Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No193/2007, imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in India and amending Council Regulation (EC) No192/2007 imposing a definitive anti dumping duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in, inter alia, India
Date: 2008-11-17
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: India, anti-dumping duty, countervailing charge, import, originating product, plastics

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 17.11.2008 
COM(2008) 757 final 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

amending Council Regulation (EC) No193/2007, imposing a definitive countervailing 
duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in India and 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No192/2007 imposing a definitive anti dumping duty 
on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in, inter alia, India  

(presented by the Commission) 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 
1997  on  protection  against  subsidised  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European 
Community as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 461/2004 of 8 March 2004 ("the 
basic Regulation") in the proceeding concerning imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, 
originating in India 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and is the 
result  of  an  investigation  which  was  carried  out  in  line  with  the  substantive  and  procedural 
requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

•  Council,  Regulation  (EC)  No193/2007  of  22  February  2007,  imposing  a  definitive 
countervailing  duty  on  imports  of  certain  polyethylene  terephthalate,  originating  in  India 
and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  192/2007  of  22  February  2007,  imposing  a  definitive  anti-
dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  polyethylene  terephthalate,  originating  in,  inter  alia, 
India. 

•  Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Interested parties concerned by the proceeding have already had the possibility to defend their 
interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic regulation.  

The basic regulation does not foresee a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive 
list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

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3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

On 27 September 2007, the Commission initiated on its own initiative a partial interim review 
of the countervailing duty in force in respect of imports of polyethylene terephthalate in India. 
The review was initiated because there was sufficient prima facie evidence suggesting that the 
circumstances  with  regard  to  subsidisation  on  the  basis  of  which  measures  had  been 
established have changed and that these changes were of a lasting nature. 

The partial interim review investigation confirmed that while the schemes in question indeed 
were  not  used  the  overall  level  of  subsidisation  with  regard  to  the  sole  co-operating  Indian 
producer  has  nevertheless  increased.  As  the  other  exporting  producer  identified  in  annex  to 
the notice of initiation failed to cooperate, it must be considered to benefit from subsidisation 
at least at the level found for the cooperating exporter. 

There  was  no  indication  of  a  need  to  recalculate  the  subsidy  rates  of  companies  having  an 
individual margin that where not concerned with this partial interim review.  

Therefore, it is suggested that the Council adopts the attached proposal for a Regulation so as 
to amend the duty rate applicable to the sole co-operating Indian producer as well as for the 
non co-operator that was also concerned by the review. While the individual margin for the 
other companies not concerned by the investigation would not change, it is proposed that the 
residual margin applicable to all other companies be changed accordingly. 

In  line  with  the  principle  that  no  product  shall  be  subject  to  both  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and the same situation arising from 
dumping  or  from  export  subsidisation,  the  level  of  anti-dumping  duties  in  the  anti  dumping 
regulation  applicable  to  the  same  product  should  be  adjusted  to  take  into  account  the 
increased countervailing duties. 

•  Legal basis 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised 
imports from countries not members of the European Community as last amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 461/2004 of 8 March 2004  

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The proposal falls under the exclusive competence of the Community. The subsidiarity 
principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reason(s). 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic regulation and leaves no scope 
for national decision. 

Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Community, national 
governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and 
proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

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•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason(s). 

The above-mentioned basic regulation does not foresee alternative options. 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the Community budget. 

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Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

amending Council Regulation (EC) No193/2007, imposing a definitive countervailing duty 
on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in India and amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No192/2007 imposing a definitive anti dumping duty on imports of 
certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating in, inter alia, India  

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,  

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against 
subsidised  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community1  ('the  basic 
Regulation'), and in particular Articles 15 and 19 thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee, 

Whereas: 

A. 

PROCEDURE 

I. 

Previous investigation and existing measures 

(1) 

(2) 

On  30  November  2000,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  2603/20002,  the  Council  imposed 
definitive  countervailing  duties  on  imports  of  certain  polyethylene  terephthalate  (PET) 
originating in, inter alia India, (the country concerned) (the original investigation). 

Following  an  expiry  review,  the  Council,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No193/20073,  imposed  a 
definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate, originating 
in  India  (the  "anti-subsidy  Regulation")  for  a  further  period  of  five  years.  The  product 
concerned falls within the CN code 3907 60 20. The rate of the fixed duty ranges between 
0 and 106.5 EUR/tonne for individually named exporters with a residual duty rate of 41.3 
EUR/tonne imposed on imports from other exporters.  

1 
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3 

OJ L 288, 21.10.97, p.1 
OJ L 301, 30.11.2000, p. 1. 
OJ L 59, 27.2.2007, p 34- 

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(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

Furthermore,  by  Regulation  (EC)  192/20074,  the  Council  imposed  a  definitive  anti-
dumping duty on the same product originating in India (the "anti-dumping Regulation"). 
Under  this  Regulation  the  rate  of  the  fixed  duty  ranges  between  88.9  and  200,9 
EUR/tonne for individually named exporters with a residual duty rate of 181.7 EUR/tonne 
imposed on imports from other exporters.  

In  line  with  the  principle  that  no  product  shall  be  subject  to  both  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  duties  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  one  and  the  same  situation  arising 
from  dumping  or  from  export  subsidisation,  the  level  of  anti-dumping  duties  in  the  anti 
dumping Regulation takes into account the amount of countervailing duty imposed by the 
anti-subsidy Regulation, in accordance with Article 14(1) of the basic Regulation. 

II. 

Initiation of a partial interim review 

Following  the  imposition  of  the  definitive  countervailing  duty  the  Government  of  India 
('GOI')  submitted  that  the  circumstances  with  regard  to  two  subsidy  schemes  (the  Duty 
Entitlement Passbook Scheme and the Income Tax Exemption under Section 80 HHC of 
the  Income  Tax  Act)  have  changed  and  that  these  changes  are  of  a  lasting  nature. 
Consequently, it was argued that the level of subsidisation was likely to have decreased 
and thus measures that had been established partly on these schemes should be revised.  

The  Commission  examined  the  evidence  submitted  by  the  GOI  and  considered  it 
sufficient to justify the initiation of a review in accordance with the provisions of Article 
19  of  the  basic  Regulation,  limited  to  the  level  subsidisation  imports  of  certain 
polyethylene  terephthalate,  originating  in  India.  After  consultation  of  the  Advisory 
Committee, the Commission initiated, by a notice published in the Official Journal of the 
European  Union5  (the  "Notice  of  Initiation"),  an  ex  officio  partial  interim  review  of 
Council Regulation (EC) No193/2007. 

The  purpose  of  the  partial  interim  review  investigation  is  to  assess  the  need  for  the 
continuation,  removal  or  amendment  of  the  existing  measures  in  respect  of  those 
companies  which  benefited  from  one  or  both  the  changed  subsidy  schemes,  where 
sufficient  evidence  was  provided  in  line  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  notice  of 
initiation. The partial interim review investigation would also assess the need, depending 
on  the  review  findings,  to  revise  the  measures  applicable  to  other  companies  that 
cooperated  in  the  investigation  that  set  the  level  of  the  existing  measures  and/or  the 
residual measure applicable for all other companies.  

III. 

Investigation period 

(8) 

The  investigation  covered  the  period  from  1  April  2006  to  31  March  2007  ('the  review 
investigation period' or 'RIP') 

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OJ L 59, 27.2.2007, p 1 
OJ C 227, 27.9.2007, p. 16. 

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IV.  Parties concerned by the investigation 

(9) 

The Commission officially informed the GOI and those Indian exporting producers who 
co-operated in the previous investigation, were mentioned under Council Regulation (EC) 
No 193/2007 as benefiting from any of the two allegedly changed subsidy schemes and 
that  were  listed  in  the  annex  to  the  Notice  of  Initiation,  as  well  as  the  Community 
producers,  of  the  initiation  of  the  partial  interim  review  investigation.  Interested  parties 
had the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing. The 
written  and  oral  comments  submitted  by  the  parties  were  considered  and,  where 
appropriate, taken into account. 

(10) 

In view of the number of parties involved in this review, the use of sampling techniques 
for the investigation of subsidisation was envisaged in accordance with Article 27 of the 
basic Regulation. 

(11)  Two exporting producers made themselves known and provided the information requested 
for  sampling.  Therefore,  the  use  of  sampling  techniques  was  not  considered  necessary. 
One of the two exporting producers that had submitted a sampling form did however later 
notify the Commission that it did not intend to complete a full questionnaire and provide 
the date necessary for the purpose of the investigation. 

(12)  The Commission therefore sent and obtained a reply to the questionnaire from only one 
producer which was eligible for this review , namely Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd (the 
"company"). A questionnaire was also addressed to the GOI. Replies were received from 
both the company and the GOI. 

(13)  The  Commission  sought  and  verified  all  information  it  deemed  necessary  for  the 
determination of subsidisation. Verification visits were carried out at the premises of the 
following interested parties: 

1.  Government of India 

Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi. 

2. 

Exporting producers in India 

Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd, New Delhi. 

VI.  Disclosure and comments on procedure 

(14)  The  GOI  and  the  other  interested  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and 
considerations upon which it was intended to propose to amend the duty rate applicable to 
the sole co-operating Indian producer and to the non cooperating exporting producer also 
mentioned in annex to the Notice of Initiation as well as the intention maintain existing 
measures  for  all  other  companies  which  did  not  co-operate  with  this  partial  interim 
review.  They  were  also  given  a  reasonable  time  to  comment.  All  submissions  and 
comments were taken duly into consideration as set out below. 

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B. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED  

(15)  The product covered by this review is the same product as the one concerned by Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  193/2007,  i.e.  PET  with  a  viscosity  number  of  78  ml/g  or  higher, 
according  to  ISO  Standard  1628-5,  originating  in  the  country  concerned.  It  is  currently 
classifiable within CN code 3907 60 20. 

C. 

I. 

SUBSIDIES 

Introduction 

(16)  On the basis of the information submitted by the GOI and the sole co-operating exporting 
producer  and  the  replies  to  the  Commission’s  questionnaire,  the  following  schemes, 
which allegedly involve the granting of subsidies, were investigated:  

(a)  Advance  Authorisation  Scheme  (formerly  known  as  Advance  Licence  Scheme) 

('AAS'),  

(b)  Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme ('DEPS'), 

(c)  Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme ('EPCGS'), 

(d) 

Income Tax Exemption Scheme ('ITES') 

(e)  Focus Market Scheme ('FMS') 

(f)  Target Plus Scheme ('TPS') 

(17)  The  schemes  (a)  (b)  (c)  (e)  and  (f)  specified  above  are  based  on  the  Foreign  Trade 
(Development and Regulation) Act 1992 (No 22 of 1992) which entered into force on 7 
August  1992  ('Foreign  Trade  Act').  The  Foreign  Trade  Act  authorises  the  GOI  to  issue 
notifications regarding the export and import policy. These are summarised in 'Export and 
Import Policy' documents, which are issued by the Ministry of Commerce every five years 
and updated regularly. One Export and Import Policy document is relevant to the RIP of 
this case, i.e., the five-year plan relating to the period 1 September 2004 to 31 March 2009 
('EXIM-policy  04-09').  In  addition,  the  GOI  also  sets  out  the  procedures  governing  the 
EXIM-policy 04-09 in a 'Handbook of Procedures - 1 September 2004 to 31 March 2009, 
Volume I' ('HOP I 04-09'). The Handbook of Procedure is also updated on a regular basis. 

(18)  The Income Tax Schemes specified above under (d) are based on the Income Tax Act of 

1961, which is amended yearly by the Finance Act. 

(19) 

In  accordance  with  Article  11(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  Commission  invited  the 
GOI  for  additional  consultations  with  respect  to  both  changed  and  unchanged  schemes 
with the aim of clarifying the factual situation as regards the alleged schemes and arriving 
at  a  mutually  agreed  solution.  Following  these  consultations,  and  in  the  absence  of  a 
mutually agreed solution in relation to these schemes, the Commission included all these 
schemes in the investigation of subsidisation. 

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(20)  One  Interested  party,  representing  Community  industry  alleged  that  a  number  of  other 
schemes and subsidies continued to be available to Indian exporters. However, no definite 
evidence  has  emerged  from  the  information  showing  that  these  schemes  were  used  by 
cooperating exporting producer. Therefore these matters have not been pursued further for 
the purpose of this specific proceeding. 

II. 

Specific Schemes 

1 

Advance Authorisation Scheme ('AAS') 

(a)  Legal basis 

(21)  The  detailed  description  of  the  scheme  is  contained  in  paragraphs  4.1.1  to  4.1.14  of  the 
EXIM-policy 04-09 and chapters 4.1 to 4.30 of the HOP I 04-09. This scheme was called 
Advance  Licence  Scheme  during  the  previous  review  investigation  that  led  to  the 
imposition by Council Regulation (EC) No 193/2007 of the definitive countervailing duty 
currently in force.  

(b)  Eligibility 

(22)  The AAS consists of six sub-schemes, as described in more detail in recital (23). Those 
sub-schemes  differ  inter  alia  in  the  scope  of  eligibility.  Manufacturer-exporters  and 
merchant-exporters "tied to" supporting manufacturers are eligible for the AAS physical 
exports  and  for  the  AAS  for  annual  requirement.  Manufacturer–exporters  supplying  the 
ultimate exporter are eligible for AAS for intermediate supplies. Main contractors which 
supply to the "deemed export" categories mentioned in paragraph 8.2 of the EXIM-policy 
04-09, such as suppliers of an export oriented unit ('EOU'), are eligible for AAS deemed 
export.  Eventually,  intermediate  suppliers  to  manufacturer-exporters  are  eligible  for 
"deemed  export"  benefits  under  the  sub-schemes  Advance  Release  Order  ('ARO')  and 
back to back inland letter of credit. 

(c)  Practical implementation 

(23)  Advance authorisations can be issued for: 

(i)  Physical  exports:  This  is  the  main  sub-scheme.  It  allows  for  duty  free  import  of 
input materials for the production of a specific resultant export product. "Physical" 
in  this  context  means  that  the  export  product  has  to  leave  Indian  territory.  An 
import  allowance  and  export  obligation  including  the  type  of  export  product  are 
specified in the licence. 

(ii)  Annual  requirement:  Such  an  authorisation  is  not  linked  to  a  specific  export 
product,  but  to  a  wider  product  group  (e.g.  chemical  and  allied  products).  The 
licence  holder  can  –  up  to  a  certain  value  threshold  set  by  its  past  export 
performance – import duty free any input to be used in manufacturing any of the 
items  falling  under  such  a  product  group.  It  can  choose  to  export  any  resultant 
product falling under the product group using such duty-exempt material.  

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(iii)  Intermediate  supplies:  This  sub-scheme  covers  cases  where  two  manufacturers 
intend to produce a single export product and divide the production process. The 
manufacturer-exporter who produces the intermediate product can import duty free 
input materials and can obtain for this purpose an AAS for intermediate supplies. 
The ultimate exporter finalises the production and is obliged to export the finished 
product.  

(iv)  Deemed exports: This sub-scheme allows a main contractor to import free of duty 
inputs which are required in manufacturing goods to be sold as “deemed exports” 
to the categories of customers mentioned in paragraph 8.2.(b) to (f),(g),(i) and (j) 
of  the EXIM policy  04-09.  According  to the  GOI, deemed exports refer to those 
transactions  in  which  the  goods  supplied  do  not  leave  the  country.  A  number  of 
categories  of  supply  is  regarded  as  deemed  exports  provided  the  goods  are 
manufactured in India, e.g. supply of goods to an EOU or to a company situated in 
a special economic zone ('SEZ').  

(v)  ARO: The AAS holder intending to source the inputs from indigenous sources, in 
lieu of direct import, has the option to source them against ARO's. In such cases 
the  Advance  Authorisations  are  validated  as  ARO's  and  are  endorsed  to  the 
indigenous supplier upon delivery of the items specified therein. The endorsement 
of the ARO entitles the indigenous supplier to the benefits of deemed exports as 
set  out  in  paragraph  8.3  of  the  EXIM-policy  04-09  (i.e.  AAS  for  intermediate 
supplies/deemed  export,  deemed  export  drawback  and  refund  of  terminal  excise 
duty).  The  ARO  mechanism  refunds  taxes  and  duties  to  the  supplier  instead  of 
refunding  the  same  to  the  ultimate  exporter  in  the  form  of  drawback/refund  of 
duties. The refund of taxes/duties is available both for indigenous inputs as well as 
imported inputs.  

(vi)  Back  to  back  inland  letter  of  credit:  This  sub-scheme  again  covers  indigenous 
supplies  to  an  Advance  Authorisation  holder.  The  holder  of  an  Advance 
Authorisation can approach a bank for opening an inland letter of credit in favour 
of  an  indigenous  supplier.  The  authorisation  will  be  invalidated  by  the  bank  for 
direct  import  only  in  respect  of  the  value  and  volume  of  items  being  sourced 
indigenously  instead  of  importation.  The  indigenous  supplier  will  be  entitled  to 
deemed export benefits as set out in paragraph 8.3 of the EXIM-policy 04-09 (i.e. 
AAS  for  intermediate  supplies/deemed  export,  deemed  export  drawback  and 
refund of terminal excise duty). 

(24) 

It  was  established  that  during  the  RIP,  the  co-operating  exporter  only  obtained 
concessions under two sub-schemes linked to the product concerned, i.e. (i) AAS physical 
exports  and  (iv)  AAS  for  deemed  exports.  It  is  therefore  not  necessary  to  establish  the 
countervailability of the remaining unused sub-schemes.  

(25)  Following  the  imposition  by  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  193/2007  of  the  definitive 
countervailing  duty  currently  in  force,  the  GOI  has  modified  the  verification  system 

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applicable to AAS. In concrete terms, for verification purposes by the Indian authorities, 
an Advance Authorisation holder is legally obliged to maintain "a true and proper account 
of  consumption  and  utilisation  of  duty  free  imported/domestically  procured  goods"  in  a 
specified  format  (chapters  4.26,  4.30  and  Appendix  23  HOP  I  04-09),  i.e.  an  actual 
consumption  register.  This  register  has  to  be  verified  by  an  external  chartered 
accountant/cost and works accountant who issues a certificate stating that the prescribed 
registers  and  relevant  records  have  been  examined  and  the  information  furnished  under 
Appendix  23  is  true  and  correct  in  all  respects.  Nevertheless,  the  aforesaid  provisions 
apply only to Advance Authorisations issued on or after 13 May 2005. For all Advance 
Authorisations  or  Advance  Licenses  issued  before  that  date,  holders  are  requested  to 
follow  the  previously  applicable  verification  provisions,  i.e.  to  keep  a  true  and  proper 
account  of  licence-wise  consumption  and  utilisation  of  imported  goods  in  the  specified 
format of Appendix 18 (chapter 4.30 and Appendix 18 HOP I 02-07).  

(26)  With  regard  to  the  sub-schemes  used  during  the  RIP  by  the  sole  co-operating  exporting 
producer,  i.e.  physical  exports  and  deemed  exports,  both  the  import  allowance  and  the 
export obligation are fixed in volume and value by the GOI and are documented on the 
Authorisation.  In  addition,  at  the  time  of  import  and  of  export,  the  corresponding 
transactions  are  to  be  documented  by  Government  officials  on  the  Authorisation.  The 
volume  of  imports allowed  under  this scheme is determined by the GOI on the basis of 
standard  input-output  norms  ('SIONs').  SIONs  exist  for  most  products  including  the 
product concerned and are published in the HOP II 04-09.  

(27) 

(28) 

In  this  respect  it  should  be  noted  that  the  SION's  are  regularly  revised.  Since  the  one 
cooperating exporter used licences issued at different times, this also meant that different 
SIONs were applied by this company under the RIP. 

Imported input materials are not transferable and have to be used to produce the resulting 
export  product.  The  export  obligation  must  be  fulfilled  within  a  prescribed  time  frame 
after issuance of the licence (24 months with two possible extensions of 6 months each).  

(29)  The review investigation established that while the cooperating exporting producer could 
establish the total consumption of raw materials there was no actual consumption register 
for the product concerned. Consumption was only presumed to be in line with the SIONs. 
It  was  therefore  not  possible  to  establish  whether  SION  requirements,  stipulated  under 
specific  authorisations/licenses,  with  respect  to  duty  free  input  materials  exceed  the 
material needed to produce the reference quantity of the resulting export product. 

(30)  Moreover,  the  review  investigation  established  that  raw  materials  were  imported  under 
three different authorisations/licenses and different SION norms and then were mixed and 
physically incorporated in the production process of the same exported good. The fact that 
there  are  three  different  SION's  with  different  consumption  norms  for  each  of  the  raw 
materials  further  underlines  the  problem  in  establishing  the  actual  consumption  of  the 
cooperating  exporter.  In  this  respect,  it  is  clear  that  an  actual  consumption  register  is  a 
basic  requirement  in  order  to  allow  for  verification  as  to  whether  the  duty-free  input 
materials  exceed  the  material  needed  to  produce  the  reference  quantity  of  the  resulting 
export product. 

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(31)  The review investigation also established that the verification requirements stipulated by 
the Indian authorities were either not honoured or not yet tested in practice. For Advance 
Licenses issued before 13 May 2005 the necessary actual consumption and stock registers 
(i.e.  Appendix  18)  were  not  sent  to  the  relevant  authorities  and  hence  not  controlled  by 
GOI.  For  Advance  Authorisations  issued  after  13  May  2005  the  necessary  actual 
consumption and stock registers are required but GOI had not yet verified the compliance 
of these registers with EXIM policy requirements. In particular, the registers were verified 
by external chartered accountants as required by the relevant Indian legislation mentioned 
under  recital  (25)  but  there  were  no  records  kept  either  by  the  company  or  by  the 
chartered accountant on how this certification process took place. There was no audit plan 
or any other supporting material of the audit performed, no recorded information on the 
methodology  used  and  the  specific  requirements  needed  for  such  scrupulous  work  that 
requires  detailed 
technical  knowledge  on  production  processes,  EXIM  policy 
requirements and accounting procedures. Account taken of this situation, it is considered 
that  the  investigated  exporter  was  not  able  to  demonstrate  that  the  relevant  EXIM 
provisions were met.  

(d)  Disclosure comments 

(32)  The cooperating exporter challenged the findings above, in particular with respect of the 
conclusions as concerns the chartered accountant as detailed in recital 31. To this end it 
was  claimed  that  there  is  no  national  or  international  legal  provision  that  requires  an 
audited company to maintain a record of how an audit was carried out. On the contrary, 
Indian law stipulates that the working papers are the property of the auditor. Under such 
circumstances and considering that no prior request to meet the chartered accountant had 
been made before the verification visit, the fact that the audited company was not in the 
possession  of  such  supporting  documents  at  the  time  of  the  visit  should  not  be  held 
against it. Furthermore, it was also claimed that the Basic regulation in any event would 
not authorise the Commission services to verify documents held outside the investigated 
company  such  as  would  be  the  case  with  an  independent  accountant  It  was  also  argued 
that  the  actual  consumption  of  the  sole  co-operating  producer  had  been  higher  than  the 
SION norms for every input and that there was no excess remission of duties. 

(33) 

In  this  respect  it  is  recalled  that  the  verification  process  performed  by  the  chartered 
accountant and the issuing of the relevant certificate form part of the verification system 
introduced by the GOI in its EXIM policy. To this end the EXIM policy has introduced 
the  charterd  accountant  as  an  actor  in  the  implementation  of  the  system  and  the 
Commission  had  to  examine  whether  the  aforesaid  verification  system  was  effectively 
applied.  The  fact  that  the  company  could  not  show  that  either  itself  nor  the  assigned 
chartered  account  hold  any  record  on  the  checks  performed  in  order  to  issue  the  EXIM 
policy stipulated certificate demonstrates that the company was not in a position to prove 
that the relevant EXIM policy provisions were met.. As to the company's claim that that 
there in any event was no excess remission of duties it is recalled that the actual situation 
found  on  the  spot  (i.e.  mixture  of  inputs  and  produced  products,  use  of  different  SION 
norms, lack of the by EXIM policy stipulated actual consumption registers) and pending 
the  fulfilment  of  the  necessary  final  verification  steps  by  the  GOI,  showed  that  any 

EN 

12 

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calculation with respect to actual consumption and consequent excess remission of duties 
per authorisation/license and SION norm was not feasible.  

(e)  Conclusion 

(34)  The exemption from import duties is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a)(ii) 
and  Article  2(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  i.e.  a  financial  contribution  of  the  GOI  which 
conferred a benefit upon the investigated exporter.  

(35) 

In addition, AAS physical exports and AAS for deemed exports are clearly contingent in 
law  upon  export  performance,  and  therefore  deemed  to  be  specific  and  countervailable 
under Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regulation. Without an export commitment a company 
cannot obtain benefits under these schemes. 

(36)  None of the two sub-schemes used in the present case can be considered as permissible 
duty  drawback  systems  or  substitution  drawback  systems  within  the  meaning  of  Article 
2(1)(a)(ii) of the basic Regulation. They do not conform to the rules laid down in Annex I 
item (i), Annex II (definition and rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and rules 
for substitution drawback) of the basic Regulation. The GOI did not effectively apply its 
verification  system  or  procedure  to  confirm  whether  and  in  what  amounts  inputs  were 
consumed  in  the  production  of  the  exported  product  (Annex  II(II)(4)  of  the  basic 
Regulation  and,  in  the  case  of  substitution  drawback  schemes,  Annex  III(II)(2)  of  the 
basic  Regulation).  The  SIONs  themselves  cannot  be  considered  a  verification  system  of 
actual consumption, since duty free input materials imported under authorisations/licenses 
with  different  SION  yields  are  mixed  in  the  same  production  process  for  an  exporting 
good.  This  type  of  process  does  not  enable  the  GOI  to  verify  with  sufficient  precision 
what amounts of inputs were consumed in the export production and under which SION 
benchmark they should be compared. Furthermore, an effective control done by the GOI 
based on a correctly kept actual consumption register either did not take place or has not 
yet been completed. In addition, the GOI did not carry out a further examination based on 
actual inputs involved, although this would normally need to be carried out in the absence 
of an effectively applied verification system (Annex II(II)(5) and Annex III(II)(3) to the 
basic  Regulation).  Moreover,  it  is  recalled  that  the  company  in  question  did  not  have  a 
consumption register that allowed for a verification of real consumption of raw material 
per  product  type.  Therefore,  even  if  an  efficient  control  system  had  been  put  in  place  it 
would  not  have  been  possible  for  the  GOI  to  ascertain  what  amounts  inputs  were 
consumed in the production of the exported product. Finally, the involvement of chartered 
accountants in the verification process has not led to the improvement of the verification 
system  as  no  detailed  rules  exist  on  how  chartered  accountants  should  perform  the 
entrusted tasks and the information presented during the investigation could not warrant 
the fulfilment of the aforesaid rules laid down under the basic Regulation.  

(37)  These two sub-schemes are therefore countervailable. 

(f)  Calculation of the subsidy amount 

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13 

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(38) 

In the absence of permitted duty drawback systems or substitution drawback systems, the 
countervailable  benefit  is  the  remission  of  total  import  duties  normally  due  upon 
importation of inputs. In this respect, it is noted that the basic Regulation does not only 
provide  for  the  countervailing  of  an  "excess"  remission  of  duties.  According  to  Article 
2(1)(a)(ii) and Annex I(i) of the basic Regulation only an excess remission of duties can 
be  countervailed,  provided  the  conditions  of  Annexes  II  and  III  of  the  basic  Regulation 
are  met.  However,  these  conditions  were  not  fulfilled  in  the  present  case.  Thus,  if  an 
absence  of  an  adequate  monitoring  process  is  established,  the  above  exception  for 
drawback  schemes  is  not  applicable  and  the  normal  rule  of  the  countervailing  of  the 
amount  of  (revenue  forgone)  unpaid  duties,  rather  than  any  purported  excess  remission, 
applies. As set out in Annexes II(II) and III(II) of the basic Regulation the burden is not 
upon  the  investigating  authority  to  calculate  such  excess  remission.  To  the  contrary, 
according  to Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of the basic Regulation it only has to establish sufficient 
evidence to refute the appropriateness of an alleged verification system.  

(39)  The subsidy amount for the exporter which used the AAS was calculated on the basis of 
import  duties  forgone  (basic  customs  duty  and  special  additional  customs  duty)  on  the 
material imported under the two sub-schemes used for the product concerned during the 
RIP  (nominator).  In  accordance  with  Article  7(1)(a)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  fees 
necessarily incurred to obtain the subsidy were deducted from the subsidy amount where 
justified claims were made. In accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, this 
subsidy  amount  has  been  allocated  over  the  export  turnover  generated  by  the  product 
concerned during the RIP as appropriate denominator, because the subsidy is contingent 
upon export performance and was not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, 
produced, exported or transported.  

(40)  The  subsidy  rate  established  in  respect  of  this  scheme  during  the  RIP  for  the  sole  co-

operating producer amounts to 12.8 %. 

2. 

Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme ('DEPBS') 

(a)  Legal Basis 

(41)  The detailed description of the DEPBS is contained in paragraph 4.3 of the EXIM-policy 

04-09 and in chapter 4 of the HOP I 04-09.  

(42) 

It was found that the cooperating exporting producer obtained no countervailable benefits 
under the DEPBS. It was therefore not found necessary to further analyse this scheme in 
the scope of this investigation. 

3. 

Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme ('EPCGS') 

(a)  Legal basis 

(43)  The detailed description of the EPCGS is contained in chapter 5 of the EXIM-policy 04-

09 and in chapter 5 of the HOP I 04-09.  

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14 

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(b)  Eligibility 

(44)  Manufacturer-exporters,  merchant-exporters  "tied  to"  supporting  manufacturers  and 

service providers are eligible for this scheme.  

(c)  Practical implementation 

(45)  Under the condition of an export obligation, a company is allowed to import capital goods 
(new and -since April 2003- second-hand capital goods up to 10 years old) at a reduced 
rate  of  duty.  To  this  end,  the  GOI  issues,  upon  application  and  payment  of  a  fee,  an 
EPCGS licence. Since April 2000, the scheme provides for a reduced import duty rate of 
5 % applicable to all capital goods imported under the scheme. Until 31 March 2000, an 
effective  duty  rate  of  11  %  (including  a  10  %  surcharge)  and,  in  case  of  high  value 
imports,  a  zero  duty  rate  was  applicable.  In  order  to  meet  the  export  obligation,  the 
imported capital goods must be used to produce a certain amount of export goods during a 
certain period.  

(46)  The EPCGS licence holder can also source the capital goods indigenously. In such case, 
the indigenous manufacturer of capital goods may avail of the benefit for duty free import 
of components required to manufacture such capital goods. Alternatively, the indigenous 
manufacturer can claim the benefit of deemed export in respect of supply of capital goods 
to an EPCGS licence holder. 

(d)  Disclosure comments. 

(47)  No comments with respect to EPCG were submitted upon disclosure.  

(e)  Conclusion on EPCG Scheme 

(48)  The EPCGS provides subsidies within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a)(ii) and Article 2(2) 
of  the  basic  Regulation.  The  duty  reduction  constitutes  a  financial  contribution  by  the 
GOI, since this concession decreases the GOI’s duty revenue, which would be otherwise 
due. In addition, the duty reduction confers a benefit upon the exporter, because the duties 
saved upon importation improve its liquidity. 

(49)  Furthermore,  the  EPCGS  is  contingent  in  law  upon  export  performance,  since  such 
licences cannot be obtained without a commitment to export. Therefore, it is deemed to be 
specific and countervailable under Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regulation.  

(50)  Finally,  this  scheme  can  not  be  considered  a  permissible  duty  drawback  system  or 
substitution  drawback  system  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2(1)(a)(ii)  of  the  basic 
Regulation. Capital goods are not covered by the scope of such permissible systems, as set 
out  in  Annex  I,  item  (i),  of  the  basic  Regulation,  because  they  are  not  consumed  in  the 
production of the exported products. 

(f) 

Calculation of the subsidy amount 

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15 

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(51)  The  one  cooperating  exporter  had  not  purchased  any  capital  goods  in  the  IP.  The 
company  continued  however  to  benefit  from  duty  exemptions  for  capital  goods 
purchased  before  the  IP  at  the  amount  established  in  the  original  investigation.  As 
established  in  the  original  investigation  the  subsidy  amount  obtained  during  the  RIP 
was calculated, in accordance with Article 7(3) of the basic Regulation, on the basis of 
the  unpaid  customs  duty  on  imported  capital  goods  spread  across  a  period  which 
reflects the actual depreciation period of such capital goods of the exporting producer. 
In  accordance  with  the  established  practice,  the  amount  so  calculated  which  is 
attributable to the RIP has been adjusted by adding interest during this period in order 
to reflect the full value of the benefit over time. Fees necessarily incurred to obtain the 
subsidy were deducted in accordance with Article 7(1)(a) of the basic Regulation from 
this sum to arrive at the subsidy amount as numerator. In accordance with Article 7(2) 
and  7(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  this  subsidy  amount  has  been  allocated  over  the 
export  turnover  during  the  review  investigation  period  as  appropriate  denominator, 
because the subsidy is contingent upon export performance and it was not granted by 
reference  to  the  quantities  manufactured,  produced,  exported  or  transported.  The 
subsidy rate established with respect to the benefit obtained by the company during the 
RIP was 0.3% 

4. 

Income Tax Exemption Scheme ('ITES') 

(a)  Legal basis  

Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act 1961 ('ITA') 

(52)  Under this scheme exporters could avail the benefit of a partial income tax exemption 
on  profits  derived  from  export  sales.  The  legal  basis  for  this  exemption  was  set  by 
Section 80HHC of the ITA.  

(53)  This provision was abolished for the assessment year 2005-2006 (i.e. for the financial 
year from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005) onwards and thus 80HHC of the ITA does 
not confer any benefits after 31 March 2004. The sole co-operating exporting producer 
did not avail of any benefits under this scheme during the RIP. Consequently, since the 
scheme has been withdrawn, it shall therefore not be countervailed, in accordance with 
Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation. 

5. 

Focus Market Scheme ('FMS') 

(a)  Legal basis 

(54)  The  detailed  description  of  the  FMS  is  contained  in  chapter  3.9  of  the  EXIM-policy 
04-09  and  in  chapter  3.20  of  the  HOP  I  04-09.  While  the  company  reported  this 
scheme,  the  investigation  revealed  that  no  benefit  was  received  in  the  RIP.  Since  it 
was  found  that  that  the  cooperating  exporting  producer  did  not  obtain  any 
countervailable  benefits  under  this  scheme,  it  was  not  found  necessary  to  further 
analyse it in the scope of this investigation. 

6. 

Target Plus Scheme ('TPS') 

(a)  Legal basis 

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16 

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(55)  The detailed description of the TPS is contained in chapter 3.7 of the EXIM-policy 04-

09 and in chapter 3.2 of the HOP I 04-09. 

(b)  Eligibility 

(56)  Any manufacturing exporter is eligible to apply for this scheme 

(c)  Practical implementation 

(57)  This  scheme  aims  at  giving  a  premium  to  companies  that  increase  their  export 
turnover  growth.  To  this  end  the  scheme  allows  eligible  companies  to  avail  of  duty 
credit ranging between 5 % to 15 % of an amount based on the difference between the 
FOB values of exports made in 2 consecutive financial years. 

(58)  Companies  wishing  to  benefit  from  the  scheme  have  to  file  an  application  to  the 
Ministry of Commerce and industry. Once authorised, a licence indicating the amount 
of the duty credit is issued by the relevant authorities. 

(59)  This  scheme  was  discontinued  in  March  2006  and  replaced  over  time  by  two  new 
schemes, the Focus Market Scheme and the Focus Product Scheme. The right to apply 
for TPS license did however continue until March 2007 and companies availing of the 
scheme may make use of the relevant duty credit entitlements until March 2009.  

(d)  Disclosure comments 

(60)  The  cooperationg  producer  considered  that  there  was  no  benefit  accrued  to  the 
company in the RIP of this scheme and considering that the scheme was withdrawn in 
2006  it  should  not  be  countervailed.  However,  as  detailed  above,  the  investigation 
revealed  that  a  benefit  was  conferred  on  the  company  in  the  RIP  and  furthermore, 
while the scheme indeed has been abandoned, companies may continue to benefit from 
it until 2009. 

(e) Conclusion on Target Plus Scheme 

(61)  The TPS provides subsidies within the meaning of Article 2(1) (a) (ii) and Article 2(2) 
of the basic Regulation. A TPS duty credit is a financial contribution by the GOI, since 
the  credit  will  eventually  be  used  to  offset  import  duties,  thus  decreasing  the  GOI’s 
duty revenue which would be otherwise due. In addition, the TPS duty credit confers a 
benefit upon the exporter, because it improves its liquidity. 

(62)  Furthermore,  the  TPS  is  contingent  in  law  upon  export  performance,  and  therefore 
deemed  to  be  specific  and  countervailable  under  Article  3(4)(a)  of  the  basic 
Regulation.  

(63)  This scheme cannot be considered a permissible duty drawback system or substitution 
drawback system within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of the basic Regulation. It 
does not conform to the strict rules laid down in Annex I item (i), Annex II (definition 
and rules for drawback) and Annex III (definition and rules for substitution drawback) 
of  the  basic  Regulation.  An  exporter  is  under  no  obligation  to  actually  consume  the 
goods imported free of duty in the production process and the amount of credit is not 
calculated in relation to actual inputs used. There is no system or procedure in place to 
confirm which inputs are consumed in the production process of the exported product 

EN 

17 

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or whether an excess payment of import duties occurred within the meaning of item (i) 
of Annex I and Annexes II and III of the basic Regulation. An exporter is eligible for 
the TPS benefits regardless of whether it imports any inputs at all. In order to obtain 
the  benefit,  it  is  sufficient  for  an  exporter  to  simply  increase  its  export  turnover 
without  demonstrating  that  any  input  material  was  imported.  Thus,  even  exporters 
which  procure  all  of  their  inputs  locally  and  do  not  import  any  goods  which  can  be 
used as inputs are still entitled to benefit from the TPS.  

(f) Calculation of the subsidy amount 

(64)  The  amount  of  countervailable  subsidies  was  calculated  in  terms  of  the  benefit 
conferred on the recipient, which is found to exist during the RIP as booked by the co-
operating  exporting  producer  on  an  accrual  basis  as  income  at  the  stage  of  export 
transaction.  In  accordance  with  Article  7(2)  and  7(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  this 
subsidy  amount  (nominator)  has  been  allocated  over  the  export  turnover  during  the 
RIP  as  appropriate  denominator,  because  the  subsidy  is  contingent  upon  export 
performance  and  it  was  not  granted  by  reference  to  the  quantities  manufactured, 
produced, exported or transported. 

(65)  The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the RIP for the sole co-

operating exporting producer amounts to 0.7% 

III. 

Amount of countervailable subsidies 

(66) 

It is recalled that of the subsidy margin, established in the original investigation was 
found to be 5.8% for the sole exporting producer co-operating with the present partial 
interim review.  

(67)  During  the  present  partial  interim  review  the  amount  of  countervailing  subsidies, 

expressed ad valorem, was fount to be 13.8 %, as listed hereunder:  

SCHEME→  ALS 

DEPBS  EPCGS 

ITIRAD 

FMS 

TPS  Total 

COMPANY
↓ 

 % 

%  

%  

%  

% 

%   %  

Pearl 
Engineering 
Polymers Ltd   12,8 

0 

0,3 

0 

0 

0,7 

13.8 

(68)  Account taken of the above it is concluded that the level of subsidisation with regard 

to the sole co-operating exporting producer has increased.  

D. COUNTERVAILING MEASURES AND ANTIDUMPING MEASURES 

I. 

Countervailing measures 

(69) 

In line with the provisions of Article 19 of the basic Regulation and the grounds of this 
partial interim review stated under point 3 of the notice of initiation, it is established 
that  the  margin  of  subsidisation  with  regard  to  the  sole  co-operating  producer  has 
increased from 5.8 % to 13.8% and, therefore, the rate of countervailing duty, imposed 
to  this  exporting  producer  by  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  193/2007  has  to  be 
amended accordingly.  

EN 

18 

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(70)  The  second  company  that  was  concerned  with  the  present  partial  interim  review 
Reliance  Industries  Ltd,  had  the  highest  subsidy  margin  in  the  original  investigation 
but  did  not  cooperate  in  this  review.  Since  this  company  did  not  cooperate  an 
assessment had to be based on best facts available in accordance with Article 28 of the 
basic  Regulation.  In  this  respect  and  in  view  of  the  findings  as  concern  the  one  co-
operating  exporter,  it  is  also  likely  that  this  non-cooperating  exporting  producer  will 
continue to avail of benefits under the investigated subsidisation schemes at least the 
same  rate  as  that  established  for  the  co-operator.  It  must  thus  be  concluded  that  the 
level  of  subsidisation  with  regard  to  the  one  non  co-operating  exporting  producer 
concerned  by  the  review  has  also  increased  to  13.8%  and,  therefore,  the  rate  of 
countervailing duty, imposed on this exporting producer by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 193/2007, has to be amended accordingly. 

(71)  With  regard  to  companies  that  cooperated  in  the  original  investigation  but  that  were 
not identified as concerned by the investigation in the annex to the Notice of initiation, 
there  was  no  indication  that  the  countervailing  and  dumping  duty  rates  applicable  to 
such companies need to be recalculated. Consequently, the individual rates of the duty 
applicable  to  all  other  parties  except  Pearl  Engineering  and  Reliance  Industries 
mentioned  under  Article  1(2)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  193/2007  remain 
unchanged.  

(72)  Conversely,  as  concerns  the  companies  that  cooperated  neither  in  this  review  nor  in 
the  original  investigation,  these  must  be  considered  to  continue  to  avail  of  benefits 
under the investigated subsidisation schemes at least the same rate as that established 
for the sole  co-operator.  In  order  to avoid granting a bonus for non cooperation it is 
considered  appropriate  to  establish  level  of  subsidisation  applicable  to  “all  other 
companies”  as  the  highest  rate  set  for  any  company  cooperating  in  the  original 
investigation i.e. 13.8% 

(73)  The  amended  countervailing  duty  rates  should  be  established  at  the  level  of  the  new 
rates of subsidisation found during the present review, as the injury margins calculated 
in the original anti-subsidy investigation remain higher. 

(74)  The individual company countervailing duty rates specified in this Regulation reflect 
the situation found during the partial interim review. Thus, they are solely applicable 
to  imports  of  the  product  concerned  produced  by  these  companies.  Imports  of  the 
product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in 
the  operative  part  of  this  Regulation,  including  entities  related  to  those  specifically 
mentioned,  cannot  benefit  from  these  rates  and  shall  be  subject  to  the  duty  rate 
applicable to “all other companies”.  

(75) 

In order to avoid that fluctuations in the PET prices caused by variations in the crude 
oil prices result in higher duties being collected it is recalled that the measures in place 
have been set in the form of a specific duty per tonne. The amount set results from the 
application of the countervailing duty rate to the CIF export prices that were used for 
the calculation of the injury elimination level in the original investigation. The same 
method has been used for the purpose of establishing the amended specific duty levels 
in the context of this review. 

(76)  The  margins  and  duty  rates  applicable  should  therefore  be  calculated  as  indicated  in 

the table below. 

EN 

19 

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Reliance Industries Ltd 

Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd 

Senpet Ltd 

Futura Polyeters Ltd 

South Asian Petrochem Ltd  

All other companies 

Countervailing 
duty rate 

Proposed 
countervailing 
duty rate 

13.8% 

13.8% 

4.43% 

0% 

13.9% 

13.8% 

69,4  Eur/t 

74,6  Eur/t 

22,0  Eur/t 

0,0  Eur/t 

106,5  Eur/t 

69,4  Eur/t 

(77)  Any claim requesting the application of these individual countervailing duty rates (e.g. 
following  a  change  in  the  name  of  the  entity  or  following  the  setting  up  of  new 
production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission6 forthwith with all 
relevant information, in particular any modification in the company’s activities linked 
to  production,  domestic  and  export  sales  associated  with,  for  instance,  that  name 
change  or  that  change  in  the  production  and  sales  entities.  If  appropriate,  and  after 
consultation of the Advisory Committee, the Regulation will be amended accordingly 
by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates. 

II.  Antidumping measures 

(78)  The amendment of the countervailing duty rate will have an impact on the definitive 

anti-dumping duty imposed on producers in India, by Regulation (EC) No 192/2007. 

(79) 

In  the  original  anti-dumping  investigation,  the  anti-dumping  duty  was  adjusted  in 
order to avoid any double-counting of the effects of benefits from export subsidies. In 
this regard, Article 14(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 
1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the 
European Communities and Article 24(1) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation provide 
that no product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing measures for 
the purpose of dealing with one and the same situation arising from dumping or export 
subsidisation. It was found in the original anti-subsidy investigation as well as in the 
present partial interim review that certain of the subsidy schemes investigated, which 
were found to be countervailable, constituted export subsidies within the meaning of 
Article 3(4)(a) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation. As such, these subsidies affected 
the export price of the Indian exporting producers, thus leading to an increased margin 
of dumping. In other words, the definitive dumping margins established in the original 
anti-dumping investigation was partly due to the existence of export subsidies. 

(80)  Consequently,  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  rates  for  the  exporting  producers 
concerned  must  now  be  adjusted  to  take  account  of  the  revised  level  of  benefit 
received  from  export  subsidies  in  the  RIP  in  the  present  partial  interim  review  to 

6 

European Commission –Directorate General for Trade- Directorate H –N-105 [ ] B-1049 Brussels. 

EN 

20 

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reflect  the  actual  dumping  margin  remaining  after  the  imposition  of  the  adjusted 
definitive countervailing duty offsetting the effect of the export subsidies. 

(81) 

In  other  words,  the  new  subsidy  levels  will  have  to  be  taken  into  account  for  the 
purpose of adjusting the dumping margins, previously established. 

(82)  The margins and duty rates applicable to the companies concerned should therefore be 

calculated as indicated in the table below. 

Countervailing 
duty rate 
(resulting from 
export 
subsidies) 

Injury 
elimination 
level 

 Anti 
dumping 
duty 
rate 

 Proposed 
anti-dumping 
duty 

Reliance Industries Ltd 

13.8% 

44,3% 

30,5% 

153,6 

Eur/t 

Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd 

13.8% 

33,6% 

16,2% 

87,5 

Eur/t 

Senpet Ltd 

4.43% 

44,3% 

39,9% 

200,9 

Eur/t 

Futura Polyesters Ltd 

0% 

44,3% 

14.7% 

161,2 

Eur/t 

South Asian Petrochem Ltd  

13.9% 

44,3% 

11,6% 

88,9 

Eur/t 

All other companies 

13.8% 

44,3% 

30,5% 

153,6 

Eur/t 

(83) 

In order to ensure proper enforcement of the countervailing and anti dumping duties, 
the  residual  duty  level  should  not  only  apply  to  non-cooperating  exporters  but  also 
apply  to  those  companies  which  did  not  have  any  exports  during  the  RIP.  However, 
the  latter  companies  are  invited,  if  they  fulfil  the  requirements  of  Article  20  of  the 
basic Regulation, to present a request for a review pursuant to that Article in order to 
have their situation examined individually, 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 193/2007 shall be replaced by the following: 
"Except as provided for in article 2, the rate of the countervailing duty applicable to the net, 
free-at-Community-frontier  price,  before  duty  for  products  manufactured  by  the  companies 
listed below shall be as follows: 

Country 

Company 

Countervailing 
duty 
(EUR/tonne) 

TARIC additional code 

India 

India 

Reliance Industries Ltd 

Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd 

69,4 

74,6 

A181 

A182  

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
India 

India 

India 

India 

Senpet Ltd 

Futura Polyesters Ltd 

South Asian Petrochem Ltd  

All other companies 

22,0 

0,0 

106,5 

69,4 

A183 

A184 

A585 

A999 

Article 2 

Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 192/2007 shall be replaced by the following: 
"Except  as  provided  for  in  article  2,  the  rate  of  the  anti  dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net 
free-at-Community-frontier  price,  before  duty  for  products  manufactured  by  the  companies 
listed below shall be as follows: 

Country 

Company 

Anti-dumping 
duty 
(EUR/tonne) 

TARIC additional code 

India 

India 

India 

India 

India 

India 

Indonesia  

Indonesia 

Indonesia 

Indonesia 

Malaysia 

Malaysia 

Malaysia 

Republic of Korea 

Republic of Korea 

Reliance Industries Ltd 

153,6 

Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd 

87,5 

Senpet Ltd 

Futura Polyesters Ltd 

200,9 

161,2 

South Asian Petrochem Ltd  

88,9 

All other companies 

P.T. Mitsubishi Chemical Indonesia 

P.T. Indorama Synthetics Tbk 

P.T. Polypet Karyapersada 

All other companies 

Hualon Corp. (M) Sdn. Bhd. 

153,6 

187,7 

92,1 

178,9 

187,7 

36,0 

MpI Polyester Industries Sdn. Bhd. 

160,1 

All other companies 

160,1 

SK Chemicals Group: 
SK Chemicals Co. Ltd  

Huvis Corp. 

KP Chemical Group: 
Honam Petrochemicals Corp. 

KP Chemical Corp. 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Republic of Korea 

All other companies 

148,3 

A181 

A182  

A183 

A184 

A585 

A999 

A191 

A192 

A193 

A999 

A186 

A185 

A999 

 A196 

A196 

 A195 

A195 

A999 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
Taiwan 

Taiwan 

Taiwan 

Thailand 

Thailand 

Thailand 

Far Eastern Textile Ltd 

Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp. 

All other companies 

36,3 

67,0 

143,4 

Thai Shingkong Industry Corp. Ltd 

83,2 

Indo Pet (Thailand) Ltd 

All other companies 

83,2 

83,2 

Article 3 

A808 

A809 

A999 

A190 

A468 

A999 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, […] 

For the Council 
The President 

EN 

23 

   EN