White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 405} {SEC(2008) 406}
Date: 2008-04-02
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, competition law, competition policy, control of restrictive practices, damages, dominant position, single market

EN 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 2.4.2008 
COM(2008) 165 final 

WHITE PAPER on 

Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 

{SEC(2008) 404} 
{SEC(2008) 405} 
{SEC(2008) 406} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
 
WHITE PAPER on 

Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 

1. 

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE WHITE PAPER 

1.1.  Why a White Paper on damages actions for breaches of the EC antitrust rules? 

Any citizen or business who suffers harm as a result of a breach of EC antitrust rules (Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty) must be able to claim reparation from the party who caused the 
damage.  This  right  of  victims  to  compensation  is  guaranteed  by  Community  law,  as  the 
European Court of Justice recalled in 2001 and 2006.1  

Despite the requirement to establish an effective legal framework turning exercising the right 
to  damages  into  a  realistic  possibility,  and  although  there  have  recently  been  some  signs  of 
improvement  in  certain  Member  States,  to  date  in  practice  victims  of  EC  antitrust 
infringements  only  rarely  obtain  reparation  of  the  harm  suffered.  The  amount  of 
compensation that these victims are forgoing is in the range of several billion euros a year.2 

In its 2005 Green Paper, the Commission concluded that this failure is largely due to various 
legal  and  procedural  hurdles  in  the  Member  States’  rules  governing  actions  for  antitrust 
damages  before  national  courts.  Indeed,  such  antitrust  damages  cases  display  a  number  of 
particular  characteristics  that  are  often  insufficiently  addressed  by  traditional  rules  on  civil 
liability  and  procedure.  This  gives  rise  to  a  great  deal  of  legal  uncertainty.3  These 
particularities include the very complex factual and economic analysis required, the frequent 
inaccessibility and concealment of crucial evidence in the hands of defendants and the often 
unfavourable risk/reward balance for claimants.  

The  current  ineffectiveness  of  antitrust  damages  actions  is  best  addressed  by  a 
combination of measures at both Community and national levels, in order to achieve effective 
minimum  protection  of  the  victims’  right  to  damages  under  Articles  81  and  82  in  every 
Member State and a more level playing field and greater legal certainty across the EU.  

The  European  Parliament4  concurred  with  the  findings  in  the  Green  Paper,  as  did  other 
stakeholders,  and  called  upon  the  Commission  to  prepare  a  White  Paper  with  detailed 
proposals to address the obstacles to effective antitrust damages actions.  

1.2. 

Objectives, guiding principles and scope of the White Paper 

This  White  Paper  considers  and  puts  forward  proposals  for  policy  choices  and  specific 
measures that would ensure, more than is the case today, that all victims of infringements of 

1 

2 
3 
4 

Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, and Joined Cases C-295−298/04, Manfredi, 
[2006] ECR I-6619. 
See section 2.2 of the Impact Assessment Report (IAR). 
See ibid., section 2.3.  
Resolution of 25 April 2007 (2006/2207(INI)). 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
                                                 
EC competition law have access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully 
compensated for the harm they suffered.  

This White Paper is to be read in conjunction with two Commission staff working documents: 
(a) a  Commission  staff  working  paper  on  EC  antitrust  damages  actions  (“the  SWP”)  which 
explains in greater detail the considerations underlying the White Paper and also provides a 
concise  overview  of  the  already  existing  acquis  communautaire;  and  (b)  an  Impact 
Assessment  Report  (the  “IAR”)  analysing  the  potential  benefits  and  costs  of  various  policy 
options, and an executive summary of this report.  

The primary objective of this White Paper is to improve the legal conditions for victims to 
exercise  their  right  under  the  Treaty  to  reparation  of  all  damage  suffered  as  a  result  of  a 
breach  of  the  EC  antitrust  rules.  Full  compensation  is,  therefore,  the  first  and  foremost 
guiding principle.  

More  effective  compensation  mechanisms  mean  that  the  costs  of  antitrust  infringements 
would  be  borne  by  the  infringers,  and  not  by  the  victims  and  law-abiding  businesses. 
Effective  remedies  for  private  parties  also  increase  the  likelihood  that  a  greater  number  of 
illegal restrictions of competition will be detected and that the infringers will be held liable.5 
Improving compensatory justice would therefore inherently also produce beneficial effects in 
terms of deterrence of future infringements and greater compliance with EC antitrust rules. 
Safeguarding undistorted competition is an integral part of the internal market and important 
for implementing the Lisbon strategy. A competition culture contributes to better allocation of 
resources, greater economic efficiency, increased innovation and lower prices.  

The  Commission  followed  the  further  guiding  principle  that  the  legal  framework  for  more 
effective antitrust damages actions should be based on a genuinely European approach. The 
policy choices proposed in this White Paper therefore consist of balanced measures that are 
rooted in European legal culture and traditions.  

Another important guiding principle of the Commission’s policy is to preserve strong public 
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 by the Commission and the competition authorities of the 
Member  States.  Accordingly,  the  measures  put forward  in  this  White  Paper  are  designed  to 
create  an  effective  system  of  private  enforcement  by  means  of  damages  actions  that 
complements, but does not replace or jeopardise, public enforcement.  

In view of the foregoing and in line with the requirement set out by the Court of Justice that 
any  victim  of  antitrust  infringements  must  be  able  to  exercise  his  right  to  compensation 
effectively,  the  issues  addressed  in  the  White  Paper  concern,  in  principle,  all  categories  of 
victim,  all  types  of  breach  of  Articles  81  and  82  and  all  sectors  of  the  economy.  The 
Commission  also  considers  it  appropriate  that  the  policy  should  cover  both  actions  for 
damages which do, and actions which do not, rely on a prior finding of an infringement by a 
competition authority.  

5 

See the IAR, section 2.1. 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
                                                 
2. 

THE PROPOSED MEASURES AND POLICY CHOICES  

2.1. 

Standing: indirect purchasers and collective redress  

In  the  context  of  legal  standing  to  bring  an  action,  the  Commission  welcomes  the 
confirmation by the Court of Justice that “any individual” who has suffered harm caused by 
an  antitrust  infringement  must  be  allowed  to  claim  damages  before  national  courts.6  This 
principle also applies to indirect purchasers, i.e. purchasers who had no direct dealings with 
the  infringer,  but  who  nonetheless  may  have  suffered  considerable  harm  because  an  illegal 
overcharge was passed on to them along the distribution chain.  

With  respect  to  collective  redress,  the  Commission  considers  that  there  is  a  clear  need  for 
mechanisms  allowing  aggregation  of  the  individual  claims  of  victims  of  antitrust 
infringements.  Individual  consumers,  but  also  small  businesses,  especially  those  who  have 
suffered  scattered  and  relatively  low-value  damage,  are  often  deterred  from  bringing  an 
individual action for damages by the costs, delays, uncertainties, risks and burdens involved. 
As a result, many of these victims currently remain uncompensated. At the rare occasions 
where  a  multitude  of  individual  actions  are  brought  in  relation  to  the  same  infringement, 
procedural inefficiencies arise, for claimants, defendants and the judicial system alike.  

The  Commission  therefore  suggests7  a  combination  of  two  complementary  mechanisms  of 
collective redress to address effectively those issues in the field of antitrust:  

•  representative  actions,  which  are  brought  by  qualified  entities,  such  as  consumer 
associations,  state  bodies  or  trade  associations,  on  behalf  of  identified  or,  in  rather 
restricted  cases,  identifiable  victims.  These  entities  are  either  (i)  officially  designated  in 
advance  or  (ii)  certified  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  by  a  Member  State  for  a  particular  antitrust 
infringement to bring an action on behalf of some or all of their members; and 

•  opt-in  collective  actions,  in  which  victims  expressly  decide  to  combine  their  individual 

claims for harm they suffered into one single action.  

Considering  that  qualified  entities  will  not  be  able  or  willing  to  pursue  every  claim,  it  is 
necessary that these two types of action complement each other to ensure effective collective 
redress for victims of antitrust infringements. In addition, it is important that victims are not 
deprived  of  their  right  to  bring  an  individual  action  for  damages  if  they  so  wish.  However, 
safeguards should be put in place to avoid that the same harm is compensated more than once. 

These suggestions on damages actions  in the field  of antitrust are part of the Commission’s 
wider  initiative  to  strengthen  collective  redress  mechanisms  in  the  EU  and  may  develop 
further within this context. 

2.2. 

Access to evidence: disclosure inter partes 

Competition  cases  are  particularly  fact-intensive.  Much  of  the  key  evidence  necessary  for 
proving a case for antitrust damages is often concealed and, being held by the defendant or 
by third parties, is usually not known in sufficient detail to the claimant.  

6 
7 

Manfredi (see footnote 1), point 61. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 2 of the SWP. 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Whilst  it  is  essential  to  overcome  this  structural  information  asymmetry  and  to  improve 
victims’  access  to  relevant  evidence,  it  is  also  important  to  avoid  the  negative  effects  of 
overly broad and burdensome disclosure obligations, including the risk of abuses.  

The Commission therefore suggests that across the EU a minimum level of disclosure inter 
partes  for  EC  antitrust  damages  cases  should  be  ensured.  Building  on  the  approach  in  the 
Intellectual Property Directive (Directive 2004/48/EC), access to evidence should be based on 
fact-pleading  and  strict  judicial  control  of  the  plausibility  of  the  claim  and  the 
proportionality of the disclosure request. The Commission therefore suggests8 that:  

•  national  courts  should,  under  specific  conditions,  have  the  power  to  order  parties  to 

proceedings or third parties to disclose precise categories of relevant evidence; 

•  conditions for a disclosure order should include that the claimant has: 

–  presented all the facts and means of evidence that are reasonably available to 
him, provided that these show plausible grounds to suspect that he suffered harm 
as a result of an infringement of competition rules by the defendant;  

–  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  he  is  unable,  applying  all  efforts  that 

can reasonably be expected, otherwise to produce the requested evidence;  

–  specified sufficiently precise categories of evidence to be disclosed; and  

–  satisfied  the  court  that  the  envisaged  disclosure  measure  is  both  relevant  to  the 

case and necessary and proportionate; 

•  adequate protection should be given to corporate statements by leniency applicants and to 

the investigations of competition authorities;  

•  to prevent destruction of relevant evidence or refusal to comply with a disclosure order, 
courts  should  have  the  power  to  impose  sufficiently  deterrent  sanctions,  including  the 
option to draw adverse inferences in the civil proceedings for damages.  

2.3. 

Binding effect of NCA decisions 

Whenever  the European Commission finds a breach of Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty, 
victims  of  the  infringement  can,  by  virtue  of  established  case  law  and  Article  16(1)  of 
Regulation  1/2003,  rely  on  this  decision  as  binding  proof  in  civil  proceedings  for  damages. 
For  decisions  by  national  competition  authorities  (NCAs)  finding  a  breach  of  Article  81  or 
82, similar rules currently exist in only some Member States.  

The Commission sees no reason why a final decision9 on Article 81 or 82 taken by an NCA in 
the European Competition Network (ECN), and a final judgment by a review court upholding 

8 
9 

For the underlying reasons see Chapter 3 of the SWP. 
In all Member States, NCA decisions are subject to judicial review. NCA decisions are considered final 
when they can no longer be reviewed, i.e. decisions that were not appealed within the applicable time 
limits  and  thus  accepted by  their  addressees,  and  those  that  were  confirmed  by  the  competent  review 
courts. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
                                                 
the NCA decision or itself finding an infringement, should not be accepted in every Member 
State as irrebuttable proof of the infringement in subsequent civil antitrust damages cases. 

A  rule  to  this  effect  would  ensure  a  more  consistent  application  of  Articles  81  and  82  by 
different national bodies and increase legal certainty. It would also significantly increase the 
effectiveness  and  procedural  efficiency  of  actions  for  antitrust  damages:  if  defendants  can 
call into question their own breach of Article 81 or 82 established in a decision by an NCA 
and, possibly, confirmed by a review court, the courts seized with an action for damages are 
required  to  re-examine  the  facts  and  legal  issues  already  investigated  and  assessed  by  a 
specialised  public  authority  (and  a  review  court).  Such  duplication  of  factual  and  legal 
analysis leads to considerable extra costs, duration and imponderability for the victim’s action 
for damages.  

The Commission therefore suggests10 the following rule:  

•  national courts that have to rule in actions for damages on practices under Article 81 or 82 
on which an NCA in the ECN has already given a final decision finding an infringement 
of  those  articles,  or  on  which  a  review  court  has  given  a final  judgment  upholding  the 
NCA decision or itself finding an infringement, cannot take decisions running counter to 
any such decision or ruling.  

This  obligation  should  apply  without  prejudice  to  the  right,  and  possible  obligation,  of 
national courts to seek clarification on the interpretation of Article 81 or 82 under Article 234 
of the EC Treaty. 

The rule set out above confers binding effect only on decisions that are final, i.e. where the 
defendant  has  exhausted  all  appeal  avenues,  and  relates  only  to  the  same  practices  and 
same undertaking(s) for which the NCA or the review court found an infringement.  

2.4. 

Fault requirement 

If the breach  of  Article 81 or  82 has been proven, Member  States  take diverse approaches 
concerning the requirement of fault to obtain damages. 

Some Member States require no fault at all as a condition for an antitrust damages claim, or 
irrebuttably  presume  the  existence  of  fault  once  an  infringement  has  been  proven.  The 
Commission sees no policy grounds against such an approach.  

As regards the other Member States, the Court’s case law on the conditions of civil liability 
for breaches of directly applicable Treaty rules, such as Articles 81 and 82, and the principle 
of  effectiveness  suggest  that  any  fault  requirements  under  national  law  would  have  to  be 
limited.  The  Commission  sees  no  reasons  to  relieve  infringers  from  liability  on  grounds  of 
absence of fault other than in cases where the infringer made an excusable error.  

The  Commission  therefore  suggests11  a  measure  to  make  it  clear,  for  Member  States  that 
require fault to be proven, that: 

10 
11 

For the underlying reasons see Chapter 4 of the SWP. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 5 of the SWP. 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  once the victim has shown a breach of Article 81 or 82, the infringer should be liable 
for  damages  caused  unless  he  demonstrates  that  the  infringement  was  the  result  of  a 
genuinely excusable error;  

•  an error would be excusable if a reasonable person applying a high standard of care could 

not have been aware that the conduct restricted competition.  

2.5. 

Damages 

The Commission welcomes the confirmation by the Court of Justice of the types of harm for 
which victims of antitrust infringements should be able to obtain compensation.12 The Court 
emphasised that victims must, as a minimum, receive full compensation of the real value of 
the  loss  suffered.  The  entitlement  to  full  compensation  therefore  extends  not  only  to  the 
actual loss due to an anti-competitive price increase, but also to the loss of profit as a result 
of any reduction in sales and encompasses a right to interest.  

For reasons of legal certainty and to raise awareness amongst potential infringers and victims, 
the  Commission  suggests  codifying  in  a  Community  legislative  instrument  the  current 
acquis  communautaire  on  the  scope  of  damages  that  victims  of  antitrust  infringements  can 
recover.  

Once the scope of damages is clear, the quantum of these damages must be calculated. This 
calculation,  implying  a  comparison  with  the  economic  situation  of  the  victim  in  the 
hypothetical scenario of a competitive market, is often a very cumbersome exercise. It can 
become excessively difficult or even practically impossible, if the idea that the exact amount 
of  the  harm  suffered  must  always  be  precisely  calculated  is  strictly  applied.  Moreover,  far-
reaching calculation requirements can be disproportionate to the amount of damage suffered.  

To facilitate the calculation of damages, the Commission therefore intends:13 

•  to  draw  up  a  framework  with  pragmatic,  non-binding  guidance  for  quantification  of 
damages  in  antitrust  cases,  e.g.  by  means  of  approximate  methods  of  calculation  or 
simplified rules on estimating the loss. 

2.6. 

Passing-on overcharges  

If the direct customer of the infringer fully or partially passed on the illegal overcharge to his 
own customers (the indirect purchasers), several legal issues can arise. At present, these create 
a great degree of legal uncertainty and difficulties in antitrust damages actions.  

Problems arise, on the one hand, if the infringer invokes the passing-on of overcharges as a 
defence  against  a  damages  claimant,  arguing  that  the  claimant  suffered  no  loss  because  he 
passed on the price increase to his customers.  

The Commission recalls the Court’s emphasis on the compensatory principle and its premise 
that damages should be available to any injured person who can show a sufficient causal 
link with the infringement. Against this background, infringers should be allowed to invoke 
the  possibility  that  the  overcharge  might  have  been  passed  on.  Indeed,  to  deny  this  defence 

12 
13 

Manfredi (see footnote 1), points 95 and 97. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 6 of the SWP. 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
                                                 
could result in unjust enrichment of purchasers who passed on the overcharge and in undue 
multiple  compensation  for  the  illegal  overcharge  by  the  defendant.  The  Commission 
therefore suggests14 that:  

•  defendants  should  be  entitled  to  invoke  the  passing-on  defence  against  a  claim  for 
compensation  of  the  overcharge.  The  standard  of  proof  for  this  defence  should  be  not 
lower than the standard imposed on the claimant to prove the damage.  

Difficulties also arise, on the other hand, if an indirect purchaser invokes the passing-on of 
overcharges  as  a  basis  to  show  the  harm  suffered.  Purchasers  at,  or  near  the  end  of  the 
distribution  chain  are  often  those  most  harmed  by  antitrust  infringements,  but  given  their 
distance from the infringement they find it particularly difficult to produce sufficient proof 
of the existence and extent of passing-on of the illegal overcharge along the distribution chain. 
If  such  claimants  are  unable  to  produce  this  proof,  they  will  not  be  compensated  and  the 
infringer,  who  may  have  successfully  used  the  passing-on  defence  against  another  claimant 
upstream, would retain an unjust enrichment.  

To avoid such scenario, the Commission therefore proposes to lighten the victim’s burden and 
suggests15 that: 

•  indirect  purchasers  should  be  able  to  rely  on  the  rebuttable  presumption  that  the  illegal 

overcharge was passed on to them in its entirety.  

In the case of joint, parallel or consecutive actions brought by purchasers at different points in 
the distribution chain,  national  courts are encouraged to make full use of all mechanisms at 
their disposal under national, Community and international law in order to avoid under- and 
over-compensation of the harm caused by an infringement of competition law. 

2.7. 

Limitation periods 

While limitation periods play an important role in providing legal certainty, they can also be 
a considerable obstacle to recovery of damages, both in stand-alone and follow-on cases.  

As regards the commencement of limitation periods, victims can face practical difficulties 
in  the  event  of  a  continuous  or  repeated  infringement  or  when  they  cannot  reasonably  have 
been  aware  of  the  infringement.  The  latter  occurs  frequently  in  relation  to  the  most  serious 
and harmful competition law infringements, such as cartels, which often remain covert both 
during and after their lifespan. 
The Commission therefore suggests16 that the limitation period should not start to run: 

•  in  the  case  of  a  continuous  or  repeated  infringement,  before  the  day  on  which  the 

infringement ceases;  

•  before the victim of the infringement can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of 

the infringement and of the harm it caused him. 

14 
15 
16 

For the underlying reasons see Chapter 7 of the SWP. 
For the underlying reasons see ibid. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 8 of the SWP. 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
                                                 
To  keep  open  the  possibility  of  follow-on  actions,  measures  should  be  taken  to  avoid 
limitation periods expiring while public enforcement of the competition rules by competition 
authorities  (and  review  courts)  is  still  ongoing.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  prefers  the 
option  of  a  new  limitation  period,  which  starts  once  a  competition  authority  or  a  review 
court adopts an infringement decision, over the option of suspending the limitation period 
during the public proceedings.  

In the latter case, claimants (and defendants) will sometimes find it difficult to calculate the 
remaining period precisely, given that the opening and closure of proceedings by competition 
authorities are not always publicly known. Moreover, if a suspension were to commence at a 
very late stage of the limitation period, there may not be enough time left to prepare a claim.  

The Commission therefore suggests17 that:  

•  a new limitation period of at least two years should start once the infringement decision 

on which a follow-on claimant relies has become final.  

2.8. 

Costs of damages actions 

The costs associated with antitrust damages actions, and also the cost allocation rules, can be 
a decisive disincentive to bringing an antitrust damages claim, given that these actions may be 
particularly costly and are generally  more  complex  and  time-consuming than other kinds of 
civil action.  

The Commission considers that it would be useful for Member States to reflect on their cost 
rules  and  to  examine  the  practices  existing  across  the  EU,  in  order  to  allow  meritorious 
actions where costs would otherwise prevent claims being brought, particularly by claimants 
whose financial situation is significantly weaker than that of the defendant.  

Due consideration should be given to mechanisms fostering early resolution of cases, e.g. by 
settlements.  This  could  significantly  reduce  or  eliminate  litigation  costs  for  the  parties  and 
also the costs for the judicial system.  

Member  States  could  also  consider  introducing,  where  appropriate,  limits  on  the  level  of 
court fees applicable to antitrust damages actions.  

Finally, Member States are invited to reflect on their cost allocation rules in order to reduce 
the  uncertainty  for  potential  claimants  about  the  costs  for  which  they  may  be  liable.  The 
“loser pays” principle, which prevails in the EU Member States, plays an important function 
in  filtering  out  unmeritorious  cases.  However,  under  certain  circumstances,  this  principle 
could also discourage victims with meritorious claims. National courts may therefore have to 
be  empowered  to  derogate  from  this  principle,  for  example  by  guaranteeing  that  an 
unsuccessful claimant will not have to bear the defendants’ costs that were unreasonably or 
vexatiously incurred or are otherwise excessive. 

The Commission therefore encourages18 Member States:  

•  to design procedural rules fostering settlements, as a way to reduce costs; 

17 
18 

For the underlying reasons see ibid. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 9 of the SWP. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  to set court fees in an appropriate manner so that they do not become a disproportionate 

disincentive to antitrust damages claims; 

•  to give national courts the possibility of issuing cost orders derogating, in certain justified 
cases, from the normal cost rules, preferably upfront in the proceedings. Such cost orders 
would guarantee that the claimant, even if unsuccessful, would not have to bear all costs 
incurred by the other party. 

2.9. 

Interaction between leniency programmes and actions for damages 

It is important, for both public and private enforcement, to ensure that leniency programmes 
are attractive.  

Adequate protection against disclosure in private actions for damages must be ensured for 
corporate  statements  submitted  by  a  leniency  applicant  in  order  to  avoid  placing  the 
applicant  in  a  less  favourable  situation  than  the  co-infringers.  Otherwise,  the  threat  of 
disclosure of the confession submitted by a leniency applicant could have a negative influence 
on  the  quality  of  his  submissions,  or  even  dissuade  an  infringer  from  applying  for  leniency 
altogether.  

The Commission therefore suggests19 that such protection should apply: 

•  to  all  corporate  statements  submitted  by  all  applicants  for  leniency  in  relation  to  a 
breach  of  Article  81  of  the  EC  Treaty  (also  where  national  antitrust  law  is  applied  in 
parallel); 

•  regardless  of  whether  the  application  for  leniency  is  accepted,  is  rejected  or  leads  to  no 

decision by the competition authority. 

This protection applies where disclosure is ordered by a court, be it before or after adoption 
of a decision by the  competition authority. Voluntary disclosure of corporate  statements by 
applicants for immunity and reduction of fines should be precluded at least until a statement 
of objections has been issued. 

A further measure to ensure that leniency programmes continue to be fully attractive could be 
to limit the civil liability of successful immunity applicants. The Commission therefore puts 
forward  for  further  consideration20  the  possibility  of  limiting  the  civil  liability  of  the 
immunity recipient to claims by his direct and indirect contractual partners. This would 
help to make the scope of damages to be paid by immunity recipients more predictable and 
more limited, without unduly sheltering them from civil liability for their participation in an 
infringement. The immunity recipient would have to bear the burden of proving the extent to 
which his liability would be limited. However, consideration should be given, in particular, to 
the need for such a measure and the impact it would have on the full compensation of victims 
of cartels and on the position of the co-infringers, especially other leniency applicants.  

19 
20 

For the underlying reasons see Chapter 10, section B.1 of the SWP. 
For the underlying reasons see Chapter 10, section B.2 of the SWP. 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The Commission invites comments on this White Paper. They may be sent, by 15 July 2008, 
either by e-mail to: 

comp-damages-actions@ec.europa.eu 

or by post to:  

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Competition, Unit A 5 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
B-1049 Brussels. 

It is standard practice within DG Competition to publish submissions received in response to 
a  public  consultation.  However,  it  is  possible  to  request  that  submissions,  or  parts  thereof, 
remain confidential. Should this be the case, please indicate clearly on the front page of your 
submission that it should not be made public and also send a non-confidential version of your 
submission to DG Competition for publication. 

EN 

11 

   EN