Case C-388/08: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus (Finland) lodged on 5 September 2008 — Criminal proceedings against Artur Leymann, Aleksei Pustovarov
Date: 2008-09-05
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: criminal procedure, extradition, international criminal law, interpretation of the law, legal process, mutual recognition principle, restriction of liberty

25.10.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 272/13

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht
Düsseldorf
lodged on 14 August 2008 —
Hoesch Metals and Alloys GmbH v Hauptzollamt Aachen

(Germany)

Questions referred

(Case C-373/08)

(2008/C 272/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hoesch Metals and Alloys GmbH

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Aachen

Questions referred

1. Is Article 24 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of
12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs
Code (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the separating,
cleaning and crushing of silicon metal blocks and the subse-
quent sieving, sorting and packaging of the silicon grains
resulting from the crushing constitutes origin-conferring
processing or working?

2. If

the answer to the first question is in the negative:
is
Council Regulation (EC) No 398/2004 of 2 March 2004
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of
silicon originating in the People's Republic of China (2) valid?

(1) OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1.
(2) OJ 2004 L 66, p. 15.

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus
lodged on 5 September 2008 — Criminal
(Finland)

proceedings against Artur Leymann, Aleksei Pustovarov

(Case C-388/08)

(2008/C 272/23)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Artur Leymann, Aleksei Pustovarov

1. How must the expression ‘offence … other than that for
which he or she was surrendered’ used in Article 27(2) of
the Framework Decision (1) be interpreted; more specifically,
what criteria are decisive in assessing whether the description
the offence on which prosecution in based differs so
of
much from the description of
the offence on which the
surrender was based that it must be regarded as an ‘other
offence’ within the meaning of Article 27(2), so that any
in
prosecution
Article 27(3)(g) and Article 27(4)?

requires

consent

referred

the

to

2. Must Article 27(2) of the Framework Decision be interpreted
the consent procedure referred to in
as meaning that
Article 27(3)(g) and Article 27(4) is to be applied in a situa-
tion where the basis of both the arrest warrant and the final
prosecution was an (aggravated) narcotics offence but the
description of
the offence in the indictment was subse-
quently altered so that the prosecution related to a different
narcotic from that referred to in the arrest warrant?

3. How must Article 27(2) of

the Framework Decision be
interpreted in so far as, under that provision, a person
surrendered may not be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise
deprived of his or her liberty for another offence, especially in
relation to the consent procedure referred to in Article 27(4)
and having regard to the provision in Article 27(3)(c) under
the criminal
which the speciality rule does not apply if
proceedings do not give rise to the application of a measure
restricting personal liberty?

(a) In cases which fall within the scope of the consent proce-
dure, must the abovementioned provisions be interpreted
as meaning that they do not preclude prosecution being
brought, proceedings being carried on or
judgment
being given for the offence in question prior to receipt of
consent, provided that the suspect is not deprived of
liberty or has his or her liberty restricted as a result of
being suspected of the offence in question?

(b) Of what relevance is it that the criminal proceedings
associated with the restriction on liberty relate to more
than one offence, one of which falls within the scope of
the consent procedure? Must the abovementioned provi-
sions then be interpreted as meaning that they do not
preclude prosecution being brought, proceedings being
carried on or
judgment being given for an offence
to the consent procedure prior to receipt of
subject
the suspect has been
consent, despite the fact
subject to a restriction on his or her personal liberty in
connection with the proceedings, where there is a lawful
basis for that restriction on liberty on grounds of other
pending charges?

that

(1) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between
Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).