Commission staff working document - Report from the Commission Synthesis of responses to the Green Paper on detection technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs and other security authorities
Date: 2008-05-23
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: data protection, exchange of information, harmonisation of standards, new technology, public safety, public-private partnership, technical cooperation

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 23.5.2008 
SEC(2008)1957 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 

Synthesis of responses  

to the Green Paper on detection technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities 

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Synthesis of responses 

to the Green Paper on detection technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities 

Introduction 

Recognising  the  important  part  that  detection  equipment  plays  in  security,  the  Commission 
organised  a  Conference  in  2005  entitled:  Public-Private  Security  Dialogue:  Detection 
Technologies and Associated Technologies in the Fight against Terrorism. As a follow-up to 
this conference, a Green Paper on detection technologies was issued at the end of 2006. The 
objective of this Green Paper is to improve the common approach to detection technologies 
by  initiating  a  public-private  dialogue,  defining  the  role  the  Commission  should  play,  and 
identifying the steps forward. This document summarises the responses that the Commission 
received  in  reaction  to  the  Green  Paper.  This  synthesis  of  responses  does  not  commit  the 
Commission to following up on any of the options outlined below. Concrete policy options on 
detection  technologies  may  be  pursued  in  specific  areas,  such  as  explosives,  chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear substances (CBRN), etc. 

Respondents 

The  majority  of  the  Member  States,  several  EU-related  bodies,  companies  and  security 
analysts submitted their answers.  

Public sector 

22 of the 27 Member States and a regional government from Spain submitted responses to the 
Green Paper on detection technologies. 

Furthermore,  5  EU-related  bodies  responded  to  the  Green  Paper:  Europol,  the  Article  29 
Working  Party,  the  JRC-IPSC  (Joint  Research  Centre  —  Institute  for  the  Protection  and 
Security  of  the  Citizen),  the  CTPG  (Counter-Terrorism  Project  Group)  and  the  ECAC 
Technical Task Force (European Civil Aviation Conference).  

Private sector 

The  Commission  received  23  responses  from  individual  companies,  (research)  centres  or 
institutes and 9 from associations or consortia. Additionally, 5 security experts reacted on a 
personal basis. 

Reading Instructions 

The  answers  are  divided  into  two  broad  categories:  public  and  private  sector.  The  public 
sector can be broken down into the Member States (MS) and EU-related bodies (EUR). The 
private sector responses are from individual companies and (research) centres (I), consortia or 
associations (C) and personal responses (P).  

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The  answers  are  summarised  per  category  and  per  question.  Not  all  respondents  answered 
every  question.  How  many  respondents  submitted  an  answer  is  indicated  for  each  question. 
When speaking of ‘all’ or ‘most’, this is relative to the number of respondents that answered 
the specific question; it does not refer to the whole body of respondents. 

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1. Standardisation and security research 

1.1 Standardisation 

1.1.1.  Are common standards needed in detection and related technologies used in the 

work of security authorities? 

18  Member  States  responded  to  this  question.  They  saw  common,  or  at  least  minimal, 
standards  as  being  useful.  The  4  EU-related  bodies  that  answered  this  question  all  think 
common  standards  are  needed.  7  consortia  and  17  individual  companies  or  research 
centres/institutes/institutes answered this question. All believed that standardisation would be 
useful.  5  security  experts  responded  to  this  question.  All  but  one  supported  the  need  for 
standards. All stakeholders identified several areas in which standards would be beneficial. 

Additional remarks include: 

•  Legal implications of data exchange must be kept in mind. 

•  Human rights legislation should be complied with. 

•  Standards should not hinder new technological development. 

•  Standardisation  is  important  to  safeguard  both  the  integrity  and  authenticity  of 
data  shared  between  authorities  (1  I),  and  the  balance  between  security  and 
privacy (1 I). 

Some  remarks  were  made  regarding  the  way  in  which  to  proceed  during  the  process  of 
standardisation: 

•  Standardisation  should  be  market-led  and  developed  in  cooperation  with  the 

industry (1 C, 1 I). 

•  The European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) should prepare and develop 

standards (1 C, 1 I). 

•  All stakeholders should be involved (3 I). 

•  Systems that have proven to be effective can form the basis for the development 
of  technological  and  operational  standards.  Standards  should  be  set  for  the 
different  technologies  that  (sub)  systems  of  a  network  are  made  up  of  so  as  to 
provide  a  baseline  for  detection  procedures.  Well  identified  requirements  and 
operational capabilities should be taken into account (1 I). 

Some observations or reservations include:  

•  Standardisation should not be only European; the US and Europe should engage 
in a joint standardisation effort. Ideally, standardisation should be carried out on a 
global level (2 C, 2 I). In addition, EU legislation should be technology-neutral (1 
C). 

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•  Standards pose a problem with regard to who they are designed for: manufacturers 

or users (2 I). 

1.1.2.  What standards do you consider to be a priority? 

13 MS indicated their priorities. The question was interpreted differently by different MS. 3 
EU-related  bodies  answered  this  question.  7  consortia  or  associations,  10  individual 
companies or (research) centres/institutes and two security experts indicated their priorities. 

All stakeholders identified a number of areas and standards that should be considered to be a 
priority. 

1.1.3.  What standards lack financial support in the pre-standardisation phase? 

4  MS  answered  this  question.  One  European  body  said  it  developed  its  technological 
standards  out  of  a  budget  provided  by  volunteer  Member  States.  4  individual  companies 
answered this question. None indicated specific standards that needed financial support. 

In  general,  all  stakeholders  that  responded  to  this  question  supported  the  idea  of  financial 
support  for  the  development  of  standards.  Few  specific  areas  for  standardisation  were 
considered to lack financial support. 

1.1.4.  To  avoid  any  duplication  and  to  improve  transparency,  would  a  regularly 
updated  list/handbook/searchable  database  of  past,  ongoing  and  planned 
standardisation  efforts  in  detection  and  closely  related  technological  fields  at 
national and European level be useful? 

Public (MS) 

All MS (12) that answered think an updated list/handbook/database would be useful. Secure 
access needs to be guaranteed. 

Public (EUR) 

3 EU-related bodies answered this question. 

One did not consider a database to be a useful instrument (1 EUR) whereas another thought it 
could be, although some standards may be too sensitive to be made public (1 EUR). The third 
organisation  recognised  the  problem  of  bringing  together  the  end-users  of  technology.  It 
proposed  alternatively  that  the  standardisation  body  CEN/CENELEC  take  the  lead  in 
standardisation activities (1 EUR). 

Private (I & C) 

9  individual  companies  or  research  centres/institutes/institutes  and  5  consortia  responded  to 
regularly  updated 
this  question.  All 
list/handbook/searchable database. One expressed doubts as to the usefulness of a database (1 
I). 

idea  of  a 

favourably 

responded 

the 

to 

Private (P) 

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Five  experts  responded  to  this  question.  All  felt  the  proposed  list/database/handbook  is  a 
useful or necessary tool (5 P). It would also prevent vested interest groups from agreeing on a 
standard ‘in secret’ and thereby putting other application vendors at a disadvantage (1 P).  

1.1.5.  Would you be interested in identifying and exchanging best practice in the use 
and handling of data and information collected by detection tools in an effort to 
comply  in  full  with  the  relevant  legislation  and  rules  governing  the  use  of 
evidence in court proceedings? 

Public (MS) 

14  out  of  16  MS  are  interested  in  identifying  and  exchanging  best  practices.  However, 
because of differences in legal systems and regulations, a single ‘best practice’ might not be 
suitable for all MS. 

Public (EUR) 

3 EU-related bodies answered this question, of which 2 indicated their interest in identifying 
and exchanging best practice. The third agency said that use of evidence in court was of no 
interest. 

Private (I & C) 

4 consortia and 9 individual companies or research centres answered this question. 

9  individual  companies  or  research  centres  and  3  consortia  or  associations  said  they  were 
interested. One consortium was not interested. 

Private (P) 

All  five  experts  would  be  interested  in  identifying  and  exchanging  best  practice,  since 
compliance  with  legislation  is  an  important  issue  (5  P).  One  expressed  doubts  regarding 
whether commercial entities would be interested (1 P). 

1.1.6  What would be the best way of identifying and exchanging these practices? 

Public (MS) 

12 MS and a Spanish region mentioned several methods of identifying and exchanging best 
practices in the field mentioned above. The three methods most mentioned are: 

•  expert meetings / working groups; 

•  secure web portal; 

•  seminars/conferences. 

Public (EUR) 

One EU-related body answered that it could play a role by fully supporting these activities. 

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Private (I & C) 

8 individual companies/research centres and 2 consortia provided suggestions. These are:  

•  A  ratification  process  in  which  each  country  specifies  where  and  how  the 

standards are adopted (1 I). 

•  A European network of excellence on security research involving all the Member 
States,  and  responsible  for  reporting  the  main  research  results  and  their 
applications to crime prevention at national level (1 C). 

•  A European Union organisation could be created (1 I). 

•  Workshops for end-users and technology providers with restricted access (2 I). 

•  Semi-formal working parties on specific topics, which in turn report to a central 

management group that disseminates the information (1 I). 

•  EU  and  Member  States-sponsored  forums  with  private  sector  involvement. 
Interaction  and  cross-fertilisation  of  ideas  with  the  public  and  private  sector  of 
other  nations  (e.g.  the  US)  would  also  be  beneficial.  ISO  standards  committees 
have  begun  to  identify  promising  technologies  and  processes.  Their  efforts  will 
benefit from the support of EU customs and security experts (1 I). 

•  Establishing  public-private  partnerships,  workshops,  either  public  or  private 

sector-sponsored conferences (1 I). 

•  Standard tests should be set up and the results disseminated to the relevant parties 

(1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four experts answered this question. They suggested the following methods: 

•  The  EU  CEN-European  Committee  for  Standardisation  could  be  assigned  this 
task. The results could be disseminated through a dedicated web-site (2 P) and/or 
an e-guide (1 P). 

•  A central online reference point (1 P). 

•  Trusted open and closed environment (1 P). 

•  Group of personalities brainstorming (1 P). 

1.2 Security Research 

1.2.1  How should information on security research in Europe be disseminated in order 
to promote competitiveness while avoiding waste of scarce resources?  

Public (MS) 

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13 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. 

It was remarked that the issue of confidentiality and the free market principle should be borne 
in  mind.  Overall,  it  was  seen  as  positive  to  disseminate  information  at  European  level.  The 
mode most mentioned was a separate, secure mechanism or a secure database. A web portal, a 
network of contacts and a centre of excellence were also mentioned. 

Public (EUR) 

Two  EU-related  organisations  answered  this  question.  One  emphasised  the  issue  of 
confidentiality  when  disseminating  information  on  security  research.  The  other  stressed  the 
need for a strong central coordination of research efforts and the sharing of information on a 
restricted basis in Europe. 

Private (I & C) 

9  individual  companies  and  7  consortia  or  associations  answered  this  question.  Some 
respondents remarked that common action and better coordination and information exchange 
is required at national level, across the European Union (EU) and with other close allies, e.g. 
the  United  States  (1  C,  2  I).  Another  agreed  that  dissemination  of  information  regarding 
research will be most effective if conducted on a global scale (1 I). One consortium added that 
there  is  a  need  to  improve  internal  EU  dissemination  in  order  to  increase  external  EU 
competitiveness. Moreover, publications should be processed with clearance similar to that of 
defence research (1 C) 

The availability of information on security research is the key factor for a quick and effective 
answer to the growing security requirements. It is important to underline that security cannot 
be  considered  a  regional  issue:  one  country’s  security  depends  on  the  levels  of  security 
guaranteed in the other countries of the Union (1 C). 

One  company  remarked  that  this  dissemination  only  applies  to  research  funded  by  public 
organisations. In this case, ESRAB would be the obvious coordinator. Commercial research 
will be driven by need and published as marketing collateral (1 I). 

The  proposals  for  dissemination  that  were  put  forward  mostly  suggest  creating  a 
database/website,  organising  workshops  or  founding  a  new  agency.  More  specifically,  the 
following suggestions were made: 

•  The Commission should coordinate EU-funded projects better in order to prevent 
duplication (2 C, 2 I). At the very least, EU R&D funds should  not be spent  on 
technologies  that  have  been  developed  by  non-EU  companies.  Ideally,  a  system 
should be created in which experts from all over the globe are regularly consulted. 
Moreover, the EU and the US could identify lighthouse security projects in which 
they could invest jointly (2 C). 

•  Projects and their results should be readily accessible (1 I). They could be put on 
the internet (2 I), a web portal (2 C) or in a database (2 I) similar to Medline — 
along  with  the  standards  (1  I).  However,  security  would  need  to  be  taken  into 
consideration. 

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•  Information should be disseminated both ‘horizontally’ (between companies in the 
same  sector  to  boost  their  competitiveness  and  develop  innovative  detection 
solutions) and ‘vertically’ (between manufacturer companies and users in order to 
direct research into finding solutions to real life situations) (1 C). 

•  The  currently  available  information  should  be  categorised  and  an  automated 
classification  system  could  be  devised  to  classify,  label  and  disseminate  new 
documents, according to the taxonomy (1 I) 

•  A summary of non-classified information could be sent to relevant parties. Those 
with  a  key  role  (funds,  governments,  industrial  partners)  could  request  further 
information (2 I). 

•  With regard to OSINT, the Commission should promote:  

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informal  meetings  where  specific  Member  States’  agencies  exchange 
notes on best practices in OSINT; 

a  trade  fair  of  OSINT  suppliers  to  enable  all  agencies  to  see  what 
technologies and methodologies exist; 

a  website  where  all  European  OSINT  suppliers  are  illustrated,  broken 
down by the sub-segment in which they operate; 

the creation of an In-Q-Tel type of organisation in Europe (1 C). 

•  A web-based journal (1 I). 

•  Organise  a  conference/workshop/forums  (1  C,  1  I).  Scientists,  the  industry  and 

law enforcement agencies should take part (1 C). 

•  Found  a  security  research  observatory  in  which  public,  private  and  academic 

stakeholders take part (1 C). 

•  Create  an  independent  European  body  to  coordinate  the  activities  of  security 
research between public and private organisations (2 I). Because of the dilemma 
whether to adopt an open source or a proprietary source approach — as both have 
their advantages — it was proposed that the open source paradigm be adopted in 
the  field  of  research,  in  combination  with  the  creation  of  a  transnational 
organisation  in  charge  of  collecting,  testing,  verifying,  adopting  and  promoting 
the most interesting and “secure” solutions (1 I). 

•  Public national or European organisations could take on this role in consultation 

with the private sector (2 I). 

•  A  list  of  recognised  security  research  providers  could  be  developed.  This 
establishes an entry barrier to deter the uncommitted, yet sets the barrier at a level 
that still promotes competition and potentially collaboration (1 I). 

•  ESRAB could coordinate dissemination. It has the following advantages: 

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– 

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– 

a single point of contact for all involved parties combines security needs, 
legislator needs, research and industry; 

access to working and discussions groups should be kept “internal only” 
due to the security need; 

participants  can  be  screened  /  controlled  (for  instance  a  “clearance” 
document is required); 

functionality of ESRAB is also controllable by the EU (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Five experts answered this question. The following suggestions were made: 

•  Academic  institutions  and  non-academia  should  cooperate  to  a  greater  extent  so 

that research results are better circulated (1 P). 

•  A private-public framework should be set up. Present examples from the USA are 

In-Q-Tel and DARPA (2 P). 

•  A central online reference point and a discussion forum or a headline group with 
subgroups  focusing  on  the  different  technologies  and  their  implications  and 
restrictions should be set up (1 P). 

•  Central authority with regional offices (1 P). 

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2. Needs and Solutions 

2.1 Technological needs and solutions 

2.1.1  Are you interested in a broader debate on the role of detection technologies and 
the influence their use potentially has on European societies? 

Public (MS) 

15  MS  were  interested  in  a  broader  debate  on  the  role  of  detection  technologies  and  the 
influence their use potentially has on European societies. It was emphasised that human rights 
should be safeguarded when using and developing detection technologies. In some areas, such 
as aviation security, this debate is ongoing. 

Public (EUR) 

Two EU-related bodies responded to this question. One indicated its interest in such a debate, 
while  the  other  emphasised  that,  when  considering  the  European  economic  interests  of 
detection, the right balance should be struck between security needs and European values. 

Private (I & C) 

11  private  organisations  and  4  consortia  replied  to  this  question.  All  but  1  association  were 
interested or very interested in the debate. 

Such a debate was considered important for the following reasons: 

•  to strike the balance between security and legal demands versus individual rights 
(5  I,  1  C);  and  to  communicate  this  to  the  industry.  Detection  technologies  and 
related  issues  such  as  interoperability  and  data  sharing  should  be  discussed,  as 
should the impact on societies that interact with Europe (1 I); 

•  to  investigate  the  role  of  detection  technologies  in  the  context  of  Homeland 

Security (1 I); 

•  to address concerns regarding the use of detection technology (1 I); 

•  to improve the European Research dialogue on detection technologies (1 C); 

•  to  address  the  role  of  detection  technology  in  supporting  staff:  how  to  enhance 

human capabilities by utilising the potential of technology (1 C); 

•  because the evolution of (cargo) security should take account of the effect it has 
on  societies,  including  its  effect  on  commerce,  public  health  and  safety,  and 
personal privacy (1 I); 

•  because of interest from a marketing corporate citizenship and strategic evaluation 

stance (1 I); 

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•  because only by continuous consultation will there be a complete match between 

what the public authorities need and what the private sector can offer (1 I). 

It was also remarked that some needs or topics should be discussed in a restricted context to 
avoid, for example, availability of detection thresholds to the general public. 

Private (P) 

Five  experts  answered  this  question.  All  said  they  were  interested  in  the  debate.  Both  the 
balance between security and civil liberties and privacy (3 P) and the social and moral impacts 
that technological innovation has were mentioned as topics of specific interest (2 P). 

2.1.2  In  what  specific  areas  do  the  relevant  security  authorities  require  technological 
improvements? Please specify the level of priority in relation to specific needs. 

research  centres,  4 
17  Member  States,  3  EU-level  bodies,  10  companies  and 
consortia/associations  and  5  experts  answered  this  question.  Several  specific  areas  were 
identified. 

2.1.3  Is there a gap between requirements for detection capabilities and the technology 
currently on offer on the market? 

In general, stakeholders identified several areas where improvements could be made. 

Public (MS) 

The  13  MS  that  answered  were  divided  on  the  issue  of  whether  there  is  a  gap  between 
requirements  for  detection  capabilities  and  the  equipment  currently  on  offer  on  the  market. 
Six  were  of  the  opinion  that  equipment  is  available,  albeit  at  high  cost.  The  other  seven 
Member  States  felt  there  was  a  gap.  This  gap  is  mainly  caused  by  the  invisibility  and 
shallowness  (specificity)  of  the  market.  The  latter  is  partly  related  to  differences  in  legal 
frameworks. 

Public (EUR) 

2 EU-related bodies answered this question. One feels there is a gap. The other thinks there is 
technology on the market that can fulfil the requirements, albeit at high cost. 

Private (I & C) 

11  private  companies  and  4  consortia  answered  this  question.  Answers  can  be  grouped  into 
three categories: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘In Between’ (Perhaps/Depends). 

One  company  thought  there  was  no  gap,  as  it  had  never  encountered  requirements  from 
clients it had not been able to meet (1 I). 

Most  respondents  (7I  &  2  C)  thought  there  was  a  gap.  2  companies  or  research 
centres/institutes  and  1  association  stated  that  this  depended  on  the  segment  of  the  market 
considered (2 I and 1 C). 

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Three experts answered this question and all of them agreed there was a gap. 

2.1.4  What are possible solutions to these gaps? 

Public (MS) 

6 Member States proposed solutions to bridge the abovementioned gaps. 

The main solutions proposed are: 

•  (European)  standardisation/harmonisation  to  increase  the  size  of  the  market 

(making it less selective and more visible); 

•  exchange of information and increased interaction between users and producers; 

•  funding  and  stimulating  research  (new  research,  ongoing  research  and  the 

transformation of research results into products). 

Public (EUR) 

One  organisation  proposed  investing  in  coordinated  research  on  new  technologies  at  a 
multilateral level within Europe to obtain a good balance between detection capabilities and 
costs.  

Private (I & C) 

3  companies  and  2  consortia  answered  this  question.  One  company  thought  there  are  no 
obvious solutions to these problems with the present technologies (1 I). 

Others proposed the following: 

•  Solutions have to be both operationally and technologically based (1 I). 

•  A  working  group  of  experts  could  give  an  overview  of  what  is  missing.  Both 

major players and smaller businesses should be involved (1 C). 

•  Providers could propose easy to use materials (plug and play, etc.) to end-users (1 

I). 

•  A possible solution to filling the gaps is  both to integrate available technologies 
and  to  undertake  research  into  future  new  technologies.  Technical  evaluation  by 
reference  centre  is  essential  to  help  purchasers  take  an  informed  decision. 
However, the detailed plan of technological solutions addressing a specific threat 
is  confidential.  Fast  detection  of  some  of  the  most  dangerous  biological  threats 
identified already exists. The cost-effectiveness of these solutions will depend on 
the size of the market (1 C). 

Private (P) 

Two experts offered a solution: 

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•  Making  the  technology  producers  work  alongside  the  Institutions  and  Public 
Administrations  in  order  to  focus  better  on  current  efforts,  particularly  in  the 
phase of defining requirements and analysis (1 P). 

•  Offering an open, readily accessible public forum in which any solution provider 
can present their technologies to the authorities. It is important to engage all the 
possible  stakeholders  simultaneously  so  as  to  arrive  at  a  practical  solution  that 
meets all requirements (1 P). 

2.1.5  In  what  specific  areas  does  the  private  sector  already  offer,  or  plan  to  offer 
technological  solutions?  Please  state  the  timescale  for  when  such  solutions  would  be 
available, and cost-effective. 

Public (MS) 

In general, specific areas were identified. 

5  MS  answered  this  question.  One  said  that  the  private  sector  did  not  yet  offer  solutions. 
While  one  said  it  could  not  provide  a  specific list,  another  specified  some  of  the  areas.  Yet 
another stressed the importance of a cost-benefit analysis. Another MS highlighted the higher 
interest of the private sector in one particular area. 

One  EU-related  body  answered  that,  in  one  particular  field,  manufacturers  in  the  private 
sector continuously develop new equipment (often with government funding) and launch it on 
the market. 

14  companies  and  3  consortia  responded  to  this  question.  Several  made  general  remarks; 
others  highlighted  specific  technologies  or  applications.  Three  experts  believed  that  private 
technological solutions were available on the market at different levels of development (2 I). 
Market  analysts  forecast  that  the  sector  of  detection  technologies  is  one  in  which  much 
research will be done and many solutions will appear in the coming years (1 P). Furthermore, 
several areas were mentioned as being the most innovative. 

2.1.6  Would it  be  helpful  and  useful to create a Europe-wide searchable list/database 
containing  specific  areas  of  needs  of  the  relevant  security  authorities,  and  at  the  same 
time solutions offered by the private sector? 

Public (MS) 

13  of  the  17  MS  that  responded  were  supportive  of  the  idea  of  a  European  database.  One 
doubted  the  additional  value  over  existing  databases  and  exchange  mechanisms.  The 
following views were expressed several times: 

•  It is important to identify the needs of users (so that the market can respond). 

•  It is important for users and producers to communicate. 

•  The database should be able to guarantee  security/confidentiality of the contents 

and access should be restricted to authorities and relevant (private) partners. 

Public (EUR) 

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4  EU-related  organisations  answered  to  this  question.  One  supported  the  idea;  the  others 
raised questions or preferred other ways of bringing producers and end-users together. 

The agency that opposed the proposed database suggests a website containing case studies in 
which  people  share  their  experience  regarding  a  technological  solution  they  have  used. 
Another  would  like  to  see  first  how  the  database  would  work.  Safeguards,  such  as  the 
transparency  of  decisions  regarding  which  solutions  to  include,  should  be  put  in  place.  The 
organisation that supported the Green Paper’s suggestion remarked that a sufficient volume of 
potential buyers is important for the development of technology. Searchable lists could play a 
role in this. Confidentiality issues should be addressed, of course. Where the area of interest is 
very specific, however, the agency proposes the establishment of a task force (like the ECAC 
technical task force). The fourth agency supports the idea of the creation of a Task Force. This 
Task  Force  –  in  which  the  private  sector  should  be  involved  to  a  certain  extent  –  would 
oversee the different application areas, identify obstacles and communalities and duly inform 
both sides. 

Private (I & C) 

15 private companies/research centres and 7 consortia/associations responded to this question. 
5 consortia and 10 companies supported the idea of a secured EU-wide database. 8 companies 
and  1  association  provided  alternative  solutions.  More  specifically,  3  companies  and  one 
consortium  both  supported  the  database  and  provided  alternatives;  5  companies  and  1 
consortium only provided alternative solutions. 

One company explicitly opposed the idea, having doubts regarding attempts by governments 
to interfere with private companies’ product development. It said that companies are perfectly 
capable of identifying the needs of the market, even when the market is made up of the public 
sector. It feels government or EU interference with research and product development in the 
private  sector  may  in  fact  lead  to  investment  errors  and  consequently  wasted  resources.  It 
therefore advises against the idea of EU harmonisation of private industry’s development of 
control and detection technologies (1 I). 

Remarks that were made by those in favour of the database: 

•  Access should be well protected given the sensitive contents of the database (1 C). 

•  Updating  and  implementing  such  database  will  be  costly.  Moreover,  it  is 
questionable to all intents and purposes who the central authority should be (1 I). 

•  It will give oversight of the real needs while maintaining competitiveness among 
manufacturers. In the event that the Commission provides financial assistance, it 
must be researched how the initiative can boost the competitiveness of European 
Industries (1 C). 

•  The availability of a Europe-wide searchable database is the right way to promote 
public  and  private  sector  dialogue  and  it  can  be  the  source  of  identifying 
guidelines in the security research domain (1 C). 

•  A  database  for  Member  States  to  identify  what  analysis  tools  or  methodologies 
exist,  and  to  create  a  list  of  the  equipment  available,  is  useful.  Similar  work  is 

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currently being done by DG ENTR in the Defence Industry Field (MEDI study — 
Mapping of European Defence Industry (1 I). 

•  We  should  include  present  and  future  needs  and  solutions  to  this  database  and 

establish priorities (1 I). 

•  Steps should be taken to ensure that innovation is not stifled by the development 

of stringent standardisation (1 I). 

•  Such a list/database is valuable, but it should be global (1 I) 

•  This  would  be  a  good  way  of  stimulating  development  of  the  required solutions 
and might be an attractive marketing investment for some providers. It has to be 
verified, however, whether setting up this database/list does not overlap with any 
existing initiatives. Moreover, the security of the requirements might be a concern 
for the commissioning authorities if the database were freely available (1 I). 

•  It would be a helpful tool for offering existing solutions and developing new ones. 
A  list  of  solutions  may  be  of  use  if  capabilities  are  reported  fairly  and  the 
presentation  of  strengths/weaknesses  and  capabilities  has  been  well  thought 
through (1 I). 

•  Such  a  list/database  would  be  essential  to  match  the  capacity  to  prevent  and  to 

respond to an attack while identifying multiple threats (1 C). 

•  This initiative would be useful, but only under strict conditions. First of all, this 
database  should  be  accessible  to  all  technology  vendors,  irrespective  of  whether 
they  are  European.  Excluding  non-European  vendors  would  deprive  EU  public 
authorities of the opportunity of using technology that might be already available 
elsewhere. At the same time, however, this database must be closely protected, as 
it  would  contain  much  security-  and  commercially-sensitive  information:  if  the 
integrity of the database were not guaranteed, technology vendors would probably 
not participate (1 C). 

•  It  would  be  useful  for  both  research  organisations  and  security  organisations.  It 
could be hosted on an appropriate website. A global approach is needed however. 
References/links to wider global equivalents would be beneficial, both for cross-
fertilisation and for access to solutions that exist already outside the EU (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Five  experts  answered  that  this  would  be  helpful.  It  would  help  identify  priorities  for  a 
developing new market (1 P). The private sector could also make suggestions for threats that 
might not yet have been recognised by the authorities (1 P). 

If not, what other solutions would you propose in order to improve the information flow 
between those who need technological solutions and those who offer them? 

Public (MS) 

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4 MS provided the following comments: 

•  A secure website could be an alternative. 

•  Interconnection of existing databases could be a subsequent step after a European 

database. 

•  It is important to look to the future and invest in anticipated needs. 

•  Other, existing initiatives, such as the ESRP, should be involved. 

Public (EUR) 

(See previous question) 

•  A website containing case studies drawn up by users. 

•  A public-private Task Force. 

Private (I & C) 

3  companies  and  one  consortium  both  supported  the  database  and  provided  alternatives;  7 
companies and 1 consortium only provided alternative solutions (see also above). 

Alternative solutions: 

•  There  is  a  need  for  better  interaction  between  users  and  producers/researchers. 
Users from specific sectors should coordinate and compile their needs, after which 
they  can  enter  the  dialogue  with  producers.  The  EC  could  facilitate  this 
coordination. Moreover, an inventory should be made of methods and equipment 
that  have  been  tested  for  specific  tasks.  Presently,  compilations  mostly  just 
include  producers´  information  but  the  users  would  need  comparisons  and 
evaluations (2 I). 

•  There  exists  unfortunately  a  real  distortion  between  the  available  technological 
offer  on  the  market  and  the  knowledge  thereof  by  the  security  services.  The 
solution would be more ‘exchanges’ and the setting-up of mechanisms that make 
suppliers  and  users  of  technology  familiar  with  each  other’s  activities.  These 
exchange  mechanisms  could  be  institutionalised  by  the  creation  of  a  European 
agency 
tools 
(questionnaires, supplier-user workshops, websites, etc.) in order to devise a road 
map (1 I). 

that  would  propose  different 

technologies 

security 

for 

•  A  working  group  on  CBRN  detection  technologies  could  be  set  up  to  improve 

public-private dialogue and to design future standards (1 C). 

•  A  science  portal  where  users  and/or  providers  can  enter  their  needs  and  their 
offers  could  be  set  up.  There  may,  however,  be  some  constraints  regarding  EU 
directives on procurement and constraints regarding secure information (1 I). 

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•  Publication of a study identifying European companies producing technologies of 
use in OSINT, to establish ´a map´ of European industrial interests. At the same 
time,  MS  should  be  encouraged  to  produce  a  common  list  of  required 
functionalities in order to understand what is needed (1 C). 

•  Creating  a  bidirectional  flow  of  information  to  close  the  gap  between  security 
organisations  and  private  companies  working  in  security  technologies.  The  flow 
could be implemented in this way: 

– 

– 

From  firms  to  organisations  by  using  a  web  portal  where  firms  can 
advertise their solutions using a defined classification. Private companies 
will  have  the  advantage  of  using  free  advertising  space  for  their 
solutions. 

From organisations to firms by using periodic communications to explain 
their  needs  and  requirements.  The  portal  and  the  data  inside  will  be 
protected by secure access (1 I). 

•  The  WCO  (World  Customs  Organization)  currently  maintains  a  database  of 
available  systems.  It  would  be  valuable  to  add  an  assessment  process  to  this 
database so that users can benefit from an independent analysis of these solutions 
(1 I). 

•  The traditional mechanism is that the managers responsible on each side take note 
of  what  is  going  on  in  the  market.  Trade  journals  and  exhibitions  are  the  main 
channels for communication (1 I). 

•  A  database  for  Member  States  to  identify  what  analysis  tools  or  methodologies 
exist; and the creation of an inventory of what is available. A similar initiative is 
currently being deployed by DG ENTR in the Defence Industry (MEDI study — 
Mapping of European Defence Industry (1 I). 

•  The  information  flow  should  be  promoted  at  two  levels:  procedural  and 
technological. In the first instance, the information flow among public institutions 
can  help  to  define  the  baseline  of  procedural  standards.  Subsequently,  the 
operational specifications in terms of process flow and detection performance will 
determine  the  minimum  technology  requirements  needed  to  accomplish  the 
standards, and also the validity and completeness of the technology available on 
the market. 

•  Organisation of meetings and seminars for end-users and the private sector (1 I). 

•  Successful  processes  and  technologies  will  be  introduced  either  directly  as  de 
facto standards, or through official standards issued by bodies such as the ISO or 
EU CEN. 

•  Given that supply-side fragmentation is one of the problems, the Commission can 
help  by  establishing  a  sub-group  focusing  on  OSINT  issues  to  encourage  large 
companies to act as systems integrators, as they have the scale to bring together 

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small  technology  providers,  while  being  mindful  of  the  need  to  grow  smaller 
innovative businesses and to protect their IP (Intellectual Property rights) (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Two  experts  responded  to  this  question.  The  need  for  better  interaction  between  those  who 
need  and  those  who  offer  technological  solutions  was  emphasised  as  a  critical  point  that  is 
often overlooked (1 P). Two methods of interaction were proposed:  

•  Appoint  a  board  (like  ESRAB)  responsible  for  defining  a  platform  for  detection 

technologies and a searchable database (1 P). 

•  Create  an  open,  unrestricted  forum.  It  is  crucial,  however,  to  discuss  the  needs 
with end-users and not, for example, policy-makers. Moreover, it is important to 
include  SMEs  (small  and  medium-sized  enterprises)  who  may  have  problems 
overcoming the bureaucratic hurdles that official tenders bring with them (1 P). 

Versatile Solutions 

2.1.7  For what existing tools and equipment could the applicability and effectiveness be 
improved by enhancing their versatility? 

Public (MS) 

11 MS answered this question. The types of answers differed greatly. Possibly versatility was 
understood  differently  by  different  MS.  Some  MS  underlined  the  benefits  of  versatility  in 
terms  of,  for  example,  efficiency.  Others  mentioned  specific  tools  that  would  benefit  from 
versatility.  Yet  others  mentioned  the  substances  to  be  detected.  One  MS  pointed  out  that 
detection tools had specific applicability and were not particularly useful for other purposes. 

Public (EUR) 

One  EU-related  body  observed  that  equipment  that  has  already  been  developed  in  one  area 
(e.g. aviation security) can also be of use in other areas. 

Private (I & C) 

9  private  companies  and  one  consortium  answered  this  question.  5  companies  and  1 
consortium provided suggestions for tools that would be more efficient when versatile. 

One  company  remarked  in  general  that  poor  knowledge  of  the  operational  capacity  of 
equipment can lead to redundancy and unfortunate financing (1 I). Two companies questioned 
the value of versatility. One doubts the efficiency of versatility as a minimum time is needed 
to reconfigure a deployed solution to face new threats without decreasing security (1 I). Two 
companies stated that an increase in versatility may lead to the eclipse of some technologies; 
it  is  sometimes  better  to  have  a  multitude  of  equipment,  each  covering  a  specific  threat 
extremely  well,  than  one  machine  handling  them  all  reasonably  well.  Varying  detection 
thresholds based on threat levels can be dangerous too, as terrorist may adapt their strategies 
accordingly. 

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Private (P) 

Three  experts  responded  to  this  question.  They  believed  all  equipment  would  benefit  from 
versatility (3 P). It was also remarked that the versatility of tools must be enhanced through a 
modular approach to the software architecture used to manage these tools and equipment (1 
P). 

2.1.8  What new versatile tools and equipment are needed? 

8  Member  States  answered  this  question  and  specified  details.  One  EU-related  body,  6 
companies, 2 associations and two experts provided suggestions for new versatile tools. 

In  general,  end-users  should  not  specify  technology,  but  rather  prepare  statements  of 
capability  and  desired  effect.  Better  training  on  current  technological  solutions  should  be 
provided by end-users to the operators of detection systems (1 P). 

Portable and mobile solutions 

2.1.9 What existing tools and equipment could be better and more effectively used in the 
work of the relevant security authorities if they were mobile and portable? 

Public (MS) 

14 MS answered this question. All agreed that mobility and portability of tools increase their 
usability and effectiveness. A minority felt that most mobile tools were already on the market. 
Others mentioned various tools that would specifically benefit from mobility. 

Public (EUR) 

One  organisation  answered  that  portability  will  enable  equipment  developed  for  the  airport 
environment to be deployed in other areas, e.g. mass events.  

Private (I & C) 

8 Companies and 4 consortia or associations responded to this question. 

One  company  responded  that  mobility  is  not  always  possible.  Moreover,  it  tends  to  be  the 
case that systems work better when they are not mobile. Compromises on detection/reliability 
tend  to  be  made  when  mobility  is  increased  (1  I).  Another  said  that  since  the  demand  for 
portability  was  growing,  Europe  should  participate  in  research  concerning  new  detection 
tools,  particularly  as  applied  to  mobile  solutions  (1  I).  One  company  considered  that  most 
military  equipment  could  be  used  for  civilian  security  after  some  adjustments  (including 
mobile and portable solutions). On the other hand, for security reasons, it may be difficult to 
transfer military technology to civilian use (1 I). 

When considering the deployment and procurement of mobile and portable tools, the overall 
objectives need to be taken into account. Detection technologies are just one component in the 
system of solutions. Furthermore, the working / hosting environment needs to be considered, 
in terms, for example, of spatial and power requirements (1 I). 

Private (P) 

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One expert also made concrete suggestions. 

2.1.10 What new portable and mobile tools and equipment are needed? 

Public (MS) 

10 MS answered this question. They felt that there was a need for new mobile tools and that 
most, if not all, equipment could benefit from mobility and portability.  

Public (EUR) 

2  EU-related  bodies  responded  to  this  question.  They  mentioned  several  examples  of 
equipment and tools.  

Private (I & C) 

6 companies and 1 consortium answered this question. One respondent stated that the focus 
should  be  more  on  components  that  make  mobility  possible  (like  low  consumption 
components,  light  and  high  power  energy  source,  robustness  of  the  equipment,  easy  to  use 
equipment)  than  on  mobile  and  portable  equipment  as  such  (1  I).  Another  added  that  the 
heaviest, most expensive and most immovable components of a security installation should be 
looked at to explore how these can be made transportable or virtualised in some way (1 I). A 
number of other concrete suggestions were made. 

Private (P) 

Two experts gave their opinions and suggested several types of equipment. 

2.2 Interoperability of systems 

2.2.1  What systems need improved interoperability? 

Public (MS) 

14 MS answered this question. All believed that interoperability or at least the possibility of 
exchanging  data  between  systems  is  important.  The  need  for  databases  and  data  systems  of 
EU national authorities to be able to communicate was what Member States mentioned most. 
Possible legal constraints were acknowledged. Other specific systems were also mentioned. 

Public (EUR) 

3  EU-related  bodies  answered  this  question.  One  declared  that  all  EU  security  information 
systems  should  be  made  interoperable,  as  should  process-orientated  systems  that  provide 
support 
interoperability  between 
complementary  detection  equipment  to  enhance  the  detection  capabilities  of  screening 
systems  while  reducing  false  alarm  rates.  Yet  another  stressed  the  importance  of 
interoperability of equipment between agencies and States. 

to  workflows.  Another 

the  need 

identified 

for 

Private (I & C) 

14 companies and 4 consortia reacted to this question. 

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The following remarks were made with regard to interoperability:  

•  Interoperability is one of the main requirements for detection systems because of 
the presence of vertical platforms, which are currently not interoperable (1 I). On 
the other hand, interoperability should not be overdone (1 I). 

•  Interoperability must be investigated at three levels: network, application and data 

management (1 I). 

•  Interoperability is fundamental to the success of both national and pan-European 
security  and 
true  root  and  branch 
interoperability,  European  Authorities  will  fail  in  their  responsibilities  to  protect 
citizens (1 I). 

law  enforcement  activities;  without 

•  Interoperability  has  two  sides:  technology  and  behaviour/culture.  In  terms  of 
technology,  IP  (Internet  Protocol)  could  function  as  the  universal  technology  to 
enable  authorities  to  work  together.  Common  standards  of  processes  and 
behaviour,  however,  are  more  important.  Without  mutual  confidence  that  all  are 
working  with  the  same  high  standards,  exchange  of  information  will  not  take 
place.  The  benefits  that  can  be  accrued  from  real  interoperability  possibly 
outweigh the outcomes from all other potential activities (1 C). 

•  Another  company  divided  interoperability  into  operational  and  technological 
interoperability. Operational interoperability consists of vertical (from local up to 
transnational levels) and horizontal interoperability (different institutions sharing 
the  operation  within  a  physical  subsystem).  In 
technological 
interoperability,  IP  networks  have  been  able  to  overcome  some  of  the  issues. 
However, some system components continue to need improved interoperability: 

terms  of 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

operational workflow among security organisations; 

sensor information of diverse nature (sensor fusion); 

COMMON fusion data models; 

Executive Information Systems (EIS); 

inter-application and inter-application communication protocols (1 I). 

•  For  commercial  reasons,  it  has  proven  difficult  to  get  vendors  to  put  data  in 
formats available to other companies. If such cooperation or common formats of 
data  are  required,  it  may  be  necessary  to  regulate  or  legislate  common  data 
standards (1 I). 

•  Many  current  detection  technologies  and  their  support  systems  have  limited 
interoperability.  However,  types  of  middleware  infrastructure  exist  that  can 
facilitate interoperability and accessibility of these systems with each other (1 I). 

•  All systems should improve interoperability (1 C). 

Private (P) 

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According to two experts, all systems need interoperability. However, interoperable databases 
are what is most urgently needed (2 P).  

1.1.6. 

2.2.2  Would  a  study  on  legal  and  other  constraints  for  interoperability  of 
systems across the EU be useful to identify limitations? 

Public (MS) 

14 Member States answered the question. All thought such a study would be useful, to serve 
as a basis for either agreements, common standards or even legal harmonisation. Privacy and 
data protection principles should be kept in mind. 

Public (EUR) 

Two  public  bodies  answered  this  question.  Both  supported  the  idea  of  such  a  study.  One 
pointed out that it would shed light on the full potential of the systems. The other highlighted 
the  importance  of  legal  safeguards  and  data  protection  principles  when  establishing 
interoperability; the fact that access to or exchange of data is possible may become a powerful 
drive in itself for de facto accessing or exchanging data. 

Private (I & C) 

9 businesses and 3 consortia answered this question. 8 companies and 1 consortium thought a 
study of this kind would be useful. One company believed that the study would be too broad, 
and thus its value would be questionable. 

One  consortium  proposed  a  way  of  identifying  interoperability  issues  regarding  the  use  of 
OSINT  (Open  Source  Intelligence):  by  making  a  model  of  what  steps  (modules)  must  be 
taken to move from information to intelligence, the ‘fault lines’ between technologies can be 
identified. Subsequently, a matrix can be devised to locate all European technology suppliers 
that play a role in each module. The Commission could inject the model into a wider industry 
debate to make sure all constraints are identified (1 C). 

The following remarks were made with respect to the suggested study: 

•  Studies of legal constraints (especially intellectual property) would help to ensure 
the definition of open standards and studies of technical and business constraints 
would help to ensure effective, practical interoperability (1 I). 

•  The  study  could  take  profiles  based  on  legal  and  organisational  constraints  as  a 
starting  point.  These  profiles  could  be  implemented  using  Role-Based  Access 
Control  (an  approach  to  restrict  system access  to  authorised  users)  to  make  sure 
that legal requirements are met (1 I). 

•  Apart  from  investigating  the interoperability of  systems,  the constraints between 

European countries should be addressed (1 I).  

Private (P) 

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Five experts responded to this question. Four answered that such a study would be useful (4 
P).  The  fifth  expert  stated  that  it  probably  would,  as  most  (but  not  all)  systems  are  usually 
designed to meet a local requirement, not an EU-wide one (1 P). 

2.3  Integration  of  information  from  different  detection  technologies  and  improved  data 
analysis. 

2.3.1  In  what  areas  do  you  believe  that  the  integration  of  information  from  different 
detection technologies would improve overall performance? 

All  MS  (12)  that  answered  this  question  felt  that  the  integration  of  different  detection 
technologies  would  improve  overall  performance.  3  EU-related  bodies  responded  to  this 
question, one of them saying that data minimisation and purpose specification should be built 
into  data  analysis  systems  so  as  to  prevent  unrestricted  data  matching  and  database 
navigation. 9 companies and 3 consortia answered this question. Three experts responded to 
this question.  

Answers  from  stakeholders  identified  several  specific  areas  that  would  benefit  from  the 
integration of information of different detection technologies. 

2.3.2 In what areas are improved data analysis techniques required? 

10 Member States, one EU-related body, 7 companies or research centres/institutes and one 
association  responded  to  this  question.  Four  experts  also  shared  their  views.  Stakeholders 
identified concrete themes which required improved data analysis techniques. 

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3. Use and certification of equipment and tools 

3.1 Best practice and the use of existing tools and equipment 

3.1.1  What would be the best way of identifying and sharing best practice in this field? 

Public (MS) 

10 Member States and one Spanish region answered this question.  

The ways most mentioned of identifying and sharing best practices are:  

•  expert conferences, meetings and seminars (5); 

•  web portal or database (6); 

•  working groups (3); 

•  (experts) exchanging information and experience (3); 

•  operational cooperation and contact with experts in the field (3). 

Public (EUR) 

3 EU-related bodies answered this question. One of them suggested a web portal as a tool for 
systematic  information  exchange;  another  proposed  a  regular  exchange  of  information  in  a 
well-organised  structure.  This  would  provide  an  overview  of  all  the  information  to  be 
maintained.  The  structure  could  take  the  form  of  working  groups  of  security  experts 
representing both governments and the private sector.  

A  third  body  would  like  to  see  the  processing  of  personal  data  minimised  as  part  of  best 
practice. 

Private (I & C) 

10 companies and 5 consortia responded to this question. 

General remarks 

•  Best  practice  should  be  identified  and  shared  within  each  sector  rather  than  at 
overall national level (2 C). Best practices must include aspects relating to human 
resources  and  training  where  these  involve  demonstrating  vigilance  and 
watchfulness to counter terrorist risks (1 C). 

•  Best practices are only relevant to the extent that users have the same setting, goal 

and aim or use is not affected by these factors (2 I). 

Specific Suggestions 

Interactive  

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•  Common  tests  and  exercises  where  practitioners  directly  interact  and  exchange 
experiences in the field. Projects should be funded for the testing and evaluation 
of methodologies and equipment (1 I). 

•  A  forum  where  representatives  of  different  governments  with  different  expertise 

come together (like ECAC TTF in the area of aviation) (1 I). 

•  User  forums,  discussions  and  newsletters  (a  secure  environment  must  be 

provided) (1 I). 

•  Conference/workshop  with  representatives  from  all  relevant  areas  (science, 
industry, public sector) (1 C) / End-users workshop with feedback to technology 
or solution providers (2 I). 

•  Peer  review  among  representatives  of  different  organisations  to  examine  best 

practices(1 I). 

•  Construction  of  a  secure  wiki-based  site  for  knowledge  sharing  across  multiple 

agencies, services and countries (1 C). 

•  To raise awareness of how OSINT can serve different areas of civil security: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

informal  meetings  where  specific  Member  States  agencies  exchange 
notes on best practices in OSINT; 

a  trade  fair  of  OSINT  suppliers  to  enable  all  agencies  to  see  what 
technologies and methodologies exist; 

a  website  where  all  European  OSINT  suppliers  are  illustrated,  broken 
down by the sub-segment in which they operate; 

the creation of an In-Q-Tel type of organisation in Europe. 

‘On paper’  

•  Articles in a relevant magazine (1 I). 

•  ESRAB can identify and disseminate best practices (2 I), for example by way of a 
website / project database /mailing list, accessible for “cleared” participants only 
(1 I). 

•  Creation of benchmarks to validate a best practice or solution (1 I). 

•  Root  cause  analysis  of  threat  resolutions  to  introduce  feedback  into  the 
organisation  and  verify  that  the  identified  best  practice  responds  to  all  the 
identified threats (1 I). 

•  Creation of a capability maturity model to assess the level of maturity and quality 

of best practices (1I). 

Private (P) 

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One  expert  suggested  paying  more  attention  to  suggestions  from  frontline  officers  and 
personnel,  who  have  specialised  knowledge  (regardless  of  their  rank),  and  giving  such 
officers a forum in which to share their ideas with colleagues from other Member States and 
with  the  solution  providers.  Another  expert  wished  to  see  more  meetings  of  experts  and 
groups of personalities. 

Identification of best practice 

3.1.1.1.  Would  it  be  through  peer  evaluation  or  questionnaires  sent  to  the  Member 
States? 

Public (MS) 

12 Member States and a Spanish region answered this question. 

Peer evaluation (7) and questionnaires (9) were seen as equally valid methods for identifying 
best practice by the majority of the MS. Several other formats, such as those mentioned in the 
previous question, were repeated. The idea was put forward to create a database to collect best 
practices that will ultimately result in a ‘European Standard’. 

Public (EUR) 

Two public agencies responded to the question. One indicated a preference for questionnaires. 
The other stated that, aside from peer evaluations or questionnaires, a well organised structure 
(such as mentioned in the previous question) should be established. Certification is a highly 
technical activity with grave consequences if not done properly. 

Private (I & C) 

5 private entities responded to this question. All had a different view. 

•  Neither evaluations nor questionnaires should be used (1 I). 

•  Questionnaires or feedback forms could be used to report usability issues on tools 
and equipment. An organisation should be established to collect and disseminate 
results (1 I). 

•  The  most  appropriate  mechanism,  whether  peer  evaluations  or  questionnaires, 
should be global and needs to be considered on a case by case, or theme by theme 
basis (1 I). 

•  Peer  evaluation  is  the  best  solution,  although  questionnaires  could  be  used  as  a 

first inventory (1 I). 

•  The best way is through meetings (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four  experts  identified  peer  evaluation  as  the  preferred  method  (4  P).  One  added  that  peer 
evaluation would also make it possible to define the best benchmark against which to validate 
tools and equipment (1 P). 

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27 

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Dissemination of best practice 

3.1.1.2 Would it be through a secure and searchable database or through meetings and 
seminars? 

Public (MS) 

13  Member  States  and  a  Spanish  region  answered  this  question.  The  secure  and  searchable 
database  (11)  was  the  slightly  preferred  option  over  meetings  and  seminars  (8).  Many  MS 
thought both methods were suitable. 

Public (EUR) 

Two  public  bodies  responded  to  this  question.  One  preferred  sharing  experience  through 
meetings, seminars and documents produced by working groups. The other favoured a secure 
and searchable database of jointly assessed case studies. 

Private (I & C) 

7 companies and 3 consortia gave their opinions on the dissemination of best practice. 

Searchable database (1 I) 

•  Meetings and seminars are too costly in terms of time. The prime source should 
be a searchable database with seminars and exhibitions as a secondary source (1 
I). 

Meetings and seminars (1 C, 4 I) 

•  Meetings and seminars establish a real network (1 C) and avoid poor translation 

problems (2 I). 

•  Meetings and seminars, followed up by regular communication to the industry (1 

I). 

•  The  idea  of  an  “enhanced  specific  public-private  sector  dialogue  on  detection 
technology”,  including  the  organisation  of  restricted  seminars  with  Member 
States, the European Commission and the European Parliament, was supported (1 
I). 

•  The effectiveness of security measures will be compromised if security practices 
are not kept confidential, and a database — even protected by passwords or other 
methods  —  would  pose  a  high  risk.  As  a  result,  meetings  or  other  tightly 
controlled communications may prove a more effective method (1 I).  

Both / Neither (2 C, 1 I) 

•  Both, to ensure the widest and most effective dissemination of best practice and to 
promote the sharing of knowledge about security among the Member States (1 C). 

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•  Both databases and conferences pose the same problems regarding confidentiality, 
the choice of participants and those authorised to possess confidential information 
(1 C). 

Private (P) 

Four experts reacted to this question. One considered both methods to be appropriate (1 P). 
The  other  three  stated  that  meetings  and  seminars  are  the  most  reliable  method,  although  a 
database may be useful. 

3.1.2  Can you suggest any other options on how best to identify and disseminate best 
practice in this field? 

Public (MS) 

11 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. Not all of them mentioned methods that 
they had not suggested in the questions above. Online distribution, for example in the form of 
a  website,  was  mentioned  most  (3).  Cooperation  and  contact  between  law  enforcement  / 
security authorities of the MS were also put forward.  

It  was  proposed  that  certification  efforts  should  be  led  by  government  bodies.  The  private 
sector, however, should be involved. 

Public (EUR) 

One  public  organisation  suggested  that  this  could  be  a  function  of  the  Council  or  the 
Commission. 

Private (I & C) 

8 private companies and 1 consortium provided the following suggestions: 

General (1 C) 

•  Best  practice  studies  should  target  not  only  Member  States,  but  also  sub-state 
stakeholders such as organisations and even citizens in order to examine not only 
best detection practices, but also “use” practices and the legality of the detection 
method employed (1 C). 

Via existing structures (5 I, 1 C) 

•  Identification and dissemination can be handled by the national regulator (1 I). 

•  Articles from users and test personnel (1 I). 

•  Evaluation  of  security  systems  by  Member  States  or  a  centralised  testing  body 
with information shared in a forum (such as the ECAC TTF for aviation) (1I). 

•  Establishment of best practices in training and methodology for each type of civil 
security force, possibly in the form of a manual similar to that produced by NATO 
for military purposes (1 C). 

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29 

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•  A comprehensive audit of all existing tools and equipment should be performed, 
followed  by  the  formation  of  technology-specific,  multi-national  user  and 
manufacturer  groups,  to  identify  and  develop  best  practice.  Results  would  be 
disseminated  via  a  secure  database.  Responsibility  for  continuous  best  practice 
development would rest with the technology-specific user group (1 I). 

•  To establish best practice, representatives of the Member States should participate 
in  a  ‘workspace  committee’  that  focuses  on  a  specific  domain  of  detection  (e.g. 
customs) or on cross-cutting areas. The cross-cutting workspaces would work on 
topics like ‘architecture’ and ‘common data elements’ and coordinate the specific 
domains where they interact (1 I). 

New organisation/body (2I) 

•  A subcommittee established from a community of experts from the EU that deals 
with, for example, border issues. The subcommittee can be extended to include all 
major trading partners (1 I). 

•  A  new  organisation  that  manages  feedback  forms  and  disseminates  them  to  the 
Member  States.  The  Member  States  may  need  to  tailor  them  to  their  own  needs 
(1I). 

Private (P) 

Three  experts  answered  this  question.  All  suggested  dedicated  conferences  and  seminars  of 
relevant national experts (2 P). 

3.1.3  If an upgrade of a tool or equipment was considered necessary and no authority 
in  other  Member  States  would  have  performed  such  an  upgrade,  would  consultation 
with the private sector on the subject be acceptable? 

Public (MS) 

18  MS  answered  this  question.  7  MS  thought  that  the  private  sector  should  be  consulted.  4 
were in favour of consultation under certain conditions. Lastly, one MS stated that innovation 
in  detection  instruments  is  by  definition  a  process  based  on  communication  between  public 
institutions and the private sector. 

Public (EUR) 

Both  public  agencies  that  answered  this  question  feel  consultation  with  the  private  sector  is 
acceptable.  Appropriate  control  of  restricted  or  confidential  information  is  necessary, 
however. 

Private (I & C) 

10  Private  companies  and  2  consortia  shared  their  views  on  consultation  with  the  private 
sector.  One  merely  stated  that  it  is  not  enough  to  look  at  the  technical  capabilities  of 
equipment; the purpose for which specific equipment can be recommended or certified (1 I) 

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30 

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also needs to be considered. The others all felt that consultation with the private sector was 
acceptable, or even natural or essential (8I, 2 C). 

The following remarks were made: 

•  Confidentiality should be taken into account (1I). 

•  Closer public-private partnership is desirable (1I). 

•  The term ‘private sector’ needs to be specified (1 C). 

•  Since  the  private  sector  manufactures  the  equipment  and  typically  performs  the 

upgrades, consultation with the private sector is often standard practice (4 I). 

•  Although upgrading existing equipment is usually the best and most efficient way 
to enhance detection capabilities, sometimes new technology is needed. Vendors 
and developers are the experts and should be consulted (2 C). 

•  If  this  implies  public-private  funding  of  the  project,  the  private  sector  would 

probably be happy to be involved (1 I). 

Private (P) 

All three experts that answered considered this consultation to be acceptable (1 P). 

Identification  and  dissemination  of  best  practice  and  the  use  of  new  tools  and 

3.2 
equipment. 

3.2.1  What  would  be  the  best  way  of  identifying  and  sharing  information  and  best 
practice in this field? 

Public (MS) 

11  MS  and  a  Spanish  region  answered  the  question.  Most  frequently  mentioned  were  the 
following ways of identifying and sharing information and best practices: 

•  seminars and conferences (6); 

•  secure electronic database (4); 

•  working groups and meetings (5). 

Public (EUR) 

3 EU-related bodies answered this question. One of them suggested a web portal as a tool for 
systematic information exchange; the other proposed a regular exchange of information in a 
well-organised  structure.  This  would  provide  an  overview  of  all  the  information  to  be 
maintained.  The  structure  could  take  the  form  of  working  groups  of  security  experts 
representing both governments and the private sector.  

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31 

   EN 

 
A third body would like to see the processing of personal data minimised as part of the best 
practice. 

Private (I & C) 

6 companies and 2 consortia gave suggestions on how to identify and share information. They 
proposed the following:  

•  Articles from users and test personnel (1 I). 

•  End-user workshops with feedback to technologies or solutions providers (2 I). 

•  Databases  and  meetings  or  seminars,  both  with  limited  access,  can  complement 
one  another.  Moreover,  the  role  to  be  played  by  public  and  private  stakeholders 
needs to be clarified (1 C). 

•  Common forums, theme conferences, discussions and newsletters are very useful. 

Security needs to be taken into account (1 I). 

•  Conferences  and  requests  for  information  to  industry,  academia  and  research 

institutes (1 I). 

•  ESRAB could identify and disseminate information (1 I). 

•  Both the availability of a secure and searchable database and the organisation of 
meetings and seminars on such issues are necessary to ensure the widest and most 
effective dissemination (1C). 

Private (P) 

Four experts on security suggested the following methods: 

•  Close  links  between  security  authorities  and  technology/solutions  providers, 
organised  within  a  standing  European  committee  (possibly  around  a  public 
“champion”  for  each  sector,  e.g.  Europol  or  OLAF  or  ENISA),  where  periodic 
meetings and exchange of information are expected (1 P). 

•  The producers and the final consumers of the technological solutions working side 

by side (2 P). 

•  Encouraging  cooperation  between  specialists  from  all  sectors  across  Member 

States (1 P). 

Identification of best practice 

3.2.1.1.  Would  it  be  through  peer  evaluation  or  questionnaires  sent  to  the  Member 
States? 

Public (MS) 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
11 MS and a Spanish region answered the question. Peer evaluation and questionnaires were 
mentioned equally often as methods of identifying best practice. Most MS thought that both 
ways  are  suitable.  Other  possible  means  that  were  mentioned  included  mostly  personal 
contact between experts or authorities. 

Public (EUR) 

The organisation that responded did not consider questionnaires to be an appropriate method; 
group consensus would tend to yield the lowest common practice rather than the best practice. 

Private (I & C) 

4  companies  provided  an  answer  to  this  question.  Two  found  neither  peer  evaluation  nor 
questionnaires to be a suitable method (2 I). One considered meetings to be a better approach. 
The  others  did  not  comment  on  either  method  but  noted  that  identification  of  best  practice 
should  be  global  in  scale  (2  I)  and  needs  to  be  considered  on  a  case  by  case,  or  theme  by 
theme basis (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four experts on security expressed their views on this question. One deemed both suggested 
methods  to  be  appropriate  (1  P).  The  others  indicated  that  devising  a  good  questionnaire 
would be difficult in this phase, since it concerns the use of new tools (2 P). One expert was 
doubtful about this option. 

Dissemination of information and best practice 

3.2.1.2.  Would  it  be  through  a  secure  and  searchable  database  or  through  restricted 
meetings and seminars? 

Public (MS) 

12 MS and a Spanish region answered the question. A secure database was mentioned by 11 
MS,  the  restricted  meetings  and  seminars  by  9.  The  vast  majority  of  the  MS  and  a  Spanish 
region deemed both methods to be appropriate. 

Public (EUR) 

One  EU-related  body  answered  that  meetings  and  seminars  are  preferable.  However,  since 
these may be too time-consuming for some MS, an additional database would be useful. 

Private (I & C) 

4  companies  indicated  their  preferences.  One  preferred  a  database,  the  other  three  favoured 
restricted meetings and seminars. The following remarks were made: 

Database (1 I): 

•  Meetings and seminars are too costly in terms of time. The prime source should 
be a searchable database with seminars and exhibitions as a secondary source (1 
I). 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
Meeting/Seminars (3 I) 

•  The effectiveness of security measures will be compromised if security practices 
are not kept confidential, and a database — even protected by passwords or other 
methods  —  would  pose  a  high  risk.  As  a  result,  meetings  or  other  tightly 
controlled forms of communications may prove a more effective method (1 I).  

Private (P) 

Four experts reacted to this question. One felt both methods were appropriate (1 P). The other 
three  stated  that  meetings  and  seminars  are  the  most  preferred  method  (3  P),  although  a 
database may be useful (2 P). 

3.2.2  Have you any other suggestions for how to identify best practice in this field and 
disseminate them effectively? 

Public (MS) 

- 

Public (EUR) 

One organisation responded. It submitted the following suggestions: 

•  experts groups involving end-users and regulators; 

•  (security) audits. 

Private (I & C) 

6  companies  provided  the  following  suggestions  with  regard  to  the  identification  and 
dissemination of best practice: 

•  Articles from users and test personnel (1I). 

•  Through expert groups (such as ECAC) (1 I). 

•  For  non-sensitive  information,  a  variety  of  channels  are  available:  database, 

publications, conferences, working groups, websites (1 I). 

•  A  secure  collaboration  site  for  Member  States  to  post  questions  and  seek 
help/advice  from  others  would  be  useful.  Collaboration  tools  can  be  used  to 
disseminate information in a secure environment (1 I). 

•  A  comprehensive  audit  of  all  existing  tools  and  equipment,  followed  by  the 
formation  of  technology-specific,  multinational  user  and  manufacturer  groups  to 
identify  and  develop  best  practice.  Results  would  be  disseminated  via  a  secure 
database. Responsibility for continuous best practice development would rest with 
the technology-specific user group (1 I). 

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34 

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•  To  establish  the  best  of  best  practices,  representatives  of  Member  States  should 
participate in ‘workspace committees’ that focus on a specific domain of detection 
(e.g.  customs)  or  on  cross-cutting  areas.  The  cross-cutting  workspaces  would 
work on topics such as ‘architecture’ and ‘common data elements’ and coordinate 
the specific domains where they interact (1 I). 

•  A centralised point of contact at EU level for both Member States and industry (1 

I). 

Private (P) 

Two  experts  proposed  a  network  of  end-users  who  would  communicate  and  work  together 
through a dedicated website (2 P). 

Experimental and new tools 

3.2.3  Are you interested in the trialling of new or experimental tools and equipment? 

If yes/no, please explain 

Public (MS) 

The 13 MS that answered the question were all interested in the trialling of equipment. Many 
had  additional  remarks  or  reservations.  Some  emphasised  the  importance  of  experimental 
tools and trials, others underlined the importance of carrying out research at European level in 
order to avoid duplication and to be more resourceful. 

Public (EUR) 

One public agency answered this question. It is interested in trialling as experimenting with 
new tools is of vital importance to enhancing security. 

Private (I & C) 

8 companies and 3 consortia expressed their interest in the trial of new or experimental tools 
and equipment. One company would be happy to offer its expertise, another to offer its tried 
and tested tools. Additional remarks were made. 

Private (P) 

All five experts were interested in the trialling of new or experimental tools as they pave the 
way for improvement and new solutions (5 P).  

3.2.4.  Would partial financing of trials of new or experimental tools and equipment by 
the Community and/or the private sector be of interest?  

Public (MS) 

12  MS  answered  this  question.  All  MS  think  that  partial  financing  of  trials  of  new  or 
experimental  tools  and  equipment  by  the  Community  and/or  the  private  sector  could  be  of 
interest; one claimed that it already exists. It was mentioned that the private sector does not 

EN 

35 

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always  have  sufficient  resources,  especially  in  the  initial  stages,  nor  do  some  MS.  In  a 
qualification process, however, some degree of independence from the private sector must be 
maintained. 

Public (EUR) 

Two EU-related bodies responded to the question. They agreed that partial funding would be 
useful.  Neither  industry  nor  public  stakeholders  are  normally  willing  to  pay  for  large-scale 
demonstration  projects.  Moreover,  some  tests  require  funding  to  buy  prototypes  and  to 
maintain the research facilities. 

Private (I & C) 

7 companies and 4 associations commented on this question. All thought co-financing by the 
Community and/or private sector would be of interest. The following issues were brought to 
the fore:  

•  The  most  promising  tools  should  be  tested,  irrespective  of  whether  they  are 

European or not (1 C). 

•  Trials should be conducted with a spirit of cooperation so that everyone involved 
learns lessons and benefits. Real world data collection can be key for technology 
development,  but  because  of  the  costs  involved  financial  assistance  should  be 
considered (1 I). 

•  It  is  important  to  stress  that  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  authority  and 

freedom to choose other solutions are not affected by the trial (1 I). 

•  An  overall  financial  package  would  strengthen  solidarity  and  could  increase 

Europe's industrial competitiveness (1 C). 

•  Trialling  is  extremely  expensive.  Furthermore,  trials  are  currently  repeated  in 
multiple Member States, multiplying the cost to industry and government. Sharing 
data will significantly reduce costs. A single trial with a broader scope would be 
much more cost-effective than multiple tests (1 I). 

•  To  avoid  any  waste  of  funds,  such  funding  should  be  carefully  apportioned  to 
companies  that  can  demonstrate  the  development  of  technologies  that  are  both 
flexible and adaptable over a significant life-cycle (1 I). 

•  As  public  authorities  are  the  main  beneficiaries  of  detection  technology,  they 
could  co-finance  its  development,  in  particular  the  ‘pre-competitive  tests’. 
Qualification  and  certification  have  to  be  addressed  for  the  pre-standardisation 
process.  The  private  sector  raised  the  question  of  the  type  of  pathogens  to  be 
identified; the degree of specificity or sensitivity, etc. (1 C). 

Private (P) 

All five security experts supported the idea of partial financing. It was mentioned that public-
private  partnerships  of  this  kind  have  already  been  established  in  the  US  (1  P).  Moreover, 

EN 

36 

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such partnerships could launch pilot projects (1 P). Additionally, it was suggested that sharing 
the cost of development may lower the cost of the final product (1 P). 

3.3 Use of data and text-mining tools 

Awareness raising exercise 

3.3.1  Would Member States and the relevant European bodies be interested in sharing 
best practice and in the potential benefits arising from the use of data- and text-mining 
tools? 

Public (MS) 

13 MS answered this question. The vast majority (10) of the states that answered this question 
suggested that they would be interested in sharing best practices. The others did not respond 
negatively, but pointed out that certain problems could arise when sharing knowledge. 

Public (EUR) 

Two EU-related bodies reacted to this question. They commented mainly on what the content 
of such best practices should be. One public body strongly advocated that best practice should 
include compliance with data protection principles. 

Private (I & C) 

1  consortium  and  1  company  answered  this  question,  stating  that  Member  States  should  be 
interested because their application to crime detection objectives could provide an innovative 
insight  into  security  issues  (1  C).  Sharing  is  considered  essential  although  privacy  laws  in 
individual Member States are likely to create a significant barrier to data sharing (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four experts answered this question in the affirmative (4 P). This topic is of interest to both 
academic and other entities (1 P). 

3.3.2.  Would  Member  States  authorities  using  this  technology  be  willing  to  share 
experience with their peers? 

Public (MS) 

All 9 MS that responded to this question answered ‘Yes’. One MS added that the sharing of 
information in this field with other authorities and the procedures for exchanging information 
could be laid down in a common agreement between all or some of the countries taking part.  

Public (EUR) 

The results of Europol’s trials could be made available for interested parties. 

Private (I & C) 

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37 

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One  company  answered  that  authorities  were  likely  to  want  to  share  experiences.  Sharing 
data, however, is more of a problem (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four  experts  answered  this  question.  Three  estimated  that  authorities  would  not  always  be 
willing to share information because of the degree of sensitivity involved (3P). It was added, 
however, that it would be important to define the procedural protocols and standards that go 
hand in hand with progress in information technology (1 P). 

3.3.3  Would  restricted  seminars  on  the  subject  organised  by  the  Member  States, 
Europol or OLAF be useful?  

Public (MS) 

13 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. All but one felt that such seminars were 
useful.  Another  MS  specified  that  their  usefulness  would  depend  on  the  topic.  It  was 
underlined once again that sharing experience is valuable, especially at European level. With 
topics like these, however, confidentiality should be guaranteed. Europol was mentioned as a 
suitable candidate for organising seminars. 

Public (EUR) 

This might be a task for CEPOL ultimately. However, Europol would be glad to contribute to 
seminars. 

Private (I & C) 

4 companies and 2 consortia responded to this question. Three companies and 1 consortium 
supported  the  organisation  of  restricted  seminars  (3  I,  1  C).  Another  emphasised  that 
collaboration  between  Member  States  and  the  relevant  bodies  is  useful  to  identify  the 
‘champions’ in data and text mining technologies (1 I). Moreover, it was suggested that the 
Commission should draw up a list of available analysis tools and methodologies (1 C). 

Private (P) 

Four security experts answered that such initiatives would be useful (4 P). 

Enhancement of the EU capacity for data and text mining 

3.3.4  Would  a  centre  of  excellence  at  European  level  accessible  to  all  Member  States 
and their relevant authorities help to tap the potential of these tools in practice? 

Public (MS) 

13 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. The majority (9) were in favour. It was 
felt that such a centre could, for example, enhance the EU’s data mining capacity, cope with 
numerous  languages,  establish  an  agreed  format  of  data  and  possibly  relieve  the  burden  of 
Europol. 4 MS expressed concern, among other things for reasons of redundancy because of 
already existing centres. 

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38 

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Public (EUR) 

One  public  body  remarked  that  the  usefulness  of  data  mining  and  text  mining  tools  would 
have to be proven in a number of specific business scenarios. While the technology might be 
impressive, the delivery of better information to the right person in the right place at the right 
time is the only real test of worth. 

Private (I & C) 

4 companies and 3 associations responded to this question.  

1 association and 2 companies replied that the creation of a network of excellence would be a 
first step towards bridging the gap between Member States with differing levels of expertise 
(1 C) and avoiding duplication of research and improving synergy at EU level (1 I). 

3  companies  and  2  consortia  supported  the  establishment  of  a  centre  of  excellence.  More 
specifically,  

•  setting  up  of  an  I-Q-Tel  type  of  organisation  would  help  to  stimulate  growth 

among small local technologies (1 C); and 

•  it would provide the opportunity to capture and deploy best practice (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four experts believed that such a centre would be useful (4 P), especially since security is a 
European issue (1 P). 

3.3.5  If  not,  what  other  options  would  you  suggest  to  maximise  the  potential  of  these 
tools? 

Public (MS) 

2  MS  suggested  other  options.  One  suggested  the  sharing  of  best  practices,  seminars  and 
exchanges. Another put forward the possibility of temporary use of demo versions (engines) 
of commercial and non-commercial technological solutions. 

Public (EUR) 

- 

Private (I & C) 

- 

Private (P) 

One expert suggested the networking of different centres of excellence dedicated to the use of 
these tools in an application security environment (1 P). 

Identification and dissemination of best practice 

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39 

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3.3.6  Would a peer evaluation or a questionnaire sent to the Member States be useful 
in identifying best practice in the use of these tools? 

Public (MS) 

10 MS answered this question. 7 MS felt both peer evaluations and questionnaires are useful 
tools for identifying the best practice in data mining tools. 2 MS preferred questionnaires. It 
was  remarked  that  questionnaires  serve  mainly  to  generate  general  and  basic  information.  1 
MS believed that it was not possible to establish a universal best practice in this area. 

Public (EUR) 

One public body responded that it did not think these tools useful as they would risk being too 
qualitative. 

Private (I & C) 

2 companies answered this question. One agreed with both options. The other did not think 
questionnaires  a  suitable  mechanism  for  accurate  data  gathering  on  complex  systems  and 
suggested peer review, backed by dedicated study and user groups, instead.  

Private (P) 

Four  experts  answered  this  question.  Two  indicated  that  both  methods  may  be  useful,  but 
possibly  difficult  to  carry  out  in  practice  (2  P).  Since  none  of  these  tools  is  standardised, 
designing a valid questionnaire or organising a peer evaluation is a problem (2 P). One expert 
supported only peer evaluation. 

3.3.7  If not, what other approaches would you suggest to identify best practice in this 
area? 

Public (MS) 

3 MS answered this question. The three approaches mentioned are: 

•  a secure database; 

•  sending  out  questionnaires  to  the  universities  and  research  institutions  that  are 

doing research in this field; 

•  sharing best practices, seminars and exchanges (as above).  

Public (EUR) 

One  body  proposed  a  collection  of  case  studies  to  illustrate  the  benefits  of  using  the  tools, 
balanced against their full cost in terms of money and time. The point is that some agencies 
may  find  data  mining  more  profitable  than  others.  It  may  depend  on  the  intelligence 
requirement. 

Private (I & C) 

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One consortium and a company suggested the following: 

•  The  Commission  should  encourage  pilot  or  rapid  prototyping  projects  to 
implement  an  end-to-end  OSINT  solution  for  specific  types  of  security  agencies 
across  several  MS  and/or  the  EU  institutions  themselves.  Such  projects  —  with 
operators,  security  forces  and  private  players  —  would  develop  technical 
integration  and  operational  use  and  help  to  improve  common  methodological 
standards (1 C). 

•  Vendors can recommend best practices or refer to organisations that are currently 

using the tools (1 I). 

•  EU-sponsored meetings of delegates from the Member States (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Two experts in the field of security proposed the following alternatives: 

•  a review of the existing literature on the subject (1 P); 

•  the appointment of a trusted board or a network of private and public specialists, 
which exchange of information between themselves, with the EU and the MS (2 
P). 

Enhancement of the regional capacity for data and text mining 

3.3.8  Would  there  be  any  spare  capacity  available  in  Member  States  and  European 
bodies  to  help  Member  States  that  do  not  possess  this  technology  to  work  on  their 
documents?  

Public (MS) 

9 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. Opinions were sharply divided.  

Public (EUR) 

Two  EU-related  bodies  responded  to  this  question.  Both  had  their  doubts  regarding  the 
proposal. One would like to see it clarified further. The other saw the logistics of the proposal 
as a problem as the responsibility for errors would be hard to manage. 

Private (I & C) 

Two  companies  responded  to  this  question.  One  stated  that  data  and  text  mining  are  so 
sensitive that outsourcing is inappropriate (1 I). The other suggested that the Community look 
at  ways  of  streamlining  requirements  for  text  mining  in  order  to  avoid  duplication.  Private 
industry could assist in this process (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Three experts answered that they believed such capacity to be available (3 P).  

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3.3.9.  If  there  were  no  such  spare  capacity  or  only  a  limited  capacity,  would  an  EU-
funded  increase  of  capacity  in  Member  States  or  at  the  European  level  be  useful  and 
practical? 

Public (MS) 

9  MS  answered  this  question.  All  Member  Status  thought  the  proposed  funding  was  both 
useful and practical. 

Public (EUR) 

One agency pointed out that this would depend on whether good research methods validated 
the usefulness of the tools. 

Private (I & C) 

One company answered that it would be worth a try (1 C). 

Private (P) 

Three security experts answered this question. They considered an EU-funded increase to be 
highly recommendable (2 P). 

3.3.10  Would Member States that lack sufficient data and text-mining capacity consider 
using the tools of other bodies, if made available? 

Public (MS) 

The 5 MS that answered this question would all consider using the tools of other bodies. 1 MS 
did not consider this to be a very practical approach. 

Public (EUR) 

- 

Private (I & C) 

Two  companies  responded  to  this  question.  One  answered  that  it  might  be  possible  if  there 
were assurances that these tools do not ‘report their activities back’ to other authorities (1 I). 
The other strongly advised that Member States acquire their own tools as security authorities 
are most effective when they can manage and search for information themselves. Moreover, 
governments  do  not  want  other  authorities  to  work  on  their  documents.  For  financially  less 
capable states, leasing or funding options could be considered (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Three experts responded positively to this question, provided  that data protection was taken 
into account (2 P). It was remarked that tools have already been borrowed in the past by way 
of intergovernmental agreement (1 P). 

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3.3.11  Would  it  be  possible  to  create  European  or  regional  centres  for  data  and  text 
mining  which  several  Member  States  and  their  authorities  could  use  for  data  and  text 
mining? 

Public (MS) 

11  MS  answered  this  question.  A  slight  majority  (6)  favoured  the  creation  of  regional  or 
European  centres.  One  MS  felt  the  creation  of  such  centres  was  probable,  while  another 
accepted  the  idea  conditionally.  Three  MS  opposed  the  idea.  One  felt  that  Europol  already 
fulfilled the function; the other supported national centres. 

Public (EUR) 

Two public agencies answered this question. One supported the idea of such centres; the other 
requested  further  clarification  as  to  what  such  a  centre  would  mean.  It  should  not  consist 
merely of a ‘clearinghouse’ of techniques for data extraction. 

Private (I & C) 

4 companies and one consortium answered this question. All think the creation of such centres 
would be possible (4 I) or even desirable (1 I) or necessary (1 C). A number of remarks were 
made on the issue: 

•  It may be useful to extend collaboration to include strategic non-EU countries (1 

I). 

•  Such  centres  should  have  the  responsibility  of  organising  and  handling  all  the 
regional  efforts  on  security  research  by  means  of  data  and  text  mining,  and 
promoting collaboration between the public and private sectors in order to tailor 
private solutions to MS authorities’ needs (1 C). 

•  These  centres  should  also  serve  as  intelligence  ‘fusion  centres’  for  collaboration 
between  security  agencies.  To  encourage  increased  information  sharing  and 
cooperation between national security authorities, implementation of an extremely 
successful  model,  such  as  the  Californian  Joint  Regional  Intelligence  Centre,  is 
recommended (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Four experts stated that this would be possible (4 P) and that such centres already exist (1 P). 

3.3.12  Do existing data and text mining tools sufficiently deal with the various languages 
within Europe?  

9 MS, one EU-related body, one company and one consortium, and four experts answered this 
question. Several concrete issues were identified. 

3.3.13  Are there adequate tools to support authorities dealing with foreign language text 
and documents?  

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9 MS, three companies and four experts answered this question. Several concrete issues were 
identified. 

Other 

3.3.14 If you disagree with any of the options suggested above, how would you address 
the concerns raised by this point? 

Public (MS) 

One MS suggested another approach. 

3.4 Testing and certifying the quality of equipment and tools 

3.4.1  Would  creating  a  network  of  national  certifying  authorities  sharing  experience 
and  knowledge,  along  with  a  system  of  quality  certification  and  benchmarking,  be 
useful? 

Public (MS) 

14  MS  answered  this  question.  All  support  the  idea  of  creating  a  network  of  certifying 
authorities. 
It  would  enhance  efficiency.  Moreover,  harmonisation  and  minimum 
requirements would be beneficial to both public and private players. However, it should not 
have a negative impact on high national security standards. 

Public (EUR) 

Three EU-related bodies responded to this question. All three were (tentatively) supportive of 
the  idea.  One  put  forward  the  example  of  ECAC  as  a  successfully  functioning  network  of 
authorities. 

Private (I & C) 

General remarks 

•  Compliance  with  stringent  standards  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  the 

development of innovative technology (1 I, 1 C). 

•  Testing  and  certifying  should  be  discussed  together  with  standardisation  efforts. 
Descriptions/specifications/list of tested equipment should be available to ‘cleared 
participants’ only (1 I). 

Answer to the question 

6  companies  or  research  centres  and  3  associations  responded  to  this  question.  Three 
supported the creation of a network (2 I), two respondents supported the creation of EU-wide 
authorities – whether in the form of a network or a single European certification agency (2 C). 
Another  preferred  a  single  agency  over  a  network  (1  I)  and  one  opposed  the  creation  of  a 
single authority (1 I). One consortium suggested that there is no need for such a network or 
authority (1 C) 

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The following additional remarks were made: 

•  Commonly agreed standards should be used and approval by one authority should 

be accepted by the others (1 I). 

•  This  network  could  be  responsible  for  publishing  articles  comparing  tools  and 

equipment (1 I). 

•  A  certifying  authority  would  be  useful  to  the  extent  that  certification  and 
benchmarking  promote  quality,  standardisation  and  open  architecture.  However, 
unnecessary  certification  requirements  that  would  impede  the  development  and 
implementation of security technology must be avoided (1 I, 1 C). 

•  As  technology  is  deployed  globally,  US  and  EU  standards  should  be  recognised 
reciprocally. In addition, the EU should consider an equivalent of the US Safety 
Act. This EU safety legislation would allow technology to be certified and rated at 
different levels, so that technology users could have benefits if using the best rated 
technology  (of  a  fiscal,  insurance  or  other  nature).  It  could  also  supply  risk 
mitigation  mechanisms  to  companies  that  could  be  sued  following  a  terrorist 
attack (2 C). 

Private (P) 

Four experts answered this question. Three believed it would be a useful initiative (3 P). The 
other stated that the definition of agreed benchmarks is a prerequisite to correct comparison 
and certification (1 P). 

3.4.2  If not, what other solution would you suggest to address the problem raised? 

Public (MS) 

Three MS provided suggestions. One felt certification and verification should be managed by 
Community  legislation.  The  second  stated  that,  for  objective  evaluations,  it  is  necessary  to 
have volumes of reference data. Such evaluation campaigns require considerable manpower, 
however.  The  third  MS  suggested  exchange  of  experience  with  new  detection  tools  among 
security authorities. 

Public (EUR) 

One  agency  suggested  that  it  may  be  appropriate  to  have  different  states/laboratories 
responsible  for  testing  and  certifying  different  technologies,  i.e.  metal  detectors,  EDS 
systems, trace detection systems, biometric and access systems, imaging systems, etc. 

Private (I & C) 

One consortium suggested using a European Quality Mark rather than a network of authorities 
or centralised authority. 

Private (P) 

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One expert suggested a network of trust. 

3.4.3  Would common standards for certifying and benchmarking be helpful? 

Public (MS) 

14 MS answered this question. Practically all favoured the creation of common standards. It 
was thought that such standards 

•  are essential to acceptable certification; 

•  would  complement  cooperation  efforts  between  public  and  private  testing 

structures; 

•  build trust, which will enable MS to rely on each other’s judgments. 

Public (EUR) 

Two bodies responded to this question. Both think common standards for benchmarking and 
certifying  would  be  helpful,  but  that  sensitive  parts  of  security  specifications  should  not  be 
made  public.  Moreover,  some  states  may  feel  more  threatened  and  therefore  require 
performance levels above the norm. 

Private (I & C) 

8 companies and 2 consortia answered this question. All agreed that such standards would be 
helpful  or  even  necessary  or  essential.  Certification  should  however  be  performance-based 
(capability) (1 I). The following remarks were made:  

Such standards would be helpful: 

•  in guaranteeing consistency in the treatment of international activities across the 
Member States (to identify liability in the event of an attack and also to reduce the 
cost  of  protection  and  detection  systems  or  installations  by  streamlining  their 
production) (1 C); 

•  for data exchange and interoperability (1 I); 

•  to ensure that players in the critical market provide quality solutions (1 I). 

In addition to common standards for benchmarking and certification: 

•  Compliance  with  standards  should  be  considered  as  a  certification  activity. 

Moreover, the skills of the ‘certifiers’ should be tested and guaranteed (2 I). 

•  The  Community  should  urgently  consider  tools  for  approval  and  calibration. 
These  tools  could  be  put  in  place  at  state  level.  But  in  that  case,  mutual 
recognition  mechanisms  (cross-certification)  of  this  approval  and  calibration 
should also be included (1 I). 

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It was also remarked that a single set of common standards would be consistent with a single 
international  certifying  authority  (1  I).  1  consortium  believed  that  this  was  part  of  the 
European Quality Mark. 

Private (P) 

Four  experts  answered  this  question.  All  believed  this  would  be  useful,  although  the 
development  of  standards  takes  considerable  time  and  effort.  Moreover,  devising  standards 
for such novel technologies may be difficult (2 P).  

3.4.4  If  not,  how  would  you  ensure  transparency  of  this  process  and  usability  of  the 
results across the EU? 

Public (MS) 

One MS and a Spanish region answered this question. The following suggestions were made: 

•  Through  a  secure  website  for  the  authorities,  which  would  contain  the  results 
and/or reports in question and which would allow users to comment on the quality 
of its contents. 

•  The  European  Commission  should  draw  up  a  Common  European  Standard  for 
certifying  and  benchmarking,  such  the  European  Standards  for  the  requirements 
on  information  (as  referred  to  above).  Once  the  Common  Standards  are 
established,  the  technologies  have  to  be  certified  and  benchmarked  by  the 
Member States. 

Public (EUR) 

One public agency proposed the following process:  

A  document  containing  technical  specifications  will  be  made  available  for  the  appropriate 
authorities.  This  document  will  have  been  drafted  by  working  groups  of  specialists. 
Stakeholders  and  manufacturers  will  be  informed  of  the  process.  Information  will  be 
controlled  and  released  only  to  producers  that  manufacture  a  specific  piece  of  equipment. 
They will be obliged to keep this information secure.  

Private (I & C) 

- 

Private (P) 

- 

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4. Studies 

4.1.  Would  you  be  interested  in  receiving  studies  on  these  topics  based  on  the 
background information outlined in the Annex?1 

Public (MS) 

15  MS  answered  this  question.  All  were  interested  in  receiving  studies.  Some  indicated 
preferences. One MS highlighted the importance of protecting data in case the development of 
new technologies should lead to more data processing. Another pointed out that some subjects 
have already been studied in the context of the ESRP and that DG JLS and DG ENTR should 
coordinate  their  activities  in  an  effort  to  consolidate  the  links  that  exist  between  new 
technologies  and  their  use  by  the  authorities.  One  MS  indicated  that  a  study  on  law  and 
specific  detection  technology  and  a  study  on  specific  detection  technology  and  its  practical 
use (studies 3 and 4 of the Green Paper) come under national jurisdiction. 

Public (EUR) 

Three  EU-related  bodies  answered  this  question.  All  agreed  that  such  studies  would  be  of 
interest. One suggested that a privacy impact assessment should also be carried out. Another 
added  that  some  studies  may  need  to  be  periodically  updated to  take account of technology 
development and threat assessment. 

Private (I & C) 

9 companies and 5 consortia answered this question. 

All were interested in receiving studies. The question was raised as to how access could be 
gained to the studies. Moreover, some respondents offered their expertise (1 I, 1 C). 

The following topics were mentioned specifically: 

•  protection of mass events (2 C, 1 I); 

•  cooperation  and  information  sharing  among  forensic  laboratories  and  security 

research in states (1 C, 1 I); 

•  law and specific detection technology (2 C, 1 I); 

•  specific detection technology and its practical use (3 C); 

1 

Studies on: 
(1) technology and the protection of mass events; 
(2) obstacles to cooperation and information-sharing among forensic laboratories and security research 
institutes;  
(3) legal provisions regulating the use of specific detection technology; 
(4) practical use of specific detection technology; 
(5) legal framework governing the use of personal detection (including surveillance) across the EU; 
(6) levels of acceptance of personal detection (including surveillance and use of biometrics) across the 
EU. 
Further information is available in Annex III of the Green Paper 

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•  personal detection technologies and biometrics (3 C). 

Additional topics: 

•  data and text mining tools (1 C); 

•  mass land transport (1 I) / mass transit (1 C); 

•  equipment that meets genuine needs and works in operational environments (1 I); 

•  evaluation of (combination of) tools for use in a specific sector (1 I); evaluation 
not just of the detection capability but also of how they operate within the whole 
process of identification of, for example, CBRN (1 I); 

•  inventory of what capacities are needed at what level (if EU-certified laboratories 
of other countries can be used, a national laboratory may not be needed) (1 I); 

•  use of high-tech infrastructure in the area of security (1 C); 

•  role of data protection in the case of personal protection (protection of persons) (1 

C). 

Private (P) 

Four experts answered. They would be interested in receiving these studies. 

If  not,  please  specify  reasons  and  suggest  alternatives  of  how  to  address  the 

4.2 
concerns raised 

Public (MS) 

- 

Public (EUR) 

- 

Private (I & C) 

One  company  specified  that  laboratories  should  also  be  certified  to  make  it  clear  what 
capabilities it has and what analyses it can carry out (1 I). 

Private (P) 

- 

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5. Implementation of results of consultation  

5.1 Enhanced specific public-private dialogue on detection and associated technologies 

5.1.1  Would  a  tool  such  as  an  enhanced  specific  public  private  dialogue  on  detection 
and  associated  technologies  be  helpful  in  implementing  the  results  of  the  public 
consultation on this paper? 

Public (MS) 

17 MS answered this question. 14 supported an enhanced specific public-private dialogue. 1 
MS questioned the added value of formalising such debate. It was emphasised that experience 
and information should be shared on a technological level and not include personal data. 

Public (EUR) 

Three public bodies answered this question. All supported the idea of public-private dialogue. 
Such a tool is needed to identify and streamline different agendas. It was remarked that the 
main  misunderstanding  between  the  political  side  and  research  and  industry  is  that  defence 
and  internal  security  are  at  the  same  time  similar  and  different.  A  coherent  strategy  on 
European  internal  security  can  only  be  achieved  if  Member  States  have  the  same 
understanding and vision. Before the public authorities can have a meaningful dialogue with 
the private sector, public stakeholders should communicate amongst themselves.  

In civil aviation, public-private dialogue on security has already been set up.  

Private (I & C) 

12  companies  or  research  centres  and  7  consortia  responded.  All  thought  this  dialogue  was 
helpful. Two respondents specifically indicated their willingness to contribute (1 C, 1 I). 

Some additional remarks were made: 

•  Dialogue should be confined to practical solutions to specific problems (1 I). 

•  Best practices and guidelines should be the responsibility of the public sector and 

not influenced by the private sector (1 I). 

•  Dialogue should take place through a forum (1 I). 

•  Such  a  dialogue  should  be  open  not  only  to  security  authorities  but  also  to  the 
private sector, data protection agencies and citizens so as to ensure the legitimate 
implementation of security controls (1 C). 

•  Any  initiative  that  promotes  communication  between  the  private  and  the  public 
sector is beneficial (1 I). Private stakeholders and academia need vehicles through 
which they can communicate with Member States’ governments (1 I). 

•  Technical specifications should be available to ‘cleared’ participants only (1 I). 

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•  This dialogue can be used for the public authorities to express their needs and the 
private  sector  to  present  its  new  technologies.  It  could  also  address  privacy 
concerns.  Sometimes,  new  technologies  are  hampered  in  their  deployment  by 
existing  EU  regulations  or  standards.  Therefore,  legislation  should  have  rapid 
built-in systems to allow fast introduction of breakthrough technologies (2 C). 

•  The EU Detection Forum has been set up to create an open dialogue with industry 
and public bodies in order to help shape European Policies in Security Research 
with the focus on detection (1 C). 

•  The dialogue should include providers from non-European countries in order to be 

meaningful (1 C). 

•  Security would need to be ensured (1 I). 

Private (P) 

Three  experts  answered  this  question.  They  responded  positively  to  the  suggestion  of  an 
enhanced public-private dialogue. One considered that a network would be necessary. 

5.1.2  If yes, would you agree with the above suggestions or do you have different ideas? 

Public (MS) 

11 MS answered the question. 9 agreed and one provided the following suggestion: a working 
group  involving  the  Member  States  should  be  set  up  to  summarise  the  results  of  the 
consultation on the Green Paper. Subsequently, it should identify the priority areas in which 
specific  action  should  be  taken;  without  duplicating  other  measures  implemented  by  the 
Commission such as FP7.  

One MS specified that steps should be taken to improve coordination between the private and 
public sectors in order to close the gaps in the areas under consideration here. However, it did 
not  agree  with  the  creation  of  another  body  or  entity,  but  felt  that  the  scope  and  powers  of 
existing bodies should be extended by creating forums for discussion and analysis. 

One MS considered that for aviation security the current structures are sufficient. 

Public (EUR) 

Two agencies answered this question. One agreed, and the other suggested that the structure 
of  exchange  should  be  permanent  in  order  to  be  able  to  release  sensitive  parts  of  technical 
specifications.  This  body  should  assess  what  information  should  be  kept  confidential  and 
direct it to the right recipients.  

Private (I & C) 

5  companies  and  2  consortia  responded  to  this  question.  Three  companies  agreed  with  the 
above suggestions. Others added the following:  

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•  open  hearings  in  Member  States  in  which  the  views  of  authorities,  citizens  and 

businesses are expressed (1 C); 

•  public-private  dialogue  on  the  use  of  technology  in  specific  areas  to  focus  the 

debate and avoid the formation of inappropriate general theories (1 I); 

•  a permanent body to oversee the public-private dialogue. The body should have a 

broad, global perspective and provide continuity over time (1 I); 

•  a  CBRN  task  force  made  up  of  companies  and  public  bodies  to  identify  and 

discuss best practice on detection and associated technologies (1 C); 

•  a network of excellence, to be created (1 C).  

Private (P) 

Three experts responded to this question. Two agreed with the above suggestions, whereas the 
other proposed an alternative solution (see below). 

5.1.3.  If not, what other mechanisms would you suggest to follow up the results of the 
public consultation of this document? 

Public (MS) 

A Spanish region provided the following suggestion: 

It would not be necessary to set up a new specific body because the Specific Group (within 
the Centre of Excellence mentioned earlier) could fulfil the functions.  

As set out in the Green Paper, the Specific Group should consist of the following:  

•  Participation: the security services should take part in it. 

•  Concrete and clearly defined objectives. for it to be effective. 

•  Standing committee. to provide weight; 

•  Forum: for experts from both the public and private sectors.  

The relevant regional authorities would be interested in helping to set up this body. 

Public (EUR) 

- 

Private (I & C) 

One consortium and one company answered this question: 

•  deliver a presentation to industry on what is required and how it is to be managed 

(1 I); 

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•  adopt an integrated approach with a clear identification of difficulties in order to 

set the priorities (1 C). 

Private (P) 

The following alternative was proposed: 

•  setting  up  an  international  body  consisting  of  specialists,  public  authorities  and 

solutions providers (1 P). 

5.1.4  Would  you  be  interested  in  contributing  to  its  work  or  directly  participating  in 
it? 

Public (MS) 

12  MS  answered  this  question.  11  expressed  their  interest;  one  indicated  they  could  not  yet 
provide  an  answer.  Reservations  included  the  point  that  participation  depended  on  the 
proposals and resources. Confidential information should be protected.  

Public (EUR) 

Three public bodies answered this question. Two indicated their interest in contributing. The 
other  would  also  be  interested,  provided  restricted  and  sensitive  information  is  dealt  with 
appropriately.  The  final  decision,  however,  would  have  to  be  taken  by  the  relevant 
hierarchical structures. 

Private (I & C) 

8 companies/research centres and 6 consortia answered this question. All would be willing to 
contribute. 

Private (P) 

Three experts responded. They would be willing to contribute (3 P). 

Action Plan 

5.2.1 Would an action plan be a useful tool for implementing the measures identified in 
the replies to this document? 

Public (MS) 

16 MS answered this question. 13 supported the idea, 3 were dubious. Comments that were 
made include:  

•  An  action  plan  will  ensure  that  results  do  not  get  lost  and  provides  a  tool  for 

monitoring progress. 

•  First the results of the GP should be disseminated, then the action plan should be 

drawn up. 

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•  The action plan should take into account that detection technologies are a national 

matter. However, it could lay the foundations for closer EU cooperation. 

Public (EUR) 

Three bodies answered to this question. All felt an action plan to be a useful tool.  

Current existing initiatives should be taken into account. 

Private (I & C) 

9 companies and 6 consortia responded to this question. All considered an action plan to be a 
useful tool. Some additional remarks were made: 

•  The action plan should be developed in active conjunction with the respondents, 

including the private sector (2 I). 

•  Publication should be restricted to cleared persons (1 I, 1 C). 

•  The action plan should be made up of concrete proposals and not merely set out 

targets (1 C). 

Private (P) 

Three experts responded. They support the idea of an action plan. 

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   EN