Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament  and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004 and (EC) No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system - Impact assessment {COM(2008) 388 final} {SEC(2008) 2094}
Date: 2008-06-25
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financing, air safety, air space, air traffic, air transport, common transport policy, impact study, organisation of transport, trans-European network

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 25.6.2008 
SEC(2008) 2093 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

accompanying the 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004 and (EC) 
No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the European 
aviation system 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2008) 388 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2094} 

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Proposal for revision of the Single European Sky legislation 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Executive summary: 

The  impact  assessment  on  the  revision  of  the  Single  European  Sky  (SES)  legislation1 
(2008/TREN/030)  follows  the  recommendations  of  two  major  preparatory  reports:  the 
High  Level  Group  report  on  the  future  regulatory  framework  for  aviation  (July 2007) 
and the Performance Review Commission report on the ‘Evaluation of the impact of the 
Single  European  Sky  initiative  on  ATM2  performance’  (December 2006).  The  SES 
proposals will form an integral part of a wider package, with two other elements: (1) the 
extension  of  EASA  competences  to  air  traffic  management  (ATM)  and  air  navigation 
services  (ANS)  (2) the  endorsement  of  the  SESAR3  master  plan.  Because  of  their 
specific  nature,  the  SESAR  and  EASA  proposals  will  be  the  subject  of  separate 
appraisals. 

The proposals considered for SES II do not introduce new legislation as such, but rather 
consolidate the previous SES package (SES I) and add an overall performance-driving 
framework.  This  framework  will  strengthen  the  network  approach  and  introduce 
environmental performance as a new area.  

What is the problem? 

Our  current  air  traffic  management  (ATM)  system  is  operating close to its limits and 
there is scope for improvement. There are inefficiencies in cost and capacity and ATM 
does not restrict the environmental impact of aviation. The system is still fragmented 
along  national  borders,  lacks  good  network  coordination  and  efficient  use  of  airspace. 
These problems lead to total additional costs of over €3bn per year.  

Sub-optimal  routing  (flight  inefficiency)  not  only  translates  into  loss  of  time  and 
money,  but  also  to  unnecessary  fuel  burn  and  emissions.  At  the  same  time,  traffic  is 

1 

2 
3 

Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the 
framework for the creation of the Single European Sky,  
Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of 
air navigation services in the Single European Sky,  
Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the organisation 
and use of airspace in the Single European Sky, 
Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
interoperability of the European Air Traffic Management Network. 
For a list of all abbreviations used in the text, see Annex 1. 
SESAR is the Single European Sky ATM Research project, which aims to modernise the ATM 
system both technologically and operationally. For more information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/sesame/index_en.htm and http://www.sesar-
consortium.aero/. 

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expected  to  double  or,  in  some  regions,  even  triple  by  2020,  to  a  volume  that  current 
technology and organisation will struggle to handle safely. Increased congestion in turn 
leads  to  unmet  demand,  reduced  competitiveness  and  unrealised  economic  potential 
both for aircraft operators and the economy at large. 

What are the main causes of the problem? 

1. Lack of a network approach: air routes were historically designed as a function of 
national  air  carrier  needs  or  to  reflect  the  network  of  traditional  radionavigation  aids. 
While navigation technology and the needs of airspace users have changed significantly, 
the  route  network  does  not  reflect  these  changes.  As  routes  channel  fee-paying  traffic 
through  predetermined  territories,  hence  determining  the  income  of  service  providers, 
the  national  approach  has  led  to  cross-country  flight  efficiency  being  a  secondary 
concern  in  route  network  design.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  sub-optimal 
civil-military cooperation.  

2.  Insufficient  oversight  of  natural  monopolies:  air  traffic  management  is  mostly  a 
natural  monopoly  (one  service  provider  in  each  block  of  airspace  due  to  technical 
constraints  and  sunk 
through 
competition.  This  system  and  the  corresponding  full-cost  recovery  mechanism  do  not 
incentivise service providers to improve their services to customers (i.e. airspace users). 
Instead, it contributes to a ‘live and let live’ attitude.  

investment  costs),  which  prevents  efficiencies 

3. Governance: while the Single Sky legislation brought air traffic management under 
the  Community  umbrella,  essential  obligations  were  left  to  national  discretion.  Some 
elements  of  the  system  also  remain  the  responsibility  of  intergovernmental  structures 
with  limited  enforcement  powers.  The  current  institutional  arrangements  for  ATM  are 
not in line with industry developments (corporatisation, privatisation, etc.) and require a 
clear  separation  of  policy-  and  law-making  from  oversight  functions  and  service 
provision. 

What are the main policy objectives? 

The over-arching objective of the revision of the Single Sky legislation is to ensure that 
the  ATM  system  effectively  provides  the  infrastructure  for  the  aviation  industry  and 
other  users  so  that  the  Lisbon  objectives  can  be  fulfilled.  Performance  must  focus  on 
four  key  areas  —  cost-efficiency,  flight  efficiency,  capacity/delays  and  safety. 
Environmental protection will be added in the revised package as an explicit objective, 
as a key area for service provision and a criterion for route network design. 

What are the main tools for achieving the policy objectives? 

The  proposals  aim  to  drive  the  performance  of  the  ATM  system.  A  regulatory 
framework with target setting will gradually ensure this. The network approach will be 
enhanced  to  solve  local  problems  with  system-wide  effects.  Wherever  possible,  the 
unbundling  of  services  should  be  considered  with  a  view  to  introducing  competition. 
This  performance  framework  should  ensure  more  efficient  integration  of  service 
provision within functional airspace blocks (FABs). 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4. 

2. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 6 

Organisation and timing ............................................................................................... 6 

Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 6 

Results of external consultation rounds........................................................................ 8 

Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board.................................................................... 9 

Problem definition...................................................................................................... 10 

2.1. 

The European air traffic management system is working at sub-optimal level ......... 10 

2.1.1.  Safety.......................................................................................................................... 11 

2.1.2.  Flight efficiency ......................................................................................................... 11 

2.1.3.  Capacity/delays .......................................................................................................... 12 

2.1.4.  Cost-efficiency ........................................................................................................... 12 

2.2. 

Causes of the persisting problems .............................................................................. 13 

2.2.1.  Lack of a genuine European network approach (legal, institutional, technical 

fragmentation) ............................................................................................................ 13 

2.2.2 

Poor governance of a natural monopoly..................................................................... 18 

2.3.  Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? .................................................. 20 

2.4. 

How will the problem evolve, all things being equal? Should the EU act? ............... 21 

3. 

4. 

Objectives of the proposals ........................................................................................ 22 

Policy options ............................................................................................................. 23 

4.1. 

First pillar: Performance regulation for monopoly services....................................... 23 

4.1.1.  Option 1: Status quo – continue with current SES legislation ................................... 23 

4.1.2.  Option 2: Local target setting (LTS) .......................................................................... 24 

4.1.3.  Option 3a: European target setting (ETS) .................................................................. 25 

4.1.4.  Option 3b: European Regulator (ETS)....................................................................... 26 

4.2. 

Second pillar: Network approach for a European-level network and the 
management of scarce resources: ............................................................................... 27 

4.3. 

Third pillar: Introduction of market measures for unbundled services ...................... 31 

4.3.1.  Description ................................................................................................................. 31 

4.3.2.  Option 1: ‘Continue with current legislation (market measures decided at 

national level)’............................................................................................................ 34 

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4.3.3.  Option 2: ‘Market measures for unbundled services’ ................................................ 35 

4.4. 

Fourth pillar: Functional airspace blocks (FABs) in the performance 
regulatoion framework: .............................................................................................. 36 

4.4.1.  Option 1: No changes — keep the status quo ............................................................ 36 

4.4.2.  Option 2: Clarify the current concept with a combination of statutory and non-

regulatory measures.................................................................................................... 37 

4.4.3.  Option 3: The structural division of service provision into FABs is decided at 

Community level ........................................................................................................ 38 

4.5. 

Role of Eurocontrol in the performance regulation framework:................................ 39 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

Comparing the alternative options ............................................................................. 40 

First pillar: Performance regulation ........................................................................... 40 

Second pillar – Network approach for a European-level network and 
management of scarce resources ................................................................................ 43 

Third Pillar: Comparison of the options for the introduction of market 
measures for unbundled services................................................................................ 44 

5.4. 

Fourth pillar: FABs within the performance framework............................................ 45 

6. 

7. 

Policy monitoring and evaluation............................................................................... 46 

Technical updates of the first SES package ............................................................... 47 

List of Annexes........................................................................................................................ 48 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

This impact assessment has been performed by DG Energy and Transport (TREN) with 
contributions  from  an  Inter-Services  Steering  Group 
the  following 
Directorates-General  participated:  the  Secretariat  General,  the  Legal  Service,  COMP, 
SANCO, TRADE, EMPL, ENTR, ENV, BUDG, INFSO, RTD and ECFIN. 

in  which 

The  revision  of  the  legislation  could  draw  upon  two  influential  reports.  Firstly,  the 
Performance Review Commission (PRC) adopted in December 2006 its ‘Evaluation of 
the  Impact  of  the  Single  European  Sky  initiative  on  Air  Traffic  Management 
Performance’4,  providing  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  the  Single 
European  Sky  over  the  previous  three  years.  Secondly,  the  High  Level  Group  on  the 
to  Vice-
Future  Aviation  Regulatory  Framework 
President Jacques Barrot 
for  driving  performance 
improvement’5. 

(July 2007): 

framework 

delivered 

report 

‘A 

its 

legislation.  Based  on 

The two reports were produced separately, but both called for a revision of the current 
Single  Sky 
in 
these 
December 2007 its ‘First Report on the implementation of the Single Sky Legislation: 
achievements  and  the  way  forward’6.  Immediately  afterwards,  and  thus  before  the 
drafting  of  the  proposal  itself,  work  was  started  on  the  impact  assessment  to  explore 
options for revising the SES7. 

the  Commission  adopted 

inputs, 

In order to meet the goal of a total system approach, recommended by the High Level 
Group,  the  revision  of  SES I  will  be  developed  and  coordinated  together  with  the 
proposal  for  an  Airport  Capacity  Action  Plan,  the  proposal  to  extend  EASA 
competences to aerodromes, air traffic management and air navigation services and the 
proposal on the ATM Master Plan, which are all due to be put forward mid-2008. 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise 

The preparation of this proposal has been preceded by the publication of the two reports 
mentioned  above,  one  of  a  more  technical  nature,  the  other  more  politically  oriented, 
and intense consultation of the aviation industry.  

Technical expertise 

This impact assessment relies on several sources of expertise, but mostly on the various 
reports  published  by  the  Eurocontrol  Performance  Review  Commission  (PRC).  The 
PRC is independent and provides highly respected reports. It produces not only annual 

4 

5 

6 
7 

See report on 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/gallery/content/public/Docs/PRC_Evaluation_of_SES.pdf. 
See details of composition and report on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/hlg/index_en.htm. 
COM(2007) 845. 
CLWP ref.: 2008/TREN/030. 

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reports  but  also  specific  reports  on  issues  such  as  the  cost  of  fragmentation  or 
comparisons between the EU and US systems, some at the request of the Commission.  

The PRC report analyses the impact of the Single Sky legislation from a performance 
standpoint, taking into account user needs. The report concludes that the Single Sky has 
already had a positive impact, especially in (i) increasing collaboration between service 
providers and (ii) ensuring separation between national service provision and oversight. 
However,  while  Community  legislation  provides  the  basis  for  better  air  traffic 
management,  it  does  not  drive  the  industry  towards  more  tangible  improvements:  the 
most promising tools for improving performance have remained the responsibility of the 
Member  States.  For  this  reason,  the  PRC  considers  the  development  of  quantitative 
performance  criteria  necessary  for  further  progress.  To  this  end,  it  proposes 
31 concrete measures to be implemented in the short or medium term8. 

Political expertise 

In September 2006, Vice-President Barrot called upon a High Level Group9 to examine 
the way forward. In July 2007, the Group submitted a unanimous report containing ten 
recommendations10. The report concentrated on performance and governance in order to 
strengthen  the  capabilities  of  the  main  actors.  The  Community  regulatory  framework 
should  give  more  responsibility  to  industry  to  deliver  the  required  environmental, 
safety, cost-efficiency and capacity benefits. 

Consultation of stakeholders 

Besides  the  two  major  contributions  mentioned  above,  to  ensure  a  full  assessment, 
additional consultation of stakeholders has been organised at all levels: 

1. 

2. 

8 

9 

10 
11 

A high-level consultation forum was held on 22 January 2008 with an audience 
of  over  400 people.  Vice-President  Barrot  attended  the  meeting.  There  was 
broad agreement among stakeholders on the need to rapidly change the Single 
Sky  legislation  now  in  order  to  drive  the  performance  of  the  air  traffic 
management  system,  using  the  ‘Community  method’  as  the  sole  vehicle  for 
change. Performance should be considered in a broad sense, including safety, 
capacity,  cost-efficiency  and  above  all  the  environment11.  The  idea  of  a 
network design and management function also received widespread support.  

Use  of  the  three  formal  consultation  channels:  (1)  Member  States  and  their 
military representatives on the Single Sky Committee, (2) industry stakeholders 
in the Industry Consultation Body, established by the Framework Regulation, 
and  (3)  social  partners  in  the  Air  Traffic  Management  Working  Group 
established in the framework of the Sectoral Dialogue Committee on Aviation. 

Evaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  SES  Initiative  on  ATM  Performance,  Eurocontrol  PRC, 
December 2006. 
See details of composition and report on 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/hlg/index_en.htm. 
The 10 recommendations are given at the end of Annex 2. 
Conclusions of the conference are given in Annex 3. 

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3. 

Informal consultations were also organised. Beyond bilateral meetings, more 
structured  meetings  —  at  European  association  level  —  were  organised 
directly  with  the  airline  community,  general  aviation  (GA),  air  navigation 
service providers, trade unions (both in the air traffic management industry and 
at  Eurocontrol),  airports,  the  military  community  and  aviation  equipment 
suppliers. These meetings served as a first acid test for more concrete ideas and 
the possible options for legislative proposals. 

Consultation of Commission services 

The  inter-service  steering  group  met  on  18  and  25  January 2008  to  assess  the  draft 
impact assessment report. Practically all comments and observations were incorporated 
into the text. 

1.3. 

Results of external consultation rounds 

As  stakeholders  were  continuously  involved  in  the  reflection  on  the  revision,  most 
associations  and  formal  consultation  bodies  were  able  to  adopt  formal  positions, 
culminating  in  a  series  of  presentations.  These  discussions  demonstrated  that  the 
aviation  community  expects  significant  and,  especially,  operationally  robust  proposals 
for  change.  All  stakeholders  endorse  the  need  to  introduce  a  performance 
framework12. 

Broadly speaking, all Member States, including the military representatives, support the 
direction for action suggested in the Commission communication on the ‘First report on 
the  implementation  of  Single  Sky  and  the  way  forward’.  Military  airspace  users 
expressed the view that the Community should engage with the Ministries of Defence to 
promote  collaboration  in  line  with  the  Statement  of  Member  States  on  military  issues 
related to the Single European Sky, attached to the Framework Regulation. In addition, 
they agree that sovereignty should no longer be seen as an obstacle to reorganisation of 
the ATM network and that pragmatic solutions should be found within a civil-military 
partnership. 

Industry  is  also  supportive  of  change.  There  are  differences,  however,  regarding 
timeframe  and  scope.  Among  airspace  users,  the  airlines  insist  on  the  rapid 
introduction  of  strong  performance  regulation  at  Community  level,  while  air 
navigation  service  providers  point  to  better  regulation,  subsidiarity  and  respect  for 
local  particularities.  General  aviation  (GA)  supports  the  use  of  the  Community 
method, as long as they are effectively consulted and the Community sets principles that 
are then implemented locally to ensure flexible access to airspace and services on fair 
terms.  Staff  representatives  too  endorse  the  idea  of  performance,  stressing  that  safety 
must  remain  the  overriding  principle  and  that  workers’  organisations  must  be  closely 
involved in the process of change. 

Consultations  have  shown  widespread  support  for  the  planned  measures  to  improve 
network  management.  After  some  initial  concerns  on  the  part  of  the  military  that  it 

12 

Stakeholders  are  represented  on  the  Industry  Consultation  Body,  which  has  been  working 
intensively during the consultation period (from December 2007 onwards). This has resulted in 
substantive position papers. Note that Annex 4 lists all the consultations held. 

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would affect their segregated areas were addressed, all parties now support the creation 
of  a  route  network  design  body.  Concerning  the  management  of  scarce  resources, 
expectations  are  very  high  —  sometimes  even  unexpectedly  high  —  that  the 
coordination  measures  will  effectively  alleviate  the  shortages.  Overall,  the  changes  in 
network management are seen not so much as a revolutionary new measure but rather as 
the logical enhancement of already existing, or planned, initiatives. 

Stakeholders  did  not  agree  on  the  way  forward  on  the  measures  for  opening  to  the 
market.  In  general,  this  concept  was  perceived  as  a  managerial  tool  likely  to  help  in 
reaching performance targets rather than as an end in itself. While some stakeholders, 
especially airspace users, were favourable to the idea, in general it was felt that the use 
of unbundling should be left to the discretion of Member States and ANSPs rather than 
be  imposed  at  EU  level.  Unbundling  may  impact  on  contingency  and  continuity  of 
service, and hence is closely linked to core business. Some stakeholders stated that the 
issue  should  be  dealt  with  during  discussions  on  integrating  services  into  functional 
airspace  blocks.  Staff  representatives  were  against  any  form  of  opening.  Even  on 
meteorological services and training services, stakeholders could not reach a unanimous 
position. 

Discussions  on  functional  airspace  blocks  generated  no  clear  feedback  as  this  issue 
had  taken  a  back  seat  in  relation  to  the  performance  framework  and  the  concept  of 
economic regulation. However, there was a feeling that a top-down approach would not 
be welcomed, especially from the military side. 

To  conclude,  the  minimum  standards  for  consultations  were  met  and  stakeholders 
were given the chance to actively contribute to the consultation process. 

1.4. 

Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board  

The  report  was  submitted  to  the  Impact  Assessment  Board  in  early  March.  Following 
the opinion issued by the Board on 11 March, the following improvements were made 
to the report: 

•  Clarification of the problem definition: 

–  Institutional issues with Eurocontrol are clarified in 2.2.2.1, last paragraph, 

together with an explanation in Annex 6; 

–  The  impact  of  the  lack  of  competition  for  certain  unbundled  services  is 

described in chapter 4; 

–  The  role  of  functional  airspace  blocks  is  clarified  in  the  assessment  in 

chapter 4; 

–  The link with SESAR is specified in chapter 2.5; 

•  The  comparison  of  options  was  facilitated  by  bringing  together  the 

description and analysis; 

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•  The environmental performance of ATM is expressed per flight — as with 
improved airframes and engines; the overall level of emissions is the object 
of ETS; 

•  The  outcome  of  consultations  is  further  detailed,  especially  on  the 

introduction of market measures; 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

Aviation is a global industry contributing to employment, social cohesion and growth. 
Air  traffic  management13  provides,  together  with  airports,  the  infrastructure  for  air 
transport.  Although  the  current  EU  air  traffic  management  system  is  in  general 
functioning well for current needs, it is operating close to its limits and there is much 
scope  for  improvement  in  performance.  Europe’s  ATM  infrastructure  is  facing  a 
doubling  or  even,  in  some  regions,  tripling  of  traffic  by  202014,  which  will  inevitably 
lead to a capacity ceiling and increased delays and may compromise safety. Air traffic 
management should not become a bottleneck for aviation growth. 

Air traffic management is a network industry: the performance of the system depends 
on its weakest link. A technical hiccup at one airport causes a ripple effect throughout 
the  whole  system,  leading  to  significant  (external)  costs  for  operators,  the  travelling 
public and the economy as a whole. Consequently, the external costs of a failing system 
may exceed the costs charged to air space users. 

This means that our system is confronted with fundamental problems. Firstly, despite 
the  good  safety  record,  many  Member  States  and  service  providers  need  to  improve 
safety  levels  in  view  of  increasing  traffic.  The  route  network  has  to  deal  with  flight 
inefficiencies  to  improve  the  environmental  capacity  of  aviation.  There  is  also  the 
challenge  of  meeting capacity requirements to avoid costly delays. Last but not least, 
air traffic management needs to become more cost-efficient. 

2.1. 

The  European  air  traffic  management  system  is  working  at  sub-optimal 
level 

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has developed a global vision for 
aviation.  Air  traffic  management  should  perform  better.  ICAO  has  therefore  come  up 
with  eleven  areas  for  improving  performance.  Four  are  of  particular  importance  for 
Europe: safety, capacity/delays, cost-efficiency and flight efficiency. Flight efficiency in 
particular  is  attracting  attention  as  it  is  intrinsically  linked  to  environmental 
performance.  The  performance  of  the  European  ATM  system  can  be  analysed  and 
measured against targets15. 

13 

14 
15 

the  ICAO  definition,  Air  Navigation  Services  are:  Air  Traffic  Management, 
Under 
Communication,  Navigation  and  Surveillance,  Aeronautical  Information  Services,  MET,  and 
Search and Rescue. ATM encompasses Air Traffic Services, Air Traffic Flow Management, and 
Air Space Management. 
PRC Reports. 
The  report  uses  as  a  reference  the  reports  of  the  Performance  Review  Commission  of 
Eurocontrol. 

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2.1.1. 

Safety 

Safety is the overriding objective of the whole aviation system. Although Europe has a 
good  safety  record,  safety  procedures  vary  widely  among  the  Member  States.  This 
means that accurate and consistent risk measurement across Europe is lacking. Incident 
reporting,  which  is  mandatory  under  Community  law16,  is  progressing  and  provides 
clarity  on  some  risk  areas,  but  progress  is  slow  and  uneven  across  Member  States. 
These variable trends make it difficult to reach conclusions on safety trends at European 
level.  Without  robust  and  transparent  reporting  and  adequate  information,  it  is  not 
possible to undertake a performance review. The system also suffers from a lack of best 
practices in safety management17 

Some Member States (i.e. national supervisory authorities introduced to oversee safety 
under  the  first  SES  package)  and  air  navigation  service  providers  would  need  to 
enhance  their  capability  to  implement  all  the  SES  safety  requirements  and  specific 
safety  enhancements.  Without  a  proper  European  framework  this  undermines  the 
confidence that every air navigation service provider has been certified properly by the 
local NSA and that the SES regulations are implemented so as to guarantee minimum 
safety standards18. 

All in all, despite the good safety record, there is a need to improve safety management, 
as  increasing  traffic  leads  to  an  exponential  increase  in  risk.  As  yet,  there  are  no 
commonly  accepted  safety  performance  indicators  at  European  level  to  drive 
improvements in the overall safety performance of air navigation service provision. 

2.1.2.  Flight efficiency 

Airspace  is  a  scarce  resource,  which  must  be  used  in  an  optimal  way  to  satisfy  the 
requirements of both civil and military airspace users. An optimal flight would allow an 
aircraft to take off steeply to reach its ideal flight level (some 10 – 13 km high with less 
gravity and resistance) as fast as possible, to take the shortest great circle route, and then 
to continuously descend to approach its end destination. 

Flight  efficiency  measures  the  difference  between  the  actual  and  optimum  aircraft 
trajectories. On average, aircraft fly 49km per flight longer than strictly necessary, or 
about 6% of an average 850km route. This flight inefficiency is costly in terms of lost 
time and money, but also leads to unnecessary fuel burn and consequently greenhouse 
gas emissions. If flight efficiency could be improved by 2km between 2006 and 2010, 
aviation could save up to €1 080m 19. 

16 

17 

18 
19 

Directive 2003/42/EC of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation; and 
Commission  Regulation  2096/2005  of  20  December  2005  laying  down  the  common 
requirements for the provision of air navigation services. 
Evaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  SES  Initiative  on  ATM  Performance,  Eurocontrol  PRC, 
December 2006. 
Idem and SES Factual Review and Reporting project, 2006. 
Performance Review Commission, 2007, An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe 
during the calendar year 2006, Eurocontrol, Brussels. 

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2.1.3.  Capacity/delays 

Air  traffic  management  should  not  become  a  bottleneck  for  the  development  of  the 
aviation  industry  and  should  be  able  to  cope  with  demand  by  providing  sufficient 
capacity.  After  the  crisis  provoked  by  the  Yugoslavian  war,  triggering  enormous  air 
traffic  delays  in  the  ’90s,  delays  have  improved,  especially  after  the  9/11  traffic 
downturn. 

Recently, this improved trend has begun to reverse, as the Eurocontrol ‘notional’ target 
of one minute delay was not met for second consecutive year20. The main reason is the 
insufficient  provision  of  capacity  and  inadequate  commitment  to  the  timely  and 
complete implementation of capacity plans. 

Delays carry a heavy cost for operators, the flying public and the economy as a whole: 
9.2 million  minutes  of  delay  translate  into  a  cost  of  €710m  (sub-optimal  allocation  of 
aircraft  and  crew  and  time  lost  for  passengers).  Bigger  delays  have  particularly 
disruptive effects: the two percent of cancelled flights account for 2/3 of total delays. In 
general, the system is very susceptible to any form of disruption, where the performance 
of the network as a whole depends on the performance of its weakest link. 

2.1.4.  Cost-efficiency 

The market for air navigation services amounts to € 7.8bn, or about 4% of the aviation 
market. The largest part, some €6.155bn, is for  en-route services, the rest for terminal 
air  traffic  control.  In  comparison,  air  traffic  control  in  the  US  is  nearly  twice  as 
efficient: it handles nearly two times more traffic for about the same cost as in Europe. 
Further,  the  annual  cost-inefficiencies  of  the  European  system  are  estimated  at  €2bn 
(PRR 2005, Chapter 9), which represents around 20% of the total costs. 

The  principles  for  the  financing  of  air  traffic  control  are  based  on  ICAO  rules, 
established  in  1944,  when  state  administrations  still  were  in  charge  of  provision.  The 
charging  rules  allow  full  cost  recovery  from  users.  This  system  does  not  provide  any 
incentive to improve cost-efficiency and explains the strong backing of the civil aviation 
industry for regulation. The Single Sky has translated these principles into Community 
law,  while  allowing  Member  States  to  use  incentives  to  improve  cost-efficiency. 
None has done so since 200421.  

A system of de facto self-regulation has yielded a patchwork of results across countries 
(-45%  to  +32%  over  the  last  four  years).  Generally,  costs  have  continued  to  grow 
steadily  over  the  last  five  years  (27.8%  for  the  Eurocontrol  38-country  area).  The 
notional  target  of  a  3%  reduction  per  serviced  flight  has  not  been  attained22.  The 
achievement of a -3% cost efficiency target between 2003 and 2008 would have saved 
€2.6 billion. If extended to  2020, this target, even if met, would not allow the SESAR 
target of halving ANS costs to be achieved by that year. 

20 
21 

22 

Idem. 
UK  has  a  price  cap  system  and  operates  ATC  in  airports  on  a  market  basis.  Germany  has 
recently introduced competition in ATC at some regional airports. 
Overview of unit rates over the last 10 years in Annex 5. 

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2.2. 

Causes of the persisting problems 

The  SES  I  legislation  has  introduced  powerful  tools  to  improve  performance  through: 
designation  of  service  providers;  unbundling  of  services;  use  of  economic  incentives; 
in  route  structure;  establishment  of  FABs; 
setting  of  user  charges;  changes 
rationalisation of infrastructure23; etc. However, the use of these tools was left to the 
discretion of Member States. Member States have hardly used these tools. Moreover, 
a fully performing system can only be achieved if the amalgamation of national systems 
is transformed into a genuine network. 

2.2.1.  Lack  of  a  genuine  European  network approach  (legal,  institutional,  technical 

fragmentation) 

2.2.1.1.  A fragmented system on the ground … 

Other segments of aviation have been organised within the single market, but air traffic 
management has remained heavily fragmented, organised within national borders. For 
the  sake  of  clarity,  fragmentation  in  ATM  can  be  defined  as  the  division  of  service 
provision  into  smaller  decision-making  units  than  would  result  from  considering  the 
optimum scale24. 

Graph 1: Fragmentation of Air Navigation Service Provision 

Source: Performance Review Commission Eurocontrol  

This system is the result of historical decisions taken within the constraints of national 
boundaries,  resulting  in  the  sub-optimal  scale  of  operations.  This  leads  to 

23 

24 

PRC,  2006,  Evaluation  of  the  impact  of  the  SES  initiative  on  air  traffic  management 
performance, Brussels, p. iii. 
The impact of fragmentation in European ATM/CNS, Report commissioned by the Eurocontrol 
PRC, prepared by Helios Economics and Policy Services, April 2006. 

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fragmentation  in  airspace,  in  service  provision,  in  systems  and  in  regulations,  which 
brings significant additional overhead costs for airspace users and end-consumers. 

Fragmentation prevents the air traffic management industry from developing economies 
of  scale,  leading  to  the  sub-optimal  size  of  en-route  centres  and  unnecessary 
duplication of systems between and within countries25, with the associated support and 
maintenance costs. 

Table 1: Annual Cost of Fragmentation in Air Navigation Service Provision 

Source: PRC, 2006, the Impact of Fragmentation in European ATM/CNS, p. 55 

The comparison here is against a theoretical ideal with a reduced number of centres and 
a common system. 

Despite technological progress in aviation in general, air traffic control (ATC) remains 
primarily craftsmanship. While cockpits have become automated, ATC systems have 
not  evolved  and  controller  working  methods  are  fundamentally  unchanged.  The 
productivity  of  air  traffic  controllers  (the  number  of  flight-hours  controlled  for  each 
hour  spent  by  an  ATCO  on  operational  duty)  is  low  in  Europe:  on  average,  an  air 
traffic controller monitors less than 1 aircraft at any given time26. 

The  increase  in  traffic  is  met  mainly  by  opening  new  ‘sectors’  with  a  proportional 
increase in staffing and hence cost. As this approach is reaching its limits, it will lead to 

25 

26 

Some  Member  States  have  integrated  military  and  civil  service provision,  which reduces  costs 
and allows for a genuinely flexible use of airspace. 
The ratio of the number of controller hours divided by the number of flight hours controlled is 
0.7 — PRC reports. 

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14 

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a  capacity  wall  in  the  coming  5  to  10  years  without  the  necessary  technological 
innovation. 

2.2.1.2.  … leads to fragmentation in the air 

The  main  reason  for  horizontal27  flight  inefficiency  is  the  lack  of  an  optimised 
strategic  design  and  use  of  airspace  from  a  trans-European  network  perspective: 
routes  may  be  direct  within  national  airspace,  but  this  does  not  imply  the  shortest 
distance between departure and destination. The current European route network is still 
an  amalgamation  of  the  national  routes  that  served  the  (then)  national  flag  carrier  or 
followed  conventional  terrestrial  radionavigation  aid  facilities.  Therefore,  the  route 
network is not always well aligned with current cross-border traffic flows. The shortest 
available routes are underused due to the lack of precise real-time information. 

The  Performance  Review  Commission  points  out  that  63%  of  route  inefficiencies  can 
be resolved within country boundaries and the other third at country interfaces, which 
demonstrates  the  European  dimension  of  flight  efficiency.  At  present,  air  navigation 
service providers are not penalised if they do not offer the optimal available route and 
airlines are not penalised if they do not take the optimal route but use longer routes to 
avoid costly areas. 

Graph 2: Flight inefficiencies 

A patchwork of national networks 

In order to ensure the safety and orderliness of traffic and to avoid areas reserved for 
military training, aircraft do not fly straight but are required to use a historically grown 
patchwork of routes. In this way, they miss out on one of the major advantages of air 
traffic: the ability to travel ‘as the crow flies’. 

27 

Vertical  inefficiency  is  a  limited  issue  at  European  level  —  23  kg  more  fuel  consumption  per 
flight, or 0.6%, while horizontal inefficiency results in 5.9% more. 

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Member States are hesitant to tackle airspace fragmentation. Routes (and hence traffic) 
determine income flows for air navigation service providers and hence directly impact 
on employment28. Another source of reluctance is the military, which have their own 
exercise areas along routes. 

Currently,  the  route  network  is  managed  on  an  intergovernmental  basis  within 
Eurocontrol,  where  Members  States,  with  the  help  of  their  air  navigation  service 
providers, come together to discuss improvements to the network29. This model brings 
together  stakeholders  that  would  not  normally  agree  to  coordinate  their  air  navigation 
service  providers  or  networks.  However,  there  are  no  incentives  to  change,  and  the 
voluntary nature of the process is also its greatest drawback in that exactly those parties 
that  most  need  to  improve  are  always  able  to  stop  short  of  actually  implementing  the 
agreed improvements. 

Another issue is the need to enforce Member State implementation of appropriate routes 
and sectors to optimise airspace use, especially at weekends where there is no military 
activity.  Currently,  there  are  no  performance  indicators  to  monitor  progress  in  the 
effective use of airspace by civil and military users. 

2.2.1.3.  …  and  insufficient  network  management  capacities  and  coordination  of 

management of scarce resources 

Linked  to  fragmentation  is  the  failure  to  establish  robust  network  management 
functions. As noted above, routes are determined in a national context and not with the 
interest of the network in mind. Similarly, national considerations in the distribution 
of  some  scarce  resources  —  for  example  radio  frequencies  —  cause  inefficiencies,  as 
every  actor  has  to  keep  a  pool  of  reserve  frequencies  for  itself,  due  to  the  lack  of  a 
system of coordination to ensure more efficient allocation of frequencies. This in turn 
causes the scarce resources to run out prematurely and leads to unnecessary installation 
of  new  technologies,  when  better  use  of  existing  resources  could  avoid  those  costs30. 
Hence,  the  network  management  initiative  seeks  to  answer  not  only  the  problems  of 
flight inefficiency and the environment, but also that of unnecessary cost. 

In general, flight efficiency depends not only on the use of airspace, but also on other 
scarce resources. Many technologies are also limited in how many ‘customers’ they can 
serve, which limits capacity growth in the ATM system and causes additional costs by 
requiring  the  installation  of  alternative  technologies.  A  good  example  of  these 

28 

29 
30 

Aircraft  operators  are  charged  on  the  basis  of  the  distance  flown  through  national  airspace 
(multiplied by a factor for weight) according to the last filed flight plan. 
Eurocontrol Route Network Design Sub-Group. 
For example, the urgency of implementing equipage with 8.33 KHz radios in aircraft is mainly 
due to poor coordination of frequency allocation in Europe. Despite having twice the European 
traffic, the US does not see a need for this investment — which in Europe carries a cost of some 
€600-800  million  —  because  as  a  single  administration  it  has  been  able  to  establish  efficient 
frequency  usage  and  coordination.  Community  spectrum  policy  supports  efficient  use  of 
frequency  bands,  which  has  so  far  not  been  attained  in  aviation.  A  similar  situation  exists  for 
example for transponder codes. 

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constraints  is  radio  frequencies31.  The  VHF  frequency  band  currently  allocated  to 
aviation is 118 to 136 MHz (allowing 720 channels, with 25 KHz spacing).  

Traffic  growth  requires  more  and  more  channels,  since  each  new  air  traffic  control 
sector  needs  its  own  channel  to  ensure  interference-free  communications.  However, 
the  installation  of  new  technology  (for  example  to  reduce  channel  spacing  and  thus 
create new channels within the assigned band) is very costly due to the large number of 
radio stations to be equipped. To re-equip all the 120 000 to 150 000 stations with new 
radios,  for  example,  the  cost  would  be  in  the  order  of  €600-750  million 32.  This 
underlines  the  need  to  strive  for  optimal  use  of  these  scarce  resources  through 
coordination and optimal allocation to permit capacity growth and cost-efficiency. 

2.2.1.4.  … and unnecessary fuel burn and environmental impact 

A  direct  consequence  of  flight  inefficiencies  and  sub-optimal  management  of  scarce 
resources  is  the  problem  of  unnecessary  fuel  burn  in  aviation.  Aviation  currently 
contributes  around  3%  of  all  CO2  emissions  in  Europe.  Air  traffic  management  could 
play  a  considerable  role  in  limiting  emissions  —  some  7-12%  of  emissions  are 
influenced  by  ATM  measures33.  Improving  horizontal  flight  efficiency  could  save 
nearly 5 million  tonnes of CO2 per annum. This could offset, at least for a while, the 
emissions  from  a  growing  aviation  industry.34  Environmental  impact  should  be  a 
consideration in route design. Noise is another issue, especially in terminal areas, where 
noise restrictions may sometimes affect environmental performance. 

A quote from a recent PRC report:35 ‘In the European core area, 32% of the airspace 
volume  above  FL195  is  shared  between  civil  traffic  and  military  activities.  On 
average… the shared airspace is assigned 74% of the time to civil traffic and 26% to 
military  operations.  In  the  European  core  area,  although  shared  airspace  is  fully 
available  for  civil  traffic  one  third  of  the  year  (i.e.  weekends),  airspace  utilisation  by 
civil traffic does not improve significantly compared to weekdays. During weekdays, in 
the European core area, the airspace booked by military is actually not used half of the 
time (13% of the daytime period on a yearly basis).’ 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

Current  technologies  that  are  quickly  becoming  scarce  include  radio  frequencies  and  (radar) 
transponder codes, but as traffic grows, more and more technologies are likely to approach their 
capacity limits and their optimal use has to be addressed. 
The calculation is based on the conservative assumption of only one radio on average for each 
aircraft  or  ground  station  and  an  average  price  of  €5 000  per  radio  installation.  Many  aircraft 
have more than one radio and the cost of radio installation varies widely depending on radio and 
aircraft type, so exact estimates are difficult. 
Performance Review Commission, 2007, An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe 
during the calendar year 2006, Eurocontrol.  
ATM, like research on engines and airframes, deals only with environmental performance per 
flight. Total emissions as such are not addressed. 
Evaluation of civil/military airspace utilisation, 15 November 2007, PRC. 

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2.2.2 

Poor governance of a natural monopoly 

2.2.2.1  National monopolies under self-regulation 

One  of  the  most  prominent  features  of  this  sector  is  that  air  traffic  services36  are 
provided by natural monopolies not subject to competition. Physical and technological 
constraints  make  it  impossible  for  two  air  traffic  control  organisations  to  compete  for 
control  in  the  same  airspace.  Competition  for  the  market  is  also  difficult  due  to  high 
sunk costs. 

In  a  number  of  Member  States,  air  navigation  service  providers  have  been 
corporatised37  with  a  view  to  increasing  the  quality  of  services.  The  problem  is  that 
regulatory structures have not been adapted to cope with these natural monopolies38. 

Strong  oversight  depends  on  separation  from  service  provision  to  avoid  conflicts  of 
interest. In some Member States, oversight authorities are still in a learning phase and 
understaffed.  Some  authorities  need  support  and  cooperation  to  effectively  implement 
SES obligations. 

Continuing with the traditional principle of full cost recovery39 has not given sufficient 
incentives to service providers in Europe to control costs and make productivity gains. 
Indeed, the US system — which is run as a state administration — manages to handle 
twice the traffic at a similar cost. 

Few  countries  have  developed  a  proper  economic  regulatory  framework  together  with 
proper oversight of investment plans and spending of the air navigation service provider 
in order to introduce incentives to cut costs or improve services. In any case, no matter 
how  effective  a  separate  national  economic  oversight  structure  is,  it  cannot  overcome 
the  deficiencies  affecting  the  entire  network.  Benchmarking  through  performance 
review under the Eurocontrol inter-governance structure has kept self-regulation and has 
not led to satisfactory results. 

Weak  governance  explains  why  SES I  has  not  delivered  the  expected  results  in  some 
important areas. In general, the functional airspace blocks approach40 is not producing 
the  benefits  hoped  for  in  terms  of  improved  flight  efficiency,  cost  reduction  and 
defragmentation.  Early  indications  from  ongoing  initiatives  are  that  tangible  results  in 
terms of cost reductions and capacity increases are modest at this stage.  

One — but not the only — reason for this is that most projects have been launched by 
air  navigation  service  providers  without  sufficient  support  from  Member  States41.  It 

36 

37 

38 
39 

40 
41 

ATC  is  a  service  provided for:  preventing  collisions between  aircraft;  preventing  collisions on 
manoeuvring  areas  between  aircraft  and  obstructions  on  the  ground;  and  expediting  and 
maintaining the orderly flow of traffic. 
Removed from government and turned into state-owned corporations. Only the UK NATS is a 
public-private partnership. For details on shareholding see www.nats.co.uk. 
ICAO Doc. ANSConf-WP/26(2000). 
ICAO principles allow for the full recovery of costs for air navigation service provision. Member 
States have scrupulously applied this principle to recover costs from airspace users. 
Regulation 551, Article 5. 
‘Evaluation of FAB initiatives and their contribution to performance improvement’, 2008, PRC 
study, ordered by the European Commission. 

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has also become clear that the division between upper and lower  airspace set at flight 
level 285 (28 500 feet) is artificial and only contributes to unnecessary fragmentation, 
thus running counter to the SES objectives. In fact, even though not legally required, all 
ongoing FAB projects currently cover all the airspace. 

While it is recognised that the creation of FABs is a new challenge and faces significant 
technical  and  organisational  difficulties,  sovereignty,  particularly  the  Member  States’ 
responsibilities  and  associated  liability  for  their  airspace  and  the  involvement  of  the 
military,  remains  an  issue.  Instead  of  prompting  innovative  mechanisms  to  exercise 
sovereignty, it often is used as an argument against enhanced cross-border cooperation 
and integration. 

Following  successful  certification,  each  air  navigation  service  provider  is  entitled  to 
offer  its  services  in  other  EU  countries.  However,  no  Member  State  has  taken  up  this 
opportunity to designate a foreign provider. Some Member States have even raised the 
issue  that  the  designation  of  foreign  providers  is  prohibited  under  their  national  law. 
Nor  have  Member  States  used  the  possibility  to  unbundle  some  services  to  improve 
their quality. 

Governance  is  an  acute  and  widely  recognised  problem  within  Eurocontrol.  Over  the 
years, Member States have had a clear separation between regulation, oversight, service 
provision  and  financing.  In  Eurocontrol,  these  functions  have  all  been  concentrated 
within  an  intergovernmental  structure.  Regulation  is  flawed  by  the  requirement  to 
obtain consensus for decision-making. Moreover, the implementation of rules depends 
on  the  good-will  of  Member  States.  Oversight  is  not  organised  for  all  non-regulatory 
activities, and responsibility for both oversight and service provision remains within the 
same  organisation.  Aircraft  operators,  who  finance  the  ATM  system  through  charges, 
and air navigation service providers that have been corporatised at national level have 
difficulty  influencing  decisions  on  operational  issues  within  an  intergovernmental 
organisation where final decisions are taken by Member States, which may no longer be 
responsible for directly providing air transport or air navigation services. 

2.2.2.2  Sovereignty and the military 

Changes to the ATM system have always proved difficult because of the association of 
airspace management with sovereignty and defence. Member States are sensitive to the 
introduction of rules for the design and use of airspace. As signatories to the Chicago 
Convention, they see airspace management as a means to comply with their obligations. 
An  intergovernmental  approach,  however,  cannot  ensure  the  flexible  and  effective 
use of a common resource — airspace — for all users. Although ICAO offers a global 
regulatory framework, Member States are inclined to deviate from these standards due 
to ‘national particularities’.  

The  country  reports  for  the  ICAO  Universal  Safety  Oversight  Audit  Programme 
indicate large differences in the compliance of Member States with ICAO standards and 
recommended  practices  (SARPS).  They  also  point  to  worrying  issues  with  safety 
oversight capability. Especially striking is the fact that Member States are to be found 
in  both  the  most  compliant  and  the  least  compliant  third  of  countries  audited,  which 
shows that the intergovernmental approach maintains regulatory fragmentation.  

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19 

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Similarly, the ongoing study by the European Commission, ICAO and Eurocontrol on 
the  official  differences  from  ICAO  SARPS  reported  by  Member  States  has  so  far 
revealed 1 522 differences (situation as at 20 February 2008). These are all cases where 
Member States have implemented their own national rules or procedures in place of 
the commonly agreed ICAO rules.  

Both studies indicate a worrying tendency for Member States to accept non-uniformity 
and disregard for ICAO rules. The negative impact on safety is obvious, as ICAO rules 
have been put in place mainly to ensure that international air traffic can operate in the 
knowledge that safety rules are implemented and applied in a harmonious manner in all 
countries.  This  may  lead  pilots  to  misunderstand  local  procedures  or  controller 
instructions  and  cause  a  safety  hazard.  This  form  of  regulatory  fragmentation  is 
incompatible with a single aviation market and is irrelevant to defence interests. 

Military airspace users demand a fair share of access to airspace. However, building an 
effective civil/military relationship on ATM issues through the ‘second pillar’ of the EU 
(the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy)  is  not  always  easy.  Variations  in  the 
organisation  of  civil/military  cooperation  in  the  EU  stand  in  the  way  of  uniform  and 
timely  airspace  management  and  the  implementation  of  changes.  Moreover,  the 
military  has  no  mechanism  for  establishing  a  common  European  view,  as  this  is 
impeded  by  different  alignments  of  states  —  NATO  or  not,  neutral  or  not.  Where 
agreements are in place, they have been concluded between a limited number of states. 

2.3.  Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? 

Air traffic control provides its services and guarantees safe flights outside the awareness 
of the flying public. Only when there is the least disruption, such as delays, incidents 
caused by bad weather or accidents does air traffic control become visible, underlining 
the critical need for safe and efficient air traffic control practices.  

A better performing air traffic control network will benefit the whole economy. 

•  The flying public, particularly professional travellers, will benefit most in terms of 
safety and time. The increased reliability and resilience of the system should reduce 
external costs. 

•  Member  States  should  adopt  a  network  approach  to  offer  aviation  the  best 

infrastructure to ensure that it prospers. 

•  Oversight authorities need to ensure a standard oversight capability in view of the 

integration of service provision. 

•  Defence:  the  military  is  involved  as  airspace  user,  oversight  authority,  service 
provider  and  regulator.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  ensure  that  security  needs 
are catered for. 

•  Airlines finance the air traffic control system and should be guaranteed performance 
standards.  As  the  air  traffic  control  system  evolves,  pilots  will  benefit  from  better 
navigation tools and better surveillance. 

EN 

20 

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•  General Aviation42 will be able to rely on better performing air traffic control. 
•  Air  navigation  service  providers  will  become  subject  to  performance  regulation. 

This may lead to restructuring and require staff involvement. 

•  The efficiency of airports impacts on the performance of the network. Predictability 
requires all stakeholders to collaborate. Airports will have to integrate information on 
their operations to ensure an efficient gate-to-gate system. 

•  The equipment industry must ensure the swift introduction of new technologies. 

2.4. 

How will the problem evolve, all things being equal? Should the EU act? 

While  major  achievements  can  be  observed  since  the  adoption  of  the  legislative 
package in 2004, there is a pressing need to adjust the legislation to overcome current 
limitations, adapt to technical change and take account of new challenges. 

First of all, the external analysis demonstrates that Member States have not fully used 
important  tools  for  improving  efficiency.  This  leads  to  variation  in  performance, 
whereby the performance of the network as a whole depends on the performance of its 
weakest link. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

The  level  of  ambition  for  the  regional  integration  of  service  providers  into 
FABs  differs  widely:  while  some  initiatives  are  promising,  others  can  be 
considered as window-dressing; 

No Member State has used the possibility to unbundle services and open them 
up to markets; 

Only one Member State uses an economic incentive scheme43; 

The route and sector design mandate remains blocked. 

These  instruments  need  to  be  used  in  a  coordinated  manner  in  order  to  tackle  the 
problems of fragmentation and flight inefficiency. 

Secondly,  while  the  first  legislative  package  was  mainly  driven  by  the  dramatic 
increases in delays after the Kosovo crisis, the legislation does not take due account of 
new challenges such as the environment. 

Thirdly, the current organisation of the ATM system is in general not able to cope with 
the  future  growth  of  traffic.  There  is  a  need  to  speed  up  the  pace  of  innovation, 
coordinate  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  and  ensure  their  continuous  updating. 
SESAR is intended to bring about this technological leap towards a better performing 
system.  This  requires  financial  control  and  the  use  of  incentives  to  orchestrate 
technological progress. 

42 

43 

General aviation covers all flights other than military and scheduled airline flights, both private 
and  commercial.  General  aviation  flights  range  from  gliders  and  powered  parachutes  to  large, 
non-scheduled cargo jet flights. 
UK NATS see: www.nats.co.uk ; www.caa.co.uk. 

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Consultations and studies have revealed wide recognition of the need for change and 
the threat posed by the current incapacity to the longer-term position of air navigation 
service  providers  and  their  employees  (social  sustainability):  if  the  problems  are  not 
tackled  early,  there  is  a  danger  of  a  crisis  leading  to  sudden  and  uncoordinated  re-
organisation. 

In conclusion, there is overall agreement that it is time for the Community to act with a 
view  to  improving  the  performance  of  the  ATC  industry  and  to  prepare  for  future 
challenges,  so  as  to  ensure  that  aviation  plays  its  role  in  contributing  to  the  Lisbon 
objectives. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSALS 

The  High  Level  Group  on  the  future  European  regulatory  framework  advised  the 
Commission  to  focus  on  performance.  The  over-arching  general  objective  of  the 
revision of the Single Sky legislation is to ensure that the ATM system will provide the 
infrastructure  for  the  aviation  industry  and  other  users  so  that  the  Lisbon  objectives 
can  be  met.  This  will  be  done  by  strengthening  the  network  approach.  Community 
intervention  is  possible  on  the  basis  of  Article  80(2)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Community. 

The table below depicts the hierarchy of objectives. 

General Objective 

ATM to provide the infrastructure for the aviation industry and other users to meet the Lisbon 
objectives 

Specific objectives 

Improved performance of ATM; 
Target  ATM  to  enhance  safety,  capacity 
and cost-efficiency; 
Introduce  the  notion  of  the  environmental 
performance of aviation; 
Transform  the  amalgamation  of  national 
into  a  seamless,  gate-to-gate 
systems 
network for the benefit of aviation. 

Consistent  governance  of  service  provision 
within the regulatory performance framework. 

Operational objectives 

•   Introduce  a  framework  for  setting 
binding  objectives  for  air  navigation 
service  providers  at  Community  level, 
review  and 
including  performance 
follow-up; 

•  Strengthen network functions; 
•  Make use of the market where possible; 
•  Support  initiatives  to  integrate  service 

provision. 

•  Proper balance between the Community method 

and local discretion; 

•  Establish  the  basis  for  the  independence  of 

national supervisory authorities. 

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4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The  performance  proposals  build  upon  SES  I,  consolidate  and  develop  it  by 
strengthening  instruments,  and  provide  a  framework  adapted  to  particular  ATM 
characteristics. As the first pillar of the proposals, a system of performance regulation 
is  to  be  introduced.  Based  on  the  strong  tradition  of  benchmarking  against  quantified 
targets  by  the  Performance  Review  Commission,  options  will  be  analysed  for 
transforming this self-regulatory system with voluntary targets into a genuine regulatory 
system  capable  of  driving  the  performance  of  the  network.  Network-wide  objectives 
will provide the basis for a process to translate these objectives into local targets. The 
Charging  Regulation44  can  be  used  as  a  tool  to  provide  economic  incentives.  As  the 
second  pillar,  to  supplement  performance  regulation,  the  necessary  regulatory  tools 
need  to  be  put  in  place  to  strengthen  network  management  functions.  Scarce 
resources  are  best  managed  from  a  network  perspective.  Thirdly,  beyond  regulation, 
competition  should  be  considered  for  areas  where  a  process  of  consolidation  could 
yield  better  quality  for  lower  price  than  performance  regulation.  Finally,  as  the  fourth 
pillar,  initiatives  to  integrate  service  provision  within  functional  airspace  blocks 
should be supported as a tool to reach the performance targets. 

In  order  to  facilitate  understanding  of  the  impact  of  the  different  options,  the 
descriptions of the options are given together with the analyses of their impact. 

4.1. 

First pillar: Performance regulation for monopoly services 

Performance  regulation  needs  to  put  in  place  (i)  mechanisms  to  set  Community-wide 
principles and objectives for safety, the environment, capacity and cost-efficiency and 
(ii)  the  processes  for  translating  these  objectives  into  local  binding  targets  for  each 
ANSP.  

Three  options  are  studied:  the  status  quo  (Option  1),  local  target  setting  (Option 2), 
where  decisions  on  targets  are  taken  at  national  level,  and  Community  target  setting, 
where decisions are taken at European level. This last option has two variants (Options 
3a and 3b). 

4.1.1.  Option 1: Status quo – continue with current SES legislation 

The first SES package already contains a number of tools for improving efficiency: 

•  The legal barriers to cross-border cooperation have been removed with system-wide 
recognition  of  certificates  for  ANS  providers  and  Community  air  traffic  controller 
licensing.  Further,  Member  States  are  legally  obliged  to  reconfigure  their  upper 
airspace  into  functional  airspace  blocks45,  which  are  supposed  to  bring  about 
defragmentation and rationalisation of infrastructure.  

44 

45 

Commission  Regulation  1796/2006  of  6  December  2006  on  laying  down  a  common  charging 
scheme for air navigation services. 
Article 2 of the Framework Regulation defines ‘functional airspace block’ as an airspace block 
based on operational requirements, reflecting the need to ensure more integrated management of 
airspace regardless of existing national boundaries. 

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23 

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•  The legislation allows the unbundling of services and the use of economic incentives 
(including economic regulation regimes for ANSPs and unbundling), but leaves this 
to  the  discretion  of  the  Member  States.  Member  States  can  also  use  designation 
procedures to impose performance levels. 

Option 1 ‘Do-nothing’ / Status quo 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

1.  Economic 
impact 
/ 
Likelihood  of 
reaching 
targets 

2. 
impact 

Social 

Impact: 

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

-
- 

in  performance  across 

the  network  brings  overall 

Self-regulation does not give sufficient incentive for change and obtaining 
economies  of  scale,  so  has  a  limited  effect  in  terms  of  performance 
improvement.  The  effect  is  also  unpredictable,  uncoordinated  and 
dependent on the willingness of Member States and ANSPs to reach these 
targets.  
The  variation 
performance down to that of the weakest link. 
Excessive  charges  result  in  higher  prices  and  lower  mobility  for  end-
customers,  the  weakened  competitiveness  of  European  airlines,  and  a 
reduced ability to invest in SESAR programmes. 
Improvements  in  parts  of  the  network  may  be  offset  by  growing 
inefficiencies in some ANSPs.  
Responsibility for network management and airspace regulation is diluted 
between  ANSPs,  Member  States  and  Eurocontrol.  The  resulting  non-
optimal  route  network  has  a  high  negative  economic  and  environmental 
impact.  

-  ANSPs continue managing restructuring following their own rhythm. 

responsibilities 

structures  are  blurred: 

Governance 
for  network 
management and airspace regulation are currently diluted between ANSPs, 
Member  States  and  Eurocontrol,  resulting  in  insufficient  capacity  in 
several areas. 
The  social  impact  is  borne  by  airlines,  which  are  adversely  affected  by 
constraints on growth and excessive costs, and by the EU at large because 
of  delays  incurred  by  passengers,  poor  job  creation  in  the  air  transport 
sector and low induced job creation in the economy at large.  
Moreover, if the European ATM situation does not improve, this will have 
a  negative  impact  on  overall  European  mobility  and  therefore  on  the 
internal market and social cohesion. 
The SES I Package does not address environmental issues. 
The  sub-optimal  design  and  management  of  airspace  leads  to  a  non-
optimal route network with a high negative environmental impact.  

3 
Environmental 
impact 

-
- 

4.1.2.  Option 2: Local target setting (LTS) 

An  independent  Performance  Review  Body  (PRB)  proposes  non-binding  European-
wide  objectives  on  the  basis  of  information  it  collects  and  analyses.  The  Community 
objectives  are  translated  into  local  targets  by  the  national  supervisory  authorities 
(NSAs).  After  consultation  of  ANSPs  and  users,  the  pricing  of  services  and  the 
performance targets are approved by the NSAs and communicated to the Commission. 

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24 

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Option 2 ‘Local Target setting’ 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1.  Economic 
impact 
/ 
Likelihood  of 
reaching 
targets 

+ 

2. 
impact 

Social 

= 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

- 

Improvements will remain slow and vary from Member State to Member 
State. Convergence will not be guaranteed (patchwork of variable national 
performance levels). 
This option risks adding to fragmentation: good performers already carry 
out cost-containment exercises and already perform well. Bad performers 
will  feel  hardly  any  pressure  to  contain their  costs  and  converge  towards 
the good performers. 
The costs of the fragmentation of service provision and sub-optimal route 
networks will continue to be borne by airspace users, passengers, and 
ultimately by the EU at large (see estimates above). 
Limited social impact for ANSPs, as they will remain masters of their cost 
containment  efforts.  The  restructuring  of  ANSPs  will  be  slow  and  will 
have a limited impact on their employees. 
This  scenario  will  bring  about  only  limited  improvement  in  the  social 
domain.  Airspace  users  and  the  EU  at  large  will  continue  to  bear  all  the 
social  costs  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  system,  which  are  well  above  the 
social benefits enjoyed by ANSP employees. 
Governance: the chances for the success of this option will be greater if 
NSAs can be appropriately sized and protected from political influence 
through independence from state administrations. However, this will 
generate substantial additional costs. 
The  issue  will  only  be  tackled  at  national  level.  The  European  aspect  of 
flight  efficiency  and  the  corresponding  environmental  impact  risks  being 
ignored.  
The environmental situation risks worsening as the gap between good and 
bad  performers  widens,  thus  prompting  airlines  to  fly  longer  routes  to 
avoid costly airspaces. 

4.1.3.  Option 3a: European target setting (ETS) 

Performance  regulation  for  ANS  provision  is  carried  out  at  Community  level.  This 
option  is  inspired  by  the  regulatory  process  used  for  the  Emissions  Trading  Scheme. 
The  Commission  approves  the  performance  targets  on  the  basis  of  proposals  by 
national  authorities,  after  verifying  that  the  proposed  contribution  to  the  overall 
performance objectives is sufficiently ambitious and realistic. The Commission’s takes 
an  individual  decision  for  each  Member  State  (or,  in  future,  for  each  FAB) 
communicating its final and binding performance targets. 

This  option  is  based  on  a  combination  of  local  initiative  and  Community  decision-
making, ensuring that  the  overall, system-wide performance targets are complied with 
and that the targets set are binding and enforced. 

5.1.3  Option 3.a European Target Setting (ETS) 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

EN 

25 

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+++ 

1.  Economic 
impact 
/ 
Likelihood  of 
reaching 
targets 

2. 
impact 

Social 

+++ 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

+++ 

The  option  can  be  implemented  without  any  additional  structure  (NSAs 
will need to be strengthened but the additional costs will be marginal). 
Coherent  and  substantial  improvements  in  operational  and  economic 
efficiency can be enforced. This will bring certainty regarding savings on 
route  charges,  flight  time  and  fuel  burn  for  airspace  users  and  their 
passengers.  Moreover,  it  will  provide  more  certainty  that  SESAR 
objectives will be met.  
Furthermore, airlines will be able to use these savings to invest in SESAR 
programmes,  thus  generating  even  faster  improvements  in  capacity, 
reduced delays, flight efficiency (environment) and safety. 
Improved  service  provision  and  economic  efficiency  will  enable  the 
sustainable  growth  of  air  traffic  and  thus  contribute  to  the  quantity  and 
quality of jobs at all levels (ANSPs, airlines, industry, EU). 
The restructuring of ANSPs will be more effective than in the ‘local target 
setting’  option.  The  cost  reductions  imposed  through  targets  set  at  EU 
level  may necessitate restructuring in their business organisation, such as 
the integration of service provision. Personnel will be able to benefit from 
the Community license and exercise mobility.  
Governance:  this  option  can  be  implemented  without  any  additional 
structure (NSAs will need to be strengthened but the additional costs will 
be marginal). 
Social  efforts  by  the  ANSPs  will  be  more  than  offset  by  the  increased 
potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced effects on 
the economy at large.  
The  combination  of  local  initiative  (making  use  of  local  knowledge  and 
respecting  national 
requirements)  and 
sovereignty  and  military 
Community decision-making is expected to bring positive and substantial 
improvements in flight efficiency and therefore in the environment. 
Clear responsibilities for target setting, network management and airspace 
regulation will ensure that environmental performance targets are met. 

4.1.4.  Option 3b: European Regulator (ETS) 

Performance  regulation  for  ANS  provision  is  fully  entrusted  to  a  Community  agency: 
this  ‘SES  Performance  Agency’  carries  out  independent  performance  reviews  of  the 
local/regional ANSPs and, after extensive consultation of stakeholders, issues proposals 
for  European-wide  performance  objectives  as  well  as  specific  performance  targets  for 
all 27 ANSPs. The Commission adopts the final binding individual targets and transmits 
them to the national authorities for implementation. 

Option 3.b ‘European Regulator’ 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1.  Economic 
/ 
impact 
Likelihood  of 
reaching 
targets 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

++(cid:57) 

The  most  radical  approach,  bringing 
implementation. 
However, this option necessitates the creation of a European agency, with 
the following drawbacks:  

immediately  after 

results 

The time needed to establish an SES Performance Agency, plus 
the time needed to allow it to perform its task of setting binding 
individual performance targets, is considerable and may be some 

EN 

26 

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2. 
impact 

Social 

-- 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

+++ 

6 years. 

Administrative  costs:  by  far  the  most  costly  policy  option  in  terms  of 
administrative budget. The agency will require a staff of at least 50 and an 
annual budget of more than €5 million per year.  
Because of the lack of local initiative, the social impact will be radical and 
likely to trigger resistance from controllers in particular. 
Governance: would require the establishment of a new agency. 
The  most  effective  scenario  in  terms  of  environmental  efficiency,  as 
Member States will be left with no room for manoeuvre. Flight efficiency 
improvements will be driven by a top-down approach. 
However, the weak point of this scenario is that it does not in itself take 
into  account  the  military/sovereignty  aspects  of  route  design.  This  risks 
generating resistance from national and military authorities. 

4.2. 

Second  pillar:  Network  approach  for  a  European-level  network  and  the 
management of scarce resources: 

Network management 

Network  management  comprises  a  wide  range  of  network  management  tasks.  These 
tasks form a set of flexible coordination and planning functions to look after the interest 
of  the  whole  European  network.  The  different  network  management  tasks,  which 
together form the ‘Network Manager’, can be handled by different actors, but together 
consist of at least the following: 

•  Route network design 

•  Management of scarce resources 

•  Traffic flow management and slot coordination & allocation 

•  Management  of  network  technologies  resulting  from  SESAR  (‘System 

Wide Information Management’, satellite-based datalinks, etc.) 

•  Coordination of technologies & their procurement 

Some  of  these  functions  need  to  be  detailed  through  implementing  rules,  and  it  is 
important  for  SES II 
to  prepare  for  SESAR 
implementation.  

to  provide  for 

in  order 

these 

In line with proper application of subsidiarity, the design of sectors — unlike routes — 
is best left to the service providers, as it goes deep into local arrangements, such as staff 
rostering  and  qualifications.  Airspace  design  in  the  wider  sense  of  allocating  different 
airspace classes or segregated (military) areas to different parts of airspace is also best 
left to national or FAB level, given state sovereignty in this area and military concerns. 
The only European-level rules envisaged here are general principles stating that airspace 
design  is  performed  at  local  level  taking  into  account  traffic  demands  and  complexity 
and including consultation of all airspace users. 

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Route network design function 

Route  network  design  is  used  below  as  the  ‘model’  case  for  all  these  network 
functions, since it is representative. The other functions could be organised in a similar 
fashion,  or  simplified  for  the  coordination  of  scarce  resources,  which  involves  purely 
distributional tasks.  

As the problem largely revolves around the lack of coordination and an overall system 
level  strategy,  all  the  options  considered  involve  introducing  better  and  more 
concentrated  coordination  functions.  Decentralising  network  management  to  local  or 
FAB  level  would  only  aggravate  the  current  difficulties,  which  are  due  to  the 
fragmented use of airspace and other resources.  

Experience shows that the efficient use of a network requires an independent ‘network 
design  function’,  in  which  all  Member  States  participate.  This  will  propose  a  route 
network that combines local, regional and European network needs in a way that takes 
into account not only the needs of all three groups of airspace users and the ANSPs but 
also  the  efficiency  of  the  wider  transport  network  (intermodality).  The  aim  is 
primarily to create the shortest possible routes between different city pairs and provide 
the airspace needed by non-commercial airspace users to operate, while also taking into 
account  other  justifiable  concerns.  The  implementation  of  the  network  should  then  be 
overseen and its efficiency monitored regularly by the Performance Review Body. 

Three  main  options  can  be  identified  for  route  network  design,  and  are  developed 
below. All aim for the gradual adaptation and optimisation of the route network: 

Option 1 — Status quo 

The current system can be described as a loose, ‘soft’ form of coordination at European 
level,  which  is  easy  for  Member  States  to  accept  and  comparable  to  the  local  target 
setting  (LTS)  option  described  for  performance  regulation  (see  4.1  above).  While 
Member States are fully responsible for their route networks, the majority have agreed 
to meet together in the Eurocontrol Route Network Development Sub-Group (RNDSG). 
This group does not make decisions on routes, but acts as a forum for states, ANSPs 
and  some  airline  representatives  to  discuss  issues.  Its  resolutions  or  conclusions  are 
therefore  in  no  way  binding  on  the  Member  States.  In  this  option,  while  coordination 
work is important, decisions are taken at local level. 

Option 1 — Status Quo 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

1.  Economic 
impact  

-- 

Major improvements to the current situation are unlikely. Under the SES I 
rules, the Community is allowed to develop implementing rules for route 
and sector design principles. However, decisions on routes are simply too 
complex  to  be  the  subject  of  anything  but  a  case-by-case  assessment. 
Therefore,  the  current  model,  using  the  Eurocontrol  RNDSG  Group,  has 
largely  come  to  the  end  of  its  development  possibilities,  risking  a 

EN 

28 

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2. 
impact 

Social 

- 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

-- 

considerable economic and environmental cost. 
As air traffic is expected to double or even triple in the next 20-30 years, 
this  cost  will  not  rise  proportionally,  but  increase  all  the  more  due  to 
congestion exacerbating the network choke points.  

This  option  will  not  have  any  immediate  social  impact,  but  compared  to 
the ideal situation (with an optimised network) it has a social cost. If the 
network  were  better  designed  it  would  allow  air  transport  to  develop 
without the previously mentioned annual €2bn charge and thus create more 
secondary  services  and  jobs.  Airlines  would  be  able  to  expand  their 
operations  or  alternatively  compete  with  slightly 
lower  prices. 
Additionally,  they  would  benefit  from  being  able  to  make  better  use  of 
their  fleets  due  to  shorter  routes,  hence  freeing  aircraft  for  additional 
operations. All this has the potential to create jobs among airspace users, 
which is not the case in the first option. 

The  current  situation  already  causes  CO2  emissions  of  around  5 million 
tonnes  per year.  Increasing  traffic  and  congestion  would  make  this  much 
worse,  since  delays  and  congestion  often  mean  having  to  hold  aircraft  at 
airports or in the air with their engines running, and flying at sub-optimal 
altitudes, which increases fuel consumption and emissions. 

Option  2  —  Central  network  design  &  management  function  augmented  by 

national and European consultation mechanisms 

This second option is based on Community decision-making, but the initiative is shared 
between  the  local/FAB  level  and  European  level.  It  calls  for  an  independent  network 
design body to be set up to arbitrate between the overall efficiency of the network and 
local constraints and specificities, such as military interests. The local levels makes their 
best route design proposals (having first consulted local airspace users and ANSPs) and 
the  network  design  body  ensures  the  coherence  of  these  local  proposals  and  their 
compatibility  with  the  overall  performance  targets.  After  in-depth  consideration  and 
European-level consultation of stakeholders, the network design body finalises its draft 
and submits it for Commission consideration. The Commission takes its final decision 
on  the  European  route  network  plan  after  having  obtained  the  positive  opinion  of  the 
Single Sky Committee (using qualified majority voting). The Commission also ensures 
that  adequate  appeal  and  review  procedures  are  in  place  to  preserve  Member  State 
sovereignty and overriding national interests. 

Option  2  —  Central  network  design  &  management  function  augmented  by 
national and European consultation mechanisms 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

1.  Economic 
impact  

++ 

This  option  will  probably  be  very  efficient  purely  from  the  network 
viewpoint,  even  if  some  compromises  are  necessary  after  consultation  of 
Member  States  and  stakeholders.  It  will  not  only  ensure  an  optimised 
network and corresponding savings, but also considerable commitment on 
the  part  of  Member  States  and  stakeholders.  There  are  also  potential 

EN 

29 

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economic  gains  for  the  airlines,  which  will  be  able  to  cut  their  costs  and 
utilise  their  aircraft  more  efficiently,  thereby  opening  up  new  routes  and 
increasing revenue. This potential is impossible to quantify exactly, since 
it  depends  on  the  current  route  network  of  each  airline,  its  product 
portfolio,  and  the  general  economic  cycle  and  the  demand  for  seats  or 
freight capacity.  

Since Member States and national service providers would be involved in 
the  work,  the  personnel  savings  would  be  minor,  but  the  political 
acceptability  of  decisions  will  be  hugely  enhanced.  The  ANSPs  would 
have  some  concerns  about  losing  traffic  due  to  route  changes,  but  much 
less  so  than  in  option  3,  as  their  concerns  would  be  properly  heard  and 
taken into account under the appeal and review procedures. The economic 
impact would thus be roughly comparable with option 3, depending on the 
effectiveness  of  the  consultation  mechanism,  which  may  even  be  better 
than  with  a  single  central  designer  by  being  more  efficient  in  conveying 
local or regional constraints to the design body. 

Compared to option 3, the model has a significant positive social impact. 
Some  changes  in  the  work  performed  by  staff  and  some  —  real  or 
perceived — loss of sovereignty would result in this option as well, but the 
gains should be enough to outweigh the negative side-effects. The majority 
of staff at national level would continue to be needed for the collection of 
data  and  stakeholder  views,  while  the  central  network  design  function 
would  need  to  obtain  sufficient  expertise.  The  positive  effects  of 
improving the efficiency of the air transport network will give the industry 
a similar ‘a license to grow’ as in option 3 and thus have a positive impact 
on jobs and employment. 

As with the other options, the potential for environmental improvement is 
considerable.  It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  exactly  how  much  in  the  way  of 
emissions will be avoided, but the potential is more than the proportional 
increase  in  traffic  since  congestion  effects  then  also  come  into  play.  If 
many  compromises  are  necessary  following  consultations,  the  positive 
impact might be lessened or at least different in character (for example less 
noise in exchange for more emissions) but will still be practically equal to 
option 3. Here too, the end result naturally depends on whether the route 
network improvements also lead to increased flight activity. 

2. 
impact 

Social 

+ 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

++ 

Option 3 — Central network designer and implementer of changes 

The third option would be to create a strong Community network agency, independent 
of all other actors. It will have sufficient expertise to design the network by itself and be 
institutionally  separate  from  Member  States,  ANSPs  and  airspace  users.  Following 
stakeholder consultation by the Agency, the finalised network plan will be implemented 
by a Commission decision  binding  on all Member States. This will guarantee that the 
network  design  plan  focuses  only  on  creating  the  shortest  possible  routes  between 
different city pairs and providing the airspace needed by non-commercial airspace users 
to  operate.  In  this  scenario,  the  initiative  is  fully  at  Community  level,  with  Member 
States only consulted in the preparatory phase. 

EN 

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Option 3 — Central network designer and implementer of changes 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1.  Economic 
impact  

++ 

2. 
impact 

Social 

+ 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

++ 

This option would be the most efficient from a purely network viewpoint. 
It  would  ensure  an  optimised  network  and  corresponding  savings.  Since 
the  Member  States  and  national  service  providers  would  be  largely 
uninvolved  in  the  work,  they  could  reduce  staff  and  make  additional 
savings, therefore giving rise to a potential reduction of slightly more than 
the €2bn noted above. Like in option 2,  this potential would emerge over a 
period of several years as the design process improves and each problem 
area  is  tackled  in  turn.  The  design  can  never  be  considered  to  be  fully 
complete, due to changing demand patterns on the part of airspace users. 
On the other hand, centralised decision-making would reduce the political 
acceptability  of  decisions  for  Member  States  and  especially  for  those 
ANSPs that will lose traffic. 

While economically efficient, this model would have an undeniable social 
and political impact. It would take away from Member States an activity 
traditionally  considered  to  be  their  sovereign  area  and  make  a  group  of 
people  redundant  in  both  the  Member  State  administrations  and  their 
service providers. Some 20 people design the whole US en-route network 
— which has a comparable area and twice the traffic — while in Europe 
27 Member States and ANSPs each have their own offices performing this 
task. More importantly for the efficiency of the network, this option would 
also  create  considerable  concern  as  to  how  the  interests  of  local  airspace 
users and service providers are to be taken into account. However, some of 
this negative impact could be offset by the possible increase in activity and 
jobs among airspace users. 

As  in  Option  1,  the  potential  for  environmental  improvement  is 
considerable. It is impossible to evaluate exactly how much in the way of 
emissions  will  be  avoided  in  practice,  since  some  of  the  gain  could  be 
negated  by  the  increase  in  activity,  but  the  potential  is  more  than  the 
proportional  increase  in  traffic  since  congestion  effects  then  come  into 
play as well. 

4.3. 

Third pillar: Introduction of market measures for unbundled services 

4.3.1.  Description 

The  provision  of  air  navigation  services  (ANS)  is  generally  considered,  given  the 
current technological possibilities, as a natural monopoly. Accordingly, improving the 
performance of the system requires performance regulation. 

However,  some  of  the  services  currently  provided  by  vertically  integrated  service 
providers  could  be  provided  under  market  conditions  after  ‘unbundling’.  In  most 
discussions,  the  provision  of  communication,  navigation  and  surveillance  (CNS) 
services,  aeronautical  information  services,  meteorological  services,  tower  services  at 

EN 

31 

   EN 

aerodromes,  and  (parts  of)  training  are  seen  as  candidates  for  the  introduction  of 
competition. 

Table 2: Air navigation services market (2006 figures — in ‘000 €) 

1  Air traffic management 

2  Meteorological 
3  Search & Rescue 
4  Aeronautical information 
5  CNS 

En-route 
Terminal 

5 054  
4 014  
1 056  
389 
23 
156 
1 322  

6  Supervision 
7  Eurocontrol Agency 
8  Other 

Communication 544 
311 
Navigation 
467 
Surveillance 
78 
622 
156 

65% 
52% 
14% 
5% 
0.3% 
2% 
17% 
7% 
4% 
6% 
1% 
8% 
2% 

The current legislation allows for unbundling at Member State level. However, Member 
States  are  quite  hesitant  to  consider  this  tool  for  increasing  performance.  In  some 
Member  States,  air  traffic  services  at  aerodromes  are  provided  under  competitive 
conditions  (competition  for  the  market).  Initial  training  for  air  traffic  controllers  is 
another domain where some Member States have introduced market forces. 

This  chapter  looks  at  these  services  with  a  view  to  assessing  the  possibilities  for 
introducing competition. 

Communication, navigation, surveillance services (CNS) 

CNS  services  provide  the  ‘eyes  and  ears’  for  air  traffic  controllers  and  pilots  and  are 
critical services for air traffic control. Accounting for 17% of total ANS costs, they are 
a  substantial  cost  component,  which  is  reflected  in  the  relative  share  of  employment: 
nearly 30% of ATM staff are technical support staff, ranging from a maximum of 54% 
to  a  minimum  of  10%.  This  reveals  quite  patchy  performance  in  CNS  provision,  and 
competition in the market could be considered as a means to improve performance. 

Air traffic control in towers (‘Tower services’) 

Some  Member  States  have  experience  with  competition  for  this  €1bn  market,  while 
others are considering market opening. Market opening is considered from two angles: 
the choice of airports for airlines and the effective range of competitors for providing air 
traffic control. 

Meteorological services (MET)  

Member  States  have  established  meteorological  services  for  the  protection  of  their 
citizens. MET services are considered to be of general interest and cover a variety of 
tasks  and  functions  with  a  multitude  of  user  groups,  both  the  general  public  and  vital 
industries such as energy, agriculture, transport, media, military and transport. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  recent  years,  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  with  satellite  observation,  high-
powered  computing  facilities  and  new  communication  technologies  has  transformed 
meteorology from a labour-intensive industry with many observational tasks to a high-
tech sector with the potential for centralising operations and reducing costs. 

ICAO has defined MET as an air navigation service, so it can be charged to the civil 
aviation  industry  at  the  discretion  of  individual  countries.  Some  Member  States  may 
decide not to recover any costs, while others have decided to establish a meteorological 
provider exclusively for aviation (and hence recover 100% of costs). 

the  MET  costs 

In  some  Member  States, 
from  aviation  appear 
disproportionate  compared  to  what  other  industries  pay.  On  average,  civil  aviation 
MET  costs  represent  some  25%  of  total  national  MET  costs,  with  shares  ranging 
between 10% and 50%. In addition to the discretionary charging of costs, there appears 
to  be  scope  for  improving  the  relationship  between  aeronautical  users  and  the 
aeronautical MET providers. 

recovered 

Aeronautical information services (AIS) 

To  ensure  flight  safety,  aeronautical  information  provides  the  pilot  with  basic 
information on the state of airports, runways, signalling, availability of routes, military 
exercises,  etc.  AIS  provision  is  naturally  much  more  limited  in  scope  compared  to 
MET, but a similar technological evolution is taking place. Paper information is being 
replaced with modern electronic forms that can be downloaded. 

Under  the  ICAO  rules  (dating  from  1944),  AIS  are  provided  ‘under  State 
responsibility’. Countries are free to provide the service themselves or use any method 
they  wish  to  choose  a  service  provider,  but  ultimate  responsibility  and  liability  lie 
always with the country whose airspace it is. Since — understandably — no country is 
eager  to  take  responsibility  for  more  than  one  provider  they  have  always  designated 
only one provider for these services. 

ICAO also defines a set of ‘standard services’ describing the datasets and formats to be 
provided.  These  standard  services  are  under  revision,  as  modern  technology  is 
resulting  in  more  and  more  services  being  considered  minimum  public  services.  It  is 
even estimated that the current ICAO-type AIS services will triple in terms of content, 
but  technological  development  still  leaves  ample  room  for  additional  value-added 
services to be provided outside the ICAO framework. 

Training for air traffic management personnel 

Air traffic control remains a craft. Safety lies in the hands of controllers who require the 
ability  to  visualise  a  three/four-dimensional  picture  of  flights  from  a  two-dimensional 
radar screen, to take quick decisions and to communicate these in an authoritative way 
to pilots. This craftsmanship is the result of rigorous selection and intensive training. 

Training for air traffic controllers is regulated on the basis of the Directive establishing 
the ‘Community air traffic controller licence’46. Initial training is traditionally given in 

46 

Directive 2006/23/EC of 27.04.2006 (OJ L114/22). 

EN 

33 

   EN 

                                                 
academies, linked to the service provider, where students receive theoretical courses and 
simulation training. The skills and competences can only be acquired on the job under 
supervision  through  a  period  of  work  in  an  air  traffic  control  unit.  This  unit  training 
cannot be separated from air traffic control and hence is not eligible for unbundling. 

Conclusions: two options 

The  first  option  would  be  to  continue  with  the  current  legislation,  i.e.  leaving  the 
discretion  for  unbundling  to  Member  States.  The  second  option  would  be  to  have 
decisions  taken  at  Community  level  and  introduce  open  tendering  procedures  for  the 
provision of these services. 

4.3.2.  Option  1:  ‘Continue  with  current  legislation  (market  measures  decided  at 

national level)’ 

While some Member States have taken the decision to organise tendering procedures for 
ATC  at  airports,  none  has  decided  to  unbundle.  Under  the  current  legislation,  most 
Member  States  are  expected  to  retain  the  vertical  integration  of  service  provision 
(services would be subject to performance regulation). 

Option 1 — Continue with current legislation 

Impact: 

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1.  Economic 
impact  

+/- 

As air navigation service providers would continue to be designated, they 
would be sheltered from competition, but would be subject to regulation. 
This  regulation  could  lead  to  the  adoption  of  performance  indicators  for 
specific services and hence improve performance in a planned way. Where 
no specific performance indicators are defined, improvement will be slow 
and marginal. It will be a challenge for the regulator to set the appropriate 
performance level. 
Vertical  integration  implies  that  service  providers  continue  to  operate  in 
the  national  context,  unless  the  integration  of  service  provision  into 
functional  airspace  blocks  leads  to  some  form  of  consolidation  of  these 
services. The pace of innovation could be slow due to small economies of 
scale and lack of market incentives to change. It is important to master the 
changes in critical services like CNS, as the smallest hiccup in the system 
could lead to significant external costs. Leaving discretion to national level 
would  in  most  cases  imply  leaving  decisions  to  management  which  can 
best assess the associated business risks. 
As restructuring may be slow, the flying public might have to pay too high 
a price for these services. This opportunity cost must be weighed against 
the possible increased risks of incidents leading to delays, and hence lost 
time.  
This assessment has to be made by type of service eligible for unbundling. 
The risk of external costs may be high in the case of CNS, but quite low 
in  the  case  of  meteorological  or  training  services.  Indeed,  a  technical 
defect in a major airport or service provider may cause disruptive effects 
throughout the whole network, costing millions of euros. 
Preserving vertical integration would protect existing jobs in an industry 
sheltered  from  competition.  This  could  lead  to  poor  allocation  of  human 
resources  in  the  overall  labour  market.  The  incentive  to  restructure  is 

2. 
impact 

Social 

-/+ 

EN 

34 

   EN 

quite weak and cross-border service provision is hampered. 
If air traffic management fails to meet demand, growth in aviation as such 
is jeopardised, hence leading to a bottleneck in the creation of jobs in the 
much wider aviation sector (37 000 in ATM versus 380 000 in aviation). 
To  the  extent  that  the  slow  pace  of  innovation  delays  the  introduction  of 
better  performing  technologies,  the  safety  of  the  flying  public  could  be 
impacted. 
The slow pace of innovation could negatively impact the environment, as 
the  introduction  of  modern  equipment  allowing  for  more  precise 
navigation  and  hence  ‘greener  flights’  could  be  delayed.  However,  the 
concerted introduction of equipment could also be regulated. 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

- 

4.3.3.  Option 2: ‘Market measures for unbundled services’ 

Impact:  

The other option is to have the decision to unbundle taken at Community level and open 
the unbundled services for public tendering. 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1.  Economic 
impact  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

+ 

The  unbundling  of  services  could  boost  competitiveness,  especially  in 
cases  where  these  services  carry  a  disproportionate  weight  in  the  overall 
cost. The patchy performance of CNS and MET in particular suggests that 
there is much scope for improvement. For meteorological services, which 
are  in  most  Member  States  provided  by  organisations  separate  from  air 
navigation  service  providers,  this  may  require  more  transparent  funding, 
possibly through the public purse. 
In addition, market pressures would lead to a healthy consolidation, e.g. in 
the  training  market,  where  some  academies  organise  training  courses  for 
very limited numbers of students. Centralised MET services could also be 
provided for several Member States. 
Unbundling  would  create  opportunities  for  cross-industry  cooperation. 
For  instance,  CNS  could  be  provided  by  non-ATM  providers;  air  traffic 
controller  training  could  be  organised  together  with  pilot  training  or  in 
conjunction with universities. Service provision could be more focused on 
the  needs  of  the  market  instead  of  the  needs  of  the  individual  service 
provider,  which  may  be  more  influenced  by  ‘short-term’  management 
decisions. 
Market players would also have an incentive to capture the market through 
the introduction of new technologies, as seen in telecoms. For CNS, MET 
and  AIS  services  in  particular,  there  is  considerable  scope  for  using 
existing and new technologies. 
The acid test for unbundling is the assessment of the associated business 
risk in this network industry, where the least hiccup is highly costly to all 
actors  involved.  This  requires  an  assessment  of  the  critical  character  of 
each type of service. 
Competition could lead to the abrupt consolidation of services and would 
require change management. In general, restructuring would take place in 
a sector serving a growing aviation industry. Social dialogue structures in 
air  traffic  management  should  provide  for  socially  acceptable  solutions 
and  appropriate  outplacement  possibilities,  if  so  required.  New  jobs  may 
require geographical mobility in order to service installations in different 
Member States from a central location. 

2. 
impact 

Social 

- 

EN 

35 

   EN 

For  CNS,  this  could  entail  the  outplacement  of  technically  skilled 
employees who may be in high demand on the labour market. The impact 
on  meteorological  services  may  be  more  limited,  as  it  would  depend  on 
finding alternative funding. Staffing in training institutes is rather limited, 
with  the  smaller  academies  in  particular  using  temporary  staff  from 
universities or service providers. 
The measures may meet social resistance. 
Competition  could  introduce  an  incentive  to  capture  markets  through 
innovative  technologies  allowing  for  more  precision  surveillance  and 
navigation,  hence  increasing  the  environmental  performance  of  air 
traffic  management.  However,  SESAR  should  bring  about  these  changes 
and possibilities. 

3 
Environmental 
impact 

+ 

4.4. 

Fourth  pillar:  Functional  airspace  blocks  (FABs)  in  the  performance 
regulatoion framework: 

Functional airspace blocks (FABs) are a major driver for change, introduced in the first 
SES  package.  This  tool  will  now  be  used  within  an  overall  performance  regulation 
framework with regulation, reinforced network management functions and unbundling. 

In any event, FABs should continue to play their full role as a means to achieve the 
performance  targets.  In  the  consultations,  most  Member  States  wanted  target 
implementation dates to be put in place for FABs. Three main options can be envisaged 
for FAB development: 

4.4.1.  Option 1: No changes — keep the status quo 

Member States already have a legal obligation to establish FABs and meet the criteria 
set  out  in  the  Airspace  Regulation.  The  Commission  continues  to  support  ongoing 
initiatives47  through  studies  and  some  funding  options.  It  reserves  the  right  to  adopt 
common  general  principles  for  the  establishment  and  modification  of  FABs  in  the 
form of Implementing Rules, as provided for in SES I. 

A forum on inter-FAB coordination is proposed in the shape of a sub-committee of the 
Single Sky Committee, where Member States will be able to exchange information and 
best practice on their initiatives. 

Option 1 ‘No changes — keep the status quo’ 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1. Economic 
impact 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

- 

This  option  would  have  the  least  economic  impact.  The  introduction  of 
FABs  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the  most  effective  ways  of  achieving  a 
performance-based  ATM  system 
in  Europe  with  subsequent  cost 
reductions stemming from greater economies of scale. 
The overall added value of such initiatives will include economic benefits 
for  airspace  users  in  the  form  of  cost  reductions,  increased  capacity  and 

47 

Baltic  FAB,  Blue  Med,  Danube  FAB,  FAB  Central  Europe,  FAB  Europe  Central,  FAB  Spain 
Portugal, FAB UK Ireland, North European FAB and NUAC. 

EN 

36 

   EN 

                                                 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

hence reduced delays due to air traffic management. The cost is difficult to 
estimate because of the variety of different initiatives, but the obligation to 
establish FABs is conditional upon a positive cost-benefit analysis. 
In  this  situation,  there  could  be  a  role  for  the  Community  to  play  by 
providing  financing  through  the  TEN-T  programme  to  alleviate  the  costs 
of transition. 
Providing  more  capacity  at  a  lower  price  will  induce  air  carriers  to  offer 
even  more  choice  to  end-users  for  business  and  leisure  travel,  thus 
achieving  the  Lisbon  agenda  objectives  in  terms  of  reducing  the  internal 
and external cost of mobility across Europe. 
The  social  impact  is  borne  by  airlines,  which  are  adversely  affected  by 
constraints on growth and excessive costs, and by the EU at large because 
of  delays  incurred  by  passengers,  poor  job  creation  in  the  air  transport 
sector and low induced job creation in the economy at large.  
Moreover, if the European ATM situation does not improve, this will have 
a  negative  impact  on  the  internal  market,  mobility  and  therefore  the 
economy. 
Not relevant 

2. Social 
impact 

- 

3. 
Environmental 
impact 

+ 

4.4.2.  Option 2: Clarify the current concept with a combination of statutory and non-

regulatory measures 

Clarify the definition and concept of FABs so as to better reflect their relationship to 
service  provision  and  airspace  design.  This  option  still  leaves  the  decision  to  the 
Member  States  to  establish  FABs  but  makes  integration  a  more  useful  and  flexible 
means to reach the performance framework objectives.  

Set a firm deadline for Member States to establish FABs by the end of 2012 and start a 
performance review of regional target settings for FABs by 2012. 

Extend  the  scope  of  FABs  to  lower  airspace  by  removing  the  limitation  to  upper 
airspace only. A forum for inter-FAB coordination is also proposed. 

The requirements of military users will be taken into account not only with respect to 
airspace  design  (part  of  network  management  and  FUA  management)  but  also  with 
respect to service provision. 

Option  2  ‘Clarify  the  current  concept  with  a  combination  of  statutory  and  non-

regulatory measures’ 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1. Economic 
impact 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

+ 

This  option  recognises  the  work  already  done  by  Member  States  while 
redirecting  the  focus  from  airspace  management  to  the  integration  of 
service provision. Basically, it would embrace already ongoing initiatives 

EN 

37 

   EN 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

to extend FABs to lower airspace as well. 
The transaction costs of service provision integration cannot be estimated 
at present, but may offset the benefits in the short term. In this situation, 
there  could  be  a  role  for  the  Community  to  play  by  providing  financing 
through  the  TEN-T  programme  to  alleviate  the  costs  of  transition. 
Furthermore,  the  integration  costs  and  possible  gains  will  greatly  depend 
on the level of integration of existing service provision. 
The feasibility studies for ongoing FAB initiatives have shown that higher 
levels of integration will provide more benefits in terms of reducing costs. 
The  establishment  of  FABs  has  direct  social  implications,  as  even  the 
lowest  level  of  integration  will  inevitably  require  the  restructuring  of 
operations. Such restructuring, however, will affect the different functions 
within the ANSPs in different ways. Support functions (administrative, IT, 
technical, training, etc.) will see the highest  mobility. On the other hand, 
there should be an increase in the number of operational personnel due to 
the forecast increase in traffic and the need for greater capacity within an 
FAB. However, personnel may be needed at different locations and/or for 
different tasks than was previously the case. This mobility will be aided by 
the EU licensing scheme for air traffic controllers. 
Leaving the initiative to create FABs to Member States means they are in a 
better  position  to  handle  the  social  dimensions  of  proposed  initiatives  at 
local  level  compared  to  specific  solutions  for  FABs  decided  at  European 
level. 
The feasibility studies for ongoing FAB initiatives have shown that higher 
levels  of  integration  will  provide  more  benefits  in  terms  of  reducing 
costs48.  However, 
implications  of 
integration should not be underestimated, as social tensions in the ANSPs 
have a direct impact on the safety and capacity of air navigation services. 
Efforts by the ANSPs in the social domain will be more than offset by the 
increased potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced 
effect on the economy at large. 
In  general,  FABs  can  be  expected  to  improve  the  quality  of  ANS 
provision, promote mobility of the workforce, generate more capacity and 
encourage innovation, without any negative impact on the environment. 
In  addition,  increased  flight  efficiency  will  bring  about  significant  fuel 
savings,  yielding  a  positive  environmental  impact.  Eurocontrol’s  PRU 
report  for  2007  estimates  that  horizontal  flight  inefficiencies  result  in  a 
3.7% additional fuel burn. If TMA airborne delays and taxiing delays are 
included as well, this represents a further 3-7% fuel burn. 

the  social  and  socio-economic 

2. Social 
impact 

+ 

3. 
Environmental 
impact 

+ 

4.4.3.  Option 3: The structural division of service provision into FABs is decided at 

Community level 

The  Commission  overturns  the  current  way  of  deciding  on  FABs  (‘bottom-up’ 
approach) and  organises a top-down process  to establish them. This process would be 
based on actual traffic flows and would take into consideration the changes to the route 

48 

For  example,  a  cost-benefit  analysis  of  NUAC,  the  FAB  in  the  Nordic  region,  indicates  a 
minimum 10% annual cost savings for the merger scenario. 

EN 

38 

   EN 

                                                 
structures  established  through  the  proposed  network  management  function.  The 
Commission takes a decision on the basis of expert advice from the different network 
functions (design, flow management, review, etc.). 

The scope of FABs is extended to lower airspace as well. 

Option  3  ‘The  structural  division  of  service  provision  is  decided  at  Community 

Impact:  

Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 

level’ 

Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed 
1. Economic 
impact 

2. Social 
impact 

+/- 

-- 

3. 
Environmental 
impact 

+ 

This  option  would  yield  the  optimum  economic  benefits  for  a  specific 
FAB.  However,  an  imposed  solution  for  FABs  would  force  ANSPs  to 
work  together,  with  may  not  lead  to  the  most  efficient  organisation  of 
service provision. This may offset the theoretically positive impact. 
The  establishment  of  FABs  has  direct  social  implications,  as  even  the 
lowest  level  of  integration  will  inevitably  require  the  restructuring  of 
operations. Such restructuring, however, will affect the different functions 
within the ANSPs in different ways. Support functions (administrative, IT, 
technical, training, etc.) will see the highest  mobility. On the other hand, 
there should be an increase in the number of operational personnel due to 
the forecast increase in traffic and the need for greater capacity within an 
FAB. However, personnel may be needed at different locations and/or for 
different tasks than was previously the case. This mobility will be aided by 
the EU licensing scheme for air traffic controllers. 
Efforts by the ANSPs in the social domain may be offset by the increased 
potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced effect on 
the economy at large.  
In  general,  FABs  can  be  expected  to  improve  the  quality  of  ANS 
provision, promote mobility of the workforce, generate more capacity and 
encourage innovation, without any negative impact on environment. 
In  addition,  increased  flight  efficiency  will  bring  about  significant  fuel 
savings,  yielding  a  positive  environmental  impact.  Eurocontrol’s  PRU 
report  for  2007  estimates  that  horizontal  flight  inefficiencies  result  in  a 
3.7% additional fuel burn. If TMA airborne delays and taxiing delays are 
included as well, this represents a further 3-7% fuel burn. 

4.5. 

Role of Eurocontrol in the performance regulation framework: 

Over the course of SES I, the Commission has cooperated with Eurocontrol in particular 
on  the  development  of  technical  implementing  rules  under  a  system  of  mandates. 
There has also been some cooperation in support of mutual policies on international fora 
and in the collection of data and studies. 

SES II  would  require  a  number  of  operational  network  functions  that  cannot  be 
performed by the Commission. These functions require an independent network  view, 
separate  from  national  interests.  In  many  cases,  the  nucleus  of  such  arrangements 
already  exists  in  Eurocontrol,  but  the  organisation  would  need  to  be  empowered  and 

EN 

39 

   EN 

focused49 to deliver the full benefits if it is chosen to perform some or all of the network 
functions discussed here.  

Since  it  contributes  only  indirectly  to  the  attainment  of  objectives,  a  more  complete 
discussion  of  the  possibilities  of  enhancing  Eurocontrol  coordination  to  carry  out 
network and performance functions is to be found in Annex 6. 

5. 

COMPARING THE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS 

5.1. 

First pillar: Performance regulation 

OPTIONS: 

1.  Do  nothing  / 
status quo 

Local 
2. 
Target Setting 

3.a.  European 
Target Setting 

3.b.  European 
Regulator 

Economic Impact 

Competitiveness 
of 
European 
airlines 

- -  
Excessive 
charges  result  in 
higher prices and 
weaken 
the 
competitiveness 
of 
airlines 

European 

Performance  of 
ANSPs 

-  
The  differences 
in  performance 
continue.  There 
tool  for 
is  no 
ensuring 
convergence. 
Bad  performers 
the 
offset 
improvements  of 
good performers 
+  
targets 
Notional 
are  agreed  under 
Eurocontrol 
arrangements, 
without 
enforceability 

any 

+ 
Improvement. 
Users  will  be 
on 
consulted 
targets 
but 
decisions  will 
at 
remain 
level, 
national 
will 
which 
perpetuate 
the 
big performance 
gaps 
between 
Member States 

+  
ANSPs 
will 
follow  national 
targets, 
but 
there  will  be  no 
system-wide 
approach 
gaps 
performance 
will remain.  
strong 
No 
incentive 
for 
bad  performers 
to 
change 
behaviour. 

and 
in 

+++  
A  coherent  and 
substantial 
in 
improvement 
operational  and 
economic 
efficiency can be 
enforced, 
bringing  savings 
on route charges, 
flight  time  and 
fuel  burn 
for 
airspace users. 

+++  
Improved 
service provision 
and 
economic 
efficiency  will 
permit 
the 
sustainable 
growth  of  air 
traffic. 
The 
economic 
pressure 
ANSPs, 
at 
coordinated 
level, 
European 
will 
ensure 
convergence  of 
cost  efficiency, 
and 
capacity 

increased 

on 

++ 
Same as for ETS, 
but 
in  a  more 
radical  manner, 
as  there  will  be 
no  negotiations 
with ANSPs. The 
radical 
most 
approach, 
bringing 
immediately 
after 
implementation. 

results 

+++ 
Same as for ETS 
probably 
with 
more 
radical 
results, but offset 
by 
time 
the 
needed  to  set  up 
an 
operational 
SES 
Performance 
Agency. 

49 

Recommendation 6 of the High Level Group on Aviation Regulation (page iii of the report), July 
2007. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
                                                 
of 
Governance 
the ATM system 

=  
Decision-
making  remains 
at national level  
- -  
No effective use 
of 
the 
Community 
method. 

- -  
Decisions 
are 
shared  between 
Member  States 
ANSPs. 
and 
Fragmentation  is 
not  reduced.  The 
Community 
method 
used. 
NSAs  have  no 
independence 
state 
from 
authorities 
and 
cannot  perform 
their 
performance 
oversight role. 

is  not 

+ - 
Target 
setting 
and  enforcement 
are  entirely  at 
level. 
European 
The 
Agency 
consults 
stakeholders  but 
the final decision 
taken 
the 
by 
Commission. 
The 
substantial 
costs  of  such  an 
agency 
will 
considerably 
exceed  the  costs 
of Option 3a. 

flight efficiency. 
Coordination  of 
investment  and 
enforcement  of 
and 
coherent 
coordinated 
performance 
targets. 
+++ 
are 
Initiatives 
ensuring 
local, 
local 
that 
and 
constraints 
specificities  are 
duly  taken  into 
account. 
The 
final  decision  is 
taken 
at 
level, 
European 
thus 
ensuring 
that  performance 
is  driven 
in  a 
consistent  way 
following 
a 
system 
‘total 
approach’. 
+++  
Efficient  use  of 
the  Community 
method 
for 
setting 
target 
through 
the 
comitology 
procedure. 
+++ 
implementation 
of local targets is 
left to local level 
with 
flexibility 
to  accommodate 
local 
specificities. 

The 

Administrative 
costs 

=  
No  new  costs 
incurred 
the 
status quo option 

in 

-  
Some  additional 
costs  due  to  the 
to  create 
need 
NSAs 
strong 
separate 
with 
budgets 
and 
resources. 
- —  
Additional  costs 
airlines, 
for 

-  
Need to create or 
designate 
an 
independent 
performance 
review  body  and 
structure. 
Need  to  upgrade 
NSAs  to  allow 
them to carry out 
performance 

- — - 
High 
administrative 
costs:  by  far  the 
costly 
most 
policy  option  in 
terms 
of 
administrative 
The 
budget. 
agency 
will 
require  a  staff  of 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
End consumers 

Employment  

- -  
More 
costly 
travel  because  of 
and 
excessive 
unjustified costs. 
Capacity  crunch 
create 
may 
for 
problems 
travellers 
and 
freight. 

- 
No  change  for 
ANSPs. 
-- 
For  airlines  and 
European 
the 
economy. 

which  will  have 
to 
negotiate 
individually 
with each NSA. 

be 

and 

+  
Slow 
variable 
improvements 
may 
expected, 
provided 
ANSPs 
cooperate 
together  on  a 
voluntary basis. 

that 

Social impact 
=  
Limited 
social 
for 
impact 
ANSPs  as  they 
will 
remain 
masters  of  their 
cost 
containment 
efforts.  
=  
Limited 
improvement  in 
the 
social 
domain. 
Airspace  users 
and  the  EU  at 
large 
will 
continue  to  bear 
social 
all 
costs 
the 
of 
shortcomings  of 
the system. 

the 

least 

50 
at 
persons 
(€5 
million per year). 

+++ 
More 
capacity 
will be delivered. 
More  flights  at 
better  prices  will 
be  offered 
to 
passengers 
by 
more competitive 
European 
airlines. 

improved 

+++ 
The 
competitiveness 
of  airlines  will 
new 
generate 
their 
in 
jobs 
sector.  Improved 
mobility 
will 
generate  more 
the 
in 
jobs 
economy 
at 
large. 
--- 
social 
The 
the 
impact  and 
local 
loss 
of 
for 
initiative 
will 
ANSPs 
trigger  resistance 
in 
particular 
from controllers. 

capacity 
be 

oversight. 
increase 
Slight 
in 
reporting 
requirements  for 
ANSPs. 
+++ 
More 
will 
delivered. 
More  flights  at 
better prices  will 
to 
be  offered 
by 
passengers 
more 
competitive 
European 
airlines. 

+++  
Improved 
service provision 
and 
economic 
efficiency  will 
contribute  to  the 
and 
quantity 
jobs 
quality  of 
offered 
all 
at 
(ANSPs, 
levels 
airlines, 
industry, EU). 
by 
Efforts 
the 
in 
ANSPs 
social 
domain 
will  be  more 
than  offset  by 
increased 
the 
potential  for  job 
creation  among 
airspace 
users 
and  the  induced 
the 
effect  on 
economy 
at 
large. 

Environmental impact 

Air quality 

Climate 

-- 
The 
‘Do 
nothing’ scenario 
does  not  address 
the 
environmental 
issue. 
The  non-optimal 
network 
route 

+  
The  issue  will 
be  tackled  only 
at national level. 
-  
No 
action. 
-  
Airlines 

European 

fly 

+++ 
The  ETS  option 
brings 
positive 
substantial 
and 
improvements  in 
flight  efficiency 
and  therefore  for 
the environment. 
Clear 

most 

+++ 
The 
effective 
scenario  in  terms 
of  environmental 
efficiency  as  no 
room 
for 
manoeuvre  will 
to 
left 
be 

EN 

42 

   EN 

high 

a 
has 
negative 
environmental 
impact 
(several 
million tonnes of 
additional  CO2 
emissions 
per 
year). 

longer  routes  to 
avoid 
costly 
airspaces. 

responsibility for 
target 
setting, 
network 
management  and 
airspace 
regulation. 

Member States.  
(The  weak  point 
of this scenario is 
that it does not in 
into 
take 
itself 
the 
account 
military 
/ 
sovereignty 
aspects  of  route 
design.) 

Conclusion: 

The ETS option is the preferred one. It is expected to bring coherent and substantial 
improvements in operational, environmental and economic efficiency in a cost-efficient 
(low implementation costs) and socially acceptable manner. The option is acceptable for 
controllers and would bring wealth and jobs to the airlines and the European economy. 
This option better respects the principles of better regulation (no additional structure 
or process required), proportionality and subsidiarity (local initiative, use of national 
expertise to propose sound targets taking account of local constraints and specificities, 
and  Community  decision-making  ensuring  that  the  system-wide  targets  are  met  and 
enforced). 

5.2. 

Second  pillar  –  Network  approach  for  a  European-level  network  and 
management of scarce resources 

The  summary  table  below  presents  a  comparison  of  the  three  options  (the  -  sign 
indicating a negative impact and the + sign a positive impact). 

Economic 

Social 

Environmental  General 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

-- 

++ 

++ 

- 

+ 

+ 

feasibility 

+ 

++ 

+/- 

-- 

++ 

++ 

Best: 

Option 2/3 

Option 2 

Option 2/3 

Option 2 

Option 2 compromises on some of the theoretical gains to ensure political acceptability. 
Much  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  consultation  mechanism.  If  it  succeeds  in  taking 
proper  account  of  local  and  regional  needs  without  negatively  affecting  the  network 
view, it could achieve the same or even better results than option 3. Even if it leads to a 
slight  reduction  in  the  gains,  its  realism  is  still  an  argument  in  its  favour.  Option  3  is 
theoretically efficient, but suffers from low feasibility. The feasibility of option 1 also 
diminishes if the sub-optimal route network increasingly affects air operations and thus 
causes discontent. 

On  basis  of  this  analysis,  option  2  is  the  preferred  solution.  Network  design  and 
management should be seen as a part of the wider target setting and attainment process, 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
where network efficiency is just one of many factors contributing to good output. Target 
setting  should  be  done  at  European  level,  with  a  mechanism  for  translating  this  into 
actions specified and overseen by the NSAs at Member State or FAB level.  

The  best  results  are  normally  ensured  through  transparent  and  public  planning  and 
review of the results as close to the regulated parties as possible, but for some areas like 
network  design  the  main  responsibility  for  planning  actions  must  be  at  network 
(European) level. This is due to the fact that optimising route networks at national level 
resolves  only  part  of  the  inefficiencies  and  may  even  worsen  the  situation  in  cases 
where  there  is  considerable  interaction  with  neighbouring  countries  or  FABs.  Only 
cooperation at both state/FAB and European levels, with the prime consideration being 
overall network efficiency, can ensure that all inefficiencies are addressed. 

Therefore,  only  option  3  can  bring  about  the  necessary  benefits  by  ensuring  proper 
planning  and  implementation  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  network.  The  process 
envisaged for network design is presented in more detail in Annex 7. 

5.3. 

Third  Pillar:  Comparison  of  the  options  for  the  introduction  of  market 
measures for unbundled services 

The impact analysis demonstrates that unbundling is not straightforward and that such 
decisions  must  be  taken  on  a  service-by-service  basis.  While  competition  in  general 
would  boost  performance,  the  possible  gains  should  be  assessed  against  the  cost  in 
terms of the business risk. Indeed, the critical factor is the increased risk for safety and 
continuity of service. 

Options/Dimensions Decision at national level 

Economic 

Environment 

Social 

on 

the 

within 

depends 

-/+ 
Performance 
regulation. 
Consolidation 
framework of FABs. 
Control  of  internally  provided 
services. 
-/+ 
Impact 
innovation 
-/+ 
Social  management  of  change 
under control. 
Safety  of 
the  flying  public 
depends on introduction of new 
technologies. 

take-up  of 

if  slow 

of 

will 

boost 

disruption  may 

Market opening at Community 
level 
+ 
Competition 
performance. 
Impact  on  FABs  not  clear: 
facilitator or obstacle. 
Risk 
increase. 
+ 
New  technologies  allow  for 
greener flights. 
- 
Consolidation  may  require  a 
restructuring  effort  —  social 
resentment. 
ATM is financed by a growing 
aviation industry. 
Safety  benefits  from  the  swift 
introduction 
new 
technologies. 

of 

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
Conclusions: preferred option: 

In order to benefit from improved performance, unbundling should be pursued after an 
appropriate  assessment  of  the  associated  business  risks.  Decisions  on  unbundling 
should  be  taken  at  Community  level  through  comitology,  after  specific  impact 
assessments.  This  way  of  proceeding  would  allow  consultation  of  stakeholders  to 
obtain their views on the balancing of possible gains against costs. This approach is in 
line  with  previous  studies,  which  argued  for leaving  decisions  to  unbundle  at  national 
level  with  a  view  to  safeguarding  continuity  of  service.  This  would  also  take  due 
account of the progress achieved through FAB initiatives and performance regulation. 

5.4. 

Fourth pillar: FABs within the performance framework 

The summary table below presents a comparison of the three options. 

Economic 

Social 

Environment 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

- 
+ 
+/- 

- 
+ 
-- 

+ 
+ 
+ 

General 
feasibility 

+ 
++ 
- 

Option  1  risks  adding  a  need  for  further  guidance  as  to  the  content  of  the  current 
obligation  to  establish  FABs.  This  is  especially  the  case  if  the  route  network 
management function is at European level, leaving it to Member States to evaluate the 
resulting  route  network/traffic  flow  patterns  in  order  to  decide  whether  to  establish 
FABs.  There  is  no  consensus  on  the  FAB  concept,  resulting  in  a  diverse  set  of 
interpretations  and  different  degrees  of  cooperation  and  integration  in  ongoing  FAB 
initiatives. 

Option  2  brings  clarity  regarding  FAB  objectives,  accelerating  existing  integration 
efforts  and  yielding  efficiency  and  economic  gains  at  a  general  level,  not  only  in 
tackling  flight  inefficiencies.  It  takes  proper  account  of  the  proposal  to  pursue  route 
network  management  at  European  level.  Much  responsibility  is  still  left  to  Member 
States since most of the aspects (operational, technical, legal, social, etc.) remain well 
within their competence. 

Option 3 could be challenged on the basis that there is no Community competence, as it 
touches  upon  Member  States’  sovereignty  and  the  defence  issues  relating  to  military 
requirements in Member States’ own airspace. For this reason, it is probably the most 
political difficult option to realise. In any case, option 3 could be envisaged as a long-
term step, should option 2 not deliver the desired performance improvements to service 
provision. 

The option chosen: 

On  basis  of  the  above  analysis,  option  2  is  the  option  with  the  most  positive  and 
favourable prospects for meeting our policy objectives. 

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
6. 

POLICY MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The need for a constant monitoring and evaluation process is heightened in ATM, since 
the nature of the system does not allow for normal market mechanisms to be used in all 
cases. These monitoring and evaluation processes have to ensure a reliable and full flow 
of information to provide legislators and policy makers with feedback on the success — 
or otherwise — of their actions. 

SES I actions 

Since the need for this kind of process was seen very early, the European ATM system 
is  in  a  fortunate  situation  in  that  the  core  of  the  evaluation  and  monitoring  system 
already exists. SES I built on the existing Eurocontrol tradition, with Articles 11 and 12 
of  the  Framework  Regulation  setting  out  a  set  of  performance  review  and  reporting 
requirements to feed the process. The performance review is de facto based on the work 
of 
the  Eurocontrol  Performance  Review  Commission,  which  produces  yearly 
performance  reports  on  the  ATM  system.  These  reports  call  for  European-wide 
performance targets, but lack legal or binding status. 

Improvements in SES II — Performance Framework 

In SES II, this process needs to be strengthened by  creating a closed-loop structure to 
feed  into  the  performance  framework  described  in  Chapter  5.  Performance  regulation 
requires  a  permanent  flow  of  information  to  feed  the  review,  target  setting  and 
enforcement process. SES II will therefore introduce a continuous loop of monitoring 
and  evaluation  for  performance  regulation  of  natural  monopolies  and  other  policy 
areas. In this particular case, therefore, the efficiency of legislation will be monitored by 
following  the  progress  of  performance  indicators  covering  safety,  capacity,  cost-
efficiency and the environment. In addition, a political assessment will decide on the 
balance between the different areas of performance according to societal needs. 

Improvements in SES II — Institutional Framework 

Beyond  monitoring  through  performance  regulation,  the  institutional  set-up  of  the 
Single  Sky  provides  for  a  permanent  flow  of  information  and  assessments  from 
different  stakeholders.  The  Commission  receives  input  from  Member  States  through 
the Single Sky Committee, from national supervisory authorities and most importantly 
from the Performance Review Body. In addition, input is provided by industry through 
the Industry Consultation  Body and  by  representatives  of staff and employers through 
the social dialogue structures. 

All  in  all,  the  aviation  industry,  which  finances  air  traffic  management,  is  given  a 
guarantee that it will receive value for money and that the standards for air navigation 
provision will genuinely improve. As the aviation industry is an indispensable partner in 
the  institutional  set-up,  the  reporting  line  to  the  Commission  on  efficiency  and 
evaluation  is  quite  direct  and  also  independent  of  the  performance  review  framework 
described above. 

EN 

46 

   EN 

7. 

TECHNICAL UPDATES OF THE FIRST SES PACKAGE 

From the technical evaluation it has become apparent that the current regulations need 
to be modified in a number of areas to take account of the lessons learned from SES I 
and technical developments and to enable the transition from regulatory action based 
on  Eurocontrol  drafts  to  action  based  on  EASA,  Eurocontrol,  ICAO  and  any  other 
bodies  that  may  be  considered  appropriate  for  the  task  at  hand.  In  particular,  the 
harmonised application of ICAO rules requires particular attention in the regulations. 

Last but not  least,  there  are three articles in the SES I legislation which apply only to 
upper airspace. It is proposed to extend the scope of these articles to lower airspace. In 
addition,  consideration  should  also  be  given  to  whether  the  articles  now  referring  to 
specific IRs need to be modified to provide for necessary updates to them, etc. A more 
detailed presentation of these technical updates is given in Annex 8. 

EN 

47 

   EN 

List of Annexes 

Annex 1: List of abbreviations used 

Annex 2: High Level Group recommendations 

Annex  3:  Conclusions  on  the  Conference  of  20.01.2008  on  consulting  aviation 
stakeholders 

Annex 4: List of consultations 

Annex 5: Unit costs 

Annex 6: Options for institutional arrangements with Eurocontrol 

Annex7: Network design process 

Annex 8: Technical update of SES II 

EN 

48 

   EN 

ANNEX 1 

List of Abbreviations 

AFIS 

Aerodrome Flight Information Service 

AIM 

AIS 

AMC 

ANS 

Aeronautical Information Management 

Aeronautical Information Services 

Acceptable Means of Compliance 

Air Navigation Services 

ANSP 

Air Navigation Service Provider 

ATCO 

Air Traffic Controller 

ATM 

BISP 

Central 
FAB 

Air Traffic Management 

Blocks of Integrated Service Provision 

Initiative by DE, FR, CH, BE, NL and LU for a common FAB 

CFMU 

Central Flow Management Unit (Eurocontrol) 

CRCO 

Central Route Charges Collection Office (Eurocontrol) 

DAP 

DAS 

EAD 

Directorate of ATM Programmes (Eurocontrol) 

Directorate of ATM Strategies (Eurocontrol) 

European Aeronautical Database (Eurocontrol) 

EASA 

European Aviation Safety Agency (Community) 

ECAA 

European Common Aviation Area 

ECAC 

European Civil Aviation Conference 

Eurocontrol  European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (www.eurocontrol.int) 

FAA 

FAB 

FUA 

GA 

Federal Aviation Administration (US) 

Functional Airspace Block 

Flexible Use of Airspace (between civil and military) 

General Aviation 

ICAO 

International Civil Aviation Organisation (UN) 

ICB 

Industry Consultation Body 

INSTILUX 

Institute of Air Navigation Services (training, Eurocontrol) 

EN 

49 

   EN 

IR 

Implementing Rule 

MET 

Meteorological services 

Mil 

MS 

Military 

Member States (EU) 

MUAC 

Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (Eurocontrol) 

NAA 

NSA 

National Aviation Administrations 

National Supervisory Authorities 

NSACB 

NSA Coordination Body 

PC 

PRB 

PRC 

PRU 

Provisional Council (Eurocontrol) 

Performance Review Body (proposed) 

Performance Review Commission (Eurocontrol) 

Performance Review Unit (Eurocontrol) 

QMV 

Qualified Majority Voting 

RVSM 

Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 

SAIP 

Single Aeronautical Information Publication 

SESAR JU  SESAR Joint Undertaking 

SES 

Single European Sky 

SES1 

First SES Package (2004) 

SES2 

Second SES Package (2008-09?) 

SESAR 

SES ATM Research Programme 

SID 

Standard Instrument Departure 

STAR 

Standard (instrument) Approach Route 

SWIM 

System-Wide Information Management 

TEN-T 

Trans-European Networks – Transport 

TMA 

US 

(Airport) Terminal Area  

United States 

EN 

50 

   EN 

ANNEX 2 

High Level Group Report and Recommendations 

To facilitate cross-referencing between the Commission recommendations in section 4 
(Accelerating 
the  High  Level  Group 
recommendations,  the  corresponding  HLG  Recommendations  (HLG  1,  2,  etc)  are 
identified in the Communication: 

Implementation  Strategy) 

and 

the 

HLG 
Recommendation 

Subject 

HLG 1 

HLG 2 

HLG 3 

HLG 4 

HLG 5 

HLG 6 

HLG 7 

HLG 8 

HLG 9 

EU as a driving force in aviation regulation in Europe 

Greater responsibilities for industry 

Better regulation 

Drive improved performance 

Deliver the Single European Sky 

Empower and focus Eurocontrol 

Address airport capacity 

Deliver continuously improving safety 

Deliver environmental benefits 

HLG 10 

Commit Member States to deliver 

The  Executive  Summary  (below)  of  the  High  Level  Group  Report  gives  more 
information. 

Executive Summary  

Vice-President  Barrot  appointed  the  High  Level  Group  for  the  Future  European 
Aviation Regulatory Framework in November 2006 in response to strong demand from 
industry,  EU  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  to  simplify  and  increase  the 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework for aviation in Europe. Vice-President Barrot 
asked  the  High  Level  Group  to  present  a  vision  for  the  development  of  the  aviation 
regulatory  framework  —  with  a  particular  focus  on  air  traffic  management  —  and  to 
provide a roadmap with practical next steps.  

The  High  Level  Group  underlines  the  need  for,  and  indeed  urgency  of,  change  in  the 
regulatory  framework  for  aviation  in  Europe.  This  is  necessary  to  ensure  alignment 
across the aviation system towards achieving shared objectives. 

The  High  Level  Group  has  faced  a  set  of  complex  and  occasionally  conflicting  aims 
when considering the performance improvement objectives: 

EN 

51 

   EN 

•  Aviation has a key role to play in achieving the objectives of the Lisbon agenda, in 
terms  of  reducing  the  internal  and  external  cost  of  mobility  within  Europe  and 
between Europe and the rest of the world. Like other transport modes, aviation is an 
important enabler of economic growth. The aviation sector itself is also a significant 
source of employment and technological innovation. 

•  At  the  same  time  capacity  in  the  air  and  on  the  ground  is  increasingly  scarce,  the 
environmental impact a growing source of concern at local and international levels, 
while improving safety becomes ever more challenging with increasing traffic levels. 

•  Additionally,  aviation  in  Europe  faces  growing  competition  from  other  parts  of  the 
world for the market in Europe and the global aviation market. This emphasises the 
importance of finding cost-effective solutions. 

To  determine  the  priorities  for  change,  the  High  Level  Group  has  reviewed  ongoing 
initiatives  to  improve  the  European  aviation  system  such  as  the  Single  European  Sky 
(SES) initiative, the inclusion of aviation in the emissions trading scheme, and the Clean 
Sky programme. It has concluded that the challenge for Europe is not to embark on 
new  system  changes  but  to  focus  on  accelerating  the  effective  delivery  of  the 
existing  initiatives  and  to  strengthen  the  capabilities  of  the  key  players  to  deliver 
them.  The  High  Level  Group  has  focused  on  the  SES  initiative  in  particular. 
Improved  ATM  can  play  a  vital  role  in  increasing  capacity  and  reducing  the 
environmental impact of aviation. 

The  High  Level  Group  has  therefore  concentrated  on  two  main  themes:  performance 
and governance. This leads to proposals for clear roles for the European Commission, 
the  Member  States  and  the  Eurocontrol  and  EASA  organisations,  and  proposals  for 
concrete actions to address the current and expected bottlenecks in performance. It also 
leads  to  proposals  to  rebalance  the  governance  of  the  aviation  system  in  Europe  to 
enable  industry  (airlines,  air  navigation  services  providers  (ANSPs),  airports  and 
manufacturers)  to  play  an  appropriate  role  in  influencing  decisions  that  affect  them. 
This  focus  has  been  validated  by  a  process  of  stakeholder  (industry,  the  military, 
professional staff associations and non-EU states) consultation.  

The  High  Level  Group  has  followed  the  European  Commission  in  taking  2020  as  the 
target  date  for  completing  the  major  changes  already  initiated  within  Europe,  in 
particular the Single European Sky. However, the High Level Group has targeted 2014 
as  the  date  by  which  its  proposals  must  be  implemented  to  ensure  that  the  European 
aviation system remains safe, competitive and environmentally responsible. 2013 is the 
date when the SESAR deployment phase is due to start.  

To facilitate the next steps, the High Level Group has outlined a roadmap for change. 
The  roadmap  provides  for  actions  that  can  be  started  immediately  and  for  putting  in 
place a process of continuous change to respond to market developments. Because 2013 
is  a  critical  date,  the  High  Level  Group  proposes  a  timely  evaluation  of  its 
recommendations in 2011 to ensure that the necessary additional actions are taken.  

The  High  Level  Group  recognises  that  its  proposals  represent  a  major  change  process 
challenge. This challenge can only be met if it fully involves the people working in the 
organisations involved in the change process. The High Level Group therefore urges the 

EN 

52 

   EN 

European  Commission  to  continue  the  process  of  extensive  consultation  with 
stakeholders  during  the  decision-making  process  following  on  from  the  High  Level 
Group’s work. In particular, the High Level Group points to the valuable contribution 
that can be made by representatives from professional staff organisations and the need 
for inclusive social dialogue.  

The  proposals  of  the  High  Level  Group  can  be  summarised  in  the  following  10 
recommendations: 

HLG 1  EU as a driving force in aviation regulation in Europe: Fragmentation is a 
major  bottleneck  in  improving  the  performance  of  the  European  aviation 
system. As this can only be addressed at European level: strengthen the role of 
the European Community and the Community method as the sole vehicle to set 
the  regulation  agenda  for  European  aviation  by  eliminating  overlaps  between 
EU  and  other  regulatory  processes,  ensuring  independent  structures  for 
regulation and service provision, and ensuring that safety regulatory activities 
are  conducted  independently  from  other  forms  of  regulation.  Drive  change 
forward  at  the  strategic  level  through  regular  meetings  of  the  European 
Directors-General  of  Civil  Aviation  working  together  with  the  European 
Commission, coordinating across the governing bodies of Eurocontrol, EASA 
and ECAC and creating a more structured dialogue between the EU and non-
EU  states.  Appoint  a  senior  figure  as  an  ‘Aviation  System  Coordinator’  to 
drive forward the necessary actions. 

HLG 2  Greater responsibilities for industry: Give more responsibility to industry in 
line  with  the  liberalisation  of  the  internal  market.  Involve  industry  more 
systematically in the rule-making process for the aviation system. Realign the 
governance  of  service  provision 
industry  greater 
responsibilities  within  a  harmonised  regulatory  framework.  Make  possible 
competition for contestable activities which can be executed by industry. 

functions 

to  give 

HLG 3  Better  regulation:  Apply  the  principles  of  better  regulation,  avoiding  over-
regulation,  and  undertaking  full  impact  assessments  and  consultation.  Apply 
consistent definitions and rationalise existing legislation.  

HLG 4  Drive  improved  performance:  Every  regulatory  intervention  should  target 
improving  performance  within  overriding  safety  objectives.  As  general 
principles,  set  performance  improvement  objectives,  maximise  the  use  of 
performance  incentives  and  require  independent  performance  reporting.  For 
ATM,  adapt the  regulatory framework and governance structures to stimulate 
management  to  deliver  improved  performance.  Where  possible,  facilitate  the 
application of market principles by the unbundling and liberalisation of ANSP 
services. Introduce economic regulation to drive performance improvement in 
the monopoly elements of ANSP activities. 

HLG 5  Deliver  the  Single  European  Sky:  Accelerate  the  delivery  of  the  Single 
European  Sky  (SES)  and  SESAR  through  proactive  management  and  annual 
progress monitoring and reporting by the European Commission. Translate the 
SES ambitions into an implementation strategy and plan. Introduce economic 
regulation for ATM services to ensure that ANSPs are incentivised to achieve 

EN 

53 

   EN 

converging  objectives  in  Europe  and  to  regulate  the  monopoly  elements  of 
ANSP  activities.  Address  the  hurdles  to  implementing  FABs  and  task  the 
Aviation  System  Coordinator  to  facilitate  their  progress.  Strengthen  the 
orientation  of  the  SESAR  programme  towards  results,  including  quick  wins, 
and  develop  proposals  for  the  pan-European  ATM  governance  structure  post 
the  SESAR  JU  in  2013.  Increase  the  political  support  for  SES  and  SESAR, 
including the military stakeholders in European ATM.  

HLG 6  Empower and focus Eurocontrol: Empower Eurocontrol to play a key role in 
delivering the Single European Sky and SESAR objectives within the strategic 
and regulatory framework set by the EU. Focus its activities on excellent pan-
European  functions  and  ATM  network  design,  and  support  for  regulation  as 
requested  by  the  European  Commission  and  Member  States.  Transfer  the 
responsibility  for  safety  regulatory  activities  to  EASA.  Invite  the  Eurocontrol 
governing bodies to give industry an appropriate role in the governance of the 
pan-European  functions  and  facilitate  the  unbundling  of  activities  through 
corporate  structures  or  undertakings  where  appropriate 
the 
Eurocontrol  organisation  to  evolve  in  line  with  industry  developments  while 
ensuring  that  the  interests  of  employees  are  considered.  Prepare  for  the 
appropriate pan-European ATM governance and operational structures for the 
post-2013 SESAR deployment phase. 

to  allow 

HLG 7  Address airport capacity: Address the forthcoming airport capacity crunch by 
asking  the  European  Commission  to  raise  the  profile  of  this  emerging 
bottleneck in the European aviation system and point the way forward in terms 
of  reconciling  growth  and  environment  goals.  Request  Member  States  to 
provide  strategies  for  addressing  the  airport  capacity  issue  while  demanding 
that  airports  themselves  take  greater  responsibility  for  securing  the  local 
‘licence  to  grow’.  Enable  the  European  Commission  to  facilitate  progress 
Integrate  airports  more 
through 
systematically into the total system approach. 

‘Aviation  System  Coordinator’. 

the 

HLG 8  Deliver  continuously  improving  safety:  Require  states  to  apply  safety 
management  principles  consistently  and,  in  particular,  facilitate  the  uniform 
application  of  ‘just  culture’  principles.  Empower  EASA  as  the  single  EU 
instrument  for  aviation  safety  regulation  including  airports  and  ATM,  and 
ensure that EASA is funded and resourced accordingly. Prepare for the SESAR 
challenge  through  timely  certification  processes.  Ensure  that  states’  safety 
oversight  is  harmonised  and  that  cooperation  between  national  authorities  is 
stimulated to achieve overall higher levels of performance. 

HLG 9  Deliver  environmental  benefits:  Building  on  the  three  pillars  of  improved 
gate-to-gate ATM, cleaner and quieter aircraft, and market-oriented solutions, 
ask the European Commission to develop an integrated environment strategy. 
Incorporate  ambitions  from  the  transport  and  environment  perspectives, 
enabling Europe to play a leading role in balancing economic, environmental, 
safety and social impacts. 

HLG 10 Commit Member States to deliver: Require more systematic implementation 
the 

of  existing  commitments  by  EU  Member  States, 

in  particular 

EN 

54 

   EN 

defragmentation targeted by the Single European Sky initiative. States should 
address inconsistent guidelines for ANSPs, performance shortfalls in oversight, 
bottlenecks in airport capacity and safety management, and the new challenges 
of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Encourage regulatory authorities 
to exchange best practices and develop common approaches. 

The  High  Level  Group  thanks  Vice-President  Barrot  for  the  opportunity  to  develop 
these recommendations and hopes that they will be acted upon without delay.  

The  High  Level  Group  commends  its  report  to  the  Vice-President,  to  the  European 
Parliament, to Eurocontrol’s Provisional Council and to the Member States. 

EN 

55 

   EN 

ANNEX 3 

Conference 

‘Towards a more performing European Aviation System’  

Conclusions  

22 January 2008  

•  The European air transport sector faces significant challenges from known areas such 
as  capacity,  safety,  security  and  efficiency  but  also  from  new  dimensions  such  as 
economics and the environment; 

•  The  High  Level  Group’s  conclusions  and  their  focus  on  enhanced  governance  and 

performance are supported by a vast majority of stakeholders; 

•  Aviation is an important enabler of economic growth and technological innovation, 
and  a  significant  source  of  employment  and  jobs  as  it  reduces  the  internal  and 
external  costs  of  mobility  within  Europe  and  between  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the 
world; 

•  Urgent need to address the cost of fragmentation of the ATM system (€3bn per year 
due to the inefficiencies and external environmental costs of the current system); 

•  The  Community  method  confirmed  as  the  most  effective  tool  —  better  regulation 
and  close  dialogue  and  cooperation  between  all  relevant  stakeholders  (Community, 
Member  States,  the  military  community,  industry,  the  social  partners  and  non-EU 
states), building on the unique expertise of Eurocontrol in ATM matters; 

•  The Commission to drive the change process — regulatory structures, performance 
framework and timely introduction are addressed and handled at Community level; 

•  Performance-driven  approach  to  achieve  the  required  improvements  in  safety, 
efficiency, capacity and cost-effectiveness, together with appropriate incentives and 
disincentives; 

•  Environmental  dimension  to  be  incorporated  in  the  aviation  system  as  a  whole  to 

achieve a balance between economic, environmental, safety and social impacts; 

•  The  environment  needs  a  comprehensive  approach  embracing  technologies  (Clean 

Sky, SEAR), SES and market measures (ETS); 

•  Pan-European  approach  for  a  European  Common  Aviation  Area  —  the  Single 

European Sky to be open to non-EU countries;  

•  The  social  dimension  is  essential  and  must  be  linked  with  the  objectives  of  the 

Lisbon Agenda; 

EN 

56 

   EN 

•  Functional  airspace  blocks  (FABs)  are  key  to  tackling  defragmentation  and 

efficiency; 

•  Member  States  should  politically  commit  to  the  creation  of  FABS  by  2010,  with 

implementation by 2012; 

•  ‘Capacity crunch’ to be addressed through technological innovation from the SESAR 

programme together with measures to improve airport capacity; 

•  The  implementation  of  SESAR  is  a  necessity  to  ensure  that  the  European  aviation 

system will be safe, competitive and environmentally responsible; 

•  The  Commission  should  be  encouraged  to  act  quickly  and  draw  up  the  SES  II 
package, including performance targets at European level, the creation of a European 
network manager, accelerating the introduction of FABs, and establishing a genuine 
performance  review  mechanism  (in  consensus  with  the  Member  States  and  all 
relevant stakeholders) by streamlining and simplifying governance elements; 

•  Reform  of  Eurocontrol;  EASA  as  the  European  safety  entity;  partnership  with  the 

network of National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) 

•  Europe to maintain its competitive position in the global aviation market in the most 

safe, efficient and sustainable manner. 

EN 

57 

   EN 

ANNEX 4 

List of consultations held for the development of SES2 

A  large  number  of  consultations  have  been  held  to  ensure  that  the  second  package  of 
SES  regulations  truly  covers  all  stakeholder  concerns.  The  consultations  started  under 
the auspices of the High Level Group (HLG) on Aviation Regulation (January to June 
2007)  and  continued  as  a  series  of  bilateral  and  group  consultations  during  the 
development of SES2 (July 2007 to February 2008). The list below contains the main 
consultation  meetings,  but  there  have  also  been  many  other  meetings  where  the  main 
subject  was  different  but  SES2  was  also  discussed.  Unless  marked  ‘HLG’  (for  High 
Level Group), the meetings were organised by the Commission in connection with the 
development of the second SES package. 

1. Airspace users (end users) 

Mr Martin Robinson, IAOPA  20 Mar 2007 

Association 
Airlines board meeting 

of  European 

April 2007 

HLG 

HLG 

Airspace Users Associations  April 2007 

HLG 

19 Nov 2007 

29 Nov 2007 

12 Dec 2007 

8 Jan 2008 

15 Jan 2008 

14 Feb 2008 

28 Feb 2008 

22 Jan 2008 

Airlines 

with 
Bilateral  meeting 
the 
General  Aviation 
context  of  the  conference  on 
aviation regulation 

in 

2. Service providers 

Civil  Air  Navigation  Services 
Organisation EC3 meeting 

April 2007 

Airport  Council  International  April 2007 

HLG 

HLG 

EN 

58 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
board meeting  

Bilateral meetings with Canso  6 Dec 2007 

12 Feb 2008 

Bilateral meeting with NATS 

10 Jan 2008 

Bilateral meeting with ENAV 

30 Jan 2008 

3. Manufacturers 

Mr Olaf Dlugi, Chair 
SESAR consortium 
executive committee 

26 Jan 2007 

HLG 

Mr  Bertrand  de  l’Epinois, 
Air Traffic Alliance 

20 Mar 2007 

HLG 

4. National administrations & regulators 

Single Sky Committee 

Jan & Apr 2007 

European  Civil  Aviation 
Conference 

May 2007 

NSA Conference 

18 Oct 2007 

Single Sky Committee 

9 Jan 2008 

HLG 

HLG 

SES2 
consultation with NSAs 

presentation 

and 

19 Feb 2008 

5. Military 

EURAMID: 

General  Major  Antonio 
Pilotto 

23 Feb 2007 

HLG 

Colonel Ian Logan 

General  Major 
Vorderman 

Peter 

Lieutenant-Colonel 
Olivier Mrovicki 

30 Jan 2008 

Bilateral 
meeting with 
Mil 
representatives 

EN 

59 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Third countries & International organisations 

Mr Patrick Goudou, Executive Director EASA 
Mr Ron Elder, Chair, Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory 
Commission 
Mr Keith Williams, Eurocontrol Performance Review 
Commission 
Mr Bo Redeborn, Director DAS, Eurocontrol 

26 Jan 2007 

HLG 

Turkey,  delegation  headed  by  Mr  Ali  Ariduru
Ukraine,  delegation headed by Mr Anatoliy Kolisnik,
Norway, delegation headed by Mr Heine Richardsen 

25 May 2007 

HLG 

Eurocontrol Provisional Council  

EASA Management Board  

Eurocontrol PRU 

7. Staff 

Mr Marc Baumgartner, IFATCA 
Mr Danny Van Der Biest, IFATSEA 
Mr Joe Magee, ETF 
Mr François Burgues, ATCEUC 
Captain Heinz Frühwirth, ECA 

ETF 

IFATCA/IFALPA/ECA 

ATCEUC 

8. Others 

HLG 

HLG 

May 2007 

June 2007 

6 July 2007 

18 Sept 2007 

24 Oct 2007 

12 Nov 2007 

28 Nov 2007 

10 Dec 2007 

20 Dec 2007 

20 Mar 2007 

HLG 

21 Nov 2007 

13 Feb 2008 

29 Feb 2008 

High-Level Conference on Aviation Regulation 

22 Jan 2008 

Industry Consultation Body (including sub-groups) 

4 Dec 2007 

EN 

60 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Dec 2007 

11 Jan 2008 

21 Jan 2008 

26 Feb 20 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5 

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

1997-2008

2000-2003

2003-08

1 Slovenia
2 United Kingdom**
3 Germany
4 Slovak Republic
5 Belgium - Lux.
6 Italy
7 France
8 Austria
9 Netherlands

10 Denmark
11 Spain Continental
12 Czech Republic
13 Spain Canarias
14 Sweden
15 Malta
16 Portugal Lisboa
17 Greece
18 Hungary
19 Cyprus
20 Ireland
21 Portugal S. Maria
22 Finland

76,05

74,73

72,61

68,39

68,11

64,93

61,61

59,44

55,48

54,38

51,37

48,81

48,22

46,52

43,38

35,91

34,87

23,73

22,62

20,92

12,44

65,00

79,27

66,56

67,81

82,04

64,99

61,36

50,04

45,45

51,83

47,80

45,03

45,90

49,20

34,31

39,57

25,60

24,59

25,14

21,87

14,50

63,52

76,65

62,56

59,61

74,63

64,50

59,36

54,12

46,71

51,67

44,11

45,76

43,11

47,99

34,85

40,84

18,95

22,99

24,15

22,04

19,68

63,00

81,53

60,50

54,74

59,61

63,33

54,39

63,33

47,39

52,08

44,44

36,35

43,85

44,43

33,49

37,86

30,57

26,71

23,25

20,63

16,15

62,63

83,52

67,82

58,75

66,70

56,26

52,21

65,36

52,88

51,90

48,99

34,51

50,01

54,65

44,04

40,25

37,13

28,64

19,42

19,46

12,57

61,25

84,81

75,02

58,97

85,12

57,94

58,11

69,56

58,10

53,58

59,19

35,78

59,33

55,23

40,16

53,29

38,23

34,49

24,76

21,42

20,81

38,91

73,18

83,83

92,26

58,89

94,98

67,99

61,94

72,24

65,74

63,48

71,34

36,32

66,76

59,11

36,35

52,04

44,05

39,09

31,23

28,35

20,82

39,02

76,60

82,58

89,31

54,89

90,63

68,30

61,34

71,48

61,22

64,27

71,34

28,05

66,76

62,33

28,73

50,80

38,03

37,70

33,46

31,88

17,69

38,07

63,88

82,58

71,31

39,34

83,65

69,39

60,40

66,29

53,51

56,78

71,77

26,45

65,87

50,61

31,85

48,84

36,66

34,62

34,56

30,91

14,80

38,07

61,98

81,15

65,06

37,44

77,78

72,25

61,03

60,67

49,19

56,78

72,45

31,94

66,49

46,23

34,24

51,87

38,69

30,80

32,50

31,31

14,74

38,09

60,77

81,38

67,37

37,86

70,95

67,66

60,97

58,05

47,67

55,11

76,64

40,91

67,75

46,28

34,81

48,22

44,18

28,09

35,61

24,95

13,29

38,23

60,84

78,08

64,93

48,33

69,52

67,07

58,63

60,47

59,64

59,39

79,61

41,43

67,23

52,20

26,97

46,75

44,82

33,64

34,02

28,14

15,04

40,44

-20,00%

4,48%

-10,58%

-29,33%

2,06%

3,30%

-4,84%

1,74%

7,50%

9,22%

54,96%

-15,13%

39,41%

12,21%

-37,82%

30,19%

28,54%

41,74%

50,40%

34,51%

20,87%

13,91%

2,75%

34,42%

7,04%

37,24%

6,85%

12,19%

12,33%

27,91%

17,96%

37,71%

-0,07%

34,32%

24,84%

7,86%

27,25%

30,60%

31,66%

25,57%

27,22%

22,47%

49,74

47,99

46,56

45,60

47,99

52,00

57,23

55,70

51,46

50,58

50,31

51,69

3,92%

20,32%

-20,43%

-3,01%

-36,94%

-55,54%

-33,88%

-0,48%

-1,59%

-24,45%

-37,91%

-15,19%

6,91%

11,21%

1,47%

-27,73%

-4,42%

-7,92%

0,29%

-39,15%

12,30%

-13,63%

-56,68%

-2,07%

-13,76%

EN 

62 

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ANNEX 6 

Options for cooperation with Eurocontrol 

1. Specificities of the problem 

For the creation and further development of SES, the European Commission has been 
tasked  with  developing  implementing  rules,  Community  specifications  and  various 
support  actions  in  increasingly  technical  areas.  Traditionally,  the  Commission  has  not 
possessed the technical expertise to do this and even recent plans for the extension of 
EASA to aerodromes and ATM/ANS cover only the safety-related aspects. For SES1, 
therefore,  the  Commission  has  made  use  of  the  technical  competence  of  Eurocontrol 
and the European standardisation bodies for its legislative work.  

In the SES2 context, the role of centralised functions to manage the network and scarce 
resources  is  becoming  increasingly  important.  The  successful  implementation  of 
SESAR  also  requires  all  actors  to  be  mobilised  in  coordinated  support  of  ATM 
modernisation.  The  current  institutional  structures  have  not  been  designed  for  this 
purpose, so the current organisational set-up needs to be enhanced. This need was also 
foreseen  by  the  High  Level  Group  on  Aviation  Regulation,  which  recommended  that 
Eurocontrol should be empowered and focused  

‘to  play  a  key  role  in  delivering  the  Single  European  Sky  and  SESAR 
objectives  within  the  strategic  and  regulatory  framework  set  by  the  EU.  [It 
should]  focus  its  activities  on  excellent  pan-European  functions  and  ATM 
network  design,  and  support  for  regulation  as  requested  by  the  European 
Commission and Member States.’50 

As noted by the Group, however, this role cannot be performed by the organisation in 
its current shape. The Eurocontrol organisation has grown steadily over recent decades 
both  in  the  number  of  staff  and  variety  of  tasks.  While  it  has  undeniably  performed 
quality work in various areas, the  organisation has grown more in response to diverse 
initiatives  for  new  work  than  in  response  to  a  clear  and  systematic  customer-needs 
approach.  In  doing  so,  the  organisation  has  transformed  from  the  original  idea  of  a 
single  ANSP  for  upper  airspace  into  an  organisation  that  still  has  service  provision 
elements,  but  is  also  involved  in  pan-European  functions,  research,  development, 
regulation and training and at the same time lacks clear direction or focus. This spread 
of tasks has led to problems in three main areas: 

(1) 

Potential:  The  pan-European  functions  (PRC,  CFMU,  EAD,  etc.)  show  good 
potential  and  some  very  high  quality  work,  but  are  not  given  the  appropriate 
priority  in  the  current  organisation.  By  their  nature,  they  are  areas  that  benefit 
from centralisation (coordination and planning tasks requiring a network-centric 
view,  straightforward  collection  tasks  that  benefit  directly  from  economies  of 
scale,  and  data  distribution,  which  for  technical  reasons  needs  to  be  planned 
centrally  to  ensure  the  provision  of  consistent  and  high-quality  datasets)  and 

50 

Recommendation 6 of the High Level Group on Aviation Regulation (page iii of the report), July 
2007. 

EN 

63 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(2) 

(3) 

contribute  significantly  to  the  running  of  the  European-level  network.  Unless 
these  functions  can  be  run  efficiently,  it  is  not  meaningful  to  implement  the 
enhanced  network  functions  of  SES2,  as  they  would  suffer  from  the  same 
limitations as the current system. 

Problem  of  focus  in  the  current  organisation:  The  current  organisation  has 
spread  in  all  directions  in  search  of  a  raison  d’être,  which  leads  to  a  need  to 
prioritise  tasks  in  order  to  ensure  the  best  added  value  for  the  organisation’s 
members. While still a good platform for regulatory drafting and pan-European 
mandates, its work would benefit from clearer prioritisation. 

Budgetary  problems  and  delivery  rates:  airspace  users  in  particular  and  some 
Member States have voiced concerns over the non-optimal use of resources and 
the need to improve productivity:  

(a)  Many  units  and  programmes  overlap  with  one  other  (4  safety  units,  2 

frequency units etc.) 

(b) 

(c) 

Few  programmes  have  been  fully  implemented  (with  the  notable 
the  Reduced  Vertical  Separation  Minima  (RVSM) 
exception  of 
programme) 

Over 40% of the annual agency budget (over €700m) is taken up by the 
programmes51,  but  these  activities  are  increasingly  covered  by  SESAR. 
They thus need to be strictly aligned with the SESAR programme, which 
for  both  the  Commission  and  Eurocontrol  is  the  primary  driver  of 
technological development.  

2. Options 

In order to meet the SES2 objectives, three main options could be considered (NB this 
part of the assessment does not consider the costs and benefits of actually having such 
centralised  functions  as  network  design  and  management  or  allocation  of  scarce 
resources.  Those  parts  of  the  impact  assessment  dealing  with  performance  targets  and 
the  network  functions  present  the  anticipated  costs  and  environmental  gains. 
Eurocontrol is a tool for realising these tasks and hence its gains are related to those of 
network functions as a whole. As noted elsewhere, these aim to cut route lengths by an 
average  of  48  km  and  save  approximately  half  a  million  tonnes  of  CO2  emissions  per 
year).  

The current situation is not assessed as an option, as it appears that its possibilities have 
been  exhausted  over  the  course  of  SES1.  The  Community  has  attempted  to  use  tools 
such as Community coordination to drive Community policies, but as decision-making 
is  based  on  unanimity,  this  has  not  had  sufficient  effect.  Furthermore,  most  important 

51 

Based on the presentation of the ‘Functional Budget’ to the Standing Committee on Finance on 4 
October  2007.  Note  that  all  budgetary  and  staff  figures  are  only  approximations  due  to  the 
transparency  problems  with  the  organisation’s  budget,  as  often  pointed  out  by  both  states  and 
airspace users on the Eurocontrol Provisional Council. 

EN 

64 

   EN 

 
                                                 
policy  decisions  are  taken  at  level  lower  than  the  Eurocontrol  Provisional  Council,  so 
the problem is more one of governance than Community action. 

Option 1 — Transformation into a Community Agency 

The first option is to transform the current Eurocontrol organisation into a Community 
agency.  This  would  require  an  international  agreement  between  the  European 
Community  and  those  Eurocontrol  states  that  are  not  EU  states.  The  agency  would 
concentrate on rule preparation and support for policy-making for the Community and 
on  the  semi-operational  pan-European  functions,  such  as  flow  management,  network 
design,  route  charges  collection,  and  allocation  of  scarce  resources.  The  agency  could 
also  have  a  more  limited  and  focused  role  in  supporting  SESAR  in  validation, 
maintenance and updating activities. 

Option 2 — Maintaining Eurocontrol for third state needs, but creating a separate 
Community agency for SES2 

A  second  option  could  be  for  the  Community  to  take  the  initiative  independently  and 
create a Community agency for the above tasks. This would be done through the normal 
EU  decision-making  process  and  the  current  Eurocontrol  organisation  would  continue 
to  exist  for  the  needs  of  third  states.  The  new  agency  would  concentrate  on  rule 
preparation  and  support  for  policy  making  for  the  Community  and  on  the  semi-
operational  pan-European  functions,  such  as  flow  management,  network  design,  route 
charges  collection,  and  allocation  of  scarce  resources.  The  agency  could  also  have  a 
more  limited  and  focused  role  in  supporting  SESAR  in  validation,  maintenance  and 
updating activities. 

Option 3 — Refocusing of Eurocontrol on its core tasks 

A  third  option  would  be  to  maintain  Eurocontrol  as  an  international  organisation,  but 
refocus it on its core tasks. This could be done through a similar system of Community 
mandates  as  is  used  today  for  rule  preparation  and  would  allow  the  third  states  to 
continue  as  fully  fledged  members  of  the  organisation.  The  core  functions  of 
Eurocontrol  would  be  based  on  its  current  strengths  and  concentrate  on  the  semi-
operational  pan-European  functions,  such  as  flow  management,  network  design,  route 
charges collection, and allocation of scarce resources as well as on rule preparation and 
support  for  policy-making  for  EU  and  third  countries.  If  the  programme  activities 
(currently spread over three directorates) can be reformed to avoid overlaps and internal 
discontinuities and to improve strategic focus, the organisation could also have a central 
role in supporting SESAR in validation, maintenance and updating activities. Retaining 
the programme activities would also increase the synergies gained from having the data 
sources  for  the  pan-European  functions  in  the  same  organisation  as  the  programmes, 
which can make use of them and vice versa. 

3. Comparing the options  

Option 1 — Transformation into a Community agency 

Many legal and institutional difficulties exist, since there is no precedent for turning an 
intergovernmental organisation into a Community agency. 

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Economic impact 

Assuming  that  the  Community  agency  could  continue  to  be  funded  through  the  route 
charges system, its financial basis would be secure. However, it is uncertain as to what 
extent  this  can  be  done,  as  at  least  the  regulatory  support  tasks  should  probably  be 
funded preferably through the Community budget as is the case for EASA. Looking at 
the issue from the Community perspective, the new agency would be a departure from 
the traditional format of Community agencies, both in terms of size and tasks. It would 
be  far  larger  than  any  other  Community  agency  in  terms  of  staff,  and  would  be 
performing tasks that are more geared towards actual operational needs than those of the 
current agencies or the Commission. 

The agency would have a disproportionate share of expenditure among the Community 
agencies, and introducing new efficiencies would probably be somewhat difficult in an 
agency  transferred  together  with  its  personnel  and  internal  culture  from  a  different 
environment.  On  the  other  hand  the  de-facto  dismantling  of  the  current  organisation 
would cause  much  uncertainty and disruption of work, and it is  uncertain whether the 
final  goal  of  a  fully  functioning  agency  can  be  achieved.  Third  parties  could  be 
encouraged  by  the  transformation  process  to  influence  it  in  ways  diverging  from 
Community  objectives.  It  would  be  especially  harmful  if  there  were  any  disruption  to 
the pan-European network services, as these are central to the realisation of SES2.  

This option threatens to sidetrack the Community machinery, which is more regulatory 
than operational. It would create a large Community agency, without actually tackling 
the  underlying  problems  of  the  organisation  and  fragmentation  of  European  ATM.  It 
could thus be seen only as a first step towards reforming the organisation. 

Social impact 

The  social  impact  concerns  mainly  Eurocontrol’s  staff52,  who  would  become  regular 
Community  contract  agents.  As  many  of  them  have  permanent  international  civil 
servant  contracts  with  somewhat  better  benefits  and  grades  than  is  usual  in  the 
Community  (NB  Eurocontrol  uses  a  modified  Community  personnel  statute),  there 
would be both fears of reduced work-related benefits in the agency and concerns about 
different treatment compared with other Community institutions. Equally, the numerous 
contract agents in Eurocontrol would face changes in their employment conditions. 

Environmental impact 

No difference in environmental impact between the different options can be found.  

Conclusion 

This option is certainly possible and would be achievable with a relatively limited social 
impact. However, it would be only the first step towards the ideal solution and the new 
body would risk becoming a misfit within the internal system of Community agencies. 
In the long run, however, the option would bring the required benefits. 

52 

The Eurocontrol organisation currently has over 2900 staff, divided between permanent officials, 
temporary staff and an increasing number of contractors. 

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Option 2 — Maintaining Eurocontrol for third state needs, but creating a separate 
Community agency for SES 

Economic impact 

Since the first option is likely to be difficult to achieve, due to the need to include third 
countries  in  the  work  of  a  Community  agency  (and  to  get  their  unanimous  agreement 
for its transformation from an international organisation), a second option could be for 
the Community to take the initiative independently and create a Community agency for 
the tasks in question. Compared to the first option, this yields a clear economic benefit, 
but is naturally not without cost either. The creation of a new Community agency from 
scratch  would  have  an  impact  on  the  Community  budget  and  an  elaborate  economic 
arrangement  would  have  to  found  in  order  to  avoid  a  situation  where  all  the  cost  is 
borne by the EC budget (continuing to cover most of the cost through route charges is 
the  most  likely  alternative).  The  agency  would  still  have  a  large  share  of  staff  and 
expenditure  compared  with  the  other  Community  agencies  and  its  tasks  would  differ 
from traditional agency tasks, but at least the budgetary impact would be limited. 

While  setting  up  the  agency  would  be  relatively  straightforward,  it  would  however 
create  a  situation  where  the  Community  would  have  to  renounce  its  membership  of 
Eurocontrol and withdraw from the organisation. The current Eurocontrol agency would 
continue to exist for the remaining non-EU members but its usefulness would be greatly 
reduced, e.g. retaining network management or coordination tasks in what would then 
be a geographically splintered area would be nonsensical. It is therefore likely that after 
a while the third countries would elect to bring the remnants of the organisation within 
the Community system. 

Social impact 

The social impact of this option would be much greater than in the first option. It would 
make the majority of current Eurocontrol staff redundant and put the whole organisation 
in  a  precarious  situation.  This  would  be  guaranteed  to  cause  social  unrest  and  have  a 
most  negative  impact  on  the  lives  of  the  employees,  even  if  they  would  most  likely 
move to the new agency. The only positive social effect would be avoiding disparity in 
terms of employment between Commission staff (and possibly also saving money due 
to lower employment costs in Commission agencies). 

Environmental impact 

No difference in environmental impact between the different options can be found.  

Conclusion 

This  option  is  easier  to  achieve  for  the  Commission  than  the  first  option,  but  would 
create much more social problems in the residual Eurocontrol agency. In all likelihood, 
the  operational  and  social  problems  would  be  such  that  eventually  third  states  would 
agree to merge the two entities into one, thereby creating option one, but through a more 
circuitous  way.  Furthermore,  as  EASA  has  already  been  created  as  the  Community 
agency  for  aviation  safety,  the  creation  of  a  second  EC  agency  for  aviation  might 
generate  concerns  about  overlap  and  poorly  coordinated  regulatory  initiatives.  For  the 
Community, the second option would bring benefits faster than the first option, but with 

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an obvious cost to the wider European ATM system and with a need to reconsider the 
role of EASA. 

Option 3 — Refocusing and empowering Eurocontrol in its core tasks 

Economic impact 

Compared  to  the  previous  two  options  this  option  would  have  negligible  economic 
impact on the Community budget, as none of the operations would be covered by it. It 
would also avoid many transition costs as staff would continue to be employed by their 
current employer on current terms. For the wider ATM system, the option is either cost-
neutral or, if other parts of the organisation are also reformed (see below), could yield 
significant financial gains. The option also offers the advantage that it would not need a 
transition period to a new scheme and thereby would allow work to commence without 
delay on the various functions assigned to Eurocontrol in SES2. The fact that staff are 
already working on the same issues that need to be tackled for the SES2 network and 
performance review functions gives them a flying start and enables the SES2 benefits to 
be achieved much earlier. While it is true that in the long run the same benefits can also 
be attained by setting up a Community agency, using a focused Eurocontrol as a tool to 
this  end  would  save  several  years  of  work  and  avoid  the  uncertainties  inevitably 
associated with such a major undertaking as creating a new agency.  

Social impact 

Socially,  this  option  would  initially  have  a  positive  impact  since  the  Eurocontrol 
organisation  would  be  given  a  new  or  at  least  a  much  stronger  mission.  It  would 
reassure the staff of their future — a question that has essentially remained unanswered 
due to the constant reorientations in the past. In the longer run, the possible additional 
reform of  Eurocontrol  could cause problems, unless it is planned well in advance and 
carried out using ‘soft’ methods, such as not filling the posts of retired personnel. 

Environmental impact 

No difference in environmental impact between the different options can be found. 

Conclusion 

It appears that while all three options are possible and would over time bring the desired 
benefits,  it  is  the  third  option  that  would  achieve  them  with  the  least  cost  and  social 
unrest.  Politically,  it  is  the  most  feasible  option,  since  it  is  mostly  a  question  of 
tweaking an existing organisation to empower and focus it. Options 1 and 2 would also 
make  the  position  of  third  states  more  difficult,  hence  giving  rise  to  concerns  and 
possible resistance to change, while option 3 enables them to continue to participate as 
full members in the same organisation and reap similar benefits as EU Member States. 
Considering  that  option  3  would  also  be  able  to  utilise  the  existing  expertise  in 
Eurocontrol  to  the  full  without  having  to  go  through  lengthy  periods  of  hiring  and 
training  personnel,  it  should  be  retained  as  the  primary  strategy.  Early  contacts  with 
Eurocontrol  have  indicated  great  understanding  for  Community  objectives  and,  most 
importantly for the feasibility of option 3, a sincere commitment to reform.  

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4. Option chosen: Refocusing and empowering Eurocontrol in its core tasks 

After consideration of the various options it is evident that the Eurocontrol organisation 
should be realigned with SES implementation so as to build on its main strengths and 
avoid  overlap  with  areas  where  either  the  Member  States,  Air  Navigation  Service 
Providers  or  the  Community  (SES/SESAR/EASA)  are  primarily  active  (option  3). 
Although the choice between the different options does not have a long-term impact on 
the  objectives  for  flight  efficiency,  the  environment  or  performance,  it  is  the  limited 
side-effects  and  the  promise  of  speedy  implementation  that  tip  the  scales  in  favour  of 
this option.  

However, it has to be kept in mind that if option 3 becomes impossible to implement, 
option  2  is  also  feasible  as  a  back-up  since  its  budgetary  impact  is  limited  (due  to 
financing through route charges after the build-up period) and it would eventually bring 
the same benefits as the other options. 

The next chapter develops the proposal to reorient Eurocontrol towards those areas that 
are not core tasks for the Community but which nevertheless benefit from coordinated 
action on a European scale. It will not go into detail on how the Community structures 
(especially  EASA,  when  it  develops  to  its  full  potential)  cover  regulatory  functions, 
SESAR coordinates R&D actions, and pure service provision is returned to the ANSPs. 
These aspects are considered in more detail in their respective sections. 

The  new  format  chosen  for  the  organisation  should  also  enable  a  reinforced 
Performance Review Body to conduct fully independent reviews of the organisation and 
its mission. These reviews should then lead to recommendations for improvements and 
Community performance targets and aid the efficient oversight of the organisation.  

In conclusion, we believe that the best option is to empower and focus Eurocontrol to 
perform  certain  key  functions  on  behalf  of  the  Community  in  order  to  successfully 
achieve the Single European Sky. The revised Eurocontrol Convention (which has been 
pending for a decade) should be ratified only after the internal reform on governance, 
transparency and focus has taken place. 

5. Core functions of a refocused and empowered Eurocontrol 

The core functions of a transformed Eurocontrol organisation should be built around the 
successful pan-European functions. No stakeholder seems to dispute that these functions 
should  be  run  from  a  centralised  location  and  that  the  Eurocontrol  agency  has  done  a 
good job in the actual operational running of these systems.  

The  main  current  pan-European  services  are  the  Central  Flow  Management  Unit 
(CFMU),  the  Central  Route  Charges  Office  (CRCO),  the  European  Aeronautical 
Database53, the Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA), and the Height Monitoring 
Service in support of RVSM applications. 

53 

EAD,  which  will  probably  form  the  seed  for  the  Community  Single  Aeronautical  Information 
Service. 

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These services are all located in Eurocontrol, because by their nature they would be less 
efficient to run if performed in a distributed manner at national or regional level. Many 
of these services also provide an impartial network link between the actual ANSPs. It is 
therefore  unlikely  that  any  efficiencies  would  be  gained  by  having  these  activities 
performed  directly  by  states  or  their  service  providers.  With  increased  responsibilities 
following the revision of the Single Sky legislation, the independence of these functions 
from  the  individual  interests  of  various  stakeholder  groups  would  also  need  to  be 
guaranteed even more than today in order to ensure a true network approach. 

In the increasingly technologically interdependent European ATM system, the number 
of  functions  that  need  to  be  performed  on  a  pan-European  level  is  likely  to  increase. 
Good  examples  of  such  new  functions  are  the  network  design  function  and  the 
coordinated  procurement  function  planned  in  SESAR.  Further  likely  candidates  for 
tasks  to  ensure  the  efficient  use  of  scarce  resources  are  the  coordination  of  frequency 
allocation  and  the  coordination  of  transponder  codes.  As  with  the  CFMU  or  CRCO, 
these tasks are most efficiently done from a single location and need to be kept separate 
from  actual  ANSPs  to  ensure  impartiality.  It  should  also  be  considered  whether  the 
performance  review  function  should  be  located  with  the  pan-European  services,  or 
whether  it  should  report  directly  to  the  Commission.  The  SES2  legislation  needs  to 
enable such tasks to be performed as they arise, if need be through implementing rules. 

The  ‘New  Eurocontrol’  organisation  would  continue  to  operate  as  an  international 
organisation, thus easily allowing non-EU states to participate. The current problems of 
non-enforceability and voluntarity are much less problematic in an organisation that is 
focused on operational tasks, and the remaining problems in this regard can be solved 
for the EU Member States by using the regulatory powers of the Commission. While the 
organisation  would  not  be  part  of  the  Community  structure,  it  would  however  be 
entrusted with the performance of functions for the EU through Commission mandates, 
given  after  consultation  of  the  Single  Sky  Committee  and  the  Industry  Consultation 
Body. 

Some well-focused development capability has to be retained in this new organisation, 
but this capability should target the areas that it serves. SESAR JU should clearly be the 
main client for this part of the organisation and a close — perhaps even institutionalised 
—  coordination  mechanism  has  to  be  created  between  the  two  entities  to  ensure  that 
there  is  no  deviation  from  the  SESAR  Joint  Undertaking  objectives  as  set  out  in  the 
Council  Regulation.  The  organisation  would  similarly  participate  as  an  ATM  network 
expert  in  rule-making  within  groups  of  experts  managed  by  EASA,  or  lead  the  work 
under mandates from the Commission or third states. 

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ANNEX 7 

Network Design and Management Process 

1. Process 

Key  to  success  of  this  function  is  that  the  process  by  which  it  reaches  decisions  is 
transparent and considered fair. 

•  The decisions must be based on open consultation of all airspace users, the military 

and ANSPs  

•  The  decisions  must  be  based  on  the  combination  of  routes  that  best  achieves  the 
stated  objectives  (the  order  of  importance  for  these  also  needs  to  be  transparently 
stated) 

•  Flight efficiency 

•  Environmental friendliness 

•  Acknowledgement of the fact that routes with more demand get priority 

•  In  conflict  cases,  the  good  of  the  whole  network  has  to  be  taken  into 
account.  Where  other  modes  of 
transport  are  available  (especially 
environmentally friendly forms such as rail), the routes in question have to 
give way to those that have no such alternatives 

•  Other needs that arise over time 

•  The  final  form  of  the  network  is  decided  by  the  network  design  function  and 
approved  in  the  Network  Sub-Group  of  the  Single  Sky  Committee,  using  qualified 
majority voting. 

•  It constitutes an input from the Network Manager 

The flow of the network design and management process could be based on a two-level 
input,  with  states  ensuring  input  at  national/FAB  level  and  the  network  function  at 
European/global level. A possible process could be as follows: 

(1) 

The Member States arrange consultation with all three groups of airspace users 
(Mil,  GA,  airlines)  and  the  ANSPs  at  national  level  to  discuss  the  needs  for 
improving the route network. The Member States will then consolidate this input 
and present the national proposals at European level, also indicating the differing 
opinions  of  airlines,  the  military,  GA  or  ANSPs  and  why  they  have  not  been 
taken on board. If a Member State is involved in an FAB, this part of the process 
is performed through cooperation between the FAB-NSAs at FAB level. 

(2) 

Once  the  network  design  function  has  received  the  Member  States’  input,  it 
performs its own planning process, feeding into it both the Member States’ input 
and  its  own  expert  view  of  what  is  needed to optimise the overall network. At 

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this  stage,  it  is  obvious  that  compromises  have  to  be  made  between  national 
interests and the efficiency of the network as a whole. 

The network design function publishes an ‘initial network plan’ for consultation 
with  the  representatives  of  all  three  groups  of  airspace  users  and  ANSPs  at 
European/global level.  

Once the network plan is finalised, it is submitted to the Network Sub-Group of 
the Single European Sky Committee for final approval using qualified majority 
voting. 

The  approved  ‘Community  Network  Plan’  is  published  through  the  Single 
European AIS service. It is also communicated to the appropriate ICAO bodies, 
and  constitutes  the  infrastructure  requirements  (navigation,  communication, 
information, etc.) for the Network Manager 

The appeal process provides for appeal first to the Commission, which bases its 
assessment  on  the  independent  advice  of  the  Performance  Review  Body  and  a 
hearing of all relevant parties. However, this appeal process should not delay the 
implementation of the plan.  

In  its  annual  reports,  the  Performance  Review  Body  will  also  assess  the 
functioning of the network design process and the network design function and 
propose improvements. 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

2. Enforcement 

The  decisions  reached  have  deadlines  for  implementation  and  are  legally  binding  on 
states (important since ANSP structures change). If states do not implement the routes 
an infringement  procedure can be started if ‘name & shame’ through the performance 
review is not enough. 

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ANNEX 8 

Technical Updates of SES I 

1. Adapting to technical progress since SES I 

The Airspace Regulation provides for the creation of a Single Aeronautical Information 
Publication  (SAIP)  for  upper  airspace.  Meanwhile,  development  work  has  started  on 
updating traditional paper-based AIS (of which AIP is the main publication) to modern 
electronic  Aeronautical  Information  Management  (AIM),  with  its  improved  products 
and tools. We also need to ensure that the new SAIP, which is a ‘safety-of-life’ service, 
is at the forefront of this development and provides a comprehensive integrated briefing 
facility (‘Common Integrated Briefing Portal’?). In addition to the need to support the 
global  modernisation  work  performed  by  ICAO,  Eurocontrol  and  many  states,  one  of 
the major motivations for the update of SAIP to provide a safety-of-life public service is 
that the 2007-2008 Eurocontrol study on airspace infringements has identified the lack 
of readily available comprehensive and high-quality briefing facilities as a major cause 
of  airspace  infringements  and  related  safety  hazards.  The  Community  should  take  the 
lead here and provide for a ‘standard’ solution that may be augmented by value-added 
service providers. 

Rules  on  the  Flexible  Use  of  Airspace  (FUA)  by  military  and  civilian  airspace  users 
have been put in place in SES I, but need to be strengthened to reap the full benefits in 
terms of capacity and efficiency. 

The Community instruments for extending our regulatory philosophy beyond direct EU 
membership  have  developed  greatly  during  the  years  SES  I  has  been  in  place.  We 
should take this into consideration in the articles providing for work with third states. 

Since the goals of SES II are broader than those of SES I, we also need to change the 
focus of the regulations from just capacity to efficiency, environmental friendliness and 
smooth functioning of the system in accordance with airspace user needs. 

The text on the harmonisation of airspace classifications needs to be updated so that it 
no longer refers to the now defunct Eurocontrol airspace strategy, but concerns a normal 
stand-alone Commission activity. 

The  current  work  on  creating  harmonised  European  Rules  of  the  Air  should  be 
explicitly highlighted in the regulations. 

We need to improve the flexibility of the basic regulations to allow us to propose and 
adopt  rules  as  we  go  along,  thereby  better  responding  to  the  needs  of  a  changing 
technical environment. 

2. Facilitating EASA extension to ATM 

The competences of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) are being extended 
to  cover  ATM/ANS  as  well.  The  current  SES  I  only  provides  for  the  development  of 
rules  with  the  support  of  Eurocontrol  or  the  European  standardisation  bodies,  so 
provision has to be made for rule development with the aid of any appropriate body.  

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We  should  also  consider  harmonising  SES  and  EASA  terminology,  since  we  have 
several  concepts  that  are  very  similar  or  even  identical  in  substance,  but  use  different 
terms due to the history of their development (for example, AMC vs EC Specifications 
or NSA vs NAA, etc). 

The  implementation  of  Eurocontrol  Safety  Requirements  (ESARRs)  has  also  been 
achieved, so we should update the article accordingly so as not to have a situation where 
we  are  bound  to  implement  all  ESARRs  that  Eurocontrol  may  develop  in  future  — 
especially since EASA will be the body responsible for safety regulation.  

3. Extending the remaining SES I concepts to lower airspace 

SES I has four concepts (FABs, SAIP, EUIR and route & sector design) limited just to 
upper  airspace,  unless  Member  States  specifically  see  the  need  to  extend  them  to  all 
airspace.  It  has  since  become  evident  to  the  Commission  and  stakeholders  that  the 
altitude  limitation  is  irrelevant  in  normal  life.  Airspaces  are  not  normally  divided  at 
28500  feet  and,  for  example,  all  FAB  projects  currently  cover  all  the  airspace. 
Maintaining  the  division  between  upper  and  lower  airspace  would  only  contribute  to 
unnecessary fragmentation and thus run counter to the objectives of SES. This view was 
also confirmed by a major Member State at the conference of 22 January 2007. 

We  should  therefore  modify  Articles  3,  5  and  6  of  the  Airspace  Regulation  to  cover 
lower airspace and delete Article 2 on the division level as redundant. The text on route 
and  sector  design  should  also  be  modified  to  take  into  account  the  network  design 
function  described  above  and  provide  for  airspace  design,  general  rules  and/or 
guidelines  stating  that  airspace  design  is  performed  at  local  level  taking  into  account 
traffic  demands  and  complexity  and  including  a  proper  consultation  of  all  airspace 
users. 

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