Report from the Commission to the Council - Second Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA
Date: 2008-08-01
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, Interpol, Schengen Information System, data protection, disclosure of information, fight against crime, passport, personal data, terrorism

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 1.8.2008 
COM(2008) 502 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 

Second Monitoring and Evaluation Report 
on the Operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 

Second Monitoring and Evaluation Report 
on the Operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA 

INTRODUCTION 

One of the key objectives of the Union is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within 
an area of freedom, security and justice. In order to achieve this aim, Member States need to 
cooperate more closely, particularly in respect of the exchange of information between their 
competent  law  enforcement  authorities  and  between  them  and  such  authorities  in  third 
countries.  

Issued and blank, stolen, lost or misappropriated passports are used to elude law enforcement 
with the objective of carrying out illicit activities capable of jeopardising the security of the 
Union and of each of the Member States. Meaningful action can only be taken at Union level 
by reason of the very nature of the threat. 

All  Member  States  are  affiliated  to  the  International  Criminal  Police  Organisation 
(“Interpol”).  In  order  to  fulfil  its  mission,  Interpol  created  a  l  database  on  stolen  travel 
documents (SLTD) that permits Interpol’s members to share between themselves data on lost 
and stolen passports. 

Common  Position  2005/69/JHA  obliges  Member  States  to  ensure  that  their  competent  law 
enforcement  authorities  exchange  data  on  issued and  blank  passports  that  are  stolen,  lost  or 
misappropriated and formatted for integration in a specific information system, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the fundamental rights of data subjects are respected. 

1. 

KEY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMON POSITION 

The Common Position stipulates 5 obligations for Member States: 

–  To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol; 

–  To ensure that such data is exchanged with Interpol immediately after it has been entered 

into the national database or SIS; 

–  To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of protection 
for  personal  data  and  that  respect  the  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  regarding  the 
automatic processing of personal data; 

–  To  ensure  that  their  competent  law  enforcement  authorities  use  the  Interpol  database  to 
access such information when appropriate for the performance of their task and to set up 
the required infrastructures to facilitate consultation; 

–  To  ensure  that  they  take  up  the  required  action  in  case  that  a  positive  identification  (hit) 

occurred. 

2. 

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT AND METHOD OF EVALUATION 

In 2006 the European Commission has submitted a report to the Council on the operation of 
the  Common  Position  within  the  Member  States1  ("the  2006  Report").  The  2006  Report 

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concluded  that  implementation  of  the  Common  Position  by  the  Member  States  is  still 
incomplete and made certain recommendations to the Member States. Therefore the Council 
instructed  the  Commission  to  submit  a  second  report  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  Member 
States have taken appropriate action in the meantime2. 
Pursuant  to  this  task,  on  1st  June  2007  the  Commission  sent  a  questionnaire  to  the  Member 
States,aimed  at  ascertaining  the  extent,  mode  and  method  of  operation  of  the  Common 
Position, as well as the improvements, if any, following the 2006 Report.  

All  Member  States  had  returned  answers  to  this  questionnaire.  Some  of  the  information 
received  by  the  Commission  was  ambiguous,  incomplete,  makes  reference  to  domestic  law 
and other provisions without providing further details, and has been provided on the basis of 
diverging  interpretations  of  the  questions  asked  by  the  Member  States.  Therefore,  the 
Commission invited specialists from the Member States to a meeting, aimed at clarifying the 
replies to the questionnaire and drawing conclusions from such replies. The meeting was held 
in Brussels on 17 and 18 September 2007. 

The present report provides an overview of the written replies to the questionnaire, as well as 
the oral explanations and information provided by the specialists of the Member States at the 
above  meeting,  and  on  that  basis  assesses  the  level  of  implementation  of  the  Common 
Position. 

3. 

3.1. 

SUMMARY OF REPLIES 

Did your Member State implement the Common Position on exchanging certain 
data with Interpol (2005/69/JHA)? 

•  If the answer is positive, in what way did your Member States implement it? 

Please transmit the relevant implementing measure where appropriate. 

•  If the answer is negative, does your Member State intend to implement it? 

•  For  the  Member  States  which  replied  to  the  questionnaire  on  the 
implementation  of  the  Common  Position  which  was  sent  in  2006,  has  there 
been any change to your situation during the year 2006/2007? 

The replies of the Member States to this question showed that all Member States have taken 
steps  to  implement  the  Common  Position,  but  that  implementation  is  at  a  variety  of  stages. 
Even though at the time of submitting their replies to the questionnaire, Latvia and Slovakia 
had not fully implemented the Common Position, they were expecting to do so by the end of 
2007.The  replies  demonstrate  that,  in  general,  there  has  been  significant  progress  in  the 
implementation and operation of the Common Position since the 2006 Report.  

3.2. 

Does your MS exchange all data on issued and blank passports that are stolen, 
lost  and  misappropriated  with  Interpol  as  required  in  Article  3(1)  of  CP 
2005/69/JHA? If your Member State does not exchange such passport data with 
Interpol, please provide some indication of an approximate percentage of such 
exchange. 

The  replies  indicate  that  22  Member  States  exchange  all  the  required  passport  data  with 
Interpol, whilst 1 Member State will be doing so imminently. Some Member States go even 
further  than  the  requirements  of  the  Common  Position  and  exchange  information  with 
Interpol as regards lost or stolen identity cards.  

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The type of data that is exchanged is not always as complete as is required under the Common 
Position in 3 Member States. More specifically, Poland provides data only on passports which 
are lost or stolen as a result of crime, Hungary only on stolen passports and Portugal only on 
blank stolen documents. 

3.3. 

Does your MS pursuant to Art. 3 (3) of CP 2005/69/JHA exchange all passport 
data  immediately  also  with  Interpol  after  it  has  been  entered  in  your  relevant 
national database or the SIS (if your Member State participates in the latter)? 
For Member States which defer the sending of data to Interpol, please describe 
your workflows that cause the interval between the recording of data into your 
relevant database or, where relevant, into SIS and the sending to Interpol. 

Article 3(3) of the Common Position requires that the data be entered in the Interpol database 
immediately  upon  their  entry  into  the  national  database  or  the  SIS.  It  is  noted  that  the 
Common Position does not aim to regulate the period between the reporting of the passport as 
lost and the entry of the information into the national database. 

The  replies  to  the  questionnaire  indicate  that  only  11  Member  States  have  achieved  such 
immediate  entry,  while  2  Member  States  will  be  doing  so  once  their  infrastructure  is 
operational. 8 Member States exchange such data with Interpol on a daily basis, which even if 
not ideal, may be an acceptable practice. Italy and Hungary exchange data on a monthly basis 
and the Czech Republic on a weekly basis. 

3.4. 

Does  your  MS  distinguish  between  Interpol  members  to  share  this  data  with 
and  those  not  to  share  this  data  with  according  Art.  3  (1)  of  the  CP 
2005/69/JHA? On what grounds does your Member State decide to make such 
distinction  or  not?  Is  reciprocity  a  consideration?  For  those  Member  States 
which answered the questionnaire contained in the 2006 Report: did you modify 
your approach? 

Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the Common Position require Member States to only share passport 
data  with  Interpol  members  that  have  an  adequate  level  of  protection  for  personal  data  and 
respect  the  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  regarding  the  automatic  processing  of  personal 
data.  The  replies  to  the  questionnaire  show  that  only  the  Netherlands  distinguishes  between 
Interpol members, while all other Member States do not make such a distinction.  

The  Member  State  that  do  not  make  such  a  distinction  justified  their  approach  on  two 
grounds: (a) they consider that the information that is sent to Interpol, in particular the number 
of  the  passport,  does  not  contain  any  personal  data,  and  (b)  they  believe  that  they  have  an 
interest in locating any of their passports in any other country. Member States have clarified 
during the specialists meeting that the adequate level of protection for personal data and the 
respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  is  considered  as  part  of  a  risk  assessment  where 
they are faced with requests for confirmation  of a  positive  identification  or for  provision of 
background information. 

3.5.  What  modalities  has  your  MS  agreed  upon  with  Interpol  for  exchanging  all 
passport data in  its possession pursuant to Art. 3 (2) of CP 2005/69/JHA? For 
those  Member  States  which  have  not  agreed  any  such  modalities,  do  you 
consider  the  Interpol  regulations  sufficient?  For  those  Member  States  which 
answered  the  questionnaire  contained  in  the  2006  Report:  did  you  deploy  the 
agreed modalities to effectively transfer legacy data? 

None of the Member States agreed special modalities for the exchange of passport data with 
Interpol.  Member  States  seem  to  consider  that  the  Interpol  regulations  and  systems,  like  I-
24/7, provide sufficient safeguards. 

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3.6.  Which  competent  law  enforcement  authorities  have  the  right  to  query  the 
Interpol database for the purpose of this CP in your Member Stare, according 
to  Art.  3  (4)  of  CP  2005/69/JHA,  and  for  which  tasks  do  they  consult  the 
database?  For  those  Member  States  which  have  already  indicated  such 
authorities  in  the  replies  to  the  questionnaire  contained  in  the  2006  Report, 
please  specify  the  tasks  for  which  these  authorities  consult  the  Interpol 
database. 

In all cases police authorities have the right to query the Interpol database, except in Greece 
where only the Interpol National Bureau (NCB) has such right. It should be noted that in most 
Member  States,  the  national  intelligence  services  are  considered  to  be  part  of  the  police 
authorities. 

In most Member States, in addition to the police, other law enforcement authorities have the 
right to query the Interpol database. For example, the Boarder Guard and the Customs Service 
have  the  right  to  query  the  database  in  Poland,  the  Border  Guard  and  the  Migration 
Department  in  Latvia,  the  Border  Police  in  Italy  and  the  Royal  Military  Police  in  the 
Netherlands. 

3.7. 

Has your Member State developed guidance and/or training on the cases where 
consultation of the Interpol database is deemed appropriate? For those Member 
States  which  have  already  indicated  such  development  in  the  replies  to  the 
questionnaire  contained  in  the  2006  Report,  how  does  your  Member  State 
ensure that suitable appropriate consultation takes place? 

The replies suggest that 17 Member States have developed some guidelines or training for the 
use  of  the  Interpol  database.  In  some  other  Member  States  general  guidance  is  given  to 
officers who have access to the database. In general, however, Member States seem to imply 
that the database is self-explanatory and that mere availability of the database is enough. They 
suggest that there is no special need for law enforcement authorities to be trained or guided in 
the use of the Interpol database. 

3.8. 

Has your Member State already set up the infrastructure required to facilitate 
consultation according Art. 3(4) of the CP 2005/69/JHA)? 

•  If  the  answer  is  positive,  please  provide  a  description  of  the  relevant 

infrastructure. 

•  For those Member States which replied to this question in the questionnaire 
contained in the 2006 Report, has there been a change in your situation since 
then? 

•  Do your competent authorities have direct access to the Interpol database? If 

the access is indirect, please describe the workflow. 

Most  Member  States  use  the  passport  data  in  the  Interpol  database  solely  for  investigation 
purposes. Only few Member States use the database for control purposes as well. The latter 
Member States provided or are in the process of providing access to border officers who are 
able to query the database manually or automatically at border crossings, using the I-24/7 and 
MIND & FIND tools provided by Interpol. 

The replies suggest that Member States have not given a particularly proactive interpretation 
to Article 3(4), and for the most part consider that the simple provision of potential access to 
competent authorities is sufficient to satisfy the requirement set out in the Article. This seems 
at  odds  with  the  text  of  the  Article,  and  particularly  with  Member  States’  obligation  to 
“ensure” law enforcement authorities consult the Interpol database where appropriate.  

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3.9. 

In addition to compliance with national legislation on data protection, does your 
Member  States  take  any  other  measure  to  ensure  an  adequate  level  of 
protection  of  personal  data  in  the  relevant  Interpol  member  country  and  the 
respect of fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing 
of  personal  data  pursuant  to  Article  3(5)  of  the  CP  2005/69/JHA?  Have  there 
been  any  complaints  from  individuals  emanating  from  such  an  exchange  of 
data? 

The  replies  indicate  that  Member  States  do  not  take  any  special  measures  to  ensure  an 
adequate level of protection of personal data in the relevant Interpol member country and the 
respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  regarding  the  automatic  processing  of  personal 
data,  other  than  the  Netherlands  which  limits  the  zones  in  which  its  data  is  available.  All 
Member  States  consider  that  their  national  legislation  is  sufficient.  Belgium,  Cyprus, 
Bulgaria,  Greece  and  Portugal  consider  that  the  passport  data  which  is  exchanged  with 
Interpol is not personal data. 

Member  State  did  not  report  incidents  of  any  complaints  from  citizens  in  relation  to  the 
exchange of data with Interpol. 

3.10. 

Please provide statistics on the number of successful identifications (hits) made 
by your competent authorities against the Interpol database during the last 12 
months.  What  is  the  average  time  your  competent  authorities  have  to  wait  to 
obtain  a  confirmation  of  the  successful  identification  (hit)  and  to  obtain 
background information following a hit? 

Most  Member  States  do  not  keep  statistics  of  the  number  of  positive  identifications  (hits) 
made by their competent authorities to the Interpol database, and were unable to provide any 
figures.  Such  data  was  made  available  by  Interpol  and  showed  that  in  the  EU  ,  between 
January  and  August  2007,  there  were  1,599  positive  identifications,  compared  to  191  such 
identifications for the same period in 2005. 

According to the replies to the questionnaire, the average time that competent authorities have 
to  wait  to  obtain  confirmation  of  a  successful  identification  varied  between  “seconds”  and 
“months” or even “no confirmation at all”, even though 13 Member States were not able to 
provide such averages at all. 

The  average  time  that  competent  authorities  have  to  wait  to obtain  background  information 
following  a  successful  identification  ranged  between  “24  hours”  to  “10  days”  and  to  “no 
background  information  at  all”.  17  Member  States  were  not  able  to  provide  such  statistics 
either  because  they  do  not  have  them  or  because  the  response  time  varies  substantially 
depending on the third country concerned. 

3.11. 

Please provide statistics on the average number of requests for confirmation of 
a  successful  identification  (hit)  that  you  were  asked  to  make  by  competent 
authorities of other Member States following a hit against the Interpol database 
during  the  last  12  months.  What  is  the  average  time  for  responding  to  such  a 
request  for  confirmation  and  to  provide  background  information  following  a 
hit? 

The replies showed that 18 Member States do not keep statistics of the number of requests for 
confirmation of a successful identification that they receive from other Member States or from 
other Interpol member countries.The average time for responding to requests for confirmation 
of  successful  identifications  varied  between  “minutes”  and  “few  hours”,  while  the  average 
time for providing background information was substantially longer, with one Member State 
noting that it may take up to 4 weeks. 

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4. 

CONCLUSIONS - SPECIFIC 

In order to provide a general overview of the operation of the Common Decision, it is again 
necessary to return to the 5 core obligations of the Member States, as identified earlier. 

4.1. 

To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol. 

At the time of writing this report, it is assumed that all Member States have implemented the 
Common Position and exchange passport data with Interpol. This is verified by Interpol. This 
result shows that since the 2006 Report, all Member States took positive steps to comply with 
their obligations.  

However, 3 Member States which do not exchange all the required types of passport data with 
Interpol. Namely, Poland provides data only on passports which are lost or stolen as a result 
of crime, Hungary only on stolen passports and Portugal only on blank stolen documents. On 
the  other  hand,  in  some  cases  Member  States  exceed  the  requirements  of  the  Common 
Position by providing, for example, information on identity cards and driving licenses.  

Some Member States communicated some problems as regards the operation of the Common 
Position and the Interpol database. Latvia noted that there is no specific field in the Interpol 
database for "alien's passport" and that this poses a problem whenever such an entry needs to 
be  made.  Portugal  raised  similar  concerns  as  regards  fraudulent  passports  and  Germany  as 
regards  misappropriated  documents  which  are  neither  lost  nor  stolen.  Member  States 
suggested as a solution to these problems, the adoption of the FADO dictionary/list both for 
the Common Position, as well as for the Interpol database purposes. 

Irrespective  of  the  identified  problems,  Interpol  statistics  show  that  entries  to  its  database 
from  the  EU  states  for  the  period  January  to  August  2007  were  11,237,207,  compared  to 
6,150,494 for the same period in 2005. These figures proved the substantial improvement in 
the exchange of data since the 2006 Report. Further, the entries of the EU Member States for 
the  above  period  represent  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  total  number  of  entries,  which 
demonstrates the huge growth in participation in this system, as well as the key role that EU 
states now play in enhancing Interpol’s capabilities.  

4.2. 

To  ensure  that  such  data  is  exchanged  with  Interpol  immediately  after  it  has 
been entered into the national database of SIS. 

Despite the fact that the replies of the Member States indicate a positive development since 
the 2006 Report, there is scope for further improvement in the implementation by the Member 
States.  

Only  11  Member  States  have  achieved  an  immediate  entry  to  the  Interpol  database,  upon 
entry to  the  national  database, and  2  other Member States are expected to be doing so very 
soon. 8 Member States exchange such data on a daily basis. However,, in the law enforcement 
field,  time  is  of  the  essence  and  nothing  short  of  an  immediate  entry  can  be  considered 
sufficient. The provision of data on a monthly or weekly basis is totally inappropriate for the 
purposes of this Common Position. 

It  is  important  that  Member  States  exchange  data  with  Interpol  immediately,  as  this  will 
enhance  the  value  of  the  information,  and  collectively  the  value  of  the  entire  exchange 
mechanism. It is recommended that the concerned Member States take steps to remedy their 
non-compliance with this requirement of the Common Position. 

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4.3. 

To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of 
protection for personal data. 

Articles  3(1)  and  3(5)  of  the  Common  Position  request  Member  States  to  ensure  that  the 
exchange of passport data is subject to the requirement that the recipient Interpol country has 
an adequate level of protection of personal data and respect of fundamental rights regarding 
the  automatic  processing  of  personal  data.  Of  all  the  Member  States,  only  the  Netherlands 
chose to limit the recipients of its passport data in order to comply with the above obligation 
of the Common Position. 

All  other  Member  States  invoke  two  reasons  for  not  limiting  such  access  to  their  passport 
data. First, the majority of Member States have indicated that they do not consider passport 
numbers  to  constitute  ‘personal  data’.  Therefore,  they  believe  that  contributions  to  or 
consultations of the Interpol database will not result in any exchange of personal data. On this 
basis, most Member States do not believe to be breaching their obligations under the Common 
Position when they do not limit access to their passport data. Second, they consider that, from 
a law enforcement point of view and for the benefit of their citizens, they have an interest in 
knowing  when  one  of  their  passports  is  detected  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  All  Member 
States believe that considerations of data protection adequacy and fundamental rights should 
come  into  play  only  at  the  stage  of  following-up  a  positive  identification  (hit),  either  to 
confirm  it  or  to  provide  background  information.  Such  follow-up  is  done  on  a  case-by-case 
basis  after  carrying  out  a  risk  assessment  of  the  situation  based  on  proportionality  and 
necessity. 

In  the  case  blank  passports,  contribution  to  or  consultation  of  the  Interpol  database  will  not 
result in any exchange of personal data, in which case the issue of ensuring an adequate level 
of  data  protection  of  the  recipient  does  not  come  into  play.  In  the  case  of  issued  passports, 
even if such contribution or consultation will involve only passport numbers, measures for the 
protection  of  personal  data  are  necessary  since  data  on  an  issued  passport  is  information 
relating to an identifiable person. 

The fact that only one Member State makes the effort to distinguish with which countries to 
share passport data, shows great willingness on the part of the Member States to be relatively 
free with exchange of their data, and a lack of concern as to whether or not the countries they 
share  data  with  have  adequate  personal  data  protection  in  place  or  not.  Where  no  personal 
data  is  exchanged,  this  practice  is  obviously  acceptable.  In  all  other  cases,  the  Commission 
recommends to Member States to ensure respect of the requirements as regards the protection 
of  personal  data  from  the  very  beginning  of  contributing  to  or  consulting  with  the  Interpol 
database and to chose to limit the recipients of its data on issued passports in order to comply 
with the obligation of Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the Common Position. 

Further,  Article  3(1)  gives  Member  States  the  choice  to  only  exchange  passport  data  with 
other  Interpol  countries  that  also  exchange  such  data.  Even  though  most  Member  States 
considered that such reciprocal treatment is important, they again consider that it comes into 
play only at the stage of following-up a positive identification (hit). 

4.4. 

To  ensure  that  their  competent  law  authorities  use  the  Interpol  database  to 
access such information when appropriate for the performance of their task and 
to set up the required infrastructures to facilitate consultation 

Despite the fact the Common Position imposes a proactive obligation on Member States to set 
up the required infrastructures and to ensure that their competent law enforcement authorities 
query the Interpol database where appropriate, they do not seem to have taken serious steps to 
comply with their obligation. 

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The  replies  seem  to  suggest  that  most  Member  States  use  the  passport  data  in  the  Interpol 
database  solely  for  investigation  purposes,  reflecting  a  prevailing  attitude  that  by  simply 
providing  access  to  the  Interpol  database  to  its  law  enforcement  authorities,  they  are 
‘ensuring’ that this valuable information resource is in fact used. In some Member States the 
database  is  accessible  only  via  the  NCBs,  while  some  others  have  provided  access  to  some 
specially authorised and trained police staff.  

However,  in  acting  in  such  way,  the  Member  States,  in  addition  to  non-complying  with  the 
Common Position, they are  missing  the real  advantages of this database in the fight against 
serious and organised crime and terrorism.  

Only  few  Member  States  have  extended  the  use  of  the  database  to  control  purposes.  The 
provision  of  direct  access  to  the  database  to  border  control  officers  is  essential  in  order  to 
maximise  the  benefits  of  the  Common  Position,  since  that  is  the  point  when  a  searched 
passport is likely to show up. 

Austria,  France,  Germany,  Sweden,  Cyprus,  Finland,  Poland,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg  and 
Ireland have provided or are in the process of providing access to border officers who are able 
to query the database manually or automatically at border crossings. Access is usually given 
using the I-24/7 and MIND&FIND tools provided by Interpol. This practice is recommended 
as the optimum use of the Interpol database. The Commission further recommends to Member 
States  to  provide  the  Commission  with  a  list  of  “competent  law  enforcement  authorities” 
under national law within the meaning of Articles 1and 3 of the Common Position. 

Even  though  it  is  clear  that  there  is  still  a  long  way  to  go  to  achieve  full  compliance  of  all 
Member  States  with  the  obligation  to  provide  access  to  the  Interpol  database,  Interpol 
statistics show that there has been remarkable increase in the searches to the database which 
are  carried  out  by  the  Member  States.  During  the  period  January  to  August  2007  Member 
States have carried out 4,202,000 searches compared to 6,692 searches for the same period in 
2005. 

4.5. 

To  ensure  that  they  take  up  the  required  action  in  case  that  a  positive 
identification (hit) occurred. 

Despite the fact that few Member States were able to provide statistics and averages in their 
replies, a dedicated session during the meeting of specialists was able to identify some issues 
and suggest some recommendations on this matter. 

The  Member  States  drew  a  distinction  between  requests  for  a  confirmation  of  a  positive 
identification (hit) and the provision of background information where the request came as a 
result of an investigation or as a result of a border check. They all agreed that the speed of 
responding  to  the  request  is  mostly  relevant  in  the  latter  case  where  the  rights  of  a  citizen 
might be affected. 

One  of  the  key  issues  which  the  Member  States  identified  as  of  outmost  importance  in  the 
efficient  and  speedy  following-up  of  successful  identifications  is  the  increase  in  the  staff  of 
NCBs in order to enable them to work on a 24/7 basis, and to provide access to NCBs to their 
national passport databases and images of the passport holders,. These two steps would help 
increase  dramatically  the  quick  and  efficient  follow-up  of  requests  for  confirmation  of 
successful identifications. 

The  Member  States  also  noted  that  they  would  welcome  the  adoption  of  some  standards  as 
regards  such  responses,  like  agreeing  on  a  maximum  response  time.  This  could  be  adopted 
initially between Member States and later be extended to all Interpol member countries. 

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5. 

CONCLUSION - GENERAL  

We  have  noticed  a  substantial  improvement in  the  operation  of  the  Common  Position  since 
the  2006  Report.  Member  States  have  taken  various  steps  in  order  to  comply  with  their 
obligations. However, the implementation of the Common Position in the fullest sense of the 
term is still incomplete and requires a more proactive and committed effort on the part of the 
Member States. 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
Appendix 1 

INTERPOL STATISTICS 

1. 

Member State Participation in the Stolen Travel Document Database 

2005 

18 

2007 

27 

2. 

Individual  Member  State  Contributions  to  the  Stolen  Travel  Document 
Database 

Member State 

Number of Documents Contributed 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

113,769 

342,104 

63 

3,743 

611,814 

120 

100,126 

90,251 

15,179 

1,969,842 

24,194 

17,996 

88,021 

3,016,320 

88,095 

341,738 

4,496 

1,652 

1,641,360 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

TOTAL 

626,826 

10,386 

832,927 

65 

90,054 

224 

163,541 

1,042,301 

11,237,207 

3. 

Number of Documents Registered in the Stolen Travel Document Database 

2005 

2007 

EU Member States 

6,394,305 

11,237,207 

Non-EU States 

2,449,300 

4,484,545 

Total 

8,843,605 

15,721,752 

4. 

Number of Searches Made of the Stolen Travel Document Database 

EU Member States 

Non-EU States 

Total 

2005 

8520 

34,796 

43,316 

2007 

4,202,000 

6,232,469 

10,434,469 

5. 

Number of Successful Hits on the Stolen Travel Document Database 

EU Member States 

Non-EU States 

Total 

2005 

381 

457 

838 

EN 

2007 

1,599 

2,180 

3,779 

12 

   EN