Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security
Date: 2008-05-22
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, action programme, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, research and development, technological change

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 22.5.2008 
COM (2008) 312 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security 

(presented by the Commission) 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  1986  Chernobyl  accident  highlights  the  catastrophic  consequences  of  nuclear  power 
plants that have a deficient design in countries with a poor safety culture and an inadequate 
operational safety and regulatory framework.  

It  is  likely  that  the  number  of  nuclear  plants  (NPPs)  in  the  world  will  rise  as  international 
actors  seek  to  increase  energy  security  by  diversifying  their  energy  mix,  in  an  effort  to 
maintain economic competitiveness against the backdrop of historically high oil prices, or as a 
way of reducing or avoiding greenhouse gas emissions.  

The objective of this communication is to review the safety and security challenges posed by 
the increasing geographical spread of nuclear energy and to propose recommendations on: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

key issues where the EU provides added value; 

a work programme based on geographical and technical priorities; 

possible elements of nuclear safety and security packages to assist third countries. 

2. 

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR POWER  

The  nuclear  energy  generation  is  an  established  part  of  the  energy  mix  in  a  number  of 
developed countries and some of them are looking to expand its use. As examples, Russia and 
China have both announced plans to expand their nuclear capacity by more than 20 GW each 
by 2020. Russia is also expanding its sales of nuclear technology; it has sold nuclear power 
plants  to  China  and  India  (under  construction)  and  recently  concluded  a  contract  to  build  a 
nuclear plant in Bulgaria.  

A number of countries which do not currently generate nuclear energy have manifested their 
interest in building NPPs. Some of them are in the neighbourhood of the EU (Jordan, Egypt, 
Tunisia,  Algeria,  Morocco,  Belarus)  while  others  such  as  Saudi  Arabia,  UAE,  Vietnam, 
Thailand, Chile and Venezuela are further away. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council  also  promote  the  use  of  nuclear  energy  by  their  members.  Some  countries  of  these 
groups  are  in  geopolitically  challenging  regions.  The  issues  surrounding  Iran's  nuclear 
development are well known.  

The EU has a mature nuclear industry and, as a result of its lengthy experience in the field, 
has  the  capacity  to  cooperate  with  partners  building  or  intending  to  build  NPPs  in  order  to 
ensure  that  all  nuclear  activity  is  conducted  in  line  with  the  highest  standards  of  safety  and 
security. Safety and non-proliferation issues must be considered as the two interlinked pillars 
of EU policy in this regard.  

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3. 

NUCLEAR SAFETY  

3.1. 

Legacy from the Tacis Nuclear Safety Programme  

With  the  break-up  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991,  some  of  the  NIS  countries  had  NPPs  of 
varying ages and designs but lacked the economic resources, independent capability or safety 
management  policies  to  upgrade  them  to  western  standards.  The  IAEA  was  tasked  with 
identifying the  shortcomings in  nuclear safety across Central Europe and the NIS countries. 
The TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme was established to address these challenges and took 
into account the G7 strategy adopted in Munich in 19921.  

The assistance provided under the Tacis Nuclear Safety Programme since 1991, in particular 
in  Russia  and  Ukraine  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Kazakhstan  and  Armenia,  needs  to  be 
continued. There is a need for consolidation and some traditional sectors, such as the support 
provided to regulators, will need to be maintained in the foreseeable future. On-site assistance 
at the NPPs is evolving towards safety of their operations and will also need to continue. 

In  Russia  it  is  important  to  continue  following  up  on  the  evolution  of  the  first  generation 
reactors  which  do  not  meet  current  internationally  accepted  nuclear  safety  standards  and 
which in the EU are considered uneconomical to upgrade. This issue will have to be brought 
up in the context of electricity trade between UCTE and IPS/UPS systems, with the objective 
of obtaining a commitment from Russia regarding the early closure of these reactors.  

Cleaning the heritage of the Northern Fleet in NW Russia will continue. The dismantling and 
storage  of  radioactive  waste  from  nuclear  submarines,  ice  breakers,  floating  bases  and  land 
bases  pose  serious  technical  and  financial  problems.  The  EC  has  contributed  €40  million 
under the Tacis nuclear safety programme to the nuclear window of the Northern Dimension 
Environmental  Partnership  (NDEP)  fund  and  has  carried  out  several  projects  and  studies  in 
the area. Further funding is envisaged.  

In Ukraine, the EU is a major donor to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF), with a contribution 
of some €240 million so far, and to the Nuclear  Safety Account (NSA), which funds projects 
related to the decommissioning of the site. Both of these funds are managed by the EBRD. In 
addition,  the  Commission  runs  other  projects,  including  the  Industrial  Complex  for  Solid 
Radwaste Management (ICSRM) funded by TACIS for a total amount of about €50 million. 
Further  pledges  will  be  required  to  fund  the  projects  under  the  CSF  and  the  NSA.  The 
Euratom  loan  facility  has  been  used  to  provide  a  USD83  million  loan  to  finance  the 
modernisation programme of Rovno 4 and Khmelnitsky 2 units (the K2R4 Project). As with 
Russia,  support  will  continue  to  be  provided  to  nuclear  regulators  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
On-site assistance at the NPPs is evolving towards safety of their operations and will need to 
continue. 

The  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  Energy  signed  in  2005  with  Ukraine2  foresees  the 
evaluation  of  the  safety  of  the  Ukrainian  NPPs.  A  Commission  –  IAEA  –  Ukraine  joint 
project on this question, funded mostly by the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, was 

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A  parallel  programme  was  adopted  under  Phare  to  carry  out  nuclear  safety  improvements  in  the  EU 
candidate countries. 
Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy between the European Union and 
Ukraine, signed in Kiev on 1 December 2005 by the President of the European Council Mr Blair, the 
President of the European Commission Mr Barroso and the President of Ukraine Mr Yushchenko. 

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started recently. The EU made its support for the ultimate accession of Ukraine to the Energy 
Community subject to satisfactory assessment of the level of nuclear safety in all Ukrainian 
operating  NPPs.  The  safety  upgrade  of  these  plants  is  also  an  obligation  of  the  Ukrainian 
utility as agreed in the contract for the Euratom loan for K2R4. 

In Armenia, the Medzamor NPP, a Soviet-designed first generation reactor, suffered in a big 
earthquake in 1988 and was subsequently shut down. However, due to energy shortages, the 
Government decided to restart Unit 2 of the NPP in 1995. While pressing the Government of 
Armenia to set a firm closure date for the plant, and in coordination with other donors under 
the aegis of the IAEA, the EU has contributed some €25 million to  carry out the most urgent 
nuclear  safety  modifications.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  Government  of  Armenia  has  indicated 
2016 as the intended closure date for the plant. This date is unacceptable to the international 
community and the EU side continues to press the Armenian Government for earlier closure. 
However,  to  reduce  the  risks  posed,  particularly  in  the  South  Caucasus’  region,  by  the 
continued  operation  of  the  plant,  assistance  to  implement  the  most  urgent  short-term  safety 
improvement measures needs to be continued.  

In  Kazakhstan,  following  a  request  for  assistance  by  the  Government  to  the  international 
community, the IAEA led a group of international donors to establish an Assessment Plan for 
the  Semipalatinsk  Nuclear  Weapons  Test  Site.  The  Commission  services  collaborated 
extensively in this work, which led to a Commission project to survey the site. In addition, the 
Commission will continue to fund projects for the decommissioning of the Aktau NPP. 

The Commission services maintain their active participation within the G8 Nuclear Safety and 
Security  Group  (NSSG),  which  took  over  the  activities  of  the  G7  Nuclear  Safety  Working 
Group  (NSWG)  created  in  1992.  This  group  outlined  the  programme  for  nuclear  safety 
improvements  in  the  NIS/CEEC  to  be  funded  by  the  international  community.  In  1995,  the 
NSWG  negotiated  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  Ukraine,  the  G7  and  the 
Commission,  which  resulted  in  the  closure  of  the  last  operating  unit  at  Chernobyl  in 
December 2000. The group has been instrumental in seeking additional pledges to cover the 
systematic cost increases of the Chernobyl projects and in leading international nuclear safety 
and security initiatives.  

3.2. 

New Nuclear Safety Projects  

The  fact  that  a  number  of  our  partners  are  considering  either  the  launch  of  a  nuclear 
programme or expanding their current activities poses a new challenge for the EU.  

Most of the ‘developing countries’ wishing to start a nuclear power generation programme do 
not currently have the legislative and regulatory infrastructure needed to ensure that safety is 
the  leading  concept  in  design,  construction  and  operational  decisions.  In  addition,  these 
countries often do not have the required expertise or adequate industrial infrastructure. These 
facts pose challenges in the field of nuclear safety and security that are of concern to the EU. 
Furthermore,  some  countries  with  existing  nuclear  power  programmes,  particularly  those 
where a rapid expansion is foreseen, may also need considerable external help. 

As  the  Tacis  Nuclear  Safety  Programme  came  to  an  end  in  2006,  a  new  Instrument  for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) with global geographical scope was adopted to continue 
and expand the actions of the Commission in the field of nuclear safety and safeguards. The 
financial  resources  under  this  instrument,  for  the  period  2007-2013,  amount  to  some  €524 

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million3.  In  addition,  the  Euratom  loan  facility  remains  operational  for  Russia,  Ukraine  and 
Armenia.  

As the need for assistance in Russia and Ukraine is diminishing and new needs are arising in 
countries outside NIS, the Commission needs to reassess how to prioritise its activities with 
third  countries4  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety  and  security.  The  objectives  of  future 
assistance/cooperation to/with third countries can be summarised as follows:  

–  improving the nuclear safety culture (including at the design and operation levels);  

–  improving protection against ionising radiations;  

–  addressing problems related to radioactive waste and spent fuel;  

–  assisting in implementing nuclear safeguards. 

The  definition  of  programmes  and  projects  to  achieve  these  objectives  will  take  into 
consideration the limitations imposed by the available financial means and human resources. 

3.3. 

Other Instruments 

The EU has several other means at its disposal when developing cooperation. Nuclear safety 
and security issues are covered by the Euratom Treaty which allows the Commission, with the 
approval  of  the  Council,  to  conclude  international  agreements  in  this  field5:  Agreements 
aimed at fostering cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on nuclear research 
have been signed with several countries, including, inter alia, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, 
United States, Japan, Argentina, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  

The  EU  has  signed  also  agreements  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety  with  countries  such  as 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The Community is also party to a growing number of international 
agreements  with  third  countries  and  is  strengthening  cooperation  with  international 
organisations,  in  particular  the  IAEA,  to  promote  non-proliferation,  nuclear  safety  and 
security.  

Furthermore,  the  Community  Nuclear  Research  and  Education/Training  Policy,  which 
includes  the  Euratom  Fission  Programme  under  the  Seventh  Framework  Programme,  has 
resources  for  indirect  and  for  direct  actions by  the  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC).  This  could 
provide for important synergies in the areas of nuclear safety and security.  

4. 

NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION 

4.1. 

Current situation 

Nuclear  safety  (in  other  words,  the  safe  design,  operation  and  decommissioning  of  nuclear 
installations,  and  regulation  of  waste  disposal)  cannot  be  dissociated  from  nuclear  security 

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These will be used mainly under the budget line 19.060401. 
Countries covered by the Pre-Accession Instrument are excluded. Industrialised/high income countries 
are also excluded in principle.  
Chapter 10 of the Euratom Treaty (Art. 101). 

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(physical security of nuclear installations, trafficking of nuclear materials, control of orphan 
sources, detection capacity, emergency response).  

Given the possible dual use (peaceful and military) of some materials, equipment and nuclear 
installations6,  the  growth  of  nuclear  power  could  increase  proliferation  risks7.  In  addition, 
there are serious concerns that non-state actors could misuse peaceful nuclear technologies for 
terrorist or other criminal ends. Tackling nuclear smuggling requires new capability-building 
at national, regional and international levels. 

In order to address nuclear security risks, several initiatives have recently been launched with 
a  view  to  reinforcing  IAEA  verification  mechanisms,  nuclear  export  control  rules,  border 
monitoring  and  the  “multilateralisation”  of  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle8.  The  joint  statement  on 
enhanced cooperation that is being prepared by the Commission and the IAEA is also aiming 
at the overall reduction of security risks in nuclear energy. 

The  EU  has  been  supporting  the  above  measures  through  the  2003  EU  Strategy  against  the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and also by providing full backing to the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004). In accordance to the GAERC conclusions of 
17  November  2003,  the  EU  is  also  introducing  the  non-proliferation  clause  in  agreements 
with  third  countries.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  will  promote  the  ratification  and 
implementation,  by  all  states  which  have  or  aspire  to  have  a  civilian  nuclear  power 
programme,  of  the  Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material  and  Nuclear 
Facilities (as amended in Vienna on 8 July 2005). 

The  European  Programme  for  Critical  Infrastructure  Protection  includes  also  an  external 
dimension  which  foresees  the  conclusion  of  specific  memoranda  of  understanding  and 
exchange  of  best  practices  with  third  countries  in  view  to  increasing  the  security  of  critical 
infrastructure.  

Via  Community  programmes  and  Council  Joint  Actions,  the  EU  has  been  active  since  the 
beginning of the 1990s in reducing proliferation risks, with a special focus on CIS countries, 
and  intends  to  address  the  risks  and  threats  worldwide  with  the  newly  adopted  Stability 
Instrument. The Instrument addresses a range of issues aiming at preventing proliferation of 
Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction9.  Finally,  the  proliferation  risks  will  also  be  addressed  in  the 
ongoing revision of the European Security Strategy. 

The security of supply of nuclear fuels is also a major factor for countries operating NPPs and 
for  those  considering  starting  nuclear  power  programmes.  Long-term  supply  relations  are 
important for suppliers and users of nuclear materials in the interest of stable and predictable 
functioning of the market. Euratom has concluded agreements for cooperation with the major 
supplier countries (eg: Australia, Canada, US, Kazakhstan), which make provision for regular 
consultations  between  the  parties.  The  agreements  also  include  “peaceful  use”  clauses  for 

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As outlined in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 on setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology.  
See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (as amended in 
Vienna on 8 July 2005).  
An example is the US-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) whereby a consortium of nations 
with advanced nuclear technology would provide fuel services and reactors to countries that ‘agree to 
refrain  from  fuel-cycle  activities’  such  as  enrichment  and  recycling.  This  is  essentially  a  fuel  leasing 
approach, wherein the supplier takes responsibility for the final disposal of the spent fuel. 
The main budget line used for this purpose will be 19.060201. 

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nuclear materials and provide for the application of safeguards which remain relevant when 
nuclear materials are exported to third countries.  

4.2. 

Future activities 

The  Community  will  continue  its  efforts  to  ensure  that  the  highest  standards  of  non-
proliferation  measures,  safety  and  security  which  are  being  further  developed  within  the 
Community  are  also  observed  internationally10.  The  Community  should  be  open  to  explore 
increased  cooperation  with  third  countries  in  order  to  promote  non-proliferation,  safety  and 
security.  When  negotiating  and  signing  Euratom  international  agreements,  the  Community 
will  seek  to  obtain  the  adherence of  its  partners  to  all  relevant  international  conventions.  In 
this  context,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  specific  Communication  on  the  Community 
competencies  given  by  the  Euratom  Treaty  in  the  field  of  nuclear  non-proliferation  will  be 
addressed by the Commission to the Council and the Parliament. 

5. 

EU ADDED VALUE 

Any  country  that  is  aiming  to  use  nuclear  power  for  civil  purposes  and  to  strictly  respect 
internationally  recognised  safety  and  security  requirements  will  face  the  challenge  of 
developing  capabilities  (both  in  human  and  financial  resources  and  infrastructure)  and  of 
establishing  the  legislative  framework  and  institutions  necessary  to  respect  the  international 
obligations. The EU, through the Community Institutions and the Member States, can provide 
a considerable contribution based on its extensive experience in dealing with nuclear power, 
the  implementation  of  the  Tacis  nuclear  safety  programme  (see  above)  and  the  range  of 
instruments at its disposal.  

The  Commission's  intervention  will  focus  exclusively  on  activities  designed  to  improve 
nuclear  safety  and  security,  including  studies,  the  development  of  legislation,  institution 
building  and  in  some  exceptional  cases  of  existing  nuclear  power  plants  on  equipment. 
Particular attention should be given to safety, security and non-proliferation training with the 
objective of mitigating the lack of fully trained human resources in the countries concerned. 
Support  packages  should  be  designed  with  the  objective  of  ensuring  sustainability  after  EU 
support has ceased.  

6. 

PROGRAMMING CRITERIA FOR THE PERIOD 2007-2013 

Cooperation with the countries that have benefited from Tacis assistance will continue in the 
foreseeable  future.  For  other  countries,  funding  priorities  will  be  based  on  strategic, 
geographic and technical criteria. 

6.1. 

Strategic and geographic criteria 

The  following  strategic  and  geographic  considerations  should  be  taken  into  account  in  due 
time  when  defining  priorities  for  allocating  assistance  with  regard  to  nuclear  safety  and 
security.  

10 

See Commission Communication of 10.1.2007 on “An Energy Policy for Europe”, COM(2007)1 final, 
pp. 18 and 19. 

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–  The geographic, strategic and geopolitical importance of the country for the EU, including 
geographical  proximity  and  the  contribution  of  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety 
Cooperation  (NSC)  and  Instrument  for  Stability  (IfS)  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy11; 

–  The willingness of the country to cooperate and its non-proliferation credentials; 

–  The  political  stability  of  the  country  as  well  as  its  capacity,  in  particular,  to  contribute 

financially over a long period.  

6.2. 

Technical criteria 

From  a  technical  standpoint,  the  following  aspects  need  to  be  taken  into  account  when 
defining priorities for EC cooperation with third countries: 

–  The urgency of the problems12 in relation to the safety of the citizens and installations as 

well as security; 

–  The imminence of the country's development of a credible nuclear power programme.  

The  various  third  countries  may  be  categorised  according  to  the  current  state  of  play  with 
respect to their experience with nuclear power and their declared ambitions, as follows: 

–  Countries with operational Nuclear Power Plants; 

–  Countries operating Research Reactors which may or may not wish to start a nuclear power 

programme; 

–  Countries with no Research Reactors intending to start a nuclear power programme. 

In addition to the nuclear safety issues, some countries will need to improve protection against 
ionising radiations and to be assisted in implementing nuclear safeguards.  

7. 

CONCLUSIONS 

As  the  geographical  spread  of  nuclear  energy  increases,  the  EU  needs  to  build  on  its 
established  policy  and  expertise  and  continue  its  work  with  partners  to  promote  the  highest 
standards of nuclear safety and security.  

The Commission will identify with partners what assistance can be supplied, to support best 
practice in existing civil nuclear programmes and, where new programmes are to be launched, 
to  ensure  that  safety  and  security  are  fully  respected  in  decision-making  processes,  in  the 
conception and execution of plans and in the subsequent operation of plants.  

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Within the neighbourhood countries wishing to start a nuclear programme, the Maghreb and Mashrek 
regions  are  particularly  important,  due  to  their  proximity  to  the  Union.  The  Middle  East  region  is  a 
second priority 

Countries with existing nuclear power programmes, particularly those with rapidly expanding ones and 
which have not been considered before, may need to be looked into on a priority basis. 

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