Council Regulation (EC) No 236/2008 of 10 March 2008 concerning terminating the partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of the anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
Date: 2008-03-10
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: Russia, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, fertiliser, import, originating product

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(Acts adopted under the EC Treaty/Euratom Treaty whose publication is obligatory)

I

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 236/2008

of 10 March 2008

concerning terminating the partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No
384/96 of the anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty
Community,

establishing the European

relationship are
These two companies, due to their
the
treated as one legal entity for
present
is
limited in scope to the examination of dumping as far
as the applicant is concerned.

the purpose of
investigation (‘the applicant’). The request

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of
22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports
from countries not members of the European Community (1)
(‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(3) thereof,

(4)

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission
after consulting the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

facie

evidence

The applicant alleged and provided sufficient prima facie
evidence that the circumstances on the basis of which
measures were established have changed and that these
lasting nature. The applicant provided
changes are of
comparison
that
showing
prima
between its own costs of ammonium nitrate and its
export prices
to the Community would lead to a
reduction of dumping significantly below the level of
the current measures. Therefore,
the continued impo-
the existing levels, which were
sition of measures at
based on the level of dumping previously established,
would no longer be necessary to offset dumping.

a

(1)

(2)

(3)

A. PROCEDURE

1. Measures in force

The measures currently in force are a definitive anti-
dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No
658/2002 (2), on imports of ammonium nitrate origi-
nating in Russia.

(5)

2. Request for review

The Commission received a request for a partial interim
review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.

The request was
lodged by two related exporting
producers in Russia, belonging to the ‘Acron’ Holding
Company, namely OJSC Acron and OJSC Dorogobuzh.

(1) OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation

(EC) No 2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 17).

(2) OJ L 102, 18.4.2002, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regu-

lation (EC) No 945/2005 (OJ L 160, 23.6.2005, p. 1).

3. Initiation

after

determined,
that

consulting
sufficient evidence existed for

the Advisory
Having
the
Committee,
initiation of a partial
interim review, the Commission,
on 19 December 2006, by a notice published in the
initiated a
Official
the anti-dumping measures
partial
applicable to imports of ammonium nitrate originating
in Russia pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regu-
lation.

Journal of
interim review of

the European Union (3),

(6)

This review was limited in scope to dumping, with the
objective of assessing the need for the continuation,
removal or amendment of
the existing measures in
respect of the applicant.

(3) OJ C 311, 19.12.2006, p. 55.

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(7)

(8)

(9)

4. Investigation

The investigation of dumping covered the period from
1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006 (‘review investi-
gation period’ or ‘RIP’).

The Commission officially advised the applicant, as well
as the representatives of the exporting country and the
the review.
Community industry of
Interested parties were given the opportunity to make
their views known in writing and to request a hearing.

the initiation of

interested parties, who requested and showed that
reasons why they should be

All
there were particular
heard, were granted a hearing.

(14)

(10) A questionnaire was sent to the applicant and its related
sales companies on the Russian domestic market. The
applicant as well as two of the related sales companies
submitted full questionnaire replies.

(11)

The Commission sought and verified all
information
deemed necessary for the determination of dumping.
Verification visits were carried out at the premises of
the following companies:

(a) The exporting producers:

— OJSC Acron,

— OJSC Dorogobuzh;

(b) The related sales companies:

— JSC Rostragronova,

— JSC Kubanagronova.

B. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

1. Product concerned

(12)

The product under review is the same as in the investi-
gations mentioned in recital (1), i.e. solid fertilizers with
an ammonium nitrate content exceeding 80 % by weight
originating in Russia (the product concerned), currently
classifiable within CN codes 3102 30 90, 3102 40 90,
ex 3102 90 00,
ex 3102 60 00,
ex 3102 29 00,
ex 3105 10 00,
ex 3105 51 00,
ex 3105 20 10,
ex 3105 59 00 and ex 3105 90 91.

2. Like product

(13) As

established in the previous

and
confirmed in this investigation, the product concerned

investigations

and the products manufactured and sold by the
applicant on the Russian domestic market were found
to have the same basic physical and chemical characte-
ristics and essentially the same uses and are therefore
considered to be like products within the meaning of
Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. Since the present
review was limited to the determination of dumping as
far as the applicant is concerned, no conclusions were
reached with regard to the product produced and sold by
the Community industry in the Community market.

C. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION

In accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation,
it was examined whether the circumstances on the basis
of which the current dumping margin was based have
changed and whether such change was of a lasting
nature.

1. Normal value

In order to establish the normal value, it was first verified
that the total domestic sales of the applicant were repre-
sentative in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic
Regulation. Domestic sales of the applicant were found
to be representative when compared to its export sales as
they represented more than 5 % of its total export sales
volume to the Community.

The Commission subsequently examined whether the
domestic sales could be considered as being made in
the ordinary course of trade pursuant to Article 2(4) of
the basic Regulation. To this end, the cost of production
of the product produced and sold by the applicant on the
domestic market was examined.

(15)

(16)

(17) Gas is a main raw material component in the manufac-
turing process of the product concerned and represents a
significant proportion of the total cost of production. In
accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, it
was examined whether the costs associated with the
production and sales of the product under consideration
were reasonably reflected in the records of the parties
concerned.

(18)

that

It was established on the basis of data published by
internationally recognised sources specialised in energy
markets,
the prices paid by the applicant were
abnormally low. By way of illustration, they amounted
to one fifth of the export price of natural gas from Russia
and were also significantly lower than the gas price paid
by the Community producers. In this regard, all available
data indicate that domestic gas prices in Russia were
regulated prices which are far below market prices paid
in unregulated markets for natural gas.

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(19)

Since gas costs were not reasonably reflected in the
applicant’s records, they had to be adjusted accordingly.
In the absence of any undistorted gas prices relating to
the Russian domestic market, and in accordance with
Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, gas prices had to
be established on ‘any other reasonable basis, including
representative markets’. The
information from other
adjusted price was based on the average price of
Russian gas when sold for export at the German/Czech
border (Waidhaus), net of transport costs and adjusted to
reflect local distribution costs. Waidhaus being the main
hub for Russian gas sales to the EU, which is both the
largest market for Russian gas and has prices reasonably
reflecting costs, can be considered a representative
market.

(20)

the applicant claimed that any
Following disclosure,
adjustment of
its gas price paid on the domestic
market would be unwarranted because the accounting
records of the company fully reflected the costs asso-
ciated with the activity of production and sales of the
like product in the country of origin.

(23)

the

(18),

address

applicant did not

this was found not

(21) However, when examining cost of production of the like
product under Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation,
it
must be determined whether the costs as booked in
the company’s accounts are reasonably reflecting the
the
costs associated with the production and sale of
product under investigation. For the reasons set out
to be the
above in recital
case. The
apparent
significant difference between the price for gas paid on
the Russian domestic market and the export price of
natural gas from Russia, on the one hand, and the one
paid by the Community producers, on the other hand. It
did also not address the fact that domestic prices for
natural gas were regulated in Russia and could not be
considered to reasonably reflect a price normally payable
in undistorted markets. Finally,
the applicant did not
explain why despite the reasons set out in recital (18),
the cost of gas used for the production of
the like
sold on the domestic market would be
product
reasonably reflected in its records. This claim therefore
had to be rejected.

(22)

de

facto

a methodology

further claimed that by making a gas
The applicant
adjustment,
to determine
normal value was used which is not foreseen by the
basic Regulation. Thus, by replacing domestic gas costs
by costs calculated as described above in recital (19), and
due to the fact that these costs constitute major part of
the total costs of the like product and therefore also of
the constructed normal value, the normal value would be
de facto determined by data from a third ‘representative’
market.
for
market
basic Regulation
foresees, however, only the following methodologies to
determine the normal value:

In this regard,
economy

the applicant argued that

countries,

the

(i) on the basis of the domestic price of the like product
in the ordinary cause of trade, or alternatively,
in
case sales are not made in the ordinary course of
trade;

(ii) on the basis of the cost of production in the country
of origin (plus a reasonable amount
for selling,
general and administrative costs (‘SG&A’) and for
profits) or

(iii) representative export prices of the like product to an
appropriate third country. The applicant concluded
that on this basis normal value should not be based
on data from a third representative market.

In this regard and as also outlined below in recitals (45)
to (48), it should first be noted that normal value was
established in accordance with the methodologies
outlined in Article 2(1) to (6) of the basic Regulation.
in order to establish whether domestic sales
However,
were made in the ordinary course of trade by reason
of price, i.e. whether they were profitable, it must first
be established whether the costs of the applicant were a
reliable basis within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the
basic Regulation. Only after costs have been reliably
established,
it can be determined which methodology
to establish normal value should be used. It is therefore
wrong to claim that by determining reliable costs in
accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation a
new methodology to determine normal value was
introduced.

(24)

(25)

(26)

The applicant moreover argued that when adjusting cost
in accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation,
the level of the adjusted costs cannot exceed the level of
the respective costs in the exporting country. Otherwise,
the methodology used when adjusting cost would be in
breach of Article 2(3) of
the basic Regulation which
stipulates that normal value of the like product shall be
calculated on the basis of the costs of production in the
country of origin.

The cost adjustment was done in accordance with
Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation. Article 2(5) of the
basic Regulation does not refer to the ‘cost of production
in the country of origin’, but explicitly entitles the Insti-
tutions to use the cost of production coming ‘from other
representative market’
than the
in other
countries
country of origin. The applicant’s argument
therefore
had to be rejected

Finally, the findings set out above in recitals (18) and
(19) are also not in contrast to Article 1 of the basic
Regulation, as claimed by the applicant. Indeed, although
Article 1 of the basic Regulation indicates that normal
value should be established by reference to data from the
country of export, the basic Regulation makes also clear
that this rule is subject to exceptions.

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(27)

The applicant’s arguments in this respect had therefore to
be rejected.

(28)

The applicant further claimed that if an adjustment were
to be made to its cost of natural gas on the domestic
market, such adjustment should be based on either the

(i) non-regulated gas prices available in Russia, or

(ii) the average export price of Russian natural gas to the

Baltic countries, or alternatively

(iii) on the basis of the actual cost of production of
natural gas in Russia plus a reasonable profit margin.

(29)

than to the

regulated domestic price

Firstly, the fact that the Commission could have chosen a
different basis does not render the choice of Waidhaus
unreasonable. The primary criterion for the choice of the
basis on which to establish the gas prices is that
it
reasonably reflects a price normally payable in undis-
torted markets.
It is undisputed that this condition is
met with respect to the prices at Waidhaus. Secondly,
the fact that the volume of gas sold at non-regulated
prices in the domestic market was only minor during
the RIP and that such prices were significantly closer to
freely-
the
determined export price strongly suggests that
these
non-regulated prices were distorted by the prevailing
regulated prices. Therefore,
the unregulated domestic
It was also considered that
prices could not be used.
Russian export prices of gas to the Baltic States were
not sufficiently representative, due to the relatively low
export
Furthermore,
necessary data concerning transportation and distribution
cost were not available and therefore, reliable prices to
the Baltic States could not be established. Indeed, by far
the greatest volume of gas is exported via the Waidhaus
hub which represents therefore an appropriate basis for
an adjustment. The applicant did not provide any
evidence
representative
markets, other than the Waidhaus hub, where prices
reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted
markets. Consequently, these arguments were rejected.

existence of

countries.

regarding

volumes

these

the

to

(30)

the applicant also claimed that

it
In this context,
purchased approximately 50 % of
the natural gas
consumed in its production of fertilisers on the non-
in Russia. The applicant claimed it
regulated market
would therefore be discriminatory to adjust
its gas
costs while no such adjustments would be made for
other exporters with higher cost levels similar to those
of the applicant. It should be noted that according to the
verified questionnaire reply, the applicant’s purchases of
natural gas on the un-regulated market in Russia were
marginal during the RIP. This claim had therefore to be
rejected.

is

i.e.

(28)

above

to base

concerned,

(31) As far as the third alternative mentioned under (iii) in
recital
the
adjustment on the actual cost of production of natural
gas in Russia,
it should first be noted that such alter-
native is not, as claimed by the applicant, expressively
foreseen in Article 2(5) of
the basic Regulation.
Furthermore, as mentioned in recital (29), the primary
criterion for
the basis on which to
establish the gas prices is that it reasonably reflects a
price normally payable in undistorted markets. Thus,
whether the price of gas charged by the supplier to the
customers is made at a profit as such is irrelevant in this
context. This argument had therefore to be rejected.

the choice of

(32)

(33)

The applicant furthermore argued that domestic prices
for natural gas in Russia regulated by the State are
increasing constantly and reaching levels covering the
cost of production of gas. Therefore, the price on the
domestic market cannot be considered as uncompetitive
or unreasonably low.

as

are profitable

This argument has no grounds since the correct standard
is not whether
for choosing a representative market
prices
such but whether prices
reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted
markets, as explained in recital (29) above. This is not the
case for prices regulated by the State. Furthermore, this
argument also contradicts public statements of
the
(as confirmed by its published
Russian gas supplier
audited accounts) that the Russian domestic gas prices
do not cover production, transportation and sales cost.
Therefore, this argument was rejected.

(34) As regards the calculation method of the gas price at
Waidhaus as
the
Russian export duty payable for all exports should have
been deducted from the Waidhaus price, because the
export duty is not incurred domestically.

the applicant claimed that

such,

(35)

Indeed the market price at Waidhaus, which was
considered as representative market within the meaning
of Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, is the price after
export taxes and not the prices before these taxes. From
the perspective of the buyer it is the price it has to pay at
Waidhaus which is relevant, and in this regard it is irre-
levant what percentage of that price constitutes an export
tax and what percentage is paid to the gas supplier. The
latter, on the other hand, will always try to maximise its
price and therefore charge the highest price its customers
are willing to pay. Given that this price is always well
above its costs of production, allowing the gas supplier
to make huge profits,
its price setting is not primarily
influenced by the amount of the export tax but by what
price its customers are willing to pay. It was therefore
concluded that the price including the export tax, and
not the price before that tax, is the undistorted market
driven price. Consequently,
the
applicant in this regard were rejected.

arguments of

the

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(36)

(37)

for

transportation cost

The applicant further claimed that the price at Waidhaus
should have been adjusted for quality,
availability,
transportation and other conditions of
marketability,
sale which would be different
in the export and the
domestic market of natural gas. It should first be noted
the price of Waidhaus was indeed adjusted by
that
different
the export and the
domestic market and that the applicant’s claim in this
regard was not warranted and had to be rejected. As far
as the other elements are concerned the applicant did not
provide any further
information or any supporting
evidence. In particular, the applicant did not show, nor
was there any other information available,
there
were differences
in quality, availability, marketability
sales which would have
and other
justified further adjustments, nor did the applicant
attempt to quantify these alleged differences.

conditions of

that

the applicant

In this context,
further argued that no
adjustments for natural comparative advantages have
been made to the price at Waidhaus. In this regard, it
was claimed that since gas is largely available in Russia
but not in the Community, prices in Russia would be
the exported gas.
naturally lower
Furthermore,
the export capacity
would be limited by the limits of the existing gas trans-
portation system which would increase export prices of
Russia. The applicant also argued that the ‘abnormal high
profits’ of the Russian gas supplier on the export market
should be deducted from the Waidhaus price used.

it was alleged that

than the price of

Russia and its affiliations were not subject to the present
investigation and that
therefore there was insufficient
information of the organisation and its cost structure
available. It is also noted that the situation in Russia in
this regard due to, inter alia, the close links between the
gas supplier and the Russian government is not suffi-
ciently transparent
to the
necessary evidence.

to allow sufficient access

costs were

(42) Moreover, the applicant, who has the burden of proof,
was not able to submit any further
information or
evidence which showed whether and in what extent
indeed
distribution
the
included
Waidhaus price. However,
since domestic customers
were purchasing the gas from local suppliers, it had to
be assumed that they would have to pay local distri-
bution costs which are not as such included in the unad-
justed Waidhaus price. Therefore, at this stage of the
proceeding it had to be considered that this adjustment
was warranted and consequently the argument was
rejected.

in

the impact on the calculation of

the Community Institutions also considered
(43) However,
that
the dumping
margin of this specific adjustment may be significant.
Therefore, given the particular situation described above
it was considered that if the applicant
in recital
the Commission
supplies sufficient verifiable evidence,
may consider the re-opening of the investigation in this
regard.

(41),

(38) As mentioned in recital (29) above, the primary criterion
for the choice of Waidhaus prices as basis on which to
establish the gas prices is that they reasonably reflect a
price normally payable in undistorted markets. The
market conditions prevailing in the domestic market
are irrelevant in this context. Therefore these arguments
had to be rejected.

(39)

The applicant also objected that the mark-up of the local
distributors has been added to the adjusted gas price,
claiming that profits of distributors would already be
included in the price at Waidhaus. In this regard, the
applicant claimed that the local distributors in Russia
were fully owned subsidiaries of the gas supplier and
therefore addition of
these distributors
could constitute double counting.

the profit of

(44)

The applicant also made allegations about non-compe-
titive domestic pricing on gas in Germany. It is noted
that ongoing investigations by German antitrust autho-
rities concern prices at which German main gas distri-
butors sell the gas on the domestic market, and therefore
it
to the price at which Russian
linked at al
exported gas is sold at Waidhaus.

is not

(45) After adjusting the cost of manufacturing as described
above, no domestic sales were made in the ordinary
course of trade pursuant of Article 2(4) of the basic
Regulation.

(40)

It is first noted that the mark-up of local distributors do
not only include the profit margin of these companies
but also their costs between purchase and re-sale of the
natural gas.

(46)

(41)

Secondly, this argument could not be sufficiently verified
anymore. This is due to the fact that the gas supplier in

It was therefore considered that domestic prices did not
provide an appropriate basis for the establishment of the
normal value and another method had to be applied. In
accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regu-
lation, normal value was constructed by adding to the
exporter’s manufacturing costs of the product concerned,
adjusted where necessary as mentioned in recital
(19)
above, a reasonable amount for SG&A and a reasonable
amount for profit.

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(47)

(48)

SG&A costs and profit could not be established on the
basis of the chapeau of Article 2(6) of the basic Regu-
lation because the applicant did not have representative
domestic sales of the product concerned in the ordinary
course of trade. Article 2(6)(a) of the basic Regulation
could not be applied, since there is only one producer
subject
to the investigation. Article 2(6)(b) was not
applicable either, since the manufacturing cost of the
applicant for products belonging to the same general
category of goods would also need to be adjusted in
respect of gas costs, for the reasons indicated in recital
(18) above. Therefore, SG&A costs and profit were estab-
lished pursuant to Article 2(6)(c) of the basic Regulation.

In accordance with Article 2(6)(c) of the basic Regulation,
the SG&A costs were based on a reasonable method. The
North American market showed a significant volume of
domestic sales and a considerable level of competition
from both domestic and foreign companies.
In this
respect, consideration was given to publicly available
information relating to major companies operating in
the fertilizers business sector. It was found that the corre-
sponding data from North American (USA and Canadian)
producers would be the most appropriate for the purpose
of the investigation, given the large availability of reliable
information from listed
and complete public financial
companies
the world. Therefore,
region of
in this
SG&A costs and profit were established on the basis of
the weighted average SG&A costs and profit from three
North American producers, which were found to be
amongst the largest companies in the nitrogen fertilizers'
sector, with regard to their domestic sales of the same
general category of products (nitrogen fertilizers). These
three producers were considered to be representative of
the nitrogen fertilizers' business and their SG&A costs
and profit
those normally
incurred by companies operating successfully in that
business segment.
It should be noted that there were
no indications that the amount for profit so established
realized by other Russian
would exceed the profit
producers on sales of products of
the same general
category on their domestic market.

thereby representative of

(49)

The Community industry objected to the above approach
with regard to the determination of
the SG&A and
claimed the applicant’s own SG&A should have been
used. However, Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation sets
out that the amounts for SG&A shall only be based on
actual data pertaining to the production and sales of the
exporting producer concerned, when these sales were
made in the ordinary course of trade. As outlined in
recitals (45) and (46), this was not the case and this
argument therefore had to be rejected.

2. Export price

(50)

In accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation,
the export price was established on the basis of the price

(51)

(52)

(53)

(54)

(55)

actually paid or payable for the product concerned when
sold for export to the Community.

3. Comparison

The normal value and the export price were compared
on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair
comparison between normal values and export prices,
due allowance in the form of adjustments was made
for differences affecting price and price comparability
in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.
Appropriate adjustments concerning transport, credit,
packing and bank charges were granted when reasonable,
accurate and supported by verified evidence.

4. Dumping margin

The dumping margin was established on the basis of a
comparison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average
in accordance with
Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

export price,

The investigation showed that dumping took place
during the RIP. The dumping margin expressed as a
percentage of the CIF Community frontier price, duty
unpaid, is 42,06 %.

5. Lasting nature of
during the IP

the circumstances prevailing

In accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation,
an analysis was made as to whether the change in
circumstances with regard to dumping could reasonably
be said to be of a lasting nature.

In this regard, it should be noted that normal value in
the original investigation was established on the basis of
profitable sales prices in the USA domestic market, since
Russia was not a market economy country at that time.
In the context of the current review investigation, Russia
is considered a market economy country, and the normal
value has therefore been established on the basis of the
applicant’s own cost of production, adjusted where
the
necessary. No indications could be found that
review
normal value established during the present
could not be considered to be of a lasting nature.

(56) No evidence was found that export sales would not

continue to be made at the current price level.

(57) On this basis, it is concluded that the changed circum-
stances with respect
investigation
regarding dumping (now based on the comparison of
the own normal value
the
applicant) could reasonably be considered to be of a
lasting nature.

and export prices of

to the original

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(58)

(59)

(60)

(61)

D. TERMINATION OF THE REVIEW

Since, in the original investigation the duty was imposed
in the form of a specific amount per tonne,
it should
have the same form in the current investigation. The duty
calculated on the basis of the current margin of dumping
would be EUR 48,09/t.

It is recalled that, as outlined in recital (94) of Council
Regulation (EC) No 658/2002, when imposing definitive
measures in 2002, the injury margin was used when
determining the amount of
the definitive duty to be
imposed in accordance with the lesser duty rule. As
defined
by Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No
658/2002, the duty currently in force is depending on
the specific product type and varies between EUR 41,42/t
and EUR 47,07/t.

Since the duty established on the basis of the current
margin of dumping is higher than the current duty, the
review should be terminated without amending the level
of the duty applicable to the applicant, which should be
maintained at the level of the definitive anti-dumping
duty rate established in the original investigation.

point to the need to further consider whether an under-
taking combining an indexed minimum price and a
quantitative ceiling would be workable.

(62) As mentioned above, due

to this

complexity the
applicant could not formulate an acceptable undertaking
offer within the statutory deadline. In view of the above,
the Council considers that the applicant should excep-
tionally be allowed to complete its undertaking offer
beyond the above-mentioned deadline but within 10
calendar days from entry into force of this regulation.

F. DISCLOSURE

(63)

Interested parties were informed of the essential facts and
considerations on the basis of which it was intended to
terminate the present review and to maintain the existing
anti-dumping duty on imports of the product concerned
produced by the applicant. All parties were given an
opportunity to comment. Their comments were taken
into account where warranted and substantiated by
evidence,

E. UNDERTAKING

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

offers within

The applicant expressed an interest in offering an under-
taking but failed to submit a sufficiently substantiated
undertaking
in
Article 8(2) of the basic Regulation. Consequently no
undertaking offer could be accepted by the Commission.
However, it is considered that the complexity of several
issues, namely

deadlines

the

set

1. the volatility of the price of the product concerned
which would require some form of
indexation of
minimum prices, while at the same time the volatility
is not sufficiently explained by the key cost driver;
and

2. the particular market

the product
concerned (inter alia, that there are limited imports
from the exporter subject to this review)

situation for

Sole Article

3102 30 90,

interim review of

The partial
the anti-dumping measures
applicable to imports of solid fertilisers with an ammonium
nitrate content exceeding 80 % by weight falling within CN
ex 3102 29 00,
codes
ex 3105 10 00,
ex 3102 60 00,
ex 3105 20 10,
and
ex 3105 90 91 and originating in Russia, initiated pursuant to
is hereby
Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96,
terminated without amending the anti-dumping measures in
force.

ex 3102 90 00,

ex 3105 51 00,

ex 3105 59 00

3102 40 90,

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 March 2008.

For the Council
The President

D. RUPEL