Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic management and air navigation services and repealing Council Directive 06/23/EEC - Impact assessment {COM(2008) 390 final} {SEC(2008) 2087}
Date: 2008-06-25
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: air safety, air traffic, air traffic control, air transport, airport, approval, impact study, professional qualifications

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 25.6.2008 
SEC(2008) 2086 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

accompanying the 

Proposal for a 

amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic 
management and air navigation services and repealing Council Directive 06/23/EEC 

Impact Assessment 

{COM(2008) 390 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2087} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Executive summary 

1 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties 

1.1  Organisation and timing 
1.2  Consultation and expertise 

2 

Problem definition 

2.1  Background and Scope of the Impact Assessment 
2.2  Three safety challenges calling for action 

2.2.1  Growth of air traffic requires new harmonised approaches  

to retain safety level 

2.2.1.1  Accidents and Occurrences 
2.2.1.2  Aerodromes and ATM/ANS: Top threat areas 

2.2.2  The current regulatory framework 

2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.2 
2.2.2.3 

The Global Player: ICAO 
Intergovernmental Bodies in Europe 
Regulatory actions by the European Community 

2.2.3  Lack of harmonized and enforceable rules 

2.3  Conclusion and justification of intervention 

3 

Objectives 

3.1  General Objectives 
3.2 
Specific Objectives 
3.3  Operational Objectives 

4 

Policy options 

4.1  General 
4.2  Affected areas of competence 
4.2.1  Aerodromes 
4.2.2  ATM/ANS 
4.3  Option A: "Do nothing" 
4.4  Option B: Extend EASA competences 
4.5  Option C: Extend EUROCONTROL mandates issued by the COM 
4.6  Option D: Establish a new Agency 
4.7  Option E: Extend EASA competences and include some other functions 

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Analysis of impact of alternative options 

5.1  Option A: "Do nothing" 

5.2.1  Safety impact 
5.2.2  Economic impact 
5.2.3  Environmental impact 
5.2.4  Social impact 
5.2.5  Other impacts 
5.2  Option B: EASA extension 
5.2.1  Safety impact 
5.2.2  Economic impact 
5.2.3  Environmental impact 
5.2.4  Social impact 
5.2.5  Other impacts 

5.3  Option C: Extend EUROCONTROL mandates issued by the COM 

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5.3.1  Safety impact 
5.3.2  Economic impact 
5.3.3  Environmental impact 
5.3.4  Social impact 
5.3.5  Other impacts 

5.4  Option D: Establish a new Agency 

5.4.1  Safety impact 
5.4.2  Economic impact 
5.4.3  Environmental impact 
5.4.4  Social impact 
5.4.5  Other impacts 

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Comparing the options 

Monitoring and evaluation 

Annex 1: 

Figures 

Annex 2: 

List of Abbreviations 

Annex 3: 

References 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This report assesses the impact of the intended extension of the competence of the European 
Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA)  to  the  regulation  of  aerodromes,  Air  Traffic  Management 
(ATM) and Air Navigation Services (ANS). 

Based  on  extensive  and  public  consultation  of  stakeholders  as  well  as  per  advice  by  expert 
partners,  safety  of  the  rapidly  growing  European  aviation  is  found  to  be  increasingly 
challenged  by  a  still  fragmented  regulatory  framework  as  well  as  by  a  persisting  lack  of 
harmonized and binding safety rules covering all areas of aviation. The intention to overcome 
this  situation  by  implementation  of  a  structured  and  sole  competence  for  regulation  of  key 
aviation safety areas such as aerodromes and ATM/ANS is based on a very broad and clearly 
indicated consensus. 

Building on the results of the Preliminary Impact Assessment launched by the Commission in 
2005,  elaborated  by  an  independent  consultant,  and  on  the  Regulatory  Impact  Assessment 
(RIA)  by  EASA,  the  present  report  assesses  several  options  to  meet  the  above  mentioned 
intention. As the concerned stakeholders are already subject to Community legislation in the 
field  of  ATM/ANS,  as  are  other  parts  of  the  aviation  chain,  i.e.  airworthiness,  flight  crew 
licensing and air operations, the centre of gravity of this assessment is put on the aerodrome 
share of the project which will represent a new area of Community competence. 

Five available policy options are identified to either:  

•  "Do nothing"; 

•  Extend the EASA competences; 

•  Extend the scope of the existing arrangement to issue mandates to Eurocontrol; 

•  Establish a new Agency; or  

•  Extend the EASA competences to include some other functions.  

All those options are balanced against the "do nothing" option as a benchmark by analysing 
their impact in the fields of safety, economy, environment, social and others. These impacts 
pertain to the envisaged shift of regulatory competence in question, whereas potential impacts 
triggered by the implementation of future rules following the actual measure will be subject to 
assessment at the corresponding later stage. 

A comparison of those impacts leads to the very clear indication that the preferred option is to 
extend  the  EASA  competences  to  include  regulatory  responsibility  for  aerodromes  and 
ATM/ANS  matters.  For  this  option,  no  adverse  effect  could  be  identified  in  the  fields 
mentioned above. 

This  conclusion  is  in  line  with  the  "total  system  approach"  to  be  taken  to  encounter 
future  aviation  safety  challenges,  to  support  internal  market  principles  and  to  reduce 
burden  of  regulated  organisations.  By  integrating  the  safety  element  into  the  Single 
European  Sky  initiative,  it  ensures  that  the  de-fragmentation  of  the  sky  will  be 
implemented without impacting negatively on the level of accident rates. For this reason, 

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the  safety  module  will  form  the  complementary,  inseparable  part  of  the  "aviation 
legislation package" 2008, as rightly requested by all stakeholders. 

Furthermore,  a  complete  set  of  monitoring  and  evaluation  tools  is  made  available  to  ensure 
proper  implementation,  execution  and  continued  quality  of  the  application  of  the 
consequences of the intended measure. 

1 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1  Organisation and timing  

This Impact Assessment has been prepared by DG TREN, based on an Inter-Service Steering 
Group  (IS-SG)  which  met  nine  times  and  included,  besides  the  Secretariat  General  and  the 
Legal  Service,  contributions  of  the  following  Directorates  General:  ENTR,  ENV,  MARKT 
and BUDG. Furthermore, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) participated in the 
process. 

The  following  major  milestones  and  achievements  formed  the  basis  for  the  development  of 
the final findings of this Impact Assessment: 

•  A  Preliminary  Impact  Assessment  launched  by  the  Commission  and  performed  by  the 
independent  consultant  ECORYS  in  20051.  This  assessment  included  an  extensive 
stakeholder consultation. 

•  The  Commission  Communication  "Extending  the  tasks  of  the  European  Aviation  Safety 

Agency: An agenda for 2010"2. 

•  A Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) performed by EASA3 which established the basis 
for the EASA Opinion to extend its scope to the regulation of safety and interoperability of 
aerodromes4.  Following  the  formalised  EASA  rulemaking  procedure,  this  work  also  was 
based  on  an  extensive  consultation,  resulting  in  very  broad  feedback  of  the  affected 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it reveals many elements and details pertaining to the execution 
of the regulatory function, hence it even addresses matters beyond the scope of the actual 
extension of competence of the Agency. 

•  A  "High  Level  Group",  appointed  by  Vice  President  Barrot  for  the  Future  European 
Aviation Regulatory Framework in November 2006 as a response to a strong demand from 
industry,  EU  member  states  and  other  stakeholders  to  simplify  and  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  the  regulatory  framework  for  aviation  in  Europe.  Vice  President  Barrot 
requested  the  High  Level  Group  to  present  a  vision  for  the  development  of  the  aviation 
regulatory framework - with a particular focus on Air Traffic Management - and to provide 
a roadmap to achieve this vision with practical next steps. 

•  Other expert insights as indicated in this document. 

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ref. [2] 
ref. [1] 
ref. [7] 
ref. [5] 

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The advice and momentum created by the above achievements fully supported the decision to 
include the project in the Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008, item 8b. This 
item  of  extension  of  the  Agency  system  to  the  regulation  of  aerodromes,  ATM  and  ANS 
forms one pillar of the "aviation package", which also comprises the amendment of the Single 
European  Sky  regulations  (item  8a)  and  the  SESAR  Master  Plan  (item  8c).5  Legislative 
proposals containing this package will be submitted by the Commission in June 2008. 

1.2 

Consultation and expertise  

As indicated above, a very high amount of consultation effort was put into the development of 
those cardinal documents. 

While the preliminary ECORYS assessment was  based  on  the  mechanism  of  questionnaires 
distributed  to  and  answered  by  key  stakeholders  as  well  as  related  interviews,  the 
aforementioned EASA opinion and attached RIA followed the formal rulemaking procedure 
of  the  Agency.  Therefore,  the  project  was  fully  available  and  transparent  to  the  public  and 
produced  some  3000  contributions,  mainly  from  stakeholders  across  the  board  of  aviation. 
The reaction of stakeholders reflected the fact that the intention to extend the safety regulatory 
competence to aerodromes will create a new area of Community competence in this field. All 
the  comments  were  taken  into  account  to  form  the  Agency  Opinion,  again  based  on  the 
publication of a Comment Response Document (CRD) and stakeholders' observations hereto.6 

In addition  to  the  above, EASA performed another consultation focusing on the ATM/ANS 
part of the extension project. A related Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) was published 
in November 20077 and lead to a further CRD issued by the Agency on 18 March 2008. This 
CRD formed a basis for the Agency's opinion published on 15 April 2008. 

However, in contrast to the aerodrome part, for the regulation of ATM/ANS matters European 
competence has already been established, first on a case-by-case basis through specific legal 
Community  instruments  and  then  comprehensively  through  the  Single  European  Sky 
regulations, adopted in 2004.8 

Therefore,  the  direct  overall  impact  of  safety  related  regulatory  activities  in  the  ATM/ANS 
field to be performed by EASA will mainly affect such regulated persons, whose activities are 
already  regulated  through  Community  rules,  and  issues  of  regulatory  governance  in  the 
Community system.  

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Commission  Legislative  and  Work  Programme  2008,  Annex  1,  item  8:  Communication  "Developing 
the single European Sky" including the SESAR Master Plan and accompanied by legislative proposals 
modifying  the  Single  European  Sky  regulations  and  extending  EASA  tasks  to  airports  and  air  traffic 
management 
ref. [7], page 19ff; also: EASA CRD 06-2006, ref. www.easa.eu.int/home/r_crd.html 
ref. [8] 
ref. Regulation (EC) 549/2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European Sky, 
Regulation  (EC)  550/2004  on  the  provision  of  air  navigation  services  in  the  single  European  Sky, 
Regulation  (EC)  551/2004  on  the  organisation  and  use  of  airspace  in  the  single  European  Sky, 
Regulation  (EC)  on  the  interoperability  of  the  European  Air  Traffic  Management  network  and 
Regulation 2096/2005 laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation services. 
In particular, EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory requirements (ESARRS) 3, 4 and 5 were adopted by 
Regulation  2096/2005,  while  the  remaining  ESARR  2  is  covered  by  Council  Directives  56/1994  and 
42/2003 and the adoption of ESARR 1 and 6 will be subject to future legislation. 

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In  addition,  a  manifold  informal  consultation  has  been  carried  out  by  the  Commission 
Services and EASA to include advice from the stakeholders of the broad aviation community, 
as  for  example  from  aerodromes,  ATM/ANS  service  providers,  air  carriers,  labour  unions, 
military aviation organisations and manufacturing industry. 

A draft of this present report was issued to the Commission Impact Assessment Board on 19 
March 2008, a related hearing took place on 16 April 2008. The positive opinion of the Board 
was given on 23 April 2008. The Board's recommendations to improve the draft report were 
implemented in the present final report. 

Overall, by the elements listed above, the level of coordination and expertise involved in this 
Impact Assessment and the included analysis of the most proper way ahead were performed 
in  accordance  with  all  applicable  standards  and  form  a  very  sound  and  clear  picture  of  the 
optimal  way  to  proceed.  The  broad  consensus  appearing  from  the  consultation  lead  to  the 
strong political commitment to establish European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) as strong 
and  sole  body  for  European  aviation  safety  regulation  aspects  and  to  have  related  measures 
integrated into the Single European Sky development. 

2 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1 

Background and Scope of the Impact Assessment 

The EASA system9 was established by the Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation 
and establishing EASA, having regard to Art. 80(2) of the Treaty.10 EASA is a Community 
Agency and so its foundation is based on the legal framework of the European Communities. 
This  framework  establishes  that  the  Community  acts  as  a  legislator,  while  Member  States 
apply  Community  law  under  Community  control.  Community  legislator  consists  of  the 
Council  of  the  EU  Member  States  and  of  the  European  Parliament  acting  in  cooperation 
through  the  legislative  co-decision  procedure.  Community  law  is  directly  applicable  in 
Member  States  and  hence  supersedes  respective  national  laws.  Where  Community 
competence has been established, Member States may no longer act individually, but may be 
given  powers  to  deviate  or  grant  exemptions,  subject  to  Commission  authorisation.  The 
Community  framework  allows  conferring  legislative  powers  to  the  Commission  (hard  law) 
and  to  an  Agency  (soft  law)  or  industry,  subject  to  clearly  specifying  the  nature  of  the 
delegated powers so as to allow political and judicial control of their exercise. 

The  main  objective  of  EASA  is  to  establish  and  maintain  a  high  uniform  level  of  aviation 
safety in Europe. In addition to this the Basic Regulation lays down additional objectives to 
facilitate  the  free  movement  of  goods,  persons  and  services,  to  ensure  a  high  level  of 
environmental  protection,  to  promote  cost-efficiency  in  the  regulatory  and  certification 
processes,  to  assist  Member  States  in  fulfilling  their  ICAO  obligations,  to  promote 
Community views with third countries and international organisations and to provide a level 
playing field for all actors in the internal aviation market.  

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I.e. centralization of the rulemaking and standardisation processes in the Agency, as well as exploitation 
of the competent authorities designated by Member States for the vast majority of the tasks concerning 
certification and oversight 
Treaty, Art. 80(2): "The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide whether, to what extent and 
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport." 

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The mandate to EASA is to prepare the safety regulatory implementing rules to be adopted by 
the Commission and to issue explanatory material to facilitate their understanding and support 
their  uniform  implementation.  This  is  the  basis  for  the  rulemaking  activity  of  the  Agency. 
Therefore, it is to develop its know-how in all fields of aviation safety following the principle 
of a "total system approach" in order to assist the Community legislator in the development 
and application of common and binding rules for the aviation system. The Basic Regulation 
also  requires  the  Agency  to  assist  the  Commission  in  monitoring  that  the  Member  States 
implement  safety  rules  effectively  and  uniformly.  It  is  thus  empowered  to  conduct 
standardisation  inspection  of  national  competent  authorities  and  to  report  cases  of  incorrect 
implementation to the Commission, which can then trigger infringement procedures under the 
Treaty or direct sanctions as appropriate. Moreover, the Basic Regulation creates a necessary 
framework in those areas, where a centralised action would be the most appropriate means to 
provide  for  uniformity,  when  it  comes  to  the  approval  of  certain  products  (e.g.  type 
certificates for aircraft) or organisations (e.g. Design Organisations).  

Initially,  the  aforementioned  Regulation  established  the  basis  of  Community  action  in 
applicable  domains  to  ensure  the  airworthiness  and  environmental  compatibility  of  aircraft, 
including personnel and organisations involved in their design, production and maintenance.  

Further work was then undertaken to address all other fields of aviation safety as the aviation 
system  behaves  as  a  network  with  all  parts  interacting  with  each  other,  as  fragmentation  at 
any  level  would  be  a  significant  impediment  to  the  efficient  functioning  of  the  overall 
network. The scope of the EASA system was therefore to be extended progressively to cover 
these  other  aspects  of  safety,  building  on  a  total  system  approach.11  A  first  step  of 
enlargement of the Agency's competences by the European legislators to cover air operations, 
licensing of flight crew and safety of third country aircraft operating in Europe entered into 
force  by  Regulation  (EC)  No.  216/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  09 
April 2008. 

Corresponding  to  the  univocal  political  commitment  to  remove  the  existing  fragmentation 
from  European  aviation  safety  regulation,  the  endeavour  now  is  to  further  extend  and 
complete  the  competences  of  EASA  in  the  field  of  safety  and  interoperability  regulation  of 
aerodromes and ATM/ANS. The legislative proposal by the Commission should be issued in 
June 2008, in view of its formal adoption in 2010. On the basis of the Essential Requirements 
which  form  an  integral  part  of  the  proposal  the  Agency  will  be  mandated  to  issue 
Implementing Rules to be adopted by the Commission through comitology procedure in the 
following years. 

Given this background of the EASA system, the present Report aims at: 

•  analysing the challenges faced by Europe to maintain or further improve the safety level of 

aviation activities; 

11 

Ref.  Regulation  (EC)  No.  1592/2002,  recital  2:  "As  a  consequence,  aeronautical  products  should  be 
subject  to  certification  to  verify  that  they  meet  essential  airworthiness  and  environmental  protection 
requirements relating to civil aviation. Appropriate essential requirements should be developed within 
one  year  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Regulation  to  cover  operations  of  aircraft  and  flight  crew 
licensing and application of the Regulation to third-country aircraft and, thereafter, other areas in the 
field of civil aviation safety. 

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•  identifying  the  regulatory  competences  necessary  to  mitigate  the  risks  of  accidents  and 

exploring various policy options to do so; 

•  carrying out an impact assessment of the various options; 

•  selecting  the  most  suitable  option  for  the  enhancement  of  the  safety  of  aerodromes  and 

ATM/ANS. 

By  doing  so,  the  report  shall  deal  with  impacts  emerging  from  the  question  of  "if  and  by 
whom  to  regulate",  while  actual  rules  following  a  shift  of  regulatory  competence  and  their 
related possible impact are not visible yet but will need to be assessed at the corresponding 
implementation level later. 

Therefore, the aim of this report is not to provide an impact analysis of individual future rules, 
esp. regards the economic side – as this is not feasible – but to focus on the rather qualitative 
impact created by the competence shift providing a mere platform for the later rules. 

2.2 

Three safety challenges calling for action 

2.2.1  Growth of air traffic requires new harmonised approaches to retain safety level 

The current European air transport system is a very safe system; European aviation safety is 
on the leading edge. However, the prominent European safety factor is not meant to comfort 
but  must  be  kept.  It  faces  the  tremendous  challenge  of  the  air  transport  volume  in  Europe 
growing  at  the  commonly  predicted  rate  of  2-5%  per  year12.  If  nothing  was  done  to  further 
improve  safety,  i.e.  if  the  accident  rate  would  remain  at  the  current  level,  the  consequence 
would be a significant and continuous rise in European aviation accidents: 

2.2.1.1 Accidents and occurrences  

Aviation  accident  statistics  is  an  exercise  of  low  numbers,  comparatively;  however,  each  of 
those mishaps involves the potential of huge and catastrophic consequences. In order to allow 
for a maximum of lessons learned from those tragic events, intense efforts are put in place to 
ensure  mandatory  and  in-depth  accident  investigations.13  This  endeavour  is  flanked  by  the 
effort  to  collect  all  possible  data  by  mandatory  reporting  of  occurrences14,  which  are 
understood  to  show  the  potential  for  an  accident  which  did  not  occur  due  to  fortunate 
circumstances.  

Based on the prevailing and still unsatisfactory level of reporting culture15, it has to be pointed 
out that a total of about 400 accidents in European commercial European aviation over the last 

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Scientific  forecasts  indeed  differ  on  the  actual  numbers  of  the  continued  growth.  The  figure  given, 
though, is conservative also in the light of the average growth experienced in Europe in the years 2003 
to 2008, which arrived at 5,4% annually. 
Ref. Directive (EC) 56/1994 establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil 
aviation accidents and incidents 
Definition as of Directive (EC) 42/2003: ‘occurrence’ means an operational interruption, defect, fault or 
other irregular circumstance that has or may have influenced flight safety and that has not resulted in an 
accident  or  serious  incident,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘accident  or  serious  incident’,  as  defined  in 
Article 3(a) and (k) of Directive 94/56/EC; 
Ref.  EUROCONTROL,  Performance  Review  Report  2006:  10  States  show  insufficient  legislation  / 
culture with regard to occurrence reporting, only 11 rated "good" (ECTL PRC 2006) 

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decade16  is  only  the  top  of  the  iceberg  of  some  1000  occurrences  per  year  involving 
aerodrome and ATM/ANS contributions, of which 25% show "high severity" criteria.17 

It  is  this  potential  for  mishap  which,  in  combination  with  the  disastrous  effects  of  only  a 
single  major  aviation  accident  –  regards  not  only  loss  of  lives  but  also  to  social  and 
economical  effects  –  calls  for  upgrade  of  safety  systems  throughout  the  globe,  to  include 
Europe. As even single, discrete mishaps have shown to be potentially fatal to whole airline or 
aerodrome operations, all involved players should put in place tremendous efforts to defend 
the high value asset of the existing safety level.  

In doing so, the importance of harmonisation, as opposed to the current fragmentation is well 
understood:  As  safety  matters  rarely  affect  one  segment  only,  the  integration  of  all  aspects 
into a single approach promotes safety in the best way. This solution also reduces the number 
of interfaces to other bodies, centralises knowledge management and provides for the shortest 
possible coordination. Overall, this solution ensures the best efficiency and effectivity of the 
process. 

2.2.1.2 Aerodromes and ATM/ANS: Top threat areas 

Recent findings from risk analyses as well as incident and accident data clearly indicate the 
shortcoming in certain regulatory aspects playing an important role18, in particular with regard 
to  the  fact  that  about  60-70%  of  air  accidents  occur  in  the  very  initial  or  final  phases  of 
flight.19  

The  evaluation  of  data  performed  by  the  International  Air  Transport  Association  (IATA)20 
confirms  for  2006  the  most  prominent  phases  of  flight  leading  to  a  total  of  77  accidents 
involving  substantial  damage  or  hull  loss  of  western-built  jet  aircraft  being  the  take  off  (9), 
the approach (5) and the landing phase (41), of which 8 occurrences were fatal. The total costs 
incurred by the accidents over the last decade are detailed in Annex 1, figure 2.2.1, indicating 
an annual average above 1200 Mio. US$ (about 920 Mio. €, based on  an exchange rate of 1.3) 

In  particular,  for  the  above  mentioned  accidents  in  2006  the  airport  facilities  and  the  ATC 
score  high  among  the  identified  "Top  Threats"  by  figures  of  24%  and  21%,  respectively.21 
Annex 1, figures 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 reveal airport facilities and related ground operation being a 
top threat to runway excursions, ground incidents and approach and landing accidents by even 
up to 33%. 

This  picture  is  demonstrated  even  more  visibly  by  recent  –  though  non-European  –  well 
known  accidents  in  Toronto,  Quito  and  Sao  Paulo,  all  being  major  and  catastrophic 
misfortunes  involving  factors  as  aerodrome  infrastructure,  aerodrome  operations  and 
ATM/ANS service provision.  

The Sao Paulo accident in 2006, claiming 200 lives due to an overshoot of a runway which 
did not benefit of an appropriate overshoot area, could happen in an identical way on all those 

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Ref.  EASA,  Annual  Safety Review  2006; about  50  %  of  those  involve  aerodrome  and  or  ATM/ANS 
contribution 
Ref. EUROCONTROL, Performance Review Report 2006 
ref. [2], page 33 and [7], page 25ff 
ref. "Annual Safety Review 2006", EASA, page 13ff 
ref. 11 
ref. 11, page 23 

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EU  aerodromes  which  do  not  feature  this  core  aerodrome  infrastructure  safety  criterion.  A 
recent major accident in Heathrow was non fatal only due to the very comfortable undershoot 
area provided in Heathrow, being the longest available in UK. 

The  most  recent  element  in  this  chain  of  serious  events  was  provided  by  an  accident  in 
Germany,  which  incurred  no  fatalities,  except  the  writing  off  of  the  aircraft  which  overshot 
the runway and crashed into a wall. 

Consequently, the EUROCONTROL "Annual Safety Report 2007"22 identifies the following 
operational  key  risk  areas  for  the  future  of  European  aviation:  Runway  incursions23, 
unauthorised  penetration  of  airspace,  level  busts,  controlled  flight  into  terrain  (CFIT)  and 
level of ATS at aerodromes, which all involve ATM/ANS and aerodrome regulatory factors.  

The reliable prediction of a significant increase of air traffic demand will obviously constitute 
a  formidable  challenge  for  European  aviation  that  requires  additional  measures  even  to 
maintain the risk of accidents at today's level.  

In  total,  the  rapidly  growing  traffic  development,  inducing  new  technologies  as  well  as 
capacity bottlenecks to both aerodromes and ATM suggests to encounter those challenges in 
an  orchestrated  way  and  not  to  allow  discrete,  isolated  and  peculiar  "island"  solutions 
developing which aggravate existing interface and harmonisation problems. As those sectors 
are "top threats", exponential rise in risk could be foreseen in these areas.  

Responding to such challenges, the aforementioned first extension of EASA competences was 
performed as well as the SAFA programme was enhanced24. Another, strong mitigation tool 
was  put  in  place  by  the  "Black  List"25.  However,  this  set  of  current  safety  improvement 
measures  is  a  partial  approach  only,  since  it  leaves  aside  the  regulatory  safety  aspects  of 
aerodromes and ATM/ANS despite their prominent safety relevance. 

If no further mitigation measures were implemented, it would not be possible to maintain an 
adequate level of safety in particular at aerodromes and in airspace with a high traffic density 
but also and increasingly in those regions which experience air traffic growing at a rate even 
above the mentioned average.  

Furthermore, the need to enlarge the ATM/ANS and aerodrome capacity and performance and 
to counteract foreseeable congestion will result in more dependency of flight safety on newly 
introduced  technology,  procedures  and  automated  functions  with  their  individual  risk  of 
failure  and  new  vulnerable  interfaces.  Thus,  the  increasing  complexity,  integration,  and 
necessary  new  technology,  as  composed  by  pan-European  services  (data  link,  EGNOS, 

22 
23 

24 

25 

ref. [9], page 20 ff 
Runway  incursions,  that  is  events  leading  to  aircraft  hitting  other  moving  objects  when  landing  or 
taking  off,  is  one  of  the  worst  scenarios  and  understood  to  be  "an  accident  waiting  to  happen".  They 
involve  mostly  aerodrome  and  ATM  factors,  which  are  attached  to  the  traffic  congestion  and  related 
pilot / ATM workload development.  
Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft; ref. Commission Regulation (EC) No 768/2006 of 19 May 2006 
implementing  Directive  2004/36/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  as  regards  the 
collection  and  exchange  of  information  on  the  safety  of  aircraft  using  Community  airports  and  the 
management of the information system 
ref. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2007 of 28 November 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 
474/2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within 
the Community 

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Galileo, digitalised aeronautical information) and as emerging for example from the SESAR 
development all call for a more streamlined and integrated approach to safety.  

The optimum efficiency of a safety system supporting a total approach has therefore to 
be  established  to  cover  the  safety  of  ATM/ANS  and  aerodromes  as  key  aviation  safety 
players  and  as  vital  elements  in  the  air  transport  chain.  Based  on  this  notion  it  has 
become evident that further action is required to ensure that the current safe system will 
evolve to match the above mentioned challenges.  

2.2.2  The current regulatory framework 

To be able to grasp the comparative analysis of the various options considered in this report it 
is necessary to have a clear picture of the current framework of the European safety system, 
its rules and its rulemaking actors. 

A complete regulating function has to be composed of three pillars forming the overall area of 
competence of a regulating body. Should any of these three pillars be absent, the regulatory 
action would be ineffective:  

(1) 

Rulemaking 

(2) 

(3) 

Certification / Licensing / Oversight 

Standardisation / Enforcement of compliance 

This  rationale  involves  merely  the  basic  principle  of  the  need  of  constant  and  complete 
feedback  (i.e.  oversight  tools)  by  constant  monitoring  and  evaluation  tools  following  the 
actual  rule.  Adjustments  found  necessary  through  this  procedure  may  pertain  to  the 
rulemaking  side  (adjustment  of  legislation)  or  to  the  market  players.  Therefore,  ensuring 
proper application of rules requires enforcement tools if and where needed.  

This  management  principle  of  the  closed  loop  of  regulation  is  applied  in  many  areas,  for 
instance  road  traffic,  where  it  becomes  apparent  that  if  the  loop  was  incomplete  or 
disconnected,  no  quality  of  rule application  can  be  assured.  Where  subsidiarity  and  level  of 
criticality permit individual issues or parts of this loop could be delegated to different players. 

The  two  sections  below  describe  which  organisations  deal  with  the  three  above  mentioned 
aspects  in  Europe.  This  will  demonstrate  the  fact  that  all  such  organisations  detailed  in 
sections  2.2.2.1  and  2.2.2.2  are  lacking  the  competence  of  the  second  and  third  pillar,  and 
none of them provides rules which are directly applicable and mandatory. 

2.2.2.1 The Global Player: ICAO 

A global and highly recognised instrumental legal framework with respect to aviation safety 
has  been  established  by  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO).  In  the 
convention  of  Chicago  in  1944  the  ground-rules  have  been  established  that  are  meant  to 
ensure the safe and orderly growth of civil aviation throughout the world. All European Union 
countries have ratified this treaty. 

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The  set  of  rules,  standards  and  recommended  practices  (ICAO  SARPs)  form  the  so  called 
"Annexes",  signed  and  transposed,  in  part  and  partially  with  reservations,  by  the  different 
ICAO Contracting States.26  

While  this  can  be  regarded  as  constituting  a  basic  foundation  for  a  potential  global  “level 
playing field” the ICAO system suffers of crucial limitations: 

The remit of ICAO is limited to rulemaking. The two other pillars of the safety system are left 
to the ICAO Contracting States. Even in the field of rulemaking it can be argued that this is 
still for a large part a national affair, as SARPS rules are of a non mandatory nature and have 
to  be  transposed  into  national  law.  The  often  generic  language  used  to  define  the  standards 
permits a large diversity of interpretation in the transposition phase. Furthermore, Compliance 
with the standards can be circumvented by filing formal differences. Other ICAO regulatory 
material is of non binding character per se.27 

Despite  the  very  valuable  achievements  by  ICAO,  those  weaknesses  of  the  international 
system  led  to  significant  differences  in  rules,  their  application  and  enforcement,  thus  in 
differing levels of aviation safety across the world as well as in the EU. 

2.2.2.2 Intergovernmental Bodies in Europe 

There  is  not  one  Europe  if  the  membership  of  different  organisations  involved  in  aviation 
safety in Europe is compared. Besides being contracting States to ICAO, Member States are 
individual  members  of  the  organisations  ECAC,  JAA  and  EUROCONTROL.  These 
organisation themselves have memoranda of co-operation between them, but are not directly 
represented  in  the  decision  making  bodies  of  each  other.  A  visual  overview  of  the 
Membership situation of those organisations is given by Annex 1, figure 2.2.2.2. 

Before the establishment of EASA, the role of individual States has been exclusive. Each state 
assumed  responsibility  on  national  level  for  all  domains,  from  airworthiness  to  ANS,  ATM 
and  aerodrome  legislation,  standardisation,  respective  standard  adoption,  certification, 
licensing and inspection. 

•  European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC): 

The ECAC currently consists of 42 Member States comprising almost all European 
States. Its objective is to promote the continued development of a safe, efficient and 
sustainable  European 
resolutions, 
recommendations  and  policy  statements  which  should  be  brought  into  effect  by  its 
Member States. The uneven implementation and lack of enforcement role reflect the 
same weakness of the ICAO system. 

system.  ECAC 

transport 

issues 

air 

Without  negating  its  contribution  to  safety  in  Europe,  ECAC  by  its  funding  nature 
misses all three pillars of the safety system mentioned above. 

•  Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA): 

26 

27 

ref. esp. to Annexes 2 (Rules of the Air), 3 (Met Services), 4 (Aeronautical Charts), 10 (Aeronautical 
Communications), 11 (ATS), 14 (Aerodromes), 15 (AIS) 
ref. [1], page 5 f. 

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The JAA is an associated body of ECAC, representing the civil aviation regulatory 
authorities of all the 42 ECAC States. For some areas in civil aviation (airworthiness 
and  aircraft  certification,  flight  crew  licensing  and  air  operations)  JAA  members 
agreed  to  coordinate  through  the  JAA  the  development  of  common  safety  rules 
which were supposed to be transposed in national law. The domains ATM/ANS and 
aerodromes, though, are not covered by the JAA. 

By establishing EASA, the JAA areas of rulemaking detailed above were gradually 
transferred  to  the  Agency.  This  led  to  the  decision  to  terminate  the  JAA  activity, 
before the end of 2010.28 

•  EUROCONTROL: 

The EUROCONTROL agency, comprising 38 States, is mainly committed to service 
provision tasks, provision of certain centralized functions, training, research as well 
as planning and management of joint development programmes.  

However, before 2004 it also played a rulemaking role (namely it has adopted and published 
the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements, ESARRs29), with the same drawback 
characteristics  of  ICAO  and  JAA.  Accordingly,  developed  rules  should  be  enacted  by 
transposition into national law by the Member States which lead to substantial differences in 
the  progress  of  implementation  of  ESARRs  among  the  EUROCONTROL  Members. 
Furthermore,  and  again  as  above,  no  actual  legal  enforcement  mechanisms  do  exist  in  that 
regard.30After the adoption of the legislative package on the Single European Sky (SES) by 
the  EU  legislator,  EUROCONTROL  assumed  the  responsibility  of  supporting  the  European 
Commission  in  the  development  of  Common  Requirements  for  the  domains  of  ANS  and 
ATM, based on individual “mandates” issued by the Commission itself. Hence, different from 
the  bodies  mentioned  above,  EUROCONTROL  serves  as  "draft"  rule  maker  directly  within 
the European context. However, also the EUROCONTROL system has important limitations 
in  the  safety  area.  Since  it  operates  under  specific  mandates  within  the  SES  legislation31,  it 
does  not  deal  with  aerodrome  safety  matters.  Furthermore,  it  has  neither  certification  nor 
enforcement  rules,  hence  two  pillars  of  the  safety  system  are  not  within  its  remit.  In 
conclusion,  any  rule,  standard  or  requirement  adopted  and  published  by  any  of  the 
intergovernmental  organisations  mentioned  above,  is  not  immediately  applicable  unless 
legally transposed at national level and application is hardly uniform in the EU. In addition, 
none  of  them  ever  had  the  competence  of  the  second  nor  the  third  regulatory  pillar,  i.  e. 
issuing certificates or licenses and any sort of enforcement powers following oversight. 

28 

29 

30 

31 

ref. "FUJA Report", Roadmap for JAA, August 2005. Pending Board approval, the JAA system will be 
closed by end of June 2009. 
ref. ESARR 1: Safety Oversight in ATM, ESARR 2: Reporting and assessment of safety occurrences in 
ATM,  ESARR  3:  Use  of  Safety  Management  Systems  by  ATM  service  providers,  ESARR  4:  Risk 
Assessment and mitigation in ATM, ESARR 5: Requirements for ATM services' personnel 
As  SES  II  and  SESAR  do  not  focus  on  aviation  safety;  the  only  safety  aspect  of  SES  has  been  the 
automatic transposition of ESARRs into Community law. However this has been very problematic, not 
only because it forces the Community to adopt texts of an external body, but most importantly because 
the ESARRs are standalone documents, that fit poorly in the general Community legal framework and 
legislative  policy.  They  are  not  aligned  with  the  requirements  of  other  aviation  safety  fields  (such  as 
operations or airworthiness) and seek to develop only high level administrative frameworks.  
ref.  Art.  8  of  "Framework  Regulation  for  the  creation  of  the  single  European  sky",  Regulation  (EC) 
549/2004 

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2.2.2.3 Regulatory actions by the European Community 

As already explained above, a fundamental principle of  the  aviation policy of the European 
Union  has  been  to  aim  at  a  high  and  uniform  level  of  safety  through  common  action  at 
Community level and high and uniform protection of the citizens by providing common safety 
rules and by ensuring that all regulated persons (legal or natural) comply with such rules. 

Contrary  to  the  frameworks  of  the  international  organisations  mentioned  above,  the  EASA 
system,  established  in  2002  as  per  Regulation  (EC)  1592/2002,  is  designed  to  execute  the 
complete set of regulatory work, i. e. all three pillars as described before: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Rulemaking, including development of “Opinions” proposed  to  and  adopted by  the 
Commission through comitology, leading to legally binding common Implementing 
Rules  immediately  applicable  throughout  the  territory  of  the  EU  Member  States  to 
which the Treaty applies (i.e. without the need of transposition at national level); 

Issuing  certificates  and  approvals,  directly  (for  the  cases  specified  in  the  Basic 
Regulation  and  where  a  centralised  action  has  been  regarded  most  efficient)  or 
through the competent Aviation Authorities usually nominated at national level; 

Oversight and standardisation, through inspections of the competent Authorities and 
reporting to the Commission, as well as enforcement powers.  

As  of  2003,  the  Agency  assumed  responsibility  for  airworthiness  and  environmental 
compatibility  of  aeronautical  products.  On  19  March  2008,  the  scope  of  competence  was 
extended  by  "the  first  step"  to  include  air  operations,  licensing  and  safety  of  third  country 
aircraft.  

Taking this into account, it becomes transparent that some crucial safety factors are subject to 
the  EASA  competence  already,  following  the  "total  system  approach"  with  aerodromes  and 
(ground) ATM/ANS not yet being included in the scope of the Agency. 

For ATM/ANS, however, it needs to be clearly pointed out that especially by the legislation 
package of Single European Sky (see section 1.2 above), certain  ATM/  ANS safety matters 
were already made subject to EU competence. While this legislation package, which will be 
further  developed  in  2008  as  part  of  a  more  comprehensive  aviation  package  in  order  to 
respond to challenges in that sector, is meant to foster the development of European aviation, 
it  does  not  explicitly  address  the  regulation  of  safety  matters.  Therefore,  a  total  system 
approach  towards  the  key  safety  factors  as  aerodromes  and  ATM/ANS  would  constitute 
complementary,  indispensable  element  of  the  Single  European  Sky  initiative,  as  it  would 
serve as its safety module. 

2.2.3  Lack of harmonized and enforceable rules 

As detailed above, the actual rulemaking and application of harmonized standards developed 
by ICAO, JAA, Eurocontrol is, apart from the areas already covered by EASA's competence, 
up to the Member States to implement. The same applies for the functions of the second and 
third pillars of regulation, i. e. for certification / licensing and oversight / enforcement action.  

Due  to  this  fact  and  the  incurred  severe  level  of  regulatory  fragmentation,  a  cacophony  of 
differences  with  regard  to  application  and  execution  of  rules  has  arisen  among  Member 
States. This situation can neither be regarded as meeting the requirements of interoperability 

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within the international aviation market, nor can it respond to the described upcoming safety 
challenges, nor to the development of a true internal market.32 

Recent, both aerodromes and ATM examples indicate the safety problem emerging from this 
situation: 

•  One  of  the  core  runway  safety  criteria is  composed by the "Runway End  Safety 
Area  (RESA)",  meant  to  allow  for  error  in  case  of  an  aircraft  under-  or 
overshooting  the  runway.  The  ICAO  standard  for  RESA  is  90  m,  with 
recommendations from different parties to up to 600 m. Implementation in Europe 
varies widely, starting from 0m. Very unsafe conditions persist, which could lead 
to accidents provoked by this cardinal matter as listed in section 2.2.1.2.  

•  One  Member  State  alone  filed  640  ATM  related  differences  to  ICAO  standards, 
differences  in  other  Member  States  are  assumed  to  amount  to  an  equal  level. 
Among  others,  this  leads  to  peculiar,  highly  individual  airspace  setups  in  every 
Member  Sate  (i.e.  different  airspace  entry  and  clearance  procedures;  while  a 
certain class of airspace may be entered without clearance requirement, the same 
airspace requires an Air Traffic Control clearance in the neighbouring State. This 
provides  for  transparency  and  compliance  challenges  to  the  operators,  finally 
resulting in frequent violations and unclear situations to the crew involving hazard 
of mid air collisions. 

•  Lack  of  common  specifications  for  new  technology  lead  to  observed  major 
implementation problems for urgently required hardware: While the airworthiness 
of state of the art Collision-avoidance equipment following the tragic Überlingen 
and  Linate  accidents  could  be  ensured  by  EASA,  it  was  found  that  the 
interoperability level of such equipment hence their actual use was very limited. 
The interoperability specifications are given at national level only, as no European 
level competence exists in this area. 

Beside  the  actual  immediate  lack  of  safety  emerging  from  these,  in  general  any  lack  of 
harmonised ATM and aerodrome procedures turns into a lack of transparency to the aircraft 
operator,  creating  another  area  of  safety  deficiencies.  Therefore,  identical  signs,  signals, 
markings, communication procedures etc are required. 

All  in  all,  the  different  endeavours  to  harmonise  procedures  and  to  improve  this 
situation  could  create  some  achievements,  but  the  systemic  and  inherent  weakness  of 
lack of regulatory functions within the current fragmented system lead to aviation safety 
rules  in  Europe  still  falling  short  of  adequate  harmonisation  and  enforcement 
considerations in two fundamental components of the global aviation safety system, and 
precisely in aerodromes and ATM/ANS. 

2.3 

Conclusion and justification of intervention 

The  current  high  European  safety  performance  is  achieved  by  the  collective  efforts  of  a 
professional, highly skilled and safety conscious workforce and safety framework.  

32 

A  prominent  and  illustrative  example  of  frequent  non  uniform  compliance  comes  with  the  surfaces 
adjacent  to  aerodrome  runways  and  related  obstacle  criteria.  As  those  criteria  tend  to  imply  severe 
safety  but  also  certain  economical  impacts  to  aerodromes,  a  huge  variety  can  be  observed. 
Consequently, with regard to competition among aerodromes, this can lead to a distorting effect. 

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However,  the  challenges  described  above  call  for  more  than  the  preservation  of  the  safety 
level achieved, they call for an improved safety performance. This improvement is urgently 
required using related orchestrated and harmonized mechanisms as well as common resources 
in order to also achieve necessary quick wins. Refer to Annex 1, figure 2.3 which illustrates 
related factors of threat to European aviation safety as mentioned in the sections above. 

Hence, it is increasingly recognized that air transport safety strongly requires a holistic, total 
system  "gate-to-gate"  approach  which  also  integrates  ATM/ANS  and  aerodromes.  Such  a 
total  system  approach  shall  cover  all  involved  in  the  safety  process  -  people,  procedures, 
equipment  and  organisational  structures.  It  can  eliminate  risks  of  safety  gaps,  conflicting 
requirements  and confused  responsibilities and may reduce  burden on  the regulated persons 
by streamlining approval processes. Specifically in the area of ATM/ANS this is well adapted 
to the regulation of future systems, where equipment on the ground, on board aircraft or in the 
space  link  together  and  constitute  a  single  system  providing  or  supporting  the  provision  for 
services essential to ensure the safety of air traffic.  

As above, this identifies the strong demand for a common intervention above national level, 
whilst making use of the framework and competences at national level in compliance with the 
principles  of  "better  regulation",  especially  as  regards  proportionality  and  subsidiarity. 
Therefore,  and  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty,  the  Commission  shall  lay  down  measures  to 
improve transport safety.33 In this  context the  Commission shall  submit a  related  legislative 
proposal to the European Parliament and the Council.34 

The High Level Group referred to under section 1.1, sees the continuation of improvement as 
one  of  the  key  challenges  for  European  aviation  and  requests  safety  to  be  aligned  with  the 
market growth35. Particularly, the "patchwork of responsibilities and regulatory structures" is 
addressed36,  leading  to  one  of  its  recommendations  to  "develop  EASA  into  the  single 
instrument for aviation safety regulation"37. Also, the HLG saw the total system approach as 
the  cornerstone  of  that  framework  and  recommended  that  safety  regulation  should  be 
conducted  independently  from  other  forms  of  regulation  and  that  all  safety  regulatory 
activities  should  be  dealt  with  under  the  to  be  established  holistic  safety  system.  Very 
importantly,  the  HLG  gave  strong  recommendations  on  the  application  of  the  Better 
Regulation  agenda  in  the  future  aviation  regulatory  framework,  containing  such  vital 
principles  as  proportionality,  subsidiarity,  best  allocation  of  roles  and  consultation.  The 
Agency is already today fully governed by these principles, as demonstrated e.g. by its formal 
rulemaking procedure.  

Moreover, this approach is supported by the findings of the "Agenda for 2010"38. From here it 
becomes apparent that the regulation of key safety factors is an integral element of the future 
of  European  aviation  framework,  to  be  inseparably  linked  to  the  Single  European  Sky  and 
SESAR initiatives. 

Furthermore,  the  imminent  demand  for  change  also  is  illustrated  by  Regulation  (EC)  No. 
1592/2002 on the establishment of EASA, which already mentions the foreseen extension of 

33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 

ref. Treaty establishing the European Community, part three, Title V, Art. 70f 
ref. Treaty establishing the European Community, part four, Title I, Art. 251 
ref [3], page 3 
ref. [3], page4 
ref. [3], page 31ff 
ref. [1], page 4ff 

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competences  of  the  Agency  to  other  areas  in  the  field  of  civil  aviation  safety,  under  the 
supervision of the Commission and in line with the Treaty.39 

Appropriately,  the  stakeholders  strongly  confirmed  the  need  for  change,  as  indicated  by 
consultations  performed  in  the  course  of  the  Preliminary  Impact  Assessment  and  the 
subsequent EASA consultation processes.40 

Based  on  this  broad  consensus  and  the  related  political  commitment,  any  other  line  than 
integrating  the  aerodrome  and  ATM/ANS  regulatory  competence  into  the  remit  of  EASA 
would  have  to  be  seen  as  deviation  from  the  commonly  future  approach  to  a  systemically 
improved safety system. 

For  clarification  purposes,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  findings  above  pertain  to  those 
aerodromes which serve as platform for commercial traffic and show ATM relevance, while 
very  small  aerodromes  used  in  the  recreational  sector  are  much  less  affected  by  the  given 
rationale. This will be explained in more detail in section 4.2.1 below. 

3 

OBJECTIVES 

The  overarching  objective  of  the  proposal  is  to  extend  the  system  conceived  to  ensure  the 
safety of transport by air in the EU to aerodromes and ATM/ANS, i.e. to those two sectors of 
the  total  system  which  are  not  regulated  to  the  level  required  by  the  challenges  of  rapidly 
growing air traffic. 

Identified objectives of this intended measure can be classified according to the three levels 
normally used by the Commission services for impact assessment, such as: 

•  The general objectives, which represent the overall wide policy goals;  

•  The specific objectives, which are the more immediate objectives of the planned legislative 

initiative contributing to achieve the overall objectives; 

•  The  operational  objectives,  which  are  related  to  the  precise  outputs  of  the  proposal  and 

which can then be assessed or even measured by appropriate indicators. 

3.1 

General Objectives 

General  societal  objectives  of  the  European  Commission  as  described  in  the  Commission’s 
work  programme  and  the  Annual  Policy  Strategy41,  in  turn  broadly  based  on  the  Lisbon 
strategy,  which  is,  with  regard  to  the  project  in  question,  to  put  Europe  on  the  track  of 
prosperity, which, in addition to building an internal market (comprehensive of facilitation of 
labour  mobility)  based  on  fair  competition,  also  comprises  greater  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the transport system, and to offer citizens, including aviation passengers the 
same high level of protection. 

Overall, safety is regarded the dominant aspect as the measure in subject focuses on fostering 
aviation safety. However, it should be stressed that safety matters are not followed for their 
own safety sake, but for the implications of increased safety which touch on the scope of the 

39 
40 
41 

ref. Regulation (EC) 1592/2002, recital 2 
ref. [2], page 15ff and 35ff, ref. [5], 27 f, ref. [13] 
ref. http.//europa.eu.int/comm/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm 

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Lisbon  strategy:  Social  and  economical  elements,  sustainable  development,  internal  market 
development and, though to a limited effect only given the nature of the project, environment. 

It is in this light that the safety of air transport is stressed as being a crucial element of these 
objectives. 

3.2 

Specific Objectives 

The specific objectives are related to specific air transport objectives, which are also followed 
by  other  initiatives  such  as  the  creation  of  a  Single  European  Sky.  More  in  detail  these 
specific  objectives  can  be  identified  in  the  White  Paper  on  the  European  transport  policy 
published  in  2001  and  its  mid  term  review  published  in  200642.  The  proposed  measure  is 
closely related to some of these specific objectives, of which those applicable are summarized 
below: 

•  Establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in Europe; 

•  Perform "Better Regulation"; Reduce the costs connected to safety regulation; 

•  Complement and support SES and SESAR by enhancing safety elements; 

•  Ensure  most  efficient  use  of  aerodromes  and  airspace  for  all  stakeholders  by  introducing 

common rules; 

•  Facilitate  evolution  of  technology  by  timely  application  of  appropriate  regulatory 

functions. 

3.3  Operational Objectives 

The  operational  objectives  are  strictly  related  to  the  concrete  actions  triggered  by  the 
proposal. As such their output is observable or even measurable and can be directly attributed 
to the action carried out. These observable/measurable operational objectives are: 

•  Enhanced  aviation  safety  by  the  establishment  of  harmonized,  binding  safety  rules  based 
on  improvement  of  the  existing  rules  and  provisions  (SARPS,  GASR  works,  SES).  This 
uniform set of rules will be proportionate and will establish an optimum balance between 
binding rules and best industrial standards as appropriate means of compliance; 

•  Enhanced  aviation  safety  by  completing  the  regulatory  loop  and  by  establishment  and 
implementation  of  appropriate  certification,  standardisation  and  oversight  activities; 
furthermore  by  establishment  of  measures  providing  for  the  Enforcement  of  compliance 
with the rules; 

•  Enhanced  aviation  safety  by  establishment  of  a  highly  skilled  and  efficient  working 

organisation; 

Hereby it should be underlined that the proposed measures will be closely based on existing 
legislation  as  mentioned,  while  providing  improvement  compared  to  this  where  and  if 
necessary. 

42 

ref. "Keep Europe moving: Sustainable mobility for our continent", COM 314/2006, 22 June 2006 

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4 

POLICY OPTIONS 

4.1  General 

This  chapter  describes  policy  options  that  are  available  in  theory  in  order  to  single  out  the 
most  appropriate  vehicle  to  develop  common  rules  and  ensure  their  uniform  application  as 
well as appropriate standardisation, oversight and enforcement of compliance with rules in the 
fields  of  aerodromes  and  ATM/ANS.  A  comparative  analysis  of  the  options  will  take  into 
account the findings indicated in section 2 which have clearly shown that the non-regulatory 
approach used so far is not adequate to face the safety challenges stemming from the aviation 
trends. The impacts created by those alternative policy options will be assessed in detail in the 
subsequent chapter 5.  

Following this rationale, the policy options that have been discerned are: 

•  Option A:  ‘Do  nothing’:  Continue  with  present  organisation  of  responsibilities.  This 

options serves as the reference situation; 

•  Option B:  Extend  the  EASA  safety  system  of  rulemaking,  certification,  licensing, 

standardisation and oversight to the domains of aerodromes and ATM/ANS 

•  Option C:  Extend the process of EUROCONTROL mandates issued by the Commission 
to  the  domains  of  aerodromes  and  ATM/ANS  (including  certification  and  inspection 
responsibilities); 

•  Option D:  Establish a new Agency responsible for aerodromes and ATM/ANS; 

•  Option E:  Extend  the  EASA  system  as  far  as  option  B,  but  to  include  also  other 

regulatory or service provision functions. 

Each  of  these  policy  options  is  outlined  from  section  4.3  onwards.  First,  by  section  4.2  the 
affected scope of competence will be detailed. 

At this point it should be explicitly stressed that the intended measure does not concentrate on 
the development and enactment of entirely new safety rules, but rather intends to promote the 
harmonisation and enforcement of uniform rules throughout the Community. Hence, it is not 
intended  to  "reinvent  the  wheel"  but  to  make  use  of  existing  voluntary  standards  or  rules, 
namely  the  ICAO  SARPS  and  GASR43  works  and  the  existing  SES  and  other  ATM/ANS 
related  rules  mentioned  above.  Also,  the  existing  regulatory  bodies  at  national  level  will 
remain  largely  unaffected  by  the  measure,  as  their  scope  of  competence  for  oversight  and 
certification will not be interfered with by the measure. Thus, it is expected that the remit of 
Member  States'  bodies  such  as  aerodrome  authorities  and  National  Supervisory  Authorities 
(NSAs) will remain substantially unchanged. 

The  options  are  based  on  the  Preliminary  Impact  Assessment  and  take  into  account  the 
conclusions achieved by the consultation processes performed by EASA. This focuses more 
on  the  aerodrome  safety  part  of  the  project  as  the  Community  has  not  yet  legislated  in  this 
area. 

43 

"Group  of  Aerodrome  Safety  Regulators";  informal  working  group  encompassing  28  States  putting 
effort into improving aerodrome related rules; ref. to figure 2.2.2.2 

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The EASA RIA, to a certain degree, deals with technical impact matters which rather relate to 
and will be further developed by future Implementing Rules. Therefore, the RIA will not be 
fully reflected at this stage, which shall merely deal with the overall competence extension, i. 
e.  the  focus  is  mainly  on  the  question  "if  to  do"  rather  on  "how  to  do"  it,  as  per  above 
However, related potential developments are referred to if and where needed.  

As regards the ATM/ANS safety regulation, a shorter analysis is required, since this domain 
is  already  the  subject  of  Community  rules  and  very  closely  linked  to  the  existing  SES 
legislation  and  the  SESAR  initiative.  Following  the  same  rationale  as  applied  for  the 
aerodrome part above, potential variations of the execution of the regulatory competence with 
regard  to  ATM/ANS  will  not  be  in  the  focus  of  the  assessment,  but  the  question  of  the 
regulatory competence itself. 

4.2 

Affected areas of competence and responsibility  

Before  elaborating  on  the  individual  policy  options,  the  areas  affected  by  regulation  of 
aerodromes  and  ATM/ANS  are  detailed  below.  They  correspond  to  the  three  pillars  of 
regulation forming the circle of proper regulatory action and of its quality assurance within a 
safety system. 

For clarification purposes, it should be pointed out that the list of aspects covered under the 
areas of air navigation services, air traffic management and aerodromes, does not imply that 
in one of the policy options EASA (or a different organisation as proposed by the option) will 
carry  out  or  provide  such  service  itself.  The  responsibilities  of  the  intended  measure  will 
purely be limited to the safety regulatory circle and will include preparation of safety related 
rules,  certification  (where  appropriate)  as  well  as  standardisation  inspection,  so  clearly 
maintaining  the  principle  of  “separation”  between  regulation  and  operational  activities, 
already well established in the EU aviation legislation. 

4.2.1 Aerodromes 

For  the  aerodrome  part,  the  aerodrome  related  definitions  shown  below  will  be  taken  into 
account,  again  leading  to  a  related  affected  scope  of  responsibilities  with  regard  to 
infrastructure and operation. This definition is in line with the definition used in other parts of 
EU legislation and based on the ICAO definition44: 

•  Aerodrome  means  any  especially  adapted  area  on  land,  water  or  man  made  structure  or 
vessel,  for  the  landing,  taking-off  and  manoeuvring  of  aircraft  including  the  aerodrome 
equipment,  installations  and  services,  which  these  operations  may  involve  for  the 
requirements of aircraft traffic. 

•  Open  to  public  use  means  aerodromes  which  are  included  in  the  official  Aeronautical 
Information  Service  (AIS)  publication  and  offer  services  not  to  a  defined  group  of  users 
only but to any user without discriminatory access provision. 

Based  on  those  definitions,  the  variety  and  scope  of  aerodromes  affected  by  the  intended 
measure needs to be illuminated: 

44 

ref. to [5], page 6 and [7], page 49 for details on the evolution of this definition 

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Within  Europe,  currently  about  700  aerodromes  exist  serving  commercial  traffic  and 
operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), which are typically referred to as "airports".45  

2145  aerodromes  are  included  currently  in  the  EUROCONTROL  data  base  used  for 
Aeronautical Information Service.46 Therefore, all these aerodromes are open to public use. 

The  consultation  and  impact  assessment  performed  by  EASA  clearly  indicates  that 
aerodromes not open to public use should not be included in the scope of European regulation 
due to the transparent lack of both justification and added value for safety.47 Therefore, this 
subset of aerodromes is ruled out at this stage.48 

The  fundamental  question  that  needs  to  be  addressed  is  whether  all  these  2145  aerodromes 
should  be  affected  by  the  proposed  measures  of  whether  this  should  be  limited  to  those 
aerodromes  mostly  or  even  exclusively  serving  commercial  air  traffic  to  include  passenger 
operation. In short, should 2145 or rather only 700 "big" aerodromes be subject to European 
rules. Annex 1, figure 4.2.1 indicates the different aerodrome criteria and their typical frame 
characteristics as well as their total numbers in Europe. 

In fact there is  no doubt about the  fact that those aerodromes with infrastructure capable of 
serving commercial passenger service should be regulated. These aerodromes must be capable 
of adverse weather operation and therefore are dependable on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). 
As  indicated  above,  the  number  of  such  aerodromes  in  Europe  is  700,  while  thousands  of 
smaller, non-IFR aerodromes exist which are not used by large aircraft but nearly exclusively 
by recreational flying and other elements of general, non commercial aviation with very small 
aircraft. 

Those  700  IFR  aerodromes  are  affected  by  significant  traffic  growth,  and  have  substantial 
interfaces with ATM/ANS services. Furthermore, the accident and incident data provided in 
section 2.2.1 imperatively calling for mitigating action strictly pertain to the operation of such 
aerodromes only, while the safety of recreational and general aviation seemingly is much less 
affected  by  related  small  aerodromes.  Taking  is  as  well  as  principles  of  "better  regulation" 
like  proportionality  and  esp.  subsidiarity  into  account,  no  safety  driven  need  can  be  seen  to 
include non-IFR aerodromes in the scope of the proposed measure.49 

Therefore,  it  is  proposed  that  for  the  time  being,  only  those  (today  about  700)  aerodromes 
open to public use and serving IFR procedures should be made subject to the suggested scope, 

45 
46 
47 
48 

49 

ref. [7], page 52 
ref. [7], page 53 
ref. [7], page 54ff 
Beyond the figure of 2145 aerodromes open to public use it is estimated that a total of up to another 
3000  aerodromes  exist  throughout  Europe.  However,  those  to  a  vast  majority  pertain  to  the 
"recreational" sector mentioned above which will not be subject to European regulation. Others of such 
3000 aerodromes do not operate in a way which is regularly accessible to public use. 
It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  fields  of  airworthiness,  operations  and  licensing  Community  regulatory 
competence  is  established  also  for  general  aviation.  Whereas  this  could  suggest  to  include  related 
aerodromes in this scope, it must be found that other than the sectors above small aerodromes, owing 
their  stationary  character,  do  not  interfere  with  "bigger"  commercial  operation  and  show,  besides,  a 
positive safety record. Hence, an air safety contribution by those smaller aerodromes to the operation of 
typical air carrier operation as well as to ATM/ANS issues can not be identified. Furthermore, it should 
be  stressed  that  the  largest  number  of  those  aerodromes  largely  or  even  exclusively  serves  aircraft 
operation  even  outside  the  existing  scope  of  European  Community  competence  (i.e.  microlight 
operation etc.) 

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leaving the smaller and non-IFR aerodromes in the remit of national aviation regulation. This 
regulation may be based on related guidance material which may be developed by EASA. 

4.2.2 ATM/ANS 

In this Impact Assessment the definitions of Air Navigation services, Air Traffic Management 
and Air Traffic services as laid down in Regulation 549/2004 on the SES framework will be 
applied, which clearly triggers the scope of responsibilities affected by the intended measure, 
in terms of both infrastructure and operation. These definitions stipulate50: 

•  ANS being composed of: 

- Air Traffic services,  
- Communication (COM), Navigation (NAV) and Surveillance (SUR) services, 
- Meteorological services (MET), 
- Aeronautical Information services (AIS). 

•  ATM means the aggregation of Air Traffic services (ATS), Airspace Management (ASM) 
and  Air  Traffic  Flow  Management  (ATFM)  (to  include  related  airborne  and  ground 
systems). 

•  Air Traffic services (ATS) contains flight information services, alerting services, air traffic 
advisory  services  and  air  traffic  control  services  (area,  approach  and  aerodromes  control 
services).

50 

ref.  Art.  2  of  "Framework  Regulation  for  the  creation  of  the  single  European  sky",  Regulation  (EC) 
549/2004, 10 March 2004 

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4.3  Option A: "Do nothing" 

This option considers a continuation of the present situation. This situation has been described 
in  chapter  2  in  detail  and  has  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  "business  as  usual"  can  not  be 
retained since there is a compelling need for improvement. Therefore, the ‘Do nothing’ option 
serves as reference and benchmark for the other policy options. 

4.4  Option B: Extend EASA competences 

The adoption of the initial "Basic Regulation" (EC) No. 1592/2002 paved the way for a new 
Community system of air safety and environmental regulation. 

This second option considers the extension of EASA's tasks to the areas of aerodromes and 
ATM/ANS, by an amendment to the Basic Regulation. 

The  Regulatory  Impact  Assessment  (RIA)  performed  by  EASA  dealt  with  potential 
variations,  which  also  could  be  looked  at  as  sub-options  of  this  option  indicating  potential 
impacts  in  different  fields  triggered  by  possible  provisions  of  future  Implementing  Rules. 
Some  of  those  variations  include  the  scope  of  aerodromes  which  was  addressed  in  section 
4.2.1 above. Variations of the scope and procedures for certification of affected aerodromes as 
well as details of certification criteria will form the content of the Implementing Rules which 
will  be  prepared  by  the  Agency  and  adopted  by  the  Commission  through  comitology 
procedure,  following  another  extensive  consultation  and  fully  fledged  impact  assessment 
process.  

4.5  Option C: Extend EUROCONTROL mandates issued by the COM 

This policy option is to extend the current fields of mandates to EUROCONTROL, which are 
limited  to  the  drafting  of  SES  related  rules,  to  cover  the  complete  set  of  safety  related 
rulemaking  in  the  aerodrome,  ATM  and  ANS  field.  EUROCONTROL  was  chosen  for  this 
option as it is prominent among the European bodies listed in section 2.2.2.2 having a kind of 
rulemaking  preparatory  function  through  SES  mandates.  Hence,  it  already  has,  to  a  limited 
degree, a formal function within the European framework. Furthermore, the development of 
rules proposed by EUROCONTROL follows processes very similar to the ones used for the 
preparation of Implementing Rules proposed by EASA. 

Many  of  the  affected  responsibilities,  especially  in  the  aerodrome  sector,  would  represent  a 
new  domain  for  the  organisation,  while  some  others  are  touched  already  in  the  light  of 
ESARR and SES related work. 

For the purpose of assessing this option, it will be assumed that the administrative procedure 
within EUROCONTROL to prepare and support rules in this option would be the same as for 
the  current  mandate  to  develop  the  SES  Implementing  Rules.  This  is  different  from  the 
procedure used to adopt the ESARRs, which needed to be approved by the specific decision 
mechanisms of this international organisation. 

4.6  Option D: Establish a new Agency 

Rather  than  extending  the  mandates  to  EUROCONTROL  or  extending  the  EASA 
competences  beyond  its  current  scope,  another  theoretical  policy  option  to  address  the 

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competence  in  question  would  be  to  create  a  fully  new  Community  Agency  with  specific 
regulatory responsibilities in the areas of aerodromes and ATM/ANS. 

Following the path of other Community Agencies as EASA, this would be a Community body 
governed  by  the  applicable  legal  framework  of  EU  and  having  its  own  legal  personality.  It 
would  be  set  up  by  an  act  of  secondary  legislation  defining  clearly  its  scope  and  advisory 
and/or regulatory role. 

This  option  was  developed  starting  from  the  preliminary  impact  assessment  in  2005,  and  is 
regarded a logical, necessary element to perform the complete assessment required. However, 
it should be noted that such option may not be viable with regard to most recent Commission 
policy  development  towards  Agencies.  Nevertheless,  this  option  shall  be  fully  examined  in 
order  to  prevent  a  potentially  meaningful  option  from  being  ruled  out  solely  on  policy 
grounds.4.7  Option E: Extend EASA competences and include some other functions 

This option is referred to for the sake of consistency and completeness, as it was developed by 
the  preliminary  Impact  Assessment,  following  the  idea  of  performing  as  specified  under 
option  B,  but  also  including  the  provision  of  other  additional  functions  by  EASA.  Those 
functions were understood to possibly reflect areas of paramount public interest, necessity of 
separation  of  regulator  and  provider  and  areas  potentially  deserving  improved  efficiency, 
hence this option could incur a set of economical and safety related incentives. 

These functions could contain, but are not limited to: 

- Performing Research and Development (R&D) 
- Technical training 
- Rulemaking for accident and incident data collection and investigation 
- Development of contingency plans 
- ATM/CNS development planning and coordination 
- R&D coordination; 
- Airspace design; 
- Flow management 
- Charge collection 
However,  the  preliminary  Impact  Assessment  clearly  indicated  that  this  option  was  less 
favourable  for  a  variety  of  reasons.51  Moreover,  many  established  fundamental  Community 
regulatory policies would also have to be changed if such approach would be chosen. 

Therefore,  and  as  this  option  goes  beyond  the  actual  scope  of  the  intended  measure  to  be 
assessed, this option will not be handled with in more detail but will be ruled out at this stage. 

51 

ref. [2], page 57ff: Concerns such as reduced efficiency, negative cost impact and duplication lead to 
the  understanding  that  this  option  was  not  suitable;  furthermore  it  did  not  receive  the  support  of 
stakeholders. 

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5 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS 

Below, the impacts of the extension of EASA competences and the other policy options are 
determined towards the "do nothing" option A that serves as a reference line and benchmark. 
The assessed impacts are grouped into safety, economical, environmental, social and others. 

These  fields  of  impacts,  which  are  derived  from  the  Commission  impact  assessment 
guidelines, should be given different appraisal factors, as certainly the safety factor shall be in 
the focus of the aviation safety measure in question and shall be regarded the driving issue.  

Regards the economic factor, it should be pointed out that, as detailed in section 2.1 above, 
actual  economic  burden  or  benefit  to  stakeholders  emerging  from  potential  later  rules  are 
beyond  possible  assessment  now.  Therefore,  the  present  report  focuses  on  the  economical 
effects  of  the  actual  measure,  i.e.  the  shift  of  regulatory  competence  and  its  related,  rather 
qualitative economic effect to the market.  

Furthermore,  with  regard  to  the  administrative  cost,  by  centralising  the  effort  in  terms  of 
rulemaking  an  overall  saving  will  be  reached.  This  rationale  applies  to  both  personnel  and 
related  administrative  cost.  Note  that  certification  and  oversight  related  administrative  cost 
remain unaffected by the measure, as this leaves the on-site execution to the Member States. 
Therefore, in this Impact Assessment Report the administrative costs will not be scrutinized 
by a standardized Excel sheet typically referred to by Commission services, as the necessary 
detail required by such exercise will emerge from the enactment of individual Implementing 
Rules  which  will  follow  the  adoption  of  this  proposal.  Those  Implementing  Rules,  whose 
results must not be made subject to the current analysis as they are still open, will undergo a 
full scale Impact Assessment and consultation at appropriate place and time. At this stage, the 
cost figures pertaining to the EASA system as established will be used as validated grounds 
for the related cost effort to be expected by the measure 

Looking at the environmental impact, it should be understood that environmental standards of 
aerodromes  are  not  subject  of  the  measure  in  question  but  will  form  part  of  a  related 
independent proposal, the content of which is the subject of a separate assessment presently 
carried out by EASA. Hence, the overall environmental contribution of the measure is limited 
to  the  results  of  the  regulatory  competence,  leaving  aside  actual  consecutive  technical  rules 
which render the environmental aspect a side aspect only. 

5.1  Option A: "Do nothing" 

5.1.1  Safety impact 

Without any mitigating measures in the field of aerodromes and ATM/ANS, the air safety in 
these  high  risk  areas  will  be  significantly  affected  by  the  combination  of  traffic  growth, 
congestion and inevitable progressive penetration of new technologies in the aviation sector. 
The  existing  safety  level,  which  would  produce  unacceptable  numbers  of  incidents  and 
accidents even if unchanged, would inevitably deteriorate. Facing this development over the 
years, a significant adverse safety impact would have to be expected. 

5.1.2  Economic impact 

The negative development  in the  paramount criterion of safety will have a direct and major 
negative economic impact due to the forecasted higher accident rate (refer to Annex 1, figure 

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2.2.1 indicating the significant cost incurred by aviation accidents). Furthermore, European air 
transport  would  suffer  competitiveness  drawbacks  as  it  would  be  prone  to  loose  its  leading 
position regards safety aspects. Taking the significant role of air transport for the aggregated 
economical  progression  into  account,  and  looking  at  the  objectives  as  per  section  3,  the 
overall economical impact is assessed to be significantly adverse.  

5.1.3  Environmental impact 

No environmental impact by this option is visible, apart from the remote consideration of very 
limited ecological damage following accidents. 

5.1.4  Social impact: 

By doing nothing to defeat the European air safety challenges, a negative social impact would 
emerge from the lack of achievement of the prime goal to prevent the loss of lives and related 
major  damage  by  air  traffic  accidents.  Beyond  that  important  matter,  the  adverse  effects  to 
competitiveness  and  attractiveness  to  the  globally  working  aviation  market  is  expected  to 
provoke negative job growth impacts on the European aviation market, though certainly not 
quantifiable at this stage. 

5.1.5  Other impacts: 

Other impacts are not foreseeable, which includes those impacts listed for the options below 
which are not applicable in the "do nothing" option regarded here. 

5.2  Option B: EASA extension 

5.2.1  Safety impact 

In  general,  extending  the  EASA  mandate  from  the  current  areas  -  airworthiness, 
environmental compatibility, air operations, crew licensing and safety of third country aircraft 
operating  in  Europe  -  to  the  regulation  of  aerodromes  and  ATM/  ANS  would  lead  to  a 
significant improvement from a safety perspective, as it would constitute an integrated, total 
aviation  safety  approach  that  ensures  interoperability,  harmonised  rules  and  most  efficient 
transition  of  voluntary,  non  uniform  safety  standards  into  Community  rules  via  a  complete 
and controlled regulatory system. It would also be fully in line with the established aviation 
regulatory  policies  of  the  Community  to  separate  regulation  from  service  provision  and  to 
ensure the independent role of safety regulation from other modes of regulatory actions, such 
as economic regulation and management of scarce resources. 

This  integrated  and  truly  holistic  approach  towards  aviation  safety  is  also  crucial  since  the 
future aviation system will head for a gate-to-gate concept, with future characteristics such as 
stronger integration of the air side of aerodromes into the ATM system, close integration and 
even amalgamation of some ground based and air-borne roles related to digital data exchange, 
collision avoidance and aircraft separation and inclusion of ground movements on the apron 
and taxiways. Furthermore, high traffic densities require integration of safety procedures for 
surface  movement  and  arrival/departure  management,  as  well  as  for  flow  and  capacity 
management. This necessity would be fully reflected by the present option. 

Also,  the  process  of  timely  conversion  of  regulatory  proposals  into  community  law  is  well 
served  by  the  extension  of  EASA  competences,  since  EASA  is  fully  integrated  in  the 
regulatory  process  of  the  European  Commission  and  is  empowered  to  adopt  certification 

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specifications  and  acceptable  means  of  compliance  itself.  Furthermore  enforcement  and 
standardisation inspections mechanisms already in place in the current EASA system could 
easily be extended to these new areas. 

Regulatory gaps as well as overlaps, as existing today would be eliminated by a sole EASA 
rule making and certification. When the responsibilities of the regulatory system for all parts 
of  the  aviation  domain  are  in  EASA  hands,  a  uniform  and  high  level  of  safety  in 
aerodromes  and  ATM/  ANS  safety  can  be  achieved  across  the  domains  and  across  the 
Member States countries. 

By following this option, EASA could develop and enforce compliance with uniform sets of 
safety  rules  for  the  whole  aviation  domain  which  would  be  beneficial  as  there  would  be  a 
reduced amount of interfaces. 

Since per this option all aviation safety matters would be contained within the EASA system, 
this  option  provides  also  for  an  optimum  knowledge  management  solution  with  regard  to 
possible interchange and reference. 

Furthermore,  by  the  separation  of  the  regulatory  function  from  the  service  provision  as 
mentioned above this alternative would come free of a potential conflict of interests. Also, it 
would  allow  for  political  arbitration  between  conflicting  objectives  to  take  place  at  the 
appropriate political level. 

All  in  all,  the  introduction  of  a  common  regulatory  framework  is  expected  to  reveal  a  key 
improvement  for  the  overall  safety  level.  Taking  the  above  mentioned  key  safety 
improvements  into  account,  the  strong  point  of  the  extension  of  EASA  competences  is 
the introduction of a common approach across the whole safety system, fully integrated 
into  the  Community  policy  and  inseparably  embedded  into  the  Single  European  Sky 
initiative. 

Those very positive findings remain valid for all possible variations of this option as assessed 
by the RIA52. 

5.2.2  Economic impact 

Though certainly not accurately quantifiable at this stage, an improved safety record resulting 
from the impact of a complete and efficient safety regulatory system in European aviation will 
lead to economical benefits for the involved market players as air carriers, airports and service 
providers,  all  emerging  from  an  increased  competitiveness,  attractiveness,  as  well  as  less 
accident related cost. Details of this positive impact could be given only by future experience 
on related cost savings due to reduced accident/incident rates and the budgetary consequences 
of future Implementing Rules, if and where applicable. The latter will be subject to a complete 
Impact Assessment at the time of their submission to the Comitology process. 

With regard to the economic effect created by the overall administrative effort emerging from 
this option, the considerations below should be taken into account:  

•  Aerodromes: 

52 

ref. [7], page 49ff 

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28 

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In  the  course  of  the  IS-SG  consultation,  a  preliminary  cost  impact  analyses  was 
performed by the Commission with regard to the administrative cost incurred by the 
regulation  of  aerodromes  by  DG  TREN.53  This  work  scrutinized  the  related 
regulatory  action  into  individual  subparts  and  attached  assumptions  of  effort  and 
frequencies  to  those.  Overall,  a  10  step  approach  has  lead  to  a  potential,  indicative 
picture of related administrative cost.  

In  particular,  this  applies  to  the  number  of  affected  aerodromes,  for  which  the 
analysis  assumed  three  scenarios:  500,  1000  or  1500  affected  aerodromes,  for  each 
scenario  a  sensitivity  analysis  and  cost  impact  assessment  was  performed.  The 
number of aerodromes affected by the intended measure will be in the area of 700 as 
detailed in section 4.2 above. 

Therefore,  the  basic  rationale  of  the  cost  analysis  as  performed  by  the  preliminary 
assessment  can  be  used  for  this  assessment,  by  interpolating  the  results  of  the  500 
and 1000 scenarios: 

•  By  assuming  an  average  number  of  aerodrome  regulatory  personnel  between  2 
and  6  Full  Time  Equivalent  (FTE)  per  Member  State  currently  occupied  with 
aerodrome rulemaking as assessed in the above mentioned analysis54: 

•  The sensitivity analysis shows that the EASA extension to aerodromes would be 
more  economical  in  all  cases  between  those  2  and  6  FTE,  with  major  annual 
savings  compared  to  the  current  effort  of  the  Member  States,  depending  on  the 
actual number of FTE assumed. The wide range of FTEs and incurred savings are 
explained  by  the  fact  that,  while  rulemaking  would  be  performed  by  EASA,  the 
certification and regular oversight still would remain in the remit of the national 
authorities.  With  the  developing  aviation  market  it  can  not  be  ruled  out  that 
personnel currently working in the rulemaking sector would be realigned to those 
certification or oversight areas. However, this effect rather should be attributed to 
national adjustments to the new situation rather than a reduced saving created by 
the measure. 

•  This  indicates  the  relation  of  savings  compared  to  the  actual  cost:  With  a  cost 
estimate  between  5.2  and  13.2  Mio  €/a,  the  measure  was  assumed  to  lead  to  an 
effort  between  3.4  and  5.5  Mio  €/a.  Theref ore,  the  saving  of  administrative  and 
substantial  cost  is  assumed  be  in  the  area  of  around  50  %  of  the  current  level 
(Refer to Annex 1, figure 5.2.2). 

•  Those  figures  are  obtained  assuming  a  total  of  17  additional  EASA  personnel 
needed  for  rulemaking,  standardisation  and  overhead.55  This  fully  matches  the 
figures  of  the  Preliminary  Impact  Assessment56  which  have  been  used  for  the 
EASA Business Plan approved by the Management Board of the Agency.57 

53 
54 
55 
56 
57 

ref. [10] 
ref. [10], step 9 and 10: Assessment of affected entities and extrapolation 
ref. [7], page 59ff and ref.[10], Step 9 
ref. [2], Annex D, page 40ff 
ref. EASA Business Plan 2008-2012 

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29 

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•  With  regard  to  the  total  EASA  related  cost,  an  update  of  the  calculation  above 
using the EASA Business Plan tool (average cost per EASA employee to include 
overhead, infrastructural and travel cost amounts to 140 000 €  annually) is  even 
more illustrative: Based on this figure, the expected 17 additional personnel would 
lead to an increase in administrative cost for EASA of 2.380.000 € annually. This 
substantially  corresponds  to  the  results  of  the  analyses  performed  by  the 
Preliminary and Regulatory Impact Assessments, which arrives at slightly higher 
annual costs of about 3 Mio. €. 58 

•  A  stated  in  section  5  above,  the  assessment  of  actual  economic  burden  or  relief 
created by later rules will be performed during the implementation level of those 
rules  and,  as  being  not  feasible,  is  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  present 
assessment. 

•  However, by the above it becomes visible that the indicated level of effort will not 
come with an overall affection  to airport charges,  or, following  this vein, airline 
tickets or change in the traffic development. For example, German airports alone 
collect a total of about 1500 Mio. €/a, so the administra tive effort indicated above 
must be regarded comparatively minimal. However, as a cost increase is ruled out, 
a negative impact in that sense is not foreseeable. 

•  ATM/ANS 

As mentioned before, safety rulemaking as one pillar of ATM/ANS safety regulation 
is currently performed by EUROCONTROL. This involves an estimate of up to 12 
personnel.59 Using the same approach for the relation between rulemaking and other 
EASA personnel required for inspection and adjacent tasks as used for the aerodrome 
effort  above,  an  estimate  of  16  additional  personnel  for  the  ATM/ANS  part  can  be 
assumed  to  be  carried  by  EASA.  The  four  additional  posts  (as  compared  to 
EUROCONTROL) are created to fulfil the standardisation inspection functions. 

Consistently, a related annual cost of the same order of magnitude as above, i. e. of 
2.240.000 € can be expected. 60 

Taking into account these estimated total administrative cost of 2.380.000 € for the aerodrome 
part plus 2.240.000 € for the ATM/ANS part and th e attached annual savings compared to the 
status quo, the economic impact of this option is assessed to be positive. 

58 

59 

60 

ref.  [7],  page  102f.  This  corresponds  to  ref.  [2],  which  adds  up  the  equal  shares  of  aerodrome  and 
ATM/ANS efforts arriving at 4.4 to 6.5 Mio. € as per Annex D, page 39. 
ref. [2], Annex D, page 40. Note that the estimated effort currently is not performed by employers fully 
assigned to the safety area, but related duties are split across the organisation.  
ref. [2], Annex D, page 39.  

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30 

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5.2.3  Environmental impact 

In  general,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  a  centralization  of  regulation  and  complete,  highly 
effective and harmonized rule making action should provide for an optimum platform to take 
into account future matters which are not directly  affected by the intended measure. Hence, 
with  regard  to  the  environmental  impact  of  the  extension  of  EASA,  while  no  direct  link  to 
environmental  aspects  exists,  this  option  is  regarded  beneficial  on  top  of  the  reduction  of 
possible  ecological  damage  by  decreased  accident  rates  following  improved  air  safety.  This 
was also indicated by the former assessments.61 A negative impact to the environment is not 
foreseeable. 

5.2.4  Social impact 

The  most  meaningful  positive  social  impact  will  be  achieved  by  reduction  of  air  transport 
casualties, injuries and damages. However, as for the economical impact above, this important 
social contribution can not be quantified yet. 

With regard to aerodromes and linked to the economical assessment above, the very detailed 
analysis  performed  by  EASA,  broken  down  in  5  different  areas,  each  with  3  variations  of 
potential  social  impact  depending  on  technical  ways  of  implementation,  has  evidenced  a 
certain variety of possible social impacts, all with nearly exclusively beneficial impacts.62 

The impact of the transfer of aerodrome safety rulemaking tasks from national administrations 
to  EASA  is  expected  to  be  minimal.  Indeed  the  number  of  staff  in  charge  of  drafting 
aerodrome safety rules in each Member State is rather limited and should be relatively easily 
effected to other functions. 

As for the ATM/ANS  part, it is estimated that 12 persons are currently occupied by related 
rulemaking  action  within  EUROCONTROL. The impact on  these persons  of the transfer of 
these  tasks  to  EASA  could  vary  depending  on  the  implementation  options  retained.  These 
options  might  vary  from  "outsourcing"  by  EASA  of  these  tasks  to  the  affected  staff  of 
EUROCONTROL to the direct employment of these personnel by EASA. Also, a realignment 
within  the  organisation  could  emerge  from  this  situation.  In  total,  it  is  found  that  possible 
negative impacts to EUROCONTROL staff could be very limited or even nullified by close 
consultation between COM, EASA and EUROCONTROL in the implementing phase of the 
measure.  

In addition, it must be pointed out that a remaining adverse social effect to Member State and 
EUROCONTROL  personnel  would  be  overcompensated  by  the  EASA  jobs  covering  same 
and additional duties and by the positive social, also job growth related impacts following the 
overall European air transport stimulation as indicated above. 

Thus,  all  in  all  the  social  impact  of  this  option  is  expected  to  be  positive,  while  a  negative 
balance can be ruled out. 

61 
62 

ref. [2], page 40 and [7], pages 70, 81, 87 and 95 
ref. [7], page 70ff, 81, 87, 96ff and 99f 

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31 

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5.2.5  Other impacts 

Timeline: Regards the timeline of implementation hence effect of the measure in question, a 
period  of  transition  for  ATM/ANS  matters  from  EUROCONTROL  to  EASA  would 
materialize. Furthermore, also for aerodrome matters the related staff would need to be built 
up and familiarized. However, those start up related challenges would fall into the period of 
rule development and take place prior to the active oversight and certification tasks.  

the  current  ATM/ANS  safety  achievements  performed  by 
Third  countries:  As 
EUROCONTROL  encompass  non-EU  Member  States,  a  shift  to  EASA  could  lead  to 
"abandoning" those States. However, as most of those States are Members to EASA or signed 
an  ECAA  agreement,  this  effect  would  currently  pertain  to  the  States  of  Moldova,  Turkey, 
Armenia, Monaco and Ukraine only. However, the Basic Regulation, through its Article 66, 
offers  them  the  possibility  to  join  the  European  safety  system  through  the  conclusion  of 
specific  safety  agreements.  Overall,  therefore a  negative  impact  to  those  countries  therefore 
can be ruled out and no such effect is assumed to materialize. 

Furthermore,  it  can  be  found  that  the  above  mentioned,  significantly  positive  safety  and 
economic  are  not  limited  to  the  Community  Member  States  but  will  benefit  also  third 
countries' airlines and passengers.  

Civil-military  interface:  The  proper  co-ordination  of  the  civil  and  the  military  side  is  of 
utmost importance to airspace management, calling for a stable civil-military interface when 
applying a change to the regulatory framework affecting this area.  

So far, this interface has been assured via coordination at national level as well as through the 
Single Sky Committee (SSC). The transfer of ATM/ANS safety matters to EASA should be 
designed to ensure that negative impacts are avoided. This question is limited to the technical 
issue on how to  ensure a proper  coordination, which will be elaborated in the course of the 
implementation  of  this  option.  Therefore,  while  pointing  out  the  need  for  an  appropriate 
solution, the actual nature of this solution is beyond the scope of this assessment. 

5.3  Option C: Extend Eurocontrol mandates issued by the COM 

5.3.1  Safety impact 

Extending the EUROCONTROL mandate to the areas of aerodromes and ATM/ANS offers 
in  place  at 
the  advantage  of  keeping  current  ATM/ANS 
EUROCONTROL. However, a number of drawbacks have been identified: 

rulemaking  expertise 

•  In  the  field  of  aerodrome  regulation,  no  regulatory  experience  is  available  in 
EUROCONTROL.  Therefore,  this  matter  would  form  a  totally  new  and  unaccustomed 
subject of the EUROCONTROL remit. For EUROCONTROL, this would mean to adapt 
the  existing  organisation  which  is  tailored  to  ATM/ANS  needs  to  integrate  the  very 
different aerodrome subject without being able to benefit from sharing in house experience 
pertaining to all other safety aspects of aviation. 

•  This option would fall short of the total system approach mentioned above, with a sole and 
independent safety body dealing with safety matters. All hazards emerging from interfaces 
with other safety players will occur. As airworthiness, operations and licensing matters are 

EN 

32 

   EN 

subject to EASA competence already, this issue forms an inevitable safety (and efficiency) 
drawback.  

•  The  tasks  of  inspecting  and  auditing  Member  States  as  regards  their  obligation  to 
implement  Community  legislation,  are  absent  from  the  remit  of  EUROCONTROL.  To 
change this situation would call for a substantial change in the international system of this 
organisation. A task which is out of proportion with this objective which, as we have seen 
under option B, can be fulfilled by four persons.  

•  Conflict  of  interest:  EUROCONTROL  today  accommodates  competence  for  service 
provision and rulemaking including safety. These competences are functionally separated 
within 
interests  and 
responsibilities.  However,  since  they  remain  within  the  same  organisation  a  conflict  of 
interest might arise which could be even seen in violation of the separation requirements as 
per European law63. 

the  EUROCONTROL  organisation 

to  avoid  any  mix  of 

In total, the safety impact created by this option is assessed to be slightly positive. 

5.3.2  Economic impact 

With  regard  to  the  actual  administrative  cost,  the  option  to  extend  the  EUROCONTROL 
mandates is considered to follow in close analogy the costs calculated above for the option to 
extend EASA. After all, the distribution of responsibilities between the central agency and the 
national  level  would  be  the  same  in  both  options.  Furthermore,  the  salary  levels  at 
EUROCONTROL  and  EASA  are  very  similar.  However,  due  to  the  increased  coordination 
effort  created  by  the  split  into  two  safety  bodies  a  certain  surcharge  compared  to  option  B 
would have to be expected.5.3.3 

Environmental impact 

Provided the related responsibilities are executed to the same quality as per the above EASA 
extension  policy  option,  the  impact  to  environment  would  follow  the  same  rationale  as 
described under sections 5.2.3. 

5.3.4  Social impact 

Beside  the  crucial  positive  social  effects  emerging  from  increased  air  safety  as  detailed  in 
section 5.2.4 above, the social impact incurred by this option would show slightly beneficial 
as  the  up  to  12  personnel  mentioned  in  sections  5.2.2  and  5.2.4  would  not  be  affected. 
However, as this would pertain to potentially required mobility only rather than to an actual 
decrease in employment, this impact is regarded minimal, while in addition and as highlighted 
by section 5.2.4 this could also be mitigated by proper transition arrangements. 

With  regard  to  the  personnel  dealing  with  aerodrome  matters,  the  same  rationale  applies  as 
explained for the EASA option above, i. e. the small group of Member States staff is expected 
to be realigned within the individual national Civil Aviation Authority.  

Hence, the total social impact by this option is regarded still slightly positive. 

63 

ref.  "Framework  Regulation  for  the  creation  of  the  single  European  sky",  Regulation  (EC)  549/2004, 
and  "Regulation  on  the  provisions  of  air  navigation  services  in  the  single  European  sky,  Regulation 
(EC) 550/2004, 10 March 2004 

EN 

33 

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5.3.5  Other impacts 

Timeline: Regards the implementation of the option, no effects are visible opposing a timely 
and fully adequate taking up of related duties. 

Third  countries:  It  is  fair  to  assume  that,  to  a  certain  degree,  the  positive  safety  and 
economic impact detailed above would still lead to a slightly positive impact even in countries 
outside the European Community. The extent of this effect will be determined by the order of 
magnitude of those triggering impacts, though. 

Civil-military  interface:  As  mentioned  under  5.2.5  above,  this  issue  which  attracted  some 
attention by stakeholders raised the question of the treatment of related safety issues through 
the  proper  body  and  Committee.  However,  if  a  regulatory  competence  for  aerodromes  and 
ATM/ANS  was  given  to  EUROCONTROL,  the  impact  to  the  necessary  solution  of  this 
matter would be neutral. 

5.4  Option D: Establish a new Agency 

In this section, the impacts of the option to establish a new, independent Agency are briefly 
benchmarked against the status quo.  

5.4.1  Safety impact 

Certainly, the establishment of a new Agency as a regulatory body on the areas of aerodromes 
and ATM/ANS is expected to lead to improvements in the overall safety level. 

However,  as  under  5.3.1  above  and  for  similar  reasons,  those  improvements  would  be  very 
limited: 

•  This new agency would exist beside EASA and EUROCONTROL, which would create a 
triangle of distributed regulatory activities. Although all intended safety competence areas 
would be covered by one of these bodies, the aviation safety system would suffer from a 
significant lack of efficiency which would arise as the result of having even an additional 
regulatory body. 

•  Therefore,  this  option  could  not  overcome  the  mentioned  efficiency,  integration  and 

interface challenges.  

•  In addition, as a fully new entity would be put in place, significant start up difficulties with 
related performance degradation would have to be expected. Furthermore, the building up 
of organic expertise would be aggravated by the sole thus distant character of this entity, 
which does not provide for in-house knowledge exchange and cross referring. 

For  the  reasons  indicated  above,  the  safety  impact  of  this  option  is  assessed  to  be  slightly 
negative. 

5.4.2  Economic impact 

Certainly, the establishment of a New Agency would lead to a decrease of multiplication in 
rulemaking activity and of existing overlaps compared to the benchmark situation. 

EN 

34 

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However, as again not being integrated into a total system approach by being responsible for 
the  entire  European  aviation  system,  this  achievement  will  be  rather  limited  and  does  still 
provide an open door for reduced efficiency and duplication of related efforts and provisions 
in areas such as certification. The same applies for harmonisation and interoperability issues. 

This  effect  would  be  very  pronounced  as  the  number  of  players  hence  interfaces  would  be 
even increased by the present option. 

Being  forced  to  coordinate  within  a  triangle  between  EASA  and  EUROCONTROL,  the 
complexity  of  the  attached  decision  making  process  also  would  be  enlarged.  A  reduced 
efficiency  and  the  inevitable  higher  overhead  effort  would  lead  to  a  strong  limitation  of 
possible cost reduction. 

Hence, similar to the findings in section 5.3.2, a variation in cost due to the reduced efficiency 
of this option has to  be foreseen, while a quantification of  this effect is neither feasible nor 
necessary at this stage. 

5.4.3  Environmental impact 

With regard to this impact emerging from option D, no significant difference can be seen to 
the  general  impact  consideration  as  created  by  options  B  and  C  as  discussed  under  section 
5.2.3  ff.  However,  looking  at  the  overall  reduced  efficiency  of  the  option  in  question  it  is 
assumed that the slight beneficial impact possibly created by reduction of accidents would be 
nullified in this case. 

5.4.4  Social impact 

Again, a social contribution might arise from a possible reduction of accidents, a more healthy 
aviation market and related collective job growth. Furthermore, option D does not include the 
advantage of making use of management, administrative and support staff already in service. 
Therefore, the total social impacts assessed for this option is regarded nil. 

5.4.5  Other impacts 

Timeline:  The  same  consideration  applies  as  described  in  sections  5.2.5  and  5.3.5  above. 
However, as the set up of a discrete body requires additional effort thus time, this additional 
start up friction has to be taken into account for the option in subject. 

Third  countries:  The  slight  positive  safety  impact  emerging  from  this  option  might  provoke 
very  minimal  positive  impacts  in  other  countries;  however,  as  this  option  would  not  come 
with  an  additional  economical  element  supporting  this  tendency,  the  overall  impact  of  the 
option on third countries is regarded nil. 

Civil-military  interface:  Again,  and  for  the  same  reasons  as  stated  under  5.2.5,  this  matter 
would  have  to  be  treated  with  attention  during  the  implementation  phase  of  the  measure  in 
order not to provoke potential safety gaps by this interface. 

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35 

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6 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

In  order  to  reach  final  conclusions  by  isolating  the  most  preferable  option,  all  the  options 
above  need  to  be  compared  to  each  other  and  their  benefit  balanced  against  the  objectives 
listed in section 3. The table below provides an overview of the identified impacts as detailed 
in  section  5  above,  especially  highlighting  the  safety  impact  as  this  needs  to  be  given  the 
highest amount of gravity. The given ratings indicate the nature of the individual impact by 
following classification against the reference line established by the status quo: 

+ + +  significantly positive 
+ + 
+ 
0 

positive 
slightly positive 
unchanged 

Option 

A 

B 

- - - 
- - 
- 
n/a 

C 

significantly adverse 
adverse 
slightly adverse 
not applicable 

Safety 

"Do 
nothing" 

deteriorating 
level,  
not compatible 
with 
challenges 

D 

New Agency 

EASA 

Eurocontrol 
mandates 

integrated, holistic 
approach 

improvement limited by 
disintegration of safety 
matters 

as option C, but even less 
efficient as distinct from 
all other safety matters 

high overall efficiency 

overall reduced 
efficiency 

integrated enforcement 
mechanisms 

enforcement legally 
open 

standardisation tools in 
place 

no standardisation 
platform 

no interfaces problems 

persisting interfaces 
problems 

more interfaces problems 

separation regulation / 
service provision 

reduced separation of 
regulation and service 

integrated knowledge 
management 

split knowledge 

knowledge management 
challenges 

- - - 

SES, community policy 

against policy 

against policy 

Economy 

- - 

Envmt 

Social 

other 

- 

- - 

n / a 

+ + + 
high efficiency, best cost 
/saving ratio 
best positive impact to 
aviation market and 
economy 

+ + 

+ 

+ + 

0 

+ + 

+ 

+ 

+ 

0 

+ 

0 

0 

0 

0 

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36 

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Looking  at  this  comparison,  and  based  on  the  reference  line  given  by  the  status  quo 
imperatively  requiring  action,  firstly  it  is  pointed  out  that  the  assessment  of  option  D 
(Establish a new Agency) revealed that it does not include any advantage over the options B 
(Extend EASA) or C (Extend EUROCONTROL mandates). In contrary, this option adds up 
the individual partial disadvantages incurred by the other two. Therefore, it can be excluded 
as clearly being inferior, limiting the further, detailed comparison to options B and C. 

With regard to the safety impact, the option C suffers from the consequences of the failure to 
achieve  a  holistic  approach.  Option  C  will  fail  to  provide  standardisation  inspections  and 
enforcement of competence functions. It will maintain a split of safety competences between 
two  organisations,  EASA  and  EUROCONTROL.  Therefore,  in  spite  of  a  certain  degree  of 
positive safety results option C is considerably weaker than option B. 

The same applies for the economical impact, where the key cost figures among the different 
options  follow  the  same  vein  but  are  based  on  the  very  different  efficiency  results  of  those 
options.  Hence,  the  option  to  extend  EASA  is  supported  by  its  higher  overall  efficiency,  so 
receives higher scores for the incurred effects both with regard to cost and to general market 
development factors emerging from the measure. This comparison of qualitative nature, while 
already  providing  a  clear  result,  reflects  the  fact  that  air  safety  is  hardly  measurable  and 
especially  an  economic  and  social  quantification  attached  loss  of  lives  is  regarded 
inappropriate.  Instead,  the  figures  below,  based  on  conservative  assumptions  and  on  the 
figures provided in section 2.2 above, reveal a potential development of European air safety 
related cost: Starting from the average of 920 Mio. € of accident related cost per year incurred 
at  global  level,  the  European  damage  is  carefully  estimated  to  be  at  10%  of  that  figure.64 
Taking  the  duplication  of  traffic  until  the  year  2025  into  account,  and  leaving  aside  the 
exponential effect of related risk growth, the resulting accident figures should be multiplied 
by 2, arriving at 184 Mio. € of annual economic  damage in Europe. The total contribution to 
that figure emerging from aerodrome and ATM/ANS safety is assumed to be in the area of at 
least  10%  each,  thus  for  each  of  those  sectors  an  average  annual  economic  damage  of  9,2 
Mio. € (today) and 18,4 Mio. € (year 2025, followi
ng the "Do nothing" option) is assumed. 
The  estimated  annual  effort  for  option  B  in  the  area  of  aerodromes  (2,380  Mio.  €)  and 
ATM/ANS (2,240 Mio. €) i ndicates the minor nature of the effort compared to the potential 
saving of accident related damage.  

The same applies for option C; however, a justified quantification of the reduced efficiency 
incurred by this option must be taken into account by 10% reduction of effects on the safety 
side and another 10% increase of organisational effort. 

Following this very conservative comparison, only a slight safety improvement created by the 
measure  will  lead  to  an  economic  "break  even".  Annex  1,  figure  6  indicates  a  related 
sensitivity analysis. 

A key difference of the two options appears for the social impact. While both options create 
positive effects due to the safety and economical impacts – again reduced in the case of option 
C – this EUROCONTROL option scores with the sole advantage of not requiring any change 

64 

As  the  aviation  accident  statistics  are  based  on  low  numbers  hence  are  highly  volatile,  it  is  most 
appropriate to take the broadest level of numbers and "shrink" them to the level needed, based on valid 
and conservative assumptions. The numbers given do not include the significant contribution by non-
accident  occurrences,  especially  by  incidents  involving  taxi  or  other  ground  operation,  ref.  [7],  page 
30f. 

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37 

   EN 

                                                 
in  the  human  resources  aspect.  However,  as  mitigating  tools  can  be  used  in  the 
implementation  phase  of  the  EASA  option,  this  slightly  non  positive  element  is 
overcompensated by the other advantages of option B. 

As  regards  the  issue  of  timeliness  to  reach  operational  cruising  speed,  both  options  have 
individual  weaknesses  and  advantages:  EASA  will  benefit  from  the  integrated  knowledge 
management  and  the  existing,  safety-oriented  structure,  while  EUROCONTROL  benefits 
from  having  ATM/ANS  expertise  already  in  house.  The  matter  of  civil-military  interface, 
though  certainly  important,  pertains  to  the  technical  implementation  phase  and  does  not 
indicate a preference for one of the option.  

In total, the above indicates that option B is clearly the most preferred option. Considering a 
weighing of the different fields of impact, and concluding that the impact  on  safety  matters 
are by and large the most important effect as compared with economic and social ones, this 
result appears even more pronounced. Therefore, it is concluded that the very prominent 
option to meet the current and future safety challenges face by the European aviation is 
option B, extending the scope of competence of EASA to the regulation of aerodromes as 
well  as  of  ATM  and  ANS.  This  solution  is  also  fully  consistent  with  the  Community 
policies in aviation safety and completes the Single European Sky and SESAR initiatives 
by adding the required safety element. 

7 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

This  section  highlights  the  tools  and  rationale  available  for  a  continuous  and  systemic 
monitoring process as well as evaluation of impacts and results achieved, which are supposed 
to  be  compared  with  the  intentions  and  especially  with  the  related  general,  specific  and 
operational objectives as listed in section 3. 

Regulation  (EC)  216/2008  provides  already  an  evaluation  tool  by  its  Art.  62.  According  to 
this provision, an external evaluation of the impact of the Regulation, of the Agency and its 
working practices has to be performed at periodic intervals. It is based on a broad stakeholder 
consultation  and  shall  include  an  action  plan.  Following  an  initial  evaluation  to  be 
commissioned  within  three  years  after  the  taking  up  of  the  new  duties  by  EASA,  this 
evaluation shall be performed every five years. By applying the same rationale, it is intended 
to  suggest  reducing  the  initial  evaluation  period  following  the  enactment  of  these  extension 
measures  to  three  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  selected  Implementing  Rules. 
Furthermore,  Articles  10  and  24  on  safety  oversight  and  standardisation  inspections  of 
Member States and their undertaking are adequate tools to assess if the measures are correctly 
implemented,  promote  and  enforce  remedial  actions  if  they  are  not  and  give  the  European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission a systemic indication of the effectiveness of the 
adopted measure and of its Implementing Rules. 

For  technical  detail  and  explanation  on  possible  proposed  indicators  balanced  against  the 
established objectives, it can be referred to the preliminary Impact Assessment, ref. [2], page 
67ff, on an exemplary basis. 

All in all, therefore a complete and satisfying set of monitoring and evaluation tools is put in 
place to ensure the correct path for implementation and achievement of the objectives listed 
under section 3. 

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Annex 1: 

Figures 

Figure 2.2.2.2: European Organisations 

European Organisations for aviation safety

ECAC & JAA
(42)

EUROCONTROL    (38)
Armenia 1 Monaco    Ukraine1

Azerbaijan1
Georgia1

GASR 
(28)

Moldova1

Turkey

Switzerland

Serbia

Norway

Iceland

EUROPEAN 
UNION
(27)

Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece

Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Poland

Portugal
Romania
Slovak Rep.
Spain
Slovenia
Sweden
U.K.

Estonia
Latvia

ICAO  EUR
(only a regional 
office; the 
Organisation is 
ICAO)
(55)

Algeria2
Andorra
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Morocco2
Russian Fed. +
Kaliningrad FIR
San Marino
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Tunisia2
Uzbekistan

Austria
Bulgaria
Cyprus3

Hungary
Luxembourg

Albania 1 Bosnia H.1 Croatia    FYROM1

Montenegro

UNMIK4

EUROPEAN COMMON AVIATION AREA (36)

1Candidates to JAA
2Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are situated in the ICAO 
AFI Region, but are served by the ICAO EUR/NAT 
Office
3ICAO Cairo Office (MID), in addition to EUR, is 
accredited in Cyprus
4United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo; Additional associated party of ECAA

A
S
A
E

)
1
3
(

n
i
e
t
s
n
e
t
h
c
e
i

L

7
0
0
2

y
l
u
J

Figure 2.2.1: Western-built Jet Aircraft Accident Costs 1997-2006 (ref. [11], page 13) 

EN 

39 

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Figure 2.2.2: 2006 Runway Excursion Accidents (ref. [11], page 26) 

Figure 2.2.3: 2006 Ground damage Accidents (ref. [11], page 28) 

EN 

40 

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EN 

41 

   EN 

 
Figure 2.2.4: 2006 Approach & Landing Accidents (ref. [11], page 29) 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
Figure 2.3.1: Factors of safety threat 

Increasing Pressure
• Traffic Growth
• Technological Changes

Existing Regulatory framework
• Slow, consensus based

decision making

• Different and overlapping bodies
• Lack of central coordination
• different safety levels

European Aviation Safety

Existing Rules
• Lack of enforcement and harmonization
• Existing gaps
• differences in certification and oversight

Figure 4.2.1: Aerodrome characteristics 

Number  Public use 

IFR 

Typical Infrastructure and use 

50 

Yes 

Yes 

Major and hub airports, more than 50 000 annual 
movements,  long  runways,  intensely  used  by 
large aircraft 

650 

Yes 

Yes 

1. Same as above, but less actual movements 

1445 

Yes / No 

No 

2.  Shorter  runways,  no  or 
limited  use  by 
passenger  aircraft,  instrument  procedures  serving 
low  end  scale  of  commercial  and  corporate  type 
use 

Shorter,  non-IFR  runways  not  allowing  (regular) 
use  of  commercial  operation,  partial  grass 
runways,  very  high  amount  of  general  and 
recreational operation 

3000 

No 

No 

very  short,  mostly  grass  runways,  recreational 
operation only 

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Figure 5.2.2: Relation of savings 

Hyp 1: 500 airports

2FTEs

4FTEs

6FTEs

DO NOTHING

EASA EXTENSION

Hyp 1: 1000 airports

2FTEs

4FTEs

6FTEs

DO NOTHING

EASA EXTENSION

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Figure 6: Cost sensitivity analysis 

Based on the conservative analysis provided in section 6, in Mio. € / year:  

Global 
damage 
European 
damage 
aerodrome 
contribution to 
damage 
ATM 
contribution to 
damage 

Cost option B 

Cost option C 

aerodrome  2,380 
ATM 
2,240 
aerodrome  2,618* 
ATM 
2,464* 

* Cost of option B * 110 % due to reduced efficiency 

today 

920 

92 

9,2 

2025 

1840 

184 

18,4 

9,2 

18,4 

share of cost (%) 
2025 
today 
12,935 
12,174 
14,228 
13,391 

25,87 
24,348 
28,457 
26,783 

The  sensitivity  analysis  reveals  that  the  cost  incurred  by  the  measure  is  in  the  area  of  25% 
today, with a decreasing share in the following years. 

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Annex 2 

List of Abbreviations 

AFIS 
AIB 
AIM 
AIP 
AIS 
AMC 
ANS 
ANSP 
ATM 
ATS 
CFIT 
CRD 

COM 
CS 
EAD 
EASA 
ECAC 
ERs 
ESARR 
EU 
FTE 
FUA 
GA 
GAP 
GASR 
IATA 
ICAO 
ICB 
IFR 
IRs 
IS-SG 
JAA 
JAR 
MET 
Mil 
MS 
MTOM 
NAA 
NAV 
NPA 
NPV 
NSA 
OPS 
PRC 
PRU 
RFFS 
RIA 
R&D 

Aerodrome Flight Information Service 
Accident Investigation Body 
Aeronautical Information Management 
Aeronautical Information Publication 
Aeronautical Information Service 
Acceptable Means of Compliance 
Air Navigation Services 
Air Navigation Service Provider 
Air Traffic Management 
Air Traffic Services 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
Comment Response Document 

Communication 
Certification Specification 
European Aeronautical Database (Eurocontrol) 
European Aviation Safety Agency 
European Civil Aviation Conference 
Essential Requirements 
EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory requirements 
European Union 
Full Time Equivalent 
Flexible Use of Airspace (between civil and military) 
General Aviation 
Ground Accident Prevention programme 
Group of Aerodrome Safety Regulators 
International Air Transport Association 
International Civil Aviation Organisation 
Industry Consultation Body 
Instrument Flight Rules 
Implementing Rules 
Inter-Service Steering Group 
Joint Aviation Authorities 
Joint Aviation Requirements 
Meteorological services 
Military 
Member States (EU) 
Maximum Take Off Mass 
National (or Civil) Aviation Authority 
Navigation 
Notice for Proposed Amendment 
Net Present Value 
National Supervisory Authorities 
Operations 
Performance Review Commission (Eurocontrol) 
Performance Review Unit (Eurocontrol) 
Rescue & Fire Fighting Services 
Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Research and Development 

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SAFA 
SARPS 
SES 
SESAR 
SESAR JU 
SMS 
SSC 
SUR 

Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft 
Standards And Recommended Practices 
Single European Sky 
Single European Sky ATM Research 
SESAR Joint Undertaking 
Safety Management System 
Single Sky Committee 
Surveillance 

Annex 3 

References 

"Extending the tasks of the European Aviation Safety Agency: An agenda for 2010", 
[1] 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2005) 578 

"Impact  Assessment  on  the  extension  of  EASA  competences  to  ANS,  ATM  and 

[2] 
airports", Final Report, Ecorys, 15 September 2005 (available at www.easa.eu.int) 

"  A  framework  for  driving  performance  improvement",  Report  of  the  High  Level 

[3] 
Group for the future European Aviation Regulatory Framework, July 2007 

"Towards  A  More  Performing  European  Aviation  System",  Single  Sky  Conference, 

[4] 
Brussels, 22 Jan 2008 

"Opinion No. 3/2007 for amending Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 to extend its scope to 
[5] 
the  regulation  of  safety  and  interoperability  of  aerodromes",  EASA,  06  December  2007 
(available at www.easa.eu.int) 

"Essential  Requirements",  Attachment  1  to  [5],  EASA,  December  2007  (available  at 

[6] 
www.easa.eu.int) 

"Regulatory  Impact  Assessment",  Attachment  2  to  [5],  EASA,  December  2007 

[7] 
(available at www.easa.eu.int) 

[8] 
"Extension  of  the  EASA  system  to  the  regulation  of  ATM  and  ANS",  Notice  of 
Proposed  Amendment  (NPA)  No.  16/2007,  EASA,  30  November  2007  (available  at 
www.easa.eu.int) 

"Annual  Safety  Report  2007",  Safety  Regulation  Commission,  EUROCONTROL, 

[9] 
2007 (available at www.easa.eu.int) 

"Impact  Assessment  on  2nd  extension  of  EASA's  competencies:  Preliminary 

[10] 
Assessment of administrative costs", Draft Report, DG TREN F3, February 2007 

[11] 

"Safety Report 2006", IATA, April 2007 

"Opinion No. 1/2008, “Extension of the EASA system to the regulation of Air Traffic 
[12] 
Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS)”, EASA, 15 April 2008 (available at 
www.easa.eu.int) 

[13]  Comment  Response  Document  (CRD)  to  NPA  2007-16,  "Extension  of  the  EASA 
system to the regulation of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services, EASA, 18 
March 2008 

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