COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT accompanying the Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy - IMPACT ASSESSMENT - {COM(2008) 721 final} {SEC(2008) 2761} 
Date: 2008-11-14
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU waters, common fisheries policy, fishing controls, information network, maritime surveillance

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 14.11.2008 
SEC(2008) 2760 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

accompanying the 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2008) 721 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2761} 

 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................................................... II 

CHANGES OF DG MARE COMPARED TO THE EARLIER DRAFTS FOLLOWING THE BOARD'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF 16 JULY 2008 ......................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

GLOSSARY......................................................................................................................................................... IV 

FLOWCHARTS.................................................................................................................................................. VI 
1. SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CFP CONTROL REGIME.......................................... VI 
2. THE NEW CYCLE OF COMPLIANCE.................................................................................................................. VII 
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN IMPROVED CONTROL SYSTEM AND REDUCED OVERCAPACITY........................... VII 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................................................VIII 

SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES................. 1 

2.4. 

2.1 
2.2 
2.3 

SECTION 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION ............................................................................................................ 3 
BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
CURRENT ROLES AND STAKEHOLDERS.................................................................................................. 3 
CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS AND PROBLEMS ........................................................................................... 4 
2.3. 1  Obsolete and incoherent approaches on control............................................................................. 4 
2.3.2  Overcapacity of fishing fleets and links to non compliance ............................................................ 4 
2.3.3  
Increased competition for marine space ......................................................................................... 7 
2.3.4   Findings and recommendations of the Court of Auditors on the current control system................ 7 
DRIVERS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE........................................................................................................... 8 
2.4.1   An inadequate legal framework ...................................................................................................... 8 
2.4.2   Existing culture of non-compliance................................................................................................. 9 
Ineffective control mechanisms ..................................................................................................... 10 
2.4.3  
SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 12 
GENERAL OBJECTIVE .......................................................................................................................... 12 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.......................................................................................................................... 13 
A new, common approach to control and inspection .................................................................... 13 
A culture of compliance................................................................................................................. 13 
Effective application of CFP rules ................................................................................................ 14 
SECTION 4: POLICY OPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 14 

3.2.1 
3.2.2 
3.2.3 

3.1 
3.2 

4.2 

OPTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE. CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND 

4.1 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 14 
Sub-option 1: No policy change, continuation of the current situation......................................... 14 
Sub-option 2: Implementation and enforcement of existing framework through implementation 

4.1.1  
4.1.2  
regulations................................................................................................................................................... 14 
Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option ..................................... 14 
4.1.3  
4.1.3.1 Specific expected impacts............................................................................................................................. 15 
4.1.3.2 Allocation of roles ........................................................................................................................................ 15 
4.1.3.3 Content of the option .................................................................................................................................... 15 
OPTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION, COMBINED WITH A CODE OF CONDUCT............... 16 
4.2.1 Approach and assumptions................................................................................................................. 16 
4.2.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option .......................................... 16 
4.2.2.1 Specific expected impacts............................................................................................................................. 16 
4.2.2.2 Allocation of roles ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
4.2.2.3. Content of the option ................................................................................................................................... 17 
OPTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT, IN THE FORM OF A NEW BINDING REGULATION ..................... 18 
4.3.1 Approach and assumptions................................................................................................................. 18 
4.3.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option .......................................... 18 
4.3.2.1. Specific expected impacts............................................................................................................................ 18 
4.3.2.2 Allocation of roles ........................................................................................................................................ 19 
4.3.2.3 Content of the option .................................................................................................................................... 19 

4.3 

4.4 
OPTION 4: CENTRALISATION OF THE CFP CONTROL POLICY AT EU LEVEL, WITH INCREASED 
COMPETENCES FOR THE COMMISSION AND THE CFCA ..................................................................................... 26 
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ......................................................................................................... 27 

5.2 

OPTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE. CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND 

5.1 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 27 
5.1.1  Option 1: General impact ............................................................................................................. 27 
5.1.2  Option 1: Link to the problem of overcapacity ............................................................................. 30 
5.1.3   Option 1: Environmental impact................................................................................................... 31 
5.1.4   Option 1: Economic impact........................................................................................................... 31 
5.1.5  Option 1: Social impacts ............................................................................................................... 32 
5.1.6   Option 1:Cost/benefit ratio ........................................................................................................... 33 
OPTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION, COMBINED WITH A CODE OF CONDUCT............... 35 
5.2.1  Option 2: General impact ............................................................................................................. 35 
5.2.2  Option 2: Link to the problem of overcapacity ............................................................................. 36 
5.2.3  Option 2: Environmental impact................................................................................................... 36 
5.2.4  Option 2: Economic impact........................................................................................................... 36 
5.2.5  Option 2: Social impact................................................................................................................. 37 
5.2.6   Option 2: Cost/benefit ratio .......................................................................................................... 37 
OPTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT BINDING AT EU LEVEL ........................................................... 37 
5.3.1  Option 3: General Impact ............................................................................................................. 37 
5.3.2  Option 3: Link to the problem of overcapacity ............................................................................. 39 
5.3.3  Option 3: Environmental impact................................................................................................... 40 
5.3.4  Option 3: Economic impact........................................................................................................... 40 
5.3.5  Option 3: Social impact................................................................................................................. 42 
5.3.6   Option 3: Cost/benefit ratio .......................................................................................................... 42 
5.3.7   Option 3: Administrative costs ...................................................................................................... 43 
5.3.7.1 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of operators................................................. 43 
5.3.7.2 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of the Member States.................................. 44 
5.3.7.3 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of the Commission...................................... 45 
5.3.7.4 Possible short term costs............................................................................................................................... 45 
SECTION 6: HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................................. 46 

5.3 

SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 51 

ANNEX I: TABLES............................................................................................................................................ 52 

ANNEX II: REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION........................................................................ 56 

ANNEX III- ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS....................................................................................................... 64 

ANNEX IV: CONTROL PROVISIONS IN CFP LEGISLATION................................................................ 66 

ANNEX V: CURRENT CONTROL SITUATION .......................................................................................... 69 

ANNEX VI: INFORMATION ON THE BIO-ECONOMIC MODEL USED FOR THE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT REPORT................................................................................................................................... 72 

iii

 
 
 
GLOSSARY 

ACFA                  Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture  

CFCA                  Community Fishery Control Agency 

CFP                     Common Fisheries Policy 

CoA                     Court of Auditors 

COM                    Commission 

DG MARE           Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 

DG SANCO         Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection 

EC                        European Communities 

ECJ                      European Court of Justice 

EEZ                     Exclusive Economic Zone 

EU                       European Union 

EUR                    Euro 

ERS                     Electronic Reporting System 

FAO                   Food and Agriculture Organization 

FMC                   Fisheries Monitoring Centre 

GPS                    Global Positioning Satellite 

ICCAT              International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 

ICES                 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 

ISG                   Inter-service steering group 

IUU                  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 

JDP                   Joint Deployment Plans 

MCS                 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 

MS                   Member State 

NAFO              Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEAFC            North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 

NGO                Non-Governmental Organization 

RAC                Regional Advisory Council 

RFMO            Regional Fisheries Management Organization 

SSB                Spawning Stock Biomass 

TAC               Total Allowable Catch 

UN                 United Nations 

VMS              Vessel Monitoring System 

v

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FLOWCHARTS 

1. SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CFP CONTROL REGIME 

e
c
n
a
i
l
p
m
o
c
n
o
n
r
o
f

s
r
e
v
i
r
D

n
o
i
t
a
c
i
f
i
t
n
e
d
i

m
e
l
b
o
r
P

s
e
c
n
e
u
q
e
s
n
o
C

Ineffective Control 
mechanisms 

Inadequate Legal 
Framework 

Culture of non 
compliance 

Shortcomings in 
the control system 

Overcapacity 

Black 
landings 

Damage to 
fish stocks 

Decreased 
prices and 
poor 
economic 
results 

Overfishing 
and financial 
incentives to 
catch more 

vi

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. THE NEW CYCLE OF COMPLIANCE 

Decreased 
overfishing and 
black landings 

Relatively stable 
prices 

Decreased 
overcapacity 

Sufficient quotas 
and trading 

Culture of 
compliance and 
Peer pressure to 
act legally 

Effective control 
mechanisms, adequate 
legal framework and 
approach based on 
incentives 

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN IMPROVED CONTROL SYSTEM AND REDUCED OVERCAPACITY  

New Control 
Framework 

Control of 
effort regime 

Control of engine 
power including 
power indicators, 
certification 

Verification of the
registered tonnage
of fishing vessels 

Verification of 
the activity of the 
Fishing vessel 

Verification of 
the specifications 
of fishing gear  

Overfishing and 
Black landings 

Reduction of 
overcapacity 

vii

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lead DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) 

Other involved services: TRADE, SANCO, TAXUD, ENV, JLS, ENTR, AGRI, COMP, 
EMPL, REGIO, OLAF, ESTAT, CFCA, JRC, TREN, MARKET, Legal Service, Secretariat-
General 

Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008 - Priority initiative 
Agenda Planning no. : 2008/MARE/001 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This  Impact  Assessment  report  lays  the  ground  for  a  proposal  for  the  reform  of  the  current 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) control regime. The objective of the Impact Assessment is to 
analyse the possible consequences of several options to address the current shortcomings in 
the EU fisheries control regime which should lead to the effective implementation of and the 
proper compliance with the CFP rules to ensure the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic 
resources.  

A  wide  consultation  involving  Member  States,  the  fishing  sector,  and  all  interested  parties 
took place. The Commission services made use of external expertise for a case study based on 
seven  stocks,  most  of  which  are  subject  to  recovery  plans,  to  support  some  of  the  elements 
relating to the present report. 

The  CFP  control  system  suffers  from  substantial  failures  identified  by  both  the  European 
Commission1 and the European Court of Auditors (CoA)2. The current system is inefficient, 
expensive,  complex,  and  its  continued  failure  will  have  significant  consequences  for  the 
future of fisheries resources, the fishing industry and the regions dependent on fishing.  

The following options emerged from the Impact Assessment analysis: 

Option  1:  No  policy  change.  Continue  current  policy  and  focus  on  implementation  and 
enforcement of existing framework 

Sub-option 1: No policy change, continuation of the current situation 

Sub-option  2:  Implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing  framework  through 
implementation regulations 

Option 2: Recast of the Control regulation, combined with a Code of conduct 

Option 3: Regulatory Instrument, in the form of a new binding Regulation 
Option 4: Centralisation of the CFP control policy at EU level, with increased competences 
for the Commission and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) 

The Impact Assessment has shown that no significant  improvements can  be expected  under 
option 1 even though recovery plans might show some positive effects. This situation would 
not change even if all outstanding implementation regulations were to be adopted. 

1 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM (2007)167 final of 10 April 

2007 on the monitoring of Member States’ implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2003-2005 

2 Special Report No 7/2007 of the Court of Auditors on the control, inspection and sanction systems relating to 

the rules on conservation of Community fisheries resources 

viii

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Option 2 would provide for a simplified legal framework and allow for partial improvements 
of  the  control  system  in  some  Member  States.  However,  since  shortcomings  in  the  current 
legal provisions could not be amended and since the impact of measures would mainly rely on 
voluntary  improvements  by  the  Member  States,  this  option  would  neither  lead  to  a  global 
approach on control nor would it create a level playing field for all stakeholders. 

A  complete  reform  of  the  current  fisheries  control  regime  under  option  3  would  not  only 
allow  to  consolidate  the  current  legislation  which  is  spread  in  a  number  of  different 
regulations. It would also allow to develop a harmonised approach to inspection and control 
covering all aspects from the catch to the plate, to develop a common culture of compliance 
and to ensure the effective application of CFP rules.  This approach would integrate and make 
full use of modern technologies, in particular by cross-checking relevant data, enabling cost 
efficient risk analyses to be the basis for targeted control strategies. It would also provide for 
a  proper  basis  for  effort  management  and  a  uniform  application  of  CFP  rules  at  Member 
States  level.  It  would  add  to  the  simplification  of  the  present  legislation  by  reducing  the 
number  of  applicable  regulations  by  up  to  36  %.  The  lower  number  of  regular  reports  that 
Member  States  would  have  to  submit  to  the  Commission  has  the  potential  to  reduce 
administrative work by 34 %. A side effect of such a reform would be that science would get 
more reliable data in a much shorter time frame providing for a better scientific advice leading 
to  better  management  decisions.  The  MRAG  study3  calculated  a  possible  increase  in  the 
biomass of 51 % and a possible gain of € 10 billion in the time  span 2010 – 2019 as a direct 
result of such an approach compared to the continuation of the current control regime. Gains 
would be most substantial for stocks under recovery plans. The case study calculated overall 
gains of 3,900 jobs in the catch (30 %), proceeding (50 %) and ancillary (19 %) industries. 
With increasing benefits the costs of control would be likely to fall in relative terms. As the 
stock situation will improve under a new and comprehensive control reform, the confidence 
of the public in the CFP would be restored. 

3 MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute of 
European studies and IFM (2008). ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control 
System applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’ (MRAG) 

ix

 
                                                 
SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

This Impact Assessment report lays the ground for the legislative package to be proposed by 
the Commission to reform the current control system of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 
The  main  objective  of  the  reform  will  be  to implement  a  sufficiently  specified  and  uniform 
policy  for  the  control  system  of  Member  States  fishing  activities  in  order  to  ensure  the 
effective  implementation  of  the  CFP  rules.  It  is  therefore  indirectly  linked  to  the  general 
objective of the CFP that is the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources. Due to its 
global and integrated approach focussing on all aspects of the CFP, the reform of the control 
policy  should  not  only  result  in  an  improved  control  capacity  and  management  of  fisheries 
resource, but additionally it should have positive structural impacts to the fishing industry and 
to  the  market  and  thus  combat  the  environmental,  as  well  as  the  economic  and  social 
consequences of non-compliance. 

The present report addresses the findings of the European Court of Auditors Special Report 
No. 7/2007. The Commission is sharing the Court's concerns and intends to address them in 
the forthcoming reform of the CFP control policy. The Parliament's Committee on Budgetary 
Control  supports  the  findings  of  the  Court,  its  recommendations  have  also  been  taken  into 
consideration in the report. 

The work on this Impact Assessment was given impetus by the setting up of an Inter-Service 
Steering  Group  (ISSG)  on  11  March  2008  mandated  to  analyze  the  overall  approach  of  the 
initiative  and  it  established  working  groups  on  specific  items.  The  following  Directorates-
General and services contributed to the ISSG: Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Trade, Health 
and  Consumer  Protection,  Taxation  and  Customs  Union,  Environment,  Enterprise  and 
Industry,  Employment,  Justice,  Freedom  and  Security,  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development, 
Legal Service, the European Anti-Fraud Office, Eurostat, the Joint Research Center Ispra, the 
Community  Fisheries  Control  Agency  and  the  Secretariat  General  of  the  Commission.4  The 
ISSG met on three occasions, and held its last meeting on 21 May, it gave regular inputs on 
the initiatives taken by DG MARE, including a discussion on the interim version of this report 
(DG  MARE  took  account  of  the  comments  received  by  the  members  of  the  ISSG  in  the 
present report). It was also the forum for exchanging experiences in fields of relevance for the 
proposed initiative. Bilateral contacts will be maintained to continue as necessary. 

The data for the Impact Assessment was collected following a broad and diverse consultation 
process with: 

•  The  Member  States:  The  issue  was  discussed  in  an  informal  meeting  with  Fisheries 
Ministers  on  18  February  2008.  Member  States  broadly  supported  the  analysis  of  the 
Commission,  but  had  reservations  on  the  harmonisation  of  sanctions  and  on  the  possible 
increased  powers  of  the  Commission.  Another  meeting  with  Member  States'  Directors-
General for fisheries had already taken place on 15 January 2008. 

•  The  stakeholders'  advisory  bodies:  A  one  day  seminar  was  organised  on  10  April  2008 
with representatives of the Regional Advisory Councils (RAC) and the Advisory Committee 

4  Moreover,  the  following  Directorates-General  were  invited  but  did  not  participate  in  the  ISSG:  Energy  and 
Transport,  Competition,  Internal  Market  and  Services,  Social  Affairs  and  Equal  Opportunities,  Regional 
Policy, 

1

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
for Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) in order to get their views on the envisaged reform of 
the CFP control policy.  

•  Technical experts: A meeting with Member States' fisheries control experts took place on 
1 February 2008, 22-23 April 2008 and 28 May 2008. 

•  High  Level  Group  of  Independent  Stakeholders  on  Administrative  burdens:  The  reform 
was presented to the High Level Group in its meeting on 18 September 2008. The chairman 
of the group expressed that the group appreciated very much the outline given by DG MARE 
and  fully  supported  the  proposed  reform  given  the  envisaged  decrease  of  administrative 
burden for the sector5.  
A  public  internet  consultation  was  carried  out  from  February  to  May  2008  to  assess  the 
impact on operators and administrations. The number of 25 contributions were received from 
a wide range of stake holders including inter alia associations from the industrial sector – of 
fishermen,  producers,  fisheries  control  technology  stakeholders,  NGOs  and  individuals. 
Notably three RACs, the Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture and one national 
authority-the UK statutory nature conservation agencies expressed their positions in support 
of  the  reform.  The  geographical  range  was  also  a  broad  one  including  French,  Portuguese, 
Polish, Spanish, British, Belgian and Dutch parties. 
All  the  contributions  received  from  the  interested  stakeholders  were  given  equal  value  and 
assessment  and  all  are  published  on  the  official  website  of  the  Commission  on  Fisheries 
together  with  their  authors  and  origin6.  (The  summary  of  the  contributions  is  contained  in 
annex II of the present report.) 
The  initiative  of  the  Commission  and  its  main  objectives  were  widely  endorsed  by  the 
participants in the consultation who contributed with valuable innovative proposals, stressing 
the need to continue the constructive dialogue between all interested parties. All unanimously 
agreed on the need to reform the control system, confirming that the 9 objectives set out by 
the  Commission  in  the  consultation  paper  are  the  main  points  of  interest  in  the  overall 
assessment of the reform.  
Many of the participants stressed that it is the culture of compliance which should be the main 
objective  of  the  reform,  calling  to  this  end  for  a  bottom-up  as  opposed  to  "top-down" 
approach in the decision-making and  implementation  process  with  more  active involvement 
of stakeholders, scientists, NGOs and national administrations, leading to more transparency, 
and broader support. There were also a number of suggestions for public training initiatives, 
especially for fishermen. 
Notably all stakeholders supported the introduction of harmonized administrative sanctions by 
the  Commission,  the  simplification  and  rationalization  of  the  rules  and  the  strengthening  of 
cooperation and assistance. NGOs and public authorities particularly supported the reform as 
an  efficient  tool  from  an  environmental  sustainable  fisheries  perspective.  All  agreed  on  the 
need to develop a new approach towards inspection and control on EC level, providing a level 
playing  field,  favouring  an  enhanced  cooperation  between  the  Commission,  fishery  control 
authorities in Member States and operators from the whole chain of production. They agreed 
that  the  Agency  should  play  a  more  important  and  constructive  role  in  coordination  and 
training.  Advisory  bodies  proposed  the  introduction  of  an  efficient  intervention  system  and 
the use positive incentives regimes. NGOs favoured the introduction of more instruments to 

5  DRAFT  FINAL  REPORT,  Measurement  data  and  analysis,As  specified  in  the  specific  contract  on  Modules 
3&4  for  the  Priority  Area  Fisheries,of  the  Framework  contract  n°  ENTR/06/061,EU  PROJECT  ON 
BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 

6 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/consultation_280208_contributions_en.htm  

2

 
 
 
                                                 
the Commission for  timely intervention whereas the industry was concerned whether it  will 
bare the cost of sanctions and suspension of EC aid or the Member States. 

The  Commission  services  made  use  of  external  expertise  to  support  some  of  the  elements 
relating  to  the  present  report.  A  specific  contract  was  concluded  (within  the  framework 
contract  FISH/2006/09  Studies  in  the  field  of  the  CFP  and  Maritime  Affairs-Lot  4:  Impact 
Assessment  studies  related  to  the  CFP)  in  force  between  the  Commission  and  the  external 
consultancy  firm  MRAG.  The  specific  contract  had  as  a  purpose  to  assess  the  probable 
outcomes  of  policy  changes  the  Commission  intends  to  propose  in  the  area  of  control.  It 
should identify the likely positive and negative impacts of proposed policy options, enabling 
informed  political  decisions  to  be  made  about  the  proposal  and  identify  trade-offs  in 
achieving competing objectives.  

SECTION 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1 

BACKGROUND 

European fisheries are managed by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), established in 1983 
with the objective of sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources7. The cornerstone of 
this  policy  is  the  limitation  and  control  of  catch  volumes  by  setting  total  allowable  catches 
(TAC's) and national quotas. The European fisheries control policy is at the heart of the CFP, 
because  its  credibility  depends  on  its  effective  application.  The  fisheries  control  policy  has 
already been partly reformed in the context of the reforms of the CFP in 1993 and 2002. Such 
reforms have therefore looked to resolve two critical issues, being first, the deficiencies in the 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  CFP  which  compromised  the  effectiveness  of 
conservation and management measures, and second, a lack of uniformity which resulted in 
inequitable implementation of control at Community level.  

Despite certain progress in solving these deficiencies, the control system continues to suffer 
from  substantial  shortcomings  identified  by  both  the  European  Commission8  and  the 
European  Court  of  Auditors  (CoA)9.  The  current  control  system  is  inefficient,  expensive, 
complex,  and  it  does  not  produce  the  desired  results.  The  continued  failure  of  the  control 
policy  will  have  significant  consequences  for  the  future  of  fisheries  resources,  the  fishing 
industry and the regions dependent on fishing.  It is within this context that the Commission is 
considering a proposal to further and substantially reform the control system underpinning the 
CFP, and that this initiative is a core priority for the Commission in the field of fisheries in 
2008.  

2.2 

CURRENT ROLES AND STAKEHOLDERS 

The  Common  Fisheries  Policy  is  an  exclusive  competence  of  the  European  Community, 
which  therefore  sets  the  legal  framework.  The  Member  States  have  to  apply  this  legal 
framework and have to make sure that the fishing industry comprising fishermen, processors 
and salesmen comply with the rules. Therefore, it is the primary responsibility of the Member 
States to ensure effective control, inspection and enforcement of the compliance with the CFP 

7 Council Regulation (EC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for the conservation 

and management of the fishery resources 

8 COM(2007)167 final 
9 Special Report No 7/2007 

3

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
rules. In this context,  decisions  on  the development and  the organisation  of control systems 
and  inspection  procedures  are  to  be  taken  on  national  level.  The  Commission's  task  as  the 
guardian of the treaty is to ensure that Member States fulfil these responsibilities. Therefore 
the Commission and its inspectors monitor, control and evaluate the application of the CFP 
rules by the Member States, e.g. by analysis of catch data reported by the Member States or 
inspections  of  the  national  control  systems.  In  the  case  of  shortcomings  or  failure  of 
individual  Member  States  in  the  application  of  the  CFP  rules  the  Commission  can  launch a 
procedure before the Court of Justice. 

The Community Fishery Control Agency (CFCA), which became operational in 2007, has the 
task to organise operational coordination and to strengthen the uniformity and effectiveness of 
enforcement by pooling EU and national means of inspection and control, and to coordinate 
enforcement  activities  by  the  establishment  and  implementation  of  Joint  Deployment  Plans 
(JDPs), which lay down the basis for joint control and inspection activities of Member States. 
Moreover,  it  should  enhance  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  by  supporting 
exchanges between, and capacity building within, Member States' inspectorates and should in 
general  assist  Member  States  to  fulfil  their  responsibilities  under  the  rules  of  the  CFP. 
However,  for  the  time  being  the  mandate  of  the  CFCA  is  limted  to  activities  concerning 
inspections at sea.   

Ensure that Member States 
fulfil their responsibility 
Monitor, control and evaluate 
the application of the CFP rules 
by the Member States 

n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C

s
e
t
a
t
S
r
e
b
m
e
M

Implement the CFP rules 
Ensure that the fishing industry 
complies with the CFP rules 

2.3 

SHORTCOMINGS 

CURRENT 
AND 

PROBLEMS 

A  number  of  problems  have  been  identified  in  the  way  the 
CFP  control  policy  is  applied,  which  are  related  either  to 
shortcomings  to  the  control  regime  as  such  or  to  structural 
problems and challenges in the fishing sector. 

y
c
n
e
g
A

2.3. 1  Obsolete and incoherent approaches on control 

Organise operational 
coordination of fisheries control 
and inspection activities by the 
Member States and assist them 
to cooperate so as to comply 
with the rules of the CFP rules 

Although  defined  as  being  global  and  integrated,  the  current  Community  control  regime  is 
limited  primarily  to  the  control  of  technical  measures  concerning  catches  and  neglects  the 
other aspects of the CFP, i.a the transports and markets. The extension of control measures to 
those areas would certainly contribute to significant overall improvements. New needs have 
arisen with respect to control, in particular within the framework of fishing effort systems and 
biologically sensitive fishing zones which are largely dealt with by ad hoc mechanisms on a 
case  by  case  basis.  The  major  efforts  undertaken  over  the  last  years  to  achieve  sustainable 
exploitation and long-term management of stocks simply cannot bear fruit in the absence of 
an effective control system.  

2.3.2  Overcapacity of fishing fleets and links to non compliance 

4

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insufficient 
quota 

Absence of 
restructuring 
of the fleet to 
ensure 
renatbility 

Absence of 
effective 
control 
mechanisms

Pressure to 
act illegally 

Overcapacity

Overfishings 

Decreased 
prices 

Illegal 
landings 

Market 
oversupply 

Overcapacity of fishing fleets is a structural problem, which leads to the unprofitability of the 
fishing  industry  and  therefore  creates  incentives  for  non-compliance  with  CFP  rules.  For  a 
high  number  of  vessels  it  is  only  possible  to  operate  profitably  by  exhausting  quotas  and 
committing overfishing. This leads to a vicious circle of fishing vessels exhausting fish stocks 
for their economic survival with an increased economic pressure to fish even more over the 
top  the  following  years  whereas  the  legal  fishing  possibilities  and  quota  allocations  shrink. 
Despite the serious ecological consequences for the environment this results also in a market 
oversupply  and  therefore  in  a  continuous  fall  of  prices  for  fishery  products.  The  currently 
insufficient control mechanisms are not able to interrupt this circle effectively.  

The  reform  of  the  control  policy  needs  to  address  this  issue  and  create  a  new  cycle  of 
compliance,  which  in  turns  would  lead  to  reduced  overcapacity.  The  implementation  of 
adequate  control  measures  would  address  the  problem  of  overcapacity.  On  the  one  hand, 
effective  and  reinforced  control  measures  on  effort  regime  will  reduce  current  overfishing 
which maintains artificially the profitability of the fleet, and therefore creates an incentive for 
non compliance with the rules. On the other hand, overcapacity would be tackled through the 
introduction  of  effective  tools  to  better  control  the  capacity  of  fishing  vessels  (through 
certification  of  the  engine  power,  definition  of  an  "active  vessel"…).  It  has  to  be 
acknowledged however, that overcapacity drivers lie beyond control issues, and will also need 
to be addressed in the context of the general reform of CFP, and of the emergency package on 
high fuel prices in the fisheries sector. 

The assessment of the balance between fishing capacity and available fishing opportunities is 
one  of  the  main  difficulties  that  the  Commission  and  Member  States  are  confronted  with 
when trying to achieve a sustainable fishing activity. What is the adequate fleet size is a very 
difficult question to answer. Moreover, it has proved difficult to demonstrate on a sound and 
objective basis the existence of overcapacity and the unbalance between capacity and fishing 
opportunities on an individual Member State basis. However, there is agreement that overall 
the  Community  fishing  fleet  is  oversized.  Even  if  a  comprehensive  'calculation'  of  the 
Community fleet overcapacity has never been carried out due to the fact, that its indicators, 

5

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
such as engine power, are easily manipulated, there are clear indications for some parts of the 
fleet that fishing capacity is in excess of what would be required to fish in a biologically or 
economically  sustainable  way.  Certain  segments  of  the  fleet  can  at  present  only  operate  if 
they realise a substantial part of their catches outside the legal system. The particular case of 
the  Mediterranean  blue  fin  tuna  fleet  demonstrates  that  the  size  of  the  Community  fleet 
targeting this species quantified in terms of theoretical catching capacity is much bigger than 
the  available  EU  quota.  A  tuna  seiner  needs  300  tonnes  a  year  to  survive  economically. 
Currently,  however,  the  official  quota  in  some  countries  only  allows  100  t  for  all  vessels 
licensed in the blue fin tuna fishery. Moreover, in some Member States, many vessels are kept 
tied  up  so  that  their  effort  allocation  (in  kilowatts  days)  may  be  transferred  to  other  vessels 
and allow them to work full time. This fact indicates as well that those parts of the fleet are 
oversized. 

Several steps have been taken since the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
to counter this problem. However, overcapacity and excessive fishing effort still remain an 
issue for many segments of the EU fleet and continue to jeopardise the economic viability 
of the sector. EU catches have steadily declined since 1993, at an average of 2% per year, 
leading  to  constantly  declining  revenues  (-25%  since  the  early  nineties).  In  particular, 
almost all demersal stocks have declined in recent years and are currently not sustainable. In 
addition market prices have remained constant or even diminished. With declining revenues 
and an excessive capital invested (estimated at around 40%), there is a high leverage effect 
of  changes  in  operating  costs,  which  has  squeezed  the  industry  margins  for  several  years. 
The  absence  of  a  sufficient  return  on  capital  has  delayed  modernisation  and  further 
weakened competitiveness of the fisheries sector.  

In the reform of the CFP in 2002, the concept of capacity reductions has been replaced by the 
mechanism  of  reference  ceilings  which  are  expressed  in  capacity  units  and  constitute 
maximum  levels  which  national  fleets  may  not  exceed.  As  a  result  of  the  CFP  reform, 
Member States are exclusively responsible for adjusting the size of their fleets to the fishing 
opportunities made available to them by the Council, expressed either in the form of quotas or 
fishing  effort  allocations.  No  capacity  reductions  are  decided  and  imposed  at  Community 
level. This system does not oblige Member States to reduce the overcapacity of their fleets, 
but  leave  them  the  choice  to  instead  limit  the  fishing  efforts  for  each  vessel.  The  current 
fishing capacity management system does not establish a concrete and measurable obligation 
to  reduce  excess  capacity,  but  only  to  'adjust'  the  size  of  the  fleet.  However,  the  current 
approach  of  giving  the  responsibility  for  managing  capacity  to  the  Member  States  and 
focusing  Community  action  on  fishing  effort  limitation  has  turned  out  to  be  unlikely  to 
resolve  the  problem  and  did  not  lead  to  a  reduction  of  overcapacities.  The  CFP  has  so  far 
failed to deliver a balance between fleet size and fishing resources. During the past 16 years 
the capacity of the Community fishing fleet has been decreasing at an average yearly rate of 
barely 2%. A 2% decrease would not even compensate for the effect of technological progress 
which is evaluated to be higher that that. If technological progress is assumed to be of 3%, as 
argued by some studies, the effective capacity of the fishing fleet may in fact have increased. 

Even  if  the  issue  is  quite  technical  in  nature,  it  is  as  well  highly  politically  sensitive.  The 
reason for this is that overcapacity is one of the great — if not “the” — malady of the CFP, 
and  Member  States  are  reluctant  in  addressing  this  proactively  in  their  fleet  management 
and/or  structural  fund  use.  Given  the  fact  that  Member  States  respect  their  basic  legal 
requirements as regards the entry exit regime for fishing efforts, the margin of manoeuvre for 
the  Commission  to  press  individual  Member  States to  allocate  more  funds  in  this  respect  is 
very limited for the time being. 

6

 
 
 
In  its  Communication  on  tackling  the  economic  consequences  of  high  fuel  prices  in  the 
fisheries  sector  the  Commission  now  proposes  an  emergency  package  to  address  both  the 
immediate  situation  of  economic  and  social  hardship  and  to  make  a  lasting  contribution  to 
tackling systemic overcapacity. This response must be EU-wide and co-ordinated in order to 
avoid distorting competition between Member States or fleets. The package consists mainly 
of measures based on temporary derogations from rules under the European Fisheries Fund, to 
support  a  faster  adaptation  of  the  Community  fleet  to  the  present  situation  and  to  provide 
temporary  relief  in  order  to  cushion  economic  and  social  consequences  in  the  transitional 
phase. It will give Member States the possibility to develop Fleet Adaptation Schemes for the 
fleets  that  are  most  dependent  on  fuel  and  most  significantly  affected  by  the  situation  of 
overcapacity.  

Such measures together with a coherent and effective approach on control will finally cut the 
vicious  circle  of  poor  economic  profitability  and  over-exploitation  of  stocks  the  EU 
fisheries  sector  has  long  suffered  from  and  will  lead  to  the  necessary  restructuring  of  the 
sector. 

2.3.3   Increased competition for marine space  

The  competition  of  the  various  actors  at  sea  for  available  space  is  sharpening  considerably. 
Extraction of raw materials, sea routes, large windmill parks, marine protected areas under the 
habitat directive, the military, the leisure industry and fisheries compete for marine space. As 
a consequence of utilisations by other actors it is likely that fishing areas will become smaller. 
Given the persisting overcapacity of the fishing industry and its poor economic performance it 
is likely that pressure and excessive fishing efforts still will increase. It is essential to develop 
a  comprehensive  and  sustainable  management  of  marine  space  and  to  find  an  acceptable 
compromise among the various users. To this end an ecosystem based approach to fisheries 
management would need to be established. 

2.3.4   Findings and recommendations  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  on  the current  control 

system 

On  numerous  occasions,  the  Commission  has  raised  serious  concerns  about  the  severe 
problems  and  obstacles  in  the  application  of  the  CFP  control  system10.  The  European 
Parliament supported this view in a resolution of 2007 on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
fishing11. Along this line, the recent audit performed by the CoA12  aimed  to  assess  whether 
the Commission and the Member States are taking the necessary steps for an effective system 
of control, inspection and sanctions for the conservation of fisheries resources. According to 
the findings of the Court the current situation is i.a characterized by an inadequate regulatory 
framework  and  insufficient  procedures  for  the  exhaustive  collection  of  data  and  for  the 

10 COM(2007)167 final 
11 Paragraph 8 of the European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)), where the EP "reiterates 
its conviction that a crucial and obvious first step for the European Union to take is, first, to fully implement 
the existing provisions of the CFP and other relevant Community legislation in an effective, fair and rigorous 
manner, in order to reduce unreported and illegal fishing by Community vessels and in Community waters." 

12 Special Report No 7/2007 

7

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
detection  of  inconsistencies.  Moreover,  the  national  inspection  systems  are  inadequate  to 
prevent and to detect infringements and their divergences do not ensure adequate inspection 
pressure nor optimise inspection activities.  
The Commission under the current conditions and due to its limited competences is not able 
to  identify  errors  and  anomalies  in  the  data  forwarded  by  Member  States  nor  to  evaluate 
national control systems and to form an opinion as to their overall effectiveness. In order to 
carry out its task of controlling the Member States in their application of the CFP rules the 
Commission  is  dependent  on  complete  and  reliable  data.  However,  the  current  non-
compliance and shortcomings in the reporting systems and the collection of data prevent the 
proper  application  of  the  system.  This  should  significantly  improve  with  the  use  of  modern 
technologies and the implementation of systematic data cross checking procedures. 
Moreover,  legal  tools  to  react  to  infringements  of  Community  legislation  are  limited.  The 
CoA concluded that if this situation continues, it will lead to grave consequences not only for 
the  natural  resource,  but  also  for  the  future  of  the  fishing  industry  and  the  areas  associated 
with it. It recommended that: 

• 

the  systems  for  collecting,  validating  and  monitoring  catch  data  should  be  improved, 
Member States should define the minimum characteristics of inspections and ensure that 
inspectors have access to all useful information. They should ensure that inspections are 
supervised and recorded in centralised databases; 

•  control  strategies  are  based  on  risk  analysis  and  evaluated  with  the  help  of  relevant 
objectives and higher consideration is given to verifiability of management measures; 
•  powers  of  Commission  inspectors  are  strengthened  and  the  mandate  of  the  CFCA  is 
broadened,  more  responsive  instruments  against  Member  States  are  introduced,  and 
sanctions have a deterrent effect and are harmonised; 
the problem of overcapacity should be addressed. 

• 

The  problems  arising  from  non-compliance,  the  consequent  damage  to  fish  stocks  and  the 
lack  of  economic  and  social  stability  have  been  recognised  by  the  Member  States,  both  at 
government level and within the fishing sector itself13. They broadly favour a reform of the 
current  system.  The  Commission  shares  the  majority  of  the  CoA's  findings  and  intends  to 
launch an ambitious reform of the EU policy for fisheries control which should address all the 
identified failures. 

2.4. 

DRIVERS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE 

A number of drivers for non-compliance with the CFP rules have been identified, which all 
contribute to the failure of the system, as they all have an impact on overcapacity and on the 
efficiency of the control regime. It is difficult to isolate one factor, as they all form part of a 
vicious circle which leads to the current situation. 

2.4.1   An inadequate legal framework  

13 COM(2007)167 final 

8

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The basis for the control policy and the roles of the Commission and the Member States are 
defined in Council Regulation (EEC) 2847/93 (the 'Control Regulation'14), and Chapter V of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 (the 'Basic Regulation'15). The complexity caused by 
the number of amendments to the Control Regulation is further exacerbated by the fact that 
the  Control  Regulation  is  only  one  of  the  elements  of  the  control  framework.  A  range  of 
control  provisions  are  contained  in  27  separate  regulations16.  However,  only  4  of  originally 
foreseen 20 implementation regulations were adopted, as a result of a combination of factors, 
such as a lack of political will, the obsolescence of specific provisions, etc. This complexity 
and  incoherence  of  the  legal  framework  leads  to  a  lack  of  clarity  and  legal  certainty  which 
makes it difficult for Member States and the fishing industry to accept the concept, to comply 
with the rules and therefore gives no incentive to not excess fishing efforts. 

2.4.2   Existing culture of non-compliance 

The  CFP  suffers  from  a  culture  of  non-compliance  in  the  sector.  Beside  the  difficult  and 
complex legal framework and the existing overcapacity of the fleet, the lack of compliance is 
essentially driven by the fact that the risk of detection of an infringement is rather low due to 
severe shortcomings in the national control systems17. A number of Member States have only 
limited dedicated fisheries control services, and the current deployment of inspectors in some 
Member  States  is  inadequate.  Moreover,  some  Member  States  do  not  apply  sufficient 
inspection  effort  on  vessels  under  10  m,  fail  to  operate  a  full  time  inspection  and  do  not 
dedicate enough resources at the stage of landing or marketing of the catch. In the absence of 
a  common  methodology  at  EC  level,  Member  States  have  developed  their  own  systems  of 
control and inspection, frequency and intensity of control and inspections differ strongly from 
one Member State to the other and fishermen have to face various procedures and practices. It 
has  resulted  in  a  variety  of  procedures  and  practices,  introducing  uncertainty,  and  lack  of 
credibility of inspection reports, therefore making the systematic follow up of infringements 
in judicial proceedings more difficult. This diversity, as highlighted by the Court of Auditors, 
gives  operators  the  opportunity  to  criticise  practices  which  they  consider  discriminatory, 
thereby making them less inclined to comply with the rules.  

Moreover,  even  in  the  case  of  detection  of  an  infringement,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
appropriate  sanctions  are  imposed.  Sanctions  for  infringements  of  CFP  rules  are  not 
sufficiently deterrent and therefore the system in place is one more factor which encourages 
non-compliance with the CFP rules and overfishing. Overall, the total amount paid in fines by 
the fisheries industry in 2006 came to €9,2 million,  constituting only 0.04 % of the number of 
active  fishing  vessels.  The  Commission  has  observed  the  significant  disparities  of  the 
sanctions imposed by the different Member States for the same type of serious infringements: 
for example, the average fine for fishing without holding a fishing licence ranged from €63 to 

14 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/1993 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the 

common fisheries policy, (OJ L 261, 20.10.1993) 

15 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation 

of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy(OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p 59-80) 

16 See annex III to this report 
17  The  elements  of  the  current  control  mechanisms  and  the  current  control  situation  in  the  Member  States  are 

described in annex IV 

9

 
 
 
 
                                                 
€24,328  in  2006 18.  The  average  fine  imposed  across  the  EU  in  the  proceedings  that  ended 
with a penalty in 2006 amounts to € 1 548. The averag e fine is less than half the average fine 
imposed in 2003 (€4 664) and less than the average fine imposed in 2004 (€ 2 272).  
According  to  Member  States'  responses  to  the  questionnaire  on  sanctions  sent  by  the 
Commission  in  April  2008,  even  though  the  suspension  of  licences  exists  as  a  possible 
measure in their legislation, in most cases it is hardly used in practice, as it is the fines which 
are most commonly imposed. The levels of those sanctions are largely divergent and notably 
in the majority of Member States they do not take into account the economic benefit from the 
infringement. 

The existing culture of non compliance also links to the perceived poor legitimacy of the CFP 
rules.  There  is  no  equal  treatment  of  stakeholders  among  the  EU,  which  certainly  is  an 
obstacle to fair competition. Poor legitimacy also comes from the fact that it is felt decisions 
are taken only following a top down approach, without effective consultation of the interested 
parties. There is a demand from the sector for a more bottom up approach, in a revised system 
where the Commission would only intervene where needed, on the basis of control strategies 
agreed  with  the  Member  States,  which  target  high  risk  activities,  and  reduce  the  number  of 
unnecessary  reporting  obligation  and  move  away  from  the  existing  system  of  centralised 
micro decisions.  

The Commission is already undertaking short term actions, in particular in areas such as the 
standardisation and harmonisation of control and development of inspection methods and full 
implementation  of  the  Vessel  Monitoring  System  (VMS)  in  conformity  with  Community 
rules. However, these measures would not be sufficient to address the problems in a long-term 
perspective. 

2.4.3   Ineffective control mechanisms 

As  guardian  of  the  Treaty,  the  Commission  not  only  verifies  and  evaluates  that  Member 
States  do  meet  their  responsibility  for  the  application  of  the  CFP  rules,  it  also  works  in 
partnership  with  them,  by  facilitating  coordination  and  cooperation.  The  Community 
assistance to "control and enforcement" activity of Member States is limited to €45 million if 
only the appropriations directly allocated19 to it are considered. However, taking into account 
all the activities designed to deal, albeit only partially, with the consequences of the serious 
shortcomings of the resource management policy, the financial issues for the Community are 
far  more  substantial,  especially  the  structural  assistance  for  fisheries  (€837  million)  and  the 
international  fisheries  agreements  (€156  milli on).  As  it  stands,  it  is  difficult  for  the 
Commission to get Member States to respect their obligations. As explained above, structural 
overcapacity creates an incitement to non-compliance, and prevents the effective application 
of  the  control  mechanisms.  The  only  way  to  achieve  effective  controls  would  be  to  set  up 
inspection  resources  and  pressure  of  controls.  These  control  tools  so  far,  have  proven 
inadequate to ensure the respect of CFP rules. 

18 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Reports from Member 

States on behaviours which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2006, 
COM/2008/xxx, forthcoming 

19 All figures relating to appropriations are 2007 payment appropriations  

10

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.4.3.1  Commission inspections 

The  verification  of  Member  States'  implementation  of  the  CFP  rules  is  carried  out  by 
monitoring  via  inspections  of  Member  States  activities  and  evaluation  of  Member  States 
inspection  reports.  A  team  of  24  Commission  inspectors,  whose  powers  are  limited  in 
scope20can request access to databases and documentation held by the national authorities, but 
they  cannot  carry  out  their  own  checks  on  private  entities  against  the  will  of  the  inspected 
party. They have the right to conduct checks in Member States without prior notice, but need 
to be accompanied by inspectors of the Member States who are ultimately responsible for the 
inspections of the sector. Thus the inspection competence never equals those of the national 
authorities. In addition, even if evidences gathered by Commission inspectors can be used for 
prosecution,  Member  States  are  not  obliged  to  act  against  individuals  on  the  basis  of  the 
findings of the Commission inspectors' reports21. 

2.4.3.2 The role of the Commission for the management of quotas 

Closure of fisheries 

The management of quotas in general is the responsibility of the Member States. This refers 
particularly  to  the  closure  of  a  fishery  after  the  exhaustion  of  the  relevant  quota.  The 
Commission is generally limited to the supervision of the management by Member States. It 
has the legal authority to close a fishery either following the notification of the Member State 
or on its own initiative22. The normal practice is to close a fishery on the basis of the figures 
of  the  relevant  Member  State.  However,  this  mechanism  relies  on  proper  enforcement  of 
Community  rules  by  the  Member  States,  coupled  with  an  efficient  monitoring  of  current 
catches  against  quota  available.  According  to  the  report  of  the  CoA,  none  of  the  Member 
States showed total compliance with the regulations. This fact is known and documented by 
the Commission who has started more than 50 infringement procedures to Member States for 
quota overshooting. Regarding the closure of the fishery on the Commission's own initiative, 
so  far,  this  possibility  has  been  used  only  twice  by  the  Commission  a)  to  close  the 
Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery for all Member States (Regulation (EC) No 1073/2007 and 
b)  to  close  the  cod  fishery  for  vessels  flying  the  flag  of  Poland  in  some  areas  of  the  Baltic 
(Regulation (EC) No 804/2007). The effectiveness of such a measure is hampered by the fact 
that  the  Commission  has  to  collect  serious  evidence  first.  This  procedure  is  very  time 
consuming  and  it  can  take  the  Commission  up  to  three  months  to  react  during  which  the 
overfishing goes on.  

Deduction of quotas 

The  Commission  has  the  capacity  to  address  overfishing  in  a  more  routine  manner  by 
deducting overfished quantities from the relevant Member State's quota the following year on 
the basis of a gradual penalizing factor23. This factor has without doubt a disciplinary effect. 
However, its consequences are only felt well after the overfishing has occurred. Moreover, if 
cases  of gross overfishing  involve a political discussion on high level, the tool is of limited 
use since decisions are influenced by other criteria. To make quota reduction a stronger tool 

20 Articles 29 and 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 
21 Article 27 paragraph 2 fourth subparagraph of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
22 Article 21 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/1993, and Article 26, paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EC) 

No 2371/2002 

23  Article  23  paragraph  4  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002,  and  Article  23  of  Council  Regulation 

(EEC) No 2847/93 

11

 
 
 
                                                 
the  Commission  should  have  an  increased  mandate  to  deduce  quotas  as  a  normal  act  of 
administration and to take the solutions away from the political discussion. 

2.4.3.3 Emergency and preventive measures 
The Commission can take emergency measures24 if there is evidence of a serious threat to the 
conservation  of  resources  or  the  marine  eco-system  resulting  from  fishing  activities,  and 
preventive measures25 where there is a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to the 
conservation  of  resources. However, due  to the  difficulty  to  gather  evidence and to observe 
the  principle  of  proportionality,  these  measures  have  proved  very  difficult  to  implement  in 
practice. 

2.4.3.4 The infringement procedure against Member States 

In case of non-compliance that cannot be corrected through other means, the Commission can 
refer  the  case  to  the  Court  of  Justice  under  the  general  procedure  for  failure  to  fulfil  an 
obligation.  So  far,  there  have  been  only  three  cases  whereby  Member  States  have  been 
sanctioned  to  pay  a  fine.  In  one  instance  the  judgment26  was  delivered  in  2005  for  non-
compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case in which the first infringement had been 
recorded  in  1984,  21  years  earlier.  The  infringement  procedures  culminating  in  a  financial 
sanction could have a deterrent effect for Member States. However, the procedure is long and 
cumbersome,  and  is  not  suitable  to  the  urgency  of  the  measures  required  to  protect  the 
fisheries resources. 
Furthermore, except for compliance with fishing fleet register27, the Commission is not in a 
position to link financial aid to a satisfactory implementation of control rules as it is already 
possible in the agricultural sector. Up to now there is no similar legal base for fisheries. 

SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES

28 

3.1 

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 

The  general  objective  is  to  implement  a  sufficiently  specified  and  uniform  policy  for  the 
control  system  of  Member  States  fishing  activities  in  order  to  ensure  the  effective 
implementation of the CFP rules. It is therefore linked to the general objective of the CFP that 
is  the  sustainable  exploitation  of  living  aquatic  resources,  and  will  have  an  impact  on  the 
reduction of overcapacity. Due to its global and integrated approach focussing on all aspects 
of  the  CFP  the  reform  of  the  control  policy  should  not  only  result  in  an  improved  control 
capacity  and  management  of  fisheries  resource,  but  additionally  should  have  positive 
structural  impacts  on  the  fishing  industry  and  on  the  market  and  thus  combat  the 
environmental,  as  well  as  the  economic  and  social  consequences  of  non-compliance. 
Profitability  would  be  addressed:  natural  restructuring  of  the  fishing  sector  would  be 
enhanced, since operations whose profitability are based on the exhaustion of fishing efforts 
would  become  obsolete.  This  approach  should  be  based  on  simplification,  standardisation, 
increased cost effectiveness and reduction of administrative burden.  

24 Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
25 Article 26 paragraph 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
26Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 12 July 2005 in Case C-304/02: Commission of the European 
Communities v French Republic; action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay 
a  lump  sum  of  20  million  euro  and  a  penalty  payment  of  57.8  million  euro  for  each  period  of  six  months 
(judgment given on 12 July 2005); France paid the lump sum and one penalty payment 

27 Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
28 For a list of core indicators of progress towards meeting the objectives, see section 7 of the report 

12

 
 
                                                 
More generally, the objective will contribute to the Sustainable Development Strategy agreed 
by the European Council in June 2006 via its focus on the protection of natural resources. It is 
also in line with the objectives set out at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002  regarding  fisheries  management29  and  the  principle  of  striving  for  better  ocean 
governance  guiding  the  current  reflections  on  a  future  Maritime  Policy  for  the  Community. 
Moreover, the overall objective of the control reform respects the Commission’s identification 
of  the  four  main  areas  where  there  is  currently  space  for  improvement  in  the  application  of 
Community Law30. 

The reform is intended to enter into force in 2010. However, the most significant impact are 
expected  on  a  medium  to  long  term  bases  within  a  period  of  5  –  10  years.  First,  Member 
States and the industry would need some time to implement the new system and to meet its 
full  requests.  Only  afterwards  the  ecosystem  can  respond  on  the  new  and  better  conditions, 
which will be measureable by the increase of biomass and by the increase of market prices for 
fish. 

3.2 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 

3.2.1  A new, common approach to control and inspection 

The  implementation  of  harmonised  inspection  procedures  and  improved  standards  should 
ensure  uniformity  in  the  implementation  of  control  policy  at  Member  States'  level,  while 
respecting and considering diversity and the specific characteristics of different fleets.  

The operational objectives would include: 
•  Ability  to  carry  out  standardised,  coordinated  inspection  actions  and  procedures  at  all 
stages of the chain, and develop comprehensive traceability systems; 
•  Ability to use modern technologies; and carry out effective and systematic cross checking 
of all relevant data and;  
•  Ability to use information identifying risks and rationalising control. 

3.2.2  A culture of compliance  

The objective is to influence the behaviours of all those stakeholders involved in the full cycle 
of fishing activities (capture, processing, distribution and marketing), so that compliance with 
the policies and regulations of the CFP is achieved through not only monitoring and control 
activities, but as a result of an overall culture of compliance where all parts of the industry are 
invested  in  compliant  activities,  and  legitimacy  of  CFP  rules  are  restored.  Moreover, 
significant  improvements  of  the  legal  framework  should  lead  to  the  reduction  of 
administrative burdens both for the industry and the administrations.    

The operational objectives would include  
•  Simplification and rationalisation of the legal framework; 
•  Ability to introduce of deterrent and harmonised sanctions;  

29Report  of  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development,  Johannesburg,  South  Africa,  26  August  -  4 

September 2002 (United Nations publication) 

30 See COM(2007)502 final of 5.9.2007 “A Europe of results - applying Community Law”: 
- prevention: increased attention to implementation throughout the policy cycle 
- efficient and effective response: improved information exchange and problem solving 
- improved working methods: prioritisation and acceleration in infringement management 
-enhanced dialogue and transparency: between the European institutions and improving information to the public 

13

 
 
                                                 
•  Ensure  improved  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  with  the  Commission 
(including the adaption of the mandate of the CFCA) and; 
•  Develop greater interaction with the sector and the stakeholders. 

3.2.3  Effective application of CFP rules 

The  operational  objective  would  be  to  strengthen  the  management  competences  and  the 
capacity of the Commission to intervene proportionately to the level of non compliance by the 
Member  States.  Responsibilities  of  the  Commission  and  Member  States  will  have  to  be 
clearly defined in order to avoid substitution and to ensure that the Commission adheres to its 
core activity of controlling and verifying implementation of the rules of the CFP by Member 
States. It is important to stress that at no stage it is intended to change the current sharing of 
responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States and the fact that the Member 
States  are  –  and  should  remain  –  responsible  for  control  and  enforcement,  but  the  current 
system  of  micro  decisions  should  be  progressively  replaced  by  a  macro  management  based 
approach. 

SECTION 4: POLICY OPTIONS 

4.1 

OPTION  1:  NO  POLICY  CHANGE.  CONTINUE  CURRENT  POLICY  AND  FOCUS  ON 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK 

4.1.1   Sub-option 1: No policy change, continuation of the current situation 

Approach and assumptions 

The main assumption for this sub-option is that current control policy is sufficient to deliver 
compliant behaviour in support of the objectives of the CFP, and that the core issue is poor 
implementation  of  the  existing  regulatory  requirements  by  Member  States.  On  numerous 
occasions, the Commission has raised serious concerns as to the lack of sufficient measures 
by  Member  States  for  this  purpose31.  In  order  to  address  the  current  shortcomings  of  the 
existing system, the emphasis could be put on a better implementation of the already existing 
legislation. 

4.1.2   Sub-option  2:  Implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing  framework  through 

implementation regulations 

Approach and assumptions 

The main assumption for this sub-option, as an alternative to the simple continuation of the 
current situation, is that emphasis could be put on the adoption of outstanding legislation. At 
the  time  of  adoption  of  the  control  regulation  around  20  implementation  regulations  were 
foreseen  to  provide  for  a  full  set  of  technical  rules  as  a  basis  for  a  comprehensive  control 
regime. Of these only four implementation regulations were adopted. This clearly prevented 
the initial control regulation from reaching its full effect.  

4.1.3   Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option 

31 COM(2007)167 final 

14

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4.1.3.1 Specific expected impacts 
The  expected  specific  impact  of  option  1,  through  the  completion  of  the  existing  legal 
framework  and  the  adoption  of  outstanding  legislation  might  partly  address  some  of  the 
failures.  One  has  to  bear  in  mind  however,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  given  that  many 
implementation regulations are still outstanding, their adoption would take a lot of time. On 
the other hand, with all the outstanding regulations being adopted, the legislative framework 
would become even more complex and more dispersed. 

4.1.3.2 Allocation of roles 

The current allocation of roles between the Member States, the Commission and the CFCA - 
as described in section 2, point 2 - would be kept without changes. 

Member States 

Commission 

  Implement the CFP rules 

s
e
l
o
R

Control the implementation of the CFP rules by the 
Member States 

-Responsible 
for 
collecting,  validating  and 
compiling  catch  data,  and 
forwarding 
the 
Commission 
-Responsible 
the 
establishment  of  its  own 
inspection procedures 

for 

to 

it 

s
e
i
t
i
l
i
b
i
s
n
o
p
s
e
R

Micromanagement 

for  monitoring  all  data 
in 

received, 
-Responsible 
identifying  errors  and  misstatements 
the  data 
forwarded by the Member States and for taking  timely 
decisions necessary to protect the resource 
-Provides  transparency  and  facilitates  international  co-
operation. 
-Limited  capacity  to  act:  Infringement  procedures,  and 
rarely used Specific procedures to close fisheries 

Community  Fishing  Control 
Agency 
Organise operational coordination 
of fisheries control and inspection 
activities by the Member States 

-Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs)  
-Activities  limited  to  inspections 
at Sea 
-Training 

Based on these assumptions, Option 1 could develop as follow: 

4.1.3.3 Content of the option 

4.1.3.3.1 

A new, common approach to control and inspection 

The Commission32 should prioritise the use of existing means of inspection and surveillance 
in selected fisheries or stocks, it should review periodically the effectiveness of inspection and 
surveillance activities in co-operation with national control experts. 

It  should  follow  up  more  systematically  the  reports  it  produces  itself  or  reports  sent  by 
Member States.  

Member States have not taken all actions foreseen in the basic regulation such as e.g. setting 
up a single authority for the collection and verification of data. The lack of action of Member 
States  in  this  respect  could  be  challenged  on  the  basis  of  Article  226  EC  Treaty  (and  if 
necessary  followed  up  through  a  '228-procedure').  Moreover,  in  the  area  of  control  and 
reporting, the Commission should be less lenient against none or late reporting.  

4.1.3.3.2 

A culture of compliance  

32  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  -  Towards  uniform  and 

effective implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy COM(2003)0130 final 

15

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  development  of  a  culture  of  compliance  among  fishing  operators  with  regard  to  the 
implementation of measures affecting their activities can be attained through better regulation 
and good governance in the CFP decision-making process. In that respect, the current system 
of microdecision and poor legitimacy might be addressed through greater involvement of the 
advisory  bodies  set  up  in  2002.  Without  necessarily  extending  their  mandate,  the  regular 
interaction  between  the  Commission  and  these  bodies  has  already  allowed  for  an  improved 
dialogue and a better understanding of the rules.    

4.1.3.3.3 

Effective application of CFP rules 

To ensure that the CFP rules are effectively applied, a number of existing competences of the 
Commission could be more frequently used. As to the closure of fisheries on Commission’s 
initiative33,  this  has  only  been  used  twice  in  2007  with  regards  to  the  Baltic  cod  and  to  the 
Bluefin  Tuna  fishery.  As  far  as  procedure  under  Article  228  is  concerned,  the  successful 
action  by  the  Commission  against  France  created  an  immediate  incentive  for  France  to 
comply  with  Community  law  following  first  judgment.  Article  228  regarding  enforcement 
should be used fully beyond this case. 

4.2 

OPTION  2:  RECAST  OF  THE  CONTROL  REGULATION,  COMBINED  WITH  A  CODE  OF 
CONDUCT 

4.2.1 Approach and assumptions 

The  second  policy  option  considers  the  implementation  of  the  reform  elements  through  a 
consolidation  of  the  currently  fragmented  control  regulation  in  combination  with  a  steering 
instrument,  such  as  a  ‘Code  of  Conduct’  or  ‘Best  Practice  Guidance’.  It  is  based  on  the 
assumption that non compliance with the CFP rules is a result of a complex control regime, 
and poor legitimacy of the CFP rules among the sector and the Member States. Following the 
adoption of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, and in line with recital 19 of that Regulation, this 
option  would  lead  to  a  new  Council  Control  Regulation,  based  on  Chapter  V  of  Regulation 
(EC)  No  2371/2002.  The  aim  would  be  to  summarise  into  only  one  regulation  all  current 
provisions governing control, inspection and enforcement that are at the moment scattered in 
different regulations34. This would both consolidate and simplify the existing rules for control, 
implementation and enforcement, but at the same time would not change or add any new legal 
requirement,  nor  would  it  introduce  any  new  instrument  to  the  better  enforcement  of  the 
current control framework.  

4.2.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option 

4.2.2.1 Specific expected impacts 

Regarding the specific expected impact of this option, it can be reasonably expected that this 
will  lead  to  a  rationalisation  of  the  existing  rules  and  therefore  be  a  contribution  to  the 
simplification of Community law. However, there is no guarantee that this will lead to a better 
implementation of the recast legal framework by Member States. In particular, the inadequate 

33  Article  26,  paragraph  4  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002  provides  that  in  the  event  of  a  Member 
State's quota, allocation or available share being deemed to be exhausted, the Commission may, on the basis of 
the information available, immediately stop fishing activities 

34 as currently laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 and its implementing regulations 

16

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
possibilities  for  the  Commission  to  make  Member  States  correct  their  shortcomings  would 
persist.  Given  the  persisting  overcapacity  and  the  poor  economic  performance  that  create 
strong  incentives  for  the  industry  not  to  comply  with  the  rules  and  the  limited  resources  of 
Member States in monitoring fisheries it can be expected that the current shortcomings of the 
CFP control system will remain.  

4.2.2.2 Allocation of roles 

The  fundamental  allocation  of  tasks  between  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  and  the 
CFCA  –  as  described  in  section  2,  point  2  -  would  not  be  altered  either  under  Option  2, 
despite  some  adaptations.  The  combination  of  the  recast  with  steering  instruments  would 
provide a new mechanism for simplifying and improving the implementation of the CFP rules 
through  clearer  provisions  and  detailed  advice  from  the  Commission  to  the  Member  States 
that  deliver  greater  clarity  on  the  requirements.  An  additional  responsibility  thus  for  the 
Commission would be to elaborate and provide guidelines for the implementation of the CFP 
rules,  whereas  for  the  Member  States  there  would  be  no  additional  obligations,  since  those 
guidelines would not be legally binding. 

Community  Fishing 
Control Agency 
Organise operational 
coordination of 
fisheries control and 
inspection activities by 
the Member States 

Deployment 

limited 

to 

-Joint 
Plans (JDPs)  
-Activities 
inspections at Sea 
- Training 

Member States 

Commission 

Implement the CFP 
rules 

Control the implementation of the CFP rules by the 
Member States 

s
e
l
o
R

s
e
i
t
i
l
i

b
i
s
n
o
p
s
e
R

Micromanagement 

for 

-Responsible 
collecting, 
and 
validating 
catch 
compiling 
and 
data, 
forwarding it to the 
Commission 
-Responsible for 
the establishment 
of its own 
inspection 
procedures 

-Responsible for monitoring all data received, identifying 
errors  and  misstatements  in  the  data  forwarded  by  the 
Member States and for taking  timely decisions necessary 
to protect the resource 
-Provides  transparency  and  facilitates  international  co-
operation. 
-Limited  capacity  to  act:  Infringement  procedures,  and 
rarely used Specific procedures to close fisheries 
-Develop understanding of  the CFP rules through clearer 
provisions  and  detailed  advice  to  Member  States  that 
deliver greater clarity on the requirements, on a voluntary 
basis 

Based on these assumptions, Option 2 could develop as follow: 

4.2.2.3. Content of the option 

4.2.2.3.1 

A new, common approach to control and inspection 

The  development  of  a  more  adequate  approach  as  regards  inspection  would  be  achieved 
through a simpler legal framework and a steering instrument. For example, as it was already 
foreseen  in  the  Communication  "Towards  uniform  and  effective  implementation  of  the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy",35  a  code  of  conduct  for  inspection  clarifying  the  duties  of 

35 COM(2003)0130 final 

17

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
inspectors  and  the  procedures  to  be  followed  by  both  masters  and  inspectors  during 
inspections at sea could contribute in particular to more uniformity at Community level.  

In  the  same  line,  the  requirement  for  Member  States  to  establish  a  validation  system 
comprising  cross  checks  and  verification  of  certain  data  collected  under  the  CFP  already 
exists, but it is clear that the implementation of such a system varies across Member States, 
and that significant broadening of the checks conducted is possible.  

4.2.2.3.2 

A culture of compliance 

This option also links in quite closely with the objective to develop a culture of compliance, 
which  can  be  best  achieved  through  a  simplified  and  clear  legal  framework  in  combination 
with  strong  partnership  between  all  stakeholders  in  the  management  of  aquatic  resources36. 
Increasingly, those having the responsibility for managing  natural resources look to achieve 
objectives  through  empowering  stakeholders  in  collaborative  processes  and  implementing 
policy  change  through  cooperative  means.  In  practice,  working  with  the  Member  States 
through  steering  action,  preparing  guidelines  etc.  and  publicising  the  apparent  discrepancies 
relating to the issue of sanctions may be the most realistic option.  

4.2.2.3.3 

Effective application of CFP rules 

Moreover,  to  ensure  that  the  CFP  rules  are  effectively  applied,  non  regulatory  instruments 
could  be  developed  that  promote  the  implementation  of  measures  that  are  currently  not 
required by the existing regulations comprising the CFP (and therefore would not be added in 
a consolidated recast text). For example, through the expert group on control, Member States 
and  the  Commission  could  agree  on  a  specific  procedure  for  closing  fisheries:  as  soon  as 
Commission’s  inspectorate  casts  doubts  on  the  reliability  of  catch  data  against  quota 
available, the Member States would commit themselves to immediately close the fishery on a 
provisional basis.  

4.3 

OPTION  3:  REGULATORY  INSTRUMENT,  IN  THE  FORM  OF  A  NEW  BINDING 
REGULATION 

4.3.1 Approach and assumptions 

The  third  option  presented  for  assessment  is  the  implementation  of  the  reform  package 
through a regulatory text that is binding at Community level. This approach is founded on the 
establishment  of  an  EU  level  playing  field,  a  demand  supported  to  a  large  extent  by  the 
Member  States  and  the  sector  itself,  which  would  ensure  a  uniform  application  of  the  CFP 
rules across the EU and a non discriminatory treatment of all fishermen. 

4.3.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option 

4.3.2.1. Specific expected impacts 
The regulatory instrument would meet the objectives of a truly global and integrated control 
policy as it would encompass all control issues, from the net to the plate. The implementation 
of  adequate  control  measures  would  also  address  the  problem  of  overcapacity.  On  the  one 

36 Presentation by Mary McAllan (Scottish Government – Marine Directorate Sea Fisheries Management) to the 

North Sea Regional Advisory Council (RAC) 

18

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
hand,  effective  and  reinforced  control  measures  on  effort  regime  will  reduce  current 
overfishing which maintains artificially the profitability of the fleet, and therefore creates an 
incentive for non compliance with the rules. On the other hand, overcapacity would be tackled 
through  the  introduction  of  effective  tools  to  better  control  the  capacity  of  fishing  vessels 
(through certification of the engine power, definition of an "active vessel…). 

4.3.2.2 Allocation of roles 
The  new  system  would  ensure  a  clearer  allocation  of  roles  between  the  Commission,  the 
Member States and the CFCA. In first instance the general division of responsibilities, where 
the Member States are responsible for the implementation of the CFP rules, the Commission 
evaluates  and  controls  the  proper  implementation  by  the  Member  States  and  the  CFCA 
provides  means  for  operational  coordination  and  cooperation  among  Member  States,  would 
not  change.  However,  as  further  elaborated  below,  the  management  competences  and 
capacities of the Commission would be strengthened and it would be given more possibilities 
to act in case of failure of Member States. The mandate of the CFCA would be extended to 
other inspection activities than at sea, and it would be given proper inspection powers and the 
responsibility for the coordination of crisis situations. For the Member States there would be 
new  obligations  related  to  the  harmonised  inspection  procedures,  such  as  cross  checking  of 
data, risk analysis or increased exchange of information with other Member States.  

  Member States 

Commission 

Implement the CFP rules 

Control and evaluate the implementation of the CFP rules 
by the Member States 

s
e
l
o
R

s
e
i
t
i
l
i
b
i
s
n
o
p
s
e
R

-Responsible  for  collecting, 
validating  and  compiling 
catch  data,  and  making  it 
available to the Commission 
via secured websites 
the 
-Responsible 
for 
implementation 
of 
inspection procedures on the 
basis of  a  risk analysis 
-Increased 
between Member States 
-Effective  sanctions  against 
individuals 

cooperation 

Macromanagement 

-Responsible  for  evaluating  errors  and  misstatements  in 
the  data  made  available  by  the  Member  States  and  for 
taking  timely decisions necessary to protect the resource 
on the basis on the basis of risk management 
-Provides  transparency  and  facilitates  international  co-
operation 
-Reinforced  capacity  to  act:  Infringement  procedures, 
more  frequent  use  of  specific  procedures  to  close 
fisheries,  auditing  function,  effective  measures  against 
member  States  (cross  compliance),  increased  powers  for 
the Commission inspectors, emergency measures 
-  Develop  understanding  of    the  CFP  rules  through 
clearer  provisions  and  detailed  advice  to  Member  States 
that  deliver  greater  clarity  on  the  requirements,  on  the 
basis of control standards and inspection procedures 

Fishing 

Community 
Control Agency 
Organise operational 
coordination of fisheries 
control and inspection 
activities by the Member 
States 

-Joint  Deployment  Plans 
(JDPs)  
-Extension  of  the  mandate 
of  the  agency  to  cover  all 
activities 
inspection 
(including  ports,  transport 
and markets)  
-Extensive 
(where 
inspection powers 
-Management 
coordination 
situations 

investigation 
and 

appropriate) 

and 
crisis 

of 

To this end, this new legislative framework could address the three objectives as follow: 

4.3.2.3 Content of the option 

4.3.2.3.1 

A new, common approach to control and inspection 

19

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although  the  level  of  compliance  by  fishing  vessels  with  technical  measures  should  not  be 
ignored, and in that respect inspection at sea would  not be abandoned, greater attention needs 
to be turned towards the comprehensive monitoring of catches. The establishment of an EU 
level playing field for control and inspection would take into account the differences across 
the segments of the fleet. 

Standardised and coordinated inspection actions and procedures at sea and on land 

Minimum  requirements  for  inspection  at  sea  and  on  land  would  be  set  up,  as  well  as  for 
transport  and  market.  The  concept  of  inspection  should  be  defined  in  the  proposed 
Regulation,  as  well  as  the  procedure  to  be  followed  during  an  inspection,  the  procedure  in 
case an infringement is detected, and the follow up to the infringement. To be effective each 
inspection,  depending  on  its  nature,  must  have  certain  features.  Centralised  recording  of  all 
inspection  reports  in  a  computerised  database  would  be  envisaged  essential.  Standard 
observers' scheme would be developed, as well as surveillance procedures. In this context, the 
role of the Member States would be enhanced since they would have to amend and improve 
their national inspection procedures accordingly.  

The Commission also sees the need to establish general standards of control in the following 
fields: 
-Recovery plans and Multi-annual management plans: Each one of these plans has associated 
control  measures  that  differ  from  plan  to  plan  as  a  result  of  different  negotiation  contexts 
when the measures were discussed at Council level.  
-Discards: For the  time being there is no specific legislation on the subject, but a reflection 
has  been  launched  to  draft  legislation  aiming  to  define  measures  concerning  a  progressive 
reduction of discards.  
-Real  time  closures  of  fisheries:  A  permanent  mechanism  of  real  time  closures  of  fisheries, 
under the responsibility of the Member States, could be introduced. For the time being there is 
no specific legislation on the subject, but a reflection has started on an appropriate procedure 
providing for the requirements to allow Member States to close temporarily certain areas for 
the protection of the stocks, and the conditions under which those closures have to be lifted 
again.  This  measure  again  would  force  Member  States  to  stronger  carry  out  their 
responsibilities and thus enhance their active role in the implementation of the CFP rules.   

The  extension  of  control  beyond  marine  activities  and  land  inspections  to  full  traceability 
would  be  introduced.  Consumers  are  increasingly  aware  of  the  need  to  contribute  to 
sustainability.  A  comprehensive  labelling  system  (indicating  the  origin  of  the  fish,  name  of 
the vessel, minimum landing size…) is needed, with sanctions linked to it if the seller does 
not  respect  its  obligations  (withdrawal  of  accreditation).  Best  practices  in  Member  States 
could be used to develop the system. The current provisions on the control of the market37 do 
not fully reflect measures adopted in the Common Organisation of the Markets Regulation38. 
The  new  regulatory  instrument  could  take  into  account  the  requirements  for  Consumer 
information  and  traceability  provisions39,  and  the  obligation  for  producer  organisations  to 
draft  and  implement  operational  programmes  every  fishing  year  (this  obligation  is  already 
part of the CFP legislation). 

Modern technologies and efficient data cross-checking systems 

37 Title VI of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 
39 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2065/2001 

20

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Modern  technologies  generate  data  that  have  a  value  in  their  own  right  such  as  Vessel 
Monitoring  Systems  (VMS),  Electronic  Reporting  Systems  (ERS),  and  Vessel  Detection 
Systems (VDS) as they provide additional tools for the monitoring, control and surveillance 
of  fishing  activities.  Accordingly,  systematically  applying  automated  data  validation 
procedures  by  using  such  modern  technologies  complimentary  to  conventional  monitoring 
tools, such as catch registration systems, can focus the limited resources of Member States for 
targeting certain vessels for control purposes.  
The Commission proposes the introduction of minimum requirements for the automated and 
systematic  validation  of  data  collected  by  Member  States.  There  should  be  basic  quality 
control  procedures  in  such  a  system  that  establishes  the  compliance  with  for  instance,  the 
VMS  regulation, the Logbook regulation, the  Control regulation etc. Amongst many others, 
the following checks or validations could still be included: Declared catch area against VMS 
data, possible fishing activity in closed fishing areas, movements of vessels over effort zones, 
designated ports and landing ports against VMS data, pre-notifications against VMS data and 
catch documents etc.  
Computer based technologies will make it possible to easily set up a data base containing all 
inspection reports and infringements to allow a global assessment of inspection activities and 
adjust  control  strategies,  if  need  be.  i.a.  France  is  already  running  such  a  system  with  very 
good results allowing its inspectors to access all relevant information in real time. In addition, 
Member States would have the obligation to enter electronically all the relevant data allowing 
a  monitoring  of  the  fishing  activities  in  nearly  real  time,  and  provide  remote  access  to  the 
Commission. This would reduce the number of reporting obligations for the Member States, 
and reduce the current system of micro decision by the Commission. 

An  automated  data  system  also  facilitates  the  exchange  of  information  between  Member 
States  and  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission.  The  Commission  will  be  in  a 
possibility to cross-check such information easily with Eurostat data.  

Adequate strategic programming, tactical targeting and sampling strategy 

Member  States  would  be  required  to  carry  out  a  risk  analysis  leading  to  a  formal  strategy 
document  that  identifies  inspection  priorities  (with  benchmarks)  and  could  be  used  as  the 
basis  for  a  rational  allocation  of  resources,  particularly  as  regards  the  cost/benefit  aspect  of 
inspections.  Member  States  would  be  obliged  to  set  up  sampling  procedures  for  specific 
fisheries like those where the national quota is likely to be fully used, stocks under recovery 
plans and stocks of a high commercial value that are likely to be subject to illegal activities. 
Member States would have to provide a detailed description on the strategies followed and the 
statistical  estimates  used  making  it  possible  to  appreciate  the  levels  of  precision  and 
relationship between the cost and precision.  

Specific measures  to address overcapacity 

It is essential to guarantee the quality of the fishing capacity indicators (Vessel tonnage and 
engine  power40).  While  the  quality  of  the  tonnage  indicator  is  considered  satisfactory,  the 

40 Under the EU legislation the Member States are required to record the vessel tonnage using the Gross Tonnage 
(GT) under the London Convention (1969) as opposed to the previously used Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) 
under the Oslo Convention (1946). This change in recording tonnage has taken place over a number of years 
throughout the 1990's and at varying rates in the different countries. Given that the GT of a vessel is generally 
significantly greater than the GRT, great care has to be taken in comparing the tonnages of the various fleets at 
different times. By the end of 2003 the recording of the tonnage by GT was largely completed. 

21

 
 
 
 
                                                 
under-declaration  of  engine  power  is  a  major  problem41.  Tackling  excessive  engine  power 
requires  both  a  new  engine  power  certification  system  and  re-enforced  control  measures 
allowing  Member  States  to  detect  and  sanction  those  vessels  which  operate  with  an  engine 
power higher than the one authorised according to their fishing licence. 

Measures for the control of recreational fishing 

The  proposed  initiative  would  envisage  introducing  proportionate  control  measures  for 
recreational fishing, to be carried out by the Member States, as this activity has an increasing 
influence on fish stocks and marine environment. For that purpose, it would be envisaged to 
limit the use of allowed fishing gears, and submit recreational fishermen to prior registration. 

4.3.2.3.2 

A culture of compliance 

Simplification of the rules 
The proposed Regulation will bring together the control standards for all the rules of the CFP 
with  a  global  approach  based  on  simplification  and  covering  all  aspects  from  the  capture 
through to the market. This proposal should put the principles in place while leaving the task 
of defining the details to implementing regulations.  

Greater interaction with the stakeholders 

The  present  system  of  centralised  micro  decisions  and  micro  management  on  Commission 
level  has  poor  legitimacy  among  stakeholders.  The  Commission  wants  to  move  to  a  macro 
management  approach,  where  it  would  mainly  act  as  an  auditor  of  the  control  system,  and 
intervene  only  where  needed,  on  the  basis  of  control  strategies  agreed  with  the  Member 
States,  which  target  high  risk  activities,  and  reduce  the  number  of  unnecessary  reporting 
obligation.  
In this context, it would be important to increase the interaction with stakeholders. Since their 
creation, the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) have developed into an important forum for 
interaction between stakeholders and the Commission. In line with the contributions received 
during the online consultation, the regulatory instrument could foresee:  
•  Public  training  initiatives,  especially  for  fishermen  and  inspectors,  in  continuation  with 
community financial assistance for improving the involvement of the fisheries sector42. 
•  Development of a culture of compliance with the law and foresee positive incentives, as 
provided  for  example  in  the  current  TACs  and  quotas  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
40/2008. 

Introduction of a system of deterrent sanctions  

Sanction regime 
The driving principle should be that there will not be an economic benefit resulting from the 
infringement  and  the  dissuasive  effect  of  the  sanction  should  be  guaranteed.  The  European 
Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  stressed  that  the  European  Community  does  not  have  the  necessary 
competence to legislate as to the type and level of sanctions imposed on the basis of criminal 
law43.  The  Commission  has  the  competence  to  create  or  harmonise  administrative  sanctions 
insofar  as  they  are  necessary  and  proportionate  for  ensuring  the  effective  application  of  its 

41  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  improving  fishing 

capacity and effort indicators under the common fisheries policy COM(2007)39 final 

42 Commission Regulation No 861/2006 
43 C-440/05, ECJ Judgment of 23 October 2007, C-176/03, ECJ Judgment of 13 September 2005 

22

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
rules and policies. It will be then up to the Member States to decide whether they apply these 
sanctions  within  a  criminal  system  or  not.  The  Community  could  envisage  a  system  to 
approximate  the  levels  of  fines  that  Member  States  must  impose  in  respect  of  serious 
infringements to CFP rules. 

Penalty point system 
Another option would be to consider the idea of using administrative means to restrict or even 
end  access  to  fisheries  by  those  who  have  repeatedly  breached  CFP  rules.  Given  that 
livelihoods are involved and the possible social and economic impacts of denying access to 
fisheries it is clear that a graduated or proportionate approach would be called for. One option 
could be the introduction of a penalty points scheme, whereby each permit holder starts off 
with  an  equal  number  of  ‘points’  some  of  which  are  then  lost  each  time  there  is  an 
infringement  leading  ultimately  to  the  loss  of  the  permit  either  for  a  defined  period  or 
indefinitely.  

Definition of serious infringements 
The  regulatory  instrument  could  provide  for  the  definition  of  serious  infringements44  taking 
into  account  the  gravity  of  the  infringement  in  question  which  is  to  be  determined  by  the 
competent authority, taking into account the criteria such as the damage done, the extent of 
the  infringement,  its  value  or  repetition.  It  would  be  necessary  to  extend  this  list  of  serious 
infringements to other elements of the chain, such as the buyers, and sellers.  

Enforcement measures and accompanying sanctions 
The  new  system  could  be  accompanied  by  a  regime  of  immediate  enforcement  measures, 
applying  to  persons  found  in  flagrante  delicto  while  committing  serious  infringements,  and 
designed  to  prevent  the  continuation  of  those  infringements.  Those  measures  would  include 
the immediate cessation of fishing activities, the rerouting to port of the vessel…In addition, 
the Community could encourage the adoption by Member States of accompanying sanctions 
to  fines  (such  as  the  confiscation  of  catches  or  gear,  suspension  or  withdrawal  of  fishing 
licences,  etc)  as  they  often  constitute  more  deterrent  penalties  than  "traditional"  financial 
penalties. 

Reinforce Administrative cooperation and mutual assistance and extension of the mandate of 
the CFCA 

In the light of a targeted and effective control system there is a clear need for an integrated 
approach on administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, to be expanded to all stages of 
the chain, including the set up of a mutual assistance system between the Member States for a 
regular and standardized exchange of control related information, and with the Commission 
and  the  CFCA.  In  this  context  would  be  necessary  to  amend  the  mandate  of  the  CFCA  in 
order  to  allow  its  proper  involvement  in  the  operational  cooperation  of  control  and 
enforcement measures at all stages. Contrary to what its name might suggest, the CFCA today 
has no powers of its own in relation to control and enforcement of CFP rules. Option 3 would 
envisage the reinforcement of the mandate of the CFCA and to involve it more actively in the 
control  and  inspection  procedures.  In  this  respect,  a  number  of  elements  need  to  be  further 
elaborated, such as: 

44 In this context, the regulatory instrument could get inspiration from existing practices in Regional Fisheries 
organisation  (notably North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), and North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC) 

23

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  The  extension  of  the  mandate  of  the  CFCA  to  establish  Joint  Development  Plans  as 
well  for  territorial  waters.  It  would  be  important  that  under  the  new  Control 
Regulation – subject to agreement of the costal Member States - access to territorial 
waters would  be provided in the framework  of Joint Deployment Plans and that any 
approval  procedure  for  entering  territorial  waters  for  patrol  ships  or  patrol  planes 
would be simple; 

• 

•  Coordination and enforcement of control and inspection at all stages of the chain, not 
only  at  sea  would  be  necessary.  Therefore,  initiatives  on  land,  during  transport, 
processing  or  marketing  should  also  be  part  of  the  mandate.  In  this  context  the  new 
Control Regulation should establish the power for the CFCA to trace back the origin 
of fish and fisheries products and to organise cooperation of audit inquiries on land; 
•  The CFCA in future should assist the Commission in monitoring the implementation 
of  the  CFP  rules  and  the  proper  application  of  the  new  CFP  control  system  by  the 
Member  States.  For  this  purpose,  the  Agency  officials  could  be  granted  own 
investigation powers, to allow inspections and audits of national control systems and 
the cooperation between Member States ; 
In order to contribute to the harmonisation and improvement of inspection standards, 
the  CFCA  should  elaborate  and  issue  manuals  and  guidance  material  reflecting  best 
practices in the field and provide training for national inspectors. It should, moreover, 
conduct  risk  analysis  on  the  basis  of  catch  data  provided  by  the  Member  States  and 
provides the Commission with technical and administrative support. 
It could be considered to extend the mandate of Community inspectors, without prior 
notice,  to  all  public  or  private  bodies  having  received  from  the  State  some  kind  of 
delegation of power in the national fisheries management scheme. This could include 
inter  alia  producer  organisations,  auction  centres,  or  wholesale  markets.  The  option 
could include the obligation to Member States to have these organisations audited by 
independent  third  parties  and  have  the  Commission’s  inspectors  allowed  to  conduct 
their  own  checks  independently  from  national  authorities  on  the  basis  of  these  audit 
reports; 

• 

•  The  CFCA,  following  existing  provision,  notably  for  the  European  Food  Safety 
Authority, could set up an emergency unit where a serious risk to the CFP has been 
identified,  which  should  be  responsible  for  the  collection  and  evaluation  of  relevant 
information and the elaboration of options to prevent or eliminate the risk. 

4.3.2.3.3 

Effective application of CFP rules 

Strengthen the capacity of the Commission to intervene proportionately to the level of  
non compliance by the Member States 

Redefine the powers of Commission inspectors 
Commission inspectors should be given the same powers as national inspectors, and should be 
ale to by their own means, to initiate and carry out inquiries, verifications and inspections in the 
Member  States.  Commission  inspectors  should  be  able  to  have  access  to  fishing  vessels, 
transport  vehicles  as  well  as  to  the  premises  of  businesses  and  other  bodies  with  activities 
relating to the CFP. When there is reason to believe that irregularities occur in the application 
of the CFP rules, the Commission should be able to carry out independent inspections. In line 
with the development of a micromanagement approach, the Commission should also be able to 
carry out audits of the monitoring, control and surveillance systems of Member States.  

24

 
 
 
 
 
Action plan for Member States to improve their implementation 
A  legal  obligation  could  be  created  obliging  Member  States  to  correct  their  system  and/or 
behaviour  at  the  request  of  the  Commission  after  shortcomings  have  been  found  in  an 
inspection mission. This could be set up in an action plan, as it is the case for example in the 
field of Consumer protection.45 Inspection reports could be published with responses from the 
Member States like SANCO reports, bearing in mind confidentiality related issues. The non-
respect  of  such  an  obligation  could  be  linked  to  an  authorisation  for  the  Commission  to 
suspend financial aid, or to deduct quotas in the following year.  

Strengthen the management capacity of the Commission 

Capacity for the Commission to rectify catch figures of Member States 
The  Commission  lacks  the  legal  capacity  to  rectify  any  figure  transmitted  officially  by  a 
Member State. The rectification of these figures could technically be done either on the basis 
of findings of Commission inspectors in the relevant Member States and the analysis of other 
relevant  figures.  The  Commission  could  be  allowed  to  close  a  fishery  on  the  basis  of  these 
corrected figures. 

Closing a fishery on the Commission initiative 
A policy option would be to reverse the burden of proof on Member States and apply fully the 
precautionary principle as defined in Article 3 of Council Regulation 2371/2002: when there 
are strong indications that fishing conditions are not sustainable, the Commission should be 
able to decide on provisional closure of fisheries and reopen it only when the Member State(s) 
concerned  can  provide  the  Commission  with  evidences  that  the  fishery  can  be  safely 
exploited. 

More flexibility for the Commission to proceed to deductions of quotas 
It is important that the deduction of quotas is set at a more deterrent level to ensure it has a 
strong  impact  on  the  Member  State  concerned.  The  Commission  could  be  given  more 
capacity to deduct quotas in future years either by increasing the penalizing factor in the case 
of  a  heavy  overexploitation  or  by  making  the  deduction  procedure  easier  or  both.  The 
Commission  could  also  be  allowed  to  deduct  quotas  systematically  in  the  event  a  Member 
State fails to meet  its  control  obligations. A multiplying factor should then apply in case of 
repeated failure. 

Financial sanctions in case of bad management  
Member States enjoy financial aid from the Commission in two ways. On the one hand they 
receive  structural  assistance  for  the  fisheries  sector.  On  the  other  hand  the  Community 
contributes  to  their  control  expenses  under  certain  circumstances.  In  case  of  a  poor 
management,  these  forms  of  financial  assistance  could  be  withheld  partly  or  wholly 
depending on the gravity of the case. A similar concept exists in agriculture. 

45  Regulation  (EC)  No 2006/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27 October 2004  on 
cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  (the 
Regulation on consumer protection cooperation) ( OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p. 1–11 ) 

25

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4.4 

OPTION  4:  CENTRALISATION  OF  THE  CFP  CONTROL  POLICY  AT  EU  LEVEL,  WITH 
INCREASED COMPETENCES FOR THE COMMISSION AND THE CFCA 

As  a  lot  of  shortcomings  for  the  current  control  policy  are  to  be  found  in  the  poor 
implementation  record  of  the  Member  States,  it  could  be  envisaged  to  modify  the  overall 
allocation  of  responsibilities  between  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission  (and  the 
Agency),  and  give  overall  implementation  powers  to  the  Commission,  through  a  dramatic 
increase  of  the  powers  of  the  Agency,  compiling  all  current  responsibilities  for  control  and 
enforcement of the Member States . The CFP is one of the few exclusive competences of the 
EU, but one where the multiple national approaches have resulted in varying procedures and 
practices.  This  diversity  gives  operators  the  opportunity  to  criticise  practices  which  they 
consider discriminatory and to question the relevance of the CFP, thereby making them less 
inclined to observe the rules.  
It is therefore proposed that the Commission, and the Agency, pool the inspection means of 
the Member States, and develop universally accepted standards, with a long term perspective 
of  setting  up  some  kind  of  European  Coastal  Guards  system.  As  such,  this  would  ensure  a 
uniform  application  of  the  CFP  rules  and  a  non  discriminatory  treatment  to  all  fishermen 
across  the  EU.  The  Commission  would  be  endorsed  with  police  and  enforcement  powers, 
which  would  also  facilitate  the  collect  of  information  pertaining  to  possible  infringements, 
and therefore reinforce the overall efficiency of the system. This would include a fundamental 
increase in terms of human resources at the level of the Commission and the Agency and a 
massive financial investment.  
This option has to be discarded at an early stage however, for the following reasons: 

•  First, the reallocation of tasks between the Commission and the Member States would 
exceed  what  the  Treaty  provides  for.  The  Commission  would  itself  implement  and 
enforce the rules it lays down. That would also imply that the Commission exercises 
jurisdiction over the Community fishing vessels. Until now, such power remains the 
competence of the Member States, and as long as they have not agreed to transfer this 
authority to the Commission, it will be impossible for the Commission to act.   

•  Second, politically, it is hardly realistic to conceive that Member States would accept 

to suddenly give up such powers to a supranational body.  

•  Third, such an option would involve a dramatic increase in costs for the Commission 
(staff and operational deployment), one that it is impossible to afford for the moment. 
•  Fourth,  it  would  go  against  the  principles  of  proportionality  and  subsidiarity,  as  this 
would  be  another  example  of  a  top  down  approach,  while  more  bottom  up 
perspectives  are  needed,  and  required  by  the  Sector,  the  Member  States,  and 
acknowledged by the Commission itself. 

From the analysis above, it appears that only Options 1, 2 and 3 can be considered as realistic 
options  to  address  the  shortcomings  of  the  control  policy.  All  options  take  it  that  the 
fundamental allocation between the tasks of the Commission and the Member States remain 
unaffected, i.e. that the Commission would initiate the appropriate legislative framework and 
monitor  the  proper  application  of  Community  law  while  it  would  be  the  responsibility  of 
Member  States  to  apply  these  rules  to  their  nationals  and  their  territory.  The  Community 
Fisheries Control Agency would continue to coordinate, with additional powers,  activities of 
Member States in all options but to a much lower degree in options 1 and 2. 

26

 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

The different actors which might be affected by the future policy of the Community are the 
following: 

The Community fishing sector: It has to face dwindling fishing opportunities and ever stricter 
rules for a couple of years. For a number of stocks TACs are complemented by effort regimes 
supposed to reduce the fishing pressure on specific stocks that are subject to recovery plans. 
Combined  with  factors  such  as  fuel  prices  this  has  made  parts  of  the  fishing  industry  more 
vulnerable. The Community fishing sector is composed of around 70,000 (small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) with a total of up to 90,000 vessels and a workforce on board those 
vessels  around  210,000  persons  with  an  overall  turnover  estimated  at  amounting  to  around 
€8,8 billion. 

The Community processing industry: Due to a lack of sufficient supplies from its own fishing 
sector, the Community processing industry relies heavily on the supply of imported products 
for raw materials and semi-processed products46. The 6,000 companies in the business employ 
some  150,000  workers  with  a  turnover  of  €18  b illion.  However,  this  industry  is  partly 
characterised  by  a  high  degree  of  internationalisation  as  a  number  of  important  firms  have 
invested  in  third  countries  and  delocalized  part  of  their  production  with  a  view  to  reducing 
labour costs and benefiting from preferential tariffs. 

The  authorities  of  Member  States  in  charge  of  control  of  fishing  activities:  The  scarcity  of 
fishing  opportunities  and  the  increase  in  rules  that  have  to  be  enforced  has  put  an  ever 
increasing  strain  on  the  control  authorities.  The  measures  proposed  would  have  a  direct 
bearing on these authorities as they will be in charge of implementing them with respect to the 
industry. 

The  fishing  sector  of  third  countries  would  be  affected  during  its  fishing  activities  in 
Community waters as it would normally be subject to the same control regime as Community 
fishing vessels in Community waters. 

5.1 

OPTION  1:  NO  POLICY  CHANGE.  CONTINUE  CURRENT  POLICY  AND  FOCUS  ON 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK 

5.1.1  Option 1: General impact 

The  current  situation  is  characterized  by  a  constant  degradation  of  fish  stocks.  Despite 
substantial efforts, there are no significant signs of stock recovery or reductions in overfishing 
since 2003. Fisheries management in the European Union is not working as it should and the 
objective  of  achieving  long-term  sustainability  is  not  being  reached.  This  situation  is  due 
partly  to  management  decisions  that  do  not  follow  scientific  advice  and  pursue  rather  short 
term  interests.  To  a  large  extent,  however,  also  poor  implementation  of  existing  technical 
rules and established TACs/quotas play an important part.  

Some progress has been observed though. In particular the introduction of recovery plans for 
specific stocks that are in particularly serious conditions with specific control targets and the 
start  of  the  work  of  the  Community  Fisheries  Control  Agency  setting  up  joint  deployment 
plans that pool control means of relevant Member States and target in particular stocks under 
recovery plans have led to a certain improvement, even though sometimes favoured by natural 
conditions as in the case of North Sea cod.  

46 See also annex I, table 3 

27

 
 
 
                                                 
In the MRAG study47 it was calculated that even under current conditions, with an enhanced 
control  in  the  framework  of  recovery  plans,  the  stock  situation  is  likely  to  improve  in  most 
cases for North Sea hake, Baltic cod, North Sea plaice and sole, Northern and Southern hake, 
Western  mackerel  and  Mediterranean  hake.  However  results  would  be  much  more 
encouraging  under  option  3  (see  table  4  and  5  in  annex  1).  Overall,  according  to  this  case 
study option 3 is likely to produce a 51%48 increase  in the biomass  of  the modelled stocks, 
and  option  2  a  22%49  increase.  In  view  of  this  outcome  the  case  study  projects  a  certain 
increase in employment as illustrated in table 6 of annex 1. 

Option 1 would only bring little or no gain after 2012 and maximal gain would be attained in 
option  3.  However,  when  referring  to  this  study  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  it  is  only  a 
calculation model with all the uncertainties that goes with it. It refers to specific stocks under 
recovery plans and it is based on certain fixed assumptions that are supposed not to change in 
the  time  span  under  investigation.  As  the  current  conditions  are  likely  to  aggravate,  as  for 
instance fuel prices, fishermen are likely to take advantage of the weaknesses of the system to 
improve  their  economic  performance.  The  improvements  might  therefore  be  less  than 
projected under present conditions. 

The continuation of the current policy can be looked at from two different perspectives: 

5.1.1.1 Sub-option 1: No policy change, continuation of the current situation 

The continuation of the current situation does not necessarily mean that the content and scope 
of  the  framework  will  remain  static.  This  approach  is  better  categorised  as  a  'business  as 
usual' approach with additional layers of rules being added in an uncoordinated manner to the 
existing web of complexity in response to isolated political demands or emergency situations 
in the fishery.   

With respect to the three main objectives defined in section 3 the consequences of this sub-
option would be as follows: 

A new, common approach to control and inspection  

5.1.1.1.1 
The fundamental problem would persist, the complexities of the regulatory and administrative 
environment  of  the  control  regime  in  place  would  further  the  current  deficiencies.  Member 
States  would  continue  to  make  only  limited  use  of  modern  technologies  leaving  the 
perception  that  they  are  not  cost  efficient  instruments.  In  particular  cross-checks  of  data 
would continue to be used only in a handful of Member States, preventing the capacity of the 
EU to analyse fisheries that are particularly subject to irregularities.  

A culture of compliance  

5.1.1.1.2 
The current situation that has led to a certain culture where non-compliance of CFP rules is 
widespread  would  continue.  This  situation  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  ICES  bases  its 
assessments  to  an  important  extent  not  only  on  reported  catches  but  on  unreported  catches, 
too.  Quota  management  on  the  basis  of  unreliable  catch  reporting  systems  would  remain 
questionable and science would continue to be deprived of reliable data. The vicious circle of 
poor  data  not  allowing  reliable  scientific  advice  leading  to  unsustainable  management 

47 MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute of 
European studies and IFM (2008). ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control 
System applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’ (MRAG) 

48 MRAG p. 133 
49 MRAG p. 133 

28

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
decisions resulting in an over-exploitation of the stocks would continue. Apart from possibly 
a  couple  of  recovery  stocks  that  are  subject  to  specific  conditions,  the  downward  trend  of 
quotas  would  generally  continue.  Even  for  recovery  stocks  an  improvement  would  not  be 
ensured  as  the  volume  of  black  landings  is  likely  to  be  greater  in  stocks  which  are  of  high 
value  and  reduced  TAC,  a  situation  that  specifically  characterizes  a  recovery  plan.  As  a 
consequence  the  supply  for  the  processing  industry  would  generally  not  improve  and  the 
consumer would lose even more confidence in fish as a sustainable food resource.  

Effective application of CFP rules  

5.1.1.1.3 
Under this sub-option the effective application of CFP rules would not be ensured either. The 
capacities of the Commission and its inspectors would remain limited. This incapacity of the 
Commission would continue to be matched by a continuous lack of severity of national legal 
systems  in  case  of  infringements  and  an  unsatisfactory  follow-up  for  legal  or  procedural 
reasons and incomplete information about sanctions and previous non-compliance. The wide 
variations in the level and types of sanctions applicable by the Member States in respect of 
infringements tend to undermine particularly the notion of a level playing field even though 
different living standards in the Member States and the details of the individual case explain 
for  a  part  the  considerable  differences  in  the  sanctions.  As  far  as  overfishing  by  Member 
States is concerned the only risk for them would be a reduction of their relevant quotas the 
following  year  as  infringement  procedures  before  the  Court  of  Justice  for  breach  of 
Community  law  remain  unlikely.  The  Commission  would  close  fisheries  against  the  will  of 
the relevant Member States only in exceptional circumstances.  

The  weakness  of  the  current  legal  framework  would  be  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  with 
diminishing fishing possibilities the economic pressure for fishermen to still fish enough by 
whatever means to achieve at least the break even point would increase. As the CFP is relying 
more and more on effort regimes as a supplementary management tool to address the problem 
of  overcapacity,  the  temptation  for  fishermen  to  manipulate  illegally  engine  power  with  a 
view  to  deploy  a  higher  effort  in  the  limited  time  available  will  grow.  This  will  risk  to 
undermine all effort regimes and therefore threatens the very basis on which the CFP is likely 
to be based to a substantial extent in the future. 

It has therefore to be concluded that under this option the control system would continue to 
suffer  from  the  shortcomings  identified  in  the  report  of  the  Court  of  Auditors.  The  control 
system would remain inefficient, expensive and complex. 

5.1.1.2  

Sub-option 2: Implementation and enforcement of existing framework through  

implementation regulations 

A  possible  improvement  of  the  current  situation  could  be  achieved  by  adopting  all 
implementation  regulations  that  were  originally  foreseen  in  the  Control  Regulation50  and  in 
the Basic Regulation51.  

A new, common approach to control and inspection 

5.1.1.2.1 
However, even the adoption of all implementation regulations would not allow to develop a 
new  approach  to  control  and  inspection.  Additional  provisions  would  rather  aggravate  the 
fragmentation  of  the  current  rules  even  further  and  lead  to  an  even  more  complex  legal 

50 Council Regulation (EEC) N° 2847/93 
51 Chapter V of Council Regulation (EC) N° 2371/2002 

29

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
framework.  Besides  that,  the  rules  would  not  be  up  to  date  as  they  would  concentrate  too 
much on activities at sea and would not comprise the whole chain from net to plate. Although 
the  Treaty  obliges  Member  States  to  cooperate  and  support  Commission  inspectors  in  their 
work,  it  could  happen  that  authorities  try  to  hide  some  evidence  or  mislead  Commission 
inspectors.  In  particular  the  often  unsatisfactory  follow-up  to  reports  of  Commission 
inspectors  in  which  shortcomings  have  been  illustrated  demonstrates  that  the  general 
obligation to cooperate is insufficient to ensure the full application of CFP rules.  

A culture of compliance  

5.1.1.2.2 
Furthermore  such  an  approach  would  not  allow  to  develop  a  culture  of  compliance  even 
though efficiency would be partly enhanced. For example article 19, paragraph 1 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) n° 2847/93 provides that Member States shall establish a validation system 
comprising in particular cross-checks and verification of data. Currently such cross-checks are 
not undertaken in some Member States while others undertake them but perceive them rather 
as  a  cumbersome  administrative  requirement.  Even  in  those  Member  States  where  this 
technology is already used more widely, in a considerable number of cases large irregularities 
have been detected in terms of the inconsistencies between sales notes, landing declarations 
and log sheets that were not identified in the cross-checking process. Notwithstanding this, it 
could  be  expected  that  some  improvements  are  achieved  when  more  pressure  is  put  on 
Member States to finally introduce what they signed up to many years ago. 

Effective application of CFP rules 

5.1.1.2.3 
The legal instruments at the disposal of the Commission to oblige Member States to actually 
implement  Community  rules  would  remain  weak  and  of  a  limited  scope  in  practice  as  a 
procedure  before  the  Court  of  Justice  is  lengthy  and  cumbersome  and  emergency  and 
preventive  measures  would  either  be  unsuitable  or  subject  to  political  considerations. 
Furthermore  in  the  field  of  the  control  of  engine  power  the  current  control  framework  does 
not  foresee  any  implementation  regulation  to  better  ensure  compliance  with  engine  power 
limitations. It would therefore be impossible to address the manipulation of engine power on 
the  basis  of  the  current  legal  framework  even  if  all  outstanding  implementation  regulations 
were to be adopted. 

This  sub-option  is  unlikely  to  improve  the  current  situation  substantially  as  compared  to  a 
situation where no action is undertaken at all.  

As sub-options 1 and 2 lead to similar failures with regards to the objectives to be attained, 
the  environmental  and  socio-economic  impacts  of  these  two  sub-options  will  be  considered 
together, as they would be more or less identical. 

5.1.2  Option 1: Link to the problem of overcapacity  

Option  1  would  not  systematically  address  the  problem  of  overcapacity.  The  logical 
consequence  will  be  that  more  and  more  fisheries  will  be  subject  to  fishing  effort  regimes 
with  a  view  to  keep  fishing  pressure  in  acceptable  limits.  As  the  overcapacity  in  the 
Community  fleet  will  persist  it  would  result  in  poor  economic  performance  for  some 
important fishing fleets. This situation has recently aggravated with the sharp increase of fuel 
prices. Recent economic projections show that such fuel prices and the low productivity levels 
will, with a few exceptions, render EU fleets unprofitable. With increasing demands of fuels 
this  trend  is  very  unlikely  to  be  reversed.  With  higher  operating  costs,  break  even  revenues 
become higher, hence incentives to fish over the top would rise.  

30

 
 
 
 
 
 
The changing framework conditions will affect some segments of the fleet more than others. 
The  sharp  increase  of  the  fuel  prices  is  already  causing  a  certain  restructuring  of  the 
beamtrawl  fleets  in  some  Member  States  as  part  of  these  fleets  have  became  economically 
unviable even under current conditions of high fuel prices. However, that restructuring will be 
unable to bring the capacity in line with available fishing opportunities. 

5.1.3   Option 1: Environmental impact 

As the current situation favours over-exploitation of the resources option 1 is likely to have 
negative  environmental  impacts.  Given  that  abundant  fish  stocks  basically  reflect  a  healthy 
environment, the continuation of the current situation would not allow the full replenishment 
of the stocks anytime soon. On the contrary, under current conditions fishing over the top of 
what  has  legally  been  decided  or  what  the  stocks  are  capable  to  bear  are  likely  to  remain  a 
common  feature  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy.  Such  increased  pressure  to  fish  outside 
legal limits would take a particular heavy toll on the ecosystem as TACs are calculated in a 
way to allow to only extract quantities that do not threaten the state of the stock in question. 
Extra  outtakes  by  illegal  catches  undermine  that  capacity  and  may  even  have  consequences 
for other species that interlink with the stock that is targeted in IUU activities and affect the 
ecosystem even more. 
Biological changes due to overfishing may be irreversible so that the fish stocks of the marine 
ecosystems  could  not  recover  and  regain  past  productivity  even  if  fishing  is  reduced  to 
sustainable levels. As fisheries are usually targeting the biggest specimens, the average size of 
individuals  would  also  decrease.  When  average  individual  size  and  stock  size  are  reduced 
beyond safe biological limits, the rate of reproduction would slow down thereby decreasing 
the capacity for replenishment and natural recovery. Below a certain level this capacity is lost 
and  the  stock  collapses  commercially.  There  are  even  cases  where  a  high  fishing  pressure 
induces more fundamental and long term changes such as genetic changes in fish populations 
or changes in marine food web.  

Another  effect  of  overfishing  would  be  the  loss  of  the  scientific  basis  for  management 
decisions. The quality of data, which is an important basis for scientific advice, tends to be 
poorest  when  quality  is  most  needed  –  when  stocks  are  overfished.  The  uncertainty  of 
scientific assessments would therefore be higher the lower a stock is. Increasing uncertainty in 
the scientific advice deteriorates the basis for development of management proposals and the 
monitoring of their success.  

The  continuation  of  the  current  situation,  even  with  all  implementation  regulations  adopted 
and  a  stronger  emphasis  on  their  implementation,  would  not  guarantee  that  situations  as 
described  in  the  preceding  paragraph  would  not  come  about.  The  fishing  sector  and  the 
political actors responsible for the CFP would thus be likely to continue to be blamed for its 
negative impact on the environment. This impact might even be exacerbated by the fact that 
due to the high fuel prices fishermen tend to fish closer to the coast thereby putting in some 
areas a high strain on the affected ecosystem. 

5.1.4   Option 1: Economic impact 

As fishing stocks are likely to be fished outside safe biological limits or more generally below 
their full biological potential they would only produce low profitability. Total catch volumes 
would  be  lower  and  the  smaller  individual  fish  would  be  less  valuable  than  when  a  stock 
would  be  fished  within  sustainable  limits.  In  addition  to  the  loss  of  potential  income,  costs 

31

 
 
 
would  increase  as  higher  fishing  effort  would  be  necessary  to  catch  volumes  big  enough  to 
create revenue.  

The lower capacity of the stock to compensate natural variations in recruitment would often 
increase the need for large annual variations in the TAC to keep the stock in stable conditions. 
This  would  reduce  the  economic  stability  of  the  sector  and  as  a  result  there  would  be  poor 
acceptance of the measures by the sector and Member States. 

Some vessels are able to respond to reduced fishing possibilities and to move to other areas 
provided  they  have  quotas  in  these  areas.  Other  cannot,  either  because  they  do  not  have 
fishing possibilities in other areas or are simple too small to move on. Other fisheries are less 
concerned  by  the  changing  framework  conditions,  especially  those  using  passive  gear  even 
though higher prices will be an issue for them as well. The situation may also vary subject to 
the species concerned as some species tend to recover faster than others.  

As a result of illegal landings there would be a continued loss of earnings (reduced catches, 
low  prices  as  the  size  of  the  fish  is  smaller,  continually  reducing  profits)  and  an  increased 
pressure  to  commit  fisheries  fraud.  This  increased  economic  pressure  which  can  be 
considered  a  vicious  circle  by  which  operators  are  forced,  in  view  of  ever  more  shrinking 
fishing possibilities, to exploit fish stock more than they can sustain and thereby reducing the 
basis  for  fishing  in  future  years,  would  force  more  people  out  of  business  at  a  high 
environmental  cost.  In  view  of  the  dwindled  stocks  even  the  remaining  job  opportunities 
would  not  be  certain.  This  would  not  only  affect  the  fishing  industry  but  also  people  in  the 
processing  industry  as  the  ever  increasing  pressure  on  the  stocks  will  lead  to  ever  more 
reduced  stocks  which  affects  the  raw  material  basis  for  the  processing  industry.  This  could 
only partly be compensated by imports.  

5.1.5  Option 1: Social impacts  

As a consequence of falling wages and low returns on capitals more fishermen would leave 
the  industry,  thereby  increasing  unemployment  in  coastal  areas  that  often  have  to  face  less 
working  opportunities  than  other  areas.  Lower  levels  of  fish  landed  would  result  in  lower 
throughputs  into  fish  factories  and  thereby  affecting  employment  in  some  processing 
industries even though some processing companies receive already their raw materials from 
outside the EU.  

As the profits of the fishing industry would shrink the ancillary support industries would be 
affected as well.  In  some  cases  this  could lead to the collapse of the local ancillary support 
industry  which  in  turn  could  force  the  fishermen  of  an  affected  place  to  move  to  another 
place. The collapse of part or the whole ancillary support industry could result in higher costs 
for obtaining business related services. There would be some knock-on-effects in the affected 
communities, too, in terms of falling tax revenues and increase of income support for laid-off 
people that do not find replacement work. 

The results might be more mitigated as far as fisheries under recovery plans are concerned if 
there  are  some  improvements  of  these  recovery  stocks  under  the  assumptions  of  the  case 
study  referred  to  above.  These  improvements  would  be,  however,  far  less  substantial  than 
under a new regime.  As  the economic parameters such as fuel prices, which are  difficult to 
predict and therefore are not included in the case study, are likely to add further strain to the 
industry, the economic performance of these fisheries under current conditions might not be 
as  good  as  projected  in  the  case  study.  It  is  therefore  to  be  expected  that  these  fisheries 
continue under the present regime to be tempted to improve their economic performance by 
unreported catches. 

32

 
 
With  the  applicable  rules  becoming  ever  more  complex,  national  fisheries  administrations 
would  have  to  face  steadily  increasing  administrative  costs  including  increased  costs  for 
understanding  and  interpreting  the  relevant  rules  as  well  as  the  necessary  training  to 
inspectors and managers. More complicated rules would increase the risk that prosecutions in 
Member  States  where  fisheries  sanctions  are  applied  on  the  basis  of  criminal  law  are  either 
not  mounted  at  all  or  that  they  will  be  thrown  out  by  the  courts.  The  continuation  of  the 
current situation would create an equivalent increased burden on the CFCA.  

Political confidence both of the fishing sector and of the public at  large in  the  management 
regime would continuously suffer and might lead to put into doubt the credibility of the CFP 
as such. The idea of a level playing field would remain an abstract concept due to divergent 
national  interpretation  of  national  rules.  Even  though  providing  for  clearer  rules  in  some 
areas,  they  would  not  fully  address  the  inadequate  regulatory  framework  criticized  by  the 
Court of Auditors in its report nor would they provide the Commission with the legal tools to 
see to their practical implementation. 

5.1.6   Option 1:Cost/benefit ratio 

Total  employment  in  2005  in  the  fisheries  sector  of  the  EU-27  amounted  to  about  407,000 
persons,  which  represents  0.2%  of  total  EU  employment.  The  catching  sector  offered 
employment  to  187,000  people  (46%  of  total  fisheries  sector  employment),  fish  processing 
138,000 (34%) and aquaculture 63,000 (16%). Employment in ancillary activities is estimated 
at 18,000 jobs (4%). 
There  are  no  resource  rents  estimates  for  the  EU  fisheries.  However,  it  is  a  fact  that  the 
industry  as  a  whole  does  not  today  generate  taxable  resource  rents.  The  resource  rent  is 
dispatched through a fishing fleet far too large to the current resource base. So from a social 
welfare perspective the CFP has failed in two ways: the public pays for resource management 
and does not get any quantifiable benefit from the private use of a public resource.  
The  EU  market  for  fishery  products,  i.e.  captures  plus  aquaculture  production,  shows  a 
structural imbalance between supply and demand. This feature has been widening in the last 
years  against  a  background  of  a  decline  in  catches  of  22%  between  1993  and  2005  and 
increase of world catches by 8%. At the same time the consumption rose by 9% reaching 24.6 
kg/person  in  2001.  In  2005  the  EU-27  production  of  fishery  products  (capture  fisheries  and 
aquaculture  production)  was  about  4%  of  the  world  total,  when  it  was  7%  in  1996.  Some 
fisheries have managed better than others, but the overall picture is falling revenues and net 
profit with excessive capital invested in many fleets. Margins remain low in many fisheries, 
partly because of continuing declining volumes and also due to the negative economic impact 
of increased fuel price. 

Trend in the EU-25 catches (1993-2006): 

33

 
 
 
 
e
m
u

l

o
V

)
s
e
n
n
o
t

f
o

s
d
n
a
s
u
o
h
t
(

9.000

8.000

7.000

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

1993

1994
Source: Eurostat 

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Trends can be evaluated only for EU-15 Member States, as historical data are not available 
for the newer MS. In the EU-15 the total employment decreased by 23% between 1997 and 
2005,  primarily  due  to  a  decrease  in  the  catching  sub-sector  (-31%).  Employment  in 
processing is more or less stable.52 

Trends in employment in the EU-15 (1000 persons) 

Fisheries sub-sector 

Fishing 

Processing 

aquaculture 

Total 

1996-8 

241.3 

101.8 

61.4 

404.5 

2005 

167.5 

100.7 

45.3 

313.5 

change 

-31% 

-1% 

-26% 

-22% 

Employment  in  the  total  fisheries  sector  of  the  EU-15  decreased  from  404,000  persons  in 
1997 to 313,000 persons in 2005, i.e. by 23%, in the catching sector from about 240,000 in 
1997 to 167,000 in 2005. 
With the current situation this downward trend is likely to continue with an average decline of 
catches of 2% per year. Even though the processing industry is generally not affected to the 
same extent, it is to be expected that imports will not be able to make up for the shortfalls of 
the EU catching sector forever.  
There would be no additional costs for the fishing sector. In particular fishermen who earn a 
substantial part of their income from illegal activities would not lose this source of income. 
However, the ineffective use of control means would continue. In particular the administrative 
burden for control authorities is likely to increase in the long run with ever new layer of rules 
being added. This situation would not allow to decrease significantly control costs while still 
maintaining  the  same  quality  of  control.  However,  the  MRAG  study,  under  the  assumption 
that  the  recovery  plans  to  which  most  of  the  seven  stocks  on  which  the  study  is  based  will 
have positive effects, calculated a possible reduction of land control costs in connection with 

52 Source Regional Dependency on Fisheries – European Parliament  Project n° IP/B/PECH/ST/IC/2006-198 

34

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
these seven stocks from 125 million € to 106.5 million € from the year 2010 to 2019 and an 
average reduction of marine inspection costs from 69.5 million € to 44.9 million € from 2008 
to  2017.  In  this  regard,  though,  there  is  a  likelihood  that  other  stocks  due  to  current  poor 
enforcement will need extra control efforts in the future and thwart any such cost savings. 

5.2 

OPTION  2:  RECAST  OF  THE  CONTROL  REGULATION,  COMBINED  WITH  A  CODE  OF 
CONDUCT 

5.2.1  Option 2: General impact 

The  development  of  an  approach  that  considers  the  implementation  of  the  reform  elements 
through a consolidated legal framework in combination with a steering instrument, such as a 
‘Code  of  Conduct’  or  ‘Best  Practice  Guidance’  could  contribute  to  a  certain  extent  to  the 
improvement  of  the  current  control  system.  As  this  approach  would  build  on  initiatives 
developed  by  Member  States  over  the  years,  coordination  of  inspection  and  surveillance 
activities  by  national  authorities  at  Community  level  would  be  improved,  based  on  the 
adoption  of  inspection  and  surveillance  strategies  by  the  Commission,  and  the  pooling  of 
national means of inspections for joint deployment. It would result in better value for money, 
as  national  means  of  inspection  would  be  used  as  rationally  and  as  effectively  as  possible. 
Some  fisheries  might  recover  as  a  result  of  unilateral  action  of  a  segment  of  the  fleet  or  of 
groups of fleet segments, but overall, this approach does not change the content of the current 
provisions  or  add  any  new  legal  instruments  and  relies  too  heavily  on  a  voluntary 
implementation  by  the  Member  States.  Even  in  the  context  of  a  recast  of  the  existing 
provisions,  Member  States  would  still  need  a  new  legal  framework  that  provides  for 
mandatory  and  new  tools  for  en  effective  application  of  the  CFP  rules.  In  that  respect,  a 
combination of consolidation and steering measures would be insufficient.  

5.2.1.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection 

In the absence of new requirements pertaining to harmonised inspection procedures, Member 
States  would  continue  to  apply  their  own  inspection  methodology.  Community  guidance  on 
the use of modern technologies, including recommendations to ensure the use of tamper proof 
satellite  tracking  devices  and  on  extending  the  coverage  of  regulation  pertaining  to  the 
provision  of  VMS  and  logbook  data  electronically  and  in  real  time  has  the  potential  to 
improve the control of activities. However, this potential is not likely to be used fully in all 
Member States. Regarding the voluntary implementation of cross-checking of data, the nature 
of the impact is likely to be varied across the community. 

5.2.1.2 A culture of compliance  

Simplification 
The recast of the control regulation would consolidate and rationalise the set of legal rules and 
therefore  would  resolve  the  problem  of  the  multiplicity  of  different  rules  or  the  situations 
where  there  are  apparent  overlaps  or  contradictions  and  provide  at  least  partial  solutions  to 
some of the current problems relating to the interpretation of the rules.  

Sanctions 
Since there would be no change of legal provisions in this respect, it is not clear whether the 
aspect  of  non-regulatory  steering  action  would  (a)  result  in  harmonisation  or  increased 
sanctions, (b) significantly accelerate or otherwise enhance the existing process of change in 
legal  procedures  that  is  already  underway  in  the  Member  States  or  (c)  produce  significant 

35

 
 
 
 
 
improvements  in  compliance,  particularly  without  parallel  increases  in  surveillance  and 
enforcement.  

5.2.1.3 Effective application of CFP rules 

In  the  absence  of  new  instruments,  the  existing  shortcomings  are  likely  to  continue,  as  the 
Commission  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  intervene  proportionately  to  the  level  of  non 
compliance by the Member States. Even in the context of a consolidation of the existing texts, 
the benefits that would result from the rationalisation exercise would not be enough to bring 
the expected results without adequate tools to enforce the CFP rules. 

5.2.2  Option 2: Link to the problem of overcapacity 

This option does not address the problem of overcapacity in a systematic way. Initiatives for 
adjustments  of  the  fleet  would  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  Member  States.  As  the  level  of 
control  is  likely  to  improve  in  those  Member  States  that  increase  voluntarily  their  control 
capacity the fleets of these Member States or fleets operating in their waters are more likely to 
fish  in  line  with  legal  fishing  opportunities.  There  is  a  certain  likelihood  that  the  economic 
pressure  thus  caused  will  lead  to  a  limited  restructuring  of  the  fleets  concerned.  However, 
such a restructuring would be insufficient to solve the problem of overcapacity as such. 

5.2.3  Option 2: Environmental impact 

As the full compliance benefit will not be realised, neither would the environmental benefits. 
Those  benefits  would  be  regionally  varied  and  unlikely  to  be  realised  in  a  short  term  time 
frame.  The  overall  environmental  impact  associated  with  pursuing  the  approach  of  a 
consolidated  legal  framework  in  combination  with  non-binding  steering  instruments  are 
therefore likely to tend towards the existing situation on the whole. 

5.2.4  Option 2: Economic impact 

As  a  result  of  partial  or  slow  uptake  adoption  of  compliance  measures,  all  fisheries  except 
mackerel  show  negative  net  benefits  in  the  early  years  of  the  projection,  and  in  some  cases 
these  negative  net  benefits  persist  throughout  the  10  year  period.  North  sea  cod,  Southern 
hake, mackerel and Mediterranean hake would still manage to produce positive net benefits, 
because  the  small  increase  in  compliance  would  be  enough  to  trigger  some  recovery. 
However, the costs would outweight the benefits for North Sea plaice and sole, Baltic cod and 
Northern hake.  

The  costs  of  deployment  would  fall  as  compliance  increases.  The  cost  of  accumulated 
enforcement expenditure is of €1,889 million in the 10 year period 53. Proportions at the start 
of the case studies represent an average 9% of gross fleet revenue, and 4% at the end of the 
programme. The current level of expenditure against sector revenue is 9%. Therefore, within 
a  ten  year  time  horizon,  the  model  would  project  net  benefits  in  terms  of  enforcement  cost 
savings,  i.e.  to  below  current  levels  of  expenditure.  Both  land  and  marine  inspection  costs 
would fall. In the case of land based inspection accounts, the implementation costs for the non 
regulatory  environment  would  fall  from  a  high  of  €  73  m,  to  €  40  m.  The  corresponding 

53 Idem 

36

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
changes in marine related costs would be € 58  m to € 45 m. Most specifically, more modest 
levels of enforcement expenditure could be afforded in the case of mackerel. 

5.2.5  Option 2: Social impact 

The  case  study  shows  that  some  2300  net  employment  gains  are  expected  from  relative 
improved  levels  of  compliance.  However,  less  efficient  fishers  would  be  removed  from  the 
sector, as they are unable to compete as a result of only partial compliance in some fisheries. 
Reduction  of  support  to  shore  side  businesses  may  take  place  with  fewer  boats  (due  to  the 
removal  of  less  efficient  fishers)  and  knock  on  effects  might  be  seen  in  the  community  if 
support  industries  do  not  find  replacement  for  fishing-related  work  (e.g.,  engineering  firms 
and ship builders). Some fishing communities, for example, are already at the lowest number 
of boats possible for keeping support businesses operating. The case study on the impacts of a 
reform of the CFP control regime projects for this option a crew gain between € -1,200 and € 
900 income per annum 10 year period54.  

Option 2 would provide for a simplified legal framework and allow for partial improvements 
of  the  control  system  in  some  Member  States.  However,  shortcomings  in  the  current  legal 
provisions could not be amended and the impact of measures would mainly rely on voluntary 
improvements by the Member States. 

5.2.6   Option 2: Cost/benefit ratio 

As  this  option  depends  largely  on  voluntary  actions  of  Member  States  the  cost/benefit  ratio 
will  be  different  for  the  Member  States  and  their  fishing  fleets  concerned  and  are  therefore 
difficult  to  quantify  for  the  EU  as  such.  However,  based  on  seven  stocks  the  MRAG  study 
arrives overall for this option at a reduction of enforcement costs at land from 146.1 million € 
to 63.7 million € from the year 2010 to 1019 and  marine enforcement costs from 88.2 million 
€  to  52  million  €  from  the  year  2008  to  2017.  Ho wever,  in  the  initial  years  there  would  be 
additional  costs  of  the  enforcement  depending  on  the  various  species.  For  instance  for  the 
North Sea cod, additional costs of 8 million could be expected. Though for the whole period 
2010-2019 a the net gain in enforcement costs of around 43 million € could  be achieved.  For 
the  fleets  of  the  Member  States  concerned,  in  most  investigated  fisheries  in  the  study  there 
would  be  loss  in  the  initial  year.  In  the  case  of  North  Sea  cod,  for  instance,  a  loss  of  97 
million € in the first year and 49 million € in th e second year is expected. However, according 
to  the  MRAG  study,  this  would  be  compensated  as  from  the  third  year  with  net  benefits  of 
174 million € over the whole period 2010 – 2019; 

5.3 

OPTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT BINDING AT EU LEVEL 

5.3.1  Option 3: General Impact 

This option would allow the Community to have the strong and efficient control regime based 
on a simplified legislative framework that is necessary.  

5.3.1.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection  

A  comprehensive  regulatory  instrument  that  is  binding  at  EU  level  would  create  a  new  and 
common  approach  to  control  and  inspection.  The  establishment  of  common  control  and 

54 MRAG p. 136 

37

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
inspection  standards  would  provide  for  a  common  basis  and  thereby  contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  a  level  playing  field.  This  would  be  enhanced  by  strengthening  the 
cooperation between Member States, the Commission and the CFCA as this would allow to 
better target specific fisheries on the basis of an overall appropriate risk analysis. By linking 
financial aid to making available control means for participating in specific control tasks of 
the  CFCA  the  readiness  of  Member  States  to  cooperate  with  the  CFCA  and  their  fellow 
Member States would be improved.  

The  quality  of  inspection  would  be  improved  by  targeting  control  resources  at  high  risk 
activities.  Risk  Analysis  would  increase  the  probability  of  detecting  regular  groups  of 
offenders and the cost effectiveness of control. A marginal increase of land based costs would 
result  in  a  greater  number  of  infringements  detected  (or  a  corresponding  increase  in 
compliance),  than  the  same  change  in  expenditure  in  marine  surveillance.  For  that  reason  a 
shift from sea based control to a more land based control is likely to lead to a higher number 
of  detections  and  hence  to  a  higher  level  of  compliance.  At  the  same  time  due  emphasis 
would be put on the fact that certain infringements as the use of certain devices during fishing 
operations  can  only  be  successfully  controlled  at  sea.  Marine  platforms  act  as  an  effective 
deterrent  for  some  illegal  fishing  practices.  Their  effectiveness  would  be  significantly 
improved through the support of a Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC), risk analyses, linking 
VMS to aerial surveillance, and intelligence received.  

The  forthcoming  introduction  of  electronic  logbooks  would  be  of  particular  importance  for 
cross-checks to be fully usable as they would allow the registration of logbook data in nearly 
real time and further contribute to the reduction of administrative costs. Electronic logbooks 
would  also  facilitate  the  management  of  fishing  effort,  a  management  tool  that  is  likely  to 
become ever more important in the future.  

5.3.1.2 A culture of compliance  

A  comprehensive  regulatory  instrument  would  set  a  framework  that  would  allow  the 
development of a culture of compliance. 

Legal  simplification  would  offer  the  opportunity  to  strengthen  the  current  set  of  rules.  The 
regulation  to  be  adopted  under  option  3  would  reduce  complexity,  inter  alia,  by  setting  up 
general, clear and simplified control rules. This would reduce the costs of implementation as 
the more complex a regulatory framework is the more costly it will be to implement. A simple 
set of rule would favour an equal interpretation and application of the rules in a multilingual 
setting  as  the  EU,  making  life  easier  both  for  the  industry  and  for  the  authorities.  It  would 
allow  a  better  transparency  and  improve  the  confidence  in  a  level  playing  field  among 
Community fishermen.  

The bulk of technical rules would be dealt with in Commission regulations allowing them to 
be  easily  amendable  to  respond  to  new  conditions.  It  has  been  calculated  that  the  vertical 
codification  of  the  amending  legislative  acts  alone  could  reduce  the  amount  of  legislative 
instruments  in  force  by  36  %55.  This  objective  would  be  particularly  important  as  the 
identified deficiencies in the current implementation and enforcement of the CFP are strongly 
related to the current complexities of the regulatory and administrative environment.  

A decrease in the number of failing national infringement procedures and prosecutions could 
be  expected  because  of  increased  clarity,  consistency  and  awareness  of  the  regulations  and 
rules.  The  substantial  changes  would  increase  the  possibilities  of  access  to  evidence  of 

55 MRAG p. 195 

38

 
 
                                                 
infringements.  In  turn  an  increased  deterrence  could  be  expected.  Such  deterrents  would  be 
created  by  increasing  the  risks  of  being  inspected  and  reducing  the  rewards  for  illegal 
activities (higher fines or loss of licence for repeated offences).  

Harmonised  sanctions  would  help  to  achieve  a  level  playing  field  in  fisheries  by  aiming  at 
establishing penalties that are proportionate to the gain from illegal activities and comparable 
in all Member States. As the public consultation has shown, harmonised sanctions do enjoy 
large support by the industry as a means of ensuring fair competition and equal treatment of 
fishermen  throughout  the  EU.  Improving  the  mechanism  for  imposing  penalties  by 
introducing  administrative  sanctions  would  enhance  the  feeling  of  equal  treatments  in  all 
Member States and enhance the deterring effect of the control regime. Possible reservations of 
the Member States in this point could be based on concerns in relation to national sovereignty. 
However, the outlined positive impacts together with the respective demand of stakeholders 
should help to overcome such reservations.      

5.3.1.3 Effective application of CFP rules 

A  mandatory  regulatory  framework  would  enable  the  Commission  to  ensure  the  effective 
application of CFP rules. First, the capacity of the Commission to intervene proportionately to 
the level of non compliance by the Member State would be amplified. A strengthening of the 
capacities of Commission inspectors would ensure that it would become more difficult to hide 
shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of  CFP  rules.  Second,  a  strengthened  capacity  of  the 
Commission would in particular allow to ensure a better management of fishing possibilities 
and  to  stop  fisheries  easier  in  real  time  on  the  Commission's  own  initiative  to  avoid 
overfishing. By ensuring respect of catch limits the reputation of the Commission as guardian 
of the treaty, and hence of the CFP, would benefit. However, since  it is likely that Member 
States would have strong reservations on such increased competences of the Commission, it 
would  have  to  ensure  that  such  measures  are  well  founded  and  applied  proportionately  and 
equally.  Otherwise  it  would  seriously  damage  its  authority  and  the  confidence  of  Member 
States  and  stakeholders,  what  would  be  contra-productive  and  would  put  the  new  control 
system into question resulting in an even lower level of compliance with the CFP rules.   

5.3.2  Option 3: Link to the problem of overcapacity 

A  comprehensive  reform  is  also  likely  to  entail  a  substantial  restructuring  of  the  current 
Community fleet and thereby to contribute to reduce the current overcapacity. As the future 
control system will ensure that only legal fish will be caught, the lack of quotas will entail a 
concentration  of  the  fleet  by  market  forces  until  it  reaches  a  level  that  allows  all  remaining 
vessels to make a living on the bases of legal quotas. Even though some fleets will be more 
affected  than  others,  this  holds  true  for  all  parts  of  the  Community  fleet  where  the 
restructuring  will  result  in  a  fleet  that  reflects  available  fishing  possibilities  and  therefore 
allow Community fishermen to make a living on the basis of legal catches. This restructuring 
would reduce some job opportunities in the catching industry, though. However, by this the 
vicious  circle  of  fishing  vessels  having  to  fish  over  the  top  for  their  economic  survival  by 
fishing above  what the stocks can sustain with an increased economic pressure to fish even 
more  over  the  top  the  following  years  to  make  ends  meet  as  the  legal  fishing  possibilities 
shrink,  would  be  broken.  By  maintaining  such  a  vicious  circle,  once  the  fish  stocks  having 
been  substantially  depleted,  job  opportunities  in  the  catching  industry  would  have  been 
seriously affected as well but with devastating ecological consequences for the environment. 
After restructuring of the fishing fleet the sufficient availability of legal quotas will allow to 

39

 
 
 
 
 
reduce control and  surveillance  costs as the likelihood  of  infringements will be  lower when 
sufficient economic income can be generated on the basis of legal catches. 

5.3.3  Option 3: Environmental impact 

The environmental benefits of having fully recovered stocks are clear. Fishing at a lower rate 
within  the  limits  of  established  TACs  would  deliver  significant  environmental  benefits  in 
terms of stress on fish stocks. According to the case study the regulatory scenario will allow 
an increase in the biomass of the nine modelled stocks of up to 51 %56. If these results were to 
be extended to all stocks in the EU, the effect of  this regulation would be to restore all EU 
stocks  to  Bpa  level  and  above  within  15  years.  Such  an  extrapolation  might  be  optimistic, 
though, as it does not take into account natural influences and predator/prey relationships. The 
growth in size of fish populations as they recover would be accompanied by increases in the 
age distribution of fish both in the population and in the catch, associated with lower fishing 
pressure. Such benefits will not be limited to the target species but would have consequences 
for the ecosystem as a whole. As the fishing effort to fish the same amount of fish would be 
reduced,  by-catches,  both  of  non-target  species  and  of  juveniles  of  target  species,  would  be 
much less. By this the impact of fisheries on the ecosystem would be reduced. 

As  the  Commission  would  have  the  ability  to  react  faster  and  better  to  shortcomings,  in 
particular  with  respect  to  over-utilisation  of  fishing  quotas,  the  environment  would  be  less 
likely to be affected by irresponsible fishing behaviour. As this ability of reaction would be 
supplemented by more severe quota deductions in case of overfishing, it could be anticipated 
that  over-exploitation  of  available  fishing  possibilities  would  become  an  exception  as 
Member States and the sector will have a keener interest in respecting quota limits. 

5.3.4  Option 3: Economic impact 

The case study referred above calculated a sum of total net profits in the regulatory option of 
€ 8.9 billion across all the stocks for the time span 2010 - 2019 57. The case study projects for 
North Sea cod a net benefit of a comprehensive new control regime for the period from 2010 
–  2019  of  more  than  €  2,8bn.  These  include  net  benefits  well  above  €  400  million  as  from 
2013 after initial losses in the magnitude of € 257 million in 2010 and € 104,000 in 2011 58. 
For Baltic cod this would amount to a total benefit of € 2,8bn with st eadily increasing gains 
ranging  from  €  125  million  in  2011  to  €  417  m illion  in  2019  with  an  initial  loss  of  €  30 
million in 201059. The initial loss is most likely to be suffered by fishermen who have gained 
additional income from the catch of illegal fish. By definition, such activities are not worthy 
of protection. 

The overall benefits would be likely to have a strong carry through to increased employment, 
particularly  in  the  processing  and  ancillary  sub-sectors.  The  case  study  calculated  that  the 
economic  benefits  would  be  50%  to  the  catching  sector,  33%  to  the  proceeding  sector  and 
16% to the ancillary support sectors60. 
Generally the case study comes to the conclusion that the net economic benefits are highest if 
the current situation is addressed under option 3 provided that it will be properly implemented 

56 MRAG p. 133 
57 MRAG p. 163 
58 MRAG p. 165 
59 MRAG p. 167 
60 MRAG p. 163 

40

 
 
 
                                                 
both at the Community level as well as on a national level. The costs of deployment would 
fall as compliance increases. For that reason it would be essential that the Commission's role 
as a guardian of Community law is  enhanced and the necessary authority bestowed on it to 
effectively ensure that Member States respect their obligations under Community law. Even 
though this is only a case study that had to work on the basis of certain assumptions which 
cannot take into account all possible natural influences, its results are clearly indicative of the 
potential that could be gained from a comprehensive reform.  

This cost effectiveness would be further enhanced by using modern technologies to the extent 
possible. In particular systematic cross-checks of all electronically registered data which are 
technically easy to set up, would be an extremely useful tool for the identification of control 
needs. They would i.a. allow to summarise the number of vessels licensed to fish for a given 
fishery,  link  fishing  areas  declared  in  the  logbook  to  fishing  activities  identified  with  VMS 
data  or  compare  logbook  data  with  landing  data.  They  also  would  ensure  that  data  would 
become more reliable and more rapidly available. More reliable data in turn would allow to 
break the vicious circle of poor data not allowing reliable scientific advice which then leads to 
unsustainable management decisions resulting in an over-exploitation of the stocks.  

In the introductory phase of a new control regime both the industry and the control authorities 
would  have  to  adapt  to  the  new  situation.  This  holds  in  particular  true  if  new  technologies 
were  to  be  extended  to  fishing  vessels  currently  not  covered  by  their  application.  In  this 
context it should be recalled that the introduction of electronic logbooks is already foreseen 
for all fishing vessels above 24 m on 1 January 2010 and for all vessels above 15 m on 1 July 
2011. However, the utilisation of new technologies will substantially reduce running costs of 
control  authorities  by  allowing  them  to  concentrate  scarce  control  resources  on  fishing 
activities that have been identified by way of risk analysis based on comprehensive automated 
cross-checks  as  being  particularly  prone  to  illegal  activities.  Some  of  the  new  technologies 
will also be useful to the industry, for instance the electronic logbook as it has the potential to 
be used in contacts with buyers of the catches.  

Concerning  the  EU  budget,  the  reform  will  have  no  additional  impact,  since  there  is  no 
financial incidence on the Financial Perspectives. Indeed, any expenditure which could result 
from the reform is already covered by Article 8 of the Council Regulation n° 861/2006 of 22 
May 2006, which establishes a financial framework for the period 2007 to 2013. In the area of 
control  and  enforcement  of  CFP  rules,  the  following  expenditure  shall  be  eligible  for 
Community financial measures: 

- new technologies and IT networks (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- automatic localisation devices (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- electronic recording and reporting systems (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- electronic recording and recording devices (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- patrol vessels and aircraft (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- training (Art 8 a ii. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- pilot projects (Art 8 a iii. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- assessment of expenditure (Art 8 a iv. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- seminars and media tools (Art 8 a v. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006) 
(all those actions are presently covered under Budget line 11.0801); 

-  all  operational  expenditure  related  to  inspection  by  Commission  inspection  (Art.  8c  of 
Council  Regulation  n°  861/2006)  -  these  expenditures  are  currently  financed  under  Budget 
line 11.0802, 

41

 
 
 
 
 -  contribution  to  the  budget  of  the  CFCA  (Art.  d  of  Council  Regulation  n°  861/2006)  and 
Council  Regulation  n°  768/2005  dated  26  April  2005:  the  CFCA  expenditure  are  financed 
under  Budget  lines  11.080501  (administrative  expenditure  of  the  CFCA)  and  11.080502 
(operational expenditure of the CFCA). 

In  addition  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  improvement  of  the  capacities  of  the 
Commission will not lead to an increased need of human resources but will rather be realised 
by the reallocation of tasks, the focus on macro management decisions and the change in the 
profile of Commission inspectors. 

As  the  experience  has  shown,  a  better  control  that  leads  to  the  eradication  or  at  least 
substantial reduction of illegal catches entails an increase of the price for legal fish. This has 
been  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  blue  fin  tuna  campaign  where  an  increased  control  and 
monitoring  based  on  a  risk  assessment  entailed  a  remarkable  increase  of  the  price  for  tuna. 
This contributes positively to the income of legal fishermen. Even though such higher income 
on less catches means at the time higher prices for consumers, the interests of consumers are 
protected by the fact that they can be assured of a sustainable supply of fisheries products. 

5.3.5  Option 3: Social impact 

As  the  stock  situation  improves  the  confidence  of  the  industry  and  the  public  in  the  CFP 
would  increase.  The  CFP  would  add  to  the  more  general  political  endeavours  to  achieve  a 
better  protection  of  the  environment  by  favouring  an  economy  that  is  more  respectful  of  
nature. A better confidence of the public in the CFP would in turn affect consumer behaviour 
and confidence as he would be convinced of buying a sustainable product, and possibly allow 
to  yield  a  higher  price  for  the  product.  Apart  from  greater  quantities  to  be  fished,  the 
individual fish would be bigger and yield a better price for the same quantities. There would 
be higher returns to fishing effort and a greater cost efficiency for the fishing sector.  

A stricter definition of a designated ports scheme would entail that some fishing vessels have 
to  travel  larger  distances  to  land  their  catch  at  authorized  locations.  However,  the  negative 
effect of this might be limited by setting a threshold either of length of vessels or of transport 
capacity below which vessels would be exempted.  

The risk of losing financial aid from the Community would be likely to encourage both the 
private sector and national authorities to abide strictly by the rules.  

5.3.6   Option 3: Cost/benefit ratio 

As a new control regulation would make widespread use of modern technologies allowing the 
identification  of  risky  activities  and  the  concentration  of  control  means  on  such  risky 
activities,  substantial  benefits  in  cost  efficiency  can  be  expected.  Overall  the  MRAG  study 
concluded that for the seven stocks investigated there would be a total gain in control costs for 
the period 2010 to 2019 in the magnitude of 389 million € compared to option 1. In the case 
of North Sea cod for instance this study expects substantial savings in later years coming to a 
net saving until 2019 of up to 42.9 million € for this fishery alone. 
As  to  the  fishing  sector,  some  part  of  the  fleets  that  have  not  already  done  so  will  have  to 
install new monitoring devices and be submitted to correspondent transmission costs. For the 

42

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monitoring  devices  there  will  be  Community  funds  available  as  this  has  been  in  the  past. 
There will also be a sharp decrease in illegal catches which in some fisheries are, according to 
estimations be ICES, of substantial dimensions. However, being illegal, the magnitude of lost 
income as a consequence of eradicating IUU catches is by definition difficult to estimate. In 
any event the loss of illegal profits is not worthy of protection. 
The  management  measures  the  implementation  of  which  the  control  system  is  supposed  to 
ensure, will take some time to bear their fruits. In a situation of a widespread stock depletion 
as a consequence of the current control system this will naturally take a couple of years. For 
the seven stocks investigated the MRAG study calculated a combined net additional benefit of 
6.4 billion € over the period 2010 to 2019. For North Sea cod the MRAG study arrives at a 
net additional benefit of 807 million € for the  whole period 2010 – 2019. Not included in this 
calculation are the benefits for other stocks or for the environment as such which are currently 
not quantifiable.  

5.3.7   Option 3: Administrative costs  

This section examines the changes that could result from the implementation of option 3, in 
terms  of  reduction  of  administrative  burdens.  The  reduction  of  unnecessary  administrative 
burdens and the high number of reporting obligations will be addressed in the context of the 
reform  and  the  simplification  exercise  it  intends  to  achieve.  The  proposals  for  reduction  of 
administrative burden were already discussed on the occasion of a meeting of the High Level 
Group (HLG) on Administrative Burdens, on 18 September. The HLG gave full support to the 
proposals of DG MARE.  

5.3.7.1 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of operators 

Reduction of the costs related to the Information Obligations 
The  proposed  reform  will  concur  to  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  Information  Obligations 
(IOs) in place under the current control framework, through the impact of the intensive use of 
modern technologies. According to the study commissioned by DG ENTR61 on the costs of 
the current control regime the final figures which are not yet approved by the Commission, 
though, concerning 6 measurement countries, and on the basis of the extrapolation carried out 
by DG MARE, the total administrative cost for the fishermen is 78 million EUR for the 22 
EU Member States (except landlocked countries). As a result of the reform, the extrapolated 
total administrative costs for the fishermen would fall to 38 million EUR (see annex III). 

The reasons for the reduction of these administrative burdens are: 
-Extension of the use of the Electronic Reporting System (ERS) to vessels above 10 metres 
As  the  obligation  to  register  the  catch  of  a  vessel  regularly  in  the  logbook  and  to  submit  a 
landing declaration was identified to be the most onerous IO, the introduction of an electronic 
logbook  (ERS)  would  be  likely  to  lead  to  a  reduction  of  administration  burdens  in  the 
magnitude  of  70%  as  many  of  the  requested  data  would  be  already  available  on  the  screen 
(identification data, position data) or could be clicked on a screen. Transmission costs in this 
regard would be neglectable. Transmission of an ERS message (~2KB size) would cost 0.20 

61 DRAFT FINAL REPORT, Measurement data and analysis, as specified in the specific contract on Modules 
3&4  for  the  Priority  Area  Fisheries,of  the  Framework  contract  n°  ENTR/06/061,EU  PROJECT  ON 
BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 

43

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
€.  For  a  vessel  having  200  fishing  days  annua lly  and  involved  in  different  fishing  types 
(gears, areas) annual costs would amount to around 100 EUR.  These transmissions costs are 
calculated for satellite data transmitted at sea. Messages on land/in port (landing declarations, 
sales notes, take-over declarations) and logbook messages (before entering port) could be sent 
from  simple  laptop/pocket  PC  free  of  charge  if  wireless  internet  connection  is  available  in 
port or via mobile phone. As technologies are developing fast those costs would very likely to 
fall in the future.   
-The  impact  of  the  intensive  use  of  modern  technologies  on  the  costs  of  sales  notes  as  a 
consequence of the reform can not be evaluated at this time as in the future their submission 
would be an obligation of the registered buyer. Even though, the fact that these notes would 
be submitted electronically means a substantial simplification in terms of time that would be 
needed  to  fill  them  in  as  these  notes  are  part  of  the  normal  business  of  registered  buyers. 
Comparable simplifications would to be expected from other IOs that are currently based on a 
paper format, like for instance transport documents. 

Overall,  the  reform  of  the  CFP  control  policy,  through  the  modernisation  of  the  control 
techniques,  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  and  the  more  extensive  use  of  modern 
technologies that are already applied, would allow for the reduction of paper work.  

The assessment of administrative costs also needs to refer to current initiatives taken in DG 
MARE, which intend to reduce the number of the existing information obligations (IOs) by 
the  Member  States.  The  project  OBONT  will  be  instrumental  in  the  achievement  of  the 
Action  Plan  for  simplifying  and  improving  the  regulatory  environment  of  the  CFP 
(COM(2005)647), as it will allow to reduce the number of the existing IOs that have become  
obsolete or redundant. Since IOs generally imply a cost for the economic operator who has to 
provide  the  information  to  his  authority,  as  a  result  DG  MARE  will  concur  to  the 
Commission's initiative aimed at cutting administrative burdens imposed on operators.  

5.3.7.2 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of the Member States 
Option  3  develops  tools  and  approaches  which  will  entail  an  overall  reduction  of  the 
administrative burden and reporting obligations: 

-Simplification  of  the  legislative  framework  will  be  an  inherent  part  of  the  CFP  control 
reform. As a result of the new legislative framework, the development of control policies that 
would continue to rely on proper enforcement of Community rules by Member States would 
lead to a less expensive, but more organised and effective inspection framework. Both at the 
level  of  Member  State  administrations  and  assimilated  EU  bodies,  the  reform  of  the 
regulatory  framework  would  increase  the  cost  effectiveness  as  the  means  and  resources 
allocated to control purposes would be partly pooled.  

-The national administrations would also have to spend less time and means on gathering data 
as they would be transmitted and fed into the system electronically. This would allow national 
administrations  to  substantially  economize  on  staff  that  is  currently  needed  to  enter  paper 
based  information  into  the  system.  In  one  Member  State  79  people  are  currently  used 
exclusively to enter such data into the system. These could be put to more effective use in the 
future.  

-At the same time the new approach would allow comprehensive and systematic cross-checks 
of  all  sorts  of  data  and  to  concentrate  on  the  areas  where  there  is  the  greatest  likelihood  of 
irregularities.  As  all  data  would  be  automated  it  would  also  become  easier  for  national 
administrations to provide the Commission with data. This effect would still be reinforced by 

44

 
 
 
the  fact  that  the  reform  would  focus  on  those  control  policies  which  are  truly  effective  and 
absolutely necessary (and avoid redundant reporting obligations.  

5.3.7.3 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of the Commission  
It is one of the objectives of the reform to promote a cost effective system, which focuses on 
the respective obligations of the Commission and the Member States. By developing a macro 
management approach, the Commission will re-orientate its tasks towards the control of the 
control systems established by the Member States, based on risk analysis and a more rational 
use of resources. The extension of the power of Commission’s inspectors requires that audits 
of parties having received delegation of power for managing fisheries are carried out. Overall, 
the use of modern technologies and electronic database means that the Commission will not 
spend its resources focusing on the report obligations by the Member States.  

5.3.7.4 Possible initial investment costs  

For the operators 

Initial investments relate to certain adaptions that operators of fishing vessels would have to 
undertake like installation of VMS and ERS devices for which financial assistance from the 
EU of up to 50% would be available. The technological development allows to combine these 
two applications in one device. The installation of a new VMS/ERS device is likely to cost 
2500 € per unit including the softwa re (around 1300 € if the availa ble financial assistance is 
taken  into  account)  with  approximate  running  costs  of  700  €  a  year.  However,  as  vessels 
above 15 metres are already equipped with VMS, the installation costs of the supplementary 
ERS function are likely to be substantially less. At the same time fishermen using ERS would 
not need to fill in paper logbooks anymore with the related savings in terms time needed for 
providing the same information in an electronic format (as identified in part 5.3.7.1). 

The establishment of a traceability system will also benefit from the progressive move from 
paper  based  tools  to  electronic  tools  (logbook,  landing  declaration,  sales  note),  and  the 
requirement for operators and auction centers to submit their data electronically. The cost per 
bar code is estimated at 0.005 EUR.  Overall those costs would in the long run be offset by 
the  benefits  of  having  an  integrated  control  approach,  where  most  of  the  IOs  are  dealt  with 
electronically, and where the system provides for the automated validation and collection of 
data. 

For the Member States 

Member States would need to ensure that they have enough control resources to meet the 
requirements of the new control regime to reflect increases in inspections and the number of 
qualified inspectors supported by adding control activities as cross-checking, transparency 
checks and risk analysis, in particular if specific control benchmarks are to be met in the 
framework of recovery plans and if these benchmarks were to be increased to address specific 
situations.  

At the end of the value chain, it is unlikely to have a measurable effect on consumers through 
change in the cost of seafood products as a result of the implementation of an automated data 
checking procedure. No additional administrative costs are expected as current procedures for 
furnishing  data  hold,  so  no  additional  costs  in  this  respect  will  be  passed  to  the  consumer.  
Changes in supply will have an effect on the price of seafood, but it is noted in this regard that 

45

 
 
 
 
a considerable range of other factors will also determine the price a consumer pays for their 
seafood.  

In  conclusion,  there  are  substantial  benefits  to  be  gained  for  all  stakeholders  at  all  levels  if 
there is a comprehensive system of control and inspection that makes sure that the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy are adhered to in their entirety. 

SECTION 6: HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

The first table below presents the efficiency of the various options with respect to their impact 
on  the  improvement  of  the  fisheries  control  system.  Their  relevance  is  assessed  against  the 
three specific objectives of the reform as identified in section 3. The second table compares 
the advantages and drawbacks of each option, taking into account the performance of each of 
them compared to the overall objective of the fisheries control reform.  

It can be concluded that option 1 would not answer the concerns of the Court of Auditors. All 
shortcomings  in  the  current  system  would  remain  and  harmonised  and  global  approaches 
would not be developed. None of the objectives of the reform would be met. 

Option 2 would provide for a simplified legal framework and allow for partial improvements 
of  the  control  system  in  some  Member  States.  However,  since  shortcomings  in  the  current 
legal provisions could not be amended and since the impact of measures would mainly rely on 
voluntary  improvements  by  the  Member  States,  this  option  would  not  lead  to  a  global 
approach  on  control,  and  it  would  not  create  a  level  playing  field  for  all  stakeholders.  The 
concerns  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  would  not  be  addressed  in  the  absence  of  any  new 
requirement. 

Option 3 would establish a global and integrated control system and a common level playing 
field, as it would effectively tackle the issues at stake, and in doing so, provide an answer to 
the Court of Auditors questions. Even though this option in the beginning might require some 
structural  adjustments,  these  would  later  lead  to  more  efficient  and  effective  structures  and 
increase the level of compliance of stakeholders. 

The comparison between the options demonstrates that option 3 supports in the most efficient 
way  the  overall  objective  of  an improvement  of  the  fisheries control  system.  The  other  two 
options  would  not  be  appropriate  to  meet  the  scale  of  the  problem  and  the  demand  for  an 
integrated and far-reaching reform. For all the above mentioned reasons, the Commission has 
decided to propose option 3 

46

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of 

the 
Relevance 
policy  options  against 
the  objectives  of  the 
reform 

Objective 1  

new, 

A 
common 
approach  to  control  and 
inspection  

Objective 2  

A culture of compliance  

Objective 3  

Effective  application  of 
CFP rules   

Overall  impact  on  the 
CFP control policy 

Option  1  Continue  current  policy  and 
focus 
and 
enforcement of existing framework 

implementation 

on 

Option 2 Recast of the legal control framework in 
combination  with  a  steering  instrument,  in  the 
form of a Code of conduct 

Option 3  Regulatory  instrument,  in  the form  of  a 
new binding regulation  

Negative,  as  control  standards  are  not 
applied  equally  across  all  Member 
States.  The  complexities  of 
the 
administrative 
and 
regulatory 
environment  of  the  control  regime  in 
place would continue 
Negative,  the  current  culture  of  non-
the  wide 
persists, 
compliance 
variations  in  the  level  and  types  of 
sanctions  applicable  by  the  Member 
States in respect of infringements tend 
to undermine particularly the notion of 
a level playing field  
Low  compliance  reflected  in  the  fact 
the ICES bases its assessments often to 
an 
important  extent  not  only  on 
reported catches but also on unreported 
catches 

Negative  impact,  incapacity  of  the 
Commission  would  continue  to  be 
matched  by  a  continuous  lack  of 
severity of national legal systems 

the  option 

Negative,  as 
to 
fails 
the  main 
address 
adequately 
challenges, continuation of the current 
situation,  threat  for  the  future  of  the 
resource 

Overall negative, as only a few Member States are 
likely  to  be  responsive  to  voluntary  measures, 
improvements will be fragmented thus reinforcing 
the  situation  that  there  are  different  levels  of 
enforcement;  this  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
objective of a level playing field 
A  consolidated  and  simplified  legal  framework 
would  allow  for  partial  improvements  of  the 
control  system  in  some  Member  States  only 
Confidence of fishermen that their peers will abide 
by the rules is undermined as only unilateral/group 
action would be taken 
legal  requirements, 
In 
impossibility  to  develop  a  level  playing  field  as 
regards  sanctions,  nor  to  provide  for  positive 
incentives 

the  absence  of  new 

Consolidation  with  code  of  conduct  do  not 
introduce the necessary legal requirements that are 
needed  for  an  effective  control  policy.  No  new 
tools  for  the  Commission  to  ensure  effective 
application of the rules. 
Limited,  as  this  approach  would  not  address  the 
current  legal  shortcomings  and  relies  too  heavily 
on  a  voluntary  implementation  by  the  Member 
States, no EU level playing field 
Consolidation 
new 
continuation of the existing failures 

instruments: 

without 

Positive impact as common inspection and control 
rules  and  modern  technologies  will  be  applied  in 
the  same  manner  throughout  the  EU  ensuring  the 
same high standards in all Member States 

of 

the 

levels  of 

legitimacy 

sanctions  across 

Positive impact with a combination of a simplified 
and  transparent  framework,  a  new  regime  on 
harmonized 
the 
Community which would address one of the most 
tangible shortcomings of the current situation, and 
greater interaction with the sector which reinforces 
(including 
the 
harmonisation of the conversion factors) 
Fishermen and other economic players realise that 
rules are applied everywhere 
New  legal  framework  for  increased  cooperation 
between  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  and 
the CFCA 
Positive,  as  the  Commission  is  equipped  with 
adequate  tools,  which  as a  result  allow  for proper 
enforcement of CFP control policy 

rules 

as 

this 

option 

establishes 

Positive, 
a 
comprehensive  approach  to  control  (from  the  net 
to  the  plate)  addressing  all  the  aspects  of  the 
current  problems,  and  leading  to  a  more  cost 
efficiency 
of 
compliance  as  a  result  of  an  effective  application 
of the CFP rules.  

approach. 

Increased 

culture 

47 

 
 
Advantages  and  drawbacks 
of each policy option 

Advantages 

Drawbacks 

Option 1 Continue current policy 
and  focus  on  implementation  and 
enforcement 
existing 
framework 

of 

the  EU 

-Demonstrate  commitment  of 
the 
shortcomings  of  the  control  policy  under  the  current 
framework 
-Does  not  require  the  adoption  of  additional  regulatory 
measures  which  would  come  in  addition  to  the  current 
framework 

tackle 

to 

Option  2  Recast  of  the  legal 
control framework in combination 
with  a  steering  instrument,  in  the 
form of a Code of conduct 

- Consolidated and simplified legal framework 
-Certain improvements of compliance, as a result of clearer 
legal  provisions  and  voluntary  approach  taken  by  some 
Member States 
-No effort needed to adjust to a new legal framework since  
no new requirements would be introduced 

Option  3  Regulatory  instrument, 
in  the  form  of  a  new  binding 
regulation  

-Most  efficient  solution,  as  control  policy  becomes  truly 
global and integrated, to ensure compliance with CFP rules, 
and the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources 
-Culture  of  compliance,  and  new  governance  will  prevail; 
trust in the CFP as a policy will be restored; level playing 
field  for  all  fishermen  in  all  EC  waters;  intensive  use  of 
modern technologies will render control more cost efficient 
-New  and  simplified  legal  framework,  with  new  tools  for 
the effective control of CFP rules 
-Price 
result  of 
the  medium 
in 
legitimacy/consumer confidence and an increase in the age 
structure;  higher  returns  to  fishing  effort  and  greater  cost 
efficiency and business confidence restored 

term  as  a 

rise 

-The  economic  viability  of  the  fishing  industry  is  jeopardized  in  the 
medium  and  long  run  as  a  result  of  ever  more  depleted  fish  stocks; 
fishermen leave the industry as a result of falling wages and low return on 
capital;  lower  levels  of  fish  landed  result  in  lower  throughputs  into  fish 
factories and increased unemployment 
-Due to the depletion of most stocks in the absence of an effective control 
system, transfer of effort to other fisheries with resulting pressure on these 
and  other  biodiversity  issues;  knock-on  effects  in  ancillary  support 
industries  
-Current  culture  on  non-compliance  persists;  credibility  of  CFP  will  be 
questioned; fragmentation of the legal framework continues  
-Structurally  the  same  economic  disadvantages  as  in  Option  1  but  effects 
will show later or in a mitigated way 
-There would still be no culture of compliance throughout the EU  
-Current shortcomings in the legal provisions could not be addressed since 
no  amendments  or  changes  would  be  made;  voluntary  changes  by  some 
Member States lead to different control standards which results in distrust 
among Member States; no level playing field  
-Consolidation  with  code  of  conduct  do  not  introduce  the  necessary  legal 
requirements that are needed for an effective control policy 
-Some  Member  States'  authorities  have  to  undertake  some  structural 
adjustments to incorporate changes 
- Authorities and sector have to adapt to the new legal framework  
-Resistance  expected  from  Member  States  to  engage  in  the  harmonisation 
of sanctions 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of 

Relevance 
the 
policy  options  against 
the three pillars 

Option  1  Continue  current  policy  and  focus  on 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing 
framework 

Environmental Pillar  

-Absence  of  stocks  replenishment.  Irreversible 
biological  changes  due  to  overfishing    and 
continued overcapaity 
-Heavy  toll  on  the  ecosystem  as  TACs  are 
calculated  in  a  way  to  allow  to  only  extract 
quantities  that  do  not  threaten  the  state  of  the 
stock in question 
-Loss  of  the  scientific  basis  for  management 
decisions 

Economic Pillar  

Social Pillar   

-Low  profitability.  Total  catch  volumes  would 
be  lower  and  the  smaller  individual  fish  would 
be  less  valuable  than  when  a  stock  would  be 
fished within sustainable limits 
-Increased  economic  pressure  :  operators  are 
forced,  in  view  of  ever  more  shrinking  fishing 
possibilities, to exploit fish stock more than they 
can  sustain  and  thereby  reducing  the  basis  for 
fishing in future years, would force more people 
out of business at a high environmental cost 
including 
administrative 
-Increasing 
increased 
and 
interpreting  the  relevant  rules  as  well  as  the 
necessary training to inspectors and managers 
-More  fishermen  would  leave  the  industry, 
thereby  increasing  unemployment  in  coastal 
areas  that  often  have  to  face  less  working 
opportunities than other areas 
-Collapse of the local ancillary support industry 
which  in  turn  could  force  the  fishermen  of  an 
affected place to move to another place 
-Fisheries  continue  under  the  present  regime  to 
be 
their  economic 
improve 
to 
performance by unreported catches 

costs 
understanding 

tempted 

costs 

for 

increase  of  22%  of 

Option  2  Recast  of  the  legal  control 
framework in combination with a steering 
instrument,  in  the  form  of  a  Code  of 
conduct 
-Overall 
the 
biomass.As  the  full  compliance  benefit 
will  not  be  realised,  neither  would  the 
environmental benefits 
-Benefits  would  be  regionally  varied  and 
unlikely  to  be  realised  in  a  short  term 
time  frame.  The  overall  environmental 
the 
impact  associated  with  pursuing 
approach  of 
legal 
a 
framework  in  combination  with  non-
binding steering instruments are therefore 
likely 
the  existing 
situation on the whole 
-All fisheries except mackerel (according 
to  the  model)  show  negative  net  benefits 
in the early years of the projection, and in 
some  cases  these  negative  net  benefits 
persist throughout the 10 year period 
-Within  a  ten  year  time  horizon,  the 
model would project net benefits in terms 
of enforcement cost savings, i.e. to below 
current levels of expenditure. 

consolidated 

towards 

tend 

to 

Option 3 Regulatory instrument, in the form of a new binding 
regulation  

-Overall  increase  of 51% of  the biomass.The  growth  in  size  of 
fish  populations  as  they  recover  would  be  accompanied  by 
increases  in  the  age  distribution  of  fish  both  in  the  population 
and  in  the  catch,  associated  with  lower  fishing  pressure.  -Such 
benefits would have consequences for the ecosystem as a whole. 
-As  the  Commission  would  have  the  ability  to  react  faster  and 
better  to  shortcomings,  in  particular  with  respect  to  over-
utilisation  of  fishing  quotas,  the  environment  would  be  less 
likely to be affected by irresponsible fishing behaviour. 

-Sum of total net profits in the regulatory option of € 8.9 billion 
across all the stocks for the time span 2010 – 2019 
-Substantial  restructuring  of  the  current  Community  fleet 
contributes to reduce the current overcapacity (cg Blue fin Tuna 
case study) 
-The initial loss is most likely to be suffered by fishermen who 
have gained additional income from the catch of illegal fish. By 
definition, such activities are not worthy of protection. 
-  The  utilisation  of  new  technologies  will  substantially  reduce 
running  costs  of  control  authorities  by  allowing  them  to 
concentrate  scarce  control  resources  on  fishing  activities  that 
have been identified by way of risk analysis 

-Less  efficient  fishers  are  removed  from 
the sector, as they are unable to compete 
as  a  result  of  only  partial  compliance  in 
some fisheries. 
-Over  the  10  year  period,  crew  gain 
between  €  -1,200  and  €  900  income  per 
annum.62 

-Net employment gain of almost 4000 jobs 
-A  better  confidence  of  the  public  in  the  CFP  would  in  turn 
affect  consumer  behaviour  and  confidence  as  he  would  be 
convinced  of  buying  a  sustainable  product,  and  possibly  allow 
to yield a higher price for the product 
-Apart  from  greater  quantities  to  be  fished,  the  individual  fish 
would be bigger and yield a better price for the same quantities. 
There would be higher returns to fishing effort and a greater cost 
efficiency for the fishing sector. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 

 
SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION  

7.1.  Core indicators of progress towards meeting the objectives 

The  Commission  will  progressively  develop  indicators  for  the  assessment  of  the  control 
system  of  the  Member  States.  As  the  Commission  will  develop  its  role  as  auditor  of  the 
control  system  of  the  Member  States,  it  will  carry  out  its  activities  on  the  basis  of  clear 
performance indicators that that will include: 

a.  the evaluation of the quota and the effort management system; 

b.  the evaluation of data validation systems, including systems of cross-checks of VMS, 
catch, effort, marketing data and data related to the Community fishing fleet register as well 
as the verification of licences, fishing permits and special fishing permits; 

c.  the evaluation of the administrative organisation, including the adequacy of the 
available staff and the available means, the training of the staff, the delimitation of functions 
of all authorities involved in monitoring, control and surveillance and enforcement as well 
as the mechanisms in place to coordinate the work and the joint evaluation of results of 
those bodies; 

d.  the evaluation of the operational systems, including procedures for monitoring, control 
and surveillance and inspection, and of designated ports;  

e.  the evaluation of national control and inspection programmes including the 
establishment of inspection levels and their implementation; 

the evaluation of the national system of sanctions, including the adequacy of the 

f. 
sanctions imposed, duration of proceedings, economic benefits of which offenders are to be 
deprived and the deterrent nature of such system of sanctions. 

7.2.  Monitoring and evaluation arrangements 

Every  two  years,  Member  States  shall  also  transmit  a  report  to  the  Commission  on  the 
implementation  of  this  regulation.  On  this  basis,  the  Commission  should  undertake  an 
intermediate  evaluation  of  its  new  initiative  within  four  years  of  its  adoption  assessing  the 
extent to which its realisations, results and impacts on economy, society and environment are 
consistent  with  the  objectives  set.  The  evaluation  results  will  be  used  for  decision  making 
needs on the future of to the regulatory framework if appropriate.  

The Commission will communicate the evaluation results to the European Parliament and the 
Council. The reporting would be carried out in a transparent manner by making the reporting 
documents  publicly  available  and  inviting  feedback.  The  evaluation  contained  in  these 
documents will take as indicators measures effectively taken, but will also look into the scope 
and substantive effectiveness of such measures in respect of the basic objective. 

51

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX I: TABLES 

Table 163 

Scientific advice about the state of the stock 

Outside safe biological limits 
Inside safe biological limits 
The state of the stock is unknown due to poor 
data 

. Scientific advice about overfishing 

The rate of fishing on the stock is known 
compared to maximum sustainable yield rate 
The stock is overfished64  
The stock is fished at the maximum sustainable 
yield rate 

2003 
30 
12 
48 

2004 
29 
10 
53 

Number of stocks 
2005 
26 
14 
53 

2006 
26 
11 
57 

2007 
26 
12 
58 

2003 

2004 

Number of stocks 
2005 
34 

2006 
23 

32 
2 

21 
2 

2007 
32 

30 
2 

2008 
28 
13 
55 

2008 
33 

29 
4 

  "Emergency" scientific advice 

2003 

2004 

Number of stocks 
2005 

2006 

Scientific advice to stop fishing 

24 

13 

12 

14 

2007 

20 

2008 

18 

Table 4. Difference between TACs and 
sustainable catches 

Excess of TAC over sustainable catch (%) 

2003 
43% 

2004 
48% 

2005 
57% 

2006 

2007 

2008 

47% 

44% 

49% 

 Summary of the scientific advice about fishing 
opportunities 

Number of fish stocks 

Stocks where stock size and fishing mortality can 
be forecast 
Stocks where a scientific advice concerning 
fishing opportunities is available 
Stocks where no scientific advice is available 

2003 
40 

2004 
34 

2005 
40 

2006 
31 

2007 
29 

2008 
30 

59 

31 

52 

40 

54 

39 

65 

29 

61 

35 

59 

37 

52

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 

Estimated landings of demersal species from the North Sea 
(1970-2004) 

Estimated landings of hake, megrims and Nephrops from the 
Iberian Atlantic Area 

d
e
d
n
a

l

s
e
n
n
o
t

d
n
a
s
u
o
h
T

Figure 1. Left panel, estimated landings in the North Sea, 1970 - 2004. Right panel, estimated landings of the main demersal species (hake, 
megrims, monkfish and Nephrops) in the Iberian Atlantic area. Data from ICES (2005) in both cases. 

Table  3:  Relation  between  EU15's  fish  production  and  imports  1961-2001  (in  %) 
(Source: Eurostat) 

%

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Production

Import

1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

The balance between production and imports of fish products (food and non-food) in the EU.  

53

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Performance of the Options in terms of stock65 (in tonnes) 

Starting  conditions 
(Spawning Stock Biomass) 

for  SSB 

SSB in 2019 

Bpa(Bpa: 
Biomass 
which 
precautionary 
approach 
apply) 

below 
the 

should 

North Sea cod 

Baltic cod 

North Sea plaice 

North Sea sole 

Northern hake 

Southern hake 

Western mackerel 

    150,000  

    240,000  

    230,000  

      35,000  

    140,000  

      35,000  

  2,300,000  

Mediterranean hake 

 -  

2006 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

           29,000  

    156,100  

    195,700  

    250,700  

             81,000  

    265,300  

    312,500  

    344,200  

           197,000  

    204,400  

    241,900  

    283,700  

             28,000  

      39,700  

      40,500  

      41,400  

           140,000  

    177,100  

    190,700  

    203,800  

             15,000  

      13,900  

      21,700  

      35,700  

         2,231,000  

  2,377,900  

  2,377,600  

  2,377,600  

               3,000  

        6,600  

        9,800  

      13,000  

Table 5: Performance of the Options in terms of stock, continued66 

Improvement over Option 1 

Year Bpa achieved 

Option 

2  Option 

3  Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

North Sea cod 

Baltic cod 

NS plaice 

North Sea sole 

Northern hake 

Southern hake 

W. mackerel 

Med Hake 

25% 

18% 

18% 

2% 

8% 

56% 

0% 

48% 

61% 

30% 

39% 

4% 

15% 

157% 

0% 

97% 

2012 

2017 

- 

2010 

2010 

- 

2011 

2014 

2014 

2010 

2010 

- 

2010 

2010 

2011 

2013 

2011 

2010 

2010 

2019 

2010 

54

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Projected changes in employment under each option67 (Number of people) 

Option  1 
(a) 

Option  2 
(b) 

Option  3 
(c) 

Net  gain 
(No  Reg) 
(d) 

Net 
gain 
Regulation 
(e) 

Difference 
(e)-(d) 

Catching 

NORTH SEA COD 

BALTIC COD 
NORTH  SEA  PLAICE  & 
SOLE 

WESTERN MACKEREL 

NORTHERN HAKE 

SOUTHERN HAKE 

358 

678 

15 

515 

252 

527 

695 

- 

578 

312 

-          46  433 

MEDITERRANEAN HAKE 

0 

61 

Sub total 

Processing 

NORTH SEA COD 

BALTIC COD 
NORTH  SEA  PLAICE  & 
SOLE 

WESTERN MACKEREL 

NORTHERN HAKE 

SOUTHERN HAKE 

MEDITERRANEAN HAKE 

- 

1,772 

2,607 

3,370 

406 

3,288 

597 

4,204 

812 

4,690 

219 

245 

112 

-           9 

- 

554 

101 

22 

14 

25 

614 

53 

60 

33 

Sub total 

Ancilliary 

4,259 

5,492 

6,288 

1,485 

2,028 

NORTH SEA COD 

BALTIC COD 
NORTH  SEA  PLAICE  & 
SOLE 

WESTERN MACKEREL 

NORTHERN HAKE 

SOUTHERN HAKE 

66 

198 

4 

100 

31 

-           8 

MEDITERRANEAN HAKE 

- 

97 

123 

18 

112 

58 

18 

2 

Sub total 

TOTAL 

391 

6,422 

429 

8,528 

10,330 

2,356 

717 

967 

155 

640 

443 

301 

147 

132 

178 

32 

124 

156 

49 

2 

672 

169 

17 

359 

289 

-           15  140 

63 

60 

480 

61 

835 

192 

916 

125 

191 

347 

147 

1,599 

407 

1,402 

190 

272 

155 

63 

130 

-        133 

86 

764 

215 

486 

-           25 

-          193 

-        168 

369 

60 

-            58 

-        106 

31 

66 

-           74 

-            20 

309 

48 

31 

14 

14 

12 

27 

25 

- 

36 

69 

33 

28 

24 

125 

56 

- 

280 

3,908 

38 

19 

544 

- 

35 

54 

14 

12 

98 

31 

- 

243 

1,550 

55

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANNEX II: REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

On the initiatives proposed by the Commission to modernize and reform the control of 
the Common Fisheries Policy 

The  Commission  carried  out  a  broad  stakeholder  consultation  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of 
the envisaged measures, their impact on operators and administrations, and to form an integral 
part  of  the  impact  assessment  report.   All  interested  parties  were  invited  from  February  to 
May  2008    to  express  their  views  on  the  nine  fields  of  action  identified  in  the  consultation 
paper, as well as to present their opinions as to what further measures would be appropriate to 
strengthen the control system of the Common Fisheries Policy. 

I. 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

There were a total of 25 contributions received in response to the Commission's invitation for 
public consultation from a wide range of stake holders including inter alia associations from 
the  industrial  sector  –  of  fishermen,  producers,  fisheries  control  technology  stakeholders; 
advisory bodies, a public authority, NGOs and individuals. The geographical range was also a 
broad one including French, German, Portuguese, Polish, Spanish, British, Belgian and Dutch 
parties. 

The  initiative  of  the  Commission  and  its  main  objectives  were  widely  endorsed  by  the 
participants in the consultation. All unanimously agreed on the need of reform of the control 
system  and  expressed  appreciation  of  the  opportunity  to  take  part  in  the  decision-making 
process  through  the  consultation.  They  also  confirmed  that  the  9  objectives  set  out  by  the 
Commission in the consultation paper are the main points of interest in the overall assessment 
of the reform.  

Along  with  the  overall  support  of  the  9  objectives,  the  stakeholders  raised  a  number  of 
important  considerations  to  be  taken  into  account  by  the  Commission,  made  some  valuable 
and creative suggestions for possible solutions to those concerns and all stressed on the need 
of a continuous dialogue and cooperation between all parties involved in the control process. 

Many  of  the  participants  emphasized  for  instance  that  it  is  the  culture  of  compliance  which 
should be the main objective of the reform as opposed to the culture of control. The industry 
also  called  for  a  bottom-up  as  opposed  to  "top-down"  approach  in  the  decision-making 
process  with  more  active  involvement  of  stakeholders,  scientists,  NGOs  and  national 
administrations, leading to more transparency, clarity and broader support. There were also a 
number of suggestions for public training initiatives, especially for fishermen. 

The majority of the concerns were related to the objectives of strengthening the capacity of 
the  Commission  and  to  the  potential  costs  and  administrative  burdens  that  use  of  modern 
technologies  might  incur.  They  underlined  that  the  principles  of  proportionality  and 
subsidiarity  ought  to  be  observed  in  these  respects.  Another  important  concern  express  was 
the  risk  of  over  centralization  of  the  control  of  the  CFP  and  the  risk  of  infringing  Member 
States' sovereignty. 

Notably all stakeholders supported the introduction of harmonized administrative sanctions by 
the  Commission,  the  simplification  and  rationalization  of  the  rules  and  the  strengthening  of 

56

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cooperation and assistance. An important point was raised on the cooperation with developing 
countries. A major concern raised was on the non-discrimination between EC vessels fishing 
outside Community waters and third country fleets. 

Even  though  stakeholders  generally  agreed  that  on-land  inspections  should  be  further 
developed and utilized, all of them emphasized the importance of sea inspections as the only 
means  to  assess  the  compliance  of  fishing  gear,  engine  size,  illegal  discarding  etc.  Some 
suggested  that  the  Community  Fisheries  Control  Agency  (hereinafter  CFCA)  should  play  a 
constructive role in that respect. 

NGOs  and  public  authorities  particularly  supported  the  reform  as  an  efficient  tool  from  an 
environmental  sustainable  fisheries  perspective.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  innovative 
contribution  of  the  FishPop  Trace  Consortium-  a  mixed  association  financed  under  the  EU 
Seventh  Framework  Programme,  drawing 
the  development  and 
implementation  of  modern  technologies  such  as  biotechnology,  genetics,  chemistry  and 
forensics in optimizing control mechanisms. 

the  attention 

to 

SUMMARY  OF  THE  CONTRIBUTIONS  RECEIVED  BY  CONSULTATION 

II. 
ISSUES 

1. 

Objective No. 1 Develop a new approach as regards inspection and control 

All  parties  to  the  consultation  strongly  agreed  on  the  urgent  need  of  new  approach  towards 
inspection and control, drawing the attention to the Court of Auditors Report as well as to the 
need  of  level  playing  field  and  a  degree  of  harmonisation.  The  majority  of  contributions 
stressed on the need not to abandon nor undermine the inspections at sea. 

However many raised concerns towards the way of achieving harmonisation especially with 
regard  to  the  conversion  factors.  It  was  underlined  that  it  should  not  damage  any  Member 
State,  should  be  based  on  sound  scientific  analysis  and  adopted  in  close  cooperation  with 
stakeholders and Norway. Some representatives of the industry noted the difficulty and risk in 
fixing  an  absolute  conversion  factor  which  can  not  take  into  account  the  differences 
depending on the fish stock, season, regional and fleet particularities.  

Another  important  consideration  noted  was  the  constraint  posed  by  certain  Member  States 
wishing  to  maintain  the  control  over  their  fleets.  Parties  and  especially  the  industry 
emphasized the need of consistent implementation, monitoring and regulation in all Member 
States.  In  this  connection,  some  requested  clarification  on  the  definition  of  "high  risk 
activities",  proposing  the  creation  of  a  list  of  them  and/or  the  guiding  criteria  in  their 
assessment such as prioritizing certain species and fishing gears for assessment.  The creation 
of a "help desk service" on the Regulation by the Commission for Member States, RACs and 
professional organizations was also proposed. 

All endorsed the harmonization at EC level of the inspection procedures in sea and on land as 
a guarantee of equal treatment and fair competition. It was observed that so far cooperation 
between states was confined to sea inspections whereas land inspections were very divergent. 
Some  contributors  noted  that  it  is  precisely  the  role  of  the  Commission  to  propose  and 
promote  these  standards  throughout  the  chain  of  commercial  exchanges  starting  from 
harbours  and  including  the  imports.  Others  advocated  for  a  "bottle  neck"  approach  to 

57

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inspection  meaning  verifying  catches  where  caught.  The  industry  suggested  that  the 
Commission  should  take  account  of  their  potential  impacts  on  the  logistical  organisation  of 
the  fishing  enterprises  so  as  not  to  overburden them  with  control  at  too  many  stages  before 
placing the product on the market.  A few contributors encouraged the expansion of onboard 
observer  programmes  and  even  the  placing  of  cameras  on  vessels  for  specific  high  risk 
fisheries. 

There  were  a  few  proposals  for  drafting  a  separate  regulation  or  guidelines  on  the  control 
harmonization elaborating in further details the main articles but also giving an authoritative 
guideline  on  their  uniform  interpretation  for  all  inspectors  and  operators.  Other contributors 
suggested  that  a  traceability  system  for  fish  and  fish  products  should  be  developed  and 
implemented from the point of landing until they reach the consumer- best practices already 
in place in member states were given as an example i.e. in UK. 

2. 

Objective No. 2 Rationalisation of the rules 

There was a broad consensus on this objective. Most of the stakeholders viewed it as the main 
prerequisite  for  the  development  of  a  culture  of  compliance.  Transparency  and  broad 
acceptance  were  underlined  as  fishermen  and  other  operators  have  to  be  able  to  understand 
and  rely  on  the  rules  in  order  to  apply  them.  The  drafting  of  an  evolving  "jurisprudential 
guide" of authentic interpretations to the articles in the regulation given by the Commission 
and the Member States' authorities was proposed. 

A concern was  raised  that  rationalization  of the  rules  should  not  mean  complete  unification 
since  account  should  be  taken  of  the  differences  in  the  fishing  zones,  vessels  etc.  It  was 
strongly recommended by a number of contributors that implementing regulations should be 
adapted  to  the  particularities  of  the  main  fishing  zones.  Another  concern  noted  was  on  the 
interaction between the control regulation and the IUU Regulation proposal and the proposal 
on authorisation. Some stakeholders from the industry suggested all these should be merged 
in one single regulation. 

The industry also called for reassessing some of the existing obligations in particular the ones 
concerning the declaration of all commercial transactions for all fish bought by approved first 
buyer  as  it  created  an  excessive  administrative  burden  for  operators.  It  was  proposed  to 
simplify  this  obligation  while  at  the  same  time  still  guaranteeing  the  traceability  of  the 
transported products by extending control over the commercial exchanges, in borders and at 
ports. One stakeholder suggested that the document required should be an invoice as opposed 
to a declaration. The obligation to declare the fishing zone in the documentation was also put 
in  question  as  difficult  to  verify  and  duplicating  the  information  already  contained  in  the 
logbook. 

The  stakeholders  from  the  industry  requested  more  flexibility  in  the  multi-annual 
management of TACs and quotas, especially regarding the tolerance margins granted in fixed 
% as it was very sensitive for certain species and differed according to the fleet specificities. 
Some  disagreed  with  the  current  8  %  margin,  proposing  one  of  10  %  as  an  acceptable 
compromise  for  some  species.  Another  proposal  in  this  respect  was  to  ensure  that  quota 
reductions and other management measures resulting from breaches of the CFP are targeted 
only towards the Member States responsible in a proportionate manner. 

58

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, all agreed that the new single control regulation should be workable and enforceable 
in  order  to  be  applied  effectively.  To  this  end  some  proposed  further  involvement  of  the 
stakeholders  in  the  drafting  process  and  a  prior  testing  in  practice  of  the  rules  before  their 
adoption. 

3. 

Objective No. 3 Strengthen the capacity of the Commission 

This  objective  was  overall  supported  by  the  contributors.  However  important  clarifications 
were made by the industry on the constraints before it. There was also an underlying concern 
about touching upon Member States' sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity was called 
for. 

Many  underlined  the  need  of  redefining  the  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  the 
Commission  in  this  respect.  Stakeholders  also  insisted  that  they  should  have  part  in  this 
process according to the bottom-up approach. 

The  possibility  of  transferring  the  decision  making  capacity  on  Real  Time  Closures  to  the 
Commission raised many concerns and reservations in the industry. It was pointed out that the 
Commission  already  has  the  possibility  to  announce  interruptions  in  the  fishery.  The 
stakeholders called for prior consultation with them before any measures of this character are 
taken, stressing the risk of the entire fishery industry paying the price for isolated breaches. 
Many  took  the  position  that  this  competence  should  remain  for  the  Member  States  and/or 
professional  organizations.  Public  authorities  and  NGOs  on  the  other  side  supported  the 
strengthening of the Commission's capacity to act on its own initiative for fisheries resources 
management in teal time except in the area of inshore waters.  

 Clarification was requested by the industry about whether it will have to pay the cost of the 
sanctions imposed by the Commission or is this for the Member State, in particular in cases of 
suspending  Community  aid.  In  any  case  stakeholders  called  for  transparency  and 
proportionality in this process. NGOs strongly favoured the introduction of more and flexible 
instruments  to  the  Commission  for  timely  intervention  targeted  precisely  at  the  fisheries 
sector.  The  measures  proposed  included  inter  alia  suspension  of  aid  payment  in  the  fishery 
sector,  excluding  operators  and  vessels  from  Fisheries  Partnership  Agreements,  access  to 
European  Fisheries  Fund,  reducing  future  fishing  rights  in  cases  of  non-compliance, 
reimbursement  of  subsidies  received  by  non-complying  companies  and  individuals  etc.  As 
justification  for  these  measures  NGOs  drew  the  attention  to  examples  of  overfishing,  IUU 
fishing and the need of promoting an overall ecosystem approach. 

The  introduction  of  a  warning  system  involving  communication  between  the  Commission, 
Member  States  and  the  fishing  sector  as  a  tool  for  prevention  was  proposed  by  some 
stakeholders.  The  possibility  of  the  Commission  to  intervene  in  the  data  submitted  by 
Member States was also promulgated. All agreed that the infringement procedures should be 
revisited  to  make  them  faster  and  more  efficient.  There  were  a  number  of  proposals  to 
harmonize and redefine the competences of inspectors and also to increase the number of EC 
inspectors,  especially  in  sensitive  fishery  zones,  allowing  them  to  operate  without  prior 
notice. 

59

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 

Objective No. 4 Harmonise sanctions 

This objective was broadly endorsed by all contributors. It was noted by many stakeholders 
that the when harmonising, the Commission will have to take due account of the opinions and 
practices  in  all  Member  States  in  this  respect.  All  stakeholders  strongly  favoured  the 
introduction  of  administrative  sanctions  in  particular  as  a  way  of  ensuring  fair  competition 
and  equal  treatment  of  all  EU  fishermen.  It  was  agreed  unanimously  that  these  sanctions 
should  be  dissuasive  and  depriving  the  perpetrators  of  the  economic  benefit  from  the 
infringement thus giving confidence in the system to all players.  

An important concern raised by the industry was that of ensuring uniform interpretation of the 
sanction rules in all Member States and notably, by all inspectors in charge. A special training 
programme  coordinated  by  the  Agency  was  proposed  as  a  way  to  reach  this  goal. 
Stakeholders  also  noted  that  fishermen  were  often  unaware,  especially  when  fishing  in  the 
EEZ of Member States other than their Flag, of the sanctions and procedures applicable under 
the  respective  national  legislation  so  it  was  suggested  that  they  were  made  accessible  in  all 
Community languages. 

A few contributors questioned the competence of the Commission to harmonise and impose 
sanctions in the light of the principle of subsidiarity. Other concerns raised in this connection 
were  about  the  specificities  (i.e.  aggravating  and  attenuating  circumstances)  of  each 
infringement, the need of individualization by national courts, the appeal possibility and the 
case-by-case  approach.  Many  other  stakeholders  however  took  the  position  that  the 
Commission does indeed have this competence, putting forward the conclusion of the Council 
Legal service from 16 April 2008 that:"The Community is competent to establish a sanctions 
scheme"'. 

Some  operators  proposed  the  introduction  of  positive  incentives  regime  (i.e.  allocating 
supplementary  fishing  days  for  enhanced  observer  coverage)  to  complement  the  sanction 
system  and  encourage  operators  to  report  perpetrators.  Other  stakeholders  underlined  the 
importance of introducing licence points system for CFP infringements operating in parallel 
to  the  other  penalties  and  envisaging  a  "black  list"  of  persistent  offenders,  subjected  to 
increased monitoring.  

One  contributor  advocated  for  the  introduction  of  trade  sanctions  in  addition  to  the 
administrative  ones  as  it  is  necessary  to  impose  sanctions  on  both  companies  that 
those  activities.  NGOs 
commercialize 
promulgated  the  strengthening  of  sanctions  for  serious  infringements  of  the  CFP  so  as  to 
include monetary penalties but also confiscation of catches, gear and even vessels. 

illegal  fish  products  and  countries  allowing 

5. 

Objective No. 5 Strengthening of cooperation and of assistance 

All  operators  strongly  favoured  the  enhancing  of  cooperation  between  the  Commission, 
fishery control authorities in Member States and operators from the whole chain of production 
including the transport, market, small scale fishermen etc. All agreed that the Agency should 
play a more important and constructive role in this respect. There were proposals put forward 
for it to verify control and training standards, to conduct workshops, seminars and exchange 
programmes. 

60

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some recommended the strengthening of cooperation aiming at harmonizing the methodology 
of inspections at sea and even more on land, taking into account the best practices existing in 
Member  States.  It  was  noted  that  currently  operators  have  suspicions  about  the  varying 
standards  of  inspections  which  can  be  addressed  by  creating  a  transparent  methodology 
subject to external verification and even audit. 

Special emphasis was put on the cooperation with competent authorities from third countries, 
in particular  developing ones. Some stakeholders proposed the establishment of cooperative 
arrangements  to  ensure  that  developing  states  have  the  means  and  competence  to  control 
fishing activities in their waters. 

One  of  the  individual  academic  contributors  stressed  on  the  efficiency  of  encouraging 
cooperation between fishermen and their professional organizations in the form of consortium 
so as to manage certain fisheries zones and to control each other in doing so. Italy and its shell 
fishing were given as an example of such decentralized approach towards control. 

6. 

Objective No. 6 Develop a culture of control 

Generally  all  contributors  agreed  with  this  objective  and  identified  it  as  a  key  one.  The 
majority  of  the  industry  stakeholders  however  put  the  emphasis  on  the  development  of  a 
culture of compliance rather than control. Contributors proposed that the Commission should 
assist  Member  States  who  are  primarily  responsible  for  informing  the  fishery  sector  of  the 
rules. 

Many  contributors  noted  that  to  achieve  this  objective  the  credibility  of  the  whole  system 
ought  to  be  increased  and  fishermen  have  to  understand  and  believe  in  the  ratio  of  the 
applicable rules. To this end it was proposed that fishermen, scientists and producers are more 
involved  in  a  "bottom-up"  decision-making  process  for  instance  with  respect  to  quota 
management giving the examples of US, Canada, Norway and Iceland where this is already 
applied. Furthermore, representatives of the industry suggested that the implementation of the 
CFP  and  control  rules  including  inspections  and  sanctions  should  be  made  in  close 
cooperation with the stakeholders so that the effort to comply comes from the bottom. 

The  industry  also  underlined  the  need  to  define  on  EC  level  the  powers  and  obligations  of 
national  inspectors  and  standardise  the  procedures  including  the  right  of  the  vessel  to  be 
informed of its  rights and legal  assistance available so as to enhance transparency and  their 
credibility for operators. It was suggested that some data bases should be made available to 
the public online.  

Advisory  bodies  proposed  the  introduction  of  an  efficient  intervention  system  through 
RFMOs and within the CFP in order to improve the confidence of fishermen that the control 
rules apply equally and in the same manner to  all  operators. Another suggestion was to use 
positive  incentives  in  return  for  participation  in  schemes  for  use  of  more  selective  gears, 
support for real time closures, and participation in stock avoidance plans. 

7. 

Objective No. 7 Use of modern technologies 

This objective was broadly endorsed with the specification by the industry however that it is 
the  Commission  who  should  bare  the  main  cost  of  the  implementation.  Many  noted  that 

61

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
technical equipment should be introduced only when and where necessary so as not to create 
disproportionate financial and administrative burdens.  

The industry underlined that the cost of the new technologies, the data transmission and their 
maintenance  should  not  be  at  the  expense  of  fishermen  but  of  specialized  funds.  It  was 
strongly advocated that these measures should not apply to vessels smaller than 15 meters. It 
was also stressed that the commercially sensitive data should remain strictly confidential and 
be used only for the purposes of control. 

Some contributors came in with innovative ideas on this objective such as the implementation 
of non-collaborative type of control technologies allowing to detect non-reporting actors and 
biased reports as well as to provide evidence for further investigation. It was suggested that in 
addition  and  to  complement  the  VMS  system  airborne  surveillance,  coastal  radars,  space-
borne  sensors  like  Synthetic  Aperture  Radar  are  used  to  improve  coverage,  availability, 
accuracy, integrity and cost. The attention was also drawn to the new generation of SARSAT 
COSPAS beacons and the future MEOSAR capabilities like GALILEO, GPS and GLONASS 
as providing return link and reducing false alarm rates.  

Another  interesting  proposal  on  this  objective  was  made  by  the  above  mentioned  mixed 
FishPop  Trace  consortium.  They  suggested  the  development  of  framework  incorporating 
strict forensic validation based on molecular biology to complement the Monitoring, Control 
and Surveillance in the fisheries sector. It was underlined that these applications are available 
but there is still a lack of cooperation between scientific institutions, control authorities and 
policy  makers.  An  example  of  a  project  working  in  the  area  was  given-  The  Global  Fish 
Barcode  of  Life  Initiative  for  identification  of  fish  species  from  sample  of  tissue  or  fish 
products  on  the  basis  of  DNA  sequence  library.  One  of  the  stakeholders  proposed  the 
establishment of reference laboratories in Member States and one at a Community level. 

8. 

Objective No. 8 Increase of cost effectiveness 

This  objective  was  broadly  favoured.  Many  stakeholders  took  the  view  that  introduction  of 
modern  technologies  can  reduce  the  cost  of  operations.  The  simplification  of  the  rules  in  a 
common  regulation  was  also  seen  as  a  tool  to  this  end.  The  main  concern  raised  by 
stakeholders  was  that  the  reduction  of  costs  does  not  lead  to  reduction  of  controls  at  sea. 
Many  proposed  that  it  is  quality  rather  than  quantity  which  is  important  in  this  respect  and 
thus the focus should be on high risk activities. 

9. 

Objective No. 9 Adapt the mandate of the Agency 

All  contributors  unanimously  agreed  on  the  need  to  adapt  and  broaden  the  mandate  of  the 
Agency. The industry also called for increase of the transparency and dialogue in its operation 
by giving the stakeholders an observer status in its working bodies. 

Many viewed that the Agency should play a greater role in developing and harmonizing on 
land  control  procedures,  in  analyzing  Member  States  best  practices  in  this  respect  and 
encouraging inter state cooperation. It was also suggested that the Agency should be allocated 
more  human  resources  to  conduct  inspections  at  sea,  in  particular  in  sensitive  areas.  The 
creation  of  EU  corps  of  inspectors  with  full  range  of  inspection  powers  was  broadly 
encouraged. 

62

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some viewed it as a potential mediator in the communication between Member States and the 
Commission.  Others recommended  that it  is given the competence to standardize control of 
fisheries  around  offshore  Natura  2000  and  other  nature  conservation  sites,  including  the 
ability to establish buffer zones for the protection of the sites. 

III.  CONCLUSIONS  

•  All stakeholders welcomed and unanimously supported the Control reform. Valuable 

proposals were made for its optimization. 

•  Generally all agreed with the main 9 objectives of the reform and particularly favoured 
the introduction of harmonized administrative sanctions and inspection procedures on 
EC level. 

•  Stakeholders clearly advocated that they want this constructive dialogue between them 
and  the  Commission  to  continue  both  for  the  decision-making  and  for  the 
implementation process. 

63

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III- ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR THE FISHERIES SECTOR 

Table 1-Administrative costs under the current control regime 
Council Regulation 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a 
control system applicable to the common fisheries policy 

Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) 

TIme  
(hour) 

Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) 

Freq  
(per 
year) 

Nbr  
of  
entitie
s 

Total nbr 
of  
actions 

Total cost 

Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 

As
s. 
Art. 

Ori
g. 
Art. 

Type of obligation 

Description of required 
action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat 

Reg 

N
o
. 
1 

6,1, 6,2, 
6,3, 19e 

Submission of (recurring) 
reports 

Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

2  4,2 

Inspection 

3  9,1 

Submission of (recurring) 
reports 

4 

Submission of (recurring) 
reports 

Inspecting and checking 
(including assistance to 
inspection by public 
authorities) 
Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

logbook and 
landing 
declaration: all 
vessels above 
10 meters 
inspection: all 
registered 
vessels 

17 

18 

0.4
5 

0,9
2 

12 

0.1 

submission of 
sales note: 
registered 
buyers 
Geographical position, landing information,  
transport document, etc* 

7.4 

340 

22500 

7650000 

56801250 

16.6 

2 

83000 

190900 

3161304 

1.2 

1 

98000
00 

9800000 

11760000 

0,0 

0 

6300000 

78022554 

Total 
administ
rative 

costs (€) 

*The 3 most costly IOs (logbook, landing declaration and sales note) together with the IO "inspection" (identified as an important "irritant") account for 87% of total cost of the 
control regulation. As the cost in relation to the remaining IOs is minor (ranges between 0.05% to 3.2% of total cost), these IOs are not individually displayed in the table.   
**According to the study undertaken by the Consortium, national obligations, going beyond EU requirements as set out in the Regulation under review, amount to 7 million 
Euro. 
***All the information obligations (IO) contained in the Control Regulation have been mapped and measured by a consortium, led by Deloitte ("DRAFT FINAL REPORT, 
Measurement data and analysis, as specified in the specific contract on Modules 3&4 for the Priority Area Fisheries,of the Framework contract n° ENTR/06/061,EU PROJECT 
ON BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS"). Those figures have not been approved yet by the Commission but serve as a basis for 
our calculations. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-Administrative costs for the new fisheries control system 

Commission proposals  for the new 
fisheries control system 

Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) 

TIme  
(hour) 

Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) 

Freq  
(per 
year) 

Nbr  
of  
entitie
s 

Total 
nbr 
of  
actions 

Total cost 

Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 

Type of obligation 

Description of required 
action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat 

Re
g 

N
o
. 

1 

Ori
As
g. 
s. 
Art
Art
. 
. 
6,1, 6,2, 
6,3, 19e 

Submission of 
(recurring) reports 

Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

2  4,2 

Inspection 

3  9,1 

Submission of 
(recurring) reports 

4 

Submission of 
(recurring) reports 

Inspecting and checking 
(including assistance to 
inspection by public 
authorities) 
Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) 

logbook and 
landing 
declaration: all 
vessels above 
10 meters 
inspection: all 
registered 
vessels 

17 

18 

0.1
4 

0,7
8 

12 

submission of 
sales note: 
registered 
buyers 
Geographical position, landing information,  
transport document, etc 

0.1
0 

2,3 

340 

22500 

7650000 

17671500 

14 

2 

83000 

190900 

2680236 

1.2 

1 

98000
00 

9800000 

11760000 

0,0 

0 

6300000 

38411736 

Total 
administ
rative 

costs (€) 

*The 3 most costly IOs (logbook, landing declaration and sales note) together with the IO "inspection" (identified as an important "irritant") account for 87% of total cost of the control regulation. As the cost in relation to the 
remaining IOs is minor (ranges between 0.05% to 3.2% of total cost), these IOs are not individually displayed in the table.   

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX IV: CONTROL PROVISIONS IN CFP LEGISLATION  

Basic regulations 

1.  Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable  exploitation  of  fisheries  resources  under  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy, 
Chapter V, (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p 59-80) 

2.  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2847/1993  of  12  October  1993  establishing  a  control 

system applicable to the common fisheries policy, (OJ L 261, 20.10.1993) 

Implementation of Control regulation 

3.  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  728/1999  of  7  April  1999  providing,  pursuant  to 
Article  7(3)  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2847/93,  for  a  notification  period  for 
Community  fishing  vessels  carrying  on  fishing  activities  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  the 
Skagerrak and the Kattegat (OJ L 93, 8.4.1999) 

4.  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1449/98 of 07 July 1998 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) N° 2847/93 as regards effort reports 
(OJ L 192, 8.7.1998, p. 4–8) 

5.  Commission Regulation (EC)  No. 500/2001 of  14  March 2001  laying down detailed 
rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) N° 2847/93 on the monitoring 
of catches taken by Community fishing vessels in third country waters and on the high 
seas (OJ L 73, 15.3.2001, p. 8–12) 

6.  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  N°  2244/2003  of  18  December  2003,  laying  down 
detailed  provisions  regarding  satellite-based  vessel  monitoring  systems  (OJ  L  333, 
20.12.2003, p. 17–27) 

Common Market Organisation 

7.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  104/2000  of  17  December  1999  on  the  common 
organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products (OJ L 17, 21.1.2000, 
p. 22–52) 

Logbook 

8.  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2807/83  of  22  September  1983  laying 
down  detailed  rules  for  recording  information  on  Member  States'  catches  of 
fish(OJ L 276, 10.10.1983) 

9.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1966/2006  of  21  December  2006  on  electronic 
recording and reporting of  fishing  activities  and  on  means  of  remote  sensing 
(OJ L 409, 30.12.2006, p. 1–10) 

10. Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 1566/2007  of  21  December  2007  laying 
down  detailed  rules  for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1966/2006  on  electronic  recording  and  reporting  of  fishing  activities  and 
on means of remote sensing (OJ L 340, 22.12.2007, p. 46–57)  

66

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAC and quotas 

11. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/2008 of 16 January 2008 fixing for 2008 the 
fishing  opportunities  and  associated  conditions  for  certain  fish  stocks  and 
groups  of  fish  stocks,  applicable  in  Community  waters  and,  for  Community 
vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required (OJ L 19, 23.1.2008, p. 
1–203)  

Technical measures 

12. Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the conservation of fisheries resources 

through technical measures in the Atlantic and the North Sea. 

Recovery Plans and Multiannual management plans 

13. Council Regulation (EC) N° 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 establishing measures for 

the recovery of cod stocks (O.J. L 70 of 9.3.2004, pp 8-11) 

14. Council Regulation (EC) No 811/2004 of 21 April 2004 establishing measures for the 

recovery of the northern hake stock. (O.J. L 185; 27.5.2004, pp 1-3) 

15. Council Regulation  (EC) No 2166/2005  of 20 December 2005 establishing measures 
for the recovery of the Southern hake and Norway lobster stocks in the Cantabrian Sea 
and  Western  Iberian  peninsula  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 850/98  for  the 
conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the  protection  of 
juveniles of marine organisms. (O.J.L345; 28.12.2005, pp 5-10) 

16. Council Regulation (EC) N° 2115/2005 of 20 December 2005 establishing a recovery 
plan for Greenland Halibut in the Framework of NAFO (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 3–
6) 

17. Council Regulation (EC) No 1100/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing measures 
for  the  recovery  of  the  stock  of  European  eel  (EC)  No 1559/2007  (OJ  L  248, 
22.9.2007, p. 17–23) 

18. Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 388/2006  of  23  February  2006  establishing  a 
multiannual plan for the sustainable exploitation of the stock of sole in the Bay 
of Biscay, (O. J. L 65; 7.3.2006, pp 1-4) 

19. Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2007 of 7 May 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan 
for  the  sustainable  exploitation  of  the  stock  of  sole  in  the  Western  Channel  (O.J.  L 
122, 11.5.2007; pp 7-9) 

20. Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 676/2007  of  11  June  2007  establishing  a  multiannual 
plan  for  fisheries  exploiting  stocks  of  plaice  and  sole  in  the  North  Sea;(  O.J.  L157; 
19.06.2007, pp.1-6) 

21. Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 1098/2007  of  18  September  2007  establishing  a 
multiannual plan for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those 
stocks,  amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No 2847/93  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC) 
No 779/97 (OJ L 248, 22.9.2007, p. 1–10)  

67

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPS 

22. Council Regulation (EC) No 1627/94 of 27 June 1994 laying down general provisions 

concerning special fishing permits (OJ L 171, 6.7.1994, p. 7–13 ) 

23. Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  41/2006  of  21  December  2006  fixing  for  2007 
the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and 
groups  of  fish  stocks,  applicable  in  Community  waters  and,  for  Community 
vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required (OJ L 15, 20.1.2007) 

Other texts 

24. Council Regulation (EC) No 643/2007 of 11 June 2007 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 41/2007 as concerns the recovery plan for bluefin tuna recommended 
by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas  (OJ L 
151, 13.6.2007, p. 1–16) 

25. Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2347/2002  of  16  December  2002  establishing 
specific  access  requirements  and  associated  conditions  applicable  to  fishing 
for deep-sea stocks, (OJ L 351, 28.12.2002, p. 6–11) 

26. Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  N°  1381/87  of  20  May  1987,  establishing 
detailed  rules  concerning  the  marking  and  documentation  of  fishing  vessels, 
(OJ L 132, 21.5.1987, p. 9–10) 

27. Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  N°  1382/87  of  20  May  1987,  establishing 
detailed rules concerning the inspection of fishing vessels, (Official Journal L 
132 , 21/05/1987 P. 0011 – 0013) 

68

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX V: CURRENT CONTROL SITUATION 

A. Elements of the current control mechanisms 

•  Monitoring of fishing vessels and their activities, through satellite tracking (VMS), vessel 

sightings and onshore inspection (applicable for all vessels exceeding 15 m); 

•  Catch monitoring  via a system of  vessel logbooks  (allowing  for  margins  of tolerance of 
20%  for  inspections  at  sea),  landing  declarations  and  sales  notes  (both  recording  actual 
live weights). Log books are applicable to all vessels over 10 m in length68 and for landing 
weights  in  excess  of  50kg.  The  completed  sheets  are  submitted  within  48  hours  and 
landing  declarations  and  sales  are  supposed  to  be  cross  checked  by  the  inspectorate  to 
ensure  consistency.  The  Commission  specifies  the  form  of  reported  outputs  required, 
outputs and output frequencies are reported to the Commission on a monthly basis, and at 
more frequent intervals as and when the catch reaches 70% of quota. Vessel logbooks are 
to become electronic as from January 2010 (for vessels 24 m and over in length), extended 
to vessels 15 m and over by July 2011. That landing declarations reflect the actual weight 
of fish landed in live weights, as opposed to the estimates shown on the log sheets;  

•  Monitoring  of  transparency  including  the  sales  note  (when  fish  is  sold  at  auction)  and 
take-over declarations, when the fish is transported within and outside national borders; 

•  Fishing effort monitoring (days at sea assigned to specific vessels); 

•  Monitoring  of  fishing  gears  and  minimum  landing  sizes  against  a  set  on  technical 
conservation regulations applicable to various species, fishing methods and fishing zones; 

•  Monitoring  of  third  country  vessels,  when  landing  into  Community  ports,  and  when 
fishing  inside  Community  waters,  and  specific  RFOs,  when  the  EC  is  assigned  a 
controlling role, for example NEAFC; 

•  Special measures applying to recovery species, including: 

o 
o 
o 
o 
o 

o 
o 
o 
o 

special fishing permits, pre notification of landings and authorisation to land; 
designated ports; 
 reduced margins of tolerance; 
separate stowage of recovery species 
set inspection benchmarks (in the form of a set percentages (10-20%69 of  
landings, depending on species); 
compliance observers70; 
weighing systems71;  
traceability inspections and  
prohibition of transhipments. 

B. Current control situation in the MS 

The  controlling  means  applied  by  each  Member  State  is  on  land  and  at  sea  fisheries 
inspection. The primary offence detected on land relate to unreported landings. The primary 
offences  detected  at  sea  relate  to  technical  measures  and  unlicensed  fishing.  Inspection 
support  means  include  a  Fisheries  Monitoring  Centre  (FMC),  data  cross  checking  systems 
(currently  under  development),  VMS  (and  requiring  refinement),  surveillance  ships  and 

69

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aircraft.  Some  national  administrations  also  use  more  sophisticated  deterrent  and  detection 
systems,  most  notably  forensic  analysis,  evaluate  regular  patterns  of  fisheries  fraud  and  to 
check product traceability beyond first hand sales (i.e. factory inspections), and inspector hit 
squads  (groups  of  inspectors  that  can  be  deployed  to  specific  sites  at  a  moments  notice). 
Controlling systems are presently being improved through Joint deployment Plans (facilitated 
by the CFCA); and  information  sharing and joint  Memorandums  of  Understanding between 
Community countries, and with cooperating Third countries (Norway and Faeroes).  

The main means of deterrent comprise the inspection activity, as previously defined, penalties 
and in some unilateral cases, dialogue and cooperation.72  

One  of  the  fundamental  problems  that  exist  with  the  system  is  that  control  is  not  applied 
equally across all MS. This means that within a single fishery control is uneven. For instance, 
French  and  Belgian  vessels  fishing  in  French  waters  may  be  subject  to  different  rates  of 
inspection (MRAG, 2003). Fishermen often complain, justifiably, about this sort of treatment, 
and we showed in our 2003 report that this situation will always lead to higher levels of non-
compliance in fishermen’s behaviour.  

It has also been elaborated (MRAG 2003 study), that compliance does indeed increase as the 
level of inspection increases. These issues have been repeatedly recognised by the COM and 
led  to  the  initiation  of  the  CFCA  in  2005.  It  is  still  too  early  to  tell  whether  the  Agency  is 
having a significant effect on levels of compliance in the EU, but they have coordinated two 
Joint Deployment Plans (Southern North Sea, Baltic) in 2007 as well as inspector exchanges 
and training.  

However, the activities of the CFCA are based on control programmes that focus on stocks in 
critical condition (North Sea Cod, Baltic Cod and BFT). What is actually required of a system 
of control is to be able to act rapidly to cauterise any impending problems. This has clearly 
failed to be the case in EU waters – control systems have apparently not been able to detect 
the increase in non-compliance that has accompanied the reduction in TACs required to keep 
stocks at target levels.  

Most specifically, the 2003 report also identified some useful inspection trends. Land based 
enforcement is perceived to be the most cost effective tool and for the countries identified. It 
is  up  to  five  times  as  likely  to  detect  an  offence  and  2.5  times  more  efficient  than  marine 
based activities. This implies that switching some costs of sea based enforcement to land will 
increase  the  probability  of  detection  but  will  only  have  a  marginal  effect  on  the  number  of 
offences  detected  unless  applied  with  at  increasing  proportions.  The  number  of  offences 
detected at sea is largely stable. However, a marginal benefit from increasing land based costs 
would  result  in  a  greater  number  of  infringements  detected  (or  a  corresponding  increase  in 
compliance),  than the same change in expenditure in marine surveillance.  However specific 
offences  (technical/unauthorised  fishing)  are  only  detectable  at  sea, 
thus  requiring 
maintenance of marine based activities, but catering for a reduction. 

The CoA underlined the following findings on the control situation: 

• 

• 

large proportions of the fleet exempted from logbook obligations (under 10m), but in 
some cases catching significant quantities of recovery species (France, Spain, UK);  
limited means available to the Commission to apply pressure on the Member States; 

70

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
• 

inadequate application of control measures as specified in the core Control Regulation 
(EC  2371/2002)  (i.e.  additional  to  those  cited  above),  or  specific  species  recovery 
programmes. These include:  

o 

inadequate  use  of  cross  checking  procedures  i.e.  for  consistency  between 
logbook, landing declarations, and sales notes, or log book, VMS tracking and 
vessel sightings; 

o  failure of some fishers to comply with VMS, and inadequate definition of non 

o 
o 
o 
o 

corruptible VMS systems; 
inadequate enforcement of transport regulations; 
inadequate enforcement of market and traceability regulations; 
inadequate enforcement of country landings; 
inadequate  control  of  fishing  gears  in  specific  areas  (North  Sea  blinders  in 
beam trawl fisheries and the continued use of drift nets in the Mediterranean); 

• 

inadequate  application  of  control  measures  as  specified  in  the  species  recovery 
programmes. These include:  

o  failure to appropriately evaluate catch declarations (Baltic cod) 
o 

lack of a strategy to secure compliance with effort limitation schemes (North 
Sea cod, southern hake and nephrops) 

o  Vessel  Monitoring  Systems  (VMS)  not  used  effectively  to  cross  check  prior 

notification of landings and fishing effort (North Sea cod) 
o  by-catch rules not systematically checked (North Sea cod) 
o  reduced margins of tolerance (8%) against catch estimates in the log book not 

properly enforced (All species recovery programmes); 
inadequate control in the landings of undersized fish (Northern hake) 

o 
o  no catch declaration system in place (Bluefin tuna) 

71

 
 
ANNEX  VI:  INFORMATION  ON  THE  BIO-ECONOMIC  MODEL  USED  FOR  THE  IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT REPORT 

Bioeconomic  modelling  was  achieved  through  linking  a  biological  population  model, 
projected  over  a  10  year  period  from  2010  (the  date  on  which  any  regulation  would  be 
implemented),  with  an  economic  model  of  fleet  performance.  Age-structured  biological 
models were constructed using the latest ICES Working Group results for relevant stocks with 
extractions  separated  into  reported,  unreported  (unallocated  in  ICES  terminology)  and 
discards, tuned over the period 2000 – 2006 to ICES assessment results.  

The  biological  model  used  was  that  described  in  the  Cabinet  Office  (2004)  report  and  was 
deliberately chosen to be simple and deterministic so that it could be easily integrated with the 
economic  model.  It  uses  ICES  (2007)  assessment  data  to  obtain  figures  for  historical 
recruitment, stock numbers at age, weight at age in the catch and stock, natural mortality and 
selectivity at age and projects the stock into the future using these parameters. The time-frame 
for  this  work  (about  6  weeks)  did  not  allow  for  the  development  of  particularly  complex 
integrated  bioeconomic  models  in,  for  example,  the  FLR  framework.  The  model  that  we 
developed  allowed  stochastic  as  well  as  deterministic  recruitment  to  be  simulated  (either  as 
bootstrapped data or as lognormal distributions) but, apart from emphasising the uncertainty 
in future projections, this was not helpful when integrating with the economic model which, 
because of its complexity, could not be developed beyond a deterministic formulation in the 
time available. Therefore, we only present deterministic results which are effectively similar 
to median stochastic results.   

Forward  projections  were  undertaken  assuming  a  constant  target  fishing  mortality,  equal  to 
the target fishing mortality in 2007. The target fishing mortality was modified by corrections 
for  discarding  and  unreported  catches  to  generate  a  realised  fishing  mortality  (Fr=Ft.d.u, 
where Ft was the target fishing mortality, d and u were the discard and unreported catch rates 
respectively,  and  Fr  is  the  realised  fishing  mortality  rate).  The  latest  ICES  assessments 
available to us were those in which the last year in the assessment was 2006, and the latest 
stock  status  was  effective  for  1  January  2007.  Using  the  ICES  calculated  Fr  in  this  and 
previous  years,  together  with  discard  and  unreported  catch  rates  calculated  from  ICES 
reported data, we were able to estimate Ft in these previous years. We then adjusted Ft (2007) 
according  to  the  anticipated  catch  levels  in  2007,  management  action  taken  by  the  EU  in 
2007,  2008  and  in  the  future  (i.e.,  a  default  starting  point  is  to  set  discards  and  unreported 
catches to zero, estimate the real target fishing mortality associated with the 2007 TAC, and 
then  apply  this  in  all  future  years  but  with  the  re-introduction  of  discards  and  unreported 
catches).  We  then  projected  the  stock  forward  to  2019  under  this  Ft  until  the  stock  had 
recovered to a size greater than Bpa, when we reverted to larger fishing mortality. 

For  some  stocks  (eg  North  Sea  cod)  harvest  control  rules  are  currently  specified  by  the 
Commission’s  recovery  plans,  which  constrain  annual  TAC  changes  to  15%  and  aim  for 
annual  population  growth  rates  of  >30%.  A  fishing  mortality  rule  was  adopted  for  these 
stocks  so  as  to  be  consistent  across  all  models  (i.e.  those  with  and  without  clear  harvest 
control rules), and this had the added advantage of dealing with target fishing mortalities that 
have  demonstrably  been  achievable  in  the  past.  For  the  cod  stocks,  this  fishing  mortality 
approach  produces  more  conservative  growth  figures  than  the  strict  implementation  of  the 
15% TAC variance rule.  

72

 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, with North Sea cod adopting the 15% rule implies a fishing mortality of 0.15 in 
2008 and 0.12 in 2009, which in the absence of unreported landings should result in SSB of 
116000  in  2009  (ICES  2007;  ACFM  report  section  6.4.2a)  and  even  with  34%  unreported 
landings and 15% discarding would result in the stock being above Bpa in 2010 – i.e. before 
the control actions proposed by the Commission could come into effect, and two years before 
the  date  estimated  by  our  final  model  (Table  32).  Adoption  of  the  TAC  rule  in  the  model 
would  have  meant  that  the  fishery  would  be  being  asked  to  deliver  much  lower  fishing 
mortalities  than  have  ever  been  achieved  for  this  stock  (i.e.  Ft<0.15,  Fr<0.23).  Without 
considerably  enhanced  control  activity  from  2007  (in  the  period  before  the  new  control 
measures could come into effect in 2010) this would imply much higher intrinsic discarding 
and unreported catch levels than we have hitherto seen. One option available to us would have 
been to use the TAC rule and suggest a return to much higher levels of unreported catches at 
these  very  low  target  fishing  mortalities.  The  relationship  between  Ft  and  unreported  catch 
rate  would  imply  that  at  Ft<0.15  we  should  be  expecting  unreported  catch  rates  of  at  least 
100%, but this is based on data from the period before Scotland and Denmark increased their 
control  action  and  increased  compliance  after  which  the  unreported  catch  rate  dropped 
significantly  from  over  100%  to  34%.  It  is  hoped  that  when  the  COBECOS  project  is 
complete  a  better  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  control  actions  and  compliance 
may  be  developed,  but  at  the  time  of  undertaking  this  modelling  that  project  had  not  yet 
delivered mature bio-economic models that could be used in this work. Nevertheless, we did 
explore this option, raising the quota in 15% increments from 22000 t in 2008 to 33000 t in 
2011  and  increasing  the  unreported  catch  rate  to  100%  over  this  time  period.  The  resulting 
stock trajectory was very similar to the trajectory of our main model up to 2010 after which 
time it increased more rapidly, reaching 280,000 t in 2012 despite 100% unreported catches, 
and the cessation of the recovery plan at this point meant that the quota rose from 33,000 t in 
2011 to 145,000 t in 2012 (and in fact that actual removals rose from 72,000 t to 162,000 t).  

The  level  of  detailed  speculation  about  likely  rates  of  under-reporting  in  each  year  of  this 
model, and the fact that it rather unrealistically predicts a rapid change in quota and catch in 
2012,  suggested  to  us  that  it  was  not  as  likely  to  reflect  reality  as  our  assumption  that  the 
fishery  might  be  able  to  maintain  a  constant  and  low  fishing  mortality  over  this  time 
consistent with its demonstrated performance in 2006. In all our models it was necessary to 
project likely decisions and events through to 2010 before the 10-year projection could even 
start. This is a longer projection (3 years, 2007 - 2010) than ICES normally undertakes in its 
assessment advice, and we did not feel confident that even recovery plan decision rules would 
necessarily be followed over that time period since recent actions taken by the EU have not 
often followed either ICES advice or the recovery plan decision rules fully (WWF, 2007).  

Consequently, for both cod stocks we chose to stay within the bounds of fishing mortalities 
and estimates of unreported catch that have recently been made (in the case of the North Sea 
cod  stock,  we  have  used  a  target  F  of  0.33,  which  is  close  to  the  achieved  level  of  0.38  in 
2006 when the level of unreported catch was 34%, and delivers a realised F of 0.5 which is 
well below Fpa). Others have noted the perverse effects of this 15% rule in the past, and we 
wanted  to  avoid  this  (Kell  et  al.,  2006,  Kelly  et  al.,  2006).  However,  to  give  some  confidence 
that our model produced results generally consistent with the recovery plan, we can report that 
for  the  two  cod  stocks,  in  the  absence  of  unreported  fishing,  this  approach  produced 
significant deviations from the 15% and 30% rules only when biomass was lower than Blim 
(an allowable deviation under the harvest control rules) and, over the period of recovery of the 
stock delivered annual changes in biomass of 45% for North Sea cod and 21% for Baltic cod.  

73

 
 
 
 
In  all  cases  we  have  attempted  to  develop  our  Option  1  model  to  reflect  what  is  actually 
happening with that stock at the moment, and what might realistically be expected to happen 
in the years before the new control measures could come into effect. In some cases existing 
control action (for instance the JDPs in the North Sea and Baltic affecting plaice/sole and cod, 
and the actions by individual Member States) combined with the situation of the stock (high 
recent recruitment, for instance) creates a situation where some recovery of the stock will be 
expected in the next few years even with some continuing level of unreported catches. This is 
consistent  with  ICES  advice  and  the  continuing  efforts  of  Member  States  to  comply  with 
recovery plans.  

In all stock projections of this sort a large number of assumptions have to be made about the 
likely  future  state  of  reality  and  projections  to  2019  from  2007  are  necessarily  extremely 
uncertain. This does not invalidate the objective of the modelling exercise, however, which is 
to  compare  the  likely  outcomes  under  conditions  of  continuing  poor  compliance  and  under 
conditions  of  improved  compliance  that  is  assumed  to  develop  under  the  proposed  control 
actions. The various stock projections differ only in the proportion of unreported catches (or 
in  the  case  of  the  plaice/sole  model  the  proportions  of  juvenile  discards),  and  because  the 
underlying model structure is the same for all Options the results are a direct comparison of 
the benefits of increasing compliance.  

To  simulate  the  condition  when  stocks  have  recovered  to  Bpa  and  above,  we  relaxed  the 
condition F=F2007 in the second year that SSB was greater than Bpa. To be consistent with 
the  Commission’s  long  term  management  plans,  an  appropriate  F  to  apply  after  recovery 
would  be  Fpa.  However,  our  approach  was  to  be  quite  conservative  about  recruitment  (see 
below, discussions on individual case studies) choosing either the geometric mean of recent 
(10  year)  recruitment  or  allowing  a  hockey-stick  stock-recruit  relationship  to  reach  an 
asymptote of a geometric mean of the past high recruitment levels. This decision was taken to 
reflect caution that historical high recruitments, particularly in the cod and hake stocks, may 
have resulted from both high stock sizes and favourable environmental conditions. Taking a 
cautious  approach  reflects  our  view  that  recruitment  will  recover  following  a  recovery  of 
stock  size  but  that  environmental  conditions  still  remain  less  favourable  than  in  the  1980s. 
Therefore,  we  were  unable,  in  some  cases,  to  apply  Fpa  and  achieve  stable  recovered 
populations (stability in the final population was important in this exercise to avoid confusing 
reductions  in  catch  and  therefore  net  benefit  in  the  final  years).  Instead,  we  chose  a  final 
realised  fishing  mortality  level  for  when  SSB>Bpa  that  was  consistent  with  our  recruitment 
assumptions and allowed populations to reach a smoothly asymptotic maximum above Bpa.  

Kell,  L.T.,  G.M.  Pilling,  G.P.  Kirkwood,  M.A.  Pastoors,  B.  Mesnil,  K.  Korsbrekke,  P. 
Abaunza,  R.  Aps,  A.  Biseau,  P.  Kunzlik,  C.  L.  Needle,  B.  A.  Roel,  and  C.  Ulrich.  An 
evaluation  of  multi-annual  management  strategies  for  ICES  roundfish  stocks.  ICES  J.  Mar. 
Sci. 63: 12-24. (2006). 
Kelly,  C.  J.,  E.  A.  Docling,  and  E.  Rogan.  The  Irish  Sea  cod  recovery  plan:  some  lessons 
learned. ICES J. Mar. Sci. 63: 600-610. (2006). 
WWF, 2007. Midterm review of the CFP. Published in October 2007 by WWF, World Wide 
Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlilfe Fund), Brussels, Belgium. 
Cabinet Office, 2004. Net Benefits: A sustainable and profitable future for UK fishing. Report of the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, United Kingdom Cabinet Office, March 2004. 

74

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75