Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The advantages and benefits of the euro: Time for assessment
Date: 2008-05-29
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Economic and Monetary Union, economic consequence, economic policy, euro, euro area, stability pact

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3. General comments

3.1
These proposals should allow the four multi-annual
programmes on education, youth and culture to function more
smoothly.

In previous opinions,

3.2
the EESC has encouraged the
Commission: to simplify access to programmes and grants for
any bodies submitting projects; to operate more closely along-
side Member States so as to encourage them to consult other
organisations when laying down annual guidelines; to shorten
the time involved in allocating grants and; not to jeopardise the
implementation of projects, inter alia by allowing the selection
decisions to take too long; these sometimes take so long that
feasibility studies are out of date because they are carried out
too far in advance of projects being implemented.

4. Specific comments

Given the comments made in points (9), (11), (15) and (17) of
the
the explanatory memorandum of

the decision in hand,

EESC recommends that, for the purposes of transparency, good
governance and public information, the Commission reiterate its
declared undertaking to inform the Programme Committee and
the European Parliament immediately of any decisions it might
take under amended Article 9.1 of Decision 1720/2006/EC.

The EESC recommends that the new Article 9.1(a) (see Article 1
‘…it shall
of the proposed Decision) be amended as follows:
adopt these decisions without the assistance of a committee and
shall
immediately inform the Programme Committee and European
Parliament thereof.’

The EESC notes that the Commission is not proposing this addi-
tion, because it feels that i) this would amend the proposal in
such a way that it would no longer be in keeping with the
committee procedure rules governed by Article 202 of the TEC
and ii) the explanatory memorandum of the present decision is
binding enough here.

Brussels, 29 May 2008.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The advantages and benefits of the
euro: Time for assessment

(2008/C 224/27)

On 27 September 2007, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its
Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on

The advantages and benefits of the euro: Time for assessment.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible
for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 30 April 2008. The rapporteur
was Mr Burani.

At its 445th plenary session, held on 28 and 29 May 2008 (meeting of 29 May), the European Economic
and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 130 votes to none with three abstentions.

1. Conclusions and recommendations

Ten years on from the introduction of

the single
1.1
currency, the EESC has decided to take stock of the benefits
brought by the euro for individuals and businesses: not so much
the economic and monetary benefits — for there are econo-
mists, politicians and media commentators to do that — but
rather from the point of view of users. In other words, a
decade of experience has shown that the euro has proved its
worth and that
this prestigious, stable
currency has enabled Europe to hold its own internationally, but
how do users see the single currency?

the introduction of

1.2
This opinion takes as its starting point an overview of
the benefits brought by the introduction of the euro: a mixture

of light and the shade cast by the international economic situa-
tion. It focuses on the results of the periodic Eurobarometer
surveys ascertaining whether and to what extent the European
public appreciates these benefits.

1.3
The results are encouraging in many countries, but in
some others a large proportion of those interviewed still say
that they find the ‘new’ currency hard to use, that they calculate
prices in the old national currency and that they blame the euro
for higher prices, and only half feel that, ultimately, the intro-
duction of the single currency has boosted economic growth.
Basically, the survey reveals that not always, in all countries, has
the euro been enough of a success with the people.

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1.4
An initial reaction to these results could be to question
whether the responses were truly objective and informed: the
EESC rejects this approach. Rather than rejoicing at the success,
we need to understand the causes underlying the negative
perceptions and ask ourselves what can be done to eliminate
the effective or subjective reasons for dissatisfaction.

1.5
The perceptions which are genuinely well founded can be
eliminated or tempered by targeted policies or measures, as
in the case of
improved payment systems (SEPA), or by
suitable measures to curb price increases. The latter must be
compatible with the principles of the free market and competi-
tion.

1.6
Subjective perceptions are more difficult to deal with:
opinions must be treated with the greatest respect and the
deep-rooted causes underlying negative perceptions must
be sought. A communication strategy is, of course, necessary,
but it should be implemented in such a way as to take into
account the differing national and social priorities of the
target publics.

1.7
The Eurobarometer survey showed deep-rooted differ-
ences in views in the various Member States: this means that
solutions based on standardised schemes must be rejected.
More specifically, perceptions differ widely between the
social strata and between people with different levels of
education. Communication strategies
should therefore be
targeted to achieve the maximum effect with the resources
used.

It should therefore be stressed that a euro communica-
1.8
tion strategy is not enough to achieve optimum results: the
survey strongly suggests that the euro is very often seen as the
symbol of Europe: opposition is not, therefore, aimed the euro
itself but rather — in the view of some people — at the very
the euro communication
concept of
strategy needs to be seen as part of a long-term, broad-based
policy whose goal will have been achieved when the public
identifies so fully with the concept of ‘Europe’ that euroscepti-
cism loses its hold.

‘Europe’. Consequently,

1.9
The concept of Europe as a political and social entity as
well as an economic entity is, moreover, dependent on gradual
achievement of social conditions based on fairness, cooperation
and absence of social conflict: this will only be possible if the
public can see evidence of practical action. No information
drive will be successful if these conditions are not put in place.

1.10
The main priority for ensuring greater acceptance of
the euro would therefore be economic and social policies in the
EU to support employment and incomes while providing appro-
priate social protection systems. This would enable citizens to
gain a more tangible appreciation of the European project and
consequently to accept the euro.

The EESC is aware of its responsibilities and its role: as
1.11
the representative of
is an institution
which is close to the public, workers and the business com-
munity. It must cooperate practically in future initiatives, if

the social partners it

necessary with actions on the ground. Links with similar,
national bodies and the work of individual EESC members in
respect of their — European and national — trade associations
will be particularly useful.

2. Background

2.1
Six years on from the introduction of the euro, the EESC
feels it is time to take stock of the impact of the new currency
on the public in the countries which adopted it. At first glance,
this seems an easy task, given the wealth of
literature from
innumerable sources: the Commission, the ECB, the EP, universi-
ties, research institutes, specialised and non-specialised press,
academics and the social partners.

The impression, however,

2.2
is that most publications on
the subject are the result of unilateral experiences and points
of view, or derive from conclusions brokered between
different and sometimes conflicting opinions. While this kind of
approach observes the rules of democracy, the essence of issues
can at times be toned down to suit individual interests and, all
too often, clouded by certain attitudes within the individual
Member States.

2.3
The EESC believes that real progress can only be made if
the situation is approached without preconceptions: given
that the euro is generally deemed to have been an unqualified
success, we need to understand why it is still criticised by
greater or lesser sections of the public, search for the reasons
and, where possible, propose solutions. In so doing, the EESC
does not claim to be revealing any startling discoveries; much
less to want to launch a new public opinion campaign: the aim
of this opinion is more modest — to spark fresh debate on
longstanding, well-known issues.

3. Working methods

3.1
The EESC has taken as a starting point the benefits of
the euro, on the basis of results already obtained or the most
commonly accepted ‘official’ views;
then discusses these
results and views drawn from research on the ground,
concluding with its own analysis of the reasons why the new
currency has been the subject of criticism or less-than-positive
evaluations. Any proposals are, as has been said, intended as a
basis for further discussion.

it

3.2
The principal document consulted was Flash Barometer
No 193, The eurozone, 5 years after the introduction of euro coins
and banknotes — Analytical report, November 2006. The survey
was carried out by the Gallup Organisation, directed by the
Commission DG ECFIN's Eurobarometer Team. Suitably quali-
fied people were interviewed from the last country to join the
euro zone in 2007 (Slovenia) and from the countries that have
joined in 2008 (Malta and Cyprus). Sources from countries
which are not members of the euro zone were deliberately not
consulted as it was deemed that only the experiences of those
directly concerned were relevant
the
research being carried out.

the purposes of

for

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Additional

3.3
information is provided by the September
2007 Eurobarometer survey (1), carried out in the new Member
States: several useful points emerge from a comparison of experi-
ences and expectations.

represents a stable, growing economy, despite economic shocks.
Its external value depends on events, whose effects can be coun-
tered — but certainly not eliminated — by appropriate
economic and monetary policy.

4. The benefits of the euro, according to results and offi-

cial views

4.1
According to Community literature and supporters of
the single currency, the euro has brought a number of bene-
fits, some of which are listed below. The reasons for this, which
by now are well known, are not reproduced, nor are the
comments, which are referred to where necessary in the section
on public perception.

4.2

The list of benefits (without comments) includes:

— a European identity: the euro is its the main, most tangible

driver;

— the euro is an international price comparison tool and

boosts competition;

— it eliminates exchange risks and currency transaction costs;

— it is no longer possible to use currency devaluation as a
lever for competition measures or to adapt commercial stra-
tegies when devaluation seems likely;

— euro zone countries are better protected against external

shocks;

— the euro has helped to moderate inflation and interest rates
(inflation risk premiums have also played some part
in
lowering interest rates);

— the euro is a driving force for growth and jobs under the

Lisbon Strategy;

— Europe now plays a leading role in monetary policy and the

euro has become an established reserve currency;

— the euro is a driving force for stability in the international

economy;

— the euro has greatly facilitated and cut the cost of tourism
and travelling for work purposes, especially within the euro
zone.

Alongside these benefits, which are rarely discussed apart
4.3
from some efforts to tone down claims that they apply across
the board, are the benefits of a ‘strong’ currency, which are
sometimes disputed.

4.4
There must be no ambiguity here: a strong currency has
benefits for some and disadvantages for others, but the
important thing is the assessment of
its net benefit to the
economy: an undoubted advantage of the euro. There is also a
desire for a stable currency, which the euro is, insofar as it

(1) Introduction of the euro in the new member States, Flash Eurobarometer

207, the Gallup Organisation, October 2007.

5. Public perception of the benefits and disadvantages of

the euro

The euro for cash payments: Seven years on from its
5.1
introduction,
it is surprising that 41 % of those surveyed
reported having some difficulty or a lot of difficulty in using
the euro; this percentage is decreasing but remains significant.
The survey does not specify the nature of these problems, but it
is fair to assume that this negative attitude is more emotional
than rational, given that a large majority (ranging from 93 % to
63 % depending on the country) reports having no problems in
recognising euro coins and banknotes. It is likely that those
saying they encounter difficulties are largely the same - some-
times socially disadvantaged - people that did not welcome the
advent of the single currency. In any case, it is hard to reconcile,
statistically, the responses on difficulties encountered with those
on usage.

5.1.1
These doubts are reinforced when a comparison is
made with the September 2007 survey of the new Member
States (NMS): approximately three quarters of those respondents
had seen euro banknotes and coins and 44 % had used them. It is
hard to fathom how it could be that in the euro area 41 % of
those with 10 years' experience of the currency claim to have
difficulties, when this is not the case in the NMS, where 44 %
are using it (or have used it), without raising any problems.

Communication campaigns alone would not bring
5.1.2
about a change in attitudes of this kind: if, as it seems, any diffi-
culties are relatively minor, or minimal, the required course of
action should be targeted national measures. Education, rather
than communication would thus be the key here. But if it is ulti-
mately found that the difficulties that are claimed are merely the
camouflaged expression of an aversion to all things European,
specific measures will have no effect. A change in attitudes
towards the euro will go hand in hand with a gradual accep-
tance of the European idea.

The euro as a benchmark for price calculations and a
5.2
factor in spending habits: One element anticipated from day
one was that for a long time to come some people (the propor-
tion varying from country to country) would continue to think
in their old national currency. The survey has confirmed this
prediction: when calculating prices, around 40 % of consumers
still use their previous national currency as a benchmark —
always or sometimes — for both everyday and exceptional
purchases.

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5.2.1
In terms of spending habits, the percentage of respon-
dents reporting that the euro had a deterrent or incentive effect
on their spending remains high (59 %); but the proportion
viewing the single currency as a neutral factor is gradually
increasing (from 31 % in 2003 to 41 % in 2007). At the same
time, there has been a decrease in the percentage of
those
stating that they buy less out of fear of spending too much
(from 39 % to 33 %) while, conversely, the proportion of those
who spend more because they do not realise how much they
have spent has remained consistent (26 % to 25 %).

5.4.1
Experience has shown that many cases of retail price
increases, in conjunction with or subsequent to the adoption of
the euro, are largely due to the rounding up of prices that
converted into decimal figures lower than 5. This ploy has been
facilitated by a lack of vigilance on the part of the authorities
and by those consumers who consider the value of the small
coins to be negligible; it has been particularly pronounced in
countries whose previous national currency had a low unit
value (Italy, for example). The EESC maintains that eliminating
the 1- and 2-cent coins is totally inadvisable: the convenience
cited by certain sections of the market must be weighed against
the issue of general interest.

5.2.2
The two aspects considered — reference to previous
national currencies and the euro as a neutral factor — are not
necessarily related, nor is there any reason to believe that the
two matching percentages (around 40 %) refer to the same
group.

is useful

5.3
The usefulness of dual price displays and consumer
preferences: Two halves of the national samples were asked two
to have dual price
different questions: whether it
displays and whether people would like this to be continued.
This produced corresponding answers: a significant majority
(around 60 %) did not consider this either useful or neces-
sary after completion of an appropriate transition period.
It should be noted that the percentage against dual price displays
has risen steadily over time: a clear sign that the single currency
is becoming (or has become, if we interpret it more positively)
ingrained in people's daily lives.

5.3.1
The responses given on dual price displays are not
surprising, considering how much time has passed since the
introduction of the euro. However, this aspect is of key impor-
tance to the countries that have recently joined the euro
area (Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) and those next in line to
join (Baltic States and Slovakia). The Eurobarometer survey of
November 2007 shows that fears of price hikes following adop-
tion of the euro are high; experience has shown that dual price
displays can be a useful deterrent provided they are accompanied
by checks and deterrent measures. This has not always been the
case in the first wave of euro countries. The Commission has
recently decreed that dual pricing should be mandatory for six
months but not continue beyond a year.

5.4
Banknotes and coins: As regards satisfaction with the
current denominations of banknotes and coins, it emerges from
the survey that, while no changes seem necessary regarding
banknotes, a significant percentage of respondents (varying
from 80 % in Finland and Germany to 33-35 % in Ireland and
Italy) are in favour of reducing the range of euro coins, and
specifically eliminating the 1- and 2-cent coins,
for greater
convenience and to simplify payments. On the other hand, the
majority fears that the removal of small euro denominations
may lead to a rise in prices: a widely held fear even in coun-
tries where the majority would like the smaller coins removed.

5.5
Particular attention should be given to the issue of using
the euro when travelling outside the euro area. An average
of over 50 % of those who travelled outside the euro area stated
that they used the euro, to a greater or lesser extent; however,
the percentages vary considerably from country to country,
from 72 % of Greeks to 38 % of Finns. We can be glad that the
euro is welcome in many tourism-oriented countries, thanks to
its prestige and number of users.

5.5.1
However, on a cautionary note, it would be advisable
to weigh up the convenience of not having to obtain foreign
currency when travelling abroad and the cost of using euros:
closer inspection shows that in most cases the euro exchange
rate charged by businesses in non-euro countries with
‘strong’ currencies is often much higher than the official
rate. This aspect was not highlighted in the survey, nor raised
by the respondents: a clear sign that
the cost of changing
money is considered secondary or not considered at all.

The chapter on current use of

the single currency
5.6
concludes with the key question: overall, what is the public
perception of the euro? Is it more advantageous or disad-
vantageous? Analysing the responses to this question is not
only of key importance to future communication strategies
but requires reflection on EU euro policy and on relations
between national governments and their citizens.

5.6.1
The percentage of citizens viewing the adoption of
the euro as advantageous was, according to the latest survey,
48 %: a considerable drop since the September 2002 survey
(59 %), but even more significant — and worrying — is the
steady downward trend over time. While a small stable percen-
tage perceives no change since the introduction of the euro (7-
8 %) there is a steady increase in those with the opposite
opinion (from 29 to 38 %).

5.6.2
In the breakdown per country of positive percep-
tions, the highest percentages are found in Ireland (75 %),
Finland (65 %) and Luxembourg (64 %), i.e. countries enjoying
considerable economic growth; negative perceptions prevail,
however, in Italy (48 %), Greece (46 %) and Germany (44 %);

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with France just above average (51 %). We should be cautious
about establishing a direct correlation between a positive
perception of the euro and economic growth. While indeed
it is true that the more positive countries include those with
good growth and vice versa (Italy and Greece), it is also the case
that the two largest euro area countries, Germany and France,
have positive growth and relatively negative perceptions.

paragraphs 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 (2). The most positive categories are
those that all socio-demographic analysis deems most informed:
men more so than women,
the self-employed and clerical
workers more than manual workers and the unemployed, young
people more than older people, urban dwellers more than rural
dwellers, those with educational qualifications more than those
with low levels of education. More information increases
one's critical faculties and maturity.

The EESC believes that this question is the crux of
5.6.2.1
the entire survey: as already touched on at paragraph 5.1.1,
there is a need to explore whether, or to what extent, there is a
correlation between satisfaction with the euro as a
currency and acceptance of the EU; there could also be a
correlation with economic conditions, which may, simplisti-
cally, be identified with the euro. In other words, it is possible
there is an emotional or ideological element involved in
people's perceptions of
the euro as a currency, which has
nothing to do with the currency per se.

5.6.3 Modest economic growth has many causes, often over-
lapping and interrelated,
inter alia, and apart from
including,
those currency-related (inflation, exchange and interest rates),
productivity, competitiveness, wage levels, spending, the balance
of payments,
industrial relations and public deficit. This is a
complex issue, the subject of debate among politicians, econo-
mists and the social partners;
the average person, however,
tends to simplify matters, focusing on a tangible element of
key relevance to their daily life, i.e. their money.

There is a tendency among specialists to blame weak
5.6.4
economic growth on monetary policy, which some researchers
and political parties see as guilty of
failing to resist rising
exchange rates and to lend adequate support to growth and
employment by a careful adjustment of interest rates. This is not
the right place for opening a debate on the matter, but here
once again public opinion perceives the euro as being at the
root of the problem.

Criticism of

the euro, particularly evident

5.6.5
in low-
growth countries, also pertains, to a certain extent in countries
with higher growth rates; there, however, opposition is accen-
tuated by the fact that before its introduction, certain sections of
the public were reluctant to abandon their own strong and
prestigious currency — for them, a symbol of prestige and of
their national identity. Moreover, these reasons are still cited in
countries that have opted out of the euro.

5.7
clearly proves

The analysis of the positive perceptions of the euro
the argument outlined in

the validity of

5.7.1
It would be too easy to think that communication
alone can overcome the dislike of the euro, but every decision
must, however, be assessed in the light of each country's indivi-
dual situation. There are countries where information is all too
effective, but often with a critical slant: political parties and
sometimes governments have a preponderant
influence on
public opinion. The result is not disinformation, but communi-
cation based on convictions that must, for democratic reasons,
be respected. On the other hand, however, a clear impression
exists that the ‘pro’ majority should put up a determined,
robust and more explicit defence of the euro.

However, a campaign in support of the euro based
5.7.2
primarily on political, economic or monetary factors would
probably have little impact on public opinion: greater consensus
could be reached by bearing in mind and highlighting the prac-
tical aspects closer to people's needs. This kind of communi-
cation is certainly the most suited to being absorbed by the
it regards everyday life, without the need to refer to
public:
abstract principles.
In other words, a simple — but not
simplistic — approach is needed. Official bodies are the least
suited to this kind of communication campaign. It would be far
better to entrust this — after briefing them on the issue — to
the business community and the social partners, which are
nearer the public and would certainly be more persuasive.

5.7.3
If we look at the practical advantages cited, the prin-
cipal one is easier and less costly travel abroad (particularly in
the euro area, but also in non-euro countries); then there is the
fact that it is easier to compare prices (3). It is this plus point,
and particularly the lack of foreign exchange fees and price
certainty, that can be flagged by tourism bodies, estate agencies,
the tourism industry in general and issuers of payment cards.
The financial sector has a key role here: the most recent devel-
opments in the area of
fund transfers (SEPA) have made
payments in the euro area just as secure, fast and free of charge
as domestic transfers. However, supervisory authorities will need
to be extremely vigilant to ensure rigorous compliance with
the rules on the part of the financial sector.

(2) In the absence of a specific socio-demographic analysis per country, it

is not possible to expand on the argument in paragraph 5.6.4.

(3) This reason, cited by 30 % of respondents probably relates to national

markets, but can be extended by analogy to the euro area.

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Less clear, a priori, is the emphasis on the third reason
5.7.4
(in order of
i.e.
importance) cited by the euro supporters,
Europe's reinforced status; this more general and theoretical
argument is part of a broad drive of a general nature.

that convergence would not affect locally-produced and
consumed goods and services:
in other words, the part of
spending that is by far the greatest and most directly perceptible
to consumers.

5.8
Looking at the criticisms of the euro is even more
interesting. The vast majority of people (81 % in 2006 and stea-
dily rising) consider it responsible for price increases. This
attitude dates back to even before the euro came into circula-
tion, when there were already fears that suppliers of goods and
services — and particularly shops — would profit from the
conversion of their national currency by rounding prices up or
increasing them illegally. The Commission reassured people that
this would not happen; governments did their bit by promoting
agreements with business; consumer associations advised vigi-
lance.

5.8.1 What
then happened in practice is part of recent
history: in some countries the agreements were respected (and
the EESC feels that Austria deserves a mention as a fine
example), in others less so and in others still, hardly at all. This
is not the time or place to start a blame game, suffice to say
that in many countries price increases coincided exactly
with the introduction of the euro. Hence the public feeling
that the price increases were generated by the euro, a feeling
which still remains and is becoming more ingrained in the
absence of any communication efforts to present the issue
fairly: i.e. that while certain people have taken the opportunity
to profit from the euro, it remains an inherently neutral instru-
ment. There has been no attempt at a communication effort of
this kind, or where there has, it has been rather half-hearted.

5.8.2
The increases that have occurred since then have
nothing to do with the euro: once it was introduced and bedded
down, the currency reflected rather than caused market
trends. Any talk of inflation, exchange rates, or speculation
is irrelevant here: these would have affected all of the indi-
vidual national currencies anyway, perhaps
to an even
greater extent than has happened with the euro. This point —
and the one made in the previous paragraph — must be clari-
fied once and for all. This argument, which is the key to
combating the scepticism and negativity which still surround
the euro, needs to be debated and become the spearhead of a
communication drive involving the social partners, govern-
ments and the Commission.

5.8.3
Another argument, which has some connection with
the previous one, is that of price convergence, i.e. the assertion
that the euro has contributed to tangible price convergence
across the euro area as a result of the competition that would
be established between the euro countries as well as pressure
from consumers, who would finally be able to compare prices.
This issue was an element of the campaign preceding the launch
of the euro, and was one of its selling points. The campaign was
in any case likely to arouse unrealistic expectations: it did not in
fact indicate the limits of convergence. It was not pointed out

The survey appears to bear this out: 68 % of

the
5.8.4
sample feels that the euro has not contributed to price conver-
gence (45 % plus 23 % ‘don't knows’). 32 % state the opposite.
Crucial
information is however lacking from this part of the
survey: there is no indication of whether the replies are of an
intuitive, emotive type, or based on direct experience (travel
abroad, cross-border purchases). In the communication drive
there will be a need to scale down the expectations attached
to price convergence, explaining why its scope is limited. It
would also be helpful to emphasise that non-existent or weak
convergence in sectors other than ‘local’ goods and services is
the result of
factors entirely unconnected with the single
currency, such as the law of supply and demand, transport
costs, or taxation. In brief, the euro has contributed to price
convergence wherever possible, but price differentials continue
to exist, as is the case in the United States, a country which has
always had a single currency.

6. Political aspects

6.1
The vast majority (75 %) of respondents believe the euro
plays an important role as an international currency, but a
much lower percentage is interested in the exchange rate,
although they generally have some idea about
the growing
strength of the euro against the dollar. On the other hand an
almost identical, or slightly higher, percentage (78 %) maintain
that the euro has had no effect (either positive or negative)
on their sense of being European. The breakdown of answers
per country provides food for thought, and a little puzzlement:
the countries where the euro is perceived to be important to a
European identity are Ireland (56 %), followed at some distance
by Italy (28 %) and Luxembourg (19 %); the lowest percentages
are to be found in the Netherlands, Greece, Germany and
Austria (10-14 %).

6.1.1
One possible explanation, though valid for only some
countries, lies in the fact that among those in which the euro is
seen as having a more positive impact on European identity is
Italy, whose previous national currency had experienced serious
fluctuations, while among those having a less
favourable
opinion is Germany, a country with pride in its old strong and
stable currency. As regards other countries, various reasons and
perceptions may come into play: disinformation,
indifference
and less support for the idea of Europe as the issuer of a
major currency. This last point seems to be borne out by a
in all countries, including those with a
rather surprising fact:
favourable opinion of the euro, a large majority of the sample
report that the euro has had no impact on the perception of
a European identity.

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6.1.2 We need to recognise that, some years after its intro-
duction and despite having proven its worth internationally, the
euro does not seem to have made any significant progress in
carving out a role as an element and symbol of European
identity. As this involves feelings based on a wide range of indi-
vidual perceptions, one cannot envisage specific campaigns on
this aimed at changing public opinion: the turnaround will have
to be effected gradually by removing the underlying causes of
those feelings. In other words, the euro will become a symbol
of European identity only when people feel convinced that they
are European.

6.2
There are grounds for optimism with regard to the ques-
tion of whether people expected to see the enlargement of the
euro area to include the new Member States: around 80 %
considered it certain or probable, with a majority across all
countries. The EESC sees this reply as a sign of confidence in
the euro's power of attraction. Such attraction would not
exist if the euro was really considered to be politically weak and
bringing negative consequences in its wake.

7. Coordination of economic policies and the Stability Pact

7.1
These issues, which are at the core of the debate and are
more abstract in nature, should be dealt with separately. The
EESC has for its part dedicated many opinions to this subject,
and may return to it in the near future. For now, it suffices to
point out that about half of the respondents were aware that
economic policies are coordinated across the Member
States, but the majority of them feel that the coordination does
not receive enough attention. The per-country analysis shows,
however, that there are significant variations between the coun-
tries in terms of both levels of knowledge and resulting
opinions. The respondents showed striking objectivity in their
assessments of their own country's economy: people whose
country's economy is performing well are aware of this, and
conversely, people from countries with more economic difficul-
ties are not slow to admit this.

7.2 With regard to the Stability Pact, levels of knowledge
and national differences seem more or less to mirror those
regarding economic policies;
respondents,
however, agree that the Stability Pact guarantees a strong and
stable euro. It is symptomatic that the highest percentages of
those who disagree come from the countries that are most
conscious of price increases, implicitly attributing them to the
euro.

three quarters of

protects the currency from shocks which would affect individual
countries to a greater extent; each person should ask themselves
where their country would be if the single currency had never
existed. What national economy could, by itself, have stood up
to the external events that have unfolded in the last few years
and which may well hit the world economy once again?

8. New Member States (NMS)

It

is impossible to cover all

8.1
the points of analysis
concerning the euro countries and the 11 NMS in a single docu-
ment. The NMS include those who have very recently joined,
and others who are likely to join at some point in the future.
However, an examination of the replies to some ‘key’ questions
of the September 2007 survey may provide some useful food
for thought on future policies to accept the single currency.

8.2
The question on the consequences at national level of
adopting the euro revealed that 53 % of citizens considered
them to be positive, compared with 33 % negative and 15 %
‘don't knows’ (4). The question on the adoption of the euro in
general threw up a broadly similar average result. In both cases,
the percentage of ‘fors’ and ‘againsts’ varied widely from country
to country, with the ‘againsts’ ranging from 55 % in Latvia to
18 % in Romania;
the negative attitude is generally more
marked in countries with smaller populations.

8.2.1
Comparing these data with those concerning the euro
countries (see point 5.6) shows that the latter have a lower rate
of ‘positives’. The EESC is unsure what to make of this fact
which, if accurate, should probably be ascribed more to overall
dissatisfaction with the EU than to specific dislike of the single
currency (see point 5.6.2).

the effect of

The unknown of the greatest importance in the eyes of
8.3
consumers is the impact of introducing the euro on prices:
three quarters of those interviewed feared price rises, while 11 %
thought
the euro would be neutral and 6 %
expected prices to fall. This should be compared with the figures
for the eurozone countries (see point 5.1), where more than
80 % blame price rises on the single currency; the conclusion
might well be that experience bears out the fears of those who
have not yet adopted it. But this would be a simplistic and
misleading argument: price increases have occurred — and
are continuing to occur — in all European countries and
around the world. It would be interesting to carry out a survey
in other countries to see what reasons are given for prices rises
where there is no euro.

7.3
According to the survey, then, there seems to be a wide-
spread feeling that a country's economic conditions and
price trends (sometimes positive) can be attributed to the
euro, and this is done from each particular (national) perspec-
tive. It is worth pointing out that the overall euro area economy

8.4
The replies to the question on the positive effects of
adopting the euro show that the vast majority of the interview
sample expect the single currency to be a convenient way of
paying for travel abroad, to make it easier to shop in other

(4) The total of more than 100 is due to rounding up.

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C 224/123

countries,
to facilitate price comparisons and to eliminate
currency exchange costs; a smaller percentage considers that the
euro will shield their country from international crises. All these
expectations match the advantages perceived by those who
have already adopted the euro, evidence — even to the fiercest
critics — that expectations have not been disappointed.

For issues of

8.5
less immediate impact, replies are less
clearly positive, with a high rate of ‘don't knows’: this is a clear
sign that citizens are more cautious, or do not reply at all,
regarding issues of less immediate impact. Seen in this light,
the results are highly positive: 66 % consider that the euro will
strengthen Europe's position in the world, and roughly half that
it will bring price stability, boost growth and employment and
will ensure sound public finances. Replies to the question on
lower interest rates were, in contrast, less clear-cut: only a third
gave a positive reply, with the remaining two thirds being
shared equally between the negatives and the undecided.

‘political’

The key question of

8.6
import concerns
perception of the euro as a factor in making people feel
more European. 53 % of the sample replied in the affirmative
and 35 % in the negative: this is in itself reassuring, and is all
the more so considering that in 2004, only 47 % of replies
were positive and 45 % negative. Comparing these figures with
the result of the survey in the eurozone countries (see point
6.1) raises questions: more than three quarters of the latter
stated that the euro has had no effect on how European
they feel.

9. Conclusions

they
The Eurobarometer surveys are valuable in that
9.1
gauge citizens' attitudes toward the euro and see how they
evolve over time: assessments may vary from time to time on
individual aspects, but one-off measures to correct certain
trends could prove inadequate — if not counter-productive — if
the overall political value of an operation which an authorita-
tive politician has presciently called ‘euro diplomacy’ is over-
looked.

9.2
A substantial section of public opinion — in both the
euro countries and the NMS — unarguably harbours strong
reservations about the single currency, but the impression
arising from the general tone of replies to the individual ques-
tions is that negative responses very often mask resistance to
the European venture. In other words, the euro as such is
not being challenged, but rather what it represents in the

Brussels, 29 May 2008.

eyes of the public: a political creation that,
if not actively
opposed, has not been taken on board, and has taken the form
of a currency imposed ‘from above’.

9.3
The sources of anti-European feeling — and towards the
euro, as the practical expression of the European ideal — are
complex. One such source is the presence in every country of
political movements and mass media which oppose the
in spite of official government positions.
European project,
Not
infrequently, governments themselves defend inevitably
unpopular measures by placing the blame on the single currency
or its basic rules. It is difficult to gauge how far such attitudes
are genuinely due to negative feelings or to mere opportunism,
but the outcome is that no ‘European’ policy can be imple-
mented unless it is assimilated by those exercising power:
governments, political parties and the media.

9.4 Organised civil society has a crucial role to play in
this strategy: it is a cross-cutting element that has the advan-
tage of being in direct contact with citizens. It can exercise
bottom-up pressure on centres of power simultaneously
with top-down pressure on citizens: an ideal yet highly
responsible position, which can be fruitful only if unity of
intent is achieved, above and beyond political positions or
national loyalties. The EESC is the only European institution
that meets these requirements and is thoroughly committed
to playing its role of cooperation with the Commission and the
Member States' social partners to the full.

9.5
There is no shortage of arguments that can be deployed
in a campaign to bring the euro, and with it the European idea,
closer to citizens: the economic weight of the eurozone, invest-
ments from around the world in the single currency, and its
progressive adoption as a reserve currency, a buffer against
financial turbulence, price stability and its contribution to main-
taining purchasing power. Objections can be countered with a
question: everyone should ask themselves what would have
happened in their own country if their national currency
had been left alone face-to-face with past, present and
likely future crises.

The main priority for ensuring greater acceptance of the
9.6
euro would in any case be economic and social policies in the
EU to support employment and incomes while providing appro-
priate social protection systems. This would enable citizens to
gain a more tangible appreciation of the European project and
consequently to accept the euro.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS