Commission staff working document - Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 on the organisation of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities {COM(2008)650}  {SEC(2008)2631}
Date: 2008-10-15
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: arrangement of working time, occupational safety, road safety, road transport

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2008/TREN/065 

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 15.10.2008 
SEC(2008) 2632 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

accompanying the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2002/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2002 on the organisation of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport 
activities 

{COM(2008)650} 
{SEC(2008)2631} 

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This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not 
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission 

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Lead DG: DG TREN  

Other involved services: Secretariat General, DG EMPL, DG ECFIN 

Agenda planning or WP reference: 2008/TREN/065

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT....................... 1 

1. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

3. 

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 9 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 9 

Consultation and expertise ......................................................................................... 10 

Problem definition...................................................................................................... 12 

3.1.  What is the issue or problem that may require action? .............................................. 12 

3.2.  What are the underlying drivers of the problem?....................................................... 14 

3.3.  Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? .................................................. 17 

3.4. 

3.5. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

6.4. 

6.5. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? ........................................... 17 

Does the EU have the right to act – Treaty base, ‘necessity test’ (subsidiarity) and 
fundamental rights limits?.......................................................................................... 18 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 18 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 20 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 24 

Base case scenario...................................................................................................... 24 

Economic impacts ...................................................................................................... 29 

Social impacts ............................................................................................................ 39 

Environmental impacts............................................................................................... 43 

Administrative impacts .............................................................................................. 43 

Comparing the options ............................................................................................... 46 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 51 

ANNEXES ................................................................................................................. 53 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Community  legislation  on  the  organisation  of  working  time  was  introduced  with  the 
establishment  of  the  internal  market  in  order  to  ensure  minimum  harmonized  social  rules 
throughout the Community. On 23 November 1993 the Council adopted the general working 
time Directive 93/104/EC1 which aimed to ensure that workers are protected against adverse 
effects on their health and safety caused by working excessively long hours, inadequate rest or 
disruptive  working  patterns.  This  general  working  time  Directive  excluded  from  its  scope 
certain sectors and activities, including transport, with the provisions that separate measures 
could be adopted for this sector. 

Following  intensive  consultations  with  the  social  partners,  main  elements  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  for  Community  rules  for  the  road  transport  sector  were  identified  and  the 
Commission made a series of legislative proposals in November 1998. It firstly proposed an 
amendment  to  the  general  working  time  directive,  to  extend  four  of  its  provisions  to  road 
transport  mobile  workers,  namely,  ‘adequate  rest’,  four  weeks'  paid  annual  leave,  a  free  of 
charge annual medical check-up for night workers and an average maximum weekly working 
time  of  48  hours.  This  was  introduced  by  Directive  2000/34/EC2  of  22  June  2000  with  the 
transposing  deadline  set  for  1  August  2003.  All  the  provisions  of  the  general  working  time 
Directive,  as  amended,  have  been  consolidated  in  Directive  2003/88/EC3  of  4  November 
2003. 

The  Commission  secondly  proposed  a  sectoral  working  time  directive  introducing  specific 
working time provisions for the transport sector. This became Directive 2002/15/EC4, whose 
aim is not only to protect the health and safety of mobile workers, but also to avoid possible 
distortions  in  competition  and  to  improve  road  safety.  This  Directive  establishes  minimum 
requirements in relation to the organisation of working time of persons performing mobile road 
transport activities. 

The  rules  that  entered  into  force  on  23  March  2005  impose  an  average  maximum  weekly 
working  time  of  48  hours  over  a  period  of  4  months  (extensible  to  6  months  by  collective 
agreements) and the absolute maximum weekly working time of 60 hours. Other key provisions 
concern night work (night workers may not work longer than 10 hours in each 24 hours period) 
and obligatory break after 6 consecutive hours of work (at least 30 minutes if working hours total 
between 6 and 9 hrs, and at least 45 minutes if working hours are more than 9 hrs). 

This sectoral Working Time Directive takes precedence of the general Working Time Directive 
2003/88/EC5  as  far  as  it  contains  more  specific  provisions  as  regards  mobile  workers  in  road 
transports sector. 

The Directive supplements the provisions of the main instrument applicable to all professional 
drivers,  namely  Regulation  (EC)  No  561/20066,  which  entered  into  force  on  11  April  2007 

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5 
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OJ L 307, 13.12.1993, p. 18 
OJ L 195, 1.8.2000, p. 41 
OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9 
OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 35 
OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9 
OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1 

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updating  and  clarifying  the  20-year  old  legislation  on  driving  time  and  rest  periods  of 
professional drivers. 

The  Regulation  sets  a  weekly  limit  of  maximum  56  hours  of  driving  time  with  a  maximum 
fortnightly  driving  time  of  90  hours,  establishes  rules  on  daily  and  weekly  rest  and  breaks 
(regular  daily  rest  of  minimum  11  consecutive  hours,  or  reduced  daily  rest  of  9  hours  taken 
maximum  3  times  a  week;  regular  weekly  rest  of  45  hours  every  week  at  least  once  every 
fortnight, reduced weekly rest of 24 hours must be compensated). These new driving time and 
rest period rules constitute important social advances for professional drivers. The Regulation's 
provisions apply to both salaried as well as self-employed drivers. 

Moreover,  the  Regulation  renders  the  rules  more  easily  enforced.  It  is  accompanied  by  the 
Directive 2006/22/EC7, which enhances enforcement regime and the correct implementation of 
the  provisions  of  the  driving  time  Regulation  by  establishing  minimum  requirements  for  the 
uniform  and  effective  checking  by  the  Member  States  of  compliance  with  the  relevant 
provisions. 

Box 1 summarises these different pieces of EU legislation. 

The  Commission’s  original  proposal  from  1998  of  what  has  become  Directive  2002/15/EC 
covered all employed mobile workers and self-employed drivers. However, as a result of an 
extensive conciliation procedure, an agreement was reached between the European Parliament 
and the Council that self-employed drivers would be temporarily excluded from the scope of the 
Directive. 

Article 2(1) of the Directive prescribes that its provisions shall apply from 23 March 2009 to 
self employed drivers once the Commission presents a report to the Council and the European 
Parliament,  which  would  analyse  the  consequences  of  the  exclusion  of  the  self-employed 
drivers from the scope of the Directive in respect of road safety, conditions  of competition, 
the structure of the profession as well as social aspects. Further it requires that on the basis of 
the report, the Commission should submit a  proposal either (a) to set out the modalities for 
inclusion of self-employed drivers which undertake purely national transport activities and for 
whom particular situations pertain or (b) not to include self employed drivers within the scope 
of the Directive. 

In  December  2005  the  Commission  launched  a  study  investigating  consequences  of  the 
exclusion  of  self  employed  drivers  from  the  scope  of  the  Directive  through  a  thorough 
examination  of  relevant  literature  and  data,  interviews  with  representatives  of  both  sides  of 
industry, national administrations and Commission services concerned. The consultant's final 
report 
link: 
at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/studies/index_en.htm 

the  Commission  website  under 

following 

available 

the 

is 

In the light of the conclusions set out in the consultants’ report, the Commission prepared the 
comprehensive  report8  presenting  key  findings  of  the  analysis  in  respect  of  road  safety, 
conditions  of  competition,  structure  of  profession  as  well  as  social  aspects.  The  report  was 
presented  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  May  2007  as  a  part  of  the  road 
package  adopted  by  the  Commission.  The  Council  did  not  discuss  this  report  and  the 
European Parliament discussed a draft report at the time of finalizing this impact assessment. 

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OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p.35 
COM(2007)266 final, 23.05.2007 

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In order to prepare the adequate legislative proposal with regard to self-employed drivers, as 
envisaged in the Article 2(1) of the Directive, the Commission Directorate-General for Energy 
and  Transport  (TREN)  launched  an  impact  assessment  to  investigate  economic,  social, 
environmental and administrative aspects of possible policy options. The aim of the analysis 
is  to  identify  the  best  policy  option,  which  would  be  enforceable,  avoid  unnecessary 
administrative burden as well as potential negative side-effects of the proposed arrangements 
and which would, at the same time, contribute to improving road safety, fair competition and 
social conditions of mobile workers. 

Box 1: Summary of the different social rules concerning the drivers 

1. Specific working time directive 

-  The  working  time  for  mobile  workers  in  road  transport  (mainly  drivers)  is  regulated  by 
Directive 2002/15/EC9. 

- The Directive was adopted 11 March 2002 with a final implementation date for the Member 
States  on  23  March  2005.  The  Directive  will  also  be  applied  to  self-employed  as  from  23 
March 2009 under certain conditions: the Commission must adopt a report and a legislative 
proposal. 

- The main content of the directive is as follows: 

- Average weekly working time is 48 hours (during a reference period of 4 months, extensible 
to 6 months)  

- Maximum weekly working time is 60 hours 

- Maximum daily working time is 10 hours, if it involves night work 

- A 30 minutes break is obligatory after 6 hours of work; this break shall be 45 minutes if the 
working day is more than 9 hours 

- Definition of night work and a limit of 10 hours of work when night work is performed 

2. General working time directive 

The  general  working  time  directive  2003/88/EC10,  covers  most  of  the  employed  workers. 
Mobile workers in road transport are covered by the general working time directive in those 
areas where the specific directive 2002/15/EC has no requirements. The general working time 
directive does not cover self-employed persons in any areas. 

Due to its complementary nature, the main elements from the general working time directive 
for mobile workers in road transport are: 

- Paid annual leave of 4 weeks 

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10 

DIRECTIVE  2002/15/EC  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  11 
March  2002  on  the  organisation  of  the  working  time  of  persons  performing  mobile  road  transport 
activities 
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9. 

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- Free annual medical check if night work is performed 

3. Driving time regulation 

The  main  part  of  the  working  day  of  a  driver  is  covered  by  rules  that  regulate  the  driving, 
breaks in driving as well as daily and weekly rest periods under Regulation (EC) 561/200611. 

The main provisions include: 

- Maximum weekly driving time of 56 hours 

-  Maximum  driving  time  in  two  weeks  of  90  hours,  leading  to  a  maximum  average  weekly 
driving time of 45 hours 

- Obligatory break of 45 minutes after 4.5 hours of driving 

- Maximum daily driving time of 9 hours (extensible twice a week to 10 hours) 

- Minimum daily rest of 11 hours (possibility to shorten it to 9 hours three times a week) 

-  Weekly  rest  of  45  hours  (possibility  to  shorten  it  to  24  hours  every  other  week,  but  with 
compensation three weeks later) 

- Co-responsibility of the employer and other actors in the transport chain for infringements 

4. Hierarchy of the rules 

In this context it is important to call that the main instrument for social rules in road transport 
is Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending 
Council  Regulations  (EEC)  No  3821/85  and  (EC)  No  2135/98  and  repealing  Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3820/8512, which have precise rules for maximum driving times as well 
as minimum breaks and rest periods. The additional effect of the working time directive is not 
significant  for  road  safety  and  is  mainly  intended  to  complement  the  protection  of  workers, 
receiving salary. 

The  general  working  time  directive  does  not  regulate  the  working  time  of  self-employed 
persons as it is applicable only to employees (workers). 

The specific working time directive overrules the general working time directive, but comes 
only  in  addition  to  the  Driving  time  regulation  (covering  all  drivers,  including  the  self-
employed drivers) and regulates other activity than driving, for example loading, unloading, 
other work, waiting (availability). 

The driving time and rest periods as well as working time and availability are registered with 
a recording device in the lorry, a tachograph according to Regulation 3821/85, as amended at 

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Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations 
(EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85, OJ No 
L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1 
OJ No L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1 

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the latest by Regulation 561/2006. All new lorries from 1 May 2006 have a digital tachograph 
with  electronic  driver's  cards,  whereas  the  older  lorries  have  an  analogue  tachograph  with 
paper sheets. 

Driving time is the most important activity of professional drivers which can account for up to 
56  hours  out  of  the  maximum  of  60  hours  of  weekly  professional  activity.  Thus,  the 
provisions  of  the  sectoral  working  time  directive  are  to  be  considered  as  secondary  to  the 
driving time and rest period provisions. 

2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

2.1. 

Organisation and timing  

This impact assessment has been prepared with a view to revise Directive 2002/15/EC on the 
organisation of working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities, which is 
part of the Commission's 2008 Work Programme under reference 2008/TREN/065. 

It has been conducted by DG TREN with the contribution of an Interservice Steering Group in 
which  DG  EMPL  and  DG  ECFIN  actively  participated.  Also  the  Secretariat  General,  DG 
ENTR  and  DG  MARKT  were  invited  to  participate. It builds  on various studies carried out 
during  2003,  2006,  2007  and  200813  including  two  consultations  with  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders. 

Work  on  this  impact  assessment  started  early  in  2007  with  the  preparation  and  adoption  in 
May 2007 of the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the  consequences  of  the  exclusion  of  self  employed  drivers  from  the  scope  of  the  Directive 
2002/15/EC  (COM(2007)  266  final).  By  this  report  the  Commission  fulfilled  one  of  its 
obligations specified in Article 2(1) of the Directive. The key findings presented in the report 
confirm  that  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  inclusion  or  non-inclusion  of  self-employed 
drivers  are  very  mixed  and  should  be  further  investigated  in  terms  of  economic,  social  and 
administrative impacts in order to find the most appropriate direction for policy development. 

After  the  adoption  of  the  Report,  the  outline  of  an  impact  assessment  has  been  prepared 
defining  main  problem  and  policy  objectives  and  identifying  initial  policy  options  to  be 
examined. 

In August 2007 the Commission retained consultants (contractor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) to 
carry out a thorough survey and to analyse in detail all possible impacts of proposed policy 
options. The kick-off meeting with consultants was held on 5 September 2007 with the aim to 
verify the full understanding of the scope of the assignment, discuss the extent of the analysis, 
general approach to the impact assessment and the project timetable. 

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Business  impact  assessment  concerning  sectors  whose  mobile  workers  are  excluded  from  the  general 
working  time  Directive  93/104/EC  (Cambridge  Policy  Consultants,  2003);  Study  on  self  employed 
drivers  and  night  time  provisions of  the  working  time  Directive  2002/15/EC  (TNO,  2006);  Impact  of 
the working time directive on collective bargaining in the road transport sector (European Foundation 
for  the  Improvement  of  Living  and  Working  Conditions,  2007),  Impact  assessment  concerning  the 
scope of the working time Directive 2002/15/EC with regard to self employed transport workers (PwC, 
2008),  

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The  Interservice  Steering  Group  was  established  in  September  2007  and  it  met  three  times 
(October 2007, November 2007 and January 2008) in order to gain a wider perspective, build 
mutual  understanding,  discuss  specific  problems  of  the  analyses,  fine-tune  policy  options, 
review  the  progress,  consider  desired  policy  developments  and  revise  the  consultant's  final 
report. 

During  the  work  on  this  impact  assessment,  particular  attention  was  paid  to  the  issue  of 
ensuring consistent, effective and efficient application and enforcement of the working time 
rules.  Thus  criteria  for  identifying  the  sought  policy  option  included:  improving  policy 
objectives achievement (fair competition, road safety,  health and safety of mobile workers), 
avoiding creation of administrative burdens for businesses, citizens and administrations and, 
in  the  same  time,  ensuring  enforceability  of  the  proposed  measures.  The  impacts  of  a 
legislative proposal and the present report should be considered in this light. 

It should be noted that the legislative proposal for amending Directive 2002/15/EC attached to 
this impact assessment is required by the Directive itself with the aim to finally solve the issue 
of the scope of the Directive with regard to self-employed drivers, which has been retained at 
the time of adoption of the Directive. 

2.2. 

Consultation and expertise 

The Commission services used several information sources to prepare this impact assessment: 

•  Firstly, it drew upon the results of the external study commissioned by the Commission in 
December 2005 with the aim to provide an overview of the state of implementation of the 
Directive  2002/15/EC,  to  examine  the  potential  consequences  of  exclusion  of  self-
employed drivers from the scope of the Directive, to assess the night time provisions. The 
address 
final 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/studies/index_en.htm 

consultant's 

available 

internet 

report 

the 

at 

is 

•  Secondly, it maintained regular contacts with Member States and various stakeholders as 

regards transposition and application of the Directive 

•  Thirdly, due to the complexity of the issue DG TREN outsourced an expertise to carry out 
a  study  examining  and  assessing  possible  economic,  social,  environmental  and 
administrative 
contract  with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  was  signed  in  August  2007.  The  consultant's  report  is  available 
on 
address: 
at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/studies/index_en.htm 

TREN  website 

options.  The 

the  DG 

following 

different 

impacts 

internet 

policy 

the 

of 

•  Fourthly,  views  of  different  stakeholders  have  been  collected  and  analyzed  in  the 

framework of two mentioned above studies. 

The findings of both studies have been extensively discussed within the Interservice Steering 
Group and they fed in own analysis and assessment of possible solutions. 

A variety of relevant actors have been contacted in order to obtain insight in the problems, the 
possible  solutions  and  the  impacts  of  these  solutions.  This  exercise  respected  minimum 
standards for consultation of interested parties set out in the Commission Communication of 
11 December 2002 (COM(2002)704 final). 

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The stakeholders have been consulted twice. First broad consultation has been carried out in 
2006  by  external  consultants  (TNO)  in  the  framework  of  a  study  on  consequences  of 
exclusion of self-employed drivers from the scope of the Directive. 

The consultation aimed at gathering views of different stakeholders regarding, inter alia, the 
existing  situation  with  regard  to  the  distinction  between  self-employed  drivers  and  mobile 
workers,  the  consequences  of  the  exclusion  of  self-employed  drivers  in  terms  of  working 
conditions  and  the  development  of  salaries  for  professional  drivers,  the  main  difficulties 
arising  from  the  temporary  exclusion  of  self-employed  drivers  in  each  Member  State,  the 
possible consequences of the inclusion of independent drivers within working time rules. 

Three  main  categories  of  stakeholders  have  been  consulted:  national  authorities,  industry 
representatives  and  social  partners  in  the  sector.  In  total  72  stakeholders  participated  in  the 
consultation process, including 22 employers' organizations, 17 employees' organizations and 
2 self-employed. 

The consultation has been performed by means of a questionnaire for national case studies in 
3  countries:  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Hungary  and  by  face-to-face,  e-mail 
and phone interviews with national stakeholders in other 22 Member States. 

In  addition  to  the  interviews,  the  preliminary  results  have  been  presented  at  an  European 
expert  meeting  for  road  transport  in  Brussels  attended  by  government'  and  employers' 
representatives  of  all  Member  States  and  at  a  meeting  of  European  Transport  Worker's 
Federation in Brussels, attended by a number of employees' representatives. Their views have 
also been taken into account at the analysis. 

The 2006 consultation revealed that the majority of stakeholders regard the Directive having 
mixed negative and positive impacts on different aspects. On one hand working time rules are 
regarded  by  the  majority  as  having  positive  impacts  on  health  and  safety  and  working 
conditions, but on the other hand they bring about numerous negative side-effects such as loss 
of salary, lack of drivers and increase of costs of the sector. Almost all stakeholders regarded 
enforcement  as  being  a  problematic  issue,  mainly  due  to  vague  definitions  and  lack  of 
enforcement power. As regards foreseen impacts of inclusion or exclusion of self-employed 
there  were  diverging  views  of  different  stakeholders,  in  particular  with  regard  to 
implementation  and  enforcement  issue  and  added  value  in  terms  of  road  safety  and  fair 
competition. 

The detailed results of consultation including the consultation paper are included in the final 
consultant's  report,  which  is  available  at  the  DG  TREN  website  at  the  internet  address 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/studies/index_en.htm 

In addition to this broad survey, a much more limited, but targeted consultation took place in 
2007, which was conducted by PwC within the study on impacts analysis. This consultation 
had  three  inter-related  objectives:  to  assess  the  general  definition  of  "dependent  self-
employed"  mobile  worker,  to  gain  knowledge  on  current  compliance  with  the  Directive  by 
mobile workers as well as to identify specific issues and bottlenecks with regard to potential 
inclusion of self-employed drivers in the scope of the Directive. 

An  overall  number  of  38  actors  (employers'  organizations,  employees'  organizations  and 
major transport companies) in the EU-27 countries were contacted. The participation rate in 
this  small  additional  consultation  was  low,  as  only  34%  stakeholders  responded.  This 

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confirms the lack of interest in the working time directive, which is regarded as less affecting 
the  industry  and  the  profession  than  the  driving  time  regulation  (Regulation  (EC)  No 
561/2006). 

Whilst  majority  of  respondents  regarded  that  the  Directive  causes  enforcement  problems 
which would even increase if self-employed drivers were included, the consultation revealed 
diverging  views  of  different  stakeholders  with  regard  to  impacts  of  inclusion  on  fair 
competition, social aspects and road safety. The consultation also confirmed that there is no 
consistent interpretation and application in Member States of definitions of self-employed and 
mobile workers as laid down in the Directive. This proves that the distinction between the two 
categories should be clarified to avoid misinterpretation or even fraud. The detailed results of 
the stakeholder consultation are given in the consultant's report. 

2.3. 

Impact Assessment Board 

The Impact Assessment Board treated the draft Impact Assessment in its meeting on 16 April 
2008 and gave valuable comments to improve the text in its opinion of 22 April 2008. The 
main comments concerned the lack of explanation of the relation of the specific working time 
directive with other applicable instruments, the weak problem definition, the fact that none of 
the  examined  options  was  chosen  and  the  incompleteness  of  the  analysis  of  social  impacts. 
Taking into account of these comments, the relationship between different acts is explained in 
sections 1 and 2, the problem definition has been made more clear and precise in section 3, 
the policy options have been revised in section 5 and the social impacts have been assessed in 
a qualitative manner in section 6. Other precisions and improvements according to questions 
and  suggestions  of  the  Impact  Assessment  Board  have  been  undertaken  throughout  the 
document. The second resubmitted draft was treated by the Impact Assessment Board in its 
opinion of 26 June 2008. The opinion notes the improvements in the draft Impact Assessment, 
but underlines that the problem definition should be strengthened, the options should be made 
more explicit, the indicators should be improved and the analysis of social impacts should be 
deepened.  Taking  into  account  of  these  comments,  the  problem  definition  includes  the 
shortcomings of the current directive in section 3, the options are explained more in detail in 
section 5, the indicators in sector 6 have been made more consequent and more closely related 
to the problem definition and social impacts have to the extent possible been analyzed in all 
options. 

3. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

3.1.  What is the issue or problem that may require action?  

This impact assessment and the subsequent legislative proposal deal with two issues, the main 
problem  being  the  scope  of  the  Directive  and  the  other  the  problem  of  low  level  of 
compliance with the Directive's provisions concerning the "false" self-employed drivers. The 
action  in  the  second  field  is  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  Community  rules  are 
respected and evenly and effectively applied by all actors who are in scope of them. 

Scope of the directive 

As  regards  the  first  issue,  the  action  is  foreseen  by  the  Directive,  which  prescribes  in  its 
Article 2(1) the review of certain provisions together with a description of the content of the 
modifications. This issue can be tackled solely by the action at the EU level, as a modification 

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of  the  Community  legislation  is  only  possible  at  the  Community  level  and  not  possible  by 
action of Member States. 

Compliance with the directive 

The current regulatory regime regarding social rules in road transport, as described in section 
1,  contributes  to  the  sustainable  objectives  of  the  transport  policy,  namely  aligning  the 
conditions  of  competition,  improving  road  safety  and  enhancing  the  health  and  safety 
protection of persons performing mobile road transport activities. 

Whether  the  goals  set  can  be  achieved  in  practice  depends  largely  on  the  compliance  of  all 
actors concerned with the standards that have been set by the current regulatory regime. The 
EU  legislation  is  only  efficient  and  effective  if  it  is  implemented  by  all  Member  States, 
applied  equally  to  all  actors  concerned  and  controlled  on  a  regular  basis  and  in  an  efficient 
manner. 

Compliance  with  and  enforcement  of  Community  law  are  a  joint  responsibility  of  both 
Member States and the European institutions. Member States play a crucial role in this respect 
as  it  is  their  obligation  to  ensure  correct  implementation  and  application  of  prevailing 
Community law in practice even if the ultimate responsibility is borne by the Commission as 
the "Guardian of the Treaties". 

During the earlier studies as well as at impact assessment process carried out to prepare the 
legislative  proposal  it  turned  out  that  the  working  time  rules  set  out  in  the  Directive  were 
applied  and  complied  with  throughout  the  Member  States  with  significant  delay.  Further 
investigations  and  stakeholder  consultations  carried  out  proved  the  low  level  of  compliance 
with  the  Directive's  provisions  concerning  "false"  self-employed  drivers  that  should  already 
be fully covered by the provisions of the directive. 

This  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Directive  does  not  contain  any  specific  or  even  general 
provisions  concerning  the  control  of  its  application.  The  Member  States  have  only  the 
unspecific  general  obligation  to  see  that  laws  are  applied.  Such  situation  differs  from  the 
control of driving times and rest periods, where Directive 2006/22/EC prescribes qualitatively 
and quantitatively the checks that Member States must undertake both at roadside and in the 
premises of undertakings. The Commission originally proposed that working time rules would 
be controlled together with driving time rules under Directive 2006/22/EC, but the legislator 
did not adopt this approach. 

This in fact undermines the Community rules and puts at stake achievement of the key policy 
objectives  underlying  the  Directive,  as  uneven  level  of  monitoring  and  controls  of  the 
application  of  the  Directive  creates  the  distortions  of  competition  between  those  transport 
undertakings  and  drivers  who  abide  by  the  rules,  and  therefore  bear  the  corresponding 
compliance  costs,  and  those  who  deliberately  ignore  the  rules.  In  addition  to  this,  transport 
undertakings that disobey the rules put at risk the health of drivers by consciously excluding 
them from the social protection measures provided by the Directive. 

The low level of compliance was thus identified as the main additional problem related to 
the  basic  problem  of  the  scope  of  the  Directive  with  regard  to  self-employed  drivers, 
which  needs  to  be  finally  resolved  as  foreseen  by  the  Directive.  This  situation  undoubtedly 
calls for an action at the EU level, as it would be unproductive and against the objectives of 

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the  Commission's  Better  Regulation  strategy  to  maintain  the  law  in  a  form,  which  is  not 
enforceable. 

3.2.  What are the underlying drivers of the problems? 

Consultations with stakeholders, various studies and review of the Directive's transposition as 
well  as  regular  contacts  with  relevant  national  authorities  and  social  partners  revealed 
diverging  application  of  the  working  time  rules  between  Member  States,  which  has  several 
underlying causes. These may be clustered into three main groupings of causes related to: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

the quality of transposition of the Directive 

the behaviour of some mobile workers, namely "false" self-employed 

the lack of obligations concerning the enforcement of the rules. 

The quality of transposition 

The  first  group  of  problems  relate  to  the  quality  of  transpositions  by  Member  States.  The 
timely  and  accurate  transposition  of  the  Community  law  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  pre-
requisites for the EU transport policy to function well and vital to guarantee the level playing 
field in the sector. 

Member States were given three years since the adoption of the Directive for accommodating 
their  national  systems  and  restructuring  the  working  time  organisation,  where  necessary,  in 
order  to  implement  the  Directive's  provisions.  Yet,  by  the  transposition  deadline  set  on  23 
March  2005  only  four  Members  States  had  adopted  the  necessary  national  transposing 
measures giving effect to the Directive. By the end of the year 2005 ten Member States were 
still  subject  to  infringement  proceedings  due  to  failure  to  implement  the  adequate  national 
rules  and  the  last  two  Member  States  notified  the  transposition  of  the  Directive  only  in 
January 2008. 

The review of national laws notified to the Commission also revealed numerous inaccuracies. 
The delays and inaccuracies detected in national transposing measures resulted mainly from a 
complex  process  of  public  consultations  with  social  partners  and  other  stakeholders  in  a 
majority  of  countries  and  objections  of  various  interest  groups  of  the  industry,  mainly  with 
regard  to  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  which  hindered  the  adoption  of  appropriate  law.  In 
addition, the national debates revealed that some national definitions were perceived as vague 
or  contradictory  to  other  legislation  or  rules,  which  was  another  cause  of  delay  and/or 
inaccurate transposition. 

On top, the transposition of the Working Time Directive came with the process of adoption 
and  then  preparing  of  national  measures  for  application  of  the  Driving  Time  Regulation. 
Unlike  other  social  road  transport  measures,  where  active  enforcement  is  considered 
necessary  and  undertaken  either  at  national  level  or  within  a  Community  regulatory 
framework, it appears that Member States do not accord working time rules the same level of 
priority as the enforcement of Community driving time and rest period rules. This comes from 
the hierarchy of these instruments: the directive is only supplementary to the regulation and 
all  the  main  road  safety  features  come  from  the  regulation  as  it  clearly  stipulates  the 
maximum driving times with obligatory breaks during driving periods and the minimum daily 
and  weekly  rest  requirements,  having  direct  road  safety  effects  in  addition  to  equal 

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competition  and  social  protection  of  drivers.  In  addition  to  this,  the  working  time  directive 
lacks obligations to perform control activities. 

The behaviour of some mobile workers, i.e. "false" self-employed 

The  other  group  of  problems  contributing  to  the  low  compliance  rate  concerns  the  bad 
behaviour  of  a  certain  group  directly  concerned  by  the  Directive's  provisions,  namely  the 
"false"  self-employed  drivers.  This  is  due  to  many  reasons,  including  the  low  compliance 
discipline  of  the  "false"  self-employed,  which  in  fact  are  mobile  workers  as  well  as  by 
transport  undertakings,  perceiving  some  definitions  as  ambiguous,  no  interest  in  complying 
with  the  rules  by  some  undertakings  due  to,  for  instance,  compliance  costs  to  be  borne  by 
businesses  and  related  to  the  restructuring  of  the  organisation  of  working  time  (one  time 
costs),  to  recruiting  additional  workers  as  well  as  to  administrative  costs  of  ensuring 
compliance internally and proving it externally. 

Even some employed mobile workers find no interest in complying with the Directive as in its 
result  they  would  loose  additional  income  gained  thanks  to  working  long  hours.  The 
reluctance of some transport undertakings to follow the rules, in turn, stems from perceiving 
only  short  term  negative  impacts  of  the  Directive  on  their  business,  such  as  lower  cost-
effectiveness, higher administrative costs and higher operational costs. 

The  bad  behaviour  problem  concerns  especially  those  drivers  who  regard  themselves  self-
employed,  as  they  have  no  employment  contract,  but  who  should  be  treated  as  employed 
mobile workers in the understanding of the Directive as they do not fully satisfy the criteria of 
the definition of self-employed driver laid down in the Directive. These drivers are so called 
"false" self-employed. The directive prescribes this group under a "negative" definition. In its 
article 3 e) it first defines that 

"self-employed driver" shall mean anyone whose main occupation is to transport passengers 
or goods by road for hire or reward within the meaning of Community legislation under cover 
of  a  Community  licence  or  any  other  professional  authorisation  to  carry  out  the 
aforementioned  transport,  who  is  entitled  to  work  for  himself  and  who  is  not  tied  to  an 
employer  by  an  employment  contract  or  by  any  other  type  of  working  hierarchical 
relationship,  who  is  free  to  organise  the  relevant  working  activities,  whose  income  depends 
directly  on  the  profits  made  and  who  has  the  freedom  to,  individually  or  through  a 
cooperation  between  self-employed  drivers,  have  commercial  relations  with  several 
customers. 

Then the current legal provisions go on stating by negation that 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  those  drivers  who  do  not  satisfy  these  criteria  shall  be 
subject to the same obligations and benefit from the same rights as those provided for mobile 
workers by this Directive. 

For this reason it is possible that some 'false' self-employed drivers, which should be covered 
by the directive, do not infringe the rules intentionally, while others do so. 

In any case, it is likely that "false" self-employed drivers would be detected with a fine-tuned 
definition and enforcement of mobile workers. 

Enforcement of the rules 

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This  situation  is  directly  linked  with  the  third  grouping  of  causes  related  to  enforcement 
regime,  which  depends  mainly  on  administration.  The  difficulties  with  enforcement  create 
additional occasion for "bad entrepreneurs", which are not adhering to common standards. 

The correct application of the Community law depends largely on an effective and efficient 
enforcement practice. This appears to create serious difficulties to Member States. There are 
several reasons behind such a situation. 

The Directive does not set any minimum systematic inspection requirements for working time 
rules. There are no clear principles for monitoring and control in a consistent manner of the 
application the rules. The enforcement in some Member States is therefore mainly bound to 
rely  on  complaints  from  drivers  or  on  investigations  following  an  accident,  only  the  latter 
presumably  applying  to  the  self-employed  while  in  other  Member  States  working  time  is 
controlled  at  the  same  time  as  driving  time.  Consequently,  the  controls  are  carried  out  by 
Member  States  with  different  extent  and  frequency  and  the  uneven  level  of  monitoring  and 
controls  creates  distortions  of  competition,  both  within  a  Member  State  between  operators 
committed to be fully compliant and those deliberately ignoring the rules as well as within the 
Community road transport market between Member States which apply rigorous monitoring 
practice and those who fail to check the proper application of the rules. 

The  only  requirement  related  to  enforcement  regime  imposed  on  Member  States  by  the 
Directive  concerns  the  obligation  to  lay  down  a  system  of  effective,  proportional  and 
dissuasive penalties for breaches of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. 
Almost all countries have laid down a system of penalties; but still their application remains 
sporadic due to the lack of a regular effective monitoring and control arrangements in most of 
the countries. Apart from the problem with broadness of definitions and difficulties with their 
translation into company's administration and enforcement practice, some Member State have 
also  signalled  the  poor  enforcement  capacity  (not  enough  inspectors)  as  a  cause  of  a  low 
effectiveness of enforcement of the rules. 

The shortcomings in enforcement create mainly a problem in situations when the dependent 
worker is not interested in the social protection provided by this legislation. It must be noted 
that the deliberate misapplication or unintentional misinterpretation of certain definitions and 
provisions  coupled  with  a  poor  quality  of  enforcement  results  in  the  phenomenon  of  'false' 
self-employed drivers. It is not a new phenomenon that an operator encourages its drivers to 
become  nominally  self-employed  but  working  exclusively  for  him,  known  as  ‘false’  self-
employed drivers. However, since the distinction between the definitions of 'mobile workers' 
and 'self-employed' in the working time directive is perceived vague, compliance discipline is 
low  and  the  lack  of  clear  harmonized  requirements  for  monitoring  and  controls  make  the 
application of the definitions ineffective, if not impossible. 

The category of 'false' self-employed is composed of drivers that are formally self-employed 
since  they  operate  on  hire  or  reward  and  are  not  tied  to  an  employer  by  an  employment 
contract or by any type of working hierarchical relationship, but they work regular hours for 
the  same  shipper  or  transport  firm  on  a  long-term  basis,  hence  they  depend  on  a  single 
entrepreneur for their source of income. Even though this category is not explicitly defined in 
the Directive, such drivers are subject to the same obligations and benefits as those provided 
for  mobile  workers,  as  they  do  not  satisfy  the  criteria  of  the  definition  of  'self  employed 
driver' given in Article 3 (e) of the Directive. In other words, a "false" self-employed driver is 
in fact a mobile worker. 

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The  particular  distinction  between  definition  of  'mobile  worker'  and  'self-employed  driver' 
seems not to be applied correctly, which results in enhancement of the phenomenon of 'false' 
self-employed. Definitely the direct effect of this phenomenon is the distortion of competition 
as such operators and their in-house sub-contractors ('false' self-employed) would compete on 
an unfair basis. 

3.3.  Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent?  

Several categories of stakeholders are directly or indirectly affected by the issue. 

-  Transport  undertakings  –  employers  who  are  committed  to  comply  with  the  rules  are 
directly  affected  because  they  are  confronted  with  the  competitive  advantage  of  those  who 
deliberately ignore the rules. The compliance costs that the 'good' entrepreneurs need to incur 
put them in a disadvantaged position in a short term compared with 'bad' entrepreneurs. These 
costs are in fact offset by a number of direct and indirect benefits that they gain by complying 
with the rules, but these benefits appear usually in a longer term. 

- Mobile workers – in fact it is generally in the interest of employed drivers to report all their 
working  time,  because  their  salary  primarily  depends  on  the  number  of  hours  they  have 
worked, and they enjoy the social protection measures. Hence, the non-compliance with the 
rules  by  their  employers  affects  them  directly  by  exposing  them  to  the  adverse  effects  of 
working excessive hours and disruptive working conditions putting at stake their health and 
safety.  They  are  also  faced  with  discrimination  compared  with  those  who  are  employed  by 
'complying' employers. 

- Genuine self-employed drivers – who are for the time being excluded from the scope of 
the  Directive,  are  affected  directly  by  non-compliance  of  both  operators  who  engage  'false' 
self-employed drivers as well as by 'false' self-employed drivers themselves. The first group 
gains the competitive advantage by lowering the operating costs due to using the services of 
'false' self-employed, which in consequence allows them to offer lower prices on the market 
and gain the additional market shares. The second group benefits from the same situation of 
non-limited  and  non-controllable  working  hours  as  genuine  self-employed  but  they  do  not 
bear all the burden and costs related to running own business. 

-  Enforcement  authorities  –  lack  of  clear  and  harmonized  principles  for  the  enforcement 
regime as well as uneven interpretation and application of certain definitions and provisions 
create difficulties for those who have to enforce them. 

3.4. 

How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? 

The evolution of the current situation, if no changes are initiated, should be considered in two 
aspects that are underlying the need for EU action. 

First  aspect  concerns  the  scope  of  the  Directive.  If  no  new  legislation  is  approved  by  the 
legislator  (the  Commission  being  under  a  legal  obligation  to  submit  a  proposal),  self-
employed  drivers  will  automatically  fall  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive  as  prescribed  in  its 
Article  2(1).  This  would  mean  a  need  for  additional  enforcement  capacity  and  efforts  to  be 
made to ensure the correct application of the rules by the expanded group of actors concerned. 
Bearing in mind the existing difficulties with correct application of the rules by those mobile 
workers  who  are  currently  in  scope  (especially  "false"  self-employed),  the  situation  will 
significantly worsen, if no action mitigating existing problems is taken. Checking the working 

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time of persons that do not need to note it down for salary purposes and who do not have an 
interest to register it accurately would be extremely difficult. It would also mean that the non-
compliance  could  significantly  increase  once  all  self-employed  drivers  will  be  in  the  scope, 
unless  a  tight  control  system  would  be  established  to  efficiently  monitor  every  activity  of 
these persons. Given that driving is the main activity of drivers and that all driving activities 
are efficiently controlled through the recording equipment, it is evident to conclude that the 
concerns of road safety are already addressed sufficiently by the existing legal provisions. 

Another aspect calling for action is the low compliance rate among the "false" self-employed, 
hampering  the  successful  implementation  of  the  existing  regulatory  regime.  If  no  change  is 
introduced  with  a  view  to  improving  compliance  level,  the  problem  with  misinterpretation, 
misapplication  or  deliberate  violation  of  the  working  time  rules  will  subsist  and  most 
probably  deteriorate.  This  will  make  the  Directive  a  'dead  law'  and  in  consequence  will 
negatively influence the EU transport policy objectives. 

3.5. 

Does  the  EU  have  the  right  to  act  –  Treaty  base,  ‘necessity  test’  (subsidiarity) 
and fundamental rights limits? 

The problems as described above have a trans-national dimension, as they affect the wider EU 
common transport policy objectives. The implementation and enforcement failures cannot be 
sufficiently solved by the Member States themselves and call for a more harmonised approach 
to  this  issue.  The  Directive's  provisions  cannot  be  amended  or  repealed  at  national  level. 
Hence, EU action, undertaken on the basis of Articles 71 and 137 of the Treaty, is necessary 
to ensure that the Community rules are uniformly applied and allow the internal road transport 
market  to  function  more  efficiently.  Due  to  subsidiarity  principle  and  the  fact  that  all 
legislation  in  the  area  of  working  time  consists  of  directives,  a  directive  should  be  used  in 
spite of the aspect that problems connected with the implementation of a directive could be 
overcome with a regulation which would ensure a uniform application of the rules. 

The proposal is proportionate to the problem at hand. It does not go beyond what is necessary 
to  achieve  the  objective  of  ensuring  the  effective  and  efficient  enforcement  and  full 
compliance to the rules within the existing legal framework. 

Hence, 
'proportionality' cemented in the Treaty. 

the  proposed  actions  comply  with 

the  principles  of 

'subsidiarity'  and 

4. 

OBJECTIVES 

The  White  Paper  on  Transport  "European  transport  policy  for  2010:  Time  to  decide"14 
indicated that with the road transport sector open to fierce competition, more attention should 
be  devoted  to  the  effective  implementation  and  enforcement  of  rules  improving  working 
conditions, road safety and fair competition on the internal road transport market. 

The  Communication  "Keep  Europe  moving  –  Sustainable  Mobility  for  our  continent,  Mid-
term review of the European Commission's 2001 Transport White Paper"15 confirmed that the 
effective  implementation  of  the  existing  EU  legislation  on  working  conditions  in  road 
transport sector is of a paramount importance for creating a level playing field and achieving 

14 
15 

COM (2001) 370, 12.9.2001 
COM (2006) 314, 22.6.2006 

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fundamental goals of the common transport policy. Further the Commission announced that it 
would  examine  the  rules  on  working  conditions  in  road  haulage  and  propose  adjustments, 
where needed. 

The revision of Directive 2002/15/EC is thus in line with the general policy objectives set out 
in the strategic policy documents. Its underlying aim is to ensure that the working time rules 
are better complied with and by this better contribute to achieve the EU road transport policy 
objectives,  which  in  this  issue  mainly  concern  the  social  protection  of  employees  by 
guaranteeing the safety and health of persons performing  mobile  road  transport  activities  as 
workers or persons assimilated to them. 

This translates into specific objectives of the proposed EU action. The following table gives 
an  overview  of  specific  objectives  and  their  indicators  of  achievement.  The  indicators  will 
enable to assess the progress towards the achievement of the objectives set and to measure the 
broader  results  achieved  through  actions  undertaken.  It  must  be  however  noted  that  the 
proposed  quantification  and  timeline  of  indicators  is  only  indicative,  as  it  is  based  on  the 
assumption  that  the  amending  Directive  as  proposed  by  the  Commission  is  adopted  and 
implemented smoothly. 

Table 1. Overview of the objectives and indicators 

Objectives 

Indicators 

Policy objective 
1. Improving working conditions 
2. Preventing distortion of competition 

General objective 
Improving  the  level  of  compliance  with  the 
working time rules in road transport 
Specific objectives 
1.  Clarify  the  scope  of  the  Directive  with  regard 
to self-employed drivers 
2.  Ensure  harmonious  application  of  rules 
concerning self-employed and mobile workers 
3. Ensure a common understanding of the current 
legal provisions 

4.  Provide  for  effective,  efficient  and  uniform 
enforcement of the rules by Member States 

5. Promote effective cooperation among Member 
States  and  between  Member  States  and  the 
Commission in the field of monitoring compliance 
6. Reduce / prevent the phenomenon of 'false' self-
employed 

1.  "False"  self-employed  drivers  get 
adequate social protection of workers 
2  Level  playing  field  provided  by  ensuring  the 
inclusion of "false" self-employed drivers 

the 

Compliance rate increased to 90% by the end of 
year 2012 

1.  The  amending  Directive  adopted  and 
implemented by the end of 2009 
2.  Relevant  definitions  clarified  and 
assistance  on  correct  application  of 
provisions provided by the EC, end of 2009 
3. Guidelines issued in 2010 

the 
the 

4.  Monitoring  and  control  arrangements  in 
place  in  MS,  by  end  of  2010;  number  of 
controls,  costs  of  controls,  timely  submission  of 
biennial reports by MS to the EC 
5. System of exchange of information and good 
practice  on  monitoring 
compliance  and 
identifying 'false' self-employed established 
6. Reduction of 'false' self-employed by 80% by 
end of 2012 

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All these specific objectives correspond with the identified problems. Their underlying aim is 
to ensure clarity, consistency of the rules as well as making them better enforceable. These are 
pre-requisites for attaining the general Community transport policy objectives. 

The  transposition  problem  is  to  be  solved  by  means  of  the  Commission  services'  standard 
procedures  concerning  the  monitoring  of  transposition  of  Community  law.  Therefore  the 
objective  of  improving  the  accuracy  of  transpositions  is  not  mentioned  here  as  it  is  beyond 
measures considered in the analysis of the policy options. 

The revision, aiming at better enforcement of the rules and by this at achieving EU transport 
policy  objectives,  contributes  to  the  objectives  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  to  strengthen  the 
competitiveness of the European economy as well as the drive towards "Better Regulation". 

As  indicated  in  the  Communication  "A  Europe  of  results  –  Applying  EC  law"16,  better 
enforcement of Community law, including improvements in the dialogue with Member States 
to ensure timely implementation and effective and equitable application, remains a priority for 
the  Commission  in  2008.  The  action  proposed  contributes  thus  to  the  achievement  of  the 
Commission's horizontal objectives of the Work Programme for 2008. 

Community  Charter  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  contains  certain 
provisions related to fair and just working conditions. These include the right of every worker 
to  working  conditions  which  respect  his  or  her  health  and  safety  as  well  as  the  right  to 
limitation  of  maximum  working  hours,  to  daily  and  weekly  rest  periods  and  to  an  annual 
period of paid leave. All these aspects are in the heart of the current regulatory regime in road 
transport.  Hence,  the  EU  action  aimed  at  enhancing  of  the  implementation  of  working  time 
rules specified in Directive 2002/15/EC is, at the same time, the mean to observe and promote 
the  respect  for  fundamental  social  rights  of  workers.  Lack  of  the  Community  action  would 
significantly  affect  one  of  the  fundamental  rights  specified  in  Article  31  of  the  Charter  and 
concerning fair and just working conditions. 

5. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The  previous  analysis  has  shown  that  the  existing  Directive  leaving  a  lot  of  flexibility  to 
Member States as to enforcement and containing transitory provisions as regards the scope of 
the  Directive  does  not  seem  to  work  efficiently  and  is  having  increasingly  unintended 
negative effects. In addition, the public consultation has shown that there is no consent on the 
status quo and there is a great expectation for a revision of the current regulatory regime, in 
particular  with  regard  to  the  situation  of  self-employed  drivers  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
Directive  as  well  as  various  practices  in  applying  and  enforcing  the  Directive's  provisions. 
The outcome of the stakeholder consultations provided valuable information, which has been 
used to identify the policy options. 

The  following  policy  options  have  been  identified  to  remedy  the  drawbacks  that  are 
associated with the current situation. Three of them (options A, B and D) deal with the scope 
of the Directive as this issue is the driving force for the EU action prescribed in the Directive 
itself.  Option  C,  with  its  two  sub-options,  additionally  embarks  upon  the  issue  of  the 
enforcement regime to solve the problem of low compliance. It must be, however, noted that 

16 

COM(2007) 502 

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compliance  cots  have  been  calculated  additionally  for  all  policy  options  to  gain  the  full 
picture of the costs of achieving the goal of full compliance under each option. These analyses 
are presented in section 6.5 of this report. 

Option A: 

"do nothing"  

This option would not require any action from the European Parliament and from the Council; 
however it would not mean maintaining the status quo. In accordance with Article 2(1) of the 
Directive, the automatic inclusion of self employed drivers within the scope of the Directive 
as of 23 March 2009 becomes reality when the Commission makes a proposal on the scope of 
the  Directive.  Without  the  proposal  the  Commission  has  not  fulfilled  its  obligations  from 
Article 2 of the Directive, which states that "On the basis of this report, the Commission shall 
submit a proposal, the aim of which may be either, as appropriate 

–  - to set out the modalities for the inclusion of the self-employed drivers within the scope of 
the Directive in respect of certain self-employed drivers who are not participating in road 
transport  activities  in  other  Member  States  and  who  are  subject  to  local  constraints  for 
objective  reasons,  such  as  peripheral  location,  long  internal  distances  and  a  particular 
competitive environment, or 

–  - not to include self-employed drivers within the scope of the Directive." 

The report referred to is the report adopted by the Commission on 23 May 2007. 

This option means in practice the expansion of the scope of the Directive. Hence it is not a 
"no  change"  option  that  could  be  referred  to  as  the  base  case  scenario.  This  option  would 
provide for a level playing field in terms of social rules for all persons engaged in mobile road 
transport  activities.  As  regards  consistency  with  other  policy  instruments  this  option  would 
result  in  full  alignment  of  the  Directive  with  Driving  Time  Regulation,  which  covers  both 
employed and self-employed drivers. The commitment of various stakeholders to this solution 
is diverging.  

Option B: 
drivers, except for self-employed drivers that are only performing national transport 

Extending the scope of the Directive by including all self-employed 

This  option  provides  for  including  only  self-employed  drivers  performing  international 
transport in the scope of the Directive, while leaving out of scope those self-employed drivers 
who carry out solely domestic transport operations. This option would require revision of the 
Directive with regard to its scope. The revision would involve the amendment of Article 2 of 
the Directive by specifying and defining the additional category of drivers falling in its scope. 
All other provisions would remain unchanged. This option would ascertain the level playing 
field among international hauliers, but could put them in a disadvantaged competitive position 
towards their domestic counterparts. 

Enhanced enforcement of the Directive with modalities to ensure the 

Option C: 
inclusion of “false self-employed” into the scope while keeping the genuine self-employed 
workers out of the Directive 

This  option  provides  for  inclusion  of  the  "false"  self  employed  drivers  in  the  scope  of  the 
Directive  by  providing  for  clarification  of  certain  provisions  and  adding  monitoring  and 
control requirements. 

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Three sub-options have been considered: 

C.1.: 

legal clarification within the framework of the Directive 

This  sub-option  envisages  the  issuing  of  a  legal  clarification  to  the  definition  of  mobile 
worker, which encompasses 'false' self employed drivers. This would involve an amendment 
of  the  existing  Directive  with  a  view  to  clarify  certain  definitions  so  that  no  room  for 
interpretation  is  left  as  to  who  is  subject  to  its  provisions.  This  option  could  also  involve 
publishing guidance notes or interpretative communications in order to ensure the harmonised 
interpretation and application of definitions provided in the Directive by Member States. By 
providing  for  a  better  distinction  between  drivers  in  scope  and  out  of  scope  it  would 
contribute to a reduction of the 'false' self-employed phenomenon. 

A better definition would be to complement the definition of mobile worker by clearly stating 
that 

"mobile worker" shall also mean a person although is not tied to an employer by an 
employment contract or by any other type of working hierarchical relationship, but 

i 

ii 

who does not have the freedom to organise the relevant working activities, 

whose income does not depend directly on the profits made, 

iii  who does not have the freedom, individually or through a cooperation between 
self-employed drivers, to have relations with several customers. 

This  option  does  not  involve  any  significant  direct  costs  form  the  Community  budget. 
Effectiveness and efficiency in solving the problem is expected to be high. 

C.2.:  administrative measures imposing full enforcement together with clarification of 
the categories "self-employed driver" and "mobile worker" 

From  the  problem  analysis  it  may  be  assumed  that  implementation  and  enforcement  is 
insufficiently  regulated  in  the  Directive.  Therefore,  this  sub-option  envisages  an  amending 
Directive  for  the  introduction  of  administrative  measures  to  enhance  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  of  the  enforcement  and  at  the  same  time  modify  the  definition  of  "mobile 
worker"  in  the  same  way  as  explained  in  option  C1  in  order  to  clearly  put  the  "false  self-
employed"  to  the  category  of  mobile  workers,  while  excluding  the  genuine  self-employed 
from  the  scope.  This  would  again  require  a  revision  of  the  Directive  with  a  view  to 
introducing  certain  requirements  concerning  monitoring  arrangements  and  cooperation  to 
ensure equitable application of the rules and full compliance to them throughout the Union.  

The enforcement measures would include the following elements: 

(1)  Member States shall organise a system of appropriate and regular monitoring 
and controls in order to guarantee the correct and consistent implementation 
of  the  rules  contained  in  this  Directive.  They  shall  ensure  that  the  national 
bodies responsible for enforcement of the Directive have an adequate number 
of qualified inspectors and shall take whatever measures are appropriate. 

(2)  Member  States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  details  of  the 

monitoring and controls arrangements set up.  

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(3)  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  ensure  that  transport 
undertakings and mobile workers have access to information, assistance and 
advice in the field of working time rules and work organisation.  

(4)  With a view to ensuring the effective, efficient and uniform implementation 
of  the  Directive  throughout  the  Community,  the  Commission  shall  support 
dialogue between Member States with the following aims: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

to  reinforce  administrative  cooperation  between  their  competent 
authorities, through the adoption of effective systems of exchange of 
information,  the  improvement  of  access  to  information  and  the 
promotion  of  exchange  of  information  and  good  practices  in 
enforcement of working time rules; 

to  promote  a  common  approach  to  the  implementation  of  this 
Directive; 

to  facilitate  dialogue  between  the  transport  sector  and  enforcement 
authorities. 

This  option  would  involve  certain  costs,  mainly  to  be  borne  by  Member  States,  related  to 
introduction or enhancement  of  enforcement regimes. However, these costs  would be offset 
by benefits stemming from an increased level of compliance to the rules. Full compliance will 
further lead to better achievement of the policy objectives. Hence, the net effectiveness and 
efficiency of this option would be satisfactory. 

C.3. :  'phasing-in' for 'false' self-employed 

This sub option envisages modalities for the inclusion of the 'false' self-employed workers by 
a clarification of the definition of mobile worker in the first phase in years 2009 to 2011 (as in 
Option  C.1  and  C.2)  and  from  2011  onwards,  by  introducing  monitoring  and  control 
requirements (as in Option C.2). This would involve a revision of the Directive by introducing 
the amendments and new provisions mentioned in both preceding sub-options with a timeline 
for the implementation of the respective amendments and new requirements laid down. 

Option D: 

Exclusion of self-employed drivers 

This policy option provides for the full exclusion of all self-employed from the scope of the 
Directive  without  taking  any  action  against  'false'  self-employed  drivers.  This  option  is 
explicitly foreseen by the Directive as one of the two possibilities. It would require amending 
Article 2 of the Directive concerning the scope by specifying that the Directive's provisions 
do  not  apply  to  self-employed  drivers.  This  option  could  result  in  maintaining  the 
phenomenon of 'false' self-employed drivers and would therefore not bring about the remedy 
for the problem of low compliance rate. 

This option reflects the existing situation, when self-employed drivers are at least temporarily 
excluded  from  the  scope,  as  it  does  not  generate  any  changes  in  terms  of  impacts  and  their 
indicators with relation to the current situation. Hence, this status quo option is referred to as 
the base case scenario against which the other options are measured. 

Another more radical option of repealing the Directive was initially considered. This option 
would in fact leave the situation substantially unchanged in comparison with the policy option 

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D,  as  mobile  workers  would  be  subject,  to  some  extent,  to  the  provisions  of  the  general 
working  time  Directive  2003/88/EC.  However,  it  must  be  recalled  that  the  initiative  to 
establish a sectoral working time rules for road transport workers was based on recognition of 
the  specificity  of  the  profession  that  requires  working  and  staying  away  from  home 
frequently. 

In fact, scrapping the Directive would neither solve the problem of 'false' self-employed nor 
of low compliance. Savings in compliance and administrative costs, which could be expected 
in  a  result  of  scrapping  the  Directive,  would  be  offset  by  the  same  type  of  costs  related  to 
compliance  with  the  general  working  time  directive.  Moreover,  such  solution  would 
undermine all the efforts made so far and costs incurred on EU, Member States and business 
levels to transpose the Directive and to adjust to the working time rules stipulated in it. For 
the above mentioned reasons this option has been discarded. 

It  must  be  remembered  that,  regardless  the  decision  on  inclusion  or  non-inclusion  of  self-
employed  drivers  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  self-employed  drivers  are,  equally  with 
employed mobile workers, subject to driving time, break and rest periods rules established by 
Regulation  (EC)  No  561/2006.  They  have  identical  obligations  related  to  organisation  of 
drivers'  hours  and  benefits  concerning  minimum  social  protection  standards,  which  are 
safeguarded  by  the  Regulation.  As  driving  time  constitutes  a  lion's  share  of  the  driver's 
working time, respecting driving time rules has direct effect also on working time of a driver. 

6. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

This section addresses the assessment of impacts of policy options described in the previous 
section. Policy options have been analysed with regard to: 

(1) 

(2) 

Type  of  impact  -  economic,  social,  environmental  and  additionally  administrative 
impacts; 

Policy  objective  –  social  protection  (including  health  and  safety)  of  drivers,  fair 
competition and additionally efficient and effective enforcement. 

Road  safety  has  not  been  taken  as  policy  objective,  as  this  aspect  is  tackled  already  by  the 
Regulation on driving times and rest periods. 

Having  in  mind  the  Commission's  commitment  to  Better  Regulation  strategy,  particular 
attention  was  paid  to  analysing  the  enforceability  of  each  policy  option  by  identifying  the 
possible enforcement system and costs associated with its delivery. 

The  quantified  estimates  and  monetized  values  of  impacts  have  been  provided,  where 
possible. However, due to the lack of reliable data or no data at all in certain domains, some 
analysis  had  to  be  based  on  assumptions  and  some  benefits  and  costs  are  provided  in 
qualitative  terms  describing  mainly  the  magnitude  of  the  impacts.  The  detailed  assumptions 
used for the analysis are in Annex 1 to this report. 

6.1. 

Base case scenario  

In order to assess the effects of introduction of each policy option first the base case indicators 
must be analysed. This section presents the analysis of the base case scenario (policy option D 
– exclusion of self-employed), which reflects the current situation projected to the year 2009, 

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when  the  scope  of  the  Directive  is  to  be  automatically  extended  to  cover  self-employed 
drivers, if no action is taken by the Commission. 

The main base case scenario indicators are following:  

•  Competition  and  economic  indicators  -  include  aspects  of  employment,  freight 

transported (market shares), turnover and transport costs. 

It  must  be  noted  that  although  the  main  characteristic  of  the  EU  road  transport  sector  is 
fragmentation  (95%  or  road  haulage  companies  are  micro-enterprises  of  less  than  10 
employees,  only  1%  are  companies  with  more  than  50  employees),  there  are  substantial 
differences between Member States as to the market share of self-employed and the share of 
employment by large companies. In order to get more insight into conditions of competition 
Member States have been grouped into four clusters of countries with similar characteristics 
with  regard  to  the  structure  of  the  freight  transport  market  (share  of  self-employed  and  of 
employment  in  large  companies)  and  trends  (consolidation  or  fragmentation  of  the  market). 
The  details  of  each  cluster  are  presented  in  Annex  II  to  this  report.  For  the  purpose  of  this 
report all indicators and impacts are presented in aggregated form as EU average. 

The share of self-employed drivers in the total number of all persons engaged in road freight 
transport  activities  is  about  30%,  ranging  from  94%  in  Malta  to  5%  in  Netherlands.  It  is 
expected that, for the base case scenario, the number of self-employed will increase by 0,2%, 
whereas the number of employed drivers is expected to decrease by -0,1% on annual basis till 
2009.  Hence,  the  total  number  of  all  drivers  is  expected  to  remain  substantially  unchanged 
over the next years till 2009. 

The table below shows the estimate numbers of drivers currently covered and not covered by 
the working time rules. 

Table 2. Drivers affected and not affected by the Directive (projection EU-27, 2009) 

Total number of 
drivers 

Employed drivers 
(affected) 

Self-employed drivers 
(not affected) 

2.629.477 

1.821.629  

807.848 (31% of all drivers) 

(69% of all drivers) 

national 

International 

genuine 

False 

768.021 

39.827 

525.101 

282.74717 

Assuming  the  full  compliance  with  the  rules  2.104.376  drivers  (employed  and  'false'  self-
employed) should be subject to the Directive's provisions, and 525.101 genuine self-employed 
drivers are excluded. In fact, the number of those who are really affected is much lower due to 
the low compliance rate. 

The fact that all 20% of all professional drivers who are considered genuine self-employed are 
excluded from the working time rules is sometimes perceived as hampering the establishment 

17 

The  number  of  'false'  self-employed  was  estimated  based  on  assumption  that  50%  of  those  self-
employed who work on behalf of large companies are 'false' self-employed, for more details see Annex 
1 

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of the level playing field in road transport industry. However, it must be noted that common 
minimum  competition,  road  safety  and  social  protection  standards  concerning  maximum 
driving  time  and  minimum  breaks  and  daily  and  weekly  rest  periods  are  safeguarded  by 
Regulation  (EC)  No  561/2006,  which  covers  all  employed  and  self-employed  persons 
performing  mobile  road  transport  activities.  The  Working  Time  Directive  can  mainly 
contribute  to  social  protection  of  workers.  The  main  potential  source  of  distortion  of 
competition is the employment of drivers as dependent workers by circumventing the rules on 
social protection, i.e. the establishment of a working relationship as 'false' self-employed. 

In  fact,  the  distortion  of  competition  is  rather  rooted  in  non-compliance  with  the  rules.  The 
current level of compliance is estimated for 20% and will remain substantially unchanged if 
no  mitigation  measures  on  EU  and  Member  States  levels  are  undertaken.  The  estimation  of 
the compliance rate takes into account those businesses and individuals who unintentionally 
do  not  follow  the  Community  rules,  those  who  deliberately  ignore  the  law  and  those  who 
consider  themselves  self-employed  whereas  they  are  in  fact  'false'  self-employed,  hence 
should be covered by the Directive together with mobile workers. 

As regards trends in freight transport over the period 2006-2009, the annual average increase 
of total freight transported within the national borders is expected to be 2,8% and the annual 
average growth of the international freight market 2,5%. 

The overall EU-27 sector turnover is expected to increase on average by 7,2%, and average 
yearly costs by 2,2% over the period 2006-2009. 

•  Road  safety  indicator  –  concerns  number  of  fatalities  involving  Heavy  Goods  Vehicles 

(HGVs) and caused by fatigue will not be used due to the following reasons. 

There are few data on road safety that provide insight into the causes of accidents and no data 
that relate accidents to the working hours of professional drivers. Moreover, data on accidents 
do  not  distinguish  between  employed  workers  and  self-employed  drivers.  Therefore  it  is 
difficult  to  draw  from  available  data  firm  conclusions  on  the  impact  of  inclusion  or  non-
inclusion of self-employed drivers on road safety. 

The latest available statistics on fatalities involving HGVs dating from 2006 cover 7 Member 
States. These data do not indicate the causes of fatalities. The latest study available, European 
Truck  Accident  Causation18,  indicates  that  fatigue  is  an  important  factor  in  around  6  %  of 
road  accidents.  It  must  be  noted  that  fatigue  cannot  be  directly  attributed  to  working  long 
hours, which could be only one of the numerous factors contributing to driver's fatigue. The 
main  instrument  to  tackle  this  problem  is  the  Driving  Time  Regulation  561/2006  that 
regulates in detail the maximum driving time, breaks and rest and that provides for efficient 
control.  It  is  assumed  that  the  main  reasons  for  fatigue  are  the  monotonous,  uninterrupted 
driving  hours.  Therefore,  the  driver's  fatigue  is  prevented  by  strict  enforcement  of  driving 
time  and  rest  period  rules  that  apply  to  all  drivers.  Because  of  the  disputable  benefit  of 
additional  working  time  provisions  on  road  safety,  no  quantitative  analysis  of  impacts  of 
policy options on a number of fatalities has been carried out. 

18 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/roadsafety/publications/projectfiles/etac_en.htm 

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•  Social  aspects  indicators19  –  cover  aspects  of  structure  of  profession  (working 
environment),  physical  health,  psychological  health  and  stress,  work-life  balance, 
remuneration. 

The working environment in the sector is generally characterized by the following features: 

– 

– 

– 

Psychosocial  work  profile  is unfavourable  compared  with  other  sectors:  workers  in 
transport show relatively low skills discretion, low job control and high job demands 
(e.g. just-in-time deliveries) resulting in high work pressure, little variation in work 
and  isolation,  little  support  from  supervisors  and  colleagues,  detrimental  work 
patterns (irregularity of shifts, night work); 

Ergonomic  and  ambient  conditions:  high  exposure  to  physical  load  (loading  and 
unloading trucks), prolonged sitting, violence and harassment by customers, threat to 
personal  security  from  theft  and  physical  assault,  noise  vibrations,  extreme  cold 
temperatures, variations in temperature, air pollutants; 

Driver  related  factors:  overweight,  lifestyle,  unhealthy  meals,  lack  of  physical 
exercise; 

These features concern in general employed as well as self-employed drivers. However, self-
employed report to have a better job control, less monotonous work, higher job demands and 
tasks variety, but they work longer hours than mobile workers who comply with the working 
time rules. 

In freight transport the average weekly working time of self-employed drivers is estimated for 
66 hours on average in national haulage and for 52 hours in international service. In passenger 
transport  self-employed  drivers  work,  on  average  in  national  and  international  carriage,  no 
longer  than  48  hours  per  week.  Consequently,  no  major  potential  impact  is  expected  in  the 
passenger transport sector in any of the policy options. Therefore only road freight transport 
has been considered in further analysis. 

All these working environment factors prove to have adverse effect on drivers20: 

•  physical health – musculoskeletal disorders (30%), backache (37%), problems with vision 

(12%), headaches (18%); 

•  psychological  health  and  stress  –  stress  (35%),  sleeping  problems  (12%),  overall  fatigue 

(30%); 

•  work-life  balance  –  due  to  working  irregular  shifts  combined  with  overnight  stays  away 
from  home  drivers  report  difficulties  in  conciliating  work  and  family  life/social 
commitments outside work (25%). 

Working fewer hours undoubtedly diminishes the exposure of drivers to all these factors that 
affect occupational safety and health risks. Hence, in general drivers should have an interest 
in complying with the social protection measures provided by the Directive. 

19 

20 

No data on effects of introduction of the Directive on structure of profession are available, the social 
aspects  have  been  thus  described  in  qualitative  terms  based  on  the  description  and  some  figures 
presenting the situation in social sphere prior to the Directive's implementation. 
Figures describe the situation prior to the introduction of the Directive 

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Self-employed drivers, being currently excluded from the working time rules, are thus more 
exposed to the adverse effects on their health and safety as well as on work-life balance due to 
working  long  hours.  On  the  other  hand  they  benefit  from  their  income  level  remaining 
unaffected  by  the  reduction  of  working  hours.  In  addition,  they  have  a  different  mentality 
towards work, as they are not in a hierarchical position, but their own bosses, which mean that 
the negative effects are psychologically diminished. 

A  decrease  in  income  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  Directive  does  not,  in  general, concern 
employed workers whose salaries are usually safeguarded by means of collective bargaining. 
However, several drivers lose some part of their income related to working overtime, which 
results in higher stress and fatigue caused by taking on additional jobs to compensate for the 
lost  income.  These  consequences  of  a  reduction  of  the  income,  to  some  extent,  offset  the 
benefits stemming from the compliance with the rules. 

The described above base case situation reflects the impacts of introduction of the Directive. 
The  Figure  1  illustrates  these  impacts  in  terms  of  costs  and  benefits  for  industry  resulting 
from compliance with the working time rules. 

Figure 2. Costs and benefits of compliance with the Directive 

Impacts of Directive's 
provisions  

Individuals 

Businesses

Society

Cost  
–reduction in total 
pay 
Benefit  
–health and safety 
-quality of life 

Costs:  
-reorganisation of labour supply 
-reorganisation of working time 
-additional administration  
- the same pay for less hours worked 
Benefits: 
-fewer work interruptions and downtime 
due to fewer accidents and absenteeism 
-increased flexibility from reorganising 
work 

Cost  
–possible increase of consumer 
prices 
Benefit  
–more attractive employment 
opportunities 
-less accidents 

Improved 
productivity and 
quality 

Net additional 
costs of production 

Better working 
conditions and 
safer services

Source: Business Impact Assessment Working Time Directive – Supplementary report for mobile workers in sea transport 
and road transport, Cambridge Policy Consultants 2003 

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6.2. 

Economic impacts 

In  the  economic  analysis  the  following  aspects  have  been  considered:  changes  in  weekly 
driving time due to limitation of weekly working time, changes in weekly profit, demand for 
road transport not satisfied due to reduction of working hours, number of additional drivers 
required  to  satisfy  the  demand,  additional  yearly  and  one  time  costs  related  to  recruiting 
additional drivers, redistribution of market shares, changes in total costs of transport service, 
administrative costs. The impacts of policy options A, B, C are analysed against the current 
situation which is presented in option D (status quo) serving as the base case scenario. 

The assessment of impacts is based on the assumption of the 20% compliance rate. 

Option A: 

"do nothing" 

As indicated in section 5 of this report policy option A, although it does not require any action 
by the European Parliament and by the Council, but would require the Commission to adopt a 
proposal on the scope of the directive, would not mean maintaining the status quo. In fact, it 
would  result  in  changing  of  the  scope  of  the  Directive  by  automatic  inclusion  of  self-
employed drivers as of 23 March 2009. 

Self-employed  drivers  performing  national  freight  transport  operations  work  on  average  66 
hours  per  week,  and  those  engaged  in  international  haulage  work  on  average  52  hours  per 
week.  The  inclusion  of  self-employed  drivers  envisaged  in  this  option  would  thus  require  a 
reduction of weekly driving time (by 27% for drivers performing national transport and 8% 
for  international  freight  transport  drivers)  due  to  abiding  by  weekly  working  time  limit  of 
average 48 hours. 

Calculation method for weekly working time 

The  weekly  average  working  time  was  calculated  by  adding  a  maximum  average  weekly 
driving  time  of  45  hours  and  a  weekly  time  devoted  to  other  activities  included  in  the 
definition  of  working  time  (loading,  unloading,  waiting  at  logistics  centres,  maintenance, 
etc.). Weekly time devoted to activities other than driving was calculated based on a number 
of weekly full trips per class of distance x unit time of the activity (e.g. unit time of loading of 
1 ton  or unit  waiting time). In  case of  time for loading this is  additionally  multiplied by  an 
average load of a truck for a class of distance.  

Example [of Denmark] for distance class of average 200 km: 

Total  weekly  loading  and  unloading  time  =11,7  trips/week  *  70%  of  full  trips  *  9  minutes 
(time unit of loading + unloading of 1 ton) * 9,9 tons/trip = 12,16 hours/week. 

Total weekly waiting time = 11,7 trips/week * 30 minutes = 5,85 hours/week 

Total weekly working time = 45 hours driving + 12,16 hours loading and unloading + 5,85 
hours waiting + 1 hour of other activities = 64.01 hours 

Hence  in  case  of  self-employed  drivers  [in  Denmark]  performing  trips  on  200  km  average 
distance the reduction of working time would equal 25% (change from 64 hours to 48 hours 
per week). 

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The  reduction  in  weekly  working  time  would  result  in  inability  of  the  self-employed  to 
transport  the  same  amounts  of  tons.  In  order  to  maintain  the  same  level  of  turnover  they 
would have to employ another driver and hence to incur additional related costs. This would 
lead consequently to a loss of income, which is considerable in case of self-employed drivers 
performing national transport. It is estimated that their weekly profits would reduce by more 
than 72% on average, which would cause leaving the entrepreneurial activity by them. In case 
of international drivers (who constitute 5 % of all self-employed and 1,5% of total number of 
drivers  in  the  sector)  their  weekly  profit  would  decrease  by  20%  on  average  in  result  of 
reducing working time, hence it is assumed that they would remain in the business. 

Calculation method for change of weekly profits 

Reduced number of weekly trips = (reduced driving time / distance class) * commercial speed 
per distance class. Example [of Denmark]: 33,7 driving hours/week / 200 km * 52 km/hour = 
8,76 trips/week 

Average number of tons transported weekly per 1 km = average load per trip * number of 
weekly trips * % of full trips * average distance class. Example [of Denmark]: 9,9 tons/trip * 
8,76 trips/week * 200 km * 70% = 12.141 tkm/week 

Weekly turnover = average tons transported weekly per 1 km * national unit value of 
turnover/tkm. Example [of Denmark]: 12.141 tkm/week * 0,23 €/tkm = 2.793 €/week 

Weekly profit = weekly turnover – weekly costs. Example [of Denmark]: 2.793 €/week – 
1.967 €/week = 826 €/week 

The weekly profit before reduction of working time (calculated based on the same 
methodology) equalled 1.822 €. Hence, the reduction  in weekly profit in this example is 55%. 

The reduction of working time of self-employed drivers would also indirectly affect transport 
companies  who  sub-contract  self-employed  drivers  to  benefit  from  certain  flexibility  in 
capacity needed to face workload peaks. In effect, these companies, in order to maintain the 
same  amount  of  freight  transported,  would  have  to  either  hire  additional  drivers  or  sub-
contract other self-employed. Both scenarios would entail additional considerable costs to be 
borne. These costs would consist in the case of employing new drivers of cost of personnel, 
maintenance, insurance, fuel, toll, taxes, one-off costs (e.g. driver's training) and in the case of 
sub-contracting  other  self-employed  of  costs  of  additional  outsourcing  of  transport  services. 
The second scenario is however unlikely due to limited capability of existing self-employed 
drivers for taking on additional contracts. Limited possibility for outsourcing freight transport 
services  and  a  need  to  employ  additional  drivers  would  also  lead  to  loosing  the  flexibility, 
which  companies  currently  enjoy  by  sub-contracting  some  transport  services  to  self-
employed. 

In  summary,  a  reduction  of  working  and  therefore  driving  time  of  self-employed  drivers 
would entail the following consequences on employment and market shares redistribution: 

(1) 

Current number of professional drivers on the market would not be able to satisfy the 
same  amount  of  freight  transport21.  It  is  estimated  that  in  order  to  meet  the  market 

21 

unsatisfied yearly demand would reach 1.340 million tons in case of full compliance and 268 million 
tons in a situation of 20% compliance level 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

demand for freight transport services approximately 59.000 of new drivers would need 
to appear on the market. 

19  %  of  self-employed  drivers  (ca.  153.500  drivers)  would  not  be  able  to  continue 
their  business  due  to  reduction  of  weekly  profit  and  hence  would  close  down  their 
entrepreneurial  activity.  The  reduction  rate  of  self-employed  drivers  was  calculated 
assuming that the maximum impact of this option will be that all self-employed drivers 
performing national freight transport (95% of all self-employed) will close down their 
business  due  to  the  considerable  reduction  of  more  than  50%  of  their  weekly  profit. 
The  realistic  (based  on  current  level  of  compliance  of  20%)  reduction  rate  of  self-
employed will thus be 19% which represents 20% * 95% of all self-employed  

In  order  to  meet  an  unsatisfied  market  demand  for  freight  transport  (created  due  to 
decreased  number  of  self-employed  and  reduced  working  capacity  of  those  who 
remained  in  business),  big  transport  companies  would  absorb  former  self-employed 
drivers  who  close  down  their  businesses  and  would  additionally  need  to  employ 
59.000  new  drivers.  In  total  transport  companies  would  have  to  employ  ca  212.500 
drivers in order to satisfy the market demand for transport of goods; 

If  new  drivers  are  found  on  the  market  then  total  employment  in  the  sector  would 
increase  by  2,2%,  and  the  structure  of  employment  would  change  in  the  following 
way: a number of employed drivers in total employment would increase by 8% and a 
share of self-employed drivers in total employment would decrease by almost 6%; 

If  the  additional  drivers  needed  are  not  found  on  the  market  then  it  would  lead  to  a 
shortage  of  drivers  and  difficulties  with  satisfying  the  market  demand  for  freight 
transport. 

In result of increased employment in transport companies their operating costs would 
increase significantly and in effect the overall EU-27 cost of transport would increase 
by  1,1%  (around  3.500  million  euros).  The  impact  of  additional  transport  costs  on 
GDP  would  be  around  0,02%.  This  would  cause  an  increase  in  the  final  consumer 
prices, which are not possible to estimate; 

Further  consequence  of  the  changes  in  employment  structure  would  be  a  substantial 
change  in  the  structure  of  the  market  with  a  redistribution  of  market  shares.  It  is 
expected that large companies would gain additional 1.5% market shares22 connected 
with the service that former self-employed drivers used to provide as shippers. Small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) would manage to maintain the same market share, but 
they would lose market power due to concentration process. 

As  regards  administrative  costs  of  this  option,  no  additional  costs  related  to  reporting 
(monitoring  system,  data  collection  and  analysis,  elaboration  of  the  biennial  report)  by 
Member States to the Commission on the implementation of the Directive will be borne. 

The option will, however, impose additional administrative requirements (recording working 
time  and  reporting  obligations)  on 
the  self-employed.  This  will  entail  additional 
administrative tasks ensuring the compliance internally and proving the compliance externally 

22 

In a situation of 100% compliance this gain would reach 7,3% 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
                                                 
including restructuring the organisation of working time, setting up and operating system for 
monitoring  the  working  time.  These  general  administrative  activities  are  not,  however, 
counted as working time of self-employed; hence they do not require a reduction of rewarded 
working / driving time and consequently do not entail direct administrative costs. 

Employers who will recruit additional drivers will incur higher administrative costs relating to 
recording, elaborating and reporting of data collected on these newly employed drivers. It is 
estimated  that  these  enterprises  would  incur  €  1.275.887  a dditional  administrative  costs23 
related to employing 212.500 new drivers. 

On one hand inclusion of self-employed drivers is seen as providing for level playing field for 
all  professional  drivers  and  aligning  conditions  of  competition  between  self-employed  and 
companies.  On  the  other  hand  inclusion  is  perceived  as  unfair  towards  self-employed,  as  it 
will give a competitive advantage to large companies who, realizing economies of scale, are 
able  to  adjust  their  work  organisation  to  the  rules  much  easier  without  losing  business  and 
market position. 

Positive impacts  

•  Level playing field for all persons performing mobile road transport activities; 

•  Elimination of 'false' self-employed phenomenon; 

•  Increase in number of employed drivers in large companies and potential increase of total 

employment in the sector; 

•  Increase of competitive advantage of large companies (which are better suited to cope with 
reduced working hours by realising economies of scale) resulting in a further strengthening 
of  consolidation  process  in  the  structure  of  the  road  freight  transport  in  countries  where 
large companies are dominant. 

Negative impacts 

•  Adverse  effects  on  entrepreneurship  development  -  a  number  of  self-employed  (who 
generally rely on low costs and long working hours) leave the market because of decrease 
in turnover or increase in operating costs due to recruiting a second driver – both resulting 
in loss of income; becoming self-employed drivers becomes less attractive; decrease in the 
number of self-employed in total employment; 

•  Disruptive  effect  on  the  position  of  the  sector  in  countries  with  a  high  share  of  self-
employed  in  the  total  employment  –  their  competitiveness  would  decrease  significantly 
compared with those countries where large companies are dominant; 

•  SMEs lose their market power due to concentration process; 

•  risk of a shortage of drivers and unsatisfied market demand for freight transport services, if 

additional drivers needed are not found on the market; 

•  Loss of flexibility by large companies who will not be able to outsource the same amount 
of transport services to self-employed and in order to meet the market demands will have 
to employ additional drivers; 

23 

Details of calculation are provided in the section 6.5 of this report concerning administrative impacts 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  Slightly  higher  administrative  costs  for  employers  related  to  monitoring,  recording  and 

reporting working time of additionally recruited drivers; 

•  Rise  in  transport  costs  resulting  from  bearing  by  large  companies  additional  yearly  and 

one-time costs of recruiting new drivers; 

•  Risk of increase in the final consumer prices of freight transport services; 

•  Maintaining or lowering the low compliance rate – a number of genuine self-employed and 
current  'false'  self-employed  drivers,  in  order  to  maintain  the  level  of  income,  will 
disregard the working time rules counting on no or poor effectiveness of monitoring and 
controls regime. This further result in rising non-compliance costs (penalties). 

Option B: 
drivers, except for self-employed drivers that are only performing national transport 

Extending  the  scope  of  the  Directive  by  including  all  self-employed 

In case of international transport, the reduction of driving time due to the compliance with the 
working  time  rules  would  be  approximately  8%  (decrease  from  52  to  48  hours  of  average 
weekly working time). As a result, part of the demand (ca. 3,3 million tons per year) could not 
be  satisfied  by  the  same  number  of  drivers.  Having  in  mind  high  labour  costs  it  is  unlikely 
that self-employed drivers would hire a second driver to maintain the same level of turnover. 
It is thus considered that these drivers would accept a slight reduction of their turnovers and a 
consequent decrease in their incomes by 4% in order to remain on the market. 

It is estimated that in order to meet the market demand for transporting the same amount of 
freight large companies would need to employ additionally 579 new drivers, which represents 
increase  by  0,02%  in  total  employment  in  the  sector  (increase  of  number  of  employed  by 
0,03%).  In  the  same  time  the  share  of  self-employed  drivers  in  total  employment  would 
decrease by 0,06 %. Hence, no substantial change in employment in the sector would appear. 

The cost of transport would increase by 0,012% (ca. 35 million euros), which would not have 
a  noteworthy  impact  on  a  level  of  GDP,  therefore  no  increase  in  final  consumer  prices  is 
expected. 

Large  companies  would  absorb  the  exceeding  demand  for  transport  from  market  shares  of 
self-employed  drivers  working  as  shippers  and  would  gain  market  shares  in  international 
market insignificantly taking over only 0,02% of market shares. 

International  self-employed  drivers  would  gain  benefits  stemming  from  social  protection 
measures,  but  in  the  same  time  they  would  find  themselves  in  a  disadvantaged  position 
towards  their  domestic  counterparts,  without  evidence  that  they  are  more  prone  to  fatigue, 
stress  and  other  adverse  effects  of  unlimited  and  uncontrolled  working  hours  than  domestic 
self-employed  drivers.  Effectiveness  in  achievement  of  the  fair  competition  objective  could 
thus appear to be low. 

As for Option A no additional administrative costs will be borne by Member States' national 
administrations  due  to  reporting  obligation  and  the  increase  in  annual  administrative  costs 
(recording  and  reporting  working  time)  incurred  by  road  transport  enterprises  due  to 
recruiting  additional  drivers  will  be  insignificant  €  3.659  (0.3%  of  the  respective  costs  in 
option A). 

Positive impacts  

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
•  Level playing field for all drivers involved in international road transport activities; 

•  Significant reduction of 'false' self-employed phenomenon among international drivers; 

•  Slight increase of employment rate in large companies operating internationally; 

Negative impacts 

•  The  problem  of  the  phenomenon  of  'false'  self-employed  drivers  continues  in  national 

transport (only insignificantly reduced); 

•  International  self-employed  drivers  experience  a  slight  reduction  in  turnover  and 

consequently a loss of income; 

•  Disruptive effect on the competitive position of international self-employed drivers against 

their domestic counterparts; 

•  Small  rise  in  transport  costs  resulting  from  additional  yearly  and  one-time  costs  of 

recruiting new drivers; 

•  Slightly  higher  administrative  costs  for  employers  related  to  monitoring,  recording  and 

reporting working time of additionally recruited drivers;  

•  Maintaining the low compliance rate; 

Option C: 
Enhanced  enforcement  of  the  Directive  with  modalities  to  ensure  the 
inclusion of “false self-employed” into the scope while keeping the genuine self-employed 
workers out of the Directive 

In  accordance  with  the  Directive  all  those  drivers  who  do  not  fall  under  the  category  of 
'mobile  worker',  but  who  do  not  satisfy  all  the  criteria  of  the  definition  of  'self-employed 
driver'  should  be  treated  as  mobile  workers  and  comply  with  the  working  time  rules.  In 
practice,  however,  many  such  drivers  regard  themselves  as  self-employed  in  order  to 
circumvent the working time rules. These are called 'false' self-employed drivers. The purpose 
of this policy option is to eliminate or at least significantly reduce the phenomenon of 'false' 
self-employed drivers, which will consequently contribute to increasing the compliance rate 
and eliminating the risk of distorting the competition. 

C.1.: 

legal clarification within the framework of the Directive 

A  legal  clarification  of  definitions  of  self-employed  driver  and  of  mobile  worker  as  well  as 
recognition of other category of drivers that do not satisfy fully the criteria of neither of the 
two definitions would help to avoid misinterpretation regarding scope of the Directive. Clear 
distinction  between  who  is  and  who  is  not  subject  to  working  time  rules  would  contribute 
considerably  to  reducing  the  number  of  'false'  self-employed  who  regard  themselves  self-
employed  due  to  wrong  interpretation  of  legislation.  It  would,  however,  not  eliminate  from 
the market those 'false' self-employed who intentionally disobey the rules. It is estimated that 
around 10%24 (28.275 drivers) of all 'false' self-employed would be affected as a consequence 
of legal clarification. 

Due  to  a  weak  financial  capability  of  'false'  self-employed  they  would,  most  probably, 
become  employees  of  companies  for  whom  they  have  been  working  so  far  rather  than  start 

24 

This  calculation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  50%  of  'false'  self-employed  are  those  who  do  not 
comply due to misunderstanding/misinterpretation of the law. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
                                                 
their  own  business  and  become  real  self-employed.  Consequently  the  number  of  employed 
drivers  would  increase  by  1,5%  and  the  total  employment  in  the  sector  would  remain 
unchanged as these drivers would only change their status from being officially self-employed 
to an employee. 

'False' self-employed are normally recorded in national statistics as self-employed, therefore 
the reduction of the number of 'false' self-employed by 10 % would result in a reduction in the 
total number of self-employed by 3,5%. However, this should be seen as a positive aspect as 
it  is  connected  with  the  reduction  of  'false'  self-employment  phenomenon.  No  significant 
change in total employment in the sector would appear as the reduction in the number of self-
employed  (due  to  reduction  of  'false'  self-employed)  would  be  offset,  to  some  extent,  by 
increased employment in large companies. 

In  general  'false'  self-employed  tend  to  be  less  expensive  than  the  real  self-employed. 
Therefore, large companies who used to outsource transport services to 'false' self-employed, 
would  rather  employ  the  former  'false'  self-employed  than  sub-contract  more  expensive 
genuine self-employed. They would not face additional costs by employing these drivers as it 
is  assumed  that  their  wages  (with  additional  costs  of  fuel,  tolls  etc.)  would  equal  the  costs 
previously paid for the outsourced service. 

However, in order not to lose completely their flexibility in meeting market demands in peak 
seasons and to be able to transport the same amount of freight, large companies would need to 
outsource  to  real  self-employed  drivers  the  service  connected  with  the  transport  of  the 
exceeding demand. This would create additional costs for these companies estimated for 631 
million  euros  every  year  (0,2%  of  total  transport  costs).  On  the  other  hand  genuine  self-
employed drivers outsourced by large companies would increase their turnover by around 1% 
(in a situation of 100% compliance rate the turnover could increase by almost 5%). 

By  recruiting  additional  drivers  (former  'false'  self-employed)  companies  would  face 
additional annual administrative costs of € 160.729 related to  recording and reporting working 
time of these drivers. 

No  redistribution  of  market  shares  would  happen  as  'false'  self-employed  drivers  work 
anyhow as subcontractors of large companies. As the rise in transport costs are expected to be 
insignificant this sub-option would not have an impact on consumer prices. 

Positive effects 

•  Reduction of the number of 'false' self-employed (those who misinterpret the law) leading 

to some improvement of compliance rate; 

•  Possible increase of the turnover of real self-employed; 

•  Increased attractiveness of the profession (resulting from increased demand for outsourcing 
services  and  elimination  of  'false'  self-employment)  which  could  lead  to  new  businesses 
creation; 

•  Aligning the conditions of competition between salaried mobile workers and some 'false' 

self-employed. 

Negative effects 

•  Large companies incur additional costs to relocate the unsatisfied demand for transport and 

additional annual administrative cost related to reporting for newly recruited drivers; 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
•  Large  companies  who  employ  additional  drivers  to  satisfy  the  freight  transport  demand 

lose partly their flexibility. 

•  Phenomenon of 'false' self-employed continues in force. 

C.2. :  administrative measures imposing full enforcement together with clarification of 
the category of "mobile worker" 

This  sub-option  envisages  introducing  new  provisions  concerning  monitoring  general 
compliance  as  well  as  proposing  new  measures  aiming  at  full  enforcement  of  the  working 
time rules to 'false' self-employed drivers in addition to a clear definition of "mobile worker" 
with a view of ending the phenomenon of "false" self-employed drivers. 

There are two types of measures considered in this sub-option: 

(1) 

(2) 

Fine-tuning  of  the  definitions  in  order  to  make  the  concept  of  mobile  worker  clear 
without ambiguity to cover also the "false" self-employed drivers. 

New provisions in the amending Directive imposing on Member States obligation to 
establish  monitoring  and  control  arrangements  in  order  to  enhance  enforcement,  to 
cooperate  among  themselves  and  with  the  Commission  in  the  field  of  common 
understanding and application of the rules, to exchange best practices and experience 
in  identifying  and  mitigating  the  phenomenon  of  'false'  self-employed.  These 
provisions also envisage the commitment of the Commission to support and facilitate 
dialogue  between  Member  States  as  well  as  between  industry  and  enforcement 
authorities. 

These  measures  entail  some  enforcement  efforts  and  related  costs  to  be  borne  mainly  by 
Member States. These measures include: 

– 

– 

Identification  of  'false'  self-employed  –  involves  coverage  in  the  enforcement  of 
working  time  also  those  mobile  workers  that  were  in  the  grey  area  of  "false  self-
employed"  in  order  to  identify  them.  This  enforcement  would  be  carried  out  by 
checking  the  outsourcing  contracts  at  outsourcing  enterprises'  premises,  self-
employed  drivers'  premises  or  based  on  the  information  available  in  labour 
inspectorates  or  other  national  entities.  It  is  estimated  that  annual  EU-27  costs  of 
inspections would vary from €1,9 million for checking 5%  of self-employed drivers 
to € 7,9 million for a 20% target.   

The  method  of  calculation:  Average  annual  cost  of  inspection  aimed  at  identifying 
'false'  self-employed  =  average  duration  of  a  check  60  minutes  *average  cost  49 
€/check  (2009  prices)  *  %  of  self-employed  drivers  checked  (targets  analyzed  5%, 
10%, 15%, 20%). Average cost per check was calculated taking account of: cost of 
inspector  40  €/hour  in  2003  prices  (includi ng  the  equipment  and  indirect  costs)  + 
additional costs 3 € per check in 2003 prices  (legal and administrative preparations, 
initial training of inspectors, communications and software, etc.). These costs were 
then projected to 2009 prices considering expected average EU-27 inflation rate. 

Enforcement system – involves development of a more harmonized system of checks 
on compliance with working time rules. This system would be based on the example 
of  enforcement  regime  set  up  for  checking  compliance  with  the  driving  time 
Regulation's  provisions.  These  checks  would  be  performed  at  intermodal  freight 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
terminals,  at  client's  premises  and  at  other  places  where  goods  are  collected  or 
delivered.  This  system  would  enable  to  check  activities  which  are  currently  not 
possible to be verified by enforcers checking driving time rules, that is loading and 
unloading,  waiting  time  at  logistic  centres.  The  cost  calculations  have  been  made 
based on different targets that is1%, 2%, 3% and 4% % of working days checked. It 
is  estimated  that  the  annual  costs  of  carrying  out  of  checks  would  vary  from 
€182million (1% target) to € 726 million (4% target). 

The method of calculation: average duration of a single check of 40 minutes means 
that an inspector will perform1,5 check per hour. Cost of inspection is 33,80 €/check. 
Annual cost of checks = number of all drivers concerned* 200 days worked by each 
driver each year * target of days worked to be checked (1%, 2%, 3%, 4%) * unit cost 
per check. Example: total number of drivers affected by the Directive (employed and 
self-employed)  2.688.000  drivers  *  200  days/driver/year  *  4%  days  worked  per 
year* 33,80 €/check = 727 million €/year. 

The enforcement actions proposed here affect all employed mobile workers as well as all self-
employed  (genuine  and  'false')  and  they  aim  not  only  at  identifying  and  eliminating  'false' 
self-employed but also at improving the compliance by employed mobile workers. This sub-
option addresses completely the problem of low compliance rate by removing its main causes 
(ambiguous definition, bad behaviour of drivers and enterprises, inefficient enforcement). 

In  a  situation  of  full  compliance  this  action  would  affect  100%  of  'false'  self-employed. 
However, as the analyses are based on the current low compliance rate it is thus expected that 
around 20% (56.550 drivers) of 'false' self-employed will disappear from the market and that 
the overall compliance rate will increase significantly. The reduction of 'false' self-employed 
coupled  with  an  improvement  of  compliance  discipline  of  employers  and  mobile  workers 
(stimulated by threats of checks and penalties for infringements) and the fully correct national 
transpositions would result in a full compliance in longer term. 

The reduction of 'false' self-employed will be reflected in national statistics as the reduction of 
the total number of self-employed by 7%. This shall be seen as the positive phenomenon as 
the decrease is connected with the reduction of 'false' self-employed, which is the objective of 
this sub-option. 

As  a  consequence  of  reducing  the  number  'false'  self-employed  the  unsatisfied  demand  for 
freight  transport  would  be  doubled  (468.807.712  tons)  compared  with  sub-option  C1.  This 
means  that  in  order  to  maintain  the  current  amount  of  freight  transported  large  companies 
would: 

(1) 

face  additional  costs  by  outsourcing  transport  services  of  the  exceeding  demand  to 
genuine  self-employed  (who  are  normally  more  expensive  than  the  'false'  self-
employed), it is expected that additional annual costs would amount 1.2 million euros, 
that is increase by +0,4% of total transport costs; 

(2) 

loose partly its flexibility by employing some of the former 'false' self-employed – this 
would not cause additional significant costs for employers. 

The new outsourcing service required by large companies would result in 2% increase of the 
average yearly turnover of genuine self-employed drivers. This would enhance attractiveness 
of the profession and stimulate the creation of new entrepreneurs. 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
The  administrative  costs  borne  by  companies  who  employed  additional  drivers  in  order  to 
take  over  the  market  share  that  self-employed  would  not  be  able  to  satisfy  would  rise  by  € 
321.459. However, these costs would not be significantly high, as they are connected with the 
additional  recording  and  reporting  efforts  (time  and  cost  of  the  company's  administration 
staff) for newly employed drivers. 

As the increase in total transport costs (around 0,4%)is expected to be low the final consumer 
prices will not be affected. 

The distortion of competition between those employed drivers who comply with the rules and 
those salaried and non-salaried drivers ('false' self-employed) who disobey the law would be 
prevented. In addition the competitive position of genuine self-employed would not be put at 
stake  by  'false'  self-employed  who  equally  (although  unlawfully)  benefit  from  unlimited 
working time (with all its consequences), but do not bear the same costs, responsibilities and 
risks related to running own business. 

Positive impacts 

•  Significant  reduction  of  'false'  self-employed  phenomenon,  which  in  a  situation  of  full 
compliance  would  lead  to  almost  full  elimination  of  the  phenomenon  of  'false'  self-
employed from the market; 

•  Possible increase of the turnover of real self-employed; 

•  Increased attractiveness of the profession which could lead to new businesses creation; 

•  Clear definition of mobile workers; 

•  Harmonized  enforcement  regime  across  EU  and  improved  transparency  of  application  of 

working time rules; 

•  Significantly  improved  compliance  rate  resulting  from  reduction  of  'false'  self-employed 

and better compliance by employed drivers and companies; 

•  Reduced, and in longer term eliminated risk of distorting the competition between drivers 

and undertakings covered by the Directive's provisions; 

•  Safeguarded competitive position of genuine self-employed. 

Negative impacts 

•  Large companies incur additional costs to relocate the unsatisfied demand for transport and 

additional annual administrative costs related to reporting for newly recruited drivers; 

•  Large  companies  who  employ  additional  drivers  to  satisfy  the  freight  transport  demand 

lose partly their flexibility; 

•  Additional costs of carrying out enforcement measures to be borne by national authorities. 

C.3. :  'phasing-in' for 'false' self-employed 

This  sub-option  envisages  'phasing-in'  procedure  for  the  inclusion  of  'false'  self-employed 
drivers within the scope of the Directive. It splits the measures proposed in sub-option C2 by 
a timescale: 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
(a) 

(b) 

providing  a  legal  clarification  of  definitions  -  in  the  first  phase  (years  2009-
2011), in order to eliminate 'false' self-employed linked to misinterpretation of 
the law; 

introducing  administrative  and  enforcement  measures  -  in  the  second  phase 
(from  2011  onwards),  in  order  to  eliminate  the  remaining  majority  of 
'intentional' 'false' self-employed from the market. 

In fact the impacts (positive and negative) of this sub-option would be very similar to those of 
sub-option C2, with some figures (e.g. regarding increase of turnover of real self-employed, 
increase  of  transport  costs)  only  insignificantly  higher  or  lower.  However,  these  results  are 
expected to materialize later than in the sub-option C2, hence problems underlying the action 
would be solved at a later stage. 

Administrative costs borne by businesses and enforcement costs incurred by Member States 
would also be the same but spread over the longer period of time. 

6.3. 

Social impacts 

Working time is one of the key dimensions of working conditions, a dimension which has an 
impact  well  beyond  work.  The  length,  scheduling  and  organisation  of  working  hours  are 
important determinants of the quality of work which has a direct effect on worker's health and 
safety,  work-life  balance  and  job  satisfaction.  Another  important  key  dimension  of  working 
conditions is remuneration, which also considerably influences worker's quality of life.Taken 
together,  all  these  aspects  contribute  to  an  image  of  the  profession,  one  which  to  date  has 
proved  insufficiently  attractive  to  counteract  the  continuing  shortage  of  professional  drivers 
throughout the Union. 

Work  can  impact  on  health  in  numerous  ways,  and  a  worker's  state  of  health  can  in  turn 
impact  on  how  work  is  being  carried  out.  In  case  of  professional  drivers  a  job  quality 
performance has a wider social impact as it directly may involve road safety including safety 
of  persons,  vehicle  and  its  load.  Therefore,  it  is  of  interest  of  all  to  ensure  a  high  quality 
working conditions of professional drivers. 

In  terms  of  income,  the  studies  show  that  for  those  Member  States  where  self-employed 
drivers form a large proportion of the sector, income is considered to be in the high bracket – 
this  reflects  the  long  hours  that  such  drivers  normally  are  expected  to  work.  For  those 
Member  States,  where  a  relatively  small  percentage  of  self-employed  drivers  serve  mainly 
larger transport companies as subcontractors, a lower income bracket is the norm. Exclusion 
of the self-employed allows them to maintain their income level, as well as their competitive 
position within the sector. While the Directive does not address the issue of profitability it is 
evident that this is a key aspect for the future viability of the self-employed driver. Applying 
the Directive’s provisions directly to self-employed drivers would have an inevitable impact 
by rendering the profession less financially attractive. 

The studies have confirmed that inclusion of self-employed drivers would reduce the physical 
workload  to  be  undertaken  by  them.  For  the  psycho-social  work  profile  in  the  sector,  the 
studies  note  that  work  demands  would  have  to  be  managed  within  a  shorter  timeframe, 
leading to a loss in job control. 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
It should be remembered that the profile of the self-employed driver is a young entrepreneur. 
Given  the  continuing  chronic  shortage  of  drivers  within  the  sector,  such  drivers  have  the 
choice  of  becoming  a  mobile  worker  or  a  self-employed  driver.  The  latter  offers  them  the 
possibility of increased job control and higher income, with the need to invest more time and 
energy to make it profitable. 

While exclusion of self-employed drivers from the Directive is not contributing to additional 
health  or  better  work/life  balance,  their  inclusion  would  generate  additional  stress  and 
administrative  workload  for  the  self-employed  and  at  the  same  time  would  reduce  their 
income. The social balance in the options is therefore related to which extent and under which 
conditions the self-employed are expected to be covered by the legislation. 

Geographical illustration of social aspects of all workers in the sector is assessed contain the 
following aspects: 

•  North (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) 

–  irregularity in working hours 
–  need of skill development 
–  physical load 
–  less work-related health problems, but still more absences from work 

•  Middle  (Belgium,  Germany,  Luxemburg,  Austria,  The  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom 

and Ireland) 

–  relatively low income 
–  regular working times 
–  less responsibilities 
–  exposure to ambient conditions, exposure to violence and intimidation 
–  less work-related health problems, but still more absences from work 

•  South (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece) 

–  many self-employed 
–  relatively high income 
–  regular working times 
–  less control and less skilled work (including training opportunities) 
–  physical risks, but not violence and intimidation 
–  more work-related health problems 

•  New Member States (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the 

Czech Republic) and Lithuania+Latvia: 

–  long working days, but not in the evening/nights 
–  desire to work more hours 
–  exposed  to  ambient  conditions,  but  low  physical  workload,  violence  and 

intimidation 

–  mixed profile on psychosocial risks: less skilled work, low control over working 

times 

It seems from the experience in these different geographical areas that tradition has shaped the 
market,  the  actors  and  the  attitude  towards  work  and  working  conditions,  which  will  stay 
different even when Community legislation on working time has been applied. The same rules 
have  had  different  consequences  in  different  regions  and  absences  from  work  seem  not  to 
correlate to real underlying causes. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
In  this  context  the  policy  options  have  been  analyzed  with  a  view  to  establish  positive  and 
negative impacts of each option in terms of physical health, psychological health and stress, 
work-life balance and road safety. 

Option A 

Limiting working hours of self-employed drivers by including them within the scope of the 
Directive  (Option  A)  would  reduce  the  exposure  to  job-related  physical  load  and  violence. 
Self-employed drivers would be indeed protected against adverse effects of working excessive 
long  hours  on  their  health  and  safety.  Providing  that  the  intensity  of  work  will  not  increase 
due  to  limited  working  hours,  the  inclusion  would  further  contribute  to  improving  self-
employed drivers' health and safety and to lessening the fatigue and stress. This would lead to 
improving driving quality and could in turn have a small effect on the overall improvement of 
road safety. 

Working  time  is  obviously  a  vital  element  in  linking  and  balancing  work  and  life.  Hence, 
reducing hours spent at work would help self-employed drivers in reconciling work and non-
working activities (family and social commitments). 

However,  this  cause-effect  relation  is  highly  simplified.  The  positive  effects  are  offset  by  a 
number of negative impacts. The inclusion would impose on self-employed drivers to: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Either  resign  from  a  part  of  their  turnover  and  hence  lose  a  significant  part  of  their 
income, which would cause higher stress related to the need of lowering living costs, 
greater fatigue and stress resulting from taking on extra jobs illegally25 to compensate 
for lost income; 

Or  to  employ  a  second  driver  in  order  to  maintain  amount  of  freight  transported, 
resulting  in  increasing  the  operating  costs  and  hence  in  lowering  the  profits,  which 
would further lead to higher stress due to worsening living standards; 

Or to maintain the operating costs and the level of freight transported by increasing the 
intensity of own work, which would in turn lead to a very high time pressure, lower 
job  control,  greater  fatigue,  health  problems  and  stress  -  all  contributing  to 
endangering road safety. 

Work-related  stress  could,  in  addition,  negatively  affect  family  life  diminishing  the  gain  of 
better life-work balance gained by working fewer hours. 

When  considering  the  social  impacts  of  inclusion  of  self-employed  drivers  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  Directive  only  covers  a  proportion  of  a  self-employed  driver’s  work. 
Such driver is still able to work excessive hours as the following activities are excluded from 
the  self-employed  working  time:  going  to  see  the  accountant/lawyer,  general  administrative 
work not linked to the specific transport operation underway. The risk arises that in order to 
compensate the lost income self-employed driver would take on an extra job. 

25 

Taking on extra job legally is restricted by Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, which requires that all work 
carried  out  by  a  driver,  within  or  outside  transport  sector,  should  be  recorded.  Hence,  in  order  to 
compensate for the lost income by taking on extra job drivers would work illegally by not respecting the 
rest periods as prescribed in the Regulation. 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
                                                 
On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  noted  that  self-employed  drivers  make  money  essentially  by 
driving, and this is the element that has been successfully targeted by the driving time rules. 
The  opinions  of  stakeholders  with  regard  to  the  impact  of  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  self-
employed on the road safety are diverging. Some state that the Regulation on driving and rest 
time  is  sufficient  to  guarantee  road  safety  and  that  accidents  might  even  increase  when 
working  hours  are  limited  (more  trucks  on  the  road,  higher  pressure  on  drivers).  Others 
indicate  that  a  reduction  of  working  time  is  necessary  from  the  viewpoint  of  safety, 
particularly  in  countries  where  a  significant  number  of  drivers  is  self-employed.  However, 
only  minority  of  stakeholders  expect  that  exclusion  of  self-employed  drivers  might  have  a 
negative impact on road safety. 

Taking  into  account  the  very  limited  contribution  of  working  time  to  road  safety  and  the 
importance  of  negative  side-effects  of  imposing  working  time  limits  to  self-employed,  it  is 
assumed  that  the  estimated  improvements  in  health/safety  and  work-life  balance  will  be 
largely  undermined  by  the  loss  of  earnings  and  the  overall  impact  of  inclusion  of  the  self-
employed will be very negative. 

Option B 

The qualitative positive and negative impacts of this option would be the same as in option A. 
Only  the  overall  dimension  of  these  impacts  would  be  much  smaller,  as  the  number  of 
affected  self-employed  drivers  is  lower.  It  is  expected  that  around  8.000  of  complying  self-
employed  drivers  performing  international  freight  transport  (out  of  ca.  40.000  of  all 
international freight transport self-employed) would be affected by the reduction of working 
time hours and its consequences26. Moreover self-employed drivers performing international 
freight  transport  work  on  average  shorter  hours  (52  hours)  than  those  involved  in  national 
transport  (average  66  weekly).  The  reduction  in  their  working  time  will  be  thus  minor,  by 
only 8%. Consequently also the effects in terms of the overall fatigue reduction prevention are 
expected  to  be  insignificant,  if  any.  In  addition,  work-life  balance  is  not  improved  by  a 
smaller amount of working hours, as these additional free hours incur abroad, but the negative 
effects of loss of earnings stay. 

Option C 

All three sub-options C aim, in general, at mitigating and preventing a phenomenon of 'false' 
self-employed. Options C2 and C3 additionally provide for measures to enhance compliance 
with  working  time  rules  of  all  drivers  covered  by  these  rules  by  enhancing  enforcement 
regime.  Hence,  social  impacts  of  option  C1  will  be  limited  by  relatively  small  number  of 
'false' self-employed drivers (approximately 28.000 of 'false' self-employed who misinterpret 
the law) affected by the working time rules. As 'false' self-employed give usually higher value 
to  their  spare  time  than  real  self-employed  they  are  expected  to  truly  benefit  from  an 
improved work-life balance as a consequence of following working time rules. Their job will 
become  less  stressful,  as  being  salaried  worker  does  not  involve  a  risk  losing  an  income  in 
case  of  an  entrepreneur's  failure.  Shorter  working  hours  will  reduce  driver's  exposure  to 
factors  influencing  occupational  safety  and  health  risks.  Coupled  with  less  stressful  job 
demands drivers affected will gain, in longer term, better psychological and physical health, 
less fatigue. Yet the contribution to better road safety will be insignificant. 

26 

Compared  with  ca.  161.000  complying  self-employed  (out  of  808.000  all  self-employed  drivers) 
affected by reduced hours in option A. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
In case of option C2 and C3 social impacts are expected to be of the same type, but larger in 
their  scope.  This  is  due  to  that  measures  proposed  address  much  broader  group  of  drivers, 
namely all 'false' self-employed (not only those who misinterpret the law unintentionally) and 
all employed who do not comply with the rules. As "false" self-employed drivers will get the 
social  protection  of  workers,  it  is  estimated  that  they  gain  in  health  and  safety,  in  work-life 
balance and job satisfaction, while they will not be subject to loss of earnings or in any case to 
a very limited loss. Therefore the overall social impact is estimated to be very positive. . 

6.4. 

Environmental impacts 

In theory all options could result in the modal split of the freight transport industry and/or in 
an  increase  of  the  number  of  trucks  on  the  roads.  These  could  have  direct  environmental 
impacts. However, as a reduction of working time affects mainly drivers engaged in short and 
medium distance freight transport, it is very unlikely that unsatisfied market demand would be 
shifted to rail or air transport modes. Hence, no positive environmental impact by shifting the 
service to more environment-friendly mode of transport such as rail is expected. 

A  reduction  of  working  hours  may  also  result  in  recruiting  additional  drivers  and  hence 
engaging additional vehicles. However, as it does not entail the increase of quantity of freight 
to be transported, thus no more vehicles are needed to run simultaneously, hence no negative 
effects on the environment are expected. 

6.5. 

Administrative impacts 

The revision of the Directive should also be seen in the light of compliance costs. Compliance 
costs  mean  the  costs  incurred  by  the  Commission,  Member  States  public  authorities, 
enterprises and citizens in meeting legal obligations stemming from the Community rules. In 
other words these are all costs that are necessary to bear in order to ensure that the rules are 
effectively, efficiently and equitably implemented. These costs include generic costs specific 
to  functioning  of  a  given  sector,  transposition  costs,  enforcement  costs  and  administrative 
costs27. 

The  low  level  of  compliance  with  the  Directive's  provisions  identified  as  the  main  problem 
besides  the  scope  of  the  directive  will  not  be  solved  by  simply  revising  the  scope  of  the 
Directive.  Without  ensuring  effective  enforcement  of  the  rules  exclusion  of  self-employed 
drivers could lead to enhancing the phenomenon of 'false' self-employed, and inclusion could 
result in deliberate disobeying the rules counting on weakness (or lack) of the monitoring and 
control system. Both situations would lead in fact to lowering the level of compliance. 

Therefore, to gain a better picture of costs of all policy options from the viewpoint of ensuring 
compliance,  the  enforcement  measures  proposed  in  option  C2  (and  C3)  have  been  analysed 
for each policy option. 

The table below presents the summary of annual costs related to ensuring compliance with the 
Directive. These costs include administrative and enforcement costs borne by Member States 
(management  of  data,  checking  the  status  of  self-employed  in  order  to  identify  'false'  self-

27 

Administrative costs mean the costs incurred by enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authorities and 
citizens  in  meeting  legal  obligations  to  provide  information  on  their  activities  either  to  public  or  to 
private parties. – "Measuring administrative costs and reducing administrative burdens in the European 
Union", Commission Working Document, COM(2006)691 final. 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
                                                 
employed, carrying out checks at intermodal freight terminals to verify the compliance with 
working time rules by all drivers concerned) and administrative costs borne by private sector 
(costs  of  recording,  monitoring  and  reporting  working  time).  These  costs  do  not  include 
administrative costs borne by Member States in relation to preparation of a biennial report to 
the Commission on implementation of the Directive, as these costs will not change. 

The details of calculations of annual enforcement and administrative costs to be borne by EU, 
national public sector and private sector can be found in Annex III to this report. 

Parties 
affected by 
cost 

Identifying of 
"false" self 
employed drivers 
(20% target) 

Enforcement 
system (costs for 
4% target) 

Monitoring and 
reporting28  

Total 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

Op. A  

Op. B  

Op. C.1  

Op. C.2  

Op. D  

0 

727.047.048 

727.047.048 

1.275.887 

1.275.887 

509.626.991 

3.659 

0  

509.626.991 

3.659 

0  

533.532.100 

533.532.100 

7.916.505 

570.549.464 

494.774.878 

160.729 

160.729 

0  

578.465.969 

321.459 

321.459 

0  

494.774.878 

No change  

0 

Source: Own calculations and Impact assessment concerning the scope of the working time directive 
2002/15/EC with regard to self-employed transport workers, PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2008. 

The results of analysis show that Option A is the most costly as it imposes the highest costs 
for Member States related to establishing enforcement system and carrying out checks and the 
highest costs for private sector related to recording, monitoring and reporting of working time. 
In addition Option A was proved to be the most difficult from the viewpoint of enforceability, 
as  it  is  almost  impossible  to  verify  the  reliability  of  working  time  records  done  by  self-
employed drivers and control all activities such as waiting time at client's premises. Hence the 
effects and costs that would be needed to provide for a reasonable level of compliance would 
be disproportionate to the results achieved. 

28 

Including collection and elaboration 

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
                                                 
The least costly, in general, is option D (base case scenario). This option, which maintains the 
current temporary regime, does not involve any actions that could create additional costs. This 
option, however, results in high non-compliance costs as it does not solve the problem of non-
compliance. 

The cheapest option considered is option B (30% less compliance costs compared with costs 
of  option  A).  It  entails  insignificant  administrative  costs  for  private  sector  equalling  only 
0,3% of respective costs in option A; and around 2% of compliance costs in options C. On the 
other hand enforcement costs of option B borne by Member States due to carrying out checks 
are only slightly lower than those in options C (5 % less than option C1 and 12 % less than 
option C2 and C3). Hence option B is the cheapest from the viewpoint of administrative costs 
for businesses and almost as expensive as options C in terms of enforcement costs. However, 
option B does not significantly improve the situation with regard to the phenomenon of 'false' 
self-employed.  Options  C.2  and  C.3  seem  to  represent  the  best  effectiveness  in  solving  the 
problem  of  low  compliance  by  eliminating  its  underlying  causes  and  in  the  same  time  their 
efficiency in achieving the expected results is achieved without excessive costs involved. The 
funds invested and administrative efforts made seem to balance best in options C.2 and C.3. 

The main options may also be put to a simplified table: 

Parties 
affected by 
cost 

Identifying of 
"false" self 
employed 
drivers (20% 
target) 

Enforcement 
system (costs for 
4% target) 

Monitoring and 
reporting29  

Total 

Total additional 
costs, euro per 
year * 

0 

233.548.057 

Op. A  

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

Op. 
C2 
(= approximately 
B)  

EU 

MSs 

Op. D  

Private 
sector 

EU 

MSs 

Private 
sector 

727.047.048 

727.047.048 

1.275.887 

1.275.887 

0  

84.012.550 

7.916.505 

570.549.464 

578.465.969 

321.459 

321.459 

0  

0 

494.774.878 

494.774.878 

No change  

0 

* As the enforcement costs in option D are costs that are assumed to be borne already today 
by  the  Member  States,  these  costs  may  be  set  as  zero  and  count  the  cost  of  options  as  the 
additional cost of the option. 

29 

Including collection and elaboration 

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
                                                 
7. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

This section presents strengths and weaknesses of each policy option based on comparison of 
economic,  social  and  administrative  impacts  of  all  options  and  from  the  perspective  of  the 
achievement  of  specific  policy  objectives.  The  policy  options  are  compared  based  on  the 
following  criteria:  effectiveness  (level  of  achievement  of  policy  objectives),  efficiency 
(resources needed to achieve these objectives), consistency (balance of positive and negative, 
direct  and  indirect  impacts),  compliance  costs  (net  increase  or  decrease),  proportionality 
(complexity of proposed intervention) and subsidiarity (to what extent does the intervention 
leave  scope  to  national  decisions?).  It  must  be  noted  that  the  impacts  concern  those  drivers 
who are affected by the policy option and who comply with the provisions, and not all drivers 
who should comply. 

Table 3. Main impacts of policy options per policy objective compared to base case scenario 
option D 

Policy 
objective 

Working 
conditions  

Type of impact 

Option A 

Option B 

Option C.1 

Option C.230 

Physical health 
and safety, 
psychological 
health and work-
related stress 

Work-life 
balance  

+ /-  

+  

+  

Only SEI who 
comply benefit 

Some FSE 
benefit 

(only FSE who 
misinterpret 
the law) 

Reduced exposure 
to physical load 
and safety risks, 
but increased 
workload, fatigue 
and stress due to 
taking on extra 
job illegally, 
stress due to 
reduced income 

+/-  

+ 

+ 

Better fit, but risk 
of worsening 
family life due to 
lower income 

Some FSE 
benefit (FSE 
more interested 
in social 
protection than 
GSE) 

++  

Many FSE 
benefit 

++ 

Many FSE 
benefit 

Remuneration of 
SEN 

- 72% reduction 
of weekly profit 

=  

+ 1% increase 
of turnover 

+ 2% increase of 
turnover 

Remuneration of 
SEI 

- 4,2% reduction 
of weekly profit 

- 4,2% 
reduction of 
weekly profit 

= 

= 

Road safety 

Scarce,  incomplete  and  incomparable  data,  implausible  assumption  on  share  of  fatalities 
caused by fatigue and lack of information on causes of fatigue make it impossible to analyse 
the  quantitative  impacts  of  policy  options  on  number  of  fatalities  which  could  be  prevented 
under each option. However, generally it can be concluded that working time as such does not 
have effect on road safety as this question is mainly dealt with by the Driving time regulation. 

Conditions of 
competition  

New jobs in the 
sector 

+ / - 

2,2% increase in 
total employment 
if additional 
drivers are found 

= level of total 
employment 
maintained (+ 
0,02% increase 
of employed 
offset by -0,01 

= 

= + 

Increasing 
number of new 
entrepreneurs in 
longer term  

30 

Option C3 is option C2 phased in over 2 years 

EN 

46 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Policy 
objective 

Type of impact 

Option A 

Option B 

Option C.1 

Option C.230 

decrease of 
self-employed 
in total 
employment )  

(change of 
employment 
structure: + 8% of 
employed drivers 
and - 6% of self-
employed in total 
employment)  

Risk of shortage 
of drivers if 
additional drivers 
are not found 

No. of SE 

- -  

-  

=  

= 

19% reduction 
and remaining SE 
loose competitive 
position and 
market share 

SEI 
disadvantaged 
compared to 
SEN 

No. of FSE 

n.a. 

=/- may reduce 
by a number of 
international 
'false' self-
employed 
affected  

No. of genuine 
self-employed 
remains 
unchanged 

However, due 
to elimination 
of 'false' self-
employed, the 
national 
statistics will 
show decrease 
by 3,5% in a 
no. of self-
employed 

Reduction of 
10% 

SMEs 

=/- maintain 
market share but 
loose market 
power 

= 

= 

Large Companies  ++ Gain market 

share 1,5% 

+ Gain market 
share 0,2% 

= 

No. of genuine 
self-employed 
remains 
unchanged 

However, due to 
elimination of 
'false' self-
employed, the 
national statistics 
will show 
decrease by 7% in 
a no. of self-
employed 

Reduction of 20% 
to be further 
reduced in long 
term due to more 
effective 
enforcement  

= 

= 

Cost of transport  + 1,1% 

+ 0,01% 

+ 0,2% 

+ 0,4% 

Consumer prices 

Increase 

=/insignificant 
increase 

=/insignificant 
increase 

=/insignificant 
increase 

Compliance 

Probability of 
inclusion of FSE 

Full 

Very low  

Low 

High  

(in theory as they 
may not comply) 

(small no. of 
FSE affected) 

(affected only 
those FSE who 
misinterpret 
the law)  

(affected all FSE 
and all employed 
drivers, due to 
better 
enforcement 
regime) 

++ Improve 
significantly 

General 
compliance  

- Reduce (broader 
group of drivers 
concerned 
coupled with the 
same low level of 

=  

+ Improve 

insignificant 
improvement if 
international 
FSE are 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
Policy 
objective 

Type of impact 

Option A 

Option B 

Option C.1 

Option C.230 

compliance 
discipline and 
weak 
enforcement) 

eliminated is 
offset by the 
risk that SEI 
ignore rules 

Identification of 
FSE  

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

Increase  

€ 1,9 to 7,9 
million (depends 
on target 5%, 
20%) 

Enforcement 
(checks on 
compliance) 

Administrative 
costs by public 
sector (reporting 
by MS) 

Administrative 
costs by private 
sector  

Increase 

€ 182 to 727 
million (depends 
on target level 
1%-4%) 

Increase 

€ 127 to 
509million 

Increase  

€ 133 to 534 
million 

Increase  

€ 143 to 
571million  

= 

= 

= 

= 

Increase (annual) 

Increase 

€ 1.275.887  

€  3.659 

Increase  

€  160.729 

Increase 

€  321.459 

Legend:  FSE  –  'false'  self-employed,  GSE  -  genuine  self-employed,  SEI  –  self-employed  performing 
international transport, SEN – self-employed performing national transport 

They key conclusions of options comparison are summed up below: 

(1) 

(2) 

The "no change" option D – used here as base case scenario - would leave the situation 
generally  unchanged,  self-employed  drivers  who  are  temporarily  excluded  would  be 
permanently  excluded  from  the  working  time  rules.  Assuming  that  the  transposition 
problem is solved by the Commission standard action, the problem of low compliance 
rate would remain unsolved. In fact the compliance rate could even worsen with a time 
passing by, as the low compliance discipline and weak enforcement are not removed. 
This  would  further  lead  to  undermining  the  key  policy  objectives.  Hence,  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of this option is low. The balance of impacts is negative. 
As it does not foresee any complex interventions there would be no effects from the 
viewpoint of proportionality and subsidiarity. 

The "full inclusion" Option A – clarifies the issue of the scope of the Directive making 
all professional drivers subject to the rules. It will only partly and indirectly addresses 
the  problem  of  low  compliance  by  including  'false'  self-employed  (together  with  all 
self-employed) within the scope of the Directive. Changing the scope does not ensure 
that these drivers will comply with the rules. On the contrary, broader target group of 
the Directive coupled with 'unwanted' rules and with weak enforcement would result 
in  worsening  the  general  compliance.  It  will  maintain  the  existing  room  left  to 
Member States (subsidiarity) as regards the enforcement regime. The effectiveness of 
achieving  the  policy  key-objectives  would  be  overall  lower  than  expected  although 
higher  than  for  base  case  scenario.  The  intervention  will  not  be  complex 
(proportionality)  but  may  occur  unenforceable  with  regard  to  monitoring  the 
compliance  by  self-employed,  which  would  be  very  difficult,  costly  and  inefficient. 

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(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

This option increases significantly administrative costs for private sector. The balance 
of impacts is negative. 

Option  B  –  changes  the  scope  by  including  only  self-employed  drivers  performing 
international  transport,  who  are  in  fact  less  affected  by  working  time  rules  than 
'domestic' self-employed drivers. It does not solve the problem of low compliance and 
does not improve the effectiveness in achieving policy objectives compared to the "no 
change"  option.  It  leaves  room  to  Member  States  (subsidiarity)  as  regards  the 
enforcement  regime.  The  complexity  of  intervention  is  low  but  it  causes  adverse 
effects  in  terms  of  uneven  conditions  of  competition  between  international  and 
domestic self-employed drivers. The administrative costs for businesses are the lowest 
of all options. The impacts are insignificant from the perspective of policy objectives, 
main problem to be solved and enforceability of the Directive. 

Option  C1  –  provides  only  for  legal  clarification  which  will  lead  to  reducing  those 
'false' self-employed who misinterpret the law. The impact of this action on reducing 
the  phenomenon  of  'false'  self-employment  and  improving  compliance  level  is 
minimal. Also the effectiveness and efficiency in achieving policy objectives does not 
significantly  improve  compared  to  base  case  scenario.  This  non-complex  action 
(proportionality)  provides  for  better  understanding  of  the  scope  of  the  Directive 
leaving room to Member States (subsidiarity) as regards the enforcement of the rules. 
The balance of impacts is slightly positive. 

Option C2 (and option C3) – tackles almost entirely the problem of both the definition 
of the mobile worker and the low compliance by introducing a better definition as well 
as an effective enforcement regime. The effectiveness in reducing the phenomenon of 
'false'  self-employed,  and  consequently  in  solving  the  compliance  problem,  is  the 
highest of all options. This further leads to improved effectiveness in achieving policy 
options. However, the relatively high enforcement costs to be borne by public sector 
and  complexity  of  intervention  bears  the  possibility  of  a  risk  of  low  proportionality 
compared to results achieved. Still, administrative costs borne by private sector are 4 
times  lower  than  in  option  A.  The  option  imposes  enforcement  requirements  on 
Member  States  that  leave  room  for  national  decisions  (in  accordance  with 
subsidiarity). The positive impacts are lowered by some additional costs. 

Conclusions 

From  the  above  analysis  it  can  be  concluded  that  of  the  analysed  options  C2  is  optimal. 
Options A, B, C1 do not solve the problem of low compliance and consequently do not lead 
to better achievement of policy objectives. Option C2 (followed by C3) is the most effective 
in  addressing  the  problem  and  achieving  policy  objectives,  being  at  the  same  time  complex 
with additional costs, but guaranteeing nearly full compliance. 

Therefore  it  is  recommended  that  the  EU  intervention  concerns  clarifying  the  scope  of  the 
Directive  and  introducing  administrative  requirements  concerning  the  enforcement  of  the 
rules. 

The proposed alternative is thus option C2. This option means in a nutshell: 

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(1) 

(2) 

a legal clarification of definitions providing a clear distinction between those who are 
and who are not in the scope of the Directive and ensuring that 'false' self-employed 
are covered by the Directive; 

requirements  imposed  on  Member  States  to  establish  an  effective  system  of 
monitoring  the  compliance,  to  notify  the  Commission  of  the  national  enforcement 
arrangements, to ensure the assistance and advisory services to those concerned by the 
rules,  to  cooperate  with  other  Member  States  and  with  the  Commission  in  order  to 
ensure  a  harmonized  understanding  and  application  of  the  rules,  to  exchange 
information, experience and best practices; 

(3) 

commitment of the Commission to support the dialogue between Member States and 
the industry and enforcement authorities. 

This option imposes general enforcement requirements on Member States and highlights their 
responsibility  for  compliance  (proportionality)  while  leaving  the  particular  solutions  to  the 
discretion of individual national decisions (subsidiarity). This will ensure that the enforcement 
regime is tailored to the existing national arrangements and enforcement capabilities of each 
country  while  providing  for  common  understanding  of  the  rules  and  harmonized  general 
approach to their implementation. 

It is assumed that this option would entail the following qualitative impacts: 

•  a reduction of ‘false’ self-employed phenomenon and in a number of transport companies 
and  drivers  non  complying  with  the  rules  resulting  from  enhanced  enforcement  by  MS, 
better  clarity  of  provisions,  improved  responsibility  of  Member  States  for  monitoring 
compliance, raised corporate social responsibility within the sector, 

•  improvement of an overall compliance rate in longer term, 

•  eliminated  distortions  of  competition  between  companies  and  drivers  who  comply  and 
those who used to disobey the rules – resulting from improving compliance discipline and 
better enforcement, 

•  better working conditions for drivers who were excluded (against their will or knowledge) 
from social protection measures provided for in the Directive by their employers who used 
to disobey the rules and who start to comply as a result of national enforcement actions and 
awareness campaigns carried out, 

•  improved overall level of health and safety of drivers covered by the Directive, 

•  possible  increase  of  turnover  of  genuine  self-employed  drivers  as  a  result  of  additional 

need for outsourcing services due to elimination of ‘false’ self-employed, 

•  possible increase of total employment in the sector resulting from the need for additional 
drivers  in  order  to  meet  the  unsatisfied  market  demand  connected  with  elimination  of 
‘false’ self-employed and of non-complying mobile workers, 

•  road safety slightly improved in longer term due to reduction of non-complying drivers, 

•  no increase in transport costs and no affect on consumer prices, 

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•  long  term  gains  for  transport  companies  resulting  from  fewer  work  interruptions  due  to 
fewer  accidents,  better  health  of  employees  and  less  absenteeism,  as  well  as  less  costs 
related to paid overtime, 

•  no significant additional administrative costs for private sector, 

•  enforcement  costs  and  efforts  of  public  sector  tailored  to  the  individual  country’s 

enforcement and financial capacity, 

•  improved  cooperation  between  Member  States  enforcement  authorities  and  between 
Member States and the Commission in the field of ensuring common understanding of the 
rules and harmonized approach to enforcement. 

The table below illustrates the summary of qualitative evaluation of each policy option from 
the perspective of contribution to attaining policy objectives. 

Table 4 – Summary of policy options assessment 

Policy option/ 
Policy 
objective 

Health & 
Safety of 
drivers 

Road safety 

Competition 

Compliance 

Enforcement 
cost 

A 

B 

C1 

C2 

C3 

+ / - 

+ 

+ 

+ + 

+ + 

= 

= 

= 

+ growing  

+ growing  

-  

- 

+ 

+ + 

+ + 

- - 

= 

+ 

+ + growing 

+ + growing 

€ 

€ 

€ 

€ 

€ 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The Commission will continuously monitor the developments in the sector and evaluate on a 
regular basis the impact of the revised legislation. This will be done through: 

–  Regular  biennial  reports  from  Member  States  on  the  implementation  of  the  Directive, 
including  the  views  of  the  industry  and  of  enforcers  on  positive  and  negative  aspects  of 
implementation of the working time rules; 

–  Communication  by  Member  States  on  their  national  arrangements  for  monitoring  the 

compliance; 

–  Regular dialogue with Member States, industry representatives and social partners on the 
effects  of  the  revised  working  time  rules  on  the  developments  in  the  sector  and  on 
achievement of policy objectives; 

–  Benchmarking to ensure an equitable implementation of the rules throughout EU; 

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€
€
€
€
€
–  Statistics on road safety, employment in the sector, market shares. 

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9. 

ANNEXES 

ANNEX 1 – Assumptions 

The following assumptions have been made for the purpose of the analysis: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

Modal  shift  -  due  to  the  fragmented  origins  and  destinations  of  short-medium 
distance  road  transport,  no  modal  shift  is  likely  to  happen  for  that  kind  of  service. 
Rail or air transport would not replace the service. Modal shift could be assumed for 
long  distance  service.  However,  the  limited  impact  of  the  adoption  of  the  policy 
options on that segment of the market allows to assume that no modal shift will occur 

Self-employed  workers  working  on  behalf  of:  large  companies  -  70%  of  all  self 
employed workers 

Self  employed  workers  performing  their  activity  as  shippers:  30%  of  all  self 
employed drivers 

“False” self employed - 50% of self employed drivers working for large companies  

Level  of  compliance  with  the  Directive:  20%,  this  assumption  is  based  on  the 
analysis of the current situation with regard to the quality of transposition (national 
transposing  laws),  compliance  discipline  (behaviour  of  employers  and  mobile 
workers),  and  quality  of  enforcement  regime  (national  systems  and 
their 
effectiveness) 

Passengers transport - on the basis of the analysis of average weekly hours worked 
by self-employed drivers in passenger transport, no major impact is expected on this 
sector  in  result  of  limits  imposed  by  the  Directive.  Self-employed  drivers  are 
currently working on average approximately 48 hours per week and a second driver 
is commonly used when night shifts are performed. For this reason, impact analysis 
has been carried out only with regard to freight transport. 

Source: Impact assessment concerning the scope of the working time directive 2002/15/EC with regard to self-
employed transport workers, PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2008. 

ANNEX 2 - Clusters of countries 

Name of the 
cluster 

Countries 

North  

Middle  

South 

NMS 

Denmark, Finland, Sweden 

Austria, Belgium, Germany ,Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, United Kingdom 

France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,  

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 

Latvia + Lithuania  Latvia, Lithuania 

Main characteristics of countries belonging to each cluster are: 

–  North: 

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Structure of the freight transport market: small share of self employed workers and large share 
of employment in the largest firms. Low share of international freight transport. 
Social  aspects  of  the  freight  transport  market:  Self  employed  earn  high  incomes31  and 
experience a high job control, however they face a very high time pressure. 

–  Middle:  

Structure of the freight transport market: small share of self employed workers and large share 
of employment in the largest firms. International freight transport market share is higher than 
in other clusters, but is decreasing because of competition from new MSs. 

Social aspects of the freight transport market: Self employed workers earn low incomes and 
experience a low job control. Control over working hours is high. 

–  South+ NMS:  

Structure of the freight transport market: large share of self employed workers and small share 
of  employment  in  the  largest  firms.  International  freight  transport  market  share  is  low  but 
increasing (especially in New MSs because of low cost services provided). 

Social aspects of the freight transport market: Self employed workers earn high incomes and 
experience a low job control. Control over working hours is high. Self employed appear to be 
a very high risk category with regard to overall fatigue. 

–  Latvia+ Lithuania:  

Structure  of  the  freight  transport  market:  small  share  of  self  employed  workers  and  small 
share of employment in the largest firms. International freight transport market share is high. 

Social aspects of the freight transport market: Self employed workers earn high incomes and 
experience  a  low  job  control.  Control  over  working  hours  is  high.  Self  employed  workers 
appear to be a very high risk category with regard to overall fatigue. 

Source: Impact assessment concerning the scope of the working time directive 2002/15/EC with regard to self-
employed transport workers, PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2008. 

ANNEX 3 – Compliance costs  

Checking the “status” of self employed drivers 

The  table  below  presents  estimated  costs  for  the  inspection  and  the  identification  of  the 
“false” self employed. 

31 

Source: TNO Report (2006) 

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Table 62: Estimation of cost of inspection to identify “false” self employed drivers to be 
performed under different targets (1'000 euros 2009 prices) 

Cluster 

Number of self 
employed 
drivers 

Cost of inspections according to different targets  
('000 euros 2009 prices) 

Target 
5% 

Target 
10% 

Target 
15% 

Target 
20% 

North 

Middle 

South + NMS 

Latvia + Lithuania 

EU – 25 

14.478 

95.885 

671.453 

26.032 

807.848 

35 

235 

1.645 

64 

1.979 

71 

470 

3.290 

128 

3.958 

106 

705 

4.935 

191 

5.937 

142 

940 

6.580 

255 

7.917 

Source: PwC calculations on Eurostat (2007), ICF Consulting (2003) and TNO (2006) 

The calculations are based on the following assumptions: 

•  The  duration  of  a  typical  inspection  is  unknown  and  it  is  likely  to  vary  significantly 
depending on the place where it is performed. However, in order to estimate the costs, the 
following has been assumed: 

•  30  minutes  for  performing  a  check  with  information  available  at  desk:  20  minutes  for 
analysing the available information and 10 minutes for writing a report and uploading the 
results on the central database. 

•  40  minutes  for  performing  a  check  at  the  premises  of  enterprises:  20  minutes  for 
performing  the  control  of  contracts,  10  minutes  for  transportation  and  planning  the 
inspection  and  10  minutes  for  writing  a  report  and  uploading  the  results  on  the  central 
database.  In  this  case  several  self  employed  drivers  can  be  checked,  thus  the  average 
duration for a single check could be low but slightly higher than a check of the previous 
type. 

•  110 minutes for performing a check at the premises of self employed drivers: 20 minutes 
for arranging an appointment; 50 minutes for transportation; 30 minutes for performing the 
check  on  contracts  and  10  minutes  for  writing  a  report  and  uploading  the  results  on  the 
central database. 

Based on this, the average duration of a check has been estimated to be 60 minutes. Hence an 
inspector can perform 1 check an hour. 

•  Cost of an inspector: 40 euros/hour (2003 prices) including the equipment and the indirect 

costs.  

•  Additional  costs:  3  euros  (2003  prices)  per  check  due  to  the  initial  costs  (legal  and 
administrative preparations; initial training of inspection staff; training on use of databases, 
communications  and  software)  and  ongoing  support  costs  for  training,  systems  etc.32. 

32 

This  analysis  is  based  on  the  methodology  from:  ICF  Consulting,  “Costs-Benefit  Analysis  of  Road 
Safety Improvements”, 2003 

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These costs were then projected to 2009 prices, considering the expected rate of inflation 
in EU-2533. Thus the average cost is 49 euros/check (2009 prices). 

33 

On the assumption that in the period 2003-2009 the average annual inflation rate in EU-25 is 2,2%. 

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Costs of setting up a new system of controls 

The following table shows the summary of costs to be borne in EU-25 countries to establish a 
system of checks at intermodal freight terminals.  

Table 1 – Annual costs of establishing a system of checks at intermodal freight terminals 
in EU25 

Categories of employees subject to 
controls 

Number 
of 
employees 
affected 
(1000s) 

Annual cost by percent working days checked 
 (1000s €) 

Target 
 1% 

Target 
 2% 

Target 
 3% 

Target 
 4% 

Op. A 

Mobile workers and self employed 

2.688 

181.762 

363.524 

545.285 

727.047 

Op. B 

Op. C.1 

Mobile workers and self employed 
drivers performing international 
transport 

Mobile workers and "false" self 
employed that misinterpreted the 
law 

1.884 

127.407 

254.813 

382.220 

509.627 

1.973 

133.383 

266.766 

400.149 

533.532 

Op. C.2 

Employed and "false" self employed 

2.110 

142.637 

285.275 

427.912 

570.549 

Op. C.3 

Employed and "false" self employed 
that misinterpreted the law / 
Employed and "false" self employed 

1.973 / 
2.110 

133.383 

266.766 

427.912 

570.549 

Op. D 

Only mobile workers 

1.830 

123.694 

247.387 

371.081 

494.775 

Op. E 

None 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Source: PwC calculations on Eurostat (2007), ICF Consulting (2003) and TNO (2006) 

To calculate these costs the following assumptions have been made: 

•  25  minutes  for  performing  a  check  at  intermodal  freight  terminals:15  minutes  for 
downloading the information from the tachograph and performing the check of the worked 
time, 5 minutes for transportation and planning of the inspection and 5 minutes for writing 
a report and uploading the results on the central database. In this case several drivers can 
be  checked,  thus  the  average  duration  of  a  single  check  could  be  slightly  lower  than  a 
check of the next type. 

•  55  minutes  for  performing  a  check  at  clients’  premises  and  at  other  places  where  the 
drivers  commonly  load  and  unload  freight:  15  minutes  for  downloading  the  information 
from  the  tachograph  and  performing  the  control  of  the  worked  time,  5  minutes  for 
transportation  and  planning  the  inspection,  30  minutes  for  time  wasted  in  waiting  and  5 
minutes for writing a report and uploading the results on the central database. 

Based  on  this,  and  assuming  that  an  equal  number  of  checks  of  the  two  types  will  be 
performed, the average duration of a single check would be 40 minutes. Hence an inspector 
would be able to perform 1,5 check an hour. Based on the unit costs the average cost for an 
inspection amounts to 33,80 euros (2009 prices). 

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It is also assumed that drivers (both mobile workers and self-employed) will work on average 
200 days a year once the Directive enters into force towards self-employed drivers too. Such 
assumptions make it possible to calculate the annual costs for checking 1%, 2%, 3% and 4% 
of drivers’ working days across the EU. 

Monitoring system and reporting by MS 

The following table shows the calculations for the estimation of the total cost for reporting by 
MS. 

Table 2 – Estimation of two-yearly monitoring and reporting costs of MS 

Time effort per 
report (man-
day) 

Labour cost per 
man-day (€) 34 

Cost per 
country report 
(€) 

Number of 
countries 

Total cost per 
cluster (€) 

North 

Middle 

South + NMS 

Latvia + Lithuania 

EU 25 

15 

238 

221 

124 

46 

3.574 

3.312 

1.864 

695 

3 

7 

13 

2 

10.721 

23.184 

24.273 

1.391 

59.533 

Source: PwC elaboration on Eurostat Data(2007) 

The country reports consist of the following main activities: 

–  Data collection from companies, self employed drivers and systems of controls; 

–  Data input and elaboration; 

–  Drafting of the report. 

The  time  effort  needed  is  likely  to  be  different  for  each  activity  and  to  vary  country  by 
country.  However,  we  can  assume  that  on  average  the  effort  for  each  activity  might  be 
appreciatively  of  5  man-days.  Thus,  the  effort  to  prepare  a  country  report  would  be  of  15 
man-days. 

Costs of compliance by private sector 

The activities to be performed by enterprises and self employed drivers for being compliant to 
the WTD cover: 

–  Reorganisation of work;. 

–  Recording working time by drivers; 

–  Elaboration and reporting of data collected. 

The calculation of costs to be borne by private sector was based on assumption that cost of 
reorganisation of work is one-time cost which does not apply to self-employed (one-worker 

34 

Average labour cost per cluster has been elaborated on the basis of Eurostat data on hourly labour cost 
for the sector “Public administration and defence; compulsory social security” for the year 2006. 

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companies),  and  enterprises  have  already  incurred  these  costs  with  introduction  of  the 
Directive, hence they will not bear additional costs when hiring new drivers. 

As regards elaboration and reporting of data collected it was assumed that this activity would 
require  2  minutes  of  work  of  administrative  employee  per  month  per  each  newly  employed 
driver. The method for calculating additional annual costs is following:  

Additional annual administrative cost = number of additional employed drivers * 2 minutes of 
labour/month * 12 months * hourly labour cost. 

The following table shows the summary of costs to be borne by road transport enterprises to 
carry out the administrative obligations set by the Directive. 

Table 3 – Estimation of additional annual costs for the activities of data collection, 
elaboration and reporting under different policy options (2009) 

North 

Middle  

South + NMS 

Latvia + Lithuania 

EU 25 

Additional 
employed drivers 

Reporting 
activity (hours) 

Labour cost per 
man-hour (€) 

Reporting 
activity cost (€) 

4.020 

24.750 

178.466 

5.319 

212.556 

1.608 

9.900 

71.387 

2.127 

85.022 

28,81 

26,79 

13,38 

4,35 

46.326 

265.225 

955.093 

9.244 

1.275.887 

Source: PwC calculations on Eurostat (2007) 

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