Special Report No 9/2008#The effectiveness of EU support in the area of freedom, security and justice for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine
Date: 2008-11-19
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU programme, access to the courts, area of freedom, security and justice, balance sheet, cooperation policy, fundamental rights, human rights, opinion of the Court of Auditors, public safety

EUROPEAN COURT 
OF AUDITORS

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU SUPPORT IN THE 
AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
FOR BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE

EN

 
 
 
Special Report No 9  

 2008

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU 
SUPPORT IN THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY 
AND JUSTICE FOR BELARUS, 
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE

(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC)

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

2

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi
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LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-45410
Fax +352 4398-46430
E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu
Internet: http://www.eca.europa.eu

Special Report No 9   

 2008

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009

ISBN 978-92-9207-139-4

DOI 10.2865/43014

© European Communities, 2009

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Belgium

CONTENTS

Paragraph 

IV 

17 

 ABBREVIATIONS

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 INTRODUCTION

810 

 AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

1162 

1152 

1119 
2027 
2844 
4552 

5357 
54 
5556 
57 

5862 

6061 
62 

 OBSERVATIONS

 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS,
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
 BORDER MANAGEMENT: SATISFACTORY ACHIEVEMENTS
 MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: POOR PROGRESS IN A DIFFICULT CONTEXT
 FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME: MIXED RESULTS
 JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MIXED RESULTS

 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?
 LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT TYPICALLY DUE TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS INVOLVING ALL MAIN PARTIES
 SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS
 SHORTCOMINGS IN MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS 
FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?
 NOT ALL POSSIBILITIES EXPLOITED TO COLLECT INFORMATION
 EXPERIENCE GAINED NOT ALWAYS REFLECTED IN NEW PROJECTS

6373 

 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 ANNEX I  MAP
 ANNEX II  JHA  PROJECT OVERVIEW COMMITTED UNDER PROGRAMMES 200005
 ANNEX III  OVERVIEW OF AUDITED CONTRACTS
 ANNEX IV  EUBAM’S AREA OF OPERATION

REPLY OF  THE COMMISSION

 
 
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS

Aeneas: programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas 
of migration and asylum

BUMAD: drug control multisectoral assistance and institution building in Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus

DG: directorate-general

DG JLS: Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security

ENP: European neighbourhood policy

EUBAM: European Union border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine

EuropeAid: EuropeAid Cooperation Office

FIU: Financial Intelligence Unit

NGOs: non-governmental organisations

TACIS: technical assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States

EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY

I.
Following the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, 
the  EU  became  a  direct  neighbour  of  Belarus, 
Moldova  and  Ukraine.  The  Commission  made 
considerable EU funds available to these coun-
tries  (166  million  euro  in  the  period  2000–05) 
to improve their capacity in the areas of: bor-
der  control;  migration/asylum  management; 
fight  against  organised  crime;  and  judiciary 
and good governance. The Commission limited 
assistance  to  Belarus  due  to  a  lack  of  respect 
for  democracy  and  human  rights.  The  EU  has 
deployed  different  instruments,  the  most  sig-
nificant  being  the  TACIS  programme  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  assistance  was  delivered 
through international organisations (see para-
graphs 1 to 7). 

II.
The purpose of the Court’s audit was to deter-
mine  the  success  of  the  EU  support,  to  estab-
lish reasons for possible underperformance and 
to  see  to  what  extent  the  Commission  had  a 
process  in  place  to  take  into  account  lessons 
learned  for  continued  assistance  in  this  field. 
The  audit  examined  40  contracts  with  a  total 
value of 100 million euro (see paragraphs 8 to 
10 and Annex III).

III.
T h e   g r e a t e r   p a r t   o f   t h e   a u d i t e d   s u p p o r t 
achieved  satisfactory  results,  particularly  in 
the area of “Border management”. Progress was 
largely unsatisfactory in the area of “Migration 
and  asylum”.  Mixed  results  were  achieved  in 
the “Fight against organised crime” and “Judi-
ciary and good governance” (see paragraphs 11 
to 52). 

IV.
The  limited  achievements  were  typically  due 
to a combination of factors involving the Com-
mission, the international institutions and the 
v a r i o u s   a u t h o r i t i e s   o f   t h e   t h r e e   c o u n t r i e s . 
External  factors  such  as  the  continued  polit-
ical  instability  in  Ukraine  also  diminished  the 
project results. Despite having very competent 
staff,  the  Delegation  in  Kiev  was  overloaded, 
dealing with a rapidly growing policy area with 
projects  not  only  in  Ukraine  but  also  in  Bela-
rus  and  Moldova.  The  Delegation  in  Moldova, 
opened in October 2005, took nearly two years 
to start operational project management. The 
co-existence  of  several  financing  instruments 
for the same purpose and the lack of coherence 
between  them  hampered  a  quality  approach. 
There  were  also  certain  shortcomings  in  the 
joint management with the international insti-
tutions. In general the coordination of the EU 
support with other donors was not developed 
enough.  Finally  the  Commission  has  not  fully 
exploited options to learn lessons, and experi-
ence gained was not always reflected in newly-
started projects (see paragraphs 53 to 62).

V.
On  the  basis  of  these  observations,  the  Court 
makes detailed recommendations which could 
help the Commission to increase the effective-
ness of the assistance given to Belarus, Moldova 
and  Ukraine  in  the  field  of  freedom,  security 
and justice (see paragraphs 63 to 73).

INTRODUCTION

7

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

One of the fundamental objectives of the European Union (EU) is to offer its 
citizens  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice 1.  This  objective  has  an 
important  external  dimension.  Following  the  enlargements  of  2004  and 
2007, the EU became a direct neighbour of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, 
sharing  a  common  border  and  facing  common  challenges  in  the  fight 
against  organised  crime,  terrorism  and  other  illegal  activities  (see  map 
in Annex I).

The EU has been making specific efforts to assist these three countries in 
improving their capacity in the areas of border control, migration/asylum 
management,  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  judiciary  and  good 
governance 2. In the period 2000–05 the Commission financed 89 projects 
with a total EU contribution of 165,7 million euro (see Annex II). 

The primary channel for EU support has been the TACIS programme 3. Projects 
have been financed through its various arms: national action programmes, 
regional action programmes and cross-border co-operation programmes. 
Created in 1991, TACIS’s overall objective was to assist the transition to 
a  free  market  economy  and  to  reinforce  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law 
in  the  partner  states.  TACIS  was  phased  out  in  2006  but  payments  will 
continue  at  least  until  2010.  From  2007  onwards,  assistance  to  Belarus, 
Moldova  and  Ukraine  has  been  programmed  under  the  new  European 
neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI) 4.

In addition to TACIS the EU has used other instruments to assist these three 
countries in the area of freedom, security and justice. 

(a) 

Preparatory  action  for  the  cooperation  on  migration  (financed  by 
specific budget line).

(b) 

Programme  for  financial  and  technical  assistance  to  third  countries 
in the areas of migration and asylum (Aeneas) 5.

(c) 

Rapid reaction mechanism

6.

(d) 

European initiative for democracy and human rights

7.

1  The old name used by the 
Commission for this policy area was 
“Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)”.

2  Already in 2003, an EU action 
plan on justice and home affairs 
was published for Ukraine 
(OJ C 77, 29.3.2003). This action plan 
was revised in 2007.

3  Technical assistance programme 
for the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States. 12 countries have benefited 
from TACIS: Belarus, Moldova, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine 
in Eastern Europe, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in Caucasus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia.

4  Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 
of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions 
establishing a European 
neighbourhood and partnership 
instrument (OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, 
p. 1).

5  Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 1).

6  Council Regulation (EC) 
No 381/2001 (OJ L 57, 27.2.2001, 
p. 5).

7  Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2242/2004 (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, 
p. 21).

 
 
 
 
8

5. 

6. 

7. 

Following devolution 8 in 2003, the Commission’s Delegation in Kiev was given 
overall  responsibility  for  implementation  of  EU  assistance  in  all  three 
countries. A new Delegation was opened in Moldova in October 2005 and 
became responsible for project implementation in summer 2007. The non-
TACIS  projects  are  usually  managed  by  the  Commission’s  headquarters 
(EuropeAid and DG JLS).

8  Giving management responsibility 
to the Commission’s in-country 
Delegations.

The greater part of the assistance in the area of freedom, security and justice 
is delivered through international organisations: United Nations develop-
ment programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), International Organisation for Migration (IOM) or the Council of 
Europe  (CoE).  On  the  basis  of  standard  contribution  agreements  signed 
with the Commission, these international organisations are in charge of 
certain  aspects  of  project  implementation,  including  procurement  and 
payment procedures (so-called joint management mode). 

The situation in Belarus was specific. A partnership and cooperation agree-
ment between Belarus and the EU was signed in 1996 but its ratification 
was frozen due to a lack of respect for democracy and human rights. Thus, 
during the period covered by the audit, assistance to Belarus was limited 
to humanitarian, cross-border and regional cooperation projects, support 
for the needs of the population, and to projects supporting directly and 
indirectly  democratisation  and  democratic  forces  (e.g.  support  to  inde-
pendent media; scholarships for youth). The freedom, security and justice 
projects in Belarus are mostly multi-country projects including Moldova 
and Ukraine.

 
 
 
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

9

8. 

The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of EU support in the 
area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  for  Belarus,  Moldova  and  Ukraine. 
The audit addressed three questions.

(a) 

To  what  extent  has  the  EU  support  for  freedom,  security  and  justice 
projects in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine been successful?

(b) 

What are the main reasons for possible underperformance?

(c) 

To what extent has the Commission a learning process in place to take 
into account lessons for continued assistance in the area of freedom, 
security and justice?

9  A project is implemented through 
one or more contracts .

10 The Commission contracts a 
consortium to carry out regular 
monitoring of the projects.

9. 

The Court audited 40 contracts, judgementally selected, with a total EU con-
tribution  of  99,3  million  euro  (out  of  the  total  of  89  projects 9  covering 
165,7 million euro in 2000–05), comprising 24 completed and 16 on-going 
contracts (Annex III). Most of these ongoing contracts followed up earlier 
EU-funded projects, allowing an assessment of the Commission’s learning 
process (main question (c) above). The audit involved an examination of: 
the  results  of  the  projects  and  comparison  with  the  stated  objectives; 
factors  standing  in  the  way  of  the  achievement  of  the  objectives;  and 
lessons  learnt  and  whether  they  were  taken  into  account  in  follow-up 
projects or programmes. 

10. 

The 40 contracts examined fell within four sub-areas: 

(a) 

border management

(b) 

migration and asylum

(c) 

fight against organised crime

(d) 

judiciary and good governance.

The audit team examined the projects on the spot during the period Novem-
ber  2006  to  July  2007,  including  visits  to  implementing  international 
organisations and national bodies as well as to monitoring units 10.

 
 
 
 
 
OBSERVATIONS

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS, 
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?

BORDER MANAGEMENT: SATISFACTORY ACHIEVEMENTS 

Belarus and Ukraine are facing major problems in border management due to 
the total length of their external borders (about 3 000 km and 7 000 km 
respectively)  and  the  lack  of  official  border  demarcation,  in  particular 
with  Russia.  Hardly  any  border  and  customs  controls  are  carried  out  at 
the  Russian-Belarusian  border.  This  permeability  of  borders  encourages 
both cross-border criminal activity and illegal migration.

Border management between Moldova and Ukraine is complicated by the 
existence  of  the  self-proclaimed  Republic  of  Transnistria  which  is  not 
recognised internationally. The Moldova-Ukraine state border is 1 222 km 
long of which 472 km on the Moldovan side is under control of the Tran-
snistrian authorities. Transnistrian authorities control the region east of 
the Dniestr River and are acting de facto independently from the rest of 
Moldova (see Box 1).

11. 

12. 

B O X   1

BACKGROUND TO THE TRANSNISTRIA CONFLICT

In parallel with Moldova’s process of emancipation from the Soviet Union, from 1989 onwards, protest 
movements in the regions with predominantly non-Moldovan populations began to resist Moldova’s 
independence eﬀ orts. As a response to Moldova’s declaration of sovereignty, a separate Transnistrian 
Moldovan Republic was proclaimed in 1990. Clashes took place and ﬁ ghting culminated in 1992, caus-
ing several hundreds of deaths and some 100 000 refugees. 

Since 1995 Moldova and Transnistria, assisted by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as international 
mediators, have discussed a possible settlement of the frozen conﬂ ict. Th  e arrival in power of the admin-
istration of President Yushchenko in Ukraine created a window of opportunity for further progress 
in resolving the conﬂ ict. Since September 2005, the EU and the US have participated as observers in 
the negotiation process. Th  e EU has been represented by a special representative for Moldova since 
March 2005.

 
 
11

13. 

The Commission has substantially helped to improve the border management 
capacities  of  Belarus,  Moldova  and  Ukraine.  Border  management  is  the 
financially most significant area for freedom, security and justice projects. 
63,2 % of the EU support (104,7 million euro) under 2000–05 programmes 
has  been  allocated  to  this  field.  The  Court  audited  10  contracts  with  a 
total value of 51,8 million euro. 

11 The Kozlovichi international 
border terminal (located near 
Brest in the Republic of Belarus) is 
the main road crossing for freight 
vehicles between the Republic of 
Belarus and Poland (Pan-European 
Transport Corridor II).

14.  Most of the projects audited achieved satisfactory results (see Annex III). 
The use of modern equipment and improved technology as well as train-
ing  for  border  guards  led  to  enhanced  border  controls  and  surveillance 
(see  examples  in  Box  2).  The  State  Border  Guard  Committee  of  Belarus 
in particular showed great commitment, using their military structure to 
implement  strictly  all  contract  stipulations.  Major  problems,  however, 
were noted in the works contract for the construction of the Koslovichi II 
Border Terminal 11 (see Box 3).

B O X   2

EXAMPLE OF SATISFACTORY RESULT: 
USE OF MODERN EQUIPMENT STRENGTHENS BORDER CONTROL

Th  e projects “Border management improvement Ukraine” (EU contribution of 4,0 million euro) and 
“Strengthening border management in the republic of Belarus” (EU contribution of 13,3 million euro) 
delivered among other things cameras, microscopes, document veriﬁ cation devices, vehicles, IT equip-
ment including automated telephone exchanges for border units and hardware for checking online, 
e.g., blacklisted persons and stolen vehicles. All investment items checked were in place according to 
the inventory log-book, properly labelled, operational and used for the intended purpose. 

 
 
12

15. 

The financially most significant project in the area of freedom, security and 
justice,  the  European  Union  border  assistance  mission  to  Moldova  and 
Ukraine 12 (EUBAM, total EU contribution of 19,1 million euro) contributed 
greatly to building capacity in the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard 
and custom services (see map in Annex IV). For example “EUBAM” aided 
the  effective  implementation  and  monitoring  of  a  new  customs  regime 
between  Moldova  and  Ukraine,  thus  helping  to  combat  smuggling  and 
illegal  cross-border  activity.  As  a  result  significant  smuggling  involving 
Transnistria was detected. The illegal evasion of taxes and customs duties 
concerned e.g. vehicles, fruit and vegetables and poultry meat. For poul-
try meat alone, EUBAM calculated losses of up to 43 million euro for the 
Ukrainian  state  budget  or  up  to  18  million  euro  for  the  Moldovan  state 
budget (period October 2005 to May 2006).

12 EUBAM is in place since 
1 December 2005. EUBAM 
operations are based on a 
memorandum of understanding 
concluded between the European 
Commission and the governments 
of Ukraine and the Republic of 
Moldova. A motivating factor was 
security threats originating from the 
Transnistria region with its assumed 
high level of cross-border criminal 
activities. EUBAM is implemented 
by the United Nations development 
programme (UNDP). 16 EU Member 
States contribute in kind through 
the secondment of professional 
personnel to the mission (about 
100 customs and border guards 
officials). EUBAM established its 
operational headquarters in Odessa 
(Ukraine) and has created one 
field office in Chisinau (Moldova) 
and a further five field offices 
alongside the Ukrainian/Moldovan/
Transnistrian border as well as a 
field office/logistics base in Odessa 
and Illichevsk seaports.

B O X   3

EXAMPLE OF UNSATISFACTORY RESULT: REDUCED SCOPE OF WORK AND DELAYS 

At the end of 2006, the original completion date, the Koslovichi II Border Terminal (EU contribu-
tion of 14,0 million euro) still resembled a huge construction site where most of the buildings were 
only half-ﬁ nished and roads, parking areas and pavement still needed to be built. Tax exemption 
problems, together with an under pricing at tender stage, led to an addendum to the contract which 
greatly reduced the scope of works (e.g. some buildings will be left  incomplete, to be ﬁ nished only as 
shells). Substantial extra funding is needed to complete the international border terminal as originally 
planned and contracted.

 
13

16. 

EUBAM detected major difficulties in securing criminal prosecutions for smug-
gling 13  (insufficient  legislation;  inefficient  interaction/unclear  roles  of 
the  state  customs  service,  state  border  guard  service,  tax  police  and 
security service; poor demarcation of green border). Most cases were not 
prosecuted as criminal, but only as administrative infringements without 
obligatory confiscation of the goods involved 14. EUBAM reported also that 
due  to  the  level  of  corruption  in  the  prosecutor’s  offices  and  judiciary, 
smugglers  have  been  released  and  the  smuggled  goods  returned  to  the 
smugglers. 

17.  When EUBAM started in November 2005 it was financed for its first six months 
by the rapid reaction mechanism 15. The mechanism was applied to respond 
in  a  rapid  and  flexible  manner  to  the  opportunity  which  arose  in  2005 
for  advancing  the  resolution  of  the  Transnistrian  conflict  (see  Box  1). 
The  project’s  assumption  is  that  improved  border  and  customs  controls 
and border surveillance along the whole border are crucial elements to a 
peaceful resolution. Whether this assumption is valid can only be assessed 
in the very long run. 

18. 

19. 

Subsequently the financing of EUBAM was characterised by the use of several 
short  term  contracts  financed  from  different  TACIS  regional  action  pro-
grammes. As a consequence, staff contracts or rental agreements had to 
be renewed every few months. The Commission had not foreseen such a 
major long-term project (nearly 1 million euro per month) when program-
ming its activities in the region.

To complement the support delivered by EUBAM, the EU is financing the 
purchase of border equipment under the project “Improvement of border 
controls at the Moldova-Ukraine border” (Bommoluk project; EU contribu-
tion of 9,9 million euro). This additional activity raises a number of chal-
lenges to be addressed in the future, such as complex tender processes 16, 
choosing the best physical location for the equipment given the length of 
the borders and ensuring complementarity with the equipment funded by 
other donors 17. Also the Governments have to provide sufficient national 
funds for running costs and maintenance.

13 Based e.g. on a case of high-value 
alcohol products smuggled from the 
Transnistrian region to Ukraine.

14 Burden of proof — the difficulty of 
securing criminal prosecutions for 
smuggling cases in Ukraine, special 
report by EUBAM.

15 This mechanism may be 
triggered in situations “when in the 
beneficiary countries concerned 
there occur situations of crisis or 
emerging crises, situations posing a 
threat to law and order, the security 
and safety of individuals, situations 
threatening to escalate into armed 
conflict or to destabilise the 
country…”.

16 In an earlier project for Ukraine 
field radar equipment and a radio 
communication network (total 
value of 5,0 million euro) could not 
be procured and delivered due to 
unsuccessful tendering procedures.

17 The US Government has allocated 
28 million dollars to improve the 
fight against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction at the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan state border.

 
 
 
 
14

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: POOR PROGRESS IN A DIFFICULT CONTEXT

EU policy aims to assist third countries in their efforts to improve their capac-
ity for migration management and refugee protection, prevent and combat 
illegal  immigration,  provide  information  on  legal  channels  for  migra-
tion and resolve refugee situations by providing better access to durable 
solutions.

Belarus,  Moldova  and  Ukraine  are  situated  on  the  eastern  border  of  the 
enlarged EU. All three are seen as transit countries for large-scale illegal 
migration westwards. Ukraine in particular faces an increase in migratory 
movements  of  persons  (both  legal  and  illegal)  entering  and  crossing  its 
territory.  Thousands  of  illegal  migrants  traverse  the  country  annually, 
largely via the border with Russia.

Ukraine is chronically short of accommodation, particularly for longer-term 
illegal  migrants.  Repatriation  requires  identification  of  the  persons  by 
the  Ukrainian  authorities  and  cooperation  from  the  relevant  embassies 
or  consulates  which  are  not  always  helpful.  Another  solution  would  be 
readmission, i.e. acceptance of the detained persons by the country from 
which they illegally entered Ukraine. However, a readmission agreement 
has  not  been  signed  between  Ukraine  and  Russia,  the  prime  source  of 
Ukraine’s illegal migrants.

The need for adequate accommodation for illegal migrants has recently 
become  more  pressing,  with  the  entry  into  force  on  1  January  2008  of 
a  readmission  agreement  with  the  European  Community.  In  2010,  after 
a  transitional  period  of  two  years,  Ukraine  will  face  the  requirement  to 
house  hundreds  or  even  thousands  of  illegal  migrants  from  third  coun-
tries, currently being held in the neighbouring EU countries of Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland, who reached the EU illicitly via Ukraine.

 
 
 
 
15

24. 

25. 

The projects in the sub-area of migration and asylum received a total EU-con-
tribution  of  16,8  million  euro  (10,2  %  of  total  support)  from  2000–05 
programmes. The Court audited 10 contracts with a total EU contribution 
of 13,8 million euro.

The project results achieved in this area of migration and asylum were unsat-
isfactory mainly in respect of infrastructure (see Annex III). A key goal of 
the EU is to help provide accommodation centres meeting international 
humanitarian  standards  for  illegal  migrants  as  well  as  for  asylum  seek-
ers.  In  Ukraine,  despite  the  EU  support,  this  objective  is  far  from  being 
achieved:

(a) 

the detention and accommodation conditions for 
illegal migrants in 
existing  centres  were  often  very  far  from  acceptable  —  in  general 
illegal  migrants  in  Ukraine  suffer  severely  from  over-crowded  living 
conditions, insufficient sanitation and poor diet (see Box 4);

(b) 

the  construction/refurbishment  of 
did not advance as planned (see Box 5); 

new  facilities  for  illegal  migrants 

(c) 

newly constructed temporary accommodation centres for 
ers were under utilised or not used at all (see Box 6).

asylum seek-

B O X   4

DESPITE ALLEVIATION BY EU SUPPORT, LIVING CONDITIONS FOR ILLEGAL MIGRANTS 
IN EXISTING ACCOMMODATION CENTRE STILL UNACCEPTABLE

Th  e project “Establishment of migration management system in Zakarpattya, Ukraine”18 (EU contribu-
tion of 2 million euro for two contracts) essentially delivered basic help to the migrants: distribution of 
food and hygiene packages, medical assistance, distribution of clothes, provision of bedding and legal 
advice. Moreover urgent repair, construction works and all kinds of running costs were also ﬁ nanced. 
Th  e project is above all an action of humanitarian aid and not of capacity building as its title might 
suggest.

Aft er nearly a year of operation, the Delegation monitored the project on the spot (April 2005). It 
reported that the conditions of the detention centres in Pavchino and Chop (the old part of the build-
ing) were inhuman and degrading, not meeting the minimum standards set by the Council of Europe, 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man Treatment. Furthermore the Delegation found evidence that the humanitarian aid delivered by 
the project did not always reach the targeted migrants. Th  is led to corrective action by the Ukrainian 
authorities.

18 The Zakarpattya region borders with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia and is a transit corridor in Ukraine for migrants 

on their way to Western Europe.

 
  
16

The sustainability of detention and accommodation centres is jeopardised 
in Ukraine by the lack of state funds for running and maintenance costs 
and because there is an unclear division of responsibilities between the 
State Border Guard Service and the Ministry of Interior. 

19 The centre is located in Gomel, 
close to Ukraine where there is 
a thriving community of Afghan 
refugees.

Difficulties with regard to project registration, tax exemption, land ownership 
and funding were also found in the construction of a temporary accom-
modation centre for asylum seekers (25 people) in Belarus 19 . On the other 
hand, in Moldova the situation was better. A temporary accommodation 
centre in Chisinau was already fully operational in November 2005, offer-
ing 160 places. 

26. 

27. 

B O X   4

At the time of the audit in November 2006 the capacity (320) in Pavchino was exceeded by about 
100 people. Th  e local project partners reported that in summer time overcrowding had been far worse 
and reached 700 people with corresponding negative consequences for hygiene and health.

Th  e migrants interviewed by the Court hesitated to speak openly. Complaints were still expressed, 
concerning medicine not passed on and the practice of searches by masked persons. It also became 
clear that the project still did not cover basic needs (e.g. suﬃ  cient heating, suﬃ  cient clean and hot water 
supply, adequate clothing including shoes). Furthermore, there was insuﬃ  cient interpretation available 
in the camps, making communication diﬃ  cult between the migrants and the authorities.

 
 
17

FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME: MIXED RESULTS

The general post-communist transition process in the countries of central 
and eastern Europe was accompanied by a considerable rise in organised 
crime  such  as  trafficking  in  human  beings,  drug  trafficking  and  money 
laundering. 

Ukraine and Moldova are major source countries for the trafficking of women 
and children for the purpose of forced prostitution in Europe. Recent years 
have seen also a growth in the trafficking of men, who are compelled, for 
instance, to work as labourers. The full scale of the practice remains rela-
tively unknown, due to the very nature of organised crime, and because 
few people are willing or able to report what has happened to them to the 
authorities. This is aggravated by a lack of witness protection measures. 
Concerning  drug  trafficking,  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Moldova  are  seen  as 
transit routes towards EU Member States. The banking systems have been 
increasingly used to launder the proceeds of serious crime.

The fight against organised crime accounted for 19,2 million euro (11,6 %) 
of the total funds allocated for the area of freedom, security and justice 
from programmes for the period 2000–05. The Court audited 10 contracts 
with a total EU contribution of 18,6 million euro.

28. 

29. 

30. 

B O X   5

POOR PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING NEW ACCOMMODATION CENTRES FOR ILLEGAL MIGRANTS

Th  e core of the project “Capacity building of migration management-CBMM I, Ukraine” (EU-con-
tribution of 3,8 million euro) was to refurbish and equip two former military sites as migrant accom-
modation centres for 1 260 persons. Th  e project steering committee decided in June 2006 to devote 
project money only to refurbishing one of the sites. By the time of the audit (November 2006) no works 
contracts were concluded and no money had been spent for refurbishment, some three months aft er the 
project’s original ﬁ nishing date (1.9.2006). Discussions were still ongoing about fundamental aspects of 
the refurbishment, e.g. how the site would be heated and what solution would be found for waste water. 
Th  e steering committee also decided to limit the numbers to be housed to 250. Th  is means that the EU 
funded capacity would be reduced by around 1 000 places in comparison to the original planning.

 
 
 
18

31. 

32. 

In spite of several successes, overall progress is still insufficient in the fight 
against organised crime (see Annex III). The projects to combat trafficking 
in human beings had weak criminalisation and prosecution components 20 
(see  paragraphs  34  and  35).  Overlapping  is  a  major  feature,  since  many 
donors are keen to fund projects in this area (see paragraph 36). Concern-
ing drug control, projects progressed slowly in the areas of legislation and 
of  police  intelligence  (see  paragraph  40).  As  regards  preventing  money 
laundering  and  terrorist  financing,  a  major  challenge  is  to  achieve  suc-
cessful prosecution (see paragraph 44).

20 The anti-trafficking projects 
had three standard components: 
protection and reintegration; 
criminalisation and prosecution; 
and raising awareness. The term 
criminalisation is commonly used in 
the project documentation.

Combating trafficking in human beings

The Governments of Ukraine and Moldova expressed their commitment to 
combating  trafficking  in  human  beings  in  national  policy  papers.  One 
project was audited in Ukraine (EU contribution of 1,9 million euro) and 
three projects (including a rehabilitation centre for victims of trafficking) 
in Moldova (total EU-contribution of 1,2 million euro).

B O X   6

UNDERUTILISATION OF NEWLY CONSTRUCTED CENTRES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS

In Ukraine, at the end of 2006, only some 65 additional persons could be housed in temporary accom-
modation centres (TACs) instead of the planned 350 (EU contribution of 1,6 million euro for “Strength-
ening the asylum systems of Ukraine and Moldova). Th  e main reason was that the centre in Odessa 
was only half-used because of a lack of state-funded running costs, and that the 80-person centre 
in Mukachevo remained completely unoccupied for more than one year and a half, in fact since its 
opening in April 2005. Th  is wasteful situation in Mukachevo resulted from the persistent failure to 
transfer ownership of the building from the border guards to the responsible project partner institu-
tion. Meanwhile, those asylum seekers lacking private means were living in tents and other short-term 
facilities run by the border guards.

 
 
21 Interpol global police 
communications system operating 
24 hours a day.

22 The amount budgeted for 
food and lodging was more than 
double the amount budgeted 
for comparable services at the 
equivalent Rehabilitation Centre 
in Kiev.

19

33.  With the help of the projects, large-scale public awareness campaigns were 
carried  out  in  Moldova  and  Ukraine  (e.g.  theatre  performances,  numer-
ous  publications,  toll-free  hotlines),  and  humanitarian  assistance  was 
delivered to hundreds of victims of trafficking (e.g. legal support, medical 
assistance, housing allowance, transport assistance, vocational training, 
’in-kind’ grants for small business start-up). Thus the aspects of preven-
tion and reintegration were well covered by the projects.

34. 

35. 

36. 

Results were less positive regarding the criminalisation and prosecution 
components,  in  particular  as  regards  information  sharing  between  law 
enforcement agencies. In Ukraine, the TACIS monitors noted that the State 
Border Guard Service was not cooperating in information exchanging ini-
tiatives. The measure to equip border checkpoints with the i24/7 system 21 
failed  when  the  tendering  process  was  cancelled  due  to  the  Ukrainian 
stakeholders  insisting  on  a  supplier  whose  prices  were  far  higher  than 
the market rate.

Getting evidence is a major challenge, since the criminal act often occurs 
outside  Moldova  or  Ukraine.  National  authorities  blamed  the  slowness 
of other countries to respond to requests for mutual assistance. To help 
circumvent such procedural blockages, the projects paid for networking 
visits for law enforcement officers to countries of transit and destination 
of victims. In addition, police officers took part in workshops on investiga-
tive techniques and anti-trafficking legislation was reviewed. Weaknesses 
persist in mutual assistance arrangements. 

There are concerns relating to efficiency and economy. As many donor organi-
sations  are  ready  to  fund  the  fight  against  trafficking  in  persons,  it  is 
a  challenge  to  avoid  unnecessary  duplication  of  actions  and  to  ensure 
cost effective use of resources. In Moldova, for instance, certain project 
activities had to be changed, and an unusually high rent was paid for the 
Rehabilitation Centre’s premises in Chisinau 22. In addition, it is not always 
possible to distinguish clearly the results of the EU support from that of 
other organisations, making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
EU spending. 

 
 
 
 
20

37. 

38. 

Drug control

Another significant project in the fight against organised crime is called 
“Drug control multisectoral assistance and institution building in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus” (BUMAD). BUMAD is a multi-annual activity in three 
phases which started in 2003 and is expected to finish at the end of 2008 
(overall EU-contribution of 6,5 million euro).

23 The first programme, CADAP, 
began in Central Asia in 2000, the 
second, SCAD, in the Southern 
Caucasus in 2001.

This programme, covering Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, is the third in a 
series of EU-funded regional programmes designed to filter the traffic of 
heroin  flowing  westwards  from  Afghanistan  towards  the  EU 23.  The  over-
all  objective  is  to  reduce  drug-trafficking  from,  and  through,  the  three 
countries towards EU Member States.

39.  Most of the activities foreseen under the different sub-projects were carried 
out (e.g. legal assistance, seaport control (Ukraine), land border control, 
police  and  community  prevention).  The  general  picture  at  the  end  of 
the  second  phase  (January  2007)  is  that  good  progress  has  been  made 
in  setting  up  national  anti-drugs  structures,  for  example  the  national 
drugs observatories, courses in drugs prevention in the respective police 
academies  or  training  in  drugs  demand  reduction  to  numerous  NGOs  in 
the three countries. 

40. 

Slow progress was noted in the components of legislation and of police 
intelligence. The necessary cooperation between customs, border guards, 
police and secret services for effective criminal investigations is not yet 
sufficiently developed in the three countries. Setting up national systems 
to support the criminal investigation of drug traffickers requires not only 
appropriate analytical tools, but also a high degree of cooperation among 
agencies which have not been accustomed to share operational data in a 
systematic way. Imbalances in investigative powers are a further compli-
cation. A particular obstacle in Belarus is the security service’s apparent 
reluctance to accept foreign analytical software. The Commission, when 
planning  the  project,  underestimated  the  time  needed  to  change  ways 
of  operational  thinking  and  to  overcome  rivalry  between  enforcement 
bodies.

 
 
 
 
21

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

Up to the completion date of BUMAD 2 (January 2007), heroin and cocaine 
seizures  were  modest.  Only  two  international  attempts  to  traffic  hero-
ine  in  Ukraine  were  uncovered,  with  the  help  of  software  delivered  by 
the  project.  Seizures  of  drugs  in  all  three  countries  concerned  mainly 
locally-produced poppy seed and cannabis. However the Ukrainian Secu-
rity Service reported in July 2007 that in cooperation with the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement  Agency  and  Turkish  law  enforcement  organisations  174  kg 
of heroin were confiscated in Illichevsk seaport. 

Projects against money laundering/terrorist financing

The overall objective of the “Project against money laundering in Ukraine” 
(EU-contribution of 1 million euro) was to prevent the use of the financial 
system to launder the proceeds of serious crime and to enable Ukrainian 
authorities to cooperate in fighting money laundering. 

The project helped to achieve Ukraine’s very significant removal from the 
“Non-cooperative countries and territories” 24 list in February 2004 and the 
acceptance of Ukraine as a member by the Egmont Group 25 in June 2004. 
Furthermore by the end of the project the State Committee for Financial 
Monitoring  (SCFM)  was  functioning  as  Ukraine’s  Financial  Intelligence 
Unit (FIU) 26. Indeed, over the years until 2006, the number of case refer-
rals,  submitted  by  the  SCFM  to  law  enforcement  authorities,  increased 
considerably (18 in 2003; 446 in 2006). 

Setting up a FIU is only a first important condition for combating money laun-
dering. There is also the need for effectively operating law enforcement 
agencies  and  trained  judges.  A  major  problem  is  the  lack  of  successful 
prosecution.  Until  the  end  of  2006  only  three  verdicts  for  money  laun-
dering were made by the courts. The lack of a modern regime of seizure 
and confiscation of assets was also identified as a serious gap in the anti 
money laundering system. However Ukraine is more advanced in the fight 
against  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  than  Moldova,  where 
serious concerns exist regarding the effectiveness of the system in place 
(e.g. weaknesses in the Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corrup-
tion or insufficient use of provisions to seize, freeze and confiscate) 27.

24 The Non-cooperative countries 
and territories (NCCT) initiative 
was developed by an inter-
governmental financial action task 
force (FATF) to ensure that measures 
for the prevention, detection and 
punishment of money laundering 
according to internationally 
recognised standards are applied.

25 Many countries around the 
world have created specialised 
governmental agencies, known 
as “financial intelligence units” 
(FIU). Recognising the benefits 
inherent in the development of a 
FIU network, in 1995, a group of 
FIUs at the Egmont Arenberg Palace 
in Brussels decided to establish an 
informal group for the stimulation 
of international cooperation. Now 
known as the Egmont Group, these 
FIUs meet regularly to find ways to 
cooperate, especially in the areas 
of information exchange, training 
and the sharing of expertise. There 
are around 100 countries with 
recognised operational FIUs.

26 It is the responsibility of a FIU to 
collect and analyse suspicious and 
threshold transactions. Investigative 
powers lie with law enforcement 
agencies.

27 Third Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report on Moldova, 
September 2007, prepared by 
moneyval (Committee of Experts 
on the Evaluation of Anti-money 
Laundering Measures, under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe).

  
 
 
 
22

28 Including one contract which 
was finally not signed, see 
paragraph 52(c).

29 Position 111 for Moldova, 
position 118 for Ukraine in the 
2007 corruption perceptions 
index compiled by Transparency 
International.

30 See e.g. Ukraine Governance 
Assessment, performed in 
February 2007 by SIGMA (Support 
for improvement in governance and 
management), a joint initiative of 
the OECD and the European Union.

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MIXED RESULTS

EU policy supports reforming the judiciary in order to ensure its independ-
ence, impartiality and efficiency. In addition it aims at strengthening legal 
cooperation with the EU in civil and criminal matters. It also gives support 
to encourage good governance which refers to the structure, functioning 
and performance of public authorities/institutions at all levels.

The projects in the sub-area of judiciary and good governance received a total 
EU-contribution  of  24,8  million  euro  (15,0  %  of  total  support)  from  pro-
grammes for the period 2000–05. This sub-area concerned only Moldova 
and Ukraine. The Court audited 10 contracts 28 with a total EU contribution 
of 14,2 million euro. 

Achievement has been mixed (see Annex III). Some projects showed satis-
factory  overall  results,  for  example  improvements  in  the  application  of 
civil and commercial law in Moldova (EU contribution of 2,2 million euro) 
or  better  international  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  in  Ukraine  (EU 
contribution of 1,5 million euro). By contrast, the results achieved in the 
project “Reform of arbitration courts and support to court administration” 
(EU contribution of 2,5 million euro) were less satisfactory, in particular 
regarding the provision of IT equipment. Nothing had been delivered by 
the original deadline. 

Anti-corruption

Results achieved to date in projects combating corruption are very modest. 
Corruption is one of the most pressing problems in Moldova and Ukraine 
threatening the whole sub-area of judiciary and good governance. Both 
countries  are  deeply  affected,  with  a  considerable  impact  on  society 29. 
The legal and administrative systems are deeply flawed (e.g. lack of public 
trust,  impaired  independence  of  judges,  insufficient  salaries,  high  level 
of perceived corruption) 30.

 
 
 
 
23

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

In 1999 and 2002 the Moldovan Government had already adopted ambitious 
national programmes for combating crime and corruption. However suc-
cess was very limited because of insufficient resources and the absence of 
an efficient control mechanism. In December 2004 the Parliament adopted 
a  new  anti-corruption  strategy  together  with  a  new  action  plan  for  its 
implementation. At that moment the Commission intervened with its first 
anti-corruption project in Moldova.

The EU contribution was a relatively small pilot activity (250 000 euro). As 
its  interim  results  were  satisfactory,  the  Commission  decided  to  fund  a 
follow-up project for three years until 2009 (EU contribution of 3 million 
euro 31).  The  new  project  progressed  more  slowly  than  planned  and  its 
achievement after the first year was very limited. Progress on key issues 32 
or in the delivery of equipment had not been achieved. The project gained 
momentum only after March 2007.

The United States signed a 25 million dollar agreement to support anti-
corruption  initiatives  in  Moldova 33.  The  World  Bank  is  also  planning  to 
aid anti-corruption measures. Coordinating the EU efforts with the assist-
ance  of  other  international  donors  is  now  a  major  challenge.  There  are 
already  parallel  monitoring  structures,  undermining  the  concept  of  a 
single national anti-corruption strategy.

31 The project has two components, 
one on anti-corruption and one on 
anti-money laundering/financing of 
terrorism.

32 Revision of monitoring structure 
for strategy and action plan; 
reduction of the conflict of 
competences among the main 
enforcement bodies in investigation 
and prosecution; elaboration of risk 
analyses within judiciary, police, tax 
inspectorate, customs and health 
and education institutions.

33 Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) threshold program 
agreement.

34 See second progress report of 26 
June 2007.

Numerous donors have been active in the field of anti-corruption in Ukraine. 
The  first  significant  EU  financed  project  in  this  area  (EU  contribution  of 
1,5 million euro) started in 2006. One year into this three-year EU project 
the number of activities carried out was substantially lower than initially 
foreseen:

(a) 

the  Ukrainian  authorities  developed  a  draft  anti-corruption  action 
plan, without using specific drafting support offered by the project 34. 
Only at a late stage, in June 2007, did the Ministry of Justice request 
an expert assessment of the draft. The experts criticised the “lack of 
transparency  of  the  drafting  process”  and  concluded  that  the  draft 
action plan was “far from satisfactory”; 

 
 
 
 
24

(b) 

no  activities  took  place  with  regard  to  a  monitoring  mechanism  for 
the  future  implementation  of  the  action  plan.  It  is  not  clear  which 
institution will have the lead in the anti-corruption fight. The issue of 
monitoring the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns 
was  not  tackled.  Also  a  general  public  opinion  survey  on  corruption 
was not carried out despite extensive preparatory work for this survey 
(defining a methodology, expert meetings);

(c) 

while  the  Commission  established  the  clear  need  to  promote  public 
involvement  in  the  anti-corruption  effort,  it  abandoned  the  plan  of 
developing a grant programme open to non governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and other civil society organisations aimed at promoting 
public involvement in the anti-corruption effort. The alternative solu-
tion, to support the creation of an advocacy and legal advice centre 
was also not realised due to procedural problems.

25

WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS 
FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?

53.  While many projects delivered satisfactory results, this section presents rea-

sons for underperformance of those that did not. 

LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT TYPICALLY DUE TO A COMBINATION 
OF FACTORS INVOLVING ALL MAIN PARTIES

54. 

The audit showed that limited achievements are typically due to a combination 
of  factors  involving  all  main  parties  (Commission,  national  authorities, 
international institutions). For example, in the anti-corruption project for 
Ukraine (see paragraph 52):

(a) 

weak needs assessment by the Commission in a difficult context and 
insufficient  coordination  with  other  donors:  substantial  parts  of  the 
p r o j e c t ,   e s p e c i a l l y   t h e   a s s i s t a n c e   t o   d r a f t i n g   l e g i s l a t i o n ,   w e r e   n o 
longer really wanted by the Ministry of Justice. Other organisations, 
particularly  American  ones,  also  provide  anti-corruption  legislative 
assistance;

(b) 

lack of commitment and of cofinancing by the national authorities
: the 
Ministry of Justice failed to provide an adequate office to the project 
team, thus breaking not only the contract conditions but also its com-
mitment expressed in a separate statement of endorsement;

(c) 

weak  management  by  the  contractor
maintain the project team; 

  which  struggled  to  set  up  and 

(d) 

e x t e r n a l   f a c t o r s
:   t h e   d i f f i c u l t   p o l i t i c a l   s i t u a t i o n   f o l l o w i n g   t h e 
2  April  2007  presidential  decree  on  early  elections  combined  with  a 
frequent  change  of  leadership  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice  caused  the 
suspension of all legislative activity surrounding the anti-corruption 
draft laws.

 
 
26

SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS

55. 

Two factors made the Commission’s management more difficult and increased 
the risk of failure:

(a) 

the majority of the projects lay under the responsibility of the Delega-
tion in Kiev. This Delegation has been responsible for project manage-
ment not only in Ukraine but also in Belarus and Moldova. Staff in the 
area of freedom, security and justice are very competent, however the 
Kiev Delegation had too few project managers to deal with a rapidly 
growing policy area with an increasing number of projects. Although 
a  new  Delegation  to  Moldova  was  opened  in  October  2005,  it  only 
started  to  become  operational  with  regard  to  project  management 
in summer 2007;

(b) 

the co-existence of different sources of financing to support the area 
of freedom, security and justice (see paragraphs 3 and 4). The TACIS 
instrument proved to be insufficient to meet the growing demand for 
funding of projects. Different instruments, procedures and Commis-
sion services were sometimes used for the same intervention, causing 
inefficient contract management (see Box 7).

B O X   7

EXAMPLE OF INEFFICIENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 

Th  e support of phase III in the cross-border co-operation between the western New Independent States 
and the EU (Söderköping process) was artiﬁ cially divided into two contracts running in parallel with 
the same contractor. One contract is ﬁ nanced from TACIS and managed by the Delegation in Kiev 
and the other is ﬁ nanced from Aeneas and managed by Commission’s HQ in Brussels (EuropeAid). 
DG JLS, the previous manager, is no longer involved. 

Th  e co-existence of two legal bases with diﬀ erent rules for the same action is not coherent. For example 
the Aeneas contract ﬁ xed the maximum allowed co-ﬁ nancing rate at 80 % whereas the TACIS con-
tract co-ﬁ nances 90 % of the total eligible costs. In addition the TACIS contract is subject to external 
monitoring whereas the Aeneas contract is not. Th  us the external monitors, who indicated a number 
of deﬁ ciencies in the intervention logic (e.g. lack of measurable indicators), cannot give a complete 
picture of the action. 

Th  e artiﬁ cial division into two projects is also not eﬃ  cient. Th  e administrative burden is doubled for 
each implementation step on the Commission’s and the contractor’s side (parallel procedures for 
project selection, contracting, cost veriﬁ cation, payment requests, payments, reporting). Th  e need for 
coordination to avoid double funding is high. 

 
27

56. 

57. 

These two structural problems led to failings in the Commission’s planning 
and implementation procedures. Requirements were not always assessed 
thoroughly  enough  (see  example  in  paragraph  52(a))  or  financing  deci-
sions  were  taken  without  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  fulfilment  of  basic 
preconditions.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  two  accommodation  centres 
for  asylum  seekers,  questions  of  land  allocation  or  ownership  were  not 
clarified (see Box 6 and paragraph 27). The Commission’s supervision of 
project reporting requirements was not strong enough (see paragraph 60). 
A major concern is the lack of exchange of information with other donor 
organisations with regard to their planned projects to avoid unnecessary 
duplication in programming and later in implementation. With regard to 
project extensions, a convincing analysis of the need for extra time and, 
in one case, for extra money was not always made.

SHORTCOMINGS IN MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS 
BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

For most of the contracts, the Commission opted for grants awarded directly 
to  international  organisations,  because  of  their  particular  competence 
in the area of freedom, security and justice and their geographical pres-
ence in the countries. As a consequence, the international organisations 
are  in  charge  of  the  day-to-day  project  implementation  (so-called  joint 
management, see paragraph 6), although the Commission retains overall 
responsibility  for  sound  management.  Whereas  generally  the  perform-
ance  of  the  international  organisations  was  satisfactory,  the  following 
shortcomings were noted in relation to this form of management:

(a) 

after contract signature, international institutions often faced prob-
lems in putting a functioning project team in place, delaying the start 
of the project by several months;

(b) 

in other cases delays were caused by lengthy procurement processes. 
Contracts with international organisations usually stipulate that the 
procurement  of  any  goods,  works  or  services  is  carried  out  by  the 
organisation in accordance with its own rules and procedures. In one 
case the contract stated that the procedures applied by the interna-
tional organisation should not be less stringent than the EU rules. This 
clause caused lengthy clarification procedures, hindering an efficient 
procurement process;

 
 
28

(c) 

in one international organisation dealing with a number of contracts, 
l e n g t h y   a d m i n i s t r a t i v e   p r o c e d u r e s   c a u s e d   l a t e   p a y m e n t s   t o   l o c a l 
suppliers;

(d) 

t h e   p o s s i b i l i t y   o f   c a r r y i n g   o u t   d e t a i l e d   c h e c k s   o n   e x p e n d i t u r e   i n 
projects implemented by an international organisation is not defined 
clearly  enough.  In  one  instance,  the  verification  clause  in  the  finan-
cial and administrative framework agreement (FAFA) with the United 
Nations was interpreted differently by the Commission and its coun-
terparts, hindering controls and a timely closure of the contract;

(e) 

EU visibility was not achieved in some projects managed by interna-
tional  organisations  in  Moldova.  Beneficiaries  are  not  always  aware 
that  projects  received  EU  funding.  Projects  are  then  perceived  only 
as  those  of  the  managing  international  organisations.  This  is  due  to 
their direct implementation role and also to the fact that project web 
pages are usually only to be found under their address.

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING 
PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS 
FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?

58. 

The Commission’s learning process is of utmost importance in the area of 
freedom, security and justice as a sustainable change can only be expected 
with a long-term gradual approach. A new project has to build upon the 
achievement and experience gained in earlier projects and repetition of 
mistakes has to be avoided. Several examples showed that lessons were 
indeed learnt: for example, in the new project “Increased independence, 
transparency and efficiency of the justice system of Moldova” (EU contri-
bution of 3 million euro) the Commission focused on a narrower spectrum 
of  interrelated  project  purposes,  avoiding  the  dispersion  found  in  the 
forerunner project. 

 
29

59. 

60. 

61. 

In line with the needed gradual approach, the Commission has financed 
projects sequentially, e.g. three consecutive projects in the area of drug 
control. The projects fiches prepared by the Commission within new pro-
grammes  usually  have  sections  “Lessons  learnt”  into  which  information 
flows from progress reporting, evaluation and monitoring.

35 Generally projects below a 
1 million euro threshold were also 
not covered.

NOT ALL POSSIBILITIES EXPLOITED TO COLLECT INFORMATION

However in some cases the sections “Lessons learnt” were weak. The Commis-
sion had not sufficiently exploited the possibilities to gather information 
for the learning process because progress reports were late or of a poor 
quality or planned evaluations had not been carried out. These shortcom-
ings  point  to  a  lack  of  supervision  by  the  Commission  of  the  respective 
contract stipulations by contractors. 

It is positive that the Commission has a contract with external consultants 
to monitor projects, including on-the-spot visits and interviews with the 
different  stakeholders.  In  general  the  external  monitors  performed  well 
and often corrective action in the daily management took place following 
their remarks. However the Court notes two weaknesses:

(a) 

s o m e   p r o j e c t s   w e r e   n o t   c o v e r e d   b y   e x t e r n a l   m o n i t o r i n g ,   n o t a b l y 
projects  comprising  works  or  supply  contracts  and  the  non-TACIS 
p r o j e c t s   m a n a g e d   f r o m   B r u s s e l s 3 5.   M a n a g e m e n t   f r o m   a   d i s t a n c e 
already hinders a closer follow up. The absence of monitoring wors-
ened the problem. The resulting lack of up to date information led in 
one  case  to  the  Commission  retroactively  agreeing  to  a  substantial 
budget change as well as to the extension of the contract one month 
after the expiry of the original grant agreement;

(b) 

the  aggregate  monitoring  scores  for  some  of  the  audited  projects 
were overly positive. 

 
 
 
30

EXPERIENCE GAINED NOT ALWAYS REFLECTED IN NEW PROJECTS

62. 

In  some  cases  experiences  gained  in  earlier  projects  were  insufficiently 
reflected in new projects. This happened especially when project manage-
ment changed from one Commission service to another. As a result new 
projects  faced  sometimes  the  same  problems  as  projects  from  previous 
programmes,  errors  were  repeated  or  there  was  no  continuity  between 
project phases (see Box 8).

B O X   8

EXPERIENCES MADE INSUFFICIENTLY TRANSFERRED INTO NEW PROJECTS

(a) 

Concerning the project “Establishment of migration management system in Zarkapattya” (Ukraine) 
the speciﬁ c experience of the ﬁ rst project was not a decisive factor in the Commission’s process of 
evaluating the proposal for the second project. While the proposal brieﬂ y explained how the action 
was intended to build on the results of the previous action the Commission evaluated it as if it were 
a new action. Th  ey did not assess if the planning documents took into account risks materialised 
in the forerunner project. For example, the role, the conduct and also the budget problems of the 
border guards service in running the centres were not considered. Th  e question as to how the project 
should better build up capacity should have been dealt with in more detail;

(b) 

the project “Capacity building of migration management-CBMM II” (Ukraine) was prepared with-
out suﬃ  cient consideration of the experience of the previous project. Although substantial imple-
mentation problems appeared in this ﬁ rst project, the Commission signed a grant agreement for a 
follow-up project at an early stage. It was not logical to replicate more or less a project which was 
facing severe implementation challenges, especially when the timetable for completion was tight;

(c) 

Th  e Koslovichi II Border Terminal project (see Box 3) revealed diﬃ  culties in obtaining bids within 
tender budgets and obtaining exemption from value added tax. Th  ese two problems had been high-
lighted in a Special Report from the Court of Auditors published in November 200136 concerning 
the TACIS cross-border cooperation programme.

36 Special Report No 11/2001 concerning the TACIS cross-border cooperation programme together with the Commission’s replies 

(OJ C 329, 23.11.2001).

 
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

31

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS, 
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?

The  greater  part  of  the  audited  projects  Belarus 37,  Moldova  and  Ukraine 
achieved  satisfactory  results  (see  Annex  III).  However  their  scope  was 
limited  compared  to  the  scale  of  the  problems  they  had  to  address  and 
success  varied,  even  between  components  within  the  same  project.  In 
general progress was slower than expected by the Commission, the great 
majority  of  projects  being  extended  by  several  months,  some  even  by 
over a year.

37 Due to a lack of respect for 
democracy and human rights, 
assistance to Belarus was limited 
to humanitarian, cross-border 
and regional cooperation projects 
(see paragraph 7).

The best performance was in the area of “Border management”. The EU sup-
port substantially enhanced the border management capacities of Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. However the long term goal of a modern system of 
border management approximating European good practice is still some 
way  off.  The  key  issue  is  to  convert  the  initial  success  into  sustainable 
operational improvement (see paragraphs 11 to 19).

The European flagship project in the area of border assistance, EUBAM, per-
formed well. The peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is, how-
ever, a long-term task needing policy measures beyond better border and 
customs controls and border surveillance (see Box 1). 

The performance was unsatisfactory in the area of “Migration and asylum”, 
mainly in respect of infrastructure. Progress in providing adequate shelter 
for illegal migrants and asylum seekers respecting international humani-
tarian  standards  has  been  especially  slow  in  Ukraine.  The  division  of 
responsibilities  at  national  level  remains  unclear  and  the  Government 
allocated insufficient funds for infrastructure and running costs (see para-
graphs 20 to 27).

63. 

64. 

65. 

66. 

67.  Mixed results were achieved in the area “Fight against organised crime”. In 
spite  of  several  successes,  project  achievements  have  been  insufficient 
in  respect  of  securing  effective  prosecution  and  improved  cooperation 
between customs, border guards, police and secret services for effective 
criminal investigations (see paragraphs 28 to 44).

 
 
 
 
 
32

68. 

In the area of “Judiciary and good governance” the results are also mixed. 
Despite democratic reforms and improvements brought about by EU sup-
port,  Moldova  and  Ukraine  are  still  deeply  affected  by  corruption  (see 
footnotes 31 and 32). The Court considers that a fundamental, long term 
change in political will, mentalities, behaviour and attitudes is required 
to  achieve  a  significant  reduction  in  this  high  level  of  corruption  (see 
paragraphs 45 to 52). 

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

The Commission should:

(a) 

with the aim of achieving sustainable operational improvement in 
border  management,  seek  advice  from  the  European  Agency  for 
the  Management  of  Operational  Cooperation  at  the  External  Bor-
ders  (Frontex);  with  regard  to  further  support  for  border  equip-
ment  ensure  complementarity  with  equipment  provided  by  other 
donors; 

(b) 

b e f o r e   r e l e a s i n g   f u r t h e r   f u n d s   f o r   c e n t r e s   f o r   i l l e g a l   m i g r a n t s 
a n d   a s y l u m   s e e k e r s ,   m a k e   s u r e   o f   t h e   r e c i p i e n t   g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
commitment  to  pay  for  at  least  the  running  costs,  thus  ensuring 
sustainability;

(c) 

in  the  fight  against  organised  crime,  focus  the  project  activities 
more  on  the  issue  of  effective  prosecution  (including  a  modern 
system  of  seizure  and  confiscation  of  assets)  and  promote  more 
systematic information sharing between law enforcement bodies; 

(d) 

continue to explore possibilities for promoting more public involve-
ment in the anti-corruption policy by supporting civil society organ-
isations and advice centres.

WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS 
FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?

69.  Whereas the Commission has the ultimate responsibility for the projects, the 
audit showed that where limited achievements were found they could be 
typically attributed to the actions or omissions of all the main parties: the 
Commission, national authorities in the recipient states and contractors 
which  in  this  area  were  often  international  organisations.  External  fac-
tors  such  as  political  instability  also  diminished  the  project  results  (see 
paragraph 54).

 
 
33

70. 

71. 

72. 

The Commission did not allocate sufficient manpower to the Delegation in Kiev 
to  deal  with  a  rapidly  growing,  labour-intensive  policy  area  in  the  three 
countries. And it took nearly two years to start operational project manage-
ment in the Delegation in Moldova (established in 2005). The co-existence 
of  several  EU  financing  instruments  for  the  same  purpose,  and  a  lack  of 
consistency  between  them,  hampered  a  quality  approach.  Furthermore, 
the Commission did not take rigorous action whenever it became apparent 
that the quality of the EU assistance was lowered by shortcomings in the 
project management of the grant contractors (see paragraphs 55 to 57).

The recipient governments and the Commission did not sufficiently coordi-
nate  EU  activities  with  the  massive  support  given  by  other  donors.  The 
uncoordinated  flow  of  funds  from  different  sources  causes  unnecessary 
duplication of efforts, inconsistent approaches and reduced incentive to 
keep costs low (see paragraphs 36, 51, 54(a)).

In the recipient countries a lack of commitment at project level was noted 
e s p e c i a l l y   i n   t h e   s u b - a r e a s   o f   m i g r a t i o n / a s y l u m   a n d   j u d i c i a r y / g o o d 
governance.  The  Commission  also  underestimated  the  extent  to  which 
external  factors,  such  as  political  fragility,  discontinuity  of  government 
structures and, potentially, lack of EU accession perspective could prevent 
the  fulfilment  of  project  objectives.  These  factors  lay  beyond  the  Com-
mission’s direct responsibility but were not adequately and realistically 
evaluated in its risk assessment (see paragraphs 54(b) and (d)). 

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 

The Commission should:

(a) 

strengthen  its  personnel  in  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  jus-
tice in the Delegations in Moldova and Ukraine and have sufficient 
expertise for dealing with procurement and works elements;

(b) 

strive  to  use  the  new  ENP  instrument  as  a 
for support to the sector; 

single  and  flexible  tool 

(c) 

exercise  more  rigorous  control  over  the  international  institutions 
acting as contractors in respect of project management procedures, 
such as mobilisation of personnel, procurement, payments, report-
ing, expenditure control and requirement for EU visibility;

(d) 

take appropriate steps to encourage and support the recipient coun-
tries to establish and exercise effective donor coordination;

(e) 

support the projects where the real interest of recipient countries 
is clear and evidenced by, among other things, national funding; at 
the same time be more realistic in terms of objectives and consider 
longer implementation periods for individual projects. 

 
 
 
34

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING 
PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS 
FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?

73. 

The Commission has not fully exploited options to learn lessons, and experience 
gained  was  not  always  reflected  in  newly-started  projects  which  in  some 
cases led to the repetition of old mistakes (see paragraphs 60 to 62). 

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 

When preparing new projects the Commission should take into account 
more systematically the experiences of earlier projects. “Lessons learnt” 
sections  should  be  more  fully  developed  in  preparatory  documents  . 
They should also become a standard element in grant applications from 
international organisations.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meet-
ing of 19 November 2008.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da Silva Caldeira
President

 
 
 
 
 
35

A N N E X   I

Source: European Commission.

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37

A N N E X   I I I 

OVERVIEW OF AUDITED CONTRACTS 

N

Title of the contract

EU 
contribution

Country

Status
(July 2007) 1

Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancing

Overall judgment 
on results2

BORDER MANAGEMENT

4 000 000,00

UA, MD

completed on 
21.5.2006

UNDP / Rapid reaction 
mechanism

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM I

EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM II

EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM III

EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM IV

4 000 000,00

UA, MD

2 200 000,00

UA, MD

8 885 000,00

UA, MD

Strengthening border management in the 
Republic of Belarus — BOMBEL I

Strengthening border management in the 
Republic of Belarus — BOMBEL II

4 500 000,00

8 800 000,00

Kozlovichi II Border Terminal — works

14 000 000,00

Border management improvement, 
Ukraine — Lot 1,2

Border management improvement, 
Ukraine — Lot 5

2 223 738,00

1 770 555,00

Reform and modernisation of the customs 
in Ukraine

1 372 500,00

BL

BL

BL

UA

UA

UA

Establishment of migration management 
system in Zakarpattya

1 278 186,41

MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Enhancing capacities in the area 
of protection and treatment of refugees 
and asylum seekers in Zakarpatia

Capacity building of migration 
management — CBMM I

Capacity building of migration 
management (Phase II) — CBMM II

Strengthening the asylum systems 
of Ukraine and Moldova

UA

UA

UA

UA

699 942,43

3 781 505,00

2 767 000,00

1 635 000,00

UA, MD

Strengthening the national asylum system 
in the Republic of Belarus

365 000,00

BL

The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Secretariat

147 479,00

BL, UA, MD

The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping I

762 488,00

BL, UA, MD

The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping II a

1 307 898,00

BL, UA, MD

The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping II b

1 026 000,00

BL, UA, MD

ongoing since 
1.3.2006

completed on 
31.10.2006

completed on 
31.1.2007

ongoing since 
1.2.2007

completed on 
31.12.2006

ongoing since 
1.9.2006

UNDP / RAP 2004

UNDP / RAP 2003

UNDP / RAP 2006

UNDP / RAP 2001

UNDP / RAP 2003

Satisfactory 

Satisfactory

ongoing since 
30.12.2004

Works contract / CBC 
2000; CBC 2002

Unsatisfactory

completed on 
17.7.2005

completed on 
17.7.2005

completed on 
15.1.2005

Supply contracts / 
TACIS NAP 2001

Satisfactory

Service contract / NAP 
2001 (Small projects 
programmes)

Satisfactory, however 
underperformance in component 
“New computerised transit system”

completed on 
31.12.2006

Grant agreement /
Budget line B7-667     

ongoing since 
1.1.2007

 Grant agreement /
Aeneas

Unsatisfactory with regard 
to capacity building (action 
of humanitarian aid)

ongoing since 
1.3.2005

ongoing since 
22.7.2006

completed on 
31.12.2006

completed on 
31.12.2006

completed on 
3.5.2004

completed on 
28.2.2006

ongoing since 
1.3.2006

International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS NAP 
2003

Unsatisfactory in its core activity 
(MACs); corrective action launched 
after audit visits

UNHCR / TACIS RAP 
2002

Unsatisfactory in its core activity 
(temporary accommodation 
centres) for Ukraine and Belarus, 
Satisfactory for Moldova

UNHCR / ATA

Swedish Migration 
Board / Budget line 
B7-667

UNHCR (subcontractors 
IOM & Swedish 
Migration Board) / 
Aeneas

UNHCR (subcontractors 
IOM & Swedish 
Migration Board) / RAP 
2004

Satisfactory, however delays. 
Exit strategy to be designed.

1  Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2  Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ cant parts of the speciﬁ c objectives not achieved (ﬁ nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).

38

A N N E X   I I I 

N

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Title of the contract

EU 
contribution

Country

Status
(July 2007)1

Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancing

Overall judgment 
on results2

FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 1

Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 2

Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 3

2 000 000,00

BL, UA, MD

2 500 000,00

BL, UA, MD

2 000 000,00

BL, UA, MD

Combating traﬃ  cking in women 
in Moldova

599 408,00

MD

Fighting traﬃ  cking in persons 
in the Republic of Moldova

300 000,00

MD

completed on 
30.4.2005

completed on 
21.1.2007

ongoing since 
1.1.2007

completed on 
23.6.2004

completed on 
18.12.2006

IOM Rehabilitation Centre for Victims 
of Traﬃ  cking Chisinau, Moldova: recovery, 
rehabilitation and reintegration through 
comprehensive care

308 000,00

MD

completed on 
3.3.2006

Combating traﬃ  cking in human beings 
in Ukraine

1 892 000,00

UA

completed on 
18.6.2006

UNDP/ RAP 2001

UNDP/ RAP 2002 

UNDP/ RAP 2004

International 
Organisation for 
Migration / RAP 2000

International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002

International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002

Satisfactory for setting new 
anti-drug structures, 
Unsatisfactory for legislation 
and police intelligence

Satisfactory, however concern 
as to eﬃ  ciency (overlapping 
with other donors)

Satisfactory, however concern 
as to economy (high rent)

International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002

Satisfactory for protection/ 
reintegration and raising 
awareness. Unsatisfactory 
for criminalisation and prosecution

Project against money laundering, 
terrorist ﬁ nancing and corruption 
in Moldova

Project against money laundering 
in Ukraine — MOLI-UA-1

Follow-up project against money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁ nancing 
in Ukraine — MOLI-UA-2

3 000 000,00

MD

ongoing since 
2.8.2006

Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2005

974 502,00

5 000 000,00

UA

UA

completed on 
1.7.2005

Council of Europe / 
RAP 1999

ongoing since 
1.5.2006

Council of Europe / 
NAP 2005

Unsatisfactory start; 
but improvement 
in anti-corruption component

Satisfactory

1  Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2  Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ cant parts of the speciﬁ c objectives not achieved (ﬁ nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).

39

Title of the contract

EU 
contribution

Country

Status
(July 2007)1

Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancing

Overall judgment 
on results2

Civil and commercial judiciary project 
NIS, Moldova

Support to the national anti-corruption 
strategy of Moldova (PACO Moldova)

Joint programme between the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe 
for Moldova: Support to continued 
democratic reforms 2004–06

Increased independence, transparency 
and eﬃ  ciency of the justice system 
of the Republic of Moldova 

Reform of arbitration courts and support 
to court administration

Ukraine international cooperation 
in criminal matters (UPIC)

Ukraine — Judicial selection and 
appointment procedure, training, 
disciplinary liability, case management 
and alternative dispute resolution 
methods

Support to good governance: Project 
against corruption in Ukraine (UPAC)

Interpol-assisted international 
cooperation in criminal matters 
by Ukrainian Law-enforcement

JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2 194 015,00

250 000,00

MD

MD

completed on 
29.7.2005

completed on 
14.1.2006

GTZ/ NAP 2001

Satisfactory

Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2003

Satisfactory (pilot action)

800 000,00

MD

completed on 
15.12.2006

Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2003

Satisfactory, however ineﬃ  cient 
design 

3 000 000,00

MD

ongoing since 
1.10.2006

Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2005

Satisfactory, however lack 
of lessons learnt

2 476 000,00

1 500 000,00

UA

UA

completed on 
31.12.2005

ongoing since 
1.12.2005

UNDP/ NAP 2000

Unsatisfactory

Council of Europe/
Nap 2004

Satisfactory

2 000 000,00

UA

ongoing since 
31.5.2006

Council of Europe/
NAP 2003

Unsatisfactory start; more 
satisfactory since 2007

1 500 000,00

989 788,00

UA

UA

ongoing since 
9.6.2006

Council of Europe/
NAP 2004

Unsatisfactory

ongoing since 
15.1.2007

Project 
prepared, 
however no 
contract signed

Interpol/NAP 2004

Unsatisfactory start; more 
satisfactory since June 2007

NAP 2004

Unsatisfactory, activity cancelled

Anti-corruption advocacy and legal advice 
centre in Ukraine (ALAC)

500 000,00

UA

Total EU contribution

99 306 004,84

A N N E X   I I I 

N

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

1  Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2  Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ cant parts of the speciﬁ c objectives not achieved (ﬁ nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).

40

A N N E X   I V

Source: European Commission.

41

REPLY 
OF THE COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. 
The  Commission’s  assistance  had  to  operate 
in difficult political and institutional contexts 
characterised by Soviet-style administration in 
need of large scale reforms.

Due to a lack of respect for democracy, human 
rights, and rule of law, Commission assistance 
to Belarus is limited to 5 million euro per year 
f o r   t h e   p e r i o d   2 0 0 7 – 1 0 .   S u c c e s s i v e   C o u n c i l 
conclusions  state  that  EU  assistance  to  Bela-
rus  will  support  the  needs  of  the  population 
and  democratisation,  notably  by  humanitar-
ian, cross-border and regional cooperation and 
by  projects  supporting  directly  and  indirectly 
democratisation and democratic forces.

III. 
The Commission welcomes the positive appre-
ciation of the Court for the projects in the area 
of  border  management  that  represents  nearly 
two  thirds  of  the  projects  financial  weight.  In 
the  area  of  migration  and  asylum,  difficulties 
were  encountered  in  the  work/supply  compo-
nents of projects, particularly in Ukraine, while 
the capacity-building components attained sat-
isfactory achievements.

IV. 
Political  instability  in  the  region  has  contrib-
uted  to  hindering  progress.  However,  limited 
a c h i e v e m e n t s   w e r e   c i r c u m s c r i b e d   t o   s o m e 
projects.

A s   r e g a r d s   c o o r d i n a t i o n   w i t h   o t h e r   d o n o r s , 
the Delegation in Ukraine is unanimously con-
sidered  in  the  forefront  of  such  an  exercise. 
The  extent  to  which  coordination  takes  place 
is heavily reliable upon the willingness of the 
parties involved to enter such a process (some 
donors, especially non-EU, are more reluctant 
than others).

42

with  their  national  funding  (i.e.  parking  areas 
and some storage facilities). Respective works 
are  ongoing.  The  new  border  terminal  thus  is 
expected to be made operational in the begin-
ning of 2009. Works were planned allowing the 
old  border  terminal  to  continue  its  function-
i n g   t h r o u g h   t h e   c o n s t r u c t i o n   p e r i o d   o f   t h e 
new  one,  and  the  old  terminal  will  continue 
to  be  used  as  a  part  of  the  entire  complex  at 
Kozlovich.

17. 
The rapid reaction mechanism (RRM) allows the 
mobilisation and rapid deployment of specific 
f i n a n c i a l   r e s o u r c e s   t o   t a k e   u r g e n t   a c t i o n   t o 
help  re-establish  or  safeguard  normal  condi-
tions  for  the  execution  of  the  policies  under-
taken, in order to preserve their effectiveness. 
A r t .   2   o f   C o u n c i l   R e g u l a t i o n   ( E C )   3 8 1 / 2 0 0 1 
c l e a r l y   i n d i c a t e s   t h a t   t h e   R R M   m a y   f i n a n c e 
actions which under normal circumstances fall 
within the regular assistance programmes. The 
major  purpose  of  the  RRM  was  to  enable  the 
Community to react swiftly to crisis situations 
and thus to support the Communities’ external 
policy.  The  RRM  paved  the  way  for  the  regu-
lar programmes to be used in order to achieve 
the  overall  objectives  of  the  intervention.  As 
mentioned  in  the  EUBAM  terms  of  reference, 
it  was  from  the  very  beginning  assumed  that 
tangible  results  can  only  be  expected  in  the 
mid- or long-terms. This assumption is fully in 
line  with  the  intention  of  the  Council  Regula-
tion establishing the RRM.

The Commission has undertaken to systemati-
cally  lead  and  strengthen  donor  coordination 
efforts in countries, and hosted a region-wide 
donor coordination conference in January 2008 
to kick-start this process.

Taking  account  of  the  possibility  of  compar-
ing  the  technical  specificity  of  projects,  les-
sons  learnt  were  considered  in  the  design  of 
subsequent operations.

The  EC  Delegation  in  Moldova  has  now  fully 
taken over programme management responsi-
bilities from the Kiev Delegation.

V.
The Commission acknowledges the work of the 
Court and its contribution to increase the effec-
tiveness of the projects. 

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

13.
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a c k n o w l e d g e s   t h e   p o s i t i v e 
a p p r e c i a t i o n   o f   t h e   C o u r t   o n   t h e   f i n a n c i a l l y 
most significant part of the audit.

Box 3 — Example of unsatisfactory result: 
reduced scope of work and delays
In spite of the difficulties mentioned, the Com-
mission  took  a  number  of  measures  in  order 
to  assure  the  completion  of  the  project.  The 
progress of work was closely and permanently 
monitored until completion. Finally, the works 
contract has been completed with full utilisa-
tion of the EC funds. The provisional acceptance 
certificate for the EC-funded works contract on 
construction of the Kozlovichi II Border Termi-
nal  was  signed  by  the  Belarusian  Customs  in 
March  2008.  The  Belarusian  Customs  took  the 
decision  to  complete  those  elements  of  infra-
structure that were excluded after negotiations 

43

18. 
The Tacis programme was not flexible enough 
to allow for a quick mobilisation of major funds 
for a longer implementation period. A window 
of  opportunity  for  such  a  project  occurred  in 
June 2005 when the Presidents of Moldova and 
Ukraine signed a joint letter to the Council and 
t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   r e q u e s t i n g   a s s i s t a n c e .   T h e 
Commission  felt  it  important  to  react  rapidly 
to  this  request.  However,  due  to  the  political 
instability  in  the  region  at  that  time  (the  so-
called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine), it was 
unavoidable to conclude short-term agreements 
making use of available funds. Meanwhile, the 
mandate  of  the  mission  was  extended  (up  to 
end 2009). A factor of predictability was intro-
duced with the coming into force of the ENPI, 
i n   t h e   f r a m e   o f   t h e   R e g i o n a l   E a s t   I n d i c a t i v e 
Programme  2007–10.  An  annual  allocation  is 
foreseen for EUBAM until the end of 2009.

19. 
The Bommoluk projects are based on EUBAM’s 
“ N e e d s   a s s e s s m e n t   a n d   r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
r e p o r t ”   w h i c h   a n a l y s e d   t h e   g a p s   a n d   n e e d s 
o f   t h e   n a t i o n a l   b o r d e r   a u t h o r i t i e s   a t   t h e 
Moldovan-Ukrainian  state  border.  A  distinct 
advantage is that the lessons learned from ten-
der  processes  in  previous  projects  are  being 
taken  into  account.  As  regards  other  donors, 
c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y   w a s   e n s u r e d   w i t h   t h e   U S 
whose focus was to provide counter-terrorism 
assistance. Before having tendered any equip-
m e n t ,   t h e   b e n e f i c i a r i e s   h a v e   t o   e n s u r e   t h a t 
they  are  able  to  operate  the  equipment,  and 
to  cover  the  running  and  maintenance  costs. 
EUBAM is carefully examining the partner serv-
ices’ capacity to fulfil their commitments.

25.
(a) 
Upon the request of the Ukrainian Government, 
the  Commission  decided  to  support  the  lat-
ter. The Ukrainian Government showed strong 
commitment  in  2004,  to  improve  conditions 
for irregular migrants and agreed to financially 
support the State Committee for Nationalities 
and Migration to establish two migrant custody 
centres which meet the standards determined 
by the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the recommendations of the CPT.

Box 4 — Despite alleviation by EU support, 
living conditions for illegal migrants 
in existing accommodation centre 
still unacceptable
Due  to  the  very  poor  condition  of  the  tempo-
rary  holding  facilities  in  Pavshino  and  Chop, 
this project finally delivered more humanitar-
ian aid than capacity building.

After  the  EC  Delegation’s  visit,  a  serious  dis-
cussion  was  held  with  representatives  of  the 
State Border Guard Service (SBGS) which took 
i m m e d i a t e   a c t i o n   a n d   i n i t i a t e d   c o r r e c t i v e 
measures. After the Court’s visit, the Commis-
sion recommended the Government of Ukraine 
closed Pavshino due to the poor human rights 
standards. Meanwhile the Cabinet of Ministers 
d e c i d e d   t o   c l o s e   P a v s h i n o   a s   s o o n   a s   o t h e r 
facilities are available.

Box 5 — Poor progress in establishing 
new accommodation centres 
for illegal migrants
Delays  were  encountered  in  refurbishing  the 
selected migrant custody centres in Zhuravychi 
(Volyn oblast) and Rozsudiv (Chernihiv oblast) 
due  to  political  instability  (“Orange  Revolu-
tion”), change in competent ministry over the 
period 2004–05 and lack of transfer of commit-
ted resources.

44

The  decision  to  reduce  the  number  of  accom-
modation places from initially 1 260 to 250 was 
based  on  European  practice  by  acknowledg-
ing that higher capacity negatively affects the 
operation  of  the  centre.  In  2007  substantial 
p r o g r e s s   w a s   m a d e   i n   r e f u r b i s h m e n t   w o r k s . 
Meanwhile both migrant custody centres have 
started operating in accordance with European 
practices.

27. 
T h e   “ S t r e n g t h e n i n g   o f   t h e   n a t i o n a l   B e l a r u s 
asylum  system  project”  faced  administrative 
a n d   l e g a l   p r o b l e m s   t h a t   t h e   E C   D e l e g a t i o n 
addressed  and  solved  through  contacts  with 
the national administration. The TAC for asylum 
seekers in Gomel in Belarus has been officially 
opened  on  16  January  2008  and  is  now  oper-
ated and used.

Box 6 — Underutilisation of newly 
constructed centres for asylum seekers
At the end of 2006, 250 accommodation places 
for asylum seekers were available in the Odessa 
Temporary Accommodation Centre (TAC) thanks 
to  the  “Strengthening  the  asylum  systems  of 
Moldova and Ukraine project”. It is true that at 
the time of the audit only half of the TAC was in 
use due to a lack of State funding. As far as TAC 
in Mukachevo is concerned it started becoming 
operational  in  November  2007  after  the  Com-
mission  convinced  the  Ukrainian  Government 
to transfer the ownership of the land and build-
ing  from  the  SBGS  to  the  State  Committee  for 
Nationalities  and  Religion,  and  to  make  avail-
able State funding for its operation.

26. 
The  Commission  is  pointing  to  the  financial 
a s p e c t s   i n   i t s   m e e t i n g s   w i t h   t h e   U k r a i n i a n 
Government.  The  division  of  responsibilities 
between  the  SBGS  and  the  Ministry  of  Inter-
nal Affairs is legally determined and clear: the 
SBGS  responsibility  ends  after  10  days  (short-
term detention), afterwards irregular migrants 
have to be handed over to the ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs. However, since the ministry did not 
operate any custody centre until recently, the 
law was not applied and the SBGS held migrants 
detained  up  to  6  months,  the  maximum  dura-
tion allowed by Ukrainian legislation.

34. 
In its attempt to assist better information shar-
i n g   a m o n g   t h e   U k r a i n i a n   l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t , 
the  Commission  in  cooperation  with  Interpol 
has  since  explored  the  possibility  of  extend-
ing i24/7 to the SBGS of Ukraine. However, for 
reasons  related  to  national  sovereignty  this 
extension proved not to be feasible.

35. 
U k r a i n e   h a s   n o t   y e t   r a t i f i e d   t h e   C o u n c i l   o f 
Europe  convention  on  data  protection  which 
is a requirement if personal data is transmitted. 
The Commission is urging Ukraine to ratify the 
convention in order to enable law enforcement 
services to cooperate with each other. The non-
ratification of the data protection convention 
is  also  a  reason  why  no  strategic  agreement 
has yet been signed with Europol.

36. 
The Commission became active in the region in 
the  fight  against  trafficking  in  human  beings 
already in 2000. With the involvement of  others 
d o n o r s   i n   a n t i - t r a f f i c k i n g ,   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n 
stopped programming such projects under the 
Tacis bilateral programme. The last project was 
the one for Belarus under NAP 2005.

40. 
The legislative process was, at least in Ukraine, 
hampered by frequent changes in the Govern-
ment  after  the  Orange  Revolution.  Generally 
speaking  legislative  processes  are  slow  in  the 
region.

41. 
At  the  time  of  the  Court’s  visit  seizures  were 
i n d e e d   m o d e s t .   H o w e v e r ,   t h e   r e s u l t s   h a v e 
i m p r o v e d   s i g n i f i c a n t l y   s i n c e   t h e n .   U k r a i n e 
s e i z e d   i n   2 0 0 7   a   t o t a l   o f   4 1 5   k g   h e r o i n   a n d 
1 9   k g   c o c a i n e ,   a n d   i n   t h e   f i r s t   f i v e   m o n t h s 
of  2008  214  kg  heroin  and  41  kg  cocaine.  In 
Moldova, a seizure of 200 kg heroin was made 
in February 2008. The EC project has certainly 
contributed to the successful seizures through 
its capacity-building activities.

47. 
The “Reform of arbitration courts and support 
to court administration” project has delivered 
tangible  results  since  it  was  the  first  judicial-
assistance project of such a scope and magni-
tude  ever  in  Ukraine  and  it  intervened  in  an 
institutional  context  still  designed  along  the 
Soviet-style  administration  profile.  Some  sig-
nificant operational changes suggested by the 
project  were  implemented  by  the  State  Court 
Administration.

Ensuring  that  all  equipment  purchases  were 
made in a transparent manner resulted in some 
cases in tender cancellations which eventually 
caused delays.

50. 
The  follow-up  project  started  in  August  2006 
and  suffered  a  slow  start  due  to  the  resigna-
tion  of  the  anti-corruption  advisor  soon  after 
the start-up conference and a new recruitment 
had to be launched.

45

52. 
The  2006–07  political  crisis  affected  the  pace 
o f   r e f o r m s   a s   w e l l   a s   a c t i v i t i e s   s u r r o u n d -
ing  adoption  of  new  anti-corruption  legisla-
tion  and  the  anti-corruption  action  plan.  The 
project received a fresh start at the end of 2007 
when the snap parliamentary elections brought 
pro-presidential political forces to power. The 
project work plan was revised during the Steer-
i n g   G r o u p   ( S G )   m e e t i n g   h e l d   o n   2 9 . 1 1 . 2 0 0 7 
and  a  list  of  priority  activities  for  the  period 
December  2007  to  March  2008  was  approved. 
Part  of  the  activities  related  to  drafting  and 
adoption  of  anti-corruption  legislation  have 
been rescheduled for 2008 and 2009.

(a) 
T h e   “ A n t i - c o r r u p t i o n   a c t i o n   p l a n ”   ( A C A P ) 
started with assistance provided by the project. 
However, subsequently the Ministry of Justice 
decided to draft the ACAP alone. As a follow-up 
measure aimed to support the ACAP implemen-
tation,  the  project  assisted  in  drafting  of  the 
“anti-corruption  package”.  The  expert  assess-
ment provided by the CoE focused on the anti-
corruption package containing three draft laws. 
The expertise by the President of the Group of 
States  against  corruption  (GRECO)  mentioned 
the high quality of the revised draft laws.

E x p e r t s   h a d   a c c e s s   t o   t h e   a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n 
action plan only briefly before it was enacted. 
Thus, there was not any possibility to suggest 
changes to the document. Moreover, the draft 
laws were supposed to be adopted at the same 
time with the action plan to provide the legal 
f o u n d a t i o n   f o r   t h e   a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n   f i g h t   i n 
Ukraine.  The  deployment  of  the  project  and 
Ukraine’s accession to GRECO served as “cata-
lysts”  for  the  action  plan’s  adoption.  Never-
theless, it was perceived that by adopting the 
action  plan  the  Government  was  intending  to 
“timely report” on the action taken rather than 
generating a well-orchestrated comprehensive 
document easy to implement.

46

(b) 
The  ACAP  was  only  adopted  in  August  2007. 
Therefore  no  ACAP  monitoring-related  activi-
ties  could  have  taken  place  at  the  time  of  the 
audit.

Project support is currently provided through 
the inter-institutional working group on com-
bating  corruption  to  which  a  representative 
from  the  project  team  has  been  appointed  as 
a  member.  Monitoring  of  ACAP  implementa-
tion is one of the group’s objectives. The issue 
of  political  party  financing  was  first  raised  at 
the project Steering Group meeting on 6 March 
2007,  but  it  was  understated  by  the  Ministry 
of Justice.

A s   t o   t h e   g e n e r a l   p u b l i c   o p i n i o n   s u r v e y   o n 
corruption, the Ukrainian authorities had sent 
simultaneous requests to several international 
donors without ensuring the necessary coordi-
nation and dissemination of the information.

54.
(a), (b), (c) 
The  main  problem  has  been  indeed  the  diffi-
cult  political  situation  from  April  2007  until 
t h e   e n d   o f   t h e   y e a r .   T h e   p e r c e p t i o n   b y   t h e 
Court  of  the  needs  assessment  in  the  area  of 
justice/judiciary/anti-corruption  in  Ukraine  is 
essentially the result of a particularly difficult 
and specific context, which is characterised by 
a  high  degree  of  fragmentation  and  dilution 
of  responsibilities  among  different  executive 
entities,  and  by  a  lack  of  any  form  of  cross-
sectoral coordination.

The project had been designed and developed 
together  with  prospective  beneficiaries  (the 
M i n i s t r y   o f   J u s t i c e   a m o n g   t h e m ) .   T h e   l o c a l 
ownership,  therefore,  has  been  ensured  from 
the  very  outset  and  confirmed  under  the  cur-
r e n t   G o v e r n m e n t ,   a p p o i n t e d   a f t e r   t h e   2 0 0 7 
elections.

R e g u l a r   d o n o r   c o o r d i n a t i o n   i n i t i a t i v e s   h a v e 
been put in place by the project team in order to 
share information; to ensure coherence among 
the different interventions and to avoid over-
lapping.  Initial  staffing  difficulties  are  over-
come and the issue of office space availability 
is now solved under the new government.

It has to be stressed that co-financing is not an 
obligation for the recipient country.

55.
(a) 
The  EC  Delegation  in  Moldova  has  now  fully 
taken over its programme management respon-
sibilities from the Kiev Delegation. In general, 
t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   w i t h   t h e   C o u r t   t h a t 
a d e q u a t e   s t a f f i n g ,   b o t h   i n   t e r m s   o f   n u m b e r 
and skills, represents a challenge.

(b) 
Though creating some administrative complex-
ity this mixed fund architecture did not impede 
the  Söderköping  project  to  reach  satisfactory 
results, as acknowledged by the Court.

Box 7 — Example of inefficient 
contract management
The division of the Söderköping phase 3 project 
between the Aeneas programme and Tacis was 
done because neither programme had available 
sufficient  funding  to  allow  a  comprehensive 
project which was particularly important after 
EU  enlargement  in  2004  in  order  to  promote 
cross-border  cooperation  in  the  area  of  asy-
lum,  migration  and  border  management  and 
to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  EU  is  build-
ing  a  new  curtain  along  the  new  EU  external 
border.

47

56. 
It is correct that the Commission’s implement-
ing partners did not pay adequate attention to 
the question of land allocation and ownership. 
However,  as  soon  as  the  Commission  learned 
a b o u t   t h e s e   p r o b l e m s   c o r r e c t i v e   m e a s u r e s 
were immediately initiated.

D o n o r   c o o r d i n a t i o n   t o o k   p l a c e   f r e q u e n t l y , 
before,  during  and  after  programming  exer-
cises. It became institutionalised after the Paris 
D e c l a r a t i o n .   M e a n w h i l e ,   j o i n t   p r o g r a m m i n g 
missions took place.

57. 
Despite  limited  cases  of  shortcomings,  inter-
national  organisations  do  usually  have  a  sig-
nificant level of know-how in terms of — inter 
alia — mobilisation of expertise, overseas finan-
cial management and efficient procurement in 
difficult  fields.  Improvements  will  be  brought 
in  the  definition  of  verification  modalities  in 
the  context  of  the  FAFA  through  the  elabora-
tion of common terms of reference, and visibil-
ity will be enhanced thanks to the issuance of 
the  “Visibility  and  communication  manual  for 
EU external actions” (April 2008) that now also 
applies to international organisations.

(d) 
“In the specific case, it has been decided to carry 
out verifications on some UNDP projects and to 
follow up on the basis of these findings”.

60. 
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   f o l l o w s   s c r u p u l o u s l y   t h e 
reporting  procedure  that  links  reporting  with 
payment  to  contractors.  There  are  instances 
w h e n   c o n t i n u i t y   o f   a c t i o n   n e c e s s i t a t e s   t h e 
l a u n c h i n g   o f   n e w   c o n t r a c t s   w h e n   t h e   f u l l 
r e p o r t i n g   p r o c e d u r e   h a s   n o t   y e t   b e e n   c o m -
pleted  on  an  existing  action,  thus  giving  rise 
to unavoidable situations when not all informa-
tion possibilities are exploited.

61.
(a) 
S i n c e   t h e   C o u r t ’ s   a u d i t   t h e   C o m m i s s i o n   h a s 
widened the ROM coverage.

(b) 
The ROM two-page summary report, supported 
b y   a   d e t a i l e d   b a c k g r o u n d   c o n c l u s i o n   s h e e t , 
includes not only the scoring of the main five 
m o n i t o r i n g   c r i t e r i a   ( r e l e v a n c e ,   e f f i c i e n c y , 
effectiveness,  impact  and  sustainability),  but 
also  a  total  of  21  sub-criteria  to  be  analysed, 
scored  and  made  available  for  statistics  and 
further  comparisons.  The  MONIS  (monitoring 
information system) database allows a detailed 
and  strategic  statistical,  yet  simple  to  extract 
a n d   u s e ,   a n a l y s i s   f o r   a l l   m a n a g e r s   i n v o l v e d 
in  projects  supervision,  implementation  and 
monitoring.

Box 8 — Experiences made insufficiently 
transferred into new projects
(a) 
The  follow-up  project  selected  was  the  best 
proposal  received  under  the  2005  Aeneas  call 
for proposals and met the actual needs of the 
detention centres in the Carpathian region.

(b) 
As regards the timing for the follow-up project, 
the CBMM 2 project was signed to support the 
positive resolution of the EC-Ukraine negotia-
tions  on  the  readmission  agreement.  Lessons 
learned  from  the  CBMM  1  project  were  taken 
into  account,  particularly  with  respect  to  the 
focus  on  temporary  holding  facilities  and  the 
i s s u e   o f   l a n d   a l l o c a t i o n / o w n e r s h i p   c l a r i f i e d 
u p f r o n t   w i t h   t h e   r e s p o n s i b l e   e n t i t y ,   a n d   t o 
the additional funds required for the VolynMi-
grant Custody Centre and made available under 
phase II of the project.

48

CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

63. 
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a c k n o w l e d g e s   t h e   o v e r a l l 
positive  appreciation  of  the  Court  as  regards 
the audited projects. Their scope was naturally 
limited  to  avoid  dilution  of  activities  and  to 
diminish the risk of low effectiveness in terms 
of outcomes, given the scale of the problems to 
be tackled in these transition countries. While 
the  capacity-building  component  of  projects 
has  achieved  overall  satisfactory  results,  the 
w o r k / s u p p l y   c o m p o n e n t s   h a v e   p r o g r e s s e d 
more  slowly  due  to  the  tendering  procedures 
i n v o l v e d   a n d   t h e   n e e d   f o r   t h e   b e n e f i c i a r y 
administration to provide adequate logistics.

64. 
The  key  issue  of  sustainability  is  tackled  in  a 
two-fold manner. On the one hand, border man-
agement  projects  are  heavily  geared  towards 
strengthening  the  technical  and  institutional 
capacities  of  the  beneficiaries.  On  the  other 
hand, EUBAM’s assessments and recommenda-
tions have been further transposed at national 
level in Moldova and Ukraine with additional EC 
support  in  view  of  ensuring  adequate  longer-
term sustainability.

65. 
The  peaceful  resolution  of  the  Transnistrian 
conflict is, as a matter of fact, tackled primarily 
at the political level.

67. 
U l t i m a t e   r e s p o n s i b i l i t y   f o r   a c h i e v e m e n t s   i n 
the  area  of  prosecution  and  improved  inter-
services cooperation for criminal investigations 
lies  with  the  national  authorities  due  to  mat-
ters relating to national sovereignty including 
security.

68. 
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   c o n s i d e r s   t h a t   p r o g r e s s   i s 
gradually undergoing in the area of corruption. 
GRECO, the group of states against corruption, 
of the CoE, of which Ukraine became a member 
in 2006, adopted its peer review report in March 
2 0 0 7   ( p u b l i s h e d   i n   O c t o b e r   2 0 0 7 ) .   U k r a i n e 
should report back to GRECO by Autumn 2008. 
T h e   a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n   a c t i o n   p l a n   m e n t i o n e d 
above aims at addressing a number of recom-
mendations  provided  by  GRECO.  Issues  to  be 
tackled include:

• 

• 

• 

• 

setting  up  a  dedicated  entity  to  deal  with 
corruption offences;

lifting undue immunities and streamlining 
the immunity-granting procedures;

m a k i n g   p u b l i c   p r o c u r e m e n t   m o r e 
transparent;

c r i m i n a l i s i n g   a n y   c o r r u p t i o n - r e l a t e d 
o f f e n c e ,   m a n y   o f   w h i c h   s t i l l   d o   n o t   f a l l 
under the criminal jurisdiction.

Recommendation
(a) 
In  principle,  the  Frontex  Regulation  provides 
the  Agency  with  a  mandate  to  facilitate  oper-
ational  cooperation  between  Member  States 
and third countries. However, the Commission 
agrees  to  seek  its  advice.  Complementarities 
of  border  equipment  were  and  will  be  further 
ensured with the other donors.

(b) 
The Commission agrees with the Court’s recom-
mention  and  would  like  to  underline  that  in 
the context of the Readmission related assist-
a n c e   p r o g r a m m e   ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,   s u c h   c o m m i t m e n t 
has already been confirmed by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in Ukraine.

49

(c) 
The  Commission  agrees  with  the  Court’s  rec-
ommendation.  This  recommendation  is  being 
ensured in the frame of the joint EC–Council of 
Europe project: “Ukraine’s international coop-
eration  in  criminal  matters”  (UPIC)  since  2006 
and currently ongoing.

(d) 
The Commission explored and will continue to 
explore  possibilities  for  promoting  non-state 
a c t o r s   i n v o l v e m e n t   i n   t h e   a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n 
policy.

69. 
The  difficult  political  context  from  April  2007 
to  the  end  of  the  year  was  the  main  problem. 
D e s p i t e   t h e s e   e v e n t s ,   l o c a l   o w n e r s h i p   w a s 
ensured.  Initial  staffing  difficulties  are  over-
come with a full time CoE staff member placed 
in Ukraine taking direct supervision/leadership 
of the project affairs.

70. 
The  EC  Delegation  in  Moldova  has  now  fully 
taken over programme management responsi-
bilities from the Kiev Delegation, which should 
solve the resources problem.

A s   r e g a r d s   t h e   c o - e x i s t e n c e   o f   s e v e r a l   E U 
financing  instruments  for  the  same  purpose, 
the  use  of  two  financing  instruments  for  sup-
porting  the  Söderköping  project  was  at  that 
time the solution to adequately respond to the 
scale of the problem.

71. 
The Commission has undertaken to systemati-
cally  lead  and  strengthen  donor  coordination 
efforts  in  Ukraine,  and  hosted  a  region-wide 
donor coordination conference in January 2008 
to kick-start this process.

In  addition  to  this,  possibilities  for  joint  pro-
gramming are being actively pursued, and one 
j o i n t   p r o g r a m m i n g   m i s s i o n   i n   U k r a i n e ,   w i t h 
Sweden’s SIDA, has been completed.

72. 
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   d r a w s   t h e   a t t e n t i o n   t o   t h e 
importance of the external factors.

Recommendation
The Commission should

(a) 
Adequate staffing, both in terms of number and 
skills, represents a challenge. However, the EC 
Delegation in Moldova has now fully taken over 
programme management responsibilities from 
the  Kiev  Delegation.  Besides,  as  regards  the 
Delegation in Ukraine, an internal reorganisa-
tion of the operations’ staff aiming at redistrib-
uting the workload, particularly in the area of 
JLS, is effective since 1.9.2008.

(b) 
While the ENPI does represent a more flexible 
instrument  that  its  predecessor,  there  is  still 
a  clear  case  for  a  division  of  labour  between 
funding  instruments,  according  to  the  advan-
tages  and  specificities  of  each.  The  focus  of 
ENPI  programmes  in  Ukraine  and  Moldova  is, 
f o r   e x a m p l e ,   o n   l a r g e ,   s e c t o r - w i d e   s u p p o r t 
programmes, rather than smaller projects. This 
is  in  line  with  the  need  to  improve  the  focus 
and  strategic  impact  of  ENPI  funding.  Other 
instruments  however,  such  as  the  “Thematic 
programme for asylum and migration” have the 
ability to mobilise smaller pools of funds, in a 
more  rapid  and  flexible  way  than  large-scale 
sector reform programmes.

50

73.
Recommendation
The Commission shares this preoccupation and 
would like to underline that it already includes 
at  the  level  of  project’s  preparation  relevant 
information regarding lessons learnt. The iden-
tification fiche for project approach is used for 
the  screening  by  the  Quality  Support  Group. 
T h i s   i s   t h e n   t r a n s l a t e d   i n t o   a n   a c t i o n   f i c h e 
w h i c h   i s   p a r t   o f   t h e   f i n a n c i n g   d e c i s i o n   a n d 
contains  a  section  regarding  “lessons  learnt” 
(section 2.2).

(c) 
The  standard  contribution  agreement  reflects 
the requirements of the FR and contains exten-
sive  requirements  as  regards  the  obligations 
of  the  IO  as  regards  visibility,  information  on 
c o n t r a c t i n g   a r r a n g e m e n t s   f o r   c o n t r a c t s ,   a s 
well as the procurement, the award of grants, 
the  respect  of  the  exclusion  criteria  an  ade-
quate ex post publicity of the EC-funded grant 
a n d   p r o c u r e m e n t   c o n t r a c t s   a w a r d e d   b y   t h e 
organisation.

(d) 
The  Commission  has  been  working  with  part-
n e r   g o v e r n m e n t s ,   M e m b e r   S t a t e s   a n d   o t h e r 
d o n o r s   t o   e n c o u r a g e   a n d   s u p p o r t   c o u n t r y -
owned  donor  coordination  mechanisms,  and 
will continue its efforts in this direction.

(e) 
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   a g r e e s   t h a t   t h e   r e c i p i e n t 
country should clearly express its interests and 
w i s h e s   t o   u n d e r l i n e s   t h a t   t h e s e   e x p r e s s i o n s 
a r e   s e t   o u t   i n   t h e   p a r t n e r s h i p   a n d   c o o p e r a -
tion  agreements  and  in  the  ENP  action  plans. 
They are further taken into consideration at the 
project’s identification stage following priori-
ties  identified  in  the  country  strategy  paper 
and the national indicative programmes in line 
with the ENP action plans. National participa-
tion is envisaged and implemented according 
to the nature of the project.

I n   t h e   f r a m e   o f   t h e   r e g u l a r   R O M   e x e r c i s e , 
p a r t i c u l a r   a t t e n t i o n   w i l l   b e   f u r t h e r   g i v e n   t o 
t h e   d e f i n i t i o n   o f   t h e   o b j e c t i v e s   i n   l i n e   w i t h 
the  political  and  institutional  capacity  of  the 
recipient  countries.  As  regards  the  length  of 
the implementation periods, it is defined tak-
ing into account the capacity of absorption of 
the  recipient  countries,  measured  in  terms  of 
the time needed to pursue sectoral reforms.

European Court of Auditors

Special Report No 9/2008

The effectiveness of EU support in the area of freedom, security and justice for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

2009 — 50 pp. — 21 X 29.7 cm

ISBN 978-92-9207-139-4

DOI 10.2865/43014

How to obtain EU publications

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SPECIAL REPORT “THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU SUPPORT IN THE AREA 

OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE FOR BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND 

UKRAINE”  EXAMINES THE  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  EU  ASSISTANCE  AND 

ANALYSES REASONS FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE. IT ALSO LOOKS AT 

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD A PROCESS IN PLACE TO 

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS LEARNED FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE 

IN THIS FIELD. THE REPORT CONTAINS DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS 

WHICH COULD HELP THE COMMISSION INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS 

OF SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE THREE COUNTRIES.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

ISBN 978-92-9207-139-4