Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Prevention of terrorism and violent radicalisation
Date: 2008-04-22
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: cooperation policy, fight against crime, public safety, radical party, terrorism

19.8.2008

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 211/61

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Prevention of terrorism and
violent radicalisation’

(2008/C 211/17)

By letter of 17 December 2007, Ms Margot Wallström, Vice-President of the European Commission, asked
the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, to draw up an exploratory opinion on the

Prevention of terrorism and violent radicalisation.

The Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship, which was responsible for preparing the
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 2 April 2008. The rapporteur was Mr Retureau,
and the co-rapporteur was Mr Cabra de Luna.

At its 444th plenary session, held on 22 and 23 April 2008 (meeting of 22 April), the European Economic
and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 147 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions.

1. Introduction

1.1
The Commission has asked the Committee to issue an
exploratory opinion on the prevention of terrorism and in par-
ticular policies to prevent violent radicalisation, on which it
plans to adopt a Communication in July 2008. The main objec-
tive of the Communication is to identify good practices in terms
of policies, actions and initiatives in the field of countering
violent radicalisation. Currently, it is foreseen that themes such
as violent radicalisation in prisons and other places of vulner-
ability or recruitment, addressing the narrative and ideology
propagated by violent radicals, as well as the engagement and
strengthening of civil society, will be touched upon in the
Communication.

The post-cold-war, economically globalised world has
1.2
seen a profound change in the international power balance. This
has had a significant impact on global institutions such as the
United Nations, which have seen (and recognised) a multitude of
new state entities claiming sovereignty and declaring themselves
subject to international public law.

1.3 Moreover, conflicts have erupted in some of these new
countries, and armed movements still occupy some territories.
Human rights are often trampled underfoot.

1.4
Territories or regions which are under little or no control
are havens for the leaders of the major terrorist groups, who
tend to set up camp wherever the rule of law and public free-
doms have ceased to exist.

Resorting to traditional warfare has proved less than
1.5
effective against this diffuse threat that comes in many guises,
with its scattered structures, which exploits fundamentalism and
an anti-democratic political
ideology to manipulate unofficial
groups willing to use political violence.

1.7
It seems that not enough effort has been made to study
the motives and methods of recruitment that can — as on
11 September 2001 — turn managers, engineers and intellec-
tuals into planners and perpetrators of coordinated suicide
attacks whose huge scale shows extreme determination and
intelligence, and the ability to infiltrate democratic societies. An
in-depth understanding of
the ideological and psychological
motivations at play is essential if a suitable counter-strategy on a
comparable scale is to be drawn up, in addition to the necessary
geopolitical analyses and the use of all means of intelligence and
information exchange.

1.8
The crisis affecting nation-states — at a time when
communications and globalisation have created a global world
where many issues cannot be resolved solely at national level —
comes hand in hand with a crisis in international law, which
lacks dissuasive means of control and, above all, sufficient legal
means for action. Only the UN Security Council has sufficient
powers, but these are lessened by the veto held by five coun-
tries.

1.9
Nonetheless, a robust, renewed multilateral system could
confront global climate, economic and social problems under
international terrorism could be
more favourable conditions;
fought more effectively within a multilateral framework that
ensures coordination and cooperation between governments
and international agencies (Interpol), with the participation of
NGOs which continue to monitor democracy and the defence
of procedural rights and public liberties.

2. Responsibilities for Europe, and initiatives in progress

or under preparation

1.6
The failure to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian
situation or other armed conflicts throughout the world is also
a political factor in the development of extremist ideas and acts
of international terrorism; it should be stressed, however, that
the majority of terrorist acts are carried out in the context of
internal conflicts.

To fight terrorism effectively at EU level, the Member
2.1
States had to adopt a common definition of
the crime of
terrorism, and bring their criminal law systems closer together
in the area of criminal charges and penalties. This process,
together with the adoption of the European arrest warrant, was
embarked on quickly and, over time, the Council has adopted
relevant framework decisions, particularly since the 1990s.

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2.2
Since the horrendous attacks of 11 September 2001 on
the USA, essential coordination has been established both inter-
nationally and at European and Community level:
the UN
Security Council linked to Interpol, NATO for military opera-
tions, the Council of Europe (with, in particular, its Convention
on the Prevention of Terrorism), the OSCE and, lastly, the EU
and Europol. Cooperation has been developed with the USA,
the countries of the Maghreb and the African Union, along with
individual military, police and financial support operations for
certain countries.

in checks on certain specifically-targeted ‘visible minorities’, who
will feel increasingly stigmatised and subject to ethnic or racist
discrimination. The threshold for tolerance has already been
radicalisation’
greatly surpassed, which encourages
during conflicts and clashes between police or military forces
and young people from certain deprived areas, which are
witness to the destruction of buildings and public and private
property.

‘violent

A consensus has been reached in the Community institu-
2.3
tions and Member States, among political
leaders and the
majority of citizens, regarding the definition of terrorism and
the types of legal or illegal actions that it does not comprise. It
is necessary to be able to carefully target the threat and its
permutations, to prevent efforts from being too scattered and
pointless restrictions being imposed on individual and collective
rights and freedoms.

2.4
However, in some African and Middle Eastern countries
in particular that have authoritarian governments, there is a
tendency to use the ‘counter-terrorism’ label to attack any kind
of political opposition. This should be a matter of concern for
the EU and its members, some of which enjoy economic and
political relations, and cooperate militarily, with the leaders of
these States, and should use their influence to limit such abuse.

if

These episodes of urban violence,

2.9
lumped together
under the umbrella of ‘radicalisation into violence’ (considered
the precursor to terrorism or even a form of terrorism per se),
can however lead to an overly broad definition of the crime of
actual, attempted or complicit terrorist activity, extending it to
include various forms of violence which, though severe, are not
necessarily driven by the intent to commit a terrorist act, even if
they have caused extensive destruction of property and possible
serious injury.

2.10
nition as terrorism.

The motive behind the act or attempt is key to its defi-

2.11
Terrorist movements have emerged in the recent past
and continue to do so today on our continent. Political violence
has no justifiable motive in democratic countries where political
parties can be formed and one can vote in regular, fair elections
at all levels of government (local, national and, in Europe's case,
the European Parliament).

2.5
Internationally, the trickiest problem seems to be finding
the right response to the threats that persist in the world from
various terrorist movements, against embassies or other ‘targets’,
particularly civilians. For geographical reasons, Europe remains
the region most at risk from terrorist attacks.

3. General points

2.6
Acts of terrorism aim to instil a climate of fear and inse-
curity, and to undermine democratic institutions. It is important,
therefore, not to fall into the trap of imposing unjustified restric-
tions on human rights and civil liberties in the name of security;
the most at-risk countries have for years experienced emergency
conditions of varying intensity: some measures may go beyond
what is essential or manageable, for instance with regard to the
personal data of transatlantic passengers, requiring a host of
details and an excessively long retention period.

2.7
Network surveillance, widespread video surveillance in
public and private areas accessible to the public, border control
policies, management of demonstrations, and extensive searches
in airports may,
infringe on privacy, freedom of
movement and, more generally, all other civil liberties. This may
affect public support for counter-terrorist policies as the public
may feel targeted by these actions.

if excessive,

2.8
Intrusions into citizens' lives and more severe controls
may also (as has already been widely pointed out) result in a rise

3.1 While there may be a consensus about the definition of
terrorism, certain new concepts may be problematic, such as
‘violent
‘the
phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas
which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of
the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism’ of 2002.

radicalisation’, defined by the Commission as

3.2
This was highlighted in the Burgess report to the EP,
with regard to the new concept of ‘violent radicalisation’ in the
context of terrorist support and recruitment:
‘The definitional
challenge related to violent radicalisation and its prevention is
that of intention’. Moreover, radicalisation is often a process that
can extend over time, years even, meaning that there is time for
dialogue, education and information procedures and other
preventive measures.

3.3
Terrorism is already old news in the political world,
making use today of global communication modes, tax havens,
and the opportunities provided by weakly governed countries or
those whose state apparatus has collapsed in order to set up
bases and training camps. Nonetheless, it is more an amorphous
phenomenon than a single, structured international network.

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The newest factor in the influence of terrorism can be
3.4
found in the instantaneous, global media that report
in a
detailed and visible way, with pictures and often practically live
coverage of attacks, the effects of which can be felt more than
ever before. However, freedom of the press means that such
sensationalism cannot be halted — and this considerably
increases the fear and insecurity felt by civilians, and provides
publicity for terrorist attacks.

The Internet

is a forum for communication that

is
3.5
exploited to spread ideologies which support violence and
recruit supporters or even candidates for suicide attacks, to
enable communication between attackers and their leaders, and
to disseminate techniques such as making home-made bombs.

3.6
However, apart from seeking out websites which glorify
terrorism, it will be hard to monitor communications between
certain groups, given today's technologies for encoding and
concealing encrypted information, whether written or spoken.

grounds for this violence (1). However,
it is very difficult to
prevent transfers made in cash or via a system of correspon-
dents whereby money deposited in one country is collected by a
middle-man in another, or operations carried out or confirmed
by encrypted message or letter. Surveillance and investigations
can be effective when it comes to fundraising for charities or
humanitarian organisations with hidden links
to terrorist
groups. However, it is important to avoid monitoring all NGOs
or complicating their humanitarian or charitable activities and
fundraising, in a climate of widespread suspicion; this is trouble-
some for the public and makes it harder for charities to do their
work — to the extent
their
programmes from being properly carried out.

it may even prevent

that

Data exchanges between police forces and intelligence
3.10
agencies concern highly sensitive information such as pictures,
names, addresses, fingerprints and DNA profiles and member-
ship of organisations, and uncertainty still remains regarding a
real guarantee of privacy and protection from data processing
or evaluation errors in VIS and SIS files, criminal records and
other files, and the possibility for individuals to correct data
held in their records.

The EESC therefore has doubts as to the likely effective-
3.7
ness of the heightened measures being adopted to monitor the
Internet and private communications.

3.11
At the end of the day, the EU's key contribution lies in
harmonisation, cooperation and sharing of experiences, which
can still be improved on, though care should be taken to avoid
layer upon layer of
legislation and extraordinary measures,
when existing laws and bodies against organised or financial
crime could be extended to cover terrorism.

3.8
It is also reasonable to doubt whether identity checks
and luggage or vehicle searches at road borders, airports, ports
or, more rarely, bus or train stations actually prevent the move-
ment of terrorists, even though the secure protection of identity
papers is a good way to prevent them from being faked. While
such measures do, to an extent, effectively complicate the move-
ment of criminals in general, they also complicate the lives of
the public and are creating a detailed map of people's move-
ments, if one also includes the proliferation of video-surveillance
systems, private security guards, electronic access passes for
public and private establishments, and mobile telephone trans-
missions and other means for real-time location of persons.
These methods do not, however, prevent suicide attacks. They
create the feeling of a police state, if democratic steps are not
taken to show that the use of these technologies must not
exceed the strict minimum required to achieve their objectives.
National bodies ‘to watch the watchers’ and the creation of a
European think-tank in this
field, and regarding data on
presumed terrorists, could be a solution.

In principle, the surveillance of

3.9
flows
does not really hinder the daily lives of citizens, and makes it
possible to watch out for illegal practices (trafficking of arms,
human beings, drugs, etc.) which enable illegal capital to be
accrued. This would help to hinder the acquisition of funds for
terrorist violence and to improve knowledge of the breeding

illegal financial

law and suspicion towards foreigners,

3.12
There is much literature confirming that states of emer-
gency (even if only low- or medium-level) tend to encourage the
restriction of civil liberties, the erosion of guarantees of the rule
of
legal and illegal
migrants and asylum seekers. This can be observed in most
Member States. An atmosphere of racism and xenophobia is
spreading, and this rising tide should be opposed in both words
and deeds.

The roles of

3.13
the Member States, EU institutions,
Europol, Eurojust, etc. are well defined, but it is above all the
operational nature of cooperation within intelligence agencies
and investigations which requires constant improvement.

3.14
To prevent radical violence and terrorism, knowledge is
required of the backgrounds and ideologies conducive to it, and
this could help eliminate many preconceived — but unproven
— ideas.

(1) EESC opinion of 11.5.2005 on a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing,
Rapporteur: Mr Simpson (OJ C 267, 27.10.2005), points 3.1.8
and 3.2.1.

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3.15
The campaign can only be organised in the long term,
as democracy and respect for civil liberties must be established
or restored in States which are weak or cannot control all their
territories, and in authoritarian or dictatorial countries.

4.1.2.3
setting up channels for dialogue with leaders and
social players from the communities in which terrorist groups
base themselves, in order to encourage joint efforts to condemn
and de-legitimise violent acts and discourse;

3.16
The EESC believes that the usually discreet action of
intelligence agencies and police investigations should not neces-
sarily be accompanied by a systematic policy of secrecy towards
citizens and their national and European representatives.
It
should be possible to provide information encouraging public
involvement and to carry out democratic supervision, despite
the context, using appropriate methods, particularly in order to
prevent the erosion of the rule of law.

4.1.2.4
establishing exchanges between the different social
players, with national and Community authorities, of experi-
ences and practices for isolating and monitoring individuals and
groups susceptible to exclusion and radicalisation leading to
violence, always being extremely careful to guarantee funda-
mental rights and freedoms and closely respect the rule of law;

4. The role of civil society in preventing terrorism and

radicalisation leading to violence

4.1 Key tasks for civil society

Civil

society is

the main victim of

international
4.1.1
terrorism (whether driven by unrepentant nationalism,
the
instrumentalisation of religious fundamentalism or simply the
use of violence as an end in itself). It is the target of terrorism
which aims only to punish collectively and indiscriminately, to
impose a widespread climate of terror and force the State to
yield to its demands. However, as pointed out in the EESC's
opinion on Civil society participation in the fight against orga-
nised crime and terrorism (2), civil society is also one of the
main players in any strategy to fight this threat, both as regards
the mechanisms for confronting the most visible effects and
underlying causes of
terrorism, and its important work in
caring for victims who have suffered the consequences of
terrorism.

4.1.2
Taking into account the leading role of the State and
the EU's institutional framework — particularly in the areas of
security, defence,
justice and finance — in fighting the most
visible symptoms and effects of this threat (preventing terrorist
acts, prosecuting and dismantling terrorist groups, detention,
judging and sentencing perpetrators of terrorist acts, blocking
funding channels, etc.), civil society can also play an important
task in this context, by:

actively ensuring that the counter-terrorism strategy
4.1.2.1
never oversteps the rule of
law and that the human rights,
values, principles and freedoms that define an open and demo-
cratic society are protected;

4.1.2.2
working with Community and national authorities at
all levels to identify activities and persons involved in terrorist
financial establishments and bodies
networks (the work of
managing telecom services is particularly important
in this
context). This cooperation should be based on a mutual
commitment by all those involved to share information, capaci-
ties and efforts
the common goal of defeating
terrorism;

to meet

(2) EESC exploratory opinion of 13.9.2006 on Civil society participation
in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, rapporteurs:
Mr Rodríguez García Caro, Mr Pariza Castaños, Mr Cabra de Luna
(OJ C 318, 23.12.2006), point 13.

suggesting

approaches

4.1.2.5
integration
processes and the views, attitudes and actions of groups of par-
for training programmes
ticular importance in this context)
aimed at the police, security and intelligence personnel who
have the biggest part to play in combating this threat;

(regarding

4.1.2.6
implementing pilot schemes which focus efforts on
areas most susceptible to alienation, radicalisation and recruit-
ment (prisons, places of worship, schools,
inner-city suburbs,
public call centres and telecom establishments, etc.), and
designed to prevent the exclusion, radicalisation and demonisa-
tion of individuals and groups due to their social class, gender,
ethnicity or religion.

4.2 Integration as a preventive approach: concrete proposals

4.2.1
It is by paying attention to the underlying causes in
which terrorist violence breeds that civil society can play its full
role. While none of the possible causes identified in this context
serve to justify violence of any kind, many lapses into terrorism
may be explained as the end result of processes of alienation,
radicalisation and recruitment fed by broad inequalities between
groups in an area, exclusion and discrimination (social, political
or economic) and by double standards applied when judging the
actions of different individuals. Integration must therefore be the
keystone of any far-reaching strategy, preferably taking a preven-
tive approach, and aiming to:

4.2.2
strengthen formal and informal education systems,
geared towards removing negative stereotypes and encouraging
tolerance and integration based on shared values inspired essen-
tially by human rights (this means, inter alia, revising current
school texts with a view to reformulating conflictual stereotypes
in order to encourage tolerance and multicultural learning);

4.2.3
obtain commitments (including codes of conduct) from
the media, so as not to provide a platform for discourse or ideas
that could encourage exclusion, racism and xenophobia. While
categorically respecting the freedom of the press and of expres-
sion, there should be encouragement of media approaches and
positions that focus on shared values throughout history and
the advantages of a rich multicultural heritage in a globalised
world;

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4.2.4
by means of public campaigns, disseminate messages
and inclusive approaches that help to clarify and correct erro-
neous concepts (international
than Islamic
terrorism, integration rather than assimilation) or inappropriate
images (citizens rather than immigrants) that widen divides and
encourage conflict;

terrorism rather

4.2.5
help to raise awareness about the importance of identi-
fying human rights as the essential basis for integration in a
multicultural society.
In this context, organised civil society
should be an important driving force in creating a society
whose members all have the same rights (social, political and
economic) and responsibilities;

4.2.6
promote the creation of social forums in which players
from the different communities in each country are present, and
which advocate mechanisms for inclusion and peaceful settle-
ment of disputes;

to harness and build on the EESC's work, through its active
contacts and cooperation with extra-Community bodies, by
looking into new areas of action geared towards preventing radi-
calisation of individuals and groups;

4.2.11
promote the emergence and consolidation of forums
for inclusive participation of the population (both native and
foreign), based horizontally on civic representation rather than
on national or religious profiles;

boost the research work of specialised centres and
4.2.12
institutes located within the EU and,
through cooperation,
within countries of particular interest in this context. Specific
focus should be given to support
for projects and studies
designed to gain an insight into the processes that can lead to
alienation, recruitment and violent radicalisation and interrela-
tions between the different factors at play.

4.3 Attending to victims

4.2.7
identify and boost the civil organisations and leaders
that represent other communities within the EU as key players
in the integration of people from other cultures, with the over-
riding aim of seeking dialogue and cooperation in order to
eradicate the causes of alienation and radicalisation among
certain members of these communities;

Last but not least, attending to the direct victims of
4.3.1
terrorist acts should be considered a fundamental part of a
general approach,
in which civil society plays a key role in
fighting terrorism. In order to prevent these victims from being
forgotten or socially excluded, it is essential in this context to:

4.2.8
implement specific programmes designed to de-radica-
lise those who may potentially sympathise with terrorist ideas
to occur
in areas where recruitment
and practices
(prisons, places of worship, etc.) and geared towards social inte-
gration and the creation of jobs;

tends

4.3.2
campaign for the full recognition of all the rights of
victims (including financial compensation due) harmed by any
type of terrorist activity, whether within or outside national
borders;

4.2.9
focus decentralised cooperation in this direction, both
at national and Community level (taking advantage of existing
frameworks such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
the
European Neighbourhood Policy, or the framework linking ACP
countries). Harnessing the vast potential of Member States' and
the EU's development cooperation policies, this would mean
establishing cooperation in the field with players who, though
defined on religious or national grounds, would express their
strong opposition to violence as a means of action;

develop social support mechanisms (physical, psycholo-
4.3.3
gical, economic) to help victims overcome their trauma and
prevent the emergence of discourse that demonises or is openly
racist or xenophobic;

4.3.4
EU in order
assisting and protecting these people.

rally political will within national governments and the
to establish agreed bases for acknowledging,

significantly increase, within the EU and in the
4.2.10
context of relations with non-EU countries, the number of, and
the budgets for, programmes for the exchange of
teachers,
students, journalists, trade union and employers' organisations,
defenders of human rights, members of NGOs, etc., while
paying specific attention to the need to improve gender equality.
Personal knowledge and exchange of experiences and viewpoints
are key methods for dismantling negative stereotypes and
building a common future in a century that will necessarily be
multi-cultural (3). In this context, it would be highly beneficial

(3) EESC opinion of 20.4.2006 on the Proposal for a Decision of the European
Parliament and of the Council concerning the European Year of Intercultural
Dialogue (2008), rapporteur: Ms Cser (OJ C 185, 8.8.2006).

4.4 People as the main focus of security and prevention: contributing

policies

4.4.1
Assuming that people are the main asset of any State
and, therefore, the EU, and in order to ensure human safety,
is
peace-building and the prevention of violent conflicts,
necessary to:

it

develop strategies and multidimensional efforts to guar-
4.4.2
antee a decent level of wellbeing and safety for all those inha-
biting an area, and for their neighbours — for by promoting
their development and safety, one guarantees one's own;

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4.4.3
reduce and eventually eliminate inequalities between
groups and countries, as the main means of promoting safety
for all. To ensure integration and undermine the terrorist threat,
there must be systematic respect for human rights and a strong
democratic climate, guaranteeing freedom of religious practices
and ensuring their separation from public affairs. This also
means opposing social areas that exist outside the law (legal
‘limbos’ or ghettoes based on customs that are unacceptable in
this context);

4.4.4
understand that security cannot be achieved at the cost
of freedom, by restricting the rights that define an open and
democratic society, or by applying counter-terrorist measures
that resemble those used by the other side;

4.4.5
acknowledge that an approach such as that required by
counter-terrorism (which must be cross-disciplinary, multi-
dimensional and long-term) can only bear fruit if there is a dedi-
cated, adequate budget, bringing together national and Com-
munity efforts.

4.5 Public-private partnerships

threat

is widespread, permanent and
The terrorist
4.5.1
global,
is safe from its impact, and its profile and methods
change constantly. This, together with the idea that the right
strategy has still not been defined to combat it, results in the
need to constantly re-examine the analyses, assessments and
methods employed to fight it. This effort involves everybody,
from governments and Community bodies to civil society as a
this will also mean exploring the
whole. By definition,

Brussels, 22 April 2008.

possibilities for public-private partnerships (under no circum-
stances allowing this to lead to counterproductive privatisation
of security and defence), working towards a common goal: the
wellbeing and safety of all (4). The following key aspects of this
approach should be highlighted:

4.5.2
the need to draw up a glossary of terms so that, when
it comes to both discussion and action, agreement can be
reached on the concepts that will guide the work of all parties
and players involved;

4.5.3
of
strategy at all levels and in all its guises;

democratic monitoring

the

counter-terrorism

4.5.4
raising awareness of the importance of the Member
States' foreign policies — and the CFSP/CESDP at Community
level — and national and Community development cooperation
policies in preventing terrorism and de-radicalising potential
terrorists;

4.5.5
the absolute need for an adequate,
for all the programmes and initiatives mentioned herein;

long-term budget

4.5.6
the need to open — or maintain — channels for
dialogue and cooperation with social, political and economic
players, both inside and outside the EU, given the impossibility
of successfully fighting this threat alone, and the advantages of
joining forces
long-term
approaches and strategies for action.

consistent,

to devise

in order

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

(4) In line with the position taken by the EESC's exploratory opinion of
13.9.2006 on Civil society participation in the fight against organised crime
and terrorism, rapporteurs: Mr Rodríguez García Caro, Mr Pariza
Castaños, Mr Cabra de Luna (OJ C 318, 23.12.2006), point 13.