Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety - Impact assessment {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}
Date: 2008-11-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, EU financing, cooperation policy, nuclear safety, technical cooperation

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 26.11.2008 
SEC(2008) 2892 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (Euratom) 

setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT  

{COM(2008) 790 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2893} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 3 

Section 1: Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties ........................................... 6 

Section 2: Problem definition..................................................................................................... 9 

Section 3: Objectives................................................................................................................ 20 

Section 4: Policy options.......................................................................................................... 21 

Section 5: Analysis of impacts ................................................................................................. 22 

Section 6: Comparing the options ............................................................................................ 33 

Section 7: Monitoring and evaluation ...................................................................................... 36 

ANNEX Overview of the consultations and technical expertise supporting the approach of the 
proposed Directive setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety........................... 36 

1. Consultations within the framework of the first Nuclear Safety Package ........................... 36 

2. Overview of the activity of expert groups in the field of the harmonization of nuclear safety 
approaches.................................................................................................................. 38 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This  Impact  Assessment  relates  to  the  agenda  planning  item  2008/TREN/003  -  Revised 
legislative proposal on nuclear safety. It accompanies the draft revised Directive setting up a 
Community framework for Nuclear Safety. This revised initiative in the area of nuclear safety 
aims to re-launch the process of establishing a common EU framework on nuclear safety, by 
replacing  the  proposed  Directive  setting  out  basic  obligations  and  general  principles  on  the 
safety of nuclear installations1 presented by the Commission in 2003 (the chronology of the 
procedural steps undertaken in the framework of the initial nuclear safety legislative package 
is  presented  under  Section  2.5.5.).  This  new  proposal  is  the  result  of  an  extensive  and 
continuous  consultation  process,  initiated  in  2004  during  the  Irish  Presidency.  The  Council 
Working  Party  on  Nuclear  Safety  (WPNS),  the  European  High  Level  Group  on  Nuclear 
Safety  and  Waste  Management  (HLG)  and  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Forum  continued 
work on this issue. 

The  HLG,  created  by  the  Commission  in  2007,  as  well  as  the  European  Nuclear  Energy 
Forum, have already contributed to enhancing a better understanding on common approaches 
that  are  required  in  the  further  development  of  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations.  This  will 
lead  to  an  improved  transparency  to  review  and  communicate  nuclear  issues,  involving 
market  participants,  European  institutions,  Member  States'  representatives  and  other 
stakeholders of the civil society (e.g. NGOs). 

The  consultation  process  that  started  in  2004  has  resulted  in  a  thorough  revision  of  the 
approach taken in the 2004 proposal for a safety Directive, which at the time faced a blocking 
minority of Member States. The main arguments were a too detailed prescription of binding 
legislation,  as  well  as  doubts  whether  the  proposal  would  fully  respect  the  subsidiarity 
principle.  The  present  revised  proposal  builds  on:  a)  the  technical  work  of  the  Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) completed in 2006 for existing nuclear 
installations, with the participation of all European nuclear safety regulators; b) the principle 
that  only  strong  and  independent  regulators  can  ensure  the  continued  safe  operation  of  the 
nuclear power plants in the EU; c) enshrining in the European legislation the principles of the 
main international instruments available, namely the Convention on Nuclear Safety2 and the 
safety work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly its 
safety  fundamental  principles3.  In  relation  to  the  Member  States'  support  for  re-launching  a 
revised nuclear safety legislative proposal, it should be noted that this new proposal benefits 
from the solid support of the current Council Presidency. A number of Member States which 
were  initially  opposed  to  the  2004  initiative,  due  to  their  concerns  on  enacting  Community 
rules  in  this  area,  have  now  openly  changed  their  position.  The  European  Parliament  has 
constantly  supported  the  setting  up  of  European  nuclear  safety  legislation  establishing 
reference levels, as illustrated over the years in its Reports4. Additionally, as reflected in the 
Conclusions of the 2nd European Nuclear Energy Forum, the industry is now a firm supporter 
of EU nuclear safety legislation.  

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Initial  2003  Commission  proposal  (COM  2003/32  final)  and  revised  2004  version  (COM  (2004)526 
final) 
IAEA INFCIRC 449 of 5 July 1994 
IAEA  Safety  Fundamentals:  Fundamental  safety  principles,  IAEA  Safety  Standard  Series  No.  SF-1 
(2006) 
See Section 2.5.4. for details. The latest were the Maldeikis report on the occasion of 50 years of the 
Euratom Treaty and the Reul report on conventional energies. 

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This  revised  proposal  creates  a  legislative  framework  for  nuclear  safety  without  being 
prescriptive as regards details. Within this framework, which recognises their sovereign right 
to use nuclear energy or not, Member States are free to fully exploit the subsidiarity principle. 

The  renewed  interest  in  nuclear  power  expressed  by  a  number  of  Member  States,  with  the 
perspective  of  numerous  life  extensions  and  new  build,  makes  the  timing  of  this  revised 
proposal particularly appropriate. It is evident that the effects of radiological incidents do not 
stop at borders, with potential consequences both for the health of workers, citizens at large, 
but also wide ranging economic implications for the energy generating industry.  

Public acceptance is a prerequisite for the further development of nuclear energy and so far 
the  Community  has  been  consistently  active  in  promoting  nuclear  safety,  as  yet  there  is  no 
Community  legal  framework  governing  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations.  However,  the 
European  citizens’  concerns  about  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  must  be  properly 
addressed by the Community, based on its recognised competencies in the field, as one of the 
main  conclusions  of  the  2007  nuclear  safety-related  survey5  was  that  even  if  Europeans  on 
average have a fair level of knowledge of nuclear issues, in particular whether or not there are 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) in their countries, they feel unfamiliar with the issue of nuclear 
safety  (ranging  from  56%  to  90%).  As  the  protection  of  the  EU  public  is  one  of  the  main 
political objectives of the EU, a legal framework aiming to the achievement of a high level of 
nuclear safety in the Community, as well as to its permanent development, would create an 
additional level of guarantee for the public in the EU, by providing legal certainty.  

The  Impact  Assessment  updates  the  2003  Impact  Assessment  related  to  the  initial  nuclear 
safety  proposal6,  having  as  technical  background  the  conclusions  and  recommendations 
identified  in  the  Final  Report  of  the  WPNS7,  approved  by  the  Council  Working  Party  on 
Atomic Questions (WPAQ) on 13 December 2006 and complemented with the findings of the 
WPNS subgroups' reports8. The WPNS comprised 70 experts from the EU Member States and 
from the Commission.  

In this context, a special emphasis should be put on the activity carried on in the framework of 
WENRA,  an  organisation  comprising  the  Heads  and  senior  staff  members  of  the  Nuclear 
Regulatory  Authorities  from  17  European  Countries,  whose  members  have  defined  many 
common safety reference levels for power reactors with a view to align national requirements 
by  the  year  2010.  Any  Community  initiative  in  this  field  should  take  advantage  of  the 
technical progresses achieved within WENRA.  

Secondly, the Impact Assessment is based on the obligations and requirements of the IAEA 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  which  constitutes  an  internationally  recognised  platform  for 
nuclear  safety  development,  as  well  as  on  the  principles  of  the  IAEA  Safety  Fundamentals. 
The Convention does not contain detailed technical rules; however, it sets up a precise legal 
framework aiming to the continuous improvement of safety. Euratom and all the EU Member 
States are Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The IAEA fundamentals 

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Special Eurobarometer no 271 "Europeans and nuclear safety", Fieldwork Oct-Nov 2006, Publication 
Feb 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_271_en.pdf 
COM 2003/32 final 
15475/2/06 REV2 (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st15/st15475-re02.en06.pdf) 
15475/2/06 
(http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st15/st15475-
re02ad01.en06.pdf)  doc.  15475/2/06  REV  2  ADD  2  (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/ 
st15/st15475-re02ad02.en06.pdf)  doc.  15475/2/06  REV  2  ADD  3 
(http://register.consilium 
.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st15/st15475-re02ad03.en06.pdf) 

2  ADD 

REV 

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constitute  a  framework  of  practices  on  which  national  safety  requirements  are  based  and  to 
the improvement of which Member States have made considerable contributions. 

The above-mentioned documents have already confirmed and provided an in-depth technical 
background for the basic principles included in the proposed revised Directive, whose general 
objective  is  to  set  up  a  framework  aiming  to  achieve,  maintain  and  continuously  improve 
nuclear  safety  and  its  regulation  in  the  Community,  as  well  as  to  enhance  the  role  of  the 
Member States' regulatory bodies. 

The Impact Assessment considers four policy options: Policy option 0 consists in keeping the 
current  situation  unchanged;  Policy  option  1  envisages  the  elaboration  of  Community 
legislation  establishing  common  safety  standards  for  existing  nuclear  installations;  Policy 
option  2  consists  in  the  elaboration  of  Community  legislation  that  sets  up  only  a  common 
framework  aiming  at  achieving  and  maintaining  a  high  uniform  level  of  nuclear  safety 
throughout  the  Community  by  recalling  widely  recognised  nuclear  safety  principles;  the 
subsequent implementing measures will be prepared within the HLG. Policy option 3 is built 
upon  a  set  of  internationally-recognised  nuclear  safety  principles  (approach  proposed  by 
Policy  option  2),  supplemented  with  additional  safety  requirements  for  new  nuclear  power 
reactors,  which  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  develop  in  line  with  the  principle  of 
continuous  improvement  of  safety,  on  the  basis  of  the  safety  levels  developed  by  WENRA 
and  in  close  collaboration  with  the  HLG,  comprising  high-level  representatives  of  the 
regulatory and safety authorities from all the EU Member States. 

The  assessment  of  the  options  showed  that  the  most  efficient  solution  for  setting  up  a 
Community  nuclear  safety  framework  is  the  one  envisaged  by  Policy  option  3.  Hence,  the 
basic approach of the current proposed revised Directive is that the Community sets up only a 
set  of  common  principles  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety,  already  included  in  the  IAEA 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (enhancing the role of national regulators, prime responsibility 
of  the  licence  holder  for  safety  under  the  control  of  the  regulatory  body,  reinforcing  the 
independence of the regulatory body, ensuring a high level of transparency on issues related 
to the safety of nuclear installations, implementation of management systems, regular safety 
supervision,  availability  of  nuclear  safety  expertise,  priority  to  safety),  supplemented  with 
additional  safety  requirements  for  new  nuclear  power  reactors,  which  Member  States  are 
encouraged to develop in line with the principle of continuous improvement of safety, on the 
basis  of  the  safety  levels  developed  by  WENRA  and  in  close  collaboration  with  the  HLG. 
Based on the ten principles for the regulation  of nuclear safety adopted by it, the HLG will 
become the focal point for cooperation between the regulatory bodies charged with the safety 
of nuclear installations in the Member States and will contribute to the development of the EU 
nuclear  safety  framework.  Member  States  are  bound  to  respect  the  obligations  and 
requirements  as  incorporated  in  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  the  principles  of  the 
IAEA Safety Fundamentals. 

This approach marks a complete reversal of the line put forward in the initial Nuclear Safety 
draft Directive, as it aims to reinforce the role and the independence of the national regulatory 
bodies thereby building on their competencies, as well as to strengthen the role of the national 
bodies in the implementation of the agreed measures. 

With  the  renewed  interest  in  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  and  elsewhere,  it  is  important  to 
maintain  a  high  degree  of  nuclear  safety  within  the  EU,  establishing  a  set  of  binding  rules. 
Despite the existence of cross-border risks in the operation of nuclear installations, there has 
been  only  limited  harmonization  between  countries  in  the  past.  Within  this  framework,  the 
fundamental  added  value  of  this  policy  option  is  that  an  EU  binding  legislative  framework 

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defining basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations, would 
lead to the attainment of the objective of achieving, maintaining and continuously improving 
nuclear safety in the Community, a result whose fulfillment at purely national level would not 
be  as  efficient.  This  approach  also  presents  the  clear  advantage  of  an  increased  certainty  of 
regulation  at  Community  level.  Consequently,  under  the  institutional  provisions  of  the 
Euratom  Treaty,  Euratom  possesses  its  own  mechanisms  to  ensure  the  compliance  of  the 
national laws of the Member States with the Directive's provisions, thus exercising its role of 
safeguarding  the  correct  application  of  the  Community  acquis.  Moreover,  it  should  be 
highlighted that EU legislation confers rights and obligations not only for the authorities from 
each  Member  State,  but  as  well  as  for  individuals  and  businesses.  The  authorities  in  each 
Member  State  are  responsible  for  implementing  EU  legislation  into  national  law  and 
enforcing it correctly, and they must guarantee citizens’ rights under these laws.  

In the absence of an EU legal framework, the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety would be 
applicable for Member States. However, the membership to the IAEA Convention on Nuclear 
Safety has only a voluntary character, as this Convention represents an incentive instrument 
and thus can not entail any sanctions for non-compliance. The Convention is not designed to 
ensure  the  fulfilment  of  obligations  by  Parties  through  control  and  sanction  but  is  based  on 
their  common  interest  to  achieve  higher  levels  of  safety,  which  will  be  developed  and 
promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Membership to this Convention entails 
two basic commitments for each Contracting Party: to prepare and make available a National 
Report for review and to subject its National Report to a peer review by the other Contracting 
Parties. Being a Contracting Party to this Convention implies including in the National Report 
a  self-assessment  of  the  steps  and  measures  already taken and in progress to implement the 
Convention's  obligations,  taking  an  active  part  in  the  review  of  its  National  Report  and  the 
Reports of other Contracting Parties and a commitment to a continuous improvement process.  

The elaboration of EU legislation on the basis of the principles of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety  and  taking  full  advantage  of  the  safety  work  already  carried  out  by  the  IAEA  in 
defining Safety Fundamentals recognises the value of the international progress in the nuclear 
safety  area  and  offers  European  civil  society  a  possibility  to  become  more  involved  in  this 
field.  

Finally,  the  proposal  also  aims  to  reinforce  the  role  and  the  independence  of  the  national 
regulatory  bodies  and  the  role  of  the  national  bodies  in  the  implementation  of  the  agreed 
measures, solution which is in full compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.  

SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. Organisation and timing 

The  elaboration  of  a  revised  legislative  proposal  on  nuclear  safety  is  included  in  the 
Commission's  agenda  planning  2008  –  Commission  actions  expected  to  be  adopted  in  the 
period  01/02/2008  -  31/12/2008  (item  2008/TREN/003).  For  the  purpose  of  finalising  the 
current  accompanying  Impact  Assessment,  a  Steering  Group  was  set  up,  composed  of 
representatives of all the interested services (DG ENV, DG ECFIN, DG RTD, JRC, SJ, SG). 

The  Impact  Assessment  Board  has  assessed  the  draft  Impact  Assessment  submitted  to  their 
attention in August 2008 and issued an initial opinion on 9 September 2008, which included 
the following general recommendations:  

–  The  report  should  strengthen  the  rationale  for  this  initiative  by  better  explaining  its 
European dimension and added value. This should be done, on the one hand, by assessing 
more  clearly  how  this  initiative  could  contribute  to  the  implementation  of  the  Member 
States'  commitments  under  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety;  on  the  other  hand,  by 

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presenting the potentially negative effects of the current differences between the national 
safety standards of the Member States on the overall level of nuclear safety in the EU and 
on the smooth functioning of the internal market.  

–  Secondly, the report should explain the division of regulatory competences in the field of 
nuclear safety between the EU, HLG and Member States. The role of the HLG as regards 
the adoption of implementing measures in future should be clarified.  

–  Thirdly, the overall coherence of the report should be strengthened by providing stronger 

links between problems, objectives, options and monitoring.  

–  Finally, the political context of this initiative should be better explained. The report should 
clarify  how  the  current  initiative  differs  from  the  nuclear  safety  proposals  that  were  put 
forward in 2003/2004. In that context, the report should explain why a public consultation 
on this initiative was not considered necessary. 

Based on these main remarks, the Board requested to receive a revised draft of the Report, on 
which it will then issue another opinion.  

As a follow-up, the Impact Assessment has been revised accordingly, in order to respond to 
the aspects raised by the Board. In relation to the previous version, additional information was 
included in the Executive Summary, as well as in the Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the document. 
The added information strengthens mainly the following aspects: 

–  the political context of the current revised proposal; 

–  the  description  of  the  consultation  with  the  stakeholders  on  a  legislative  framework  on 

nuclear safety, in line with the Commission minimum standards for consultation; 

–  the  main  differences  of  the  current  revised  approach  in  relation  to  the  previous  draft 
Directive  dealing  with  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  included  in  the  Nuclear  Safety 
Package; 

–  the  added  value  of  the  proposed  revised  Directive  and  its  relation  with  the  IAEA 

Convention on Nuclear Safety; 

–  the  envisaged  division  of  regulatory  competencies  between  the  EU  institutions,  the  HLG 

and the Member States; 

–  the definition of the concept "nuclear safety"; 

–  the update of the estimations with the results of the latest 2007 DGTREN forecasts; 

–  the coverage of the proposed European safety reference levels. 

After the re-submission of the revised draft Impact Assessment, the Impact Assessment Board 
has  issued  its  final  opinion  on  14  October  2008,  which  included  the  following  general 
recommendations for improvement: 

–  The  report  should,  as  a  general  comment,  better  explain  the  added  value  of  the  initiative 
and provide greater clarity on the procedure envisaged for adopting new safety reference 
levels.  Specifically  for  explaining  the  added  value,  the  report  should  be  more  explicit  on 
whether the varying standards have an impact on the functioning of the internal market or 
raise safety concerns. 

–  The links between problems, objectives, options and monitoring should be more coherent. 

–  The  definition  of  regulatory  competences  between  the  EU,  the  HLG  and  Member  states 

should be explained better. 

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–  The  executive  summary  should  be  more  concise  and  the  report  should  refrain  from 

concluding on the actions needed in the problem definition section. 

In  the  light  of  these  recommendations,  the  draft  Impact  Assessment  has  been  revised 
accordingly,  in  order  to  respond  to  the  issues  raised  by  the  Board.  In  relation  to  the  first 
version, the Executive Summary was shortened and changes were made mainly in Section 2 
of the document. The added information strengthens especially the following aspects: 

–  the added value of the initiative; 

–  the analysis of the compliance with the subsidiarity principle; 

–  the procedural aspects related with the future implementing measures. 

As a result of the comments received from the Commission services on the text of the draft 
Nuclear  Safety  Directive  and  on  the  accompanying  Impact  Assessment  within  the  Inter-
Service consultation, the text of the present document has been further amended accordingly. 

1.2. Consultation and expertise  

The current draft Directive setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety aims to re-
launch the Commission's initiative of enacting binding legislation in the field, by updating and 
replacing the corresponding proposal from the Nuclear Safety Package. 

Throughout the elaboration process of the initial Nuclear Safety Package in 2003 and 2004, a 
wide  consultation  with  the  stakeholders  on  the  opportunity  of  setting  up  a  nuclear  safety 
legislative framework was carried out at the initiative of the Commission, supplementing the 
consultations resulting from the legislative procedure provided for in the Euratom Treaty (the 
opinions  of  the  Group  of  experts  set  up  by  Article  31  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  of  the 
European and Social Committee).  

The Commission proposal to have an exchange of views on the contribution of nuclear energy 
in meeting the growing concerns about security of energy supply, reduction of CO2 emissions 
and competitiveness, while taking fully into account nuclear safety and security aspects was 
endorsed by the Heads of State and Government reunited in the European Summit of 8 and 9 
March 20079. As a concrete follow-up, the European Nuclear Energy Forum was established, 
to  which  high  representatives  from  Governments,  several  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament  representing  different  political  groups  and  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  participated  actively,  as  well  as  the  Presidents  and  CEOs  of  major  companies, 
representatives  from  energy  intensive  consumers,  NGOs  and  Trade  Unions,  and  other  key 
decision  makers  and  organisations  at  national  and  EU  level.  The  Conclusions  of  the  2nd 
Prague Forum emphasised the  Forum's  strong support for the adoption of EU legislation on 
nuclear  safety  based  on  "common  fundamental  safety  principles  for  nuclear  installations" 
stating  furthermore  that  "if  it  succeeds  in  adopting  such  a  legal  framework,  Europe  can 
become  a  real  model  also  for  possible  nuclear  newcomers,  ensuring  that  they  take  all 
necessary  measures  for  ensuring  the  highest  safety  and  security  levels  before  developing 
nuclear infrastructure". 

In addition, the technical background supporting the basic principles proposed in the current 
draft revised Directive setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety was provided 
by  the  outcome  of  the  activity  of  the  different  expert  groups  dealing  with  nuclear  safety 
matters. Several different levels and types of activities have been developed at EU level, with 
the  involvement  of  expert  groups.  These  groups,  comprising  representatives  of  the  safety 

9 

Presidency conclusions (7224/1/07 REV 1) 

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authorities  of  the  Member  States,  have  actively  contributed  to  the  harmonisation  of  nuclear 
safety practices.  

A detailed report on the consultations  undertaken  in the  framework of the previous Nuclear 
Safety Package, as well as on the work of the various expert working groups in the field of 
harmonization  of  nuclear  safety  approaches  within  the  EU  is  presented  in  the  Annex  of  the 
Impact Assessment. These extensive consultations are in line with the Commission minimum 
standards  for  consultation,  allowing  the  public  to  be  informed  and  actively  involved  in  the 
preparation of the legislative initiative. 

SECTION 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. The problem that requires action 

The main purpose of the Euratom Treaty was to supervise the secure management of nuclear 
installations, including a high standard of health protection. A broad set of specific measures, 
distinct from those which had evolved under the auspices of the IAEA, has been developed in 
the field of radiation protection.  

Nuclear  Safety  can  be  defined  as  the  achievement  of  proper  operating  conditions  through 
measures  taken  with  a  view  to  the  prevention  of  accidents  or  mitigation  of  accident 
consequences, resulting in the protection of workers, the public and in the air, water and soil 
from  undue  radiation  hazards  arising  from  nuclear  installations.  Paradoxically,  the  safety  of 
nuclear installations has not developed in the same way as radiation protection, although it is 
supposed to provide concrete guarantees for protecting population against ionising radiation, 
an  area  in  which  the  Commission  has,  for  a  number  of  years,  had  undeniable  technological 
expertise  through  the  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC)  and  the  Framework  Programme  for 
research and technological development. However, the Community has actively intervened in 
connection with the harmonisation of nuclear safety practices for over 25 years, in particular 
under  the  Council  Resolutions  of  22 July 197510  and  18 June 199211  on  the  technological 
problems of nuclear safety. Although the established system of radiation protection ensures a 
high level of protection for the health of the population, it should be further supplemented to 
ensure  that  a  high  level  of  safety  of  nuclear  installations  is  maintained,  developed  and 
continuously improved. However, binding Community legislation in the area of nuclear safety 
has not been adopted until present.  

At present, the interest in nuclear energy is undergoing a revival phase, due to a number of 
driving factors.  

Energy efficiency, renewables and sustainable biofuels all have a very important and growing 
contribution to a sustainable energy policy. However, for the production of base-load energy 
at  competitive  prices,  nuclear  energy  is  currently  the  main  low-carbon  source  in  many  EU 
Member  States.  The  EU  is  the  largest  nuclear  electricity  generator  in  the  world,  having  a 
mature  nuclear  industry  spanning  the  entire  fuel  cycle  with  its  own  technological  base  and 
highly skilled workforce. Nuclear energy provides more than a third of the EU electricity and 
it has proven to be a stable, reliable source, relatively shielded from price fluctuations when 
compared  to  the  oil  and  gas  markets.  Continued  use  of  nuclear  energy  therefore  would 
increase  the  EU  energy  independence  and  security  of  supply  as  well  as  contribute  to  the 
limitation of CO2 emissions, but it is also still confronted with a number of outstanding issues 
that need to be resolved. Provided an adequate level of safety is ensured, nuclear energy can 

10 
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OJ No C 185 of 14 August 1975, p. 1. 
OJ No C 172 of 18 June 1992, p. 2. 

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continue to play an important role in the EU, supported by a firm commitment in research and 
promotion of technological developments, aimed at further enhancing its safety. 

Safety  infrastructure  includes  many  components,  including  the  legal  framework  and 
regulatory capability, emergency preparedness and response, educated and trained manpower, 
a  stable  electrical  grid,  adequate  financial  and  industrial  resources,  and  the  nurturing  of  an 
appropriate safety culture in the generating entity. Therefore, there are many responsibilities 
that  arise  from  the  commitment  to  using  nuclear  energy  and  the  new  and  expanding 
programmes  must  take  appropriate  and  timely  actions  to  fulfil  those  responsibilities.  The 
Member States must remain mindful of the fact that the prime responsibility for safety always 
rests  with  the  operator  and  that  an  appropriate  safety  infrastructure,  independent  of  any 
contractual arrangements is necessary. All these aspects are for the time being regulated at the 
level of Member States, which creates a too heterogeneous situation. 

Replacement  and/or  life  extension  of  ageing  nuclear  power  plants  (NPPs)  deserve  special 
attention, since a large number of currently operating plants in the EU will come to the end of 
their  originally  foreseen  lifetime  before  2030,  leading  to  a  substantial  decrease  in  the 
contribution of nuclear energy, unless new plants are built or older ones are upgraded, so that 
they can safely operate for an extended period. Also, a high level of nuclear safety in the EU 
requires ensuring the safe closure and decommissioning of those nuclear reactors reaching the 
end of their lifetime, or for which safety cannot be upgraded at an appropriate high level in an 
economical  manner.  According  to  recent  forecasts12,  as  a  result  of  political  decisions  on 
nuclear phase-out in certain old Member-States and the closure of plants with safety concerns 
in some new Member-States, nuclear energy output will be 20% smaller in 2030 than it was in 
2005. As a consequence, in order to maintain the share of nuclear energy in the energy mix, 
new  investments  are  expected  to  replace  or  upgrade  aging  generation  capacities.  In  the  EU, 
currently two new nuclear installations are under construction (1 in Finland and 1 in France). 
Several  others  are  planned  or  firmly  decided  in  some  Member  States  (e.g.  Mochovce 
(Slovakia),  Belene  (Bulgaria),  Cernavoda  (Romania),  Ignalina  (Lithuania),  as  well  as  an 
indefinite number of installations especially in France and the UK). In addition, other types of 
installations are under construction (e.g. enrichment plants). The absence of an EU framework 
establishing  fundamental  safety  principles  and  requirements  creates  uncertainties  for  the 
investors.  Therefore,  in  the  current  context  it  is  the  right  time  to  reconsider  the  project  of 
setting  up  a  Community  nuclear  safety  approach  that  would  create  a  legal  reference  and  a 
level playing field throughout the EU, as currently there is a different system in each Member 
State, leading to a certain degree of fragmentation. 

Moreover,  this  exercise  would  also  reflect  externally,  by  ensuring  the  existence  of  a 
comparable basis for discussions in the process of negotiation of nuclear-related International 
Agreements between the Community and third parties. 

Another aspect that has to be highlighted is that, even if following the Chernobyl accident, no 
major  accidents  have  occurred  within  the  EU  or  in  its  neighbourhood,  nevertheless  several 
incidents on a low INES scale of 0-2 have been reported. This sporadic recurrence of events 
of concern make clear that the promotion of a strong safety culture at EU level — for both 
operators  and  regulators  —  supported  by  appropriate  legal  instruments,  should  represent  a 
priority. 

12 

European Energy and Transport - Trends to 2030 Update 2007 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2007/energy_transport_trends_2
030_update_2007_en.pdf) 

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The  nuclear  sector  is  also  confronted  with  the  problem  of  the  ageing  of  qualified  human 
resources dealing with technical matters. Efforts are needed to establish an effective process 
for  the  development  and  transfer  of  knowledge  areas  and  to  ensure  the  preservation  and 
availability of resources.  

Finally, public acceptance should be considered, as it is one of the driving factors of the future 
development  of  nuclear  energy.  The  existence  of  different  national  regulatory  systems  will 
only  perpetuate  the  current  lack  of  information  in  the  field,  illustrated  by  the  results  of  the 
opinion  polls  carried  on  by  the  Commission  with  the  participation  of  respondents  from  the 
Member States. Information on the measures adopted by the Member States on nuclear safety 
matters should be openly made available to the public in a timely and accurate manner. 

2.2. Underlying drivers of the problem 

Following  the  Chernobyl  accident  in  1986  -  undoubtedly  the  most  serious  accident  in  the 
history of atomic energy, and the G-7 Summit in Munich in 1992, the EU began to concern 
itself  with  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries 
and the Republics of the former Soviet Union. 

Nuclear safety is still a central issue in the context of the recent enlargements of the EU. The 
work  carried  out  in  the  Community  framework  in  order  to  bring  nuclear  installations  in  the 
former  candidate  countries  up  to  a  high  level  of  safety  allowed  a  European  perspective  to 
emerge in this context.  

Four  first  generation  Soviet-design  nuclear  reactors  (Ignalina  1  and  2  in  Lithuania  and 
Bohunice  1  and  2  in  Slovakia)  are  being  shut  down  in  predetermined  stages  in  compliance 
with the 2004 Accession Treaty. The EU is providing financial assistance, subject to certain 
conditions, to various projects on decommissioning and replacement of electricity generation 
capacity.  Similar  arrangements  are  in  place  for four  of  the  six  reactors  at  Kozloduy,  two  of 
which  were  already  closed  prior  to  Bulgaria's  accession  to  the  EU  and  another  two  were 
closed by the end of 2006 as part of Bulgaria's EU Accession Treaty. Two Regulations13 were 
adopted,  providing  for  continued  financial  assistance  to  Lithuania  and  Slovakia  until  2013, 
guaranteeing at least the same level of funding as agreed for the period 2004-2006. Euratom 
loans have been provided to Kozloduy 5 and 6 in Bulgaria (€212.5 million in 2000 to improve 
safety-related equipment), Cernavoda 2 in Romania (€223.5 million in 2004 for construction). 

Also, the extension of plant lifetime where safely possible and/or new construction aiming at 
meeting the electricity demand, is necessary in order to maintain the share of nuclear energy 
in the current energy mix.  

Evidence of widely differing safety and security measures were observed by the Commission 
when  giving  its  point  of  view  on  the  built  of  new  plants  proposed  since  2004.  Such 
differences not only impact on the overall safety of the workers and the population, but may 
entail cost differences for the construction and operation of the plants. 

Protection from ionising radiation is also a concern after the end of the active life of a nuclear 
installation. In practice, final shutdown of a nuclear installation marks the start of a new phase 
with  the  objective  of  lifting  the  radiological  protection  restrictions  imposed  while  it  was  in 
operation.  These  restrictions  are  due  to  the  presence  of  large  quantities  of  radioactive 
materials in the form of structural materials, equipment, operational waste and spent fuel. It is 
therefore necessary to remove these materials and to subject them to the treatment appropriate 

13 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1990/2006 (OJ L 411, 30.12.2006, p. 10–17) 
Council Regulation (Euratom) No 549/2007 (OJ L 131, 23.5.2007, p. 1–4) 

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to  their  physical  characteristics  and  their  levels  of  radioactivity,  in  accordance  with  safety 
standards in force. 

Also,  the  climate  change  issue  has  revamped  the  public  debate  on  nuclear  power.  Public 
opinion constantly requires the highest possible level of nuclear safety and information on it, 
because  of  the  keen  public  awareness  of  the  risks  for  human  health  and  the  environment, 
linked  to  the  operation  of  NPPs.  Concerns  about  the  safety  of  NPPs,  management  of 
radioactive  waste,  security,  proliferation  and  terrorism  have  all  had  an  influence  on  public 
opinion. 

2.3. Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? 

Euratom  legislation  in  force  does  not  address  the  particular  aspects  of  nuclear  installation 
safety. The primary responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with the holders 
of the relevant licence, under the control of the national regulatory authority of each Member 
State. 

in  Community 

Along the lines of the existing national systems, it is necessary to consider nuclear safety in a 
Community  perspective.  Enshrining 
the  obligations  and 
requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the principles laid down in the IAEA 
Safety  Fundamentals  will  make 
to  reconcile  efficiency  and  speed  of 
implementation. Interlinking the national systems and the Community system will guarantee 
the maintenance of a high level of safety for nuclear installations in the enlarged EU and will 
enhance the transparency of the EU regulatory mechanisms. In a long-term perspective, this 
shall  result  in  an  improved  public  confidence  in  the  decision-making  process  applied  at  EU 
level on nuclear safety matters.  

it  possible 

legislation 

The  nuclear  safety  Directive  will  benefit  EU  citizens  by  enhancing  their  safety  and  giving 
them legal certainty. It would also benefit Member States, as it would give them a reference 
for their national nuclear safety systems. It would benefit the national nuclear safety control 
bodies as it would ensure that they get enough means for their work and give them the driving 
role in implementing the common EU rules. 

Also, the establishment of a common approach in the field of nuclear safety will lead to the 
increase of the nuclear energy's competitiveness. 

2.4. The evolution of the problem all things being equal 

At  present,  EU  is  facing  major  challenges  linked  with  climate  change,  increasing  import 
dependence and higher energy prices, in the overall context of a growing interdependence of 
EU Member States in energy aspects. 
Under  the  New  Energy  Policy  projections14,  total  EU-27  energy  requirements  continue  to 
increase slightly (1.5%) by 2020 in case of moderate oil prices and to decrease slightly (-2%) 
in case of high oil prices15. Under these projections, only renewable energy sources increase 
their market share. The share of nuclear in total energy consumption drops slightly, from 14% 
in  2005  to  between  12  and  14  %  by  2020.  In  total  the  share  of  indigenous  and  low  carbon 
energy sources rises from 21% in 2005 to 30% in 2020. 

14 

15 

The  figures  under  this  section  have  been  updated  in  line  with  the  Commission's  Second  Strategic 
Energy Review adopted on the 13 November 2008. Figures presented elsewhere in the graphs are based 
on the Nuclear Illustrative Programme adopted in 2007. 
Commission staff working document: Europe's current and future energy position, Demand – resources 
– investments, COM(2008) 744 

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Import  dependence  continues  to  grow  even  under  the  New  Energy  Policy  projections,  from 
around 52% in 2005 to between 56 and 58% in 2020. Import dependence for oil continues to 
be the highest, reaching 92% in 2020. Gas import dependence rises substantially, from 58% at 
present  to  between  71  and  73%  in  2020.  Similarly,  solid  fuel  supply  will  be  increasingly 
based  on  imports,  reaching  around  50%  in  2020  (up  from  just  under  40%  today).  EU-27 
energy  related  CO2  emissions  are  expected  to  remain  below  the  1990  level  and  to  decline 
another 18 to 20% by 2020 under the New Energy Policy scenario.  

Currently,  NPPs  generate  approximately  one  third  of  the  electricity  and  14%  of  the  energy 
consumed  in  the  EU.  Nuclear  power  is  currently  the  largest  source  of  low-carbon  dioxide 
(CO2) production of energy in the EU. Also, it is less vulnerable to fuel price changes than 
coal  or  gas-fired  generation,  as  uranium  represents  a  limited  part  of  the  total  cost  of 
generating nuclear electricity and is based on sources which are sufficient for many decades 
and  widely  distributed  around  the  globe,  being  as  well  one  of  the  cheapest  sources  of  low 
carbon energy that is presently produced in the EU. 

To  meet  the  expected  energy  demand  and  to  reduce  European  dependency  on  imports, 
decisions are expected to be made on new investments or on the life extension of some plants. 
Having in view the fact that a significant number of NPPs are due to close down within the 
next 20 years, construction of new plants and/or extension of the current operating lifetimes of 
existing  reactors  will  be  required  if  the  Member  States  choose  to  keep  the  low  CO2  option 
and maintain or even increase the current share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix.  

While each Member State and energy utility chooses its own energy mix, individual national 
decisions relating to nuclear energy can have more general impacts in terms of the electricity 
market,  the  EU's  overall  dependence  on  imported  fossil  fuels,  CO2  emissions,  and 
competitiveness,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  environment  and  safety.  In  particular,  a  serious 
incident  at  a  NPP  could  affect  neighbouring  Member  States.  Cross-border  impacts  are 
possible  also  in  managing  the  back-end  of  the  fuel cycle (radioactive waste, including from 
decommissioning). In addition, it should be mentioned that some companies intend to invest 
in the EU in the construction of NPPs in different Member States. 

Experience  of  managing  industrial  risks  has  already  shown  the  possible  trans-boundary 
environmental  consequences.  There  are  already  similar  provisions  foreseen  in  the  Euratom 
Treaty  in  Article  37  in  the  field  of  radioprotection,  that  provide  the  obligation  of  each 
Member State to notify to the Commission any plans for the disposal of radioactive waste that 
would result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member 
State. 

Therefore, at present it is no longer possible to consider nuclear safety from a purely national 
perspective. Only a common approach can guarantee the continuous improvement of nuclear 
safety in an enlarged Union of 27-Member States. 

2.5. Community competence 

2.5.1. Euratom Treaty legal basis 

Civil nuclear activities are regulated in the European Union by the Euratom Treaty, signed in 
1957. The Euratom Treaty contains provisions allowing the Community to regulate the use of 
nuclear energy by the Member States, in particular those governing health protection (Chapter 
3) and nuclear safeguards (Chapter 7).  

The  competence  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  to  regulate  in  the  field  of  the 
health  protection  against  ionizing  radiation  is  explicitly  recognised  by  the  Euratom  Treaty. 
Accordingly, in the Treaty's Preamble, the Member States declare that they are "resolved to 

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create  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  development  of  a  strong  nuclear  industry"  and  also 
"anxious to create conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of 
the public". In addition, pursuant to Article 2(b) of the Treaty, the Community is mandated to 
"establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public 
and ensure that they are applied." Title II, Chapter 3 "Health and Safety", sets up a number of 
detailed  provisions  intended  to  establish,  give  effect  and  apply  the  basic  safety  standards 
mentioned  in  Article  2(b)  of  the  Euratom  Treaty.  Article  30  paragraph  1  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty  establishes  that  "Basic  standards  shall  be  laid  down  within  the  Community  for  the 
protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from 
ionizing  radiations."  Article  32  provides  that  the  basic  standards  may  be  revised  or 
supplemented. A substantial corpus of Euratom legislation in the field has been adopted and 
updated during the years and is completed by a set of legal instruments of different binding 
nature, covering a wide range of aspects such as operational protection of workers (including 
outside workers) and population, natural radioactive sources, high activity sealed sources and 
orphan  sources,  emergency  preparedness,  medical  applications,  control  and  supervision  of 
shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as well as a number of regulations establishing 
provisions  on  the  conditions  governing  imports  of  agricultural  products  originating  in  third 
countries  following  the  accident  at  the  Chernobyl  NPP,  aimed  at  safeguarding  the  health  of 
consumers of such products. The central element of this legislation is the Council Directive 
96/29/Euratom  laying  down  basic  safety  standards  for  the  health  protection  of  the  general 
public  and  workers  against  the  dangers  of  ionising  radiation  (Basic  Safety  Standards 
Directive)16. 

Chapter  3  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  has  been  used  so  far  mainly  for  radiation  protection 
purposes.  It  is,  however,  undeniable  that  health  protection  covers  both  radiation  protection 
and nuclear safety, two closely linked concepts serving a common health protection objective.  

This approach has been confirmed by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. In 
its judgement from 10 December 2002 in the Case C-29/99, the Court stated17 that “it is not 
appropriate,  in  order  to  define  the  Community’s  competencies,  to  draw  an  artificial 
distinction between the protection of the health of the general public and the safety of sources 
of  ionising  radiation.”  The  Court  confirms  on  the  other  hand  the  technical  competence  of 
national  safety  authorities  to  authorise  the  construction  or  operation  of  nuclear  facilities. 
However,  the  Court  recognises  that  this  technical  competence  does  not  prevent  the 
Community  from  legislating  in  this  field.  The  Court  judgement  is  on  this  point  explicit18: 
“Even though the Euratom Treaty does not grant the Community competence to authorise the 
construction  or  operation  of  nuclear  installations,  under  Articles  30  to  32  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health 
protection,  an  authorisation  system  which  must  be  applied  by  the  Member  States.  Such  a 
legislative  act  constitutes  a  measure  supplementing  the  basic  standards  referred  to  in  that 
article.”  

In  the  conclusions  of  the  Advocate-General  Jacobs  delivered  on  13  December  2001  in  the 
Case C-29/99 it is concluded that "In the light of the current scientific knowledge, it is neither 
possible  nor  desirable  to  maintain  artificial  boundaries  between  radiation  protection  and 
nuclear  safety.  From  a  legal  perspective  it  is  also  evident  that  modern  radiation  protection 
systems such as the Basic Standards Directive are increasingly source-oriented and therefore 

16 
17 

18 

OJ L 159, 29.6.1996. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  v  Council  of  the  European  Union  (Case  C-29/99)- 
paragraph 82 
paragraph 89 

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necessarily also regulate aspects of the safety of installations."19 Furthermore, the Advocate-
General  states  that  "The  fact  that  the  Member  States  retain  exclusive  competence  over  the 
technological  aspects  of  nuclear  safety  does  not  prevent  the  Community  from  adopting 
legislation  which  establishes  certain  safety  requirements,  authorisation  requirements, 
inspection and assessment requirements or enforcement mechanisms."20 

2.5.2. Competence recognised by the Council of the European Union 

With  the  development  of  the  European  nuclear  industry,  convergence  at  Community  level 
became necessary in order to support the Member States in their efforts to harmonise safety 
practices. The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the technological problems of nuclear 
safety recognised that it was the Commission's responsibility to act as a catalyst in initiatives 
taken at international level in the field of nuclear safety. This Resolution, while "taking into 
account  the  prerogatives  and  responsibilities  assumed  by  national  authorities",  makes 
reference  to  the  alignment  of  safety  requirements  in  the  context  of  a  desirable  harmonised 
approach at Community level. It calls for effective collaboration among Member States at EC 
level  and  specifically  requires  the  "progressive  harmonization  of  safety  requirements  and 
criteria  in  order  to  provide  an  equivalent  and  satisfactory  degree  of  protection  of  the 
population  and  of  the  environment  against  the  risks  of  radiation  resulting  from  nuclear 
activities and at the same time to assist the development on trade on the understanding that 
such harmonization should not involve any lowering of the safety level already attained". As a 
result  of  this  Resolution,  the  Commission  set  up  several  expert  groups  dealing  with  nuclear 
safety matters.  

Against  this  background,  a  second  Council  Resolution  was  adopted  in  1992.  In  this 
Resolution, the Council reaffirmed the intentions of the 1975 Resolution and invited Member 
States to continue and intensify concerted efforts towards harmonization of safety issues. In 
this  context,  the  Council  "requests  the  Member  States  to  continue  -  with  an  active 
contribution from the Commission - to ensure greater concerted effort between the national 
safety  authorities  in  the  Community  on  safety  criteria  and  requirements  and  on  the 
incorporation of the conclusions reached into the practice followed in the Member States, in 
order  to  arrive  at  a  system  of  safety  criteria  and  requirements  recognized  throughout  the 
Community." and "encourages the Member States and the Commission to act in a coordinated 
manner  in  international  fora  on  the  basis  of  the  achievements  reached  in  the  Community 
towards  a  system  of  internationally  accepted  nuclear  safety  criteria  and  requirements,  in 
particular  in  the  framework  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)."  The 
European  Council  has  regularly  recalled  the  1992  Resolution  in  the  context  of  the 
enlargement  process  and  the  importance  of  developing  high  standards  of  nuclear  safety  in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Following this Resolution, participation in the expert groups was 
extended to representatives of the Central and Eastern European Countries and the Republics 
of the former Soviet Union (NIS). 

In  the  framework  of  the  discussions  on  Commission  proposals  for  Council  Directives 
(Euratom)  setting  out  the  basic  obligations  and  general  principles  on  the  safety  of  nuclear 
installations and on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, in the June 
2004  Council  Conclusions  on  nuclear  safety  and  on  the  safety  of  the  management  of  spent 
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste21, the following statements were made: 

“(the Council) urges Member States together with the Commission: 

19 
20 
21 

paragraph 166 
paragraph 167 
10823/04 

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to avail themselves in particular of the possibilities offered by the review meetings under the 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  the  Joint  Convention  on  the  Safety  of  Spent  Fuel 
Management  and  on  the  Safety  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  in  2005  and  2006 
respectively, 

to assess the results achieved under these Conventions, including at previous Conferences of 
the Parties,  

to take stock of the outcome of the work conducted by national nuclear regulatory authorities 
in multinational fora, including in the WENRA framework,  

and on that basis 

to engage in a wide ranging consultation process facilitating the choice of instrument(s), in 
the  framework  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  that  can  contribute  more  effectively  to  achieving 
nuclear  safety  and  the  safe  management  of  spent  fuel  and  radioactive  waste,  without 
excluding any instrument and in line with the principles of better law making.” 

The importance of an EU action in the field of nuclear safety is also emphasised in the May 
2007 Council Conclusions on Nuclear Safety and Safe management of spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste22. In the Preamble of the Conclusions, it is stated that "Bearing in mind that 
nuclear safety is a national responsibility exercised where appropriate in an EU-framework. 
Decisions concerning safety actions and the supervision of nuclear installations remain solely 
with the operators and national authorities."  

2.5.3. Competence recognised by the European Council 
The  Cologne  European  Council  in  June  199923  asked  the  Commission  to  ensure  that  high 
nuclear  safety  standards  are  applied  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Following  on  from  this 
request,  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  in  the  candidate  countries  was  evaluated  by  the 
Commission and the Council in 2001, making it possible to arrive at a European perspective 
on nuclear safety, agreed by the fifteen Member States and the Commission. 

The  Laeken  European  Council  in  December  2001  marked  the  transition  from  reflection 
conducted in the perspective of enlargement to that of a global political vision at the level of 
the  enlarged  EU.  One  of  the  conclusions24  of  this  meeting  was  that  "the  European  Council 
undertakes  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety  in  the  Union.  It  stresses  the  need  to 
monitor  the  security  and  safety  of  nuclear  power  stations.  It  calls  for  regular  reports  from 
Member  States'  atomic  energy  experts,  who  will  maintain  close  contacts  with  the 
Commission". The Conclusions of the Laeken Council apply the Cologne Conclusions within 
the  EU,  the  objective  of  both  sets  of  conclusions  being  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  nuclear 
safety.  
In  the  Presidency  Conclusions25  of  the  Brussels  European  Council  from  March  2007,  it  is 
stated  that  the  European  Council  "confirms  that  it  is  for  each  and  every  Member  State  to 
decide whether or not to rely on nuclear energy and stresses that this has to be done while 
further improving nuclear safety and the management of radioactive waste, and to that effect 
it…can envisage the creation of a high-level group on nuclear safety and waste management."  

22 

23 
24 
25 

Adopted at the 2798th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Economic and Financial Affairs) 
- 8784/07 
150/99 REV 1 
SN 300/1/01 REV 1 
7224/1/07 REV 1 

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2.5.4. Competence underlined by the European Parliament Reports  

The Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy of the European Parliament 
published  in  2002  a  report  on  the  Commission  Communication  on  the  Operation  of  the 
Euratom Safeguards Office in 1999-2000, with Paul Rübig as a rapporteur26. In this report, the 
European  Parliament  encourages the Commission "to propose a Directive to fix a reference 
framework  for  all  activities  of  auditing  and  certification  in  the  field  of  Nuclear  Safety, 
Security and Safeguard". 
In  the  2007  Report  on  Assessing  Euratom  –  50  Years  of  European  nuclear  energy  policy27, 
published by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Eugenijus Maldeikis as a 
rapporteur, one of the gaps identified by the European Parliament was exactly "the absence of 
a  legislative  corpus  on  harmonised  standards  with  real  added  value,  particularly  in 
comparison with the existing international framework, for nuclear safety, the management of 
radioactive  waste  and  the  decommissioning  of  nuclear  plants".  In  this  context,  the  Report 
reiterates  the  Commission's  competence  to  regulate  in  the  area  of  nuclear  safety  under 
Euratom Treaty, as confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Case C-29/99. 
Furthermore, it is pointed out that "in the context of a need to adapt European energy policy 
and  extend  the  working  lives  of  power  stations,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  draw  up  robust 
legislation and adopt concrete measures at Community level in the fields of nuclear safety, the 
management  of  radioactive  waste  and  the  decommissioning  of  nuclear  plants".  For  that 
matter, the Parliament "invites the Commission to review the relevant drafts of its legislative 
proposal and submit new proposals for directives on the safety of nuclear facilities, on waste 
management,  and  on  closure  and  decommissioning  of  nuclear  facilities  taking  into  account 
the  ‘polluter-pays’  principle".  It  also  "urges  the  Commission  and  Council  to  look  into  this 
question with all due speed" and asks to be consulted in this work. 

A  similar  position  is  reflected  in  the  Report  on  Conventional  energy  sources  and  energy 
technology28, published by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, having Herbert 
Reul as rapporteur, which "welcomes the Commission's call for the imposition in the EU of 
common reference levels for nuclear safety; in that connection, urges that, on the basis of a 
best  practice  peer  review,  these  reference  levels  should  reflect  the  highest  possible  safety 
standards". Moreover, the report "recalls that dozens of nuclear power plants are planned or 
being built worldwide, and that it is vital for the EU to be involved in their construction, both 
from  the  point  of  view  of  industrial  strategy  and  in  order  to  promote  the  most  stringent 
possible  safety  principles  throughout  the  world".  This  approach  is  in  line  with  the  Nuclear 
Illustrative Programme29, adopted in accordance with Article 40 from the Euratom Treaty. 

2.5.5. Initial Nuclear Safety Package 

On 30 January 2003, after receiving in December 2002 the opinion of the Group of Experts 
set  up  by  Article  31  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  Commission  adopted  two  proposals  of 
Directives  dealing  respectively  with  the  safety  of  nuclear  facilities  and  the  management  of 
spent  fuel  and  radioactive  waste30.  The  legal  bases  of  these  two  proposals  are  included  in 
Chapter 3 of Title II of the Euratom Treaty, which concerns health protection. The initial draft 
Directive  setting  out  basic  obligations  and  general  principles  on  the  safety  of  nuclear 
installations proposed common safety standards and verification mechanisms to guarantee the 

26 
27 
28 
29 
30 COM 2003/32 final  

A5-0196/2002 
A6-0129/2007 
A6-0348/2007 
COM(2007) 565 final 

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17 

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application  of  common  methods  and  criteria  with  regard  to  nuclear  safety  throughout  the 
enlarged EU.  

After the European Economic and Social Committee gave its opinion on 26 March 2003, both 
proposals were forwarded to the Council. In accordance with the procedure in Article 31 of 
the Euratom Treaty, the Council requested the opinion of the European Parliament. Debates 
took place within the ITRE subcommittee. The European Parliament adopted opinions on the 
proposals in its plenary session on 13 January 2004. The opinion of the European Parliament 
supports the approach taken by the Commission of endowing the enlarged EU with binding 
legislation  in  the  field  of  safety  of  nuclear  facilities  and  of  radioactive  waste  management. 
Parliament  adopted  a  number  of  amendments,  the  majority  of  which  were  acceptable  to  the 
Commission.  Subsequently,  revised  proposals31  were  elaborated  taking  into  account  certain 
amendments  brought  by  the  European  Parliament,  but  also  the  developments  of  the  texts 
following  the  discussions  within  the  Council.  The  main  request  of  the  European  Parliament 
concerned  the  financing  of  the  decommissioning  of  nuclear  facilities.  The  European 
Parliament  pointed  out  that  there  existed  among  Member  States  a  diversity  of  methods  to 
finance  decommissioning  operations  which  could  lead  to  distortions  of  competition  and  to 
discriminations between the producers of nuclear power. The Commission had stressed during 
the debates in the European Parliament the importance of this question in the context of the 
internal market of electricity. In October 2006 the Commission adopted a recommendation on 
the  use  of  decommissioning  funds32  which  is  the  basis  of  annual  reports  to  the  European 
Parliament on the subject. 

At  the  same  time,  both  proposals  were  discussed  in  the  Council,  under  the  Italian  and  Irish 
Presidencies. One of the problems encountered by delegations was the absence of clear safety 
standards to be used in conjunction with the directive. This obstacle is removed since 2006, 
when  WENRA  finalized  the  publication  of  safety  reference  levels  for  existing  nuclear 
reactors, which can be used by the Member States as a reference. An additional major concern 
expressed  by  the  Council  was  the  intention  of  the  Commission  to  create  a  body  of  safety 
inspectors, removing such competence from the national regulators. The budgetary provisions 
in the safety directive were designed for such purpose. It should be remarked that the current 
approach  reverses  this  point  completely,  leaving  the  nuclear  safety  inspections  solely  to  the 
national regulators. The Atomic Questions Group (AQG) referred the matter to the Permanent 
Representatives  Committee  in  November  2003  and  May  2004.  As  a  majority  allowing  the 
adoption or the rejection of both proposals for Directives was not possible to be obtained at 
the  Coreper  II  meeting  of  13  May  2004,  it  was  agreed  that  Council  conclusions  would  be 
worked out by consensus.  

Draft conclusions on nuclear safety and on the safety of the management of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste were agreed by Member States within the AQG and were adopted by 
the  Council  on  28  June  200433.  Subsequently,  as  a  consequence  of  the  June  2004  Council 
Conclusions, the WPNS was activated.  

In addition, in 2007, the Commission launched two initiatives to further debate the future of 
nuclear energy and to identify requirements for its development. The first is the HLG focusing 
on identifying safety issues for priority handling and recommending actions to be taken at EU 

31 
32 

33 

COM(2004) 526 final 
Commission  Recommendation  of  24  October  2006  on  the  management  of  financial  resources  for  the 
decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste, OJ L330, 28.11.2006. 
10823/04 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
                                                 
level. The second, the European Nuclear Energy Forum, intends to provide a platform for a 
broad and transparent stakeholder discussion on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. 

2.6. Subsidiarity  

The EU Member States have already implemented measures enabling them to achieve a high 
level  of  nuclear  safety  within  the  EU.  However,  because  of  the  different  historical 
backgrounds,  legal  frameworks,  type  and  number  of  reactors  and  different  approaches  to 
regulation,  common rules in the field  of nuclear safety to  be applied  across the Community 
have not yet been established, although this would lead to a further improvement of nuclear 
safety, which could not be achieved exclusively at national level.  

The  Community's  competence  to  set  up  basic  safety  standards  at  EU  level  is  explicitly 
regulated  in  the  Euratom  Treaty.  According  to  Art.  2,  letter  b)  of  the  Treaty,  "In  order  to 
perform  its  task,  the  Community  shall,  as  provided  in  this  Treaty:…establish  uniform  safety 
standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are 
applied." Title Two, Chapter 3 "Health and Safety", sets up a number of detailed provisions 
intended to establish, give effect and apply the basic standards mentioned in Article 2(b) of 
the  Euratom  Treaty.  Chapter  3  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  has  been  used  mainly  for  radiation 
protection purposes until the recognition by the European Court of Justice of the intrinsic link 
between  radiation  protection  and  nuclear  safety  and  of  the  Community  competence  in  the 
field  of  nuclear  safety  (in  its  Ruling  in  Case  C-29/99,  the  Court  stated  that  “it  is  not 
appropriate,  in  order  to  define  the  Community’s  competencies,  to  draw  an  artificial 
distinction between the protection of the health of the general public and the safety of sources 
of ionising radiation.”). Therefore, this Ruling acknowledges the fact that the existing safety 
standards aiming to the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from  ionizing  radiations have to be complemented with safety standards for 
nuclear installations, as well as that the technical competence of the national authorities with 
responsibility for safety does not preclude the Community from legislating in this connection. 

After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the problem of ensuring nuclear safety worldwide was 
addressed with new vigour, especially within the IAEA, under whose auspices the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety has been enacted. However, this Convention is a voluntary mechanism that 
does  no  allow  to  verify  the  Contracting  Parties'  compliance  with  its  rules.  In  the  current 
context  of  the  expansion  of  the  global  demand  for  nuclear  generation  which  has  a  trans-
national impact, enacting Community legislation recognising internationally endorsed nuclear 
safety principles and aiming to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety at EU level 
becomes  a  prerequisite  of  the  future  development  of  nuclear  energy.  Over  the  years,  the 
support for the elaboration of EU nuclear safety legislation has been constantly reflected by 
the Council and the European Parliament, and more recently by the European Nuclear Energy 
Forum.  A  revised  proposal  would  also  respond  to  the  expectations  of  citizens  that  consider 
nuclear  safety  an  essential  matter  to  be  handled  at  EU  level,  as  demonstrated  by  the  2007 
Eurobarometer.  Despite  this  support  and  despite  a  previous  proposal  in  the  area,  no  EU 
nuclear safety legislation is in force today.  

The new proposal reverses the top-down approach of the 2003/2004 proposal to a bottom-up 
one  and  encourages  Member  States'  cooperation,  as  for  the  safety  of  new  nuclear  power 
reactors,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  develop  additional  safety  requirements,  in  line 
with  the  continuous  improvement  of  safety  on  the  basis  of  the  safety  levels  developed  by 
WENRA and in close collaboration with the HLG. In addition, Member States retain the right 
to  impose  at  national  level  more  stringent  safety  measures  than  those  provided  for  in  the 
Community legal framework. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
Secondly,  at  the  level  of  principles  proposed,  the  revised  Directive  is  anchored  on  the 
competence  existing  in  the  Member  States'  regulatory  authorities,  as  well  as  on  the 
internationally  endorsed  principles  of  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  of  the  IAEA 
Safety  Fundamentals,  thus  not  imposing  any  additional  burden  on  the  Member  States' 
authorities. All the EU Member States and Euratom are Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on  Nuclear  Safety.  The  IAEA  safety  standards,  comprising  Safety  Fundamentals,  Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides, are binding on the IAEA for its own operations, are applied 
by other sponsoring organizations for their own operations, and are recommended for use by 
States and national authorities in relation to their own activities.  

EU binding legislation also provides legal certainty by opening the possibility for citizens to 
turn to the European institutions in case they feel unsafe about the safety of nuclear energy. 

Moreover, it should be mentioned that the new proposal takes fully into account the Member 
States'  views  expressed  during  the  examination  of  the  2003/2004  package,  by  decoupling 
safety  from  nuclear  waste  and  financial  issues,  as  well  as  by  removing  the  idea  to  create  a 
Community  body  of  safety  inspectors  and  leaving  the  responsibility  of  nuclear  safety 
inspections solely to the national regulators. 

SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES 

3.1. General objective 

The  general  objective  of  the  proposed  Directive  is  to  achieve,  maintain  and  continuously 
improve nuclear safety and its regulation in the Community and to add value by enhancing the 
role of the regulatory bodies. This would lead to the increase of the safety of the operation of 
NPPs,  the  sustainable  contribution  of  nuclear  energy  to  the  EU's  growing  energy  demands, 
ensuring a level playing field for new investment in NPPs, tackling the trans-boundary effects 
of  eventual  nuclear  incidents  by  creating  the  premises  of  a  unitary  and  coordinated  EU 
response, increasing the level of public acceptance of nuclear energy.  

Its  scope  of  application  is  the  design,  siting,  construction,  maintenance,  operation  and 
decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under 
the  legislative  and  regulatory  framework  of  the  Member  State  concerned.  Nuclear 
installations cover nuclear fuel fabrication plants, research reactors (including sub-critical and 
critical  assemblies),  nuclear  power  plants,  spent  fuel  storage  facilities,  enrichment  plants  or 
reprocessing facilities. 

In this context, it should be clarified that the transport of radioactive material falls outside the 
scope  of  the  revised  Directive  on  nuclear  safety.  The  recast  of  the  Community  regulatory 
framework  on  the  transport  of  radioactive  material  is  a  separate  item  on  the  Commission 
legislative agenda. 

3.2. Operational objectives/ principles 

Through  creating  a  Community  framework  for  Nuclear  Safety  the  following  operational 
objectives should be achieved: 

–  Enhancing the role of national regulators; 

–  Prime  responsibility  of  the  licence  holder  for  safety  under  the  control  of  the  regulatory 

body;  

–  Reinforcing the independence of the regulatory body; 

–  Ensuring a high level of transparency on issues related to the safety of nuclear installations;  

–  Implementation of management systems; 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
–  Regular safety supervision;  

–  Availability of nuclear safety expertise; 

–  Priority to safety. 

3.3. The consistency of these objectives with other EU policies  

The  development  of  a  Community  approach  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety,  supported  and 
complemented by national legislation, will have as a result the achievement of an increased 
level of protection of the health of workers and public, as well as of the environment, against 
radiation hazards. Therefore, it would contribute to the full achievement of the objectives of 
the Basic Safety Standards Directive, as well as of all the legislation in the area of radiation 
protection,  namely  protecting  the  workers  and  the  general  public  against  the  dangers  of 
ionising  radiation  without  unduly  limiting  the  beneficial  uses  of  the  practices  giving  rise  to 
radiation exposure. 

SECTION 4: POLICY OPTIONS 

Policy option 0 assumes that no additional rules in the field of nuclear safety are established 
at  Community  level,  in  order  to  harmonise  the  existing  approaches.  Option  0  would  leave 
things as they are. This is the business-as-usual scenario. 

Policy  option  1  assumes  the  elaboration  of  Community  legislation  that  has  the  objective  of 
establishing common safety standards for existing nuclear installations. This was the approach 
envisaged  in  the  process  of  elaboration  and  negotiation  of  the  Commission  proposal  for 
Council (Euratom) Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety 
of nuclear installations. 

Policy  option  2  assumes  the  elaboration  of  Community  legislation  that  sets  up  only  a 
common  framework  aiming  at  achieving  and  maintaining  a  high  uniform  level  of  nuclear 
safety  throughout  the  Community,  by  recalling  widely  recognised  principles  analysed  and 
confirmed  at  international  level.  The  implementing  guidelines  and  arrangements  will  be 
prepared at the level of the HLG that comprises high – level representatives of the regulatory 
and safety authorities from the EU Member States.  

Policy  option  3  is  built  upon  a  set  of  internationally-recognised  nuclear  safety  principles 
(approach proposed by Policy option 2), supplemented with additional safety requirements for 
new nuclear power reactors, which Member States are encouraged to develop in line with the 
principle of continuous improvement of safety, on the basis of the safety levels developed by 
WENRA and in close collaboration with the HLG.  

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
A presentation of the envisaged sharing of competencies between the EU, Member States and 
the HLG under this policy option is included in the table below.  

EU 

Member States 

HLG 

–  Setting  basic  nuclear  safety 
principles in the Directive; 

–  Transposing  the  Directive  in 

–  Focal  point  for  the  cooperation 

national law; 

of the national regulators; 

–  HLG secretariat; 

–  Supervising  the  implementation 
of  the  Directive,  including  non 
compliance cases. 

–  Cooperate  with 

the  Member 
States in the process of defining 
additional safety requirements; 

–  Upon  the  adoption  of  a  EU 
Directive  on  nuclear  safety,  the 
initial mandate of the HLG will 
be  revised  in  line  with  the  new 
legal framework. 

in 

–  Fulfilling  the  obligations  and 
requirements  set  up 
the 
nuclear  safety  EU  legislation 
and 
establishing 
(e.g. 
maintaining  a  legislative  and 
regulatory  system,  ensuring  the 
independence  of  the  regulatory 
body,  informing  the  public  on 
the  issues  related  to  nuclear 
safety,  respecting  the principles 
Safety 
of 
Fundamentals 
the 
obligations and principles of the 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety, 
developing, 
considered 
if 
appropriate,  additional  safety 
requirements);  

IAEA 

and 

the 

–  Sending HLG delegates; 

–  Cooperating  with  the  HLG  in 
defining 

the 
additional safety requirements; 

process 

of 

–  Collaborating within WENRA. 

SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

5.1. Policy option 0 – no policy change.  

a) Safety-related impact  

At the end of 2007, in EU-27 a total of 146 nuclear reactors are in operation in 15 Member 
States, totalling a capacity of 132 GWe. The average age of NPPs is approaching 25 years. In 
France, which has the largest fleet (59) of nuclear reactors accounting for nearly 80% of its 
electricity generation, and Lithuania, with only one NPP yet accounting for 70%, the average 
age is around 20 years. The UK fleet of 19 NPPs has an average age approaching 30 years, 
while in Germany the average age of their fleet of 17 operational NPPs is nearly 27 years34. 
Also, within the EU, some Member States have decided or planned to construct new nuclear 
reactors.  For  those  EU  countries  that  choose  to  continue  or  to  start  making  use  of  nuclear 
energy generation, Member States' Governments need to take the necessary decisions. In the 
current  context,  as  nuclear  safety  is  paramount  in  Member  States'  decision  on  whether  to 
continue  to  use  nuclear  energy,  being  also  the  foundation  upon  which  a  nuclear  power 
programme must be built upon, a Community nuclear safety approach represents an essential 
element  for  developing  a  sustainable  safety  infrastructure  at  the  national  level.  It  requires 
common or shared approaches, built on solid national and international experience. The lack 
of  such  a  common  framework  will  have  negative  effects  for  the  sustainability  of  nuclear 
energy at EU level. 

34 

source: update of COM (2007) 565 final data 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
The distribution of operational and planned shutdown for NPPs in the enlarged EU as well as 
potential new build, and the distribution of age of NPPs in the EU are presented in the figures 
below, as adopted by the Commission in October 2007. 

Figure 6 : EU 27 Operational & Shutdown NPPs by age

152 operational NPP 
(-3 from 31/12/06)

operational and to shutdown before
2025 in a 40y lifetime scenario

2 Under Construction (FI, RO)

67 actually Shutdown NPP 
(+3 from 31/12/06)

24

Nr

20

16

12

8

4

0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Age (at 1/11/06 or at SD)

Source TREN, PRIS

source: COM(2007) 565 final 

Figure 7 : Age (on 01/04/06) of NPPs in the EU

Oldest

Mean Age

Youngest

<————NPP in EU10+2———— >

more recent 
Plants
in NEW M S

<—————NPP in EU-15 ———— >

45

40

35

30
y
25

20

15

10

5

0

)
1
(

O
R

)
4
(

G
B

)
6
(
Z
C

)
6
(

K
S

)
1
(
T
L

)
4
(

U
H

)
1
(

I

S

Source PRIS

source: doc. COM(2007) 565 final 

b) Competitiveness impact 

)
3
2
(
0
1
-
U
E

)
9
2
1
(
5
1
-
U
E

)
9
5
(

R
F

)
8
(

P
S

)
7
1
(

E
G

)
7
(

E
B

)
4
(

I

F

)
0
1
(

E
S

)
3
2
(
K
U

)
1
(
L
N

)
8
4
1
(
5
2
-
U
E

)
2
5
1
(
7
2
-
U
E

Since  legislation  on  the  liberalisation  of  the  energy  market  has  been  enacted,  the  role  of 
governments  has  evolved  towards  creating  the  appropriate  framework  for  competition.  On 
liberalised markets, investment decisions are taken by investors and not by governments.  

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost  and  investment  risks  are  important  issues  when  considering  construction  of  nuclear 
reactors. Nowadays a new NPP involves an investment in the range of € 2 to 3.5 billion (for 
1000  MWe  to  1600  MWe  respectively)35.  It  is  essential  that  plans  for  both  new  and 
reinvigorated  nuclear  power  development  and  other  uses  of  nuclear  technology  are 
complemented  with  equally  ambitious  plans  for  the  establishment  and  enhancement  of 
sustainable safety infrastructures.  

Investments in new nuclear facilities require a stable legislative and political framework given 
the  time  lag  between  the  initial  investment  and  sizeable  returns.  Uncertainty  about  future 
electricity prices, market structure and conditions and about future energy and climate change 
policies poses a major risk to long-term investment in the energy sector. This is particularly 
important for nuclear energy, due to the high capital investment associated with construction 
of  a  new  NPP  and  the  relatively  long  period  before  any  such  investment  starts  to  show  a 
profit. In practical terms, investments of approximately 900 billion euros are estimated in the 
EU  energy  generation  with  a  2030  horizon.  As  far  as  nuclear  construction,  currently,  two 
1600 MWe European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) reactors are being built: in Finland (3rd Unit 
of  the  Olkiluoto  NPP)  and  at  Flamanville,  France;  expected  to  be  operational  by  2012. 
Finland is also starting the procedure for the possible construction of a 6th reactor, and EDF 
(France) is planning more EPR reactors by 2020-30. Other on-going, or firmly planned, new 
build in the EU are the two units of the Belene AES-92 VVER in Bulgaria, Units 3 and 4 of 
the  Mochovce  VVER  in  Slovakia,  and  Units  3  and  4  of  the  Cernavoda  CANDU  NPP  in 
Romania (unit-2 connected to the grid in 2007). In January 2008 the UK government gave the 
go ahead for new nuclear build, stating that nuclear power should play a role in providing the 
UK  with  clean,  secure  and  affordable  energy.  Italy  has  also  taken  a  decision  in  principle  to 
reconsider  nuclear  power  as  a  possible  energy  source.  It  is  therefore  important  to  try  to 
establish  firm  policy  frameworks  so  that  the  conditions  are  clear  and  predictable  for  new 
investments.  The  absence  of  an  EU  legislative  framework  creates  uncertainties  for  the 
investors.  

c) Social impact 

A factor to be taken into account, which influences the debate on the future of nuclear power, 
is the issue of public opinion, because of its impact on the political decisions to be taken and 
of the legitimate right of population to be involved. Public opinion and perception of nuclear 
power is paramount to the future of nuclear policy. It is essential that the public has access to 
reliable  information  and  can  participate  in  a  transparent  decision-making  process.  Public 
confidence and acceptance are inextricably tied to safety which itself has a direct impact on 
operating  the  facility  without  incidents.  The  active  participation  of  all  stakeholders  in  all 
appropriate  phases  of  a  NPP  project  is  essential.  They  are  very  visible  activities  that  need 
strong  involvement  from  all  stakeholders,  especially  citizens  who  are  directly  affected.  It  is 
essential that this involvement is established in a transparent way and that public trust in the 
project is established at the earliest stage.  

Until  now,  even  though  the  safety  and  reliability  record  of  EU  nuclear  power  is  excellent, 
nevertheless the public does not have the highest confidence in nuclear safety. According to 
the  Eurobarometer  on  nuclear  safety36,  most  citizens  think  that  they  are  not  well  informed 
about nuclear safety. Even if Europeans on average have a fair level of knowledge of nuclear 
issues, in particular whether or not there are NPP in their countries, they feel unfamiliar with 

35 
36 

COM(2007) 565 final 
Special Eurobarometer no 271 "Europeans and nuclear safety", Fieldwork Oct-Nov 2006, Publication 
Feb 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_271_en.pdf 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
the  issue  of  nuclear  safety  (ranging  from  56%  to  90%).  In  this  context,  it  should  be 
underlined the fact that even in countries with a high share of electricity produced from NPPs, 
the  percent  of  citizens  who  do  not  feel  informed  about  nuclear  safety-related  issues  is  high 
(e.g. France – 84%, Lithuania - 82%). 

source: Eurobarometer no 271 "Europeans and nuclear safety" 

In the light of the above considerations, an enlarged EU needs a common approach in the field 
of nuclear safety as the current system of each Member State operating its own set of safety 
rules  is  too  complicated  and  confuses  the  public’s  understanding  of  how  nuclear  safety  is 
regulated.  The  lack  of  a  common  nuclear  safety  framework  at  EU  level  can  have  negative 
effects on the public confidence in nuclear safety matters. 

5.2. Policy option 1 - Community legislation setting up common safety standards for existing 
nuclear installations 

The impact of this approach was already detailed in the Impact Assessment accompanying the 
previous Nuclear Safety proposal37 . As presented in 2004, this option was not acceptable to 
the Council. Therefore, only a short summary is given below. 

a) Safety-related impact  

The  Commission  has  actively  intervened  in  connection  with  the  harmonisation  of  nuclear 
safety  practices  for  over  25  years.  Despite  its  efforts,  nuclear  safety  measures  differ 
considerably from one Member State to another. It is necessary to consider nuclear safety in a 
Community  perspective.  The  Commission  concluded  that  only  a  common  approach  can 
guarantee  the  maintenance  of  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety  in  an  enlarged  EU.  This 
conclusion is still valid, while the implementation needs to be tailored to the existing safety 
arrangements in place in the Member States, in line with the subsidiarity principle. 

b) Competitiveness impact 

The beneficiaries of the proposed actions will be the operators of nuclear installations and the 
national  safety  authorities,  as  the  objective  of  the  proposal  is  to  introduce  basic  obligations 
and general principles for the safety of nuclear installations. 

37 

included in COM 2003/32 final 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
 
c) Social impact 

The public acceptance of nuclear energy may increase, in particular in Member States which 
have no nuclear industry or in which public confidence in national safety regulation is low.  

d) Environmental impact 

Policy option 1 has no direct environmental impact.  

e) Impact on the EU budget  

The financial impact is detailed in the 2003 Impact Assessment which estimated the following 
overall multi-annual estimate of expenditure at 247 000 euros, excluding staff costs. 

5.3.  Policy  option  2  –  Community  legislation  setting  up  a  common  framework  of 
internationally  recognised  principles,  supplemented  by  implementing  measures  prepared  by 
the HLG 

a) Safety-related impact  

All the technical analysis supporting the proposed reference principles and highlighting their 
role for the improvement of the safety culture has already been done at different expert levels 
(for a detailed description of their activity – see Annex of the present Impact Assessment).  

Also,  these  fundamental  nuclear  safety  principles  have  already  been  recognised  at 
international  level,  within  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  to  which  Euratom  and  all  the 
EU Member States are Contracting Parties and consequently, submit National Reports on the 
implementation  of  their  obligations  for  the  Review  Meetings  of  the  Parties.  Therefore, 
binding Community legislation recalling principles already unanimously endorsed at EU level 
would  only  add  value  to  the  existing  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  within  the 
Review Meetings that provide a forum for the exchange of good practices and information in 
the  field.  This  approach  is  also  endorsed  by  the  Council  in  the  WPNS  SG  1  Report38, 
according to which "The CNS process is an incentive approach for improving regulatory and 
safety  practices  in  a  general  sense  through  positive  examples,  questions  and  peer  review 
comments. In this way the CNS promotes harmonisation in the broad sense of the regulatory 
and  safety  issues  covered.  Especially  it  seems  to  have  been  an  efficient  driving  force  for 
improvements  of  the  legal  basis  and  the  regulatory  framework.  The  CNS  is  the  only 
international convention obliging parties to report on the status of nuclear power plant safety 
in  their  countries.  As  such  the  CNS  has  a  very  important  role  for  improvement  of  nuclear 
safety  worldwide,  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  all  states  with  operating  nuclear  power  plants 
now have ratified it." 

This approach is also supported by the May 2007 Council Conclusions on Safe management 
of  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  radioactive  waste,  which  identify  amongst  the  actions  related  to 
harmonised approaches, shared knowledge and joint efforts in the area of the safety of nuclear 
installations,  the  "Promotion  of  the  practical  use  of  current  international  contexts 
(Convention on Nuclear Safety, Joint Convention, IAEA, OECD/NEA, WENRA) at EU-level in 
terms  of  common  approaches  and  good  practices  to  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and 
how  the  results  are  used,  also  taking  into  account  the  interaction  between  the  different 
contexts. The work at EU-level has to build  on the existing high level of cooperation which 
shall be maintained and encouraged by EU Member States and the Commission." The same 
solution  is  also  proposed  in  the  Maldeikis  Report  on  Assessing  Euratom  –  50  Years  of 
European  nuclear  energy  policy,  where  the  European  Parliament,  after  underlining  the 

38 

15475/2/06 REV 2 ADD 1 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
                                                 
absence of appropriate EU legislation in the field of nuclear safety, "calls on the Commission 
to draw on the experience gained from implementing the conventions governed by the IAEA 
(Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  the  Joint  Convention  on  the  Safety  of  Spent  Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management) and to take account of the 
assessments, conducted by the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), of the most advanced 
national  practices  in  the  field  of  radioactive  waste  management;  notes  that  concerted 
initiatives, such as those carried out by the Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association 
(WENRA), to develop a joint approach to nuclear safety, are likely to help with drawing up a 
basis  for  legislation".  Also,  in  its  Opinion  on  the  Nuclear  Illustrative  Programme39,  the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  states  that  it  "agrees  with  the  Commission's 
present  view  that  the  common  nuclear  safety  reference  levels  and  their  appropriate 
implementation should be built on the extensive expertise of Member States' national nuclear 
safety authorities in collaboration within WENRA. Any other approach could possibly put in 
some member states the present high safety performances at risk".  

Moreover,  the  approach  under  review  recognises  the  principle  of  national  responsibility  for 
the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  in  a  Community  framework.  This  is  why  the  detailed 
implementing  rules  necessary  for  putting  into  practice  the  Community  framework  will  be 
prepared  within  a  formalised  forum,  the  HLG,  comprising  representatives  of  the  regulatory 
and safety authorities from all the EU Member States, on a “as needed” basis. This solution is 
fully in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity that requests the EU not to take action 
unless  Community  action  is  more  effective  than  action  taken  at  national,  regional  or  local 
level. 

b) Competitiveness impact 

Nuclear  power  has  traditionally  shown  a  combination  of  higher  construction  and  lower 
operating  costs  than  fossil-fuel-based  energy  production,  which  exhibits  lower  capital  costs 
but higher and potentially fluctuating fuel and, hence, operating costs.  

Nuclear construction lead times are, for engineering and licensing reasons, much longer than 
for combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) or renewable energy sources. 

The economic competitiveness of nuclear power depends on several factors, with construction 
times,  capital  costs,  waste  disposal,  decommissioning  and  the  operational  capacity  factor 
playing a key role. The private sector will be ultimately responsible for proposing, developing 
and  operating  new  NPPs.  Hence,  it  will  be  the  private  sector,  including  developers  and 
financial institutions, which will bear many of the procedural risks involved in furthering the 
nuclear option. Both private and public institutions would release loans only if safety features 
are accomplished by the applicant. Setting up a Community approach on nuclear safety, while 
maintaining rigorous safety and quality standards, will increase the competitiveness of nuclear 
energy,  by  allowing  shorter  and  more  predictable  licensing  processes,  thus  mitigating 
construction risks. 

The range of levelised costs of generating electricity, with 10% discount rates and C costs at 
30$/tCO2 (1€ = 1.25 $) is presented in the figure below.  

39 

2007/C 256/11 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Figure 11b: Electricity Generation Costs in High Discount rate Case

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

range on 

Capacity factor

80

70
Nuclear High 
60

50
Nuclear Low 

40

30

20

10

0

CO2 
Range 
Fuel 
O&M 
C&C 

CCGT

Coal Steam IGCC

– 
source: COM(2007) 565 final 

c) Social impact 

On 
Wind 

Shore 

Nuclear 

The elaboration of a common nuclear safety EU framework will have as a result the increase 
of the degree of public acceptance towards nuclear energy by efficiently addressing societal 
expectations on public access to information and public participation to the decision-making 
process,  in  the  context  of  nuclear  activities.  Such  an  approach  will  ensure  an  open  and 
transparent  communication of  the  Community with the public in the field of nuclear safety, 
especially having in view the results of the 2007 Eurobarometer on nuclear safety (for details, 
see the assessment of the social impact of Policy option 0).  

d) Environmental impact 

Within the concept of the European Atomic Energy Community, human beings (“workers and 
the  general  public”)  are  protected  against  the  dangers  arising  from  ionising  radiation  and 
aspects of the environment (water, air, soil) in so far as this is necessary to protect the human 
health.  In  this  context,  the  intrinsic  link  between  radiation  protection  and  nuclear  safety  is 
confirmed in the European Court of Justice judgement from 10 December 2002 in the Case C-
29/99,  according  to  which  “it  is  not  appropriate,  in  order  to  define  the  Community’s 
competencies,  to  draw  an  artificial  distinction  between  the  protection  of  the  health  of  the 
general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation.” 40 

In  the  area  of  nuclear  safety,  important  aspects  of  environmental  protection  go  beyond  the 
scope of the Euratom Treaty. However, there is a major environmental dimension.  

Nuclear installations and their operation present potential hazards and have to be managed in 
ways that ensure the protection of people and the environment, now and in the future, against 
the dangers arising from the ionising radiation which they emit. 

Technical  solutions  exist  that  meet  these  objectives  and  are  based  on  shared  common 
principles of a high level of safety. The continuing improvement and implementation of these 

40 

paragraph 82 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
solutions  and  principles  by  Member  States  should  ensure  that  a  uniformly  high  level  of 
protection within their respective territories is reached. 

However, policy option 2 has no direct environmental impact at this stage, as it proposes only 
a set of Community nuclear safety principles. Nevertheless, the environmental impacts of the 
future  implementing  measures  prepared  by  the  HLG  will  be  further  assessed  when 
appropriate.  

e) Impact on the EU budget  

No  impact  on  the  EU  budget  can  be  foreseen,  as  this  policy  option  proposes  only  a  set  of 
Community nuclear safety principles. Nevertheless, the HLG has in principle the possibility 
to  propose 
the  national 
administrations and/or the utilities operating NPPs or willing to put forward new investments. 
Such  cases  will  be  assessed  on  a  case  by  case  basis  if  and  when  specific  measures  are  put 
forward.  

implementing  measures  with  a  financial 

impact  on  both 

5.4.  Policy  option  3  -  Community  legislation  setting  up  a  common  framework  of 
internationally  recognised  principles,  obligations  and  requirements,  supplemented  with 
additional  safety  requirements  for  new  nuclear  power  reactors,  that  Member  States  are 
encouraged to develop. 

The  main  differences  of  this  proposed  approach  from  the  2003/2004  proposals  are  the 
following: 

–  Decoupling  from  waste  issues.  One  of  the  major  political  obstacles  of  the  previous 

proposals, the regulation of decommissioning funds, is not there anymore. 

–  Very strong powers of the regulators have been written down clearly, e.g. the power to shut 

an installation down. This will strengthen the position of regulators in the EU. 

–  The HLG did not exist at the time of the old proposals. In the new draft, it will become a 
focal  point  of  cooperation  between  national  regulators;  also,  if  deciding  to  define 
additional  safety  requirements  for  new  nuclear  power  reactors,  Member  States  should  us 
use the expertise of the HLG and work in close cooperation with it.. This upgrading of the 
HLG will closely involve the Member States and strengthen the national regulators, as the 
members come from the national regulatory bodies. 

a) Safety-related impact  

This  policy  option  has  as  a  foundation  the  conceptual  structure  of  Policy  option  2 
(establishing  at  EU  level  a  framework  of  basic  internationally  recognised  and  endorsed 
nuclear  safety  principles).  The  considerations  presented  for  the  assessment  of  the  safety 
impact of Policy option 2 apply mutatis mutandis for Policy option 3.  

The proposed Community framework on nuclear safety should aim to the achievement of the 
following internationally endorsed fundamental principles: 

Enhancing the role of the national regulators 

The  regulatory  body  should  be  provided  with  adequate  authority,  competence  and  financial 
and human resources to fulfil its responsibilities (e.g. supervision and regulation of the safety 
of nuclear installations, ensuring of the implementation of safety requirements, conditions and 
regulations,  granting  licences  and  monitoring  their  application).  This  principle  is  already 
endorsed  in  Article  8,  paragraph  1  of  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  as  well  as  in 
Principle 2 of the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
In this context, the safety measures and controls to be implemented in a nuclear installation 
shall be decided only by the regulatory body and subsequently realised by the licence holder.  

Also, in order to continuously improve the regulatory infrastructure, the regulatory body and 
the national regulatory structure should be subject to periodic international peer reviews.  

Enshrining in Community legislation such provision would only add value by supporting and 
strengthening the already existing competencies of the national regulatory bodies.  

Prime responsibility of the licence holder for safety under the control of the regulatory 
body  

The principle of the responsibility of the licence holder for the safety of a nuclear installation 
has already been widely accepted, as it is already recognised by the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety  (Article  9)  and  by  the  IAEA  Safety  Fundamentals  (Principle  1).  The  WPNS  SG1 
Report  also  concludes  that  "While  the  prime  responsibility for  implementing  the  defence-in-
depth rests with the licence holders (operators), the implementation has to be ensured by an 
effective national regulatory framework for nuclear safety."  

Reinforcing the independence of the regulatory body 

In order to facilitate autonomous decisions giving priority to nuclear safety, the independence 
of the regulatory body, effectively separated from any other organization tasked to promote, 
operate  nuclear  installations  or  justify  societal  benefits,  as  well  as  its  freedom  from  undue 
influence, must be ensured. A similar provision already exists in the CNS (Article 8 paragraph 
2) and in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals (Principle 2). 

One of the conclusions highlighted in the WPNS SG1 Report, in the section dedicated to the 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  to  the  assessment  of  its  review  meetings,  was  that  "the 
CNS process is providing incentives to improve national practices, and thus to harmonise at a 
high  level".  Furthermore,  it  is  stated  that  "a  development  has  taken  place  during  the  three 
review  processes 
to  broaden 
implementation  of  evolving  safety  concepts,  e.g.  safety  management,  and  to  further  develop 
conceptual issues, e.g. independence of regulatory bodies. The CNS has been a major driving 
force to harmonize the legal basis and the regulatory framework of the Contracting Parties 
(articles 7, 8, 9) and to provide adequate resources for the regulatory bodies and operators 
(article 11)." 

towards  a  common  understanding  of  safety 

issues, 

A revised nuclear safety proposal should follow the same approach and aim to reinforce the 
role  and  the  independence  of  the  national  regulatory  bodies  thereby  building  on  their 
competencies, rather than creating a top-down approach, as in the 2004 directive proposal.  

Ensuring  a  high  level  of  transparency  on  issues  related  to  the  safety  of  nuclear 
installations 

A  high  level  of  transparency  on  issues  relating  to  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  should 
consist in the provision of information to the public in an accurate and timely manner about 
important nuclear safety matters. 

Implementation of management systems 

A future EU framework should establish principles governing the licence holders' obligations. 
One of these principles is their obligation to put in place management systems, concept which 
is included in Principles 1 on the responsibilities of the licence holder and explained more in 
detail in Principle 3 of the IAEA Safety Fundamentals, according to which it "has to integrate 
all  elements  of  management  so  that  requirements  for  safety  are  established  and  applied 
coherently  with  other  requirements,  including  those  for  human  performance,  quality  and 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
security,  and  so  that  safety  is  not  compromised  by  other  requirements  or  demands.  The 
management  system  also  has  to  ensure  the  promotion  of  a  safety  culture,  the  regular 
assessment  of  safety  performance  and  the  application  of  lessons  learned  from  experience". 
Such management systems should be regularly verified by the regulatory body  

Regular safety supervision 

Nuclear  safety  supervision  (assessments,  investigations,  control  and  enforcement  actions) 
carried out by the regulatory body throughout the whole lifetime of installations responds to 
the obligation of assessment and verification of safety set up in Article 14 of the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety. In order to strengthen the powers of European regulators, a EU Directive 
should provide for extended regulatory powers in the interest of safety, by clearly spelling that 
in case of serious or repeated safety rules breaches, the regulatory body shall have the power 
to withdraw the operating licence, to order the stop of operations of any plant if it deems that 
safety is not fully guaranteed as well as to allow the restart of operation.  

Availability of nuclear safety expertise 

The availability of nuclear safety experts is an extremely important issue which comes up at 
every international meeting concerned with nuclear safety. The past decades have not trained 
enough  specialists,  so  that  there  is  also  the  problem  of  aging  of  safety  personnel  and 
inspectors, of which many are approaching retirement. This is an area where the Community 
can  assist  with  helping  trans-national  cooperation  and  training.  The  obligation  to  ensure  the 
availability of sufficient and qualified staff is also recognised in Article 11 paragraph 2 of the 
CNS.  WPNS  SG1  Report  noted  on  human  resources  that  "To  develop  and  maintain  an 
effective defence-in-depth of a nuclear facility, an appropriate operating organisation with an 
effective management system has to be in place, providing a strong management commitment 
to  safety  and  a  strong  safety  culture.  This  means  e.g.  that…sufficient  number  of  adequately 
trained staff is available". 

Priority to safety 

The  main  aim  of  the  Member  States'  legislative  and  regulatory  systems  should  be  the 
achievement  of  the  highest  level  of  safety  in  nuclear  installations.  This  objective  is  also 
provided for in Article 10 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 

Moreover, the possibility of Member States to impose at national level more stringent safety 
measures should be provided in the Community legislation. A similar legal provision is also 
included in Article 54 of the Basic Safety Standards Directive, "If a Member State is to adopt 
dose  limits  which  are  stricter  than  those  laid  down  in  this  Directive,  it  shall  inform  the 
Commission and the Member States" 

Until  now,  the  safety  and  reliability  record  of  EU  NPPs  is  excellent.  Nevertheless,  since 
nuclear power provides one third of Europe’s electricity and the typical initial design life of 
an NPP is currently 40 years, currently, decisions are required on extension of the life of some 
plants, where safely possible, or on new investments, in order to meet the expected demand 
and to replace ageing infrastructure over the next 20 years. A significant number of NPPs are 
indeed due to close down within the next 20 years. Taking into account the current EU energy 
mix,  if  the  planned  phase-out  policy  in  some  EU  Member  States  is  maintained,  without 
extending  plant  lifetime  and/or  new  construction,  nuclear  energy's  share  of  electricity 
production  will  be  significantly  reduced.  In  this  context,  policy  option  3  aims  to  go  further 
than setting up a set of nuclear safety principles and it encourages Member States to establish 
additional safety requirements for the safety of the new power reactors, taking as a basis the 
WENRA safety levels and in close cooperation with the HLG. The WENRA Reactor Safety 
safety  levels  cover  a  wide  range  of  fields  covering  Safety  Policy,  Operating  Organisation, 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
Management  System,  Training  and  Authorization  of  NPP  staff,  Design  Basis  Envelope  for 
Existing Reactors, Design Extension of Existing Reactor, Safety Classification of Structures, 
Systems and Components, Operational Limits and Conditions, Ageing Management, System 
for  Investigation  of  Events  and  Operational  Experience  Feedback,  Maintenance,  In-service 
inspection  and  Functional  Testing,  Emergency  Operating  Procedures  and  Severe  Accident 
Management  Guidelines,  Contents  and  updating  of  Safety  Analysis  Report,  Contents  and 
updating  of  Safety  Analysis  Report,  Probabilistic  Safety  Analysis,  Periodic  Safety  Review, 
Plant Modifications, On-site Emergency Preparedness, Protection against Internal Fires.  

A  projection  of  the  expected  nuclear  capacity  to  provide  the  nuclear  share  of  electricity 
generation in the EU assuming planned closedown of reactors and potential lifetime extension 
or/and new build is presented below. 

Figure 5 : Evolution of nuclear production capacity  vs 
forcasted nuclear share of the primary energy demand (EU-25)

140

120

100

)
e
(
W
G

WNO'06  
APS 
scenario

,
y
t
i
c
a
p
a
c
d
e

l
l

a
t
s
n
I

Existing, calculated from PRIS (IAEA)
data with 40 Y lifetime*

World Nuclear Outlook 2006 (WNO'06)

With lifetime extention and/or new build

Nuclear share in Primary Energy demand

80

60

40

20

0

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

e
r
a
h
s
r
a
e
c
u
N

l

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

* from PRIS data, considering actual constructions + Life Extention when applicable, and 32Y German Phasing out

Sources PRIS; European Energy & Transport, Trends to 2030, update 2005 (L Mantzos & P Capros) and World Energy Outlook 2006

source: COM(2007) 565 final 

b) Competitiveness impact  

The considerations presented for the assessment of the safety impact of Policy option 2 also 
apply mutatis mutandis for Policy option 3.  

c) Social impact 

The considerations presented for the assessment of the safety impact of Policy option 2 also 
apply for Policy option 3.  

d) Environmental impact 

The considerations presented for the assessment of the safety impact of Policy option 2 also 
apply for Policy option 3.  

e) Impact on the EU budget  

No  additional  financial  burden  for  the  EU  budget,  as  the  licence  holder  should  possess  the 
adequate financial resources for fulfilling its nuclear safety obligations.  

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 6: COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

By comparing the individual impacts per option, the following conclusions can be drawn from 
the Impact Assessment: 

Policy  option  0  can  not  be  accepted,  taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  absence  of 
Community legislation would be prejudicial to Community citizens and to the interest of the 
enlarged EU. Despite a certain degree of harmonisation, today the nuclear safety procedures 
and practices still vary from one Member State to another and this diversity of measures does 
not  allow  the  Community  to  satisfy  itself  that  the  health  protection  requirements  of  Article 
2(b)  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  are  applied  in  the  most  effective  way.  Therefore,  Community 
intervention  is  indispensable  to  guarantee  the  maintenance  of  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety 
within the EU. 

Policy  option  1  was  considered  for  the  elaboration  of  the  proposal  of  Directive  setting  out 
basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations. Having in view 
the  fact  that  the  proposals  of  the  Nuclear  Safety  Package  have  not  been  adopted  by  the 
Council until present, this Policy option has not proved to be a feasible one in the light of the 
necessity  to  achieve  a  progress  in  developing  an  EU  harmonised  approach  in  the  area  of 
nuclear safety. Nevertheless, it should be underlined the fact that, although not yet adopted, 
those  proposals  have  set  in  motion  a  process  leading  to  greater  awareness  of  the  need  to 
establish a Community framework linking the work of national safety authorities. 

Policy option 2 is completely in line with the conclusions adopted by the Council of EU, as 
well as by the European Council, requesting that nuclear safety should be exercised in an EU-
framework (see Section 2.5). However, in order to achieve a progress in developing nuclear 
safety  at  EU  level,  the  proposed  Community  framework  should  not  be  restricted  simply  to 
taking over a set of basic principles. 

In  the  framework  of  the  above  considerations,  Policy  option  3  appears  to  be  the  preferred 
approach, as it presents the highest range the benefits, by going beyond the level of principles  

A comparative overview of the impacts is presented in the table below.  

Environmental 
impact 

Impact on 
the EU 
budget 

- 

- 

Table: Impact Assessment: Overview of the impacts 

Policy 
option 

Safety impact 

Competitiveness 
impact 

Social impact 

Option 0 

Business as 
usual (no 
policy 
change)  

- Absence of a 
harmonised nuclear 
safety Community 
framework. 

- The safety of 
nuclear installations 
is the responsibility 
of the nuclear 
operators under the 
supervision of their 
national authorities. 

- Different national 
regulatory systems. - 
Member States' 
measures differ 
considerably from 
one MS to another. 

-The most crucial 
factor affecting the 
prospect of growth of 
nuclear power is its 
underlying economics 
as a NPP involves an 
up front investment 
ranging from €2 to 
€3.5 billion. 

-The EU recognises 
the importance of 
maintaining a 
technological lead in 
the field of nuclear 
energy 

- The absence of an 
EU framework 
establishing a 

- One of the 
driving factors of 
the future 
development of 
nuclear energy is 
public 
acceptance. 

- According to the 
2007 survey on 
nuclear safety, the 
European citizens 
feel unfamiliar 
with the issue of 
nuclear safety 
(ranging from 
56% to 90%). 

- The existence of 
national 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
 
Policy 
option 

Safety impact 

Competitiveness 
impact 

Social impact 

Environmental 
impact 

Impact on 
the EU 
budget 

comparable level of 
nuclear safety 
between the Member 
States will create 
uncertainties for the 
investors.  

regulatory 
systems will only 
perpetuate the 
current lack of 
information in the 
field. 

-The beneficiaries of 
the proposed actions 
will be the operators 
of nuclear installations 
and the national safety 
authorities, as the 
objective of the 
proposal is to 
introduce basic 
obligations and 
general principles for 
the safety of nuclear 
installations. 

-The public 
acceptance of 
nuclear energy 
may increase, in 
particular in 
Member States 
which have no 
nuclear industry 
or in which public 
confidence in 
national safety 
regulation is low.  

- To meet the 
increasing energy 
demand and to 
reduce European 
dependency on 
imports, decisions 
should be made on 
new investments or 
on the life extension 
of some plants. 

- The lack of a 
common nuclear 
safety approach will 
have a negative 
effect on the long 
term on the future 
development of 
nuclear energy at 
EU level. 

-Nuclear safety 
measures differ 
considerably from 
one Member State 
to another.  

-It is necessary to 
consider nuclear 
safety in a 
Community 
perspective.  

-Implementation 
needs to be tailored 
to the existing 
safety arrangements 
in place in the 
Member States, in 
line with the 
subsidiarity 
principle. 

Option 1 

Community 
legislation 
aiming to 
establish 
common 
safety 
standards for 
existing 
nuclear 
installations 

Option 2 

Community 
legislation 
setting up a 
common 
nuclear 
safety 
framework 
(widely 
recognised 
principles) + 
implementin

- Set of widely 
recognised nuclear 
safety principles, 
enshrined in the 
IAEA Convention 
on Nuclear Safety: 

- Euratom and all 
the Member States 
are Contracting 
Parties to the 
Convention 
(subsequently, they 

- The establishment of 
a common approach 
in the field of nuclear 
safety will lead to the 
increase of the nuclear 
energy' 
competitiveness, by 
reducing the industry's 
investment risks 

The elaboration 
of a common 
nuclear safety EU 
framework will 
have as a result 
the increase of 
the degree of 
public acceptance 
towards nuclear 
energy 

-Policy option 
1 has no direct 
environmental 
impact at this 
stage, as it 
proposes only 
a set of 
Community 
nuclear safety 
principles.  

-Nevertheless, 
there may be a 
substantial 
beneficial 
impact 
resulting from 
the future 
implementing 
measures 
prepared by 
the HLG. 

- No direct 
environmental 
impact (this 
Policy option 
proposes only 
a set of 
Community 
nuclear safety 
principles).  

-The 
environmental 
impacts of the 

- 
Estimations 
the 
of 
overall 
multi-
annual 
estimate  of 
247 000 
euros, 
excluding 
staff costs. 

- No impact 
on the EU 
budget can 
be foreseen, 
as this 
policy 
option 
proposes 
only a set of 
Community 
nuclear 
safety 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
option 

Safety impact 

Competitiveness 
impact 

Social impact 

Environmental 
impact 

g measures 
prepared by 
the HLG 

elaborate National 
Reports and 
participate at the 
regular Review 
Meetings). 

- Implemented rules 
prepared by the 
HLG (comprising 
high-level 
representatives of 
the regulatory and 
safety authorities 
from all the EU 
Member States) → 
subsidiarity 
principle. 

future 
implementing 
measures 
prepared by 
the HLG will 
be further 
assessed when 
appropriate.  

- See the 
considerations 
from Policy 
option 2. 

- See the 
considerations 
from Policy 
option 2. 

-See the 
considerations from 
Policy option 2. 

- See the 
considerations from 
Policy option 2. 

-  

-Additional 
element: Member 
States are 
encouraged to 
define additional 
safety requirements 
for new nuclear 
power reactors, 
using as a basis the 
WENRA safety 
standards and in 
cooperation with 
the HLG. 

Option 3 

Community 
legislation 
setting up a 
common 
framework 
of 
international
ly 
recognised 
principles, 
obligations 
and 
requirement
s, 
supplemente
d with 
additional 

Impact on 
the EU 
budget 

principles.  

- 
Nevertheles
s, the HLG 
has in 
principle 
the 
possibility 
to propose 
implementi
ng 
measures 
with a 
financial 
impact on 
both the 
national 
administrati
ons and/or 
the utilities 
operating 
NPPs or 
willing to 
put forward 
new 
investments
. Such cases 
will be 
assessed on 
a case by 
case basis if 
and when 
specific 
measures 
are put 
forward.  

No 
additional 
financial 
burden for 
the EU 
budget, as 
the licence 
holder 
should 
possess the 
adequate 
financial 
resources 
for 
fulfilling its 
nuclear 
safety 
obligations 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
option 

Safety impact 

Competitiveness 
impact 

Social impact 

Environmental 
impact 

Impact on 
the EU 
budget 

safety 
requirement
s for new 
nuclear 
power 
reactors, that 
Member 
States are 
encouraged 
to develop. 

SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The  indicators  of  progress  towards  meeting  the  objectives  will  be  set  up  at  the  level  of  the 
Member States, solution which is in full compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and it 
does not hamper the principle of the national responsibility for nuclear safety. 

An  additional  monitoring  of  the  Directive's  results  will  be  achieved  by  means  of  the  HLG 
obligation set up in its founding Commission Decision to regularly submit to the Commission 
a  report  of  its  activities.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  shall  transmit  this  report  to  the 
European Parliament and the Council. 

As an additional remark, it should be noted that the reporting of the health protection of the 
public and workers falls outside the scope of the current revised Directive, as it is covered by 
the radiation protection acquis. Also, there are health-related reporting mechanisms under the 
International  Nuclear  Event  Scale  (INES  scale)  which  represents  a  means  for  promptly 
communicating to the public in consistent terms the safety significance of events reported at 
nuclear installations. Events are classified on the Scale at 7 levels; the upper levels (4−7) are 
termed  accidents  and  the  lower  levels  (1−3)  incidents.  In  addition,  monitoring  of  air,  water 
and soil are established in Articles 35-36 of the Euratom Treaty and regularly carried out by 
the Commission services. 

ANNEX 

Overview of the consultations and technical expertise supporting the approach of the 
proposed Directive setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety 

1. CONSULTATIONS  ON  THE  NECESSITY  OF  A COMMUNITY NUCLEAR SAFETY  LEGISLATIVE 

FRAMEWORK 

1.1 Consultations under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty 

Article  31  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  defines  the  procedure  for  the  adoption  of  the  basic  safety 
standards provided for in Article 30 for the protection of the health of workers and the general 
public  against  the  dangers  arising  from  ionising  radiation.  According  to  the  Treaty,  these 
standards shall be worked out by the Commission after it has obtained the opinion of a group 
of  persons  appointed  by  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Committee  from  among  scientific 
experts, and in particular public health experts in the Member States. Also, the Commission 
shall obtain the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on these basic standards. 

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36 

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In  relation  to  the  first  consultation,  the  Commission  submitted  in  2002  its  draft  legislative 
proposals to the Article 31 Group of experts. The Group of experts supported the Commission 
initiatives and urged it to continue its efforts as regards harmonisation. The discussions within 
the  group  made  it  possible  to  clarify  some  inaccuracies.  Texts  were  therefore  amended  in 
order  to  take  into  account  constructive  criticisms  formulated  by  the  Group  of  experts. 
Subsequently, the 2003 opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee concluded 
that the Committee "reaffirms the basic obligation of the Member States and the Community 
to  guarantee  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and  the  disposal  of  radioactive  waste; 
fundamentally endorses the Commission's initiative to achieve this, in particular also with a 
view to harmonising regulatory systems and in anticipation of enlargement". 

1.2. Stakeholders consultation 

In  addition  to  the  consultations  resulting  from  the  legislative  procedure  provided  for  in  the 
Euratom Treaty, the Commission carried out numerous consultations, with both the national 
authorities and industry, individually or collectively through various fora. Consultations were 
also  undertaken  with  international  organizations,  such  as  the  IAEA  and  the  NEA.  The 
Commission  took  also  advantage  of  its  participation  in  various  international  meetings  to 
present its plans for EU regulation in the field of nuclear safety. On this point, the following 
events should in particular be rated:  

–  European Nuclear Society Conference (France, October 2002);  

–  International Conference  on  issues and trends in radioactive waste management (Austria, 

December 2002);  

–  International  conference  on  waste  disposal  in  geological  formations  (France,  January 

2003);  

–  International waste management symposium (the United States, February 2003);  

–  Nuclear waste, second parliamentary meeting (France, March 2003);  

–  Meeting  with  the  Group  of  European  municipalities  with  nuclear  facilities  (Belgium, 

March 2003);  

–  Conference  organized  by  the  “Consejo  de  seguridad  nuclear”  in  San  Lorenzo  de  El 

Escorial (Spain, July 2003);  

–  General  assembly  of  the  World  association  of  Nuclear  Operators  –WANO  -  (Germany, 

October 2003);  

–  International  symposium  on  the  harmonization  of  nuclear  safety  approaches  (Germany, 

October 2003);  

–  Eurosafe 2003 (France, November 2003);  

–  The European discussions: nuclear waste management (France, November 2003);  

–  International conference on geological repositories (Sweden, December 2003);  

–  Energy choices for Europe 2004 (Belgium, March 2004);  

–  Euradwaste (Luxembourg, March 2004);  

–  First parliamentary meeting on nuclear energy (Belgium, April 2004);  

–  Meetings of WPNS (2004-2006); 

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37 

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–  Meetings  of  the  Nuclear  Regulators’  Working  Group  (NRWG),  Reactor  Safety  Working 
Group  (RSWG)  and  CONCERTation  on  European  Regulatory  Tasks  (CONCERT), 
presented below (2005-2006); 

–  4 meetings of the HLG (2007-2008); 

–  3 meetings of the European Nuclear Energy Forum (2007-2008). 

These  various  meetings  made  it  possible  to  present  the  legislative  proposals  and  to  follow 
their  development  throughout  the  discussion  process  with  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council.  

2. OVERVIEW OF THE ACTIVITY OF EXPERT GROUPS IN THE FIELD OF THE HARMONIZATION 

OF NUCLEAR SAFETY APPROACHES 

2.1. NRWG and RSWG 

The  Commission  has  worked  with  the  support  of  expert  groups  for  more  than  30  years  and 
has launched many studies and initiatives in the field of nuclear safety. In order to pursue the 
objectives  of  the  1975  Council  Resolution  on  the  technological  problems  of  nuclear  safety, 
the  Commission  set  up  two  expert  groups  dealing  with  nuclear  installation  safety.  The 
NRWG,  which  met  last  in  June  2005,  includes  representatives  of  nuclear  regulatory 
authorities from EU Member States and Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
RSWG, which included all the EU regulatory bodies and industry, was discontinued in 1998. 

Their  approach  to  harmonisation  consisted  in  a  comparison  of  national  practices, 
identification  of  common  features,  and  analysis  of  the  safety  relevance  of  differences. 
Common  technical  opinions  were  expressed  on  certain  safety  issues,  and,  while  these  were 
not  safety  "standards",  they  were  expected  to  promote  good  practices.  Activities  of  both 
Groups  included  safety  aspects  of  ageing,  applications  of  risk-based  approaches  and 
innovative  technologies.  These  activities  were  widely  documented  and  published  either  as 
technical  publications,  or  as  Communications  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament. 
The outcome of the work of these expert groups has provided a sound technical background, 
which can be fully valorised by setting up a framework at EU level, establishing a common 
approach in the field of nuclear safety regulation.  

2.2. CONCERT 

The CONCERT Group, formed in 1992, was a forum that brought together EU, Central and 
Eastern  European  Countries  and  Newly  Independent  States  nuclear  regulators  to  share 
experience and to enhance the progress of assistance and co-operation programmes in general. 
Among  its  other  activities,  the  discussions  within  this  group  significantly  contributed  to 
achieving  the  objectives  of  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  by  forming  a  common 
regulatory view on nuclear safety issues and developing the safety culture. The group held its 
last meeting in 2005. 

2.3. WENRA  

In  February  1999,  the  heads  of  the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Authorities  of  Western  European 
countries with NPPs decided to create WENRA. The aim of WENRA was to improve nuclear 
safety, thus pursuing, among others, the objective of developing a "harmonised approach to 
selected  nuclear  safety  and  radiation  protection  issues  and  their  regulation,  in  particular 
within the European Union"41. The terms of reference of WENRA were signed by the chief 
nuclear  regulators  of  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain, 

41 

WENRA Policy Statement, signed in Stockholm in December 2005 

EN 

38 

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Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The main objectives of WENRA at that time 
were  to  develop  a  common  approach  to  nuclear  safety  and  to  provide  an  independent 
capability to examine nuclear safety in the applicant countries. 

In March 2003, WENRA extended its membership to the heads of the Regulatory Authorities 
of all the then EU Candidate Countries with nuclear power programmes. The revised terms of 
reference  were  signed  by  the  chief  regulators  of  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Hungary, 
Lithuania,  Romania,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia,  in  addition  to  the  earlier  members.  After  2003, 
the objectives of the co-operation within WENRA were extended, so that it would become a 
network  of  chief  nuclear  safety  regulators  in  Europe,  exchanging  experience  and  discussing 
significant safety issues. 

In order to harmonise safety approaches, two working groups were launched. The mandate of 
the working groups was to analyse the current situation and the different safety approaches, 
compare individual national regulatory approaches with the IAEA Safety Standards, identify 
any  differences  and  propose  a  way  forward  to  possibly  eliminate  the  differences  without 
impairing the final resulting level of safety. 

The  Reactor  Harmonisation  Working  Group  (RHWG),  consisting  of  experts  from  the 
WENRA organisations, was established in 2000. During 2000-2002, the group carried out a 
pilot study to develop and test a methodology for making systematic comparisons of national 
requirements on selected reactor safety issues and to arrive at conclusions about what needs to 
be  addressed  at  the  national  levels  in  order  to  reach  common  safety  levels.  A  main  study 
started  in  2003  with  basically  the  same  methodology  as  the  pilot  study  and  with  additional 
issues to be covered. 

Another  WENRA  working  group,  the  Working  Group  on  Waste  and  Decommissioning 
(WGWD), has looked into harmonisation of the areas of nuclear waste and spent fuel storage 
and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. 

In January 2006, two reports on reference levels in these areas were published. In connection 
with publishing, WENRA invited stakeholders to comment on the reports. 

As a result, WENRA members have defined many common safety reference levels for power 
reactors with a view to align national requirements by the year 2010. 

A  first  revision  of  the  reference  levels  related  to  reactor  safety  has  been  published  by 
WENRA in January 2007, as a result of comments by stakeholders on the report published in 
January 2006. 

The RHWG has given further consideration to some issues raised by the stakeholders. As a 
result of this work, WENRA members have decided to slightly modify some reference levels 
to further clarify their intent. A revision of the RHWG Safety Reference Levels was published 
in March 2007. 

In  January  2008,  WENRA  published  a  new  revision  of  the  reference  levels  applicable  to 
reactor safety, reflecting the work of the RHWG to propose a revised set of reference levels 
on  issue  C-  "Management  Systems"  as  well  as  the  commitment  of  WENRA  to  revise  the 
reference levels when new knowledge and experience are available. 

One of the tasks entrusted to the WPNS was to asses the WENRA reports and action plans. In 
this  context,  SG1  analysed  the  WENRA  Report  on  Harmonisation  of  safety  approaches  for 
Nuclear  Power  Reactors  while  SG2  evaluated  the  WENRA  Report  on  Harmonisation  of 
safety  approaches  for  Waste  and  Decommissioning.  The  issues  investigated  covered  the 
extent of harmonised approaches to safety requirements and implementation, indicated by the 
benchmarking  results  for  the  studied  issues,  and  the  measures  to  accomplish  harmonised 

EN 

39 

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approaches  for  the  issues  presented  in  the  WENRA  studies  that  are  included  in  the  agreed 
action  plans.  As  a  result,  one  of  the  conclusions  of  the  WPNS  –  SG1  Report  is  that  the 
"WENRA methodology is a systematic, documented and logical approach to harmonisation".  

2.4. WPNS  

Following the Council Conclusions on Nuclear Safety and Safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive  waste,  reached  in  June  2004,  a  wide  ranging  consultation  process  was  initiated, 
aiming to identify new instrument(s) that can contribute more effectively to further improving 
nuclear safety and the safety of the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, without 
excluding  any  instrument,  in  the  framework  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  in  line  with  the 
principles of better law making. 

Subsequently, as a consequence of the June 2004 Council Conclusions, after long negotiations 
on the Commission's proposals for Council (Euratom) Directives setting out basic obligations 
and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations and on the management of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste, WPNS was activated by the WPAQ. 

The  Council  Conclusions  call  for  an  “extensive  consultation”  with  stakeholders  before  any 
instruments in these fields are developed in the framework of the Euratom Treaty. According 
to the  Conclusions,  a  basis  needs  to  be developed for the consultation process, in particular 
taking  into  account  the  work  conducted  by  national  nuclear  regulatory  authorities  to  reach 
harmonised safety approaches. Furthermore, the Conclusions request Member States together 
with  the  Commission  "to  engage  in  a  wide  ranging  consultation  process  facilitating  the 
choice  of  instrument(s),  in  the  framework  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  that  can  contribute  more 
effectively to achieving nuclear safety and the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste, without excluding any instrument and in line with the principles of Better law making."  
On 3 December 2004, the WPAQ agreed on an Action Plan42 for following up on the Council 
Conclusions. This Action plan identified three main action areas: 

–  Actions in relation with the safety of nuclear installations; 

–  Actions in relation with safety of the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste; 

–  Actions in relation with the financing of the decommissioning of nuclear installations and 

safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 

The Work Programme43 of WPNS established three subgroups to address the tasks identified 
therein. The subgroups were assessing the following fields: 

Subgroup 1 (SG1) was assigned the area of Nuclear Installation Safety. 

Subgroup  2  (SG2)  was  assigned  the  area  of  safety  of  the  management  of  spent  fuel  and 
radioactive waste (including decommissioning). 

Subgroup  3  (SG3)  was  assigned  the  area  of  financing  of  the  decommissioning  and 
dismantling  of  nuclear  installations  and  financing  the  safe  management  of  spent  fuel  and 
radioactive waste.  

The final WPNS Report, comprising overall conclusions and recommendations, was approved 
by  the  WPAQ  on  13  December  2006.  The  detailed  methodology,  organisation  of  work  and 
data  collection,  detailed  results  from  data  collection  and  analysis,  and  justification  for  the 

42 
43 

15955/04 
5574/2/05 REV 2 

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40 

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conclusions  and  recommendations  are  presented  in  the  attached  reports  produced  by  the 
established subgroups. The main sources of the Reports are the following: 

–  International Conventions (Convention on Nuclear Safety, Joint Convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management) review 
process; 

–  WENRA44 reports and action plans; 

–  National use of the IAEA Safety Requirements; 

–  Harmonised approaches to nuclear safety, safe management of spent fuel and radioactive 

waste reached within the work of NEA45/CNRA46, RWMC47, CSNI48; 

–  Harmonised approaches to nuclear safety, safe management of spent fuel and radioactive 

waste reached as a result of Community activities; 

–  Study  of  financial  arrangements  for  decommissioning  and  the  management  of  spent  fuel 

and radioactive waste. 

2.5. HLG 

In  10  January  2007,  the  Commission  adopted  a  draft  Nuclear  Illustrative  Programme  that 
proposed the establishment of a High Level Group on nuclear safety, waste management and 
decommissioning.  The  Brussels  European  Council  from  March  2007  endorsed  the 
Commission's  proposal  to  establish  an  EU  High  Level  Group  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  Waste 
Management.  The  Council  Conclusions  of  May  2007  on  Nuclear  Safety  and  Safe 
Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste paved the way for the creation of 
the  HLG.  The  conclusions  were  adopted  based  on  the  results  of  the  work  carried  by  the 
WPNS; they set out a list of possible actions, acknowledging that any new initiatives at the 
EU  level  should  be  assessed  against  their  potential  contribution  to  the  whole  system  of 
existing efforts. The actions are connected with the safety of nuclear installations, the safety 
of  the  management  of  spent  fuel  and  radioactive  waste  as  well  as  the  financing  of  the 
decommissioning  of  nuclear  installations  and  the  safe  management  of  spent  fuel  and 
radioactive waste. The European Parliament subsequently adopted the 50 years of European 
nuclear  energy  policy  report,  wherein  it  regretted  the  absence  of  binding  legislation  in  the 
nuclear safety domain and urged the Commission and the Council to take the necessary steps 
for  it,  taking  note  of  the  initiative  to  establish  a  High  Level  Group.  On  12  July  2007,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee also adopted a favourable Opinion on the content 
of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme. 

the  Commission  Decision  of  17 

The  HLG  was  established  by 
July  2007 
(2007/530/Euratom49). According to the Commission Decision, the HLG shall assist the EU 
institutions  in  progressively  developing  common  understanding  and  eventually  additional 
European  rules  in  the  fields  of  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and  the  safety  of  the 
management  of  spent  fuel  and  radioactive  waste.  The  HLG  may  set  up  working  groups  or 
subgroups  to  study  specific  subjects  and  it  shall  every  two  years  submit  a  report  of  its 
activities to the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. With its actions, the 

44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 

http://www.wenra.org 
Nuclear Energy Agency (of the OECD) 
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (NEA) 
Radioactive Waste Management Committee (NEA) 
Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (NEA) 
O.J. L 195 , 27/07/2007 P. 0044 - 0046 

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HLG  shall  optimise  the  efforts  and  results  which  Euratom  and  its  Members  States  achieve, 
inter alia, at the IAEA and the OECD NEA. The HLG comprises the Heads of the national 
regulatory or nuclear safety authorities of the 27 Member States.  

By setting up the HLG, the technical work of WENRA in the field of harmonization will be 
widened in a more formal framework, in association with representatives of the non nuclear 
countries of the EU. The importance of the activity carried on at WENRA level is recognised 
and stressed in the May 2007 Council Conclusions on Safe management of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste. In this framework, the role of WENRA is underlined as a reference for 
the  future  work  of  the  HLG  in  the  fields  of  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and  safety  of  the 
management  of  spent  fuel  and  radioactive  waste  ("Building  on  the  WENRA  process  with 
regard  to  further  development  of  Safety  Reference  levels  and  to  how  WENRA  States,  being 
also  Member  States  of  the  EU,  implement  the  WENRA  national  action  plans,  thereby 
including those countries that do not operate any nuclear power plants and the Commission. 
While  the  work  at  EU  level  shall  not  duplicate  the  WENRA  process,  all  the  Member  States 
should  have  the  possibility  of  being  informed,  putting  questions  and  further  contributing  to 
the  process  done  so  far."  and  "Building  on  the  WENRA  activities  and  consideration  of  its 
relevance to the safety of spent fuel, radioactive waste and decommissioning management in 
the EU. While the work at EU level shall not duplicate the WENRA process, all the Member 
States  should  have  the  possibility  of  being  informed,  putting  questions  and  further 
contributing to the process done so far"). 

The HLG met for the first time in October 2007. Three subgroups were established, dealing 
with the following topics: 

–  Improvements of nuclear safety arrangements; 

–  Improvements in the decommissioning, radioactive waste management and spent 

fuel arrangements; 

–  Improvements in transparency arrangements. 

As  far  as  nuclear  safety  is  concerned,  HLG  has  already  concluded  that  any  EU  legal 
instrument on nuclear safety should be based upon the Convention on Nuclear Safety as well 
as on the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. Also, most of the members of the HLG actually support 
the revised approach currently proposed. 

The proposed revised Community legislation on nuclear safety should recognise the key role 
to the HLG, which will act as a focal point of cooperation between nuclear regulators and will 
be  consulted  by  the  Member  States  when  defining  additional  safety  requirements  for  new 
power reactors. For this purpose, its initial mandate will be amended accordingly, in order to 
properly reflect its competencies under the Directive. 

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