cautiously  due  to  several  factors.  Firstly,  the 
unpredictability of asylum flows and changes that could occur in the asylum practices of Member 
States, the unpredictability of the proportion of asylum-seekers falling under the Dublin procedure 
and  those  likely  to  appeal  a  transfer  decision,  as  well  as  the  particularities  of  each  case,  make  it 
difficult  to  provide  reliable  estimations.  Secondly,  given  that  the  Dublin  system  is  based  on  the 
presumption  that  all  Member  States  offer  an  adequate  standard  of  protection,  so  that  transferring 
asylum-seekers  should  not  in  principle  lead  to  infringements  of  their  fundamental  rights,  the 
suspension of transfers for this reason should in theory be infrequent (although in reality, as pointed 
out  in  section  2.2.4.,  the  asylum  system  and  practice  of  some  Member  States  is  not  always 
adequate). The current practice of Member States, which rarely grant suspensive effect to an appeal, 
would lead to the same conclusion. 

Finally, it is considered that independently of the number of potential asylum-seekers affected, the 
policy measure presented would still be justified given that their fundamental rights are at stake. It 
is  also  clear  that  the  measure  is  proportionate  to  the  set  objective,  given  that,  as  demonstrated 
above, it offers a balanced solution between the need to adequately protect asylum-seekers’ rights 
and the need for a system that operates smoothly.  

Stakeholders’ opinions on these issues are quite divergent: while most Member States are generally 
reluctant to introduce an obligation to examine the need to temporarily suspend enforcement of a 
transfer  decision  and  to  increase  the  legal  safeguards  in  general  in  the  Dublin  Regulation,  the 
UNHCR supports this option, while the EP even calls for the automatic suspension of transfers in 
the event of appeals. 

–  Custodial measures  

Prohibiting in general the detention of all asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure (option a) 
might  be  unjustified  and  disproportionate,  given  that  under  certain  circumstances  detention  is 
needed to ensure that asylum-seekers do not abscond and that they are transferred to the responsible 
Member State (i.e. that the result of the Dublin procedure is implemented).  

Option  b)  would  adequately  achieve  the  objective  of  offering  adequate  protection  to  asylum-
seekers, while at the same time ensuring the system operates efficiently. This option would ensure 
that the detention of Dublin asylum-seekers is not arbitrary by providing clear grounds for it as well 
as ensuring that detainees enjoy the same reception conditions and procedural guarantees as other 
detained asylum-seekers not subject to the Dublin procedure. The fact that this is a specific form of 
detention  only  concerning  asylum-seekers  subject  to  the  Dublin  procedure  justifies  having  it 
regulated  in  the  Dublin  Regulation  rather  than  in  the  Asylum  Procedures  and  the  Reception 
Conditions Directive. While these instruments contain general provisions about the conditions and 
grounds  for  detention  of  asylum-seekers  in  general  and  therefore  can  be  considered  as  ‘lex 
generalis’  for  Dublin  as  well,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  regulate  the  Dublin-related  grounds  for 
detention  in  the  Dublin  Regulation,  which  will  function  as  a  ‘lex  specialis’.  Therefore,  policy 
option c) is not adequate. 

Taking into account the above arguments, the preferred policy measure to address the issue of the 
arbitrary detention of Dublin asylum-seekers is policy option b). Respect for the rights of asylum-
seekers would be guaranteed and at the same time the system will continue to work efficiently, by 
allowing  Member  States  to  detain  asylum-seekers  in  exceptional  circumstances,  when  there  is  a 
clear  risk  of  absconding  and  thus  hindering  implementation  of  the  Dublin  procedure.  The 

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fundamental  rights  of  applicants,  in  particular  the  right  to  freedom  of  movement,  will  be 
guaranteed.  Moreover,  in  terms  of  social  impacts,  this  measure  will  limit  the  possibility  of 
applicants  being  isolated  from  society  through  detention,  which  will  also  positively  influence 
society’s perception of them (i.e. they will not be perceived as criminals or illegal immigrants, as 
often currently happens). While this option would raise certain concerns, in particular on the part of 
those Member States that seem to use detention for Dublin cases on a systematic basis throughout 
the  Dublin  procedure,  it  would  be  welcomed  by  the  European  Parliament,  the  UNHCR  and  civil 
society, since it is in line with international standards. 

Finally,  the  preferred  policy  option  is  in  line  with  the  principle  of  proportionality,  since,  as 
demonstrated  above,  it  provides  a  balanced  solution  between  the  need  to  ensure  respect  for 
fundamental  rights  and  the  need  for  Member  States to  have  the discretion to use detention where 
justified. 

–  The principle of effective access to the asylum procedure and the exception to this principle 

Regarding  access  to  the  asylum  procedure:  clarifying  the  principle  of  an  effective  access  to  the 
asylum procedure for asylum-seekers under the Dublin procedure, will guarantee that the merits of 
an asylum-seeker’s claim are always examined in the responsible Member State. In particular, by 
explicitly laying down that any decision to discontinue the examination of an application has to be 
revoked by the responsible Member State when the asylum-seeker is sent back to that Member State 
pursuant  to  the  Dublin  rules,  would  prevent  wrong  applications  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  in  this 
respect  in  the  future,  as  was  the  case  for  Greece  until  April  2006.  Moreover,  clarifying  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  access  to  appeal  procedures  for  asylum-seekers  under  the  Dublin 
procedure in line with the Asylum Procedures Directive is an equally important and complementary 
safeguard,  needed  in  order  to  avoid  possible  negative  consequences  of  incorrect  first-instance 
decisions and to ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. However, this issue may 
need  to  be  further  considered  in  the  larger  context  of  access  to  appeal  procedures  for  all  asylum-
seekers (and not only those under the Dublin procedure) and therefore it may be necessary to assess 
it within the context of the upcoming proposal amending the Asylum Procedures Directive. 

Regarding the application of the  safe third-country criteria:  If Member States were to continue to 
apply their national rules on this issue, they might infringe the Asylum Procedure Directive, which 
sets  out  clear  conditions  Member  States  have  to  consider  when  assessing  the  safe  third-country 
criteria. The stipulation that Member States will be able to send asylum-seekers to a third country 
only after careful examination of the safe third-country criteria laid down in the Asylum Procedures 
Directive is in conformity with the asylum acquis and is an important safeguard in order to prevent 
indirect refoulement.  

Based  on  the  above  arguments,  the  only  option  that  would  adequately  strengthen  the  legal 
safeguards for asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure, ensuring that asylum-seekers have 
the right to a full and fair examination of their claims in all circumstances, is option a). This option 
respects the principle of proportionality since it only aims to clarify the principle of effective access 
to  the  asylum  procedure  and  the  exception  to  this  principle,  in  accordance  with  the  Asylum 
Procedures Directive, in order to ensure that equal standards apply to all asylum-seekers.  

This option is expected to be well received by some Member States, while possibly raising concerns 
for  others,  in  particular  those  which  currently  do  not  always  seem  to  guarantee  the  principle  of 
effective  access  to  the  asylum  procedure,  and  which  might  incur  additional  administrative  and 

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financial costs as a result. The European Parliament, the UNHCR and civil society are expected to 
welcome this measure. 

5.5. 

Ensuring  respect  for  family  unity  and  improving  the  management  of  vulnerable 
groups in order to address their special needs 

Legislate 

–  Vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors and people with special needs, such as people 

suffering from trauma, particular illnesses, etc.) 

Policy option a) would ensure that vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied minors, undergo a 
specific,  accelerated  procedure  for  determining  responsibility.  The  management  of  vulnerable 
groups would be greatly improved by creating a separate procedure for them, with shorter deadlines 
for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  and  the  designation  of  specific  experienced 
authorities  to  deal  only  with  cases  involving  vulnerable  groups.  This  separate  procedure  would 
ensure  that  applicants  with  special  needs  do  not  suffer  additional  hardship  due  to  the  delays  and 
hindrances  characterising  the  current  system.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  their  cases  would  be 
considered  by  specific  authorities  experienced  in  this  area  would  be  an  extra  guarantee  that  their 
special  needs  are  correctly  considered  during  the  procedure.  However,  this  option  would  present 
political  difficulties  in  gaining  the  approval  of  Member  States,  which  would  very  likely  raise 
concerns about possible abuses of such a separate procedure by applicants who could pretend to be 
vulnerable in order to have their cases addressed more quickly and effectively. Moreover, creating a 
new  separate  procedure,  with  shorter  deadlines  and  dedicated  authorities,  would  require 
considerable restructuring of the current units in the Member States, with more employees needed 
and  therefore  significantly  increased  costs.  In  some  Member  States,  given  the  small  Dublin  units 
they  have  because  of  the  modest  number  of  Dublin  cases,  such  a  separation  would  be  moreover 
difficult to implement.  

Policy  option  b)  would  reinforce  and  streamline  the  treatment  of  unaccompanied  minors,  in 
particular by ensuring that the best interests of the child are always considered in determining the 
Member State responsible, that their right to reunification with their enlarged family who could take 
care of them is always guaranteed, that they enjoy the same facilities and protection in the event of 
transfer (through the sharing  of  relevant  information  between Member  States such as information 
on  schooling,  etc.)  and  that  they  can  receive  legal  representation  throughout  the  procedure. 
Although  this  option  does  not  require  setting  up  a  completely  new  procedure  with  new  deadlines 
and  specific  authorities  as  with  policy  option  a),  it  is  expected  to  achieve  a  similar  level  of 
protection for the asylum-seekers involved. This option would incur costs too, but they are expected 
to be lower than for putting in place a completely new procedure. The main cost driver for policy 
option  b)  would  be  the  obligation  to  provide  unaccompanied  minors  with  a  representative 
throughout  the  Dublin  procedure,  requiring  those  Member  States  which  do  not  already  do  so  to 
devote resources to providing this additional service to applicants.  

Under policy option c), the problem of adequately addressing vulnerable groups’ needs under the 
criteria for determining responsibility (in particular continuity in protection) would be eliminated, 
with exceptions made for cases where a transfer decision is in the best interests of applicants with 
special needs, in which case they would still undergo the transfer process. By allowing vulnerable 
groups to remain in the Member State where they lodged their application, unless their best interests 
require  otherwise,  this  option  prevents  possible  infringements  of  their  fundamental  rights  if  they 
were to be sent to a different Member State. Moreover, they would have immediate access to the 

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asylum procedure. However, as for policy option a), this option could be abused by applicants in 
order to remain in the Member State where they want to stay. Moreover, leaving the choice of the 
responsible  Member  State  to  the  applicant  could  overburden  those  Member  States  perceived  as 
being more ‘attractive’ than others, which would then incur increased costs to provide the additional 
services required to cater for the special needs of such persons.  

Policy option d) would ensure continuity in the protection offered to asylum-seekers (in particular 
those persons with special medical conditions), through close cooperation between Member States 
and the exchange of all relevant information before a transfer is carried out, in particular medical 
information (using a standard EU form). The sharing of medical information would ensure both the 
efficient transfer of the persons involved and the proper protection of these persons in the receiving 
Member State. The issue of exchanging medical information is expected to raise some concerns on 
the part of Member States, in particular regarding the confidentiality of medical information, which 
would need to be fully guaranteed. This option is not expected to give rise to significant costs. The 
costs  of  information  exchange  would  be  marginal  (the  standard  form  could  be  sent  through  the 
existing secure DubliNet network already used by Member States for exchanging personal data on 
applicants).  

Based on the above arguments, the preferred policy options that would adequately address the needs 
of vulnerable groups are policy option b) (for unaccompanied minors) and policy option d) (for all 
persons with special needs). By including new rules and safeguards or clarifying the existing rules, 
these policy options would ensure that the Dublin procedure is applied to this category of applicants 
in  an  adequate,  efficient  way  that  would  ensure  their  protection.  The  preferred  policy  options 
comply with the principle of proportionality since: 1) the safeguards proposed for unaccompanied 
minors reflect existing obligations under international law, in particular the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; 2) the mechanism for exchanging (medical) information about the person to be 
transferred will not impose a disproportionate burden on Member States since they already collect 
relevant data at national level and will only have to ensure their transmission to the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum application.  

Practical cooperation 

Policy measure a) would ensure that staff involved in the Dublin procedure are well trained in order 
to  adequately  handle  the  cases  of  vulnerable  groups.  Along  with  the  preferred  legislative  policy 
measures identified above, this practical cooperation action would further guarantee that the special 
needs  of  this  group  of  persons  are  carefully  considered  during  the  Dublin  procedure.  The 
implementation of this option requires an increase in the financial and administrative spending by 
Member States on the Dublin procedure. However, Member States can apply for European funding 
(European Refugee Fund) to support part of the costs involved in training.  

Under policy option b), without having to designate specific authorities to deal only with minors, 
Member  States  could  create,  under  practical  cooperation,  a  network  of  experts  that  could  meet 
regularly in order to exchange best practices on the implementation of the strengthened provisions 
of  the  Dublin  regulation  for  dealing  with  minors.  This  idea  has  been  already  suggested  by  one 
Member State in the context of the existing informal meetings of experts and should in principle be 
supported  by  most  delegations.  In  terms  of  cost,  the  creation  of  the  network  under  Eurasil  would 
avoid any extra spending. 

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Based on the above arguments, both policy measures for practical cooperation are preferred, as they 
will  significantly  contribute,  together  with  the  preferred  legislative  options,  to  improving  the 
management of vulnerable groups and minors in particular. 

–  Family reunification  

Policy  option  a),  which  proposes  extending  the  current  restrictive  definition  of  family  members, 
would oblige Member States to reunify extended family members (where at least one is subject to 
the  Dublin  procedure)  in  all  circumstances,  thereby  increasing  the  protection  of  their  rights  (in 
particular  the  right  to  family  unity).  Moreover,  this  could  contribute  to  reducing  secondary 
movements of applicants throughout the EU in order to reunite with extended relatives and could 
have  important  positive  social  impacts.  However,  this  option  presents  considerable  political 
difficulties,  as  it  would  go  against  the  rest  of  the  asylum  and  immigration  acquis,  which  has  a 
restrictive  definition  of  family  members.  Moreover,  Member  States  could  also  invoke  practical 
difficulties, such as the difficulty of proving links with the extended family, and the risk of abuse by 
applicants.  

Policy option b) also  enhances  the  right of  family  members to be reunited. However, although it 
covers applicants for and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, also included in policy option a), it 
is limited to two main groups: children and dependent relatives (vulnerable groups). It is considered 
that  the  political  environment  is  favourable  to  such  an  extension,  as  the  need  to  substantially 
increase  the  protection  of  children  and  other  vulnerable  groups  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the 
essential elements for the second stage of the Common European Asylum System. Moreover, this 
option would also increase the possibility for Member States to reunify extended relatives who are 
not dependent on one another strictly speaking. This last aspect would be left to the discretion of the 
Member States, so should not raise implementation concerns. This policy option has a considerable 
impact on fundamental rights, as the right to family reunification would be considerably extended. 
The social impacts would be relatively good as well, as family reunification is an important factor 
offering  a  firm  basis  upon  which  applicants  could  start  their  social  integration  process  in  the 
receiving  society.  Moreover,  by  providing  increased  protection  to  applicants  through  family 
reunification, this option could reduce the tendency to resort to secondary movements. In terms of 
financial  feasibility,  the  increased  right  to  family  reunification  would  incur  financial  and 
administrative costs, as more applicants would meet the criteria of the Regulation.  

The  preferred  policy  option  is  therefore  policy  option  b),  which  will  considerably  increase  the 
protection of applicants under the Dublin procedure while at the same time remaining feasible. This 
option does not go beyond the objective, which is to ensure family unity. 

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6. 

ASSESSMENT OF THE PREFERRED OPTION 

On the basis of the assessment in chapter 5, it is clear that none of the individual policy sub-options 
completely address the problems or fully achieve the policy objectives. It is also worth noting that 
not  all  the  policy  sub-options  are  mutually  exclusive,  therefore  various  combinations  have  been 
considered in arriving at the preferred policy option. By combining different policy sub-options, a 
higher degree of effectiveness could be achieved.  

A table summarising the individual policy sub-options included in the preferred option can be found 
in Annex 2.  

The following rating symbols are used: 

+ represents a positive impact in comparison to the status quo 

- represents a negative impact or difficulty in terms of feasibility in comparison to the status quo 

0 represents no impact, i.e. the same as the status quo 

Preferred Option 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Relevance 

protection 

international 

To  ensure  that  the  needs  of  applicants 
for 
are 
comprehensively  addressed  under  the 
determining 
mechanism 
for 
the 
responsibility,  and 
system’s  efficiency  in  order  to  reduce 
the time and resources spent by Member 
States 

increase 

to 

+ 

This policy option is strongly relevant for ensuring the protection of applicants and 
improving the efficiency of the mechanism for determining responsibility. 

Shorter deadlines for information requests (4 weeks) and an adequate deadline for 
take-back  requests  (shorter  than  for  take-charge  requests  when  based  on 
EURODAC evidence) and for humanitarian requests (2 months) would make the 
Dublin procedure more efficient and address the needs of applicants in a more timely 
manner. 

The practical transfer arrangements (such as rules on responsibility for costs) would 
address  the  need  to  eliminate  possible  uncertainties  or  delays  deriving  from 
unclear provisions of the Dublin Regulation. 

By further clarifying the conditions and circumstances for applying the cessation of 
responsibility  and  discretionary  clauses,  this  policy  option  will  help  make  the 
mechanism  for  determining  responsibility  run  more  smoothly  and  provide 
more  protection.  The  manual/handbook  would  be  of  considerable  support  in 
correctly applying the Regulation. 

The extension of the current conciliation mechanism to cover all matters of dispute 
on  the  application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation  could  improve  the  efficiency  of  the 
procedure  for  determining  responsibility.  Efficiency  would  also  be  increased  by 
using  the  expertise  of  the  European  Asylum  Support  Office  to  provide  support  for 
the application of the Dublin Regulation and devising a manual/handbook. 

Efficiency would be enhanced by avoiding further overburdening those Member 
States  whose  asylum  processing  and  reception  capacities  are  under  strain  by 
suspending  transfers  in  limited  and  well-defined  circumstances  and  adequately 
addressing  the  protection  needs  of  the  applicants  concerned  since  a  non-
overburdened Member State would  take responsibility for them.  Moreover, asylum 
expert  teams  would  help  ensure  that  Dublin  mechanism  continues  to  function 
efficiently and provide protection in cases of particular pressure on a certain Member 
State. 

Applicants  for  international  protection  would  be  adequately  protected  by 
providing  them  with  the  necessary  information  on  the  functioning  of  the  Dublin 
system as soon as they lodge their applications and by arranging Dublin interviews. 
Moreover, by providing further specific information (e.g.. on the right to appeal a 
transfer decision), applicants would be in a better position to defend their rights and 
to  act  in  a  manner  compatible  with  the  principles  of  the  Dublin  mechanism, 
which  could  reduce  the  number  of  secondary  movements.  The  EU  leaflet  would 
facilitate and support the provision of adequate information. 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Preferred Option 

The  right  to  appeal  a  transfer  decision  would  be  confirmed,  the  possibility  of 
granting  suspensive  effect  to  an  appeal  on  a  transfer  decision  would  be  introduced 
and  the  preliminary  procedural  guarantees  would  be  strengthened  (improved 
notification  procedure,  right  to  legal  assistance),  thus  substantially  improving  the 
protection of applicants. Moreover, the possibility to grant suspensive effect for an 
appeal could increase the efficiency of the system by avoiding people being returned 
in the event of decisions being overturned. 

The  detention  of  applicants  would  be  appropriately  limited,  thus  increasing  their 
protection. However, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Dublin mechanism, 
detention  would  be  allowed  but  only  in  well-identified  exceptional  circumstances 
(where there is a genuine risk of absconding). 

By ensuring effective access to the asylum procedure, the present option guarantees 
the  comprehensive  protection  of  applicants  and  correct  application  of  the 
principles  of  the  Dublin  Regulation.  The  protection  of  applicants  would  also  be 
guaranteed when they are to be sent to a third country. 

This policy option would ensure that the Dublin procedure is applied efficiently and 
in  respect  of  vulnerable  groups,  especially 
in  a  protective  manner 
unaccompanied  minors and people with special  medical needs. The introduction of 
staff training and expert networks would help considerably to increase efficiency 
and protection. 

The  right  to  family  reunification  would  be  extended  (for  applicants  and 
beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection),  reinforced  (for  dependent  relatives)  or 
presented  as  a  possibility  to  Member  States  (for  non-dependent  relatives),  thus 
increasing the standard of protection for applicants and helping to reduce the level of 
secondary movements.  

The present option would be highly relevant in achieving this objective. 

Suspending Dublin returns in certain circumstances would respond to the flaw in the 
current  mechanism  for  determining  responsibility.  The  overburdened  responsible 
Member State would not receive additional applicants until it is capable of doing 
so,  once  the  situation  of  particular  pressure  is  over.  Moreover,  overburdened 
Member  States  facing  particular  pressure  would  benefit  from  emergency  financial 
support upon request. 

Finally,  asylum  expert  teams  would  give  essential  support  to  overburdened 
Member  States  in  managing  mass  inflows  of  applicants,  in  particular  those 
coming  under  Dublin  transfers.  These  teams  would  ensure  that  overburdened 
Member  States  are  still  able  to  cope  and  that  people’s  needs  are  adequately 
considered in these particular circumstances too. 

The  present  policy  option  has  considerable  but  manageable  implementation 
difficulties. 

Setting  time  limits  for  submitting  take-back  requests,  reducing  deadlines  for 
information  requests  and  setting  a  deadline  for  replying  to  requests  based  on 
humanitarian grounds should not give rise to major concerns on the part of Member 
States. 

No major difficulties are expected for clarifying the practical rules on transfers. The 
exchange of best practices would be at the discretion of the Member States. 

Member  States  could  raise  some  concerns  regarding  the  conditions  for  the 
application  of  the  discretionary  clauses,  in  particular  with  respect  to  the 
reintroduction  of  the  asylum-seeker's  consent.  The  manual/handbook  would  not 
pose any relevant difficulties. 

The  broadening  of 
face  major 
implementation difficulties, since decisions will remain non-binding. The same goes 
for the manual/handbook envisaged. 

the  conciliation  mechanism  would  not 

A  mechanism  for  suspending  transfers  could  raise  some  political  difficulties,  but 
they  are  expected  to  be  overcome  by  clearly  identifying  the  limited  circumstances 
under which the mechanism could be activated. The creation of asylum expert teams 
should not raise major concerns either.  

Member States would have to further commit to providing adequate information 
to  applicants,  as  a  basic  requirement.  An  additional  commitment  would  then  be 
required  for  the  further  specific  information  called  for  by  this  option.  The  EU 
leaflet  would  possibly  reduce  the  implementation  difficulties.  The  arranging of 

To  contribute 
to  better  addressing 
situations  of  particular  pressure  on 
Member  States’ 
facilities 
and/or asylum procedural capacities 

reception 

+ 

Feasibility 

Implementation feasibility  

- 

EN 

55 

   EN 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Preferred Option 

Dublin interviews might raise concerns in those Member States which currently do 
not hold them. 

The  possibility  for  suspensive  effect  to  be  given  to  an  appeal  against  a  transfer 
decision should not constitute a major concern, since judges would be entitled to 
refuse  such  a  request  if  not  justified.  However,  this  is  generally  perceived  as  a 
sensitive political issue, and thus likely to raise some concerns for Member States. 

Moreover, the obligation to provide legal assistance and the strengthening of other 
preliminary  procedural  guarantees  (notification  procedure)  would  require  an 
additional commitment on the part of the Member States and may give rise to some 
contrasting opinions. 

The  limitations  proposed  for  detention  are  expected  to  raise  some  concerns 
especially among those Member States that systematically use detention throughout 
the Dublin procedure. 

The need to ensure effective access to the asylum procedure may require additional 
commitment from Member States which currently do not entirely comply with 
this  obligation.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  Member  States  would  have  to  conform  to 
Article  27  of  the  Asylum  Procedures  Directive  would  require  them  to  respect  a 
common 
their  national 
interpretations. 

that  may  not  correspond 

interpretation 

to 

Some implementation difficulties may arise especially for those measures designed 
to  ensure  the  adequate  protection  of  unaccompanied  minors  under  the  procedure 
for  determining  responsibility,  whereas  other  minor  difficulties  would  occur  with 
more  general  measures  for  vulnerable  groups.  Training  for  staff  and  expert 
networks would encounter marginal implementation difficulties. 

The extension of the right to family unity would raise considerable concerns on the 
part  of  Member  States,  as  they  would  have  to  ensure  family  unity  for  a  larger 
number of applicants. The changes in some cases would be perceived as a limitation 
of their current discretionary power to use certain clauses (such as the possibility to 
reunite dependent relatives under the humanitarian clause, which will be transformed 
into an obligation). 

The measures increasing the standard of protection would incur increased financial 
and administrative costs, whereas those measures that improve the efficiency of the 
Dublin system would generally entail only short-term  additional costs and possible 
long-term cost reductions or savings. 

Setting  time  limits  e.g.  for  submitting  take-back  requests  and  reducing  those  for 
information requests would incur additional administrative costs. However, some 
economies  of  scale  could  be  achieved  in  the  medium  term  because  of  a  more 
efficient process. 

For  the  practical  measures  concerning  transfers,  in  particular  the  issue  of  transfer 
costs, the costs would be borne mainly by non-border Member States. The exchange 
of best practices would give rise to voluntary costs for Member States.  

Some financial and administrative costs would arise for the additional procedures 
to be implemented when the discretionary clauses are applied. Savings would arise 
to  the  extent  that  costs  related  to  disputes  or  delays  in  the  application  of  the 
cessation  or  discretionary  clauses  are  reduced,  also  with  the  support  of  the 
manual/handbook, which would incur low additional costs. 

Financial feasibility 

- 

No financial costs would arise for extending the current conciliation mechanism. The 
manual/handbook would entail limited costs. 

Some  Member  States  would  face  further  costs  if  they  suspend  outgoing 
transfers due to situations of particular pressure in the responsible Member State, as 
they would take charge of the people not being transferred. Overall, Member States 
with currently less than the average EU burden would have to bear the major 
part of the costs in situations of particular pressure. 

Costs would rise where Member States have to adapt their existing information to 
the  form,  language  and  content  called  for  by  this  policy  option.  Comparable 
additional  costs  would  be  incurred  for  the  further  specific  information  to  be 
provided.  Savings  could  arise  if  the  information  provided  fosters  a  more 
collaborative  and  compliant  attitude  on  the  part  of  applicants  under  the  Dublin 
procedure. The EU leaflet would possibly reduce the overall costs of providing this 
information.  Additional  costs  would  also  arise  for  those  Member  States  which 
currently do not hold Dublin interviews. 

If accepted, the suspensive effect of an appeal against a transfer decision could 
on  the  one  hand  incur  costs  for  the  Member  State  where  the  applicant  is  to 
remain temporarily. On the other hand, it could also bring about savings due to 

EN 

56 

   EN 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Preferred Option 

Expected Impacts 

Social impacts at Member State level 

+ 

the fact that the costs of possible returns following overturned decisions would be 
avoided.  The  strengthening  of  preliminary  procedural  guarantees  would  require 
some  Member  States  to  increase  expenditure  (in  particular  for  the  provision  of 
legal assistance). The major part of the costs could be borne by non-border Member 
States. 

Reducing the cases where Dublin applicants can be detained should in principle lead 
to  savings,  as  the  strain  on  Member  State  detention  facilities  and  the  considerable 
costs  this  implies  would  be  reduced.  This  could  apply  mainly  to  the  non-border 
Member States. 

Increased financial and administrative costs would arise for those Member States 
which  do  not  always  fully  guarantee  access  to  the  asylum  procedure.  Savings 
could occur only to the extent that effective access to the asylum procedure would 
reduce irregular movements. 

Costs would increase to deal with unaccompanied minors (i.e. representation) and 
to  exchange  medical  information  regarding  vulnerable  transferees.  Costs  would 
increase  for  training  staff  and  setting  up  an  expert  network.  However,  a  large 
proportion could also be co-financed by projects under the European Refugee Fund. 
No  costs  would  be  required  for  setting  up  an  expert  network,  if  this  is  done  under 
Eurasil. 

Financial and administrative costs would derive from the increased right to family 
reunification, as more applicants would come under the criteria of the Regulation. 

The Dublin system has an impact on Member State societies by allocating asylum 
seekers  throughout  the  Member  States,  who  then  have  to  integrate  within  their 
receiving  societies  while  their  applications  are  being  examined.  The  longer 
applicants  have  to  wait  for  their  Member  State  of  destination  to  be  decided,  the 
worse it is for their integration. Finally, the more the measures address and reduce 
irregular secondary movements, the better it is for social acceptance and integration 
in the receiving societies. 

Setting  time  limits  for  take-back  requests  and  reducing  those  for  information 
requests,  as  well  as  for  requests  based  on  humanitarian  grounds,  would  address 
situations of delay, which can weigh on receiving communities, and have a positive 
impact  by  reducing  the  incentive  to  resort  to  irregular  movements,  thereby 
possibly reducing the number of illegal cases in other Member States. 

The  measures  regarding  the  discretionary  clauses  in  particular  take  full  account  of 
the interests and needs of applicants which could smooth their integration within 
their receiving societies. 

By providing adequate information to applicants for international protection as soon 
as their applications are lodged would ensure that applicants are immediately aware 
of  their  position  and  rights  within  the  Member  States,  providing  the  basis  for 
adequate  social  integration.  The  additional  specific  information  would  enhance 
this impact. 

The  possibility  to  appeal  against  transfer  decisions  reinforces  the  protection  of 
applicants while the suspensive effect of such appeals may prevent them having to 
be transferred back and forth between Member States and thus worsening their social 
isolation. 

The limitation of detention would reduce the social isolation this entails and could 
change the negative perception often encountered in receiving societies, associating 
Dublin cases with criminals or illegal immigrants.  

Full  access  to  the  asylum  procedure  at  the  end  of  the  procedure  for  determining 
responsibility  would  allow  applicants  to  benefit  from  rights  and  facilities  to  help 
with their social integration in receiving societies (i.e. access to healthcare). 

Improved  measures  for  vulnerable  groups,  in  particular  unaccompanied  minors, 
would address the needs of these people and enable them to better integrate in and 
be less of a burden to receiving societies once the Dublin procedure is concluded. 
Adequately  trained  staff  with  a  network  of  experts  behind  them  would  ensure  that 
applicants’ social needs are better addressed. 

This policy option would greatly reinforce the right to family unity of applicants for 
international  protection,  including  applicants  for  and  beneficiaries  of  subsidiary 
protection,  thereby  providing  these  people  with  an  extremely  important  support 
for social integration. 

EN 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Preferred Option 

Economic  impacts  at  Member  State 
level 

+ 

Impact on third countries 

+ 

Fundamental rights 

+ 

The Dublin mechanism has an economic impact in the way it distributes applicants 
(as potential temporary labour force) throughout the Member States and to the extent 
that it prevents irregular movements that place applicants in irregular situations that 
can feed the informal economy. 

Increased  consideration  for  applicants’  needs  and  interests  in  applying  the 
discretionary clauses reduces the incentive for these people to resort to irregular 
movements. 

The  provision  of  adequate  information  to  applicants  for  international  protection  as 
soon as they lodge their applications would foster a more compliant attitude towards 
the  functioning  of  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility  and  applicants 
would be less prone to move irregularly.  

The legal safeguards provided by the right to appeal, possible suspensive effect and 
notification may reduce irregular movements on the part of applicants. 

By  limiting  the  use  of  detention,  this  option  could  increase  the  number  of 
applicants entering the host Member State’s labour market during the procedure 
for determining responsibility. 

Ensuring  that  applicants  access  the  asylum  procedure  in  the  first  and  second 
instances  would  allow  and  encourage  them  to  remain  in  a  legal  situation.  This 
would  increase  the  chances  of  applicants  legally  accessing  the  labour  market,  in 
the receiving Member State. 

The  broadened  right  to  family  unity  could  entail  the  redistribution  of  applicants 
throughout  the  Member  States,  and  therefore  a  minor  or  major  concentration  of 
potential temporary labour in certain Member States, where they could enter the 
informal  economy  wherever  this  redistribution  generates  an  excess  on  local  labour 
markets.  However,  this  measure  could  reduce  secondary  movements  to  achieve 
family unity. 

The potential impact of the Dublin system on third countries depends on the degree 
to  which  its  efficient  functioning  and  its  protection  are  increased  and  could  attract 
further  flows  of  applicants,  thereby  relieving  possible  asylum  pressures  on  third 
countries  of  origin  and  increasing  flows  through  transit  countries.  However,  this 
impact will generally be extremely limited, and mostly result from the extension of 
the right to family unity, which would marginally increase the number of applicants 
arriving,  since  they  would  know  that  they  would  have  better  chances  of  reuniting 
with their relatives once they apply in the EU. 

The preferred policy option has an impact on fundamental rights in that they will be 
better taken into consideration in the implementation of the Dublin procedure. 

The  change  in  the  time  limits  will  considerably  reduce  delays  during  which 
fundamental rights may not be adequately addressed (e.g. the period of time during 
which family members could be kept separately would be reduced). 

The  confirmation  that  applicants  would  not  have  to  bear  the  transfer  costs 
themselves  would  protect  them  better,  their  choices  would  be  better  taken  into 
consideration, and the right to family unity would be guaranteed. 

The  clarifications  in  the  discretionary  clauses  would  fully  address  the  right  to 
family unity of applicants for international protection. 

The provision of information to applicants in a specific form, language and content 
would  allow  them  to  learn  and  understand  their  status  and  rights  as  soon  as  they 
lodge their applications. This would provide them with a strong basis for defending 
their fundamental rights. 

The  right  to  appeal,  the  possible  suspensive  effect  and  the  notification  procedure 
provide additional safeguards to applicants and ensure that the right to an effective 
remedy is fully respected. 

The right to liberty and free  movement would be reinforced by the limitation of 
detention. 

The  principle  of  an  effective  access  to  the  asylum  procedure  once  the  Dublin 
procedure is completed, which is part of the right to asylum would be strengthened. 
Compliance with Article 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive would ensure that 
applicants’  fundamental  rights  are  also  respected  if  the  responsible  Member 
State decides to send them to a safe third country. 

The  fundamental  rights  of  vulnerable  groups,  especially  unaccompanied  minors, 
would be adequately taken into consideration. Trained staff would guarantee these 
fundamental  rights  more  effectively  with  the  support  of  a  network  of  experts  to 

EN 

58 

   EN 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 

Preferred Option 

indicate the correct level and method of protection for vulnerable groups. 

The right to family unity would be considerably reinforced and protected within the 
mechanism  for  determining  responsibility,  by  extending  the  scope  of  family 
reunification under the Dublin procedure. 

6.1. 

Assessment of proportionality and EU added value 

The  preferred  option  is  proportional  to  the  objectives  defined  in  this  impact  assessment  and 
represents  a  balanced  solution  between  the  benefits  achieved  (i.e.  having  a  more  efficient  and  a 
more protective system) and the efforts to be made by Member States to implement them.  

The preferred option will ensure that the Regulation is more consistently applied by Member States, 
while  also  improving  the  consistency  with  the  EU  asylum  acquis,  in  particular  the  Qualification 
Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive. At the same time, the Regulation will provide for a 
concrete  solidarity  mechanism  to  be  activated  at  EU  level  in  cases  of  particular  pressure  on  the 
asylum systems of certain Member States.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

In order to monitor whether the revised Regulation is being effectively followed by Member States, 
the  Commission  will  carry  out  regular  evaluation  and  reporting.  Regular  expert  meetings  will 
continue  to  be  held  to  discuss  implementation  problems  and  exchange  best  practices  between 
Member States.  

The  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  on  Community  statistics  on  migration  and  international 
protection,60 which includes specific references to the Dublin-related statistical data, will contribute 
to ensuring adequate monitoring and evaluation.  

Moreover,  as  announced  in  the  Policy  Plan,  in  addition  to  evaluation  at  regular  intervals,  the 
Commission is committed to re-evaluating the principle on which the Dublin system is based once 
the second stage of the CEAS is in place.  

The  following  main  indicators  could  be  used  to  assess  the  progress  and  effectiveness  of  the 
preferred policy option in achieving the objectives: 

•  Implementation by Member States of the amendments proposed to the Dublin Regulation; 

•  Resources devoted to implementing the amendments proposed to the Dublin Regulation; 

•  Number  of  effected  transfers  of  asylum  seekers  in  comparison  with  the  number  of  accepted 

transfer requests; 

•  Number of disputes settled under the dispute settlement mechanism; 

60 

Regulation (EC) No 862/2007, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007. 

EN 

59 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  Number of cases where the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses are applied; 

•  Resources used to inform and provide legal assistance to applicants for international protection 

under the Dublin procedure; 

•  Number of applicants subject to the Dublin procedure; 

•  Transfers suspended in situations of particular pressure; 

•  (Distribution  of)  applications  for  international  protection  relative  to  population  size  (per  1000 

inhabitants) per Member State;  

•  Number  of  asylum  expert  teams  set  up  and  sent  to  Member  States  under  particular  pressure.

EN 

60 

   EN 

ANNEX 1: Assessment of the status quo 

No EU action 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 

Relevance 

The  current  Dublin  system  suffers  from  a  series  of  limitations  that  keep  it 
from attaining its overall objective.  

for 

throughout 

international  protection 
the  procedure 

is  not 
The  protection  of  applicants 
comprehensively  addressed 
for  determining 
responsibility. The information provided to applicants does not always allow 
them to understand and defend their cases during the Dublin procedure, and the 
legal safeguards currently provided are not adequate to ensure their effective 
protection.  In  particular,  the  right  to  remedy,  i.e.  to  appeal  against  a  Dublin 
decision, is not always guaranteed, and the principle of effective access to the 
asylum  procedure  is  not  ensured.  Member  States  would  continue  to  use 
custodial  measures  discretionally  with  the  risk  of  infringing  applicants’ 
fundamental rights.  

Preserving  the  status  quo  also  means  that  vulnerable  groups  subject  to  the 
Dublin  procedure  would  continue  to  receive  a  low  standard  of  protection.  In 
particular,  unaccompanied  minors  would  still  run  the  risk  of  not  having  their 
specific  situation  adequately  addressed  within  the  procedure.  Moreover,  the 
right to family unity within the Dublin procedure would continue to be limited 
(e.g.  asylum-seekers  would  not  be  allowed  to  reunite  with  beneficiaries  of 
subsidiary  protection;  reuniting  with  dependent  relatives  would  not  be 
obligatory, etc.). 

In  terms  of  efficiency,  the  main  hindrances  to  the  smooth  operation  of  the 
Dublin mechanism are ineffective transfers, inadequate time limits and non-
uniform  application  of  certain  provisions  such  as  the  discretionary  and 
cessation clauses, together with other secondary factors. Maintaining the status 
quo would therefore leave the issue of ineffective transfers, with its consequent 
waste of time and resources, unaddressed, as would be the case for time limits, 
which,  due  to  their  absence  (i.e.  for  take-back  requests  and  requests  on 
humanitarian  grounds)  or  their  inadequacy  (i.e.  information  requests),  create 
delays 
in  the  procedure  for  determining  responsibility.  Likewise, 
preserving the status quo in the application of the cessation and discretionary 
clauses  would  also  be  inefficient  since  Member  States  would  continue  to 
interpret and apply these clauses in divergent ways, leading to uncertainties in 
the functioning of the Dublin procedure and would moreover continue to 
impact  negatively  on  asylum-seeker's  rights.  Finally, 
the  current 
conciliation mechanism is ineffective, since it is limited to the application of 
the humanitarian clause and its decisions are not binding. The status quo entails 
preserving  a  situation  where  disputes  on  problematic  areas  of  application  of 
the Dublin mechanism (not only on the humanitarian clause) would continue 
to cause delays and inadequate application of the procedure for determining 
responsibility. 

If  the  status  quo  is  maintained,  the  Dublin  mechanism  would  continue  to 
function regardless of the burden  on certain Member States. Therefore, the 
Dublin mechanism can increase, both in real and potential terms, the burden 
on  certain  Member  States  and  possibly  overburden  their  asylum  systems  if 
they are already facing particular pressure. 

No additional measures would be implemented, so there are no difficulties or 
risks in this respect. 

No  additional  financial  and  administrative  costs  would  be  incurred  in 
preserving the status quo. 

0 

0 

0 

0 

protection 

international 

To  ensure  that  the  needs  of  applicants 
for 
are 
comprehensively  addressed  under  the 
determining 
mechanism 
for 
the 
responsibility,  and 
system’s  efficiency  in  order  to  reduce 
time  and  resources  spent  by  Member 
States 

increase 

to 

To better address situations of particular 
pressure  on  Member  States’  reception 
facilities  and/or  asylum  procedural 
capacities 

Feasibility 

Implementation feasibility 

Financial feasibility 

Expected Impacts 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 

No EU action 

Maintaining  the  status  quo  does  not  have  any  relevant  positive  social 
impacts.  

On  the  contrary,  the  exclusion  of  applicants  for  (and  beneficiaries  of) 
subsidiary  protection  from  the  Dublin  allocation  criteria  (i.e.  family 
reunification) deprives these people, whose number in Europe is growing, of an 
important factor for social integration. 

The  inadequate  consideration  of  issues  of  family  unity  and  the  special 
needs  of  vulnerable  applicants  can  give  rise  to  secondary  movements 
driving these people into illegality and causing them to be negatively perceived 
by  host  societies.  The  fact  that  applicants  may  be  deprived  of  family  unity 
consequently deprives them of a major factor for social integration. 

The  lack  of  legal  safeguards  also  deprives  applicants  for  international 
protection  of  important  support  for  their  social  integration.  Custodial 
measures lead to social isolation and negative perceptions on the part of the 
host  societies,  and  lack  of  information  can  prevent  applicants  from  fully 
exercising their rights.  

The allocation of applicants regardless of exceptional situations of particular 
pressure that could arise in certain Member States can also affect the level of 
integration and social perception of these people in overburdened receiving 
countries. 

The economic impacts of the status quo are also not positive. 

The level of secondary movements, which is to a certain extent caused by the 
inadequate  functioning  (i.e.  on  family  unity)  or  ineffective  deterrence  (i.e. 
information)  of  the  Dublin  system,  could  be  seen  as  a  potential  source  of 
illegal labour for the informal economy.  

The distribution of asylum seekers regardless of whether a Member State is 
overburdened could lead to irregular labour on a saturated labour market. 

The  extremely  limited  impact  that  a  responsibility  allocation  system  could 
have on third countries consists in the degree to which its functioning and the 
protection  it  offers  could  attract  further  flows  of  applicants,  thereby  relieving 
possible  asylum  pressures  on  third  countries  of  origin  and  increasing  flows 
through transit countries. It could be argued for instance that the uncertainty 
surrounding  the  possibility  of  reuniting  with  family  members  once 
applicants arrive in the EU can be a factor in deterring applicants from coming 
to  the  EU.  Therefore,  maintaining  the  status  quo  would  have  little  impact 
on third countries. 

The  current  system  for  determining  the  responsible  Member  State  has  an 
impact  on  fundamental  rights  to  the  extent  that  it  imposes  conditions  on  the 
enjoyment  of  these  rights  (e.g.  right  to  liberty  and  security,  right  to  family 
unity). The exclusion of certain categories of persons (such as beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection) from the scope of the Dublin Regulation is a limitation 
on the right to family unity. The systematic recourse to custodial measures is 
a  serious  limitation  on  the  right  to  liberty  and  freedom  of  movement, 
whereas  inadequate  consideration  of  special  needs  can  considerably  affect 
applicants’ right to security. 

Social impacts at Member State level 

0 

Economic  impacts  at  Member  State 
level 

0 

Impact on third countries 

Fundamental rights 

0 

0 

EN 

62 

   EN 

ANNEX 2: Summary of the preferred policy option 

Specific Objectives 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Legislate 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to:  1)  fix  a  time  limit  for  requesting  a  Member  State  to  take  back  an 
asylum-seeker,  which  should  be  shorter  than  the  deadline  for  requesting  to  take  charge  (currently  3 
months) when the request is based on evidence from the EURODAC database; 2) reduce the deadline for 
responding to requests for information from 6 to 4 weeks and oblige Member States to justify any delays 
in  replying  —  moreover,  a  Member  State  not  respecting  the  time  limit  for  replying  to  an  information 
request  should  not  be  able  invoke  the  expiry  of  the  time  limit  for  submitting  a  take-charge/take-back 
request as grounds for refusing such a request if that Member State is determined to be responsible; and 3) 
make the deadline for replying to requests on humanitarian grounds identical to the deadline for replying 
to take-charge requests (2 months) and set no deadline for submitting a request. 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  and  Implementing  Regulation  in  order  to  establish  in  particular  that  the 
transferring  Member  State  is  to  bear  the  transfer  costs,  and  to  clarify  the  consequences  in  the  case  of 
erroneous transfers or where a transfer decision is overturned on appeal after the person has already been 
transferred. 

Amend the Dublin Regulation to clarify in particular that for the cessation of responsibility clauses it is 
the requested Member State61 which has to prove that the third-country national left the territory of the 
EU  (in  the  case  of  Article  16(3))  or  has  been  expelled  (in  the  case  of  Article  16(4)).  Regarding  the 
sovereignty  clause,  it  should  be  clarified  that  the  Member  State  applying  it  has  to  inform  the  other 
Member  States  of  the  application  of  the  clause,  information  which  should  be  sent  both  via  the  existing 
bilateral secure network DubliNet and the EURODAC database. The circumstances for the application of 
the  sovereignty  clause  should  be  left  open,  but  it  should  be  specified  that  it  may  be  used  mainly  for 
humanitarian reasons. Moreover, the condition of the applicant’s consent for the application of the clause 
should be reintroduced. Regarding the humanitarian clause, the Member State able to make a request on 
humanitarian grounds should be clearly identified in the Regulation, Member States should be obliged to 
justify a refusal to accept a request on humanitarian grounds, and practical arrangements for obtaining the 
written consent of persons to be reunited should be included in the Implementing Regulation 

Practical Cooperation 

Identify and disseminate best practices in performing transfers of asylum-seekers via meetings of experts. 
Encourage  greater  practical  cooperation  between  Member  States,  in  particular  on  the  days  and  times 
chosen for transferring asylum-seekers under the Regulation. 

Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain answers 
to  questions  raised  by  Member  States’  experts  on  the  application  of  the  Regulations  in  concrete  cases. 
This  should  be  developed  by  the  Commission  in  cooperation  with  the  Member  States  during  expert 
meetings. The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases.  

Legislate 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  include  a  conciliation  mechanism  for  all  matters  of  dispute  on  the 
application of the Dublin Regulation. 

Use  the  EASO  expertise  in  order  to  provide  support  for  the  application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation 
(gathering information, support to monitoring etc), with no decision-making powers. 

Practical Cooperation 

Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain answers 
to  questions  raised  by  Member  States’  experts  on  the  application  of  the  Regulations  in  concrete  cases. 
This should be developed by the Commission in cooperation with Member States during expert meetings. 
The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases. 

Ensuring that the 
procedure for 
determining 
responsibility operates 
smoothly 

Ensuring disputes 
between Member 
States are tackled in 
an effective way 

61 

Meaning  the  Member  State  who  has  been  requested  to  take  charge  of  or  take  back  an  asylum  applicant  but  who  refuses  to  do  so  by 
invoking the cessation of responsibility clause. 

EN 

63 

   EN 

                                                 
Specific Objectives 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Legislate 

Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish a provision for suspending Dublin transfers in limited and well-
defined  circumstances  in  order  to  respond  to  two  different  situations:  the  first  is  the  case  where  a 
Member State is faced with an exceptional situation of particular pressure on its asylum system and where 
Dublin transfers, if undertaken, would aggravate this situation; the second concerns the case where there 
are concerns that the standards of protection in a certain Member State are not in conformity with the EU 
acquis  on  asylum,  so  in  order  to  adequately  protect  the  asylum-seekers  concerned,  Dublin  transfers 
towards that particular Member State should be suspended. This would be a general mechanism, meaning 
that  all  Member  States  would  stop  transfers  to  a  specific  Member  State  and  as  a  result  would  become 
responsible  for  dealing  with  the  asylum  applications  of  those  persons  whose  transfers  have  been 
suspended. 

Preventing further 
overburdening of 
Member States facing 
particular pressure 

Practical Cooperation 

Set up asylum expert teams coordinated at EU level to assist Member States that would be overburdened 
the high number of Dublin transfers. However, this option should apply if there has been no decision to 
suspend returns or where such a decision has been taken by the Commission, for a temporary period until 
the situation is stable in the affected Member States.  

EN 

64 

   EN 

Specific Objectives 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Strengthening the legal 
safeguards for asylum-
seekers and enabling 
them to better defend 
their rights 

Legislate 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  further  specify  the  form  (which  should  be  age-appropriate),  language 
and content of information and the stage of the procedure when it should be provided to asylum-seekers. 
The general information about the Dublin procedure should be given to all asylum-seekers upon lodging 
their  applications.  During  the  Dublin  procedure,  Member  States  should  provide  further  specific 
information  to  those  asylum-seekers  for  which  another  Member  State  accepted  responsibility,  such  as 
information  on  available  legal  remedies  against  a  transfer  decision  and  entities  that  may  provide  legal 
assistance. Moreover, Member States should be obliged to hold a specific Dublin interview with asylum-
seekers subject to the Dublin procedure, during which, if need be, they should be orally informed about 
the application of the Regulation. The interview must be held in good time, as soon as possible after the 
lodging of an application for international protection. 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  provide  for  a  standard  EU-wide  multilingual  leaflet  about  the  Dublin 
procedure, to be agreed under the comitology procedure. Based on the different leaflets already existing in 
several Member States on the Dublin procedure, the Commission would propose a standard information 
leaflet to be discussed and decided upon in comitology meetings. The leaflet would in particular include 
information  on  the  Dublin  rules,  the  rights  of  asylum-seekers  under  the  Dublin  procedure,  and  the 
remedies available. Member States would have to ensure the translation of the leaflet (for instance using 
EU  funding)  in  the  languages  most  frequently  used  or  understood  by  asylum-seekers  entering  their 
territories. The different language versions should be exchanged between Member States. Member States 
may include further details in the leaflet adapted to their national contexts. 

Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish the right to appeal against a Dublin transfer decision, and to 
oblige  the  courts  to  examine  on  their  own  initiative  the  need  to  temporarily  suspend  enforcement  of  a 
transfer  decision  (i.e.  whether  applicants  should  remain  in  the  territory  pending  the  outcome  of  their 
appeal). The criteria the courts should use in deciding on the need to suspend enforcement of a transfer 
decision,  pending  the  outcome  of  an  appeal,  will  be  left  to  the  Member  States.  In  addition,  the  right  to 
legal assistance will be clarified and the procedure for notification of the transfer decision to the asylum-
seeker, in particular as regards the time, form and content of such notifications will be further specified.  

Include  a  provision  in  the  Dublin  Regulation  to  reiterate  the  principle  that  asylum-seekers  may  not  be 
detained solely on account of their status as asylum-seekers and to forbid the detention of asylum-seekers 
subject to a transfer decision except as an extraordinary measure of final resort, after a transfer decision 
has  been  notified  to  the  asylum-seeker  and  where  any  other  non-custodial  measures  are  unlikely  to 
achieve satisfactory results, in particular because there are objective reasons to believe that there is a risk 
of the asylum-seeker absconding. The detention of minors should be forbidden unless this is in their best 
interest, for instance for family reasons. Such a provision would also clarify that asylum-seekers detained 
under  the  Dublin  procedure  would  enjoy  the  same  standards  of  protection  as  those  laid  down  in  the 
Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive.  

Amend the Dublin Regulation in order to clarify that an asylum-seeker subject to the Dublin procedure 
shall in all circumstances have an effective access to the asylum procedure. In particular, it would be laid 
down  that  Member  States  would  have  to  revoke  any  decision  to  discontinue  the  examination  of  an 
application  after  its  withdrawal  by  the  applicant  and  ensure  that  the  examination  of  the  application  is 
completed.  Moreover,  in  view  of  ensuring  coherence  between  the  Dublin  and  the  Asylum  Procedures 
Directive, several issues regarding the access to appeal procedures for asylum-seekers under the Dublin 
procedure may need to be further clarified in the context of the upcoming proposal amending the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. Regarding the issue of sending an asylum-seeker to a third-country, this right would 
be retained, but only after careful examination of the safe third-country criteria set out in Article 27 of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive. 

Legislate 

Ensuring respect for 
family unity and 
improving the 
management of 
vulnerable groups in 
order to address their 
special needs 

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  and  the  Dublin  Implementing  Regulation  in  order  to  further  clarify  and 
strengthen  the  applicability  of  the  Dublin  rules  to  unaccompanied  minors  in  accordance  with  the  UN 
Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child.  This  option  would  aim,  among  other  things,  to:  clarify  the 
applicability  of  the  principle  of  the  ‘best  interests  of  the  child’  in  determining  the  responsible  Member 
State; make compulsory the right of unaccompanied minors to reunite with relatives who can take care of 
them;  and  include  rules  on  information  sharing  (such  as  on  age  and  level  of  education)  and  on  the 
representation  of  unaccompanied  minors  throughout  the  procedure.  However,  the  procedure  for 
determining  responsibility  as  such  would  remain  unchanged,  meaning  in  particular  that  the  same 
deadlines for making and responding to requests would continue to apply.  

Amend  the  Dublin  Regulation  and  the  Implementing  Regulation  to  include  different  provisions  to  take 
better  account  of  the  situation  of  asylum-seekers  with  special  needs,  such  as  a  new  provision  obliging 
Member  States  to  exchange  relevant  information  (such  as  medical  information)  before  carrying  out 

EN 

65 

   EN 

 
Specific Objectives 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Dublin transfers (and introducing a standard form for the information to be exchanged, to be annexed to 
the Implementing Regulation).  

Amend the Dublin Regulation to extend the right to family reunification by including applicants for and 
beneficiaries  of  subsidiary  protection  within  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  In  addition,  the  Regulation 
would extend the right to reunification to dependent relatives. The definition of ‘family member’ would 
be enlarged, but only in order to ensure respect for the principle of the best interests of the child (e.g. the 
principle would remain that children should be unmarried to be considered part of the family, but when it 
is in their best interests, married children may be considered to be family members; in the case of a child 
asylum-seeker,  minor unmarried siblings would be included as members  of the family, etc.). Moreover, 
the  application  of  the  humanitarian  clause  would  be  extended  to  relatives  who  are  not  necessarily 
dependent on one another in a strict sense (such as adult siblings could be). As the humanitarian clause is 
a  discretionary  provision,  Member  States  would  have  the  possibility  but  not  the  obligation  to  reunite 
extended (non-dependent) relatives. 

Practical Cooperation 

Member States to provide staff involved in the procedure for determining responsibility with appropriate 
training, in particular so that they can appropriately handle cases involving vulnerable groups. 

Set up a network of Member State experts dealing with minors. 

EN 

66 

   EN 

Table I: Rate of effective incoming transfers per Member State (2006) 

ANNEX 3: Statistical data 

Number of effected 
incoming requests 

Number of accepted 
incoming transfers 

Rate of effective 
incoming transfers 

BE 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

IE 

IT 

CY 

LV 

LT 

LU 

HU 

MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

SI 

SK 

FI 

SE 

91 

270 

0 

2574 

1 

501 

174 

0 

65 

507 

6 

1 

5 

54 

260 

59 

603 

678 

1011 

7 

81 

437 

66 

0 

913

534

162

3649

3

1179

397

1664

87

1159

33

2

11

74

451

127

987

1204

2148

23

196

954

287

1758

9.97% 

50.56% 

0.00% 

70.54% 

33.33% 

42.49% 

43.83% 

0.00% 

74.71% 

43.74% 

18.18% 

50.00% 

45.45% 

72.97% 

57.65% 

46.46% 

61.09% 

56.31% 

47.07% 

30.43% 

41.33% 

45.81% 

23.00% 

0.00% 

EN 

67 

   EN 

 
UK 

IS 

NO 

TOTAL 

399 

0 

341 

8034 

752

0

798

14768

53.06% 

n.a. 

42.73% 

54.40%62 

62 

The overall average percentage of effective transfers is based only on those Member States for which complete 
data are available (BE, DK, FR, FI and SE are therefore not included in the total). 

EN 

68 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Table II: Rate of effective incoming transfers per Member State (first half of 2007 — January to June) 

Number of effected 
incoming requests 

Number of accepted 
incoming transfers 

Rate of effective 
incoming transfers 

BE 

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

IE 

IT 

CY 

LV 

LT 

LU 

HU 

MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SK 

73 

7 

125 

 n.a 

1148 

1 

351 

55 

513 

27 

474 

9 

3 

9 

22 

96 

30 

228 

399 

257 

11 

7 

37 

171 

436

11

204

177

1469

2

1149

185

886

45

960

25

5

12

34

162

117

275

601

558

28

33

98

308

16.74% 

63.64% 

61.27% 

n.a. 

78.15% 

50.00% 

30.55% 

29.73% 

57.90% 

60.00% 

49.38% 

36.00% 

60.00% 

75.00% 

64.71% 

59.26% 

25.64% 

82.91% 

66.39% 

46.06% 

39.29% 

21.21% 

37.76% 

55.52% 

EN 

69 

   EN 

 
 
FI 

SE 

UK 

IS 

NO 

TOTA
L 

50 

 n.a. 

207 

1 

203 

4514 

89

329

316

2

405

56.18% 

n.a. 

65.51% 

50.00% 

50.12% 

8415

53.64%63 

63 

The overall average percentage of effective transfers is based only on those Member States for which complete 
data are available (DK and SE are therefore not included in the total). 

EN 

70 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Table III: Rate of effective outgoing transfers per Member State (2006) 
Number of accepted 
outgoing requests 

Number of effected 
outgoing transfers 

EU-25 MS 
+IS and NO 

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Slovenia 

Slovak Republic 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Iceland 

1702

146

156

3496

2

16

157

1754

498

256

2

0

3

143

38

0

1595

2337

86

28

25

124

829

1358

1531

9

n.a. 

133

115

2115

2

7

22

847

293

49

2

0

4

119

9

2

1082

942

269

15

11

33

751

n.a. 

1486

9

Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 

n.a.  

91.10% 

73.72% 

60.50% 

100.00% 

43.75% 

14.01% 

48.29% 

58.84% 

19.14% 

100.00% 

0.00%  

133.33%64 

83.22% 

23.68% 

n.a.  

67.84% 

40.31% 

312.79%65 

53.57% 

44.00% 

26.61% 

90.59% 

n.a.  

97.06% 

100.00% 

64 

65 

Data submitted by this Member State show the number of transfers to be higher than the number of accepted 
requests. These figures should normally coincide or the number of transfers should be lower than the number 
of acceptances. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that some Member States might not register requests 
that have been accepted implicitly (in accordance with Articles 18(7) and 20(1)(c) of the Dublin Regulation). 
Therefore, in the calculation of the final average, the number of transfers undertaken by this Member State is 
considered equal to the number of accepted requests. 
Idem. 

EN 

71 

   EN 

 
                                                 
EU-25 MS 
+IS and NO 

Number of accepted 
outgoing requests 

Number of effected 
outgoing transfers 

Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 

Norway 

Average 

829

14 060

461

8595

55.61% 

61.13%66 

Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS 

66 

The overall average percentage of effective transfers is based only on those Member States for which complete 
data are available (BE and SE are therefore not included in the average). For Lithuania and Poland, the number 
of effected transfers is considered equal to the number of accepted requests for the reasons explained above. 

EN 

72 

   EN 

                                                 
Table IV: Rate of effective outgoing transfers per Member State (first half of 2007 — January to June) 

EU-27 MS 
+IS and NO 

Number of accepted 
outgoing requests 

Number of effected 
outgoing transfers 

Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 

716

0

57

139

1860

0

3

50

995

162

270

0

0

3

34

21

0

525

765

34

14

6

7

34

162

1462

696

12

478

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovak Republic 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Iceland 

Norway 

67 
68 
69 

See footnote 60. 
Idem. 
Idem. 

227

0

62

n.a.

1126

0

1

16

415

100

49

0

0

1

26

8

0

495

399

89

2

6

9

24

140

n.a.

573

6

266

31.7% 

- 

108.77%67 

- 

60.54% 

- 

33.33% 

32% 

41.71% 

61.73% 

18.15% 

- 

- 

33.33% 

76.47% 

38.1% 

- 

94.29% 

52.16% 

261.76%68 

14.29% 

100% 

128.57%69 

70.59% 

86.42% 

- 

82.33% 

50% 

55.65% 

EN 

73 

   EN 

                                                 
Average 

6904 

3978 

57.61%70 

Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS 

Table V: Effect of Dublin transfers on the asylum burden of Member States (2006) 

MS 

Burden 
(application/ 
population 
ratio)71 

Real terms72 

Potential terms73 

Net Dublin 
transfers 

(incoming -
outgoing 
transfers) 

Influence of 
net Dublin 
transfers on 
first 
applications 

Net Dublin 
transfers 

(incoming -
outgoing 
transfers) 

Influence of 
net Dublin 
transfers on 
first 
applications 

BE 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

IE 

IT 

CY 

LV 

LT 

LU 

HU 

MT 

0.8 

0.3 

0.3 

0.3 

0.0 

1.1 

0.1 

0.4 

1.0 

0.2 

5.9 

0.0 

0.0 

1.1 

0.2 

3.1 

n.a.

137

n.a.

459

-1

494

152

n.a.

-228

458

4

1

1

-65

251

57

n.a.

5.02%

n.a.

2.18%

-20.00%

4.03%

2.87%

n.a.

-5.38%

4.43%

0.09%

10.00%

0.69%

-12.38%

11.87%

4.49%

-789

-8.90% 

388

n.a.

153

1

1163

240

-90

-411

903

31

2

8

-69

413

127

14.21% 

n.a. 

0.73% 

20.00% 

9.48% 

4.53% 

-0.34% 

-9.69% 

8.72% 

0.68% 

20.00% 

5.52% 

-13.14% 

19.53% 

10.00% 

70 

71 
72 
73 

The overall average percentage of effective transfers is based only on those Member States for which complete 
data are available (DK and SE are therefore not included in the average). For the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovenia,  the  number  of  effected  transfers  is  considered  equal  to  the  number  of  accepted  requests  for  the 
reasons explained above. 
The average EU burden (applications/population ratio) is 0.4 applications per 1000 inhabitants. 
Number of effected transfers. 
Number of accepted transfers but not necessarily effected. 

EN 

74 

   EN 

                                                 
NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

SI 

SK 

FI 

SE 

UK 

IS 

NO 

0.9 

1.6 

0.1 

0.0 

0.2 

0.5 

0.4 

2.7 

0.5 

0.1 

1.1 

-479

-264

742

-8

70

404

n.a.

n.a.

-3.31%

-1.98%

17.56%

-6.15%

14.00%

14.18%

n.a.

n.a.

-1087

-3.90%

-9

-120

-22.50%

-2.26%

-608

-1133

2062

-5

171

830

-542

400

-779

-9

-31

-4.20% 

-8.49% 

48.80% 

-3.85% 

34.20% 

29.12% 

-23.82% 

1.64% 

-2.80% 

-22.50% 

-0.58% 

Net transfers for border and non-border Member States74 

Incoming 
transfers 

Outgoing 
transfers 

Total Net Transfers (Incoming — Outgoing) 

Total border MS75 

3050 

425

Total non-border MS76 

4984 

6640

Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS  

2625 

-1656 

74 

75 
76 

The  totals  for  border  and  non-border  Member  States  are  calculated  only  for  those  Member  States  for  which 
data are complete for the first and second halves of 2006. 
EE, EL, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI, SK. 
BE, CZ, DK, DE, FR, IE, LU, NL, AT, FI, SE, UK, IS, NO. 

EN 

75 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Map 1  

New  asylum  applications  relative  to  population  size  (per  1000  inhabitants):  distribution  of  burden  between 
Member States in 2006 

Between 0 and 
0,1

Between 0,2 
and 0,4

Between 0,5 
and 1

More than 1.1

Source: EUROSTAT 

EN 

76 

   EN 

ANNEX 4: ASYLUM GLOSSARY  

Asylum  

Asylum  is  a  form  of  protection  given  by  a  State  on  its  territory  based  on  the  principle  of  ‘non-
refoulement’ (see below) and internationally or nationally recognised refugee rights. It is granted to 
persons  who  are  unable  to  seek  protection  in  their  country  of  citizenship  and/or  residence  in 
particular  for  fear  of  being  persecuted  for  reasons  of  race,  religion,  nationality,  membership  of  a 
particular social group or political opinion.  

Chain refoulement 

Refugees who are sent back to another country which then sends them back to their home country 
are said to suffer indirect or chain refoulement, which similarly contravenes the protection provided 
under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  

Non-refoulement  

This  is  the  key  principle  of  international  refugee  law,  which  requires  that  no  State  may  return  a 
refugee in any manner to a country where his/her life or freedom may be endangered. The principle 
also applies to rejection at the frontier. It is set out in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the  Status  of  Refugees  and  constitutes  the  legal  basis  for  the  obligation  of  States  to  provide 
international protection to those in need of it. Article 33(1) reads as follows: ‘No Contracting State 
shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where  his  life  or  freedom  would  be  threatened  on  account  of  his  race,  religion,  nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. Article 3 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in the light of the jurisprudence of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  and  Article  3  of  the  UN  Convention  Against  Torture  and 
Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment are also considered bases for ‘non-
refoulement’ obligations. 

Refugee  

A  person  who  fulfils  the  requirements  of  Article  1(A)  of  the  Geneva  Convention.  Article  1(A) 
defines a refugee as any person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it’. 

Refugee status  

This  is  defined  in  EU  legislation  as  the  status  granted  by  a  Member  State  to  a  person  who  is  a 
refugee  and  admitted  as  such  to  the  territory  of  that  Member  State.  In  terms  of  the  Geneva 
Convention,  refugee  status  is  defined  as  the  status  possessed  by  a  person  who  fulfils  the 
requirements of the definition of refugee as laid down in the Convention.  

EN 

77 

   EN 

Subsidiary protection 

The  EU  Qualification  Directive  created  subsidiary  protection  status  in  order  to  give  protection  to 
certain  categories  of  persecuted  people  who  are  not  covered  by  the  1951  Geneva  Convention  on 
refugees. It grants a lower level of rights than the status under the Geneva Convention. 

Unaccompanied minors 

Unaccompanied  minors  are  persons  below  the  age  of  eighteen  who  arrive  in  the  territory  of  the 
Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsible for them whether by law or by custom, and 
for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person. They include minors who 
are left unaccompanied after they have entered the territory of Member States. 

Vulnerable persons 

In  accordance  with  the  Reception  Conditions  Directive,  vulnerable  persons  refers  to  minors, 
unaccompanied  minors,  disabled  persons,  elderly  people,  pregnant  women,  single  parents  with 
minor  children,  and  persons  who  have  been  subjected  to  torture,  rape  of  other  serious  forms  of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence. Under national law and practices Member States could 
further categorise vulnerable persons. 

Terms/provisions in the Dublin Regulation: 

Take charge  

‘Take  charge’  means  the  procedure  under  which  a  Member  State  takes  responsibility  for  an 
applicant on the basis of the objective and hierarchical criteria laid down in the Regulation (such as 
family reasons, legal or illegal entry, etc.) and consequently has to examine the application.  

Take back 

‘Take  back’  refers  to  the  situation  where  the  applicant  leaves  the  territory  of  the  responsible 
Member State and enters another Member State where he or she might apply again for international 
protection or might stay without permission, in which case the responsible Member State must at 
the latter’s request take him/her back. 

Requests for information 

For  the  purpose  of  applying  the  Dublin  Regulation  or  examining  an  application  for  asylum,  any 
Member  State  can  request  information  from  another  Member  State  concerning  an  asylum-seeker. 
This information can cover, among other things, personal data, such as the personal details of the 
applicant and his/her family members, and identity or travel documents. Such information is often 
necessary for determining responsibility, so it is very important that Member States reply swiftly to 
such requests. The Regulation sets out detailed data protection rules. 

Incoming requests 

Requests for an asylum seeker to be taken back in order to complete his/her asylum application, or 
for  taking  charge  of  an  asylum  seeker  in  order  to  examine  his/her  asylum  application,  sent  by 
another Member State to the reporting Member State. 

Outgoing requests  

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Requests  for  an  asylum  seeker  to  be  taken  back  to  complete  his/her  asylum  application,  or  for 
taking  charge  of  an  asylum  seeker  in  order  to  examine  his/her  asylum  application,  sent  by  the 
reporting Member State to another Member State. 

Cessation of responsibility clauses 

According  to  Article  4(5)  of  the  Dublin  Regulation,  the  procedure  for  determining  the  Member 
State  responsible  lies  with  the  Member  State  where  the  application  is  first  lodged.  Consequently, 
that  Member  State  is  obliged  to  take  back  the  applicant  even  if  the  latter  has  travelled  to  another 
Member State during the course of the procedure. However, this obligation ceases if the applicant 
has  left  the  territories  of  the  Member  States  for  at  least  three  months  or  if  another  Member  State 
grants the asylum-seeker a residence document. 

According  to  Article  16(3)  of  the  Dublin  Regulation,  the  responsibility  to  take  charge  of  or  take 
back a person ceases when that person has left the territory of the Member States for at least three 
months, unless the Member State responsible has issued him/her a valid residence document. 

According  to  Article  16(4)  of  the  Dublin  Regulation,  the  obligation  to  take  back  a  person  ceases 
where the responsible Member State has adopted and actually implemented, following withdrawal 
or rejection of the asylum application, the provisions that are required before that person can go to 
his/her country of origin or to another country to which he may lawfully travel. 

Member States  

Currently,  the  notion  of  ‘Member  States’  under  the  Dublin  Regulation  means  all  27  EU  Member 
States, as well as the associated countries applying the Dublin acquis, i.e. Norway and Iceland. The 
Dublin system has been further extended to Switzerland through an international agreement (which 
was signed in October 2004 and entered into force in March 2008, its application being linked to the 
lifting of internal border controls, expected for December 2008). Liechtenstein is also expected to 
become a member of the Dublin system in the near future (Protocol signed in February 2008).  

However,  for  the  purpose  of  the  Evaluation  report  on  the  Dublin  system,  which  assessed  the 
application of the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations from their respective entry into force dates until 
the end of 2005, ‘Member States’ meant 26 EU Member States (24 EU Member States — all except 
Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark — plus two associated countries — Iceland and Norway). This is 
because, until 21 February 2006, Denmark did not take part in the Dublin Regulation and Romania 
and Bulgaria were not yet Member States.  

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ANNEX 5: The likely administrative costs of the preferred policy option 

1. Administrative costs of the preferred policy option 

Administrative  costs77
associated to: 

  have  been  assessed  with  regard  to  obligations  to  provide  information 

•  the obligation to provide applicants with general information about the Dublin procedure, upon 

lodging their applications;  

•  the obligation to provide certain applicants with further specific information during the Dublin 
procedure, in particular information on available legal remedies against a transfer decision and 
entities that may provide legal assistance; 

•  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  sending  and  the  receiving  Member  State  before 
carrying out a transfer, in particular medical information about the persons to be transferred; 

•  the tools for practical cooperation (identification and diffusion of best practices,78 handbook on 

the application of the Dublin Regulation)79. 

These  are  the  main  elements  of  the  preferred  policy  option  which  entail  additional  administrative 
costs and which are associated with specific types of obligations and required actions listed in the 
table below. 

77 

78 

79 

According to the EC IA guidelines, ‘Administrative costs are defined as the costs incurred by enterprises, the 
voluntary sector, public authorities and citizens in meeting legal obligations to provide information on their 
action  or  production,  either  to  public  authorities  or  to  private  parties.  Information  is  to  be  construed  in  a 
broad  sense,  i.e.  including  costs  of  labelling,  reporting,  monitoring  and  assessment  needed  to  provide  the 
information and registration’. 
Identification  and  diffusion  of  best  practices  relates  to  the  policy  objectives  of  ensuring  that  Dublin  system 
operates smoothly, in particular by ameliorating the transfer mechanism. 
Administrative costs have been assessed in accordance with the EU Standard Cost Model Manual. 

EN 

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 Table I: Types of obligations and actions required for each individual policy measure 

Policy measure 

Type of obligation 

Type of action required 

1. 

2. 

Obligation  to  provide 
applicants 
with 
information 
general 
about 
the  Dublin 
procedure 

Obligation  to  provide 
certain 
applicants 
with  further  specific 
about 
information 
Dublin 

of 

information 
Exchange 
between 
the  Member  States 
involved about the applicants to 
in  particular 
be 
persons with special needs 

transferred, 

with 
Familiarising 
information obligation 

the 

Training  authorities  on 
information obligations 

the 

Other  — 
information 

Creation 

of 

Retrieving  relevant  information 
from existing data 

Adjusting existing data 

Copying 

Submitting the information 

with 
Familiarising 
information obligation 

Training 
information obligations 

staff 

on 

the 

the 

Submission of recurring reports 

Retrieving  relevant  information 
from existing data 

Submitting the information 

Filing the information 

Identification and diffusion of 
best practices 

Other  — 
information 

Creation 

of 

Producing new data 

Creating  a  handbook  on  the 
application 
the  Dublin 
of 
Regulation 

Other  — 
information 

Creation 

of 

Designing information material 

Submitting the information 

Submitting the information 

Producing new data 

EN 

81 

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Firstly, new information would have to be created and provided to applicants concerning: 

1. 

2. 

the functioning of the Dublin procedure in general; 

specific details, such as on entities that may provide legal assistance. 

This measure would entail familiarising staff with the new obligations and training them in how to 
provide  such  information.  Such  information  would  have  to  be  prepared  by  retrieving  additional 
details on these obligations. This would then be added to the existing material already provided to 
applicants and be copied and distributed to these people. 

Secondly,  Member  States  would  be  obliged  to  exchange  information  before  transferring 
applicants, in particular vulnerable persons. This would entail familiarising Dublin staff and training 
them  to  retrieve  specific  files  or  reports  and  submit  information  to  the  responsible  Member  State 
where the applicants are to be transferred. A standard form for the submission of information is to 
be adopted under the comitology procedure and used by all Member States. 

Thirdly,  the  identification  and  diffusion  of  best  practices  require  time.  The  exchange  of  best 
practices would be organised at EU level. 

Fourthly, the creation of a handbook on the application of the Regulation would require time to be 
produced (by the Commission in cooperation with Member States in the course of expert meetings), 
formatted and subsequently submitted to Member States. 

2. Main assumptions used to assess the costs of the preferred policy option 

On  the  basis  of  the  above  considerations,  the  administrative  costs  have  been  assessed  for  two 
scenarios: 

•  Scenario ‘t0’: 1st year of implementation of the preferred policy option 

•  Scenario ‘t0+2’: 3rd year of implementation of the preferred policy option.  

These scenarios have been developed in order to assess the main administrative costs of launching 
the new measures and then maintaining them. 

Main assumptions of Scenario ‘t0’80 

With reference to Table I, the following main assumptions have been made in order to estimate the 
administrative costs of the preferred policy option: 

•  Concerning  the  costs  of  familiarising  staff  with  the  obligations  and  training  personnel  in  the 

Member State Dublin units,81 the following estimations have been made82: 

80 
81 

82 

It should be noted that the numbering of the assumptions follows the numbering of the cost items in Table II. 
The  need  to  familiarise  staff  with  obligations  relates  to  the  following  measures:  (i)  general  information  by 
Member  States  to  applicants  about  the  Dublin  mechanism,  (ii)  information  for  applicants  on  specific  issues 
such as on entities that may provide legal assistance, (iii) exchange of information between the Member States 
involved about the applicants to be transferred. 
The estimates are based on the information contained in Member State contributions on the application of the 
Dublin  system.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  information  provided  on  the  number  of  staff  working  on  the 

EN 

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1. 

2. 

an average of 2 senior officials (directors and heads of unit) per Member State would be 
familiarised  with  the  obligations  for  the  submission  of  forms83  and  the  need  to  provide 
additional information on certain aspects of the Dublin procedure such as on entities that 
may  provide  legal  assistance  (assumption:  two working  days  required,  with  an  estimated 
total of 32 working hours per Member State); 

an average of 15 officials per Member State would require training on the obligations for 
preparing  and  submitting  information84  (assumption:  training  course  lasting  two  working 
days, with an estimated total of 240 hours per Member State). 

•  Concerning  implementation  costs  for  the  remaining  actions85,  the  following  assumptions,  in 

terms of working hours (WH), have been made for the following actions: 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

64 WH for each Member State to retrieve detailed information on the Dublin procedure 
in general and the further specific issues such as entities that may provide legal assistance; 

16  WH  for  each  Member  State  to  adjust  the  existing  information  material  to  include 
details of the Dublin procedure and further specific issues such as entities that may provide 
legal assistance (assuming that each Member State will have to do this once a year); 

12 WH for each Member State to copy the amended information material with details of 
the  Dublin  procedure  and  further  specific  issues  such  as  entities  that  may  provide  legal 
assistance (assuming that each Member State will have to do this once a year); 

0.1 WH for each Member State to supply the information to applicants for international 
protection  (based  on  the  average  number  of  applications  per  Member  State  in  the  past  5 
years (2003-2007), i.e. 8 920.5486; 

0.5  WH  for  each  Member  State  to  retrieve  information  on  transferees,  in  particular 
vulnerable persons (assuming that files on these people already exist). This would be done 
for  each  vulnerable  transferee,  with  the  annual  number  of  such  people  transferred  on 
average by each Member State estimated to be 199.5187; 

application of the Dublin mechanism is not always reliable, given that Member States may have given different 
interpretations as to who exactly should be considered as ‘Dublin personnel’. 
The submission of forms is related to the exchange of information between the Member States involved, on the 
applicants to be transferred. 
The information relates to: (i) general information to applicants about the Dublin mechanism, (ii) information 
for  applicants  on  specific  issues  such  as  on  entities  that  may  provide  legal  assistance,  (iii)  exchange  of 
information between the Member States involved about the applicants to be transferred. 
Submitting  the  information;  Filing  the  information;  Retrieving  relevant  information  from  existing  data; 
Adjusting existing data; Copying; Producing new data; Designing information material. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  average  is  based  on  the  EU-27  Member  States  plus  Norway,  since  the  data  for 
Iceland are incomplete. 
This assumption is based on an estimate drawn from a study carried out by ICAR (Information Centre about 
Asylum  and  Refugees)  concerning  vulnerable  groups  in  the  asylum  process  in  the  UK,  which,  as  the  UK 
received  the  highest  average  number  of  applications  in  the  past  5  years  (2003-2007),  constitutes  a 
representative  sample  for  estimating  the  proportion  of  vulnerable  applicants  in  total  applications  in  the  EU 
(Vulnerable  groups  in  the  asylum  determination  process,  Thematic  Briefing  prepared  for  the  Independent 
Asylum Commission, Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), 2007). An estimate was made 
of  the  proportion  of  vulnerable  people  in  the  average  number  of  outgoing  transfers  per  Member  State,  but 

EN 

83 

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8. 

9. 

10. 

0.1 WH in each Member State for submitting the information concerning transferees, in 
particular  vulnerable  persons,  to  the  responsible  Member  State.  This  would  be  done  for 
each vulnerable transferee, with the annual number of such people transferred on average 
by  each  Member  State  estimated  to  be  199.51  (assuming  that  most  information  will  be 
submitted electronically); 

0.5 WH in each Member State to file the information received on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable  persons.  This  would  be  done  for  each  vulnerable  transferee,  and  the  annual 
number  of  such  people  transferred  on  average  by  each  Member  State  is  estimated  to  be 
199.51. 

350 WH for the Commission’s DG JLS to (i) diffuse the best practices on the application 
of  the  policy  option,  (ii)  draft  the  handbook  on  the  application  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation  (submission  costs  are  considered  zero  since  the  information  would  be 
uploaded on the website or submitted electronically); 

11. 

16  WH  for  DG  JLS  to  design  the  handbook  on  the  application  of  the  Dublin 
Regulation (assuming that DG JLS will already have other handbook formats available). 

•  Assumptions for the hourly labour costs of Member State asylum personnel 

The hourly labour costs of Member State asylum personnel have been estimated on the basis of the 
EU  average  hourly  labour  costs  in  public  administration  (NACE  L),  extracted  from  Eurostat. 
Eurostat  provides  hourly  and  monthly  labour  costs  and  gross  earnings  per  economic  sector. 
However, for government (NACE section L, public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security), we only have information on the New Member States. Additional data were required to 
extend our information on labour costs to the entire EU-27. Eurostat provides a number of possible 
indicators, namely average personnel costs in services in the EU-27 in 2003 (NACE sections G, H, 
I,  and  K)88,  median  gross  annual  earnings  in  industry  and  services  in  the  EU-25  in  2002  (the 
outcome of the Structure of Earnings Survey 2002)89, and average hourly labour costs in industry 
and  services  of  full-time  employees  in  enterprises  with  10  or  more  employees  in  2002)90.  The 
relative  differences  between  Member  States  in  the  level  of  labour  costs  according  to  the  various 
sources compare fairly well. OECD data were used to forecast the level of annual labour costs per 
Member  State  in  200891
.  Information  on  the  annual  hours  worked  per  employee  in  the  total 
economy per Member State in 2005 was taken from the total economy database of the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre92. The end result is an average hourly labour cost per employee in 
NACE section L (public administration and defence; compulsory social security) of €24.30 in the 

88 

89 

90 
91 

92 

excluding BG and RO, since the available data are for 2006 and BG and RO were not yet Member States at the 
time. 
Eurostat, ‘Main features of the services sector in the EU’, Statistics in Focus — Industry, trade and services 
19/2007. 
Eurostat,  ‘Earnings  disparities  across  European  countries  and  regions.  A  glance  at  regional  results  of  the 
Structure of Earnings Survey 2002’, Statistics in Focus – Population and social conditions 7/2006. 
Eurostat, Europe in Figures 2005, p. 169. 
OECD Economic Outlook 81 database. The average increase in labour costs in Poland, Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic and the Czech Republic was used for the New Member States that are not members of the OECD. 
Groningen  Growth  and  Development  Centre  and  the  Conference  Board,  Total  Economy  Database,  January 
2007, http://www.ggdc.net. The average annual number of hours worked in the New Member States was 1 855 
hours per worker, while the Eurostat data on labour costs per hour and per month result in an annual number of 
1 800 hours worked in NACE section L, suggesting that the data match. 

EN 

84 

   EN 

                                                                                                                                                                  
EU-27 in 2008, and €23.30 excluding Denmark. On the ba sis of this result, the hourly rate for 2009 
has  been  estimated  by  applying  the  growth  rate  for  average  hourly  labour  costs  in  the  EU-27 
between 2000 and 2005, thus obtaining a final rate of €23.84 . 

EN 

85 

   EN 

Main assumptions of Scenario ‘t0+2’93 

With reference to Table I, the following main assumptions have been made in order to provide an 
estimate of the administrative costs of the preferred policy option: 

•  Concerning the costs of familiarising staff with the obligations and training personnel in the 
Member State Dublin units94, no additional cost would be incurred two years after the initial 
implementation of the preferred option; 

•  Concerning  implementation  costs  for  the  remaining  actions95,  assuming  that  there  will  be  no 
further  need  to  continue  to  identify  and  diffuse  best  practices  and  the  handbook  on  the 
application  of  the  Dublin  Regulation,  the  following  assumptions,  in  terms  of  working  hours 
(WH), have been made for the following actions: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

93 
94 

95 

96 

8 WH for each Member State to retrieve updated information on the Dublin procedure in 
general and on further specific issues such as on entities that may provide legal assistance; 

4  WH  for  each  Member  State  to  adjust  the  existing  information  material  to  include 
details  of  the  Dublin  procedure  in  general  and  further  specific  issues  such  as  on  entities 
that may provide legal assistance (assuming that each Member State will have to do this 
once a year); 

12 WH for each Member State to copy the information material with details of the Dublin 
procedure  in  general  and  further  specific  issues  such  on  entities  that  may  provide  legal 
assistance (assuming that each Member State will have to do this once a year); 

0.1 WH for each Member State to supply the information to applicants for international 
protection  (based  on  the  average  number  of  applications  per  Member  State  in  the  past  5 
years (2003-2007), i.e. 8 920.54); 

0.5  WH  for  each  Member  State  to  retrieve  information  on  transferees,  in  particular 
vulnerable  persons.  This  would  be  done  for  each  vulnerable  transferee,  with  the  annual 
number  of  such  people  transferred  on  average  by  each  Member  State  estimated  to  be 
199.5196 (assuming that files on these people will already exist); 

It should be noted that the numbering of the assumptions follows the numbering of the cost items in Table III. 
The  need  to  familiarise  staff  with  obligations  relates  to  the  following  measures:  (i)  general  information  by 
Member  States  to  applicants  about  the  Dublin  mechanism,  (ii)  information  for  applicants  on  specific  issues 
such as on entities that may provide legal assistance, (iii) exchange of information between the Member States 
involved on the applicants to be transferred. 
Submitting  the  information;  Filing  the  information;  Retrieving  relevant  information  from  existing  data; 
Adjusting existing data; Copying; Producing new data; Designing information material. 
This assumption is based on an estimate drawn from a study carried out by ICAR (Information Centre about 
Asylum  and  Refugees)  concerning  vulnerable  groups  in  the  asylum  process  in  the  UK,  which,  as  the  UK 
received  the  highest  average  number  of  applications  in  the  past  5  years  (2003-2007),  constitutes  a 
representative  sample  for  estimating  the  proportion  of  vulnerable  applicants  in  total  applications  in  the  EU 
(Vulnerable  groups  in  the  asylum  determination  process,  Thematic  Briefing  prepared  for  the  Independent 
Asylum Commission Information, Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), 2007). An estimate was made 
of  the  proportion  of  vulnerable  people  in  the  average  number  of  outgoing  transfers  per  Member  State,  but 
excluding BG and RO since the available data are for 2006 and BG and RO were not yet Member States at the 
time. 

EN 

86 

   EN 

                                                 
6. 

7. 

0.1 WH in each Member State for submitting the information concerning transferees, in 
particular  vulnerable  persons,  to  the  responsible  Member  State.  This  would  be  done  for 
each vulnerable transferee, with the annual number of such people transferred on average 
by  each  Member  State  estimated  to  be  199.51  (assuming  that  most  information  will  be 
submitted electronically); 

0.5 WH in each Member State to file the information received on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable  persons.  This  would  be  done  for  each  vulnerable  transferee,  with  the  annual 
number  of  such  people  transferred  on  average  by  each  Member  State  estimated  to  be 
199.51. 

•  Labour costs: no significant changes in labour costs (see Scenario ‘0’) due to the short period 
level'

‘Scenario 

expected 

inflation 

since 

rates 

and 

EU 

0’ 

at 

EN 

87 

   EN 

EU Cost Model: Policy Options Obligations in 'Scenario t0' 

Proposal  on  the  future  development  of  measures  on  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  to 
determine  the  Member  State  responsible  for  assessing  asylum  applications,  based  on 
Council Regulation 343/2003/EC 

Tariff 
(€ per hour) 

Time  
(hour) 

Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) 

Freq  
(per year) 

Nbr 
of 
entit
ies 

Total nbr
of  
actions 

Total  
cost 

Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 

No. 

Ass. 
Art. 

Orig. 
Art. 

Type of obligation 

Description of required 
action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat 

Reg 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Submission 
(recurring) 
Other 

of 
reports

Familiarising  with 
information obligation 

the 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Submission 
(recurring) 
Other 

of 
reports

Training  members  and 
employees 
the 
information obligations 

about 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Other 

Retrieving 
relevant 
information  from  existing 
data 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Other 

Adjusting existing data 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Other 

Other 

Copying 
(reproducing 
reports,  producing  labels 
or leaflets) 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Submitting the information 
(sending 
the 
it 
designated recipient) 

to 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

of 

of 

Retrieving 
relevant 
information  from  existing 
data 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Submitting the information 
the 
it 
(sending 
designated recipient) 

to 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

23 

32,00 

745,6 

1,00 

29 

29 

21.622 

23 

240,00 

5.592,0 

1,00 

29 

29 

162.168 

23 

23 

23 

23 

23 

23 

64,00 

1.491,2 

1,00 

29 

29 

43.245 

16,00 

372,8 

1,00 

29 

29 

10.811 

12,00 

279,6 

1,00 

29 

29 

8.108 

0,10 

2,3 

8.920,54 

29 

258.696 

602.761 

0,50 

11,7 

199,51 

29 

5.786 

67.404 

0,10 

2,3 

199,51 

29 

5.786 

13.481 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

EN 

88 

EN 

 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
9 

10 

11 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

of 

filling the information 

MS 
Services 

Asylum 

Other 

producing new data 

EU  DG 
Services 

JLS 

Other 

Designing 
material 
conception…) 

information 
(leaflet 

EU  DG 
Services 

JLS 

23 

23 

23 

0,50 

11,7 

199,51 

29 

5.786 

67.404 

350,00 

8.155,0 

1,00 

1 

16,00 

372,8 

1,00 

1 

1 

1 

8.155 

373 

100
% 

100
% 

100
% 

   Total administrative costs (€) 1.005.533 

EN 

89 

EN 

 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EU  Cost  Model:  Policy  option  obligations  in  ‘Scenario 
t0+2' 

Proposal for the future development of the criteria and mechanisms to determine 
the  Member  State  responsible  for  assessing  asylum  applications,  based  on 
Council Regulation 343/2003/EC 

Rate 
(€ per 
hour) 

Time  
(hours) 

Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip.) 

Freq  
(per 
year) 

No  
of  
entities 

Total No 
of  
actions 

Total  
cost 

Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 

No 

Ass. 
Art. 

Orig. 
Art. 

Type of obligation 

Description of required 
action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat  Reg 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Other 

Retrieving 
information 
existing data 

relevant 
from 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Other 

Adjusting existing data 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Other 

Other 

Copying 
reports, 
labels or leaflets) 

(reproducing 
producing 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Submitting 
the 
information  (sending  it 
to 
designated 
the 
recipient) 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

of 

Retrieving 
information 
existing data 

relevant 
from 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

of 

the 
Submitting 
information  (sending  it 
to 
designated 
the 
recipient) 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

Submission 
(recurring) reports 

of 

Filing the information 

MS  Asylum 
Services 

23 

8.00 

186.4 

1.00 

29 

29 

5 406 

100% 

23 

4.00 

93.2 

1.00 

29 

29 

2 703 

100% 

23 

12.00 

279.6 

1.00 

29 

29 

8 108 

100% 

23 

0.10 

2.3 

8 920.54 

29 

258 696 

602 761 

100% 

23 

0.50 

11.7 

199.51 

29 

5 786 

67 404 

100% 

23 

0.10 

2.3 

199.51 

29 

5 786 

13 481 

100% 

23 

0.50 

11.7 

199.51 

29 

5 786 

67 404 

100% 

Total administrative costs (€) 

767 267 

EN 

90 

EN 

 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EN 

91 

EN