Corrigendum to Council Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP of 14 April 2008 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ( OJ L 107, 17.4.2008 )
Date: 2008-08-07
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: international security, non-proliferation of arms, nuclear safety, weapon of mass destruction

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CORRIGENDA

Corrigendum to Council Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP of 14 April 2008 on support for IAEA activities in the
areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Official Journal of the European Union L 107 of 17 April 2008)

Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP should read as follows:

‘COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/314/CFSP

of 14 April 2008

on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in
particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted
the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Chapter
III of which contains a list of
measures to combat such proliferation and which need
to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.

to the measures
particular

The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is
III
giving effect
in
thereof,
financial
releasing
specific projects conducted by
resources
to support
multilateral
International
the
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

listed in Chapter

institutions,

such as

through

On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted Common
Position 2003/805/CFSP on the universalisation and rein­
forcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means
of delivery (1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for
the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive
safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and
commits the EU to work towards making the Additional
Protocol and comprehensive safeguards agreements the
standard for the IAEA verification system.

On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action
for IAEA activities under
2004/495/CFSP on support
its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework
of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Prolif­
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2).

(5)

On 18 July 2005,
the Council adopted Joint Action
2005/574/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the

areas of nuclear security and verification and in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (3).

On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action
2006/418/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the
areas of nuclear security and verification and in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (4).

The strengthening of the control of high-activity radio­
active sources in accordance with the G-8 statement and
Action Plan on securing radioactive sources, adopted at
the 2003 Evian Summit, remains an important objective
for the EU, which will be pursued through outreach to
third countries.

In July 2005, States Parties and the European Atomic
Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material
(CPPNM) with a view to expanding its scope
to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful
domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and to
oblige States Parties
to
criminal sanctions.

to make violations

subject

In September 2005, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear
Terrorism Convention) was opened for signature. Upon
its entry into force, it will require States Parties to enact
legislation to criminalise these offences.

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

The IAEA pursues the same objectives as set out
in
Recitals (3) to (9). This is done through the implemen­
its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed
tation of
entirely through voluntary contributions to the IAEA
Nuclear Security Fund.

(1) OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34.
(2) OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46.

(3) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44.
(4) OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20.

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(11)

(12)

The EU has contributed to this fund through Joint Action
through Joint Actions
2004/495/CFSP,
as
2005/574/CFSP
are
currently implemented by the IAEA and which are
geared towards the Central Asian Region, the Mediter­
ranean Region and Africa respectively.

2006/418/CFSP which

as well
and

In order to help address the specific challenges in the
field of nuclear security and non-proliferation in Asian
countries, due in particular to the growing number of
nuclear applications in the region, inter alia in the field of
medicine, agriculture and water, as well as nuclear
this Joint Action should specifically support
research,
IAEA activities in South-East Asia. This should take
into account the increasing role of Asia as a partner to
the EU in the field of security. Particular emphasis should
be given to the strengthening of nuclear safety and
security in non-energy nuclear applications in eligible
countries,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

For the purposes of giving immediate and practical imple­
1.
mentation to certain elements of the EU Strategy against Prolif­
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall support
the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verifi­
cation in order to further the following objectives:

— achieving progress towards the universalisation of interna­
tional non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments,
including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the
Additional Protocol,

— enhancing the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials
and equipment and the relevant technology, providing legis­
lative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear
security and safeguards,

— strengthening the detection of and response to illicit traf­

ficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of

2.
the EU Strategy, are the projects which aim at:

— strengthening national

and regulatory infra­
legislative
structures for the implementation of relevant international
instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification,
including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the
Additional Protocol,

— assisting States in strengthening the security and control of

nuclear and other radioactive materials,

— strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response
radioactive

trafficking in nuclear

and other

to illicit
materials.

These projects
in countries needing
assistance in these areas after an initial assessment carried out
by an expert team.

shall be carried out

A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2

The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the
1.
the Common Foreign and
Council/High Representative for
Security Policy (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implemen­
tation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully asso­
ciated.

2.
The projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out
by the IAEA. It shall perform this task under the control of the
SG/HR, assisting the Presidency. For this purpose, the SG/HR
shall enter into the necessary arrangements with IAEA.

3.
The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep
each other regularly informed about the projects, in conformity
with their respective competences.

Article 3

1.
The financial reference amount for the implementation of
the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 7 703 000,
to be funded from the general budget of the European Commu­
nities.

2.
The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in
paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the
European Community procedures and rules applicable to the
general budget of the European Communities.

3.
The Commission shall supervise the proper management
of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2, which shall take
the form of a grant. For this purpose,
it shall conclude a
financing agreement with the IAEA. The financing agreement
shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the EU
contribution, appropriate to its size.

endeavour

The Commission shall

4.
the
financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as
possible after the entry into force of this Joint Action. It shall
inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the
date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

to conclude

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Article 4

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report
to the
Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the
basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA. These reports
shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council. The
Commission shall be fully associated.
It shall provide infor­
mation on the financial aspects of the implementation of this
Joint Action.

after 12 months if no financing agreement has been concluded
before that date.

Article 6

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Union.

Article 5

Done at Luxembourg, 14 April 2008.

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of
adoption.

its

It shall expire 24 months after the date of the conclusion of the
financing agreement between the Commission and the IAEA or

For the Council
The President

I. JARC

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ANNEX

EU support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implemen­
tation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Description

The number of terrorist incidents in EU Member States and elsewhere over recent years has shown no sign of
diminishing. The international community has recognised in various forums that the risk of successful acts of nuclear
terrorism involving nuclear or other radioactive material remains high. In addition, recent reports of illicit trafficking,
also involving particularly sensitive nuclear material, have underscored the continuing risk that terrorists could
acquire such materials.

The international community has reacted strongly to these threats and has taken several
initiatives aimed at
preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists. Particular
attention was drawn to the situation in Asia by the Seminar on Strengthening Nuclear Security in Asian Countries,
which took place in Tokyo in November 2006, which called on the IAEA to enhance its cooperation with States in
the region to ensure that acceptable levels of security are applied to all nuclear and other radioactive material under
jurisdictions and according to effective national systems and functions. Added impetus to international
national
efforts was given through the launch in July 2006 of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear non-
proliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.

Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments
that are relevant for nuclear security and verification: in July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1540(2004), dealing with weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors. UN Security
Council Resolution 1373(2001) calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources (1). In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and the Board of Governors of the IAEA have
adopted several resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system (2).

implementation of these international

instruments may be significantly facilitated,

States'
in part, by assistance
provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of
Governors of the IAEA in September 2005 (3). This is a continuation to the 2003-2005 Plan of Activities to
protect against nuclear terrorism (4). The Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment,
analysis and coordination; (2) Prevention; and (3) Detection and response. It also includes a part referred to as
‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’, which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards
objectives but which are also recognised for their important contributions to nuclear security.

(1) GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9. Also the document: ‘Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport Safety
and Waste Management: Promoting Effective and Sustainable National Regulatory Infrastructure for the Control of Radiation Sources’
(GOV/2004/52-GC(48)/15) includes parts that are relevant to the IAEA-EU cooperation under the EU Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. These activities are also reflected in ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’ in the IAEA Nuclear Security
Plan for 2006-2009.

(2) In September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided that in order to strengthen the
safeguards system, the so-called ‘small quantities protocol’ (SQP) to NPT safeguards agreements should remain part of the Agency's
safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria; the 2005 IAEA General Conference
adopted a resolution in which it noted, inter alia, that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented
by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

(3) GOV/2005/50-GC(49)/17.
(4) GOV/2002/10.

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legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and,

International Safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represent key means of verifying the compliance by States
with their specific non-proliferation commitments and obligations. It is of utmost importance that the required
national
if
is in place (1). The implementation requires that each State party to such
applicable, an additional protocol,
agreements maintain an effective State System for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
(SSAC). In
September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors requested that the IAEA Secretariat assist States for which compre­
hensive safeguards agreements had small quantities protocols attached,
including non-members of the Agency,
through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of such SSACs.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These provide a comprehensive approach to nuclear security
including the regulatory controls, accountability and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials in use,
‘from cradle to grave’, in the short term as well as in the long term. However, should the
storage and transport,
protection fail, backup measures must be established to detect theft or attempts to smuggle the material across
international borders and to respond to malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, should they
occur.

The IAEA is about to complete implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on
support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation
of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In addition, the IAEA is in the process of
implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support of IAEA activities in the areas of
nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006, on support for
IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support the efforts of recipient
States in the Caucasus, Central Asia, south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Mediterranean region in the Middle
East, and Africa to strengthen nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.

Support for these efforts continues to be in high demand in IAEA Member States as well as in States that are not
members of the IAEA. Countries eligible to receive support are:

in south-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of
Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan;

in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia;

in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic; and

in Africa (2): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe;

in the South-East Asia region: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,

Work will continue in south-eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, in the Mediterranean region in the Middle
East, and in Africa on the basis of the existing Joint Actions and an update of the needs evaluations carried out as
part of those Joint Actions. This Joint Action will focus on South-East Asia. The final selection of the additional
countries in the South-East Asia region to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase,
which will comprise evaluation of existing information in headquarters supplemented by assessment missions where
required. The support activities for each project will be focused on those countries that are in most need of support
in each project area.

(1) See the Agency's Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, as published by the

IAEA.

(2) Up to 20 to 25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades under different projects. Additional

countries may be involved in regional training events.

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For the purpose of the needs evaluations, a team of recognised experts will assess the present status of nuclear
security system already in place in these countries and give recommendations on improvements. The recommen­
dations will constitute a platform for the definition of subsequent assistance, covering present status and need for
improvement as regards prevention, detection of and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other
radioactive materials, including those in non-nuclear use, and of nuclear facilities. Priorities will be set in identifying
the countries for each project that would be covered by the budget made available through EU support. The
development of human resources will be implemented as part of the established training programme of the
IAEA, which, to a large extent,
is based on a regional approach. The participation of experts from as many
eligible countries as possible will be supported, subject to available financial resources.

Subsequently, projects will be implemented in the selected countries in three fields:

1. Legislative and Regulatory Assistance

(treaties, conventions, agreements, norms,

instruments and recognised
The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises,
principles
IAEA standards, codes of conduct and guidance
documents, and recommendations) that are implemented by national authorities to control nuclear material
and other radioactive sources. This broad range of norms (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a
framework for using nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their related facilities safely and securely —
both those with large nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities.

in large part,

international

legislation, and regulatory control

The existence of proper national
is a precondition for a
successful nuclear security regime. National implementing legislation should provide a framework of principles
and general provisions that enables authorised governmental entities to exercise the necessary regulatory
functions and that regulates the conduct of any person engaged in regulated activities. In many States such
legislation is inadequate and the regulatory infrastructure is not in place or is inadequate. Such gaps, combined
with inefficient regulatory control infrastructures result in a weakness of the global security regime. The aim
should therefore be to strengthen or establish adequate national legislative and regulatory frameworks, and the
effective application of relevant measures.

infrastructure,

Radioactive materials are often used in non-nuclear applications, e.g. in medical or industrial use. Some of these
sources are highly radioactive and belong to categories 1 to 3 as defined in the IAEA document ‘Categorisation of
Radioactive Sources’. These sources, if not adequately under regulatory control and protected, may fall into the
wrong hands and be used in malicious activities. The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of
radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with international standards, the
guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated
import/export guidance, and with best practices.

The conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the IAEA is an effective measure that
promotes stringent national and international control over nuclear material and related technologies.
It is
important that national
installations, facilities
In addition, States that have concluded an additional
and material
protocol need to ensure that their national
implementing legislation has been enhanced to enable the State
concerned to comply with the additional obligations under the additional protocol. In particular, the State's
domestic legislation should be revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body designated
for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.

implementing legislation clearly identify the nuclear activities,

to which safeguards will be applied.

States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security when becoming parties to
the CPPNM by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism
In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540(2004) also obliges all States to
Convention.
establish domestic controls including the establishment of appropriate controls over materials related to
nuclear weapons.

States' undertakings included in the aforementioned international instruments in the field of nuclear security have
resulted in a juxtaposition of commitments related to the security of nuclear material and facilities and other
radioactive sources. These commitments include measures for the establishment of a regulatory infrastructure for
radiation safety and security of radioactive sources; accountancy and control measures; physical protection
measures; import and export controls and the criminalisation of unlawful acts.

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2. Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The materials used or stored at nuclear facilities and locations must be adequately accounted for and protected in
order to prevent theft or sabotage. An effective regulatory system should identify those elements requiring
implementation at the level of the State and of the operator respectively.

It is also of vital importance that powerful and vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications are physically
protected against malicious acts when used or stored, and when no longer required, that they be dismantled and
stored, or disposed of as radioactive waste, in a safe and secure location.

All States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to establish and maintain state systems of
accounting for and control of all nuclear material (SSACs) subject to safeguards. However, IAEA estimates that
such systems are lacking or inadequate in many States that are party to such agreements. This situation is
particularly widespread among the 120 States or so that do not operate any nuclear facilities.

3. Strengthening of States' Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking relates to the unauthorised receipt, provision, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear material and
other radioactive materials, whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international
borders.

A terrorist-made, crude nuclear explosive device or a radiological dispersal device cannot be constructed without
the material having been acquired as a result of illicit trafficking. In addition, sensitive equipment and technology
to produce sensitive material for or to construct a crude nuclear explosive device may also have been acquired via
illicit trafficking. It may be assumed that cross-border movement of material or technology is necessary for the
material to reach its end destination. To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory
systems to be in place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures
and information at border stations for detecting attempts to smuggle radioactive materials (including fissile,
radioactive materials) or unauthorised trade in sensitive equipment and technology.

Effective measures must also be in place to respond to such acts and also to seizures of any radioactive materials.
Law enforcement staff (customs, police, etc.) is frequently not trained in the use of detection equipment, and thus
the sensitive equipment and technology may be unfamiliar. Training of these officers is therefore critical to the
success of any measures put in place for detection of illicit trafficking. Different training should be offered to staff
of different categories, both in using detection instruments and in understanding the reading of the instruments
in order to be able to decide on follow-up activities.

Support in this area is in great demand as a result of increased awareness of the threat involved and of the
availability of equipment and methodology for improved border-monitoring capability.

2. Objectives

Overall objective: To strengthen nuclear security in selected countries.

2.1. Evaluation Phase: Financing International Nuclear Security Missions

Evaluation will be carried out by the IAEA to identify needs to strengthen nuclear security in each of those countries
mentioned in point 1, in which such evaluation has not been completed. For the other identified countries, the
evaluation carried out earlier will be updated. The evaluation will cover, as appropriate, physical protection and
security of nuclear and non-nuclear applications, established measures to combat illicit trafficking as well as the
necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure. The results of the overall evaluation will be used as a basis for selecting
the countries in which the projects will be implemented.

The projects outlined above will:

— evaluate, in each country, the status of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and the
protection of any nuclear or research installation or location in which these materials are used or stored. Identify
a subset of facilities and locations containing these materials to be selected for subsequent upgrading and
support,

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— evaluate, in each country, any needs with respect to the upgrading of the security of radioactive sources. Identify
any weaknesses and shortcoming against
requiring
international
improvement of regulatory infrastructure, and identify the need to provide additional protection of powerful,
vulnerable sources. The specific equipment needed to provide protection would also be determined as a result of
the evaluation,

standards and the Code of Conduct

— evaluate, in each country, the current status of the capability to combat illicit trafficking and identify needs for

the required improvements,

— evaluate, in each country, the status of the SSAC and identify needs for the required improvements.

2.2. Implementation of specific actions defined as priorities as a result of the evaluation phase

P r o j e c t 1 . L e g i s l a t i v e a n d R e g u l a t o r y A s s i s t a n c e

Project purpose:

— to strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material
taking into account relevant international instruments and recognised principles in the nuclear security field and
existing synergies with national systems of radiation safety,

— to strengthen national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional

Protocols concluded between States and the Agency,

— to strengthen the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources.

Project results:

— development and adoption of comprehensive, coherent and effective legislation at the national level, thereby

contributing to a harmonised, strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security,

— development and adoption (in national languages) of national legislation necessary to enable States to comply

with their obligations under Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,

— establishment/upgrading of the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive
sources through the provision of advisory services, equipment and training, in accordance with international
standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and best
practices.

P r o j e c t 2 . S t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e S e c u r i t y a n d C o n t r o l o f N u c l e a r a n d o t h e r R a d i o ­

a c t i v e M a t e r i a l s

Project purpose:

— to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear and other radioactive materials in nuclear

applications in the selected countries,

— to strengthen the control and physical protection of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications in the

selected countries,

— to strengthen SSACs for the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including in

States with ‘small quantities protocols’.

Project results:

— physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations

upgraded,

— vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications protected or, as appropriate, dismantled and transferred to safe

and secure storage in the selected countries,

— national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection improved through expert assistance,

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— establishment and maintenance of effective SSACs capable of implementing safeguards agreements and additional

protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’,
— staff training provided in the countries eligible to receive support.

P r o j e c t 3 . S t r e n g t h e n i n g o f S t a t e s ' C a p a b i l i t i e s

f o r D e t e c t i o n a n d R e s p o n s e t o

I l l i c i t T r a f f i c k i n g

Project purpose:
— to strengthen the States' capacities for detection of and response to illicit trafficking in the selected countries.

Project results:
— enhanced information collected and evaluated on illicit nuclear trafficking, from open sources and from States'
Points of Contact, to improve the knowledge about and circumstances of illicit nuclear trafficking. This infor­
mation will also facilitate the prioritisation of the various activities undertaken to combat illicit trafficking,
— national frameworks established through expert assistance, to combat illicit trafficking and to improve the
national coordination of control cross-border movements of radioactive materials, sensitive nuclear equipment
and technology in the selected countries,

— border-monitoring equipment upgraded at selected border crossings,
— training provided for law enforcement staff in countries eligible to receive support.

3. Duration

The evaluation will be performed within a period of three months after the entry into force of the contribution
agreement between the Commission and the IAEA. The three projects will be performed in parallel during the 21
subsequent months.

The total estimated duration for the implementation of this Joint Action is 24 months.

4.

Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries are the countries where the assessment and the subsequent projects will be implemented. Their
authorities will be helped to understand where there are weak points and receive support to bring solutions and
increase security. The final choice of the beneficiaries and the needs to be addressed in the selected countries shall be
made in consultation between the implementing entity and the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR in close consul­
tation with Member States and the Commission in the framework of the competent Council working group. These
decisions shall be based, where appropriate, on proposals made by the implementing entity in accordance with
Article 2(1) of this Joint Action.

5.

Implementing Entity

The IAEA will be entrusted with the implementation of the projects. The international nuclear security missions will
be performed following the standard mode of operation for missions of the IAEA, which will be carried out by IAEA
and Member States' experts. The implementation of the three projects will be done directly by the IAEA staff and/or
by selected experts or contractors from IAEA Member States. In the case of contractors, the procurement of any
goods, works or services by the IAEA in the context of this Joint Action shall be carried out in accordance with the
applicable rules and procedures of the IAEA.

6.

Third Party Participants

The projects will be financed 100 % by this Joint Action. Experts from IAEA Member States may be considered as
third party participants. They will work under the standard rules of operation for IAEA experts.

7.

Specific Conditions for Contracting and Procurement

In some cases, to improve the security arrangements for nuclear and other radioactive materials, e.g. radioactive
sources, originally supplied by the Russian Federation, contracts for procurement of goods, works and services could
be offered to providers in the Russian Federation, which are familiar with the Russian technology.’