Council Regulation (EC) No 238/2008 of 10 March 2008 terminating the partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of the anti-dumping duty on imports of solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia
Date: 2008-03-10
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: Russia, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, chemical fertiliser, fertiliser, import, originating product

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COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 238/2008

of 10 March 2008

terminating the partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of the
anti-dumping duty on imports of solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty
Community,

establishing the European

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of
22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports
from countries not members of the European Community (1)
(the basic Regulation), and in particular Article 11(3) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission
after consulting the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

A. PROCEDURE

1. Measures in force

inter alia,

By Regulation (EC) No 1995/2000 (2),
the Council
imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of
solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate (UAN) origi-
nating,
in Russia. This Regulation will here-
inafter be referred to as ‘the original Regulation’ and
the investigation that led to the measures imposed by
the original Regulation will be hereinafter referred to as
‘the original investigation’.

Following an expiry review initiated in September 2005,
the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 1911/2006 (3),
renewed for five years these measures at their current
level. The measures consist of specific duties. This regu-
lation will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the expiry Regu-
lation’ and the investigation that led to the measures
imposed by the expiry Regulation will be hereinafter
referred to as ‘the expiry review’.

2. Request for a review

A request for a partial interim review (the present review)
pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation was
lodged by
from Russia,
two exporting producers
belonging to the Joint Stock Company ‘Mineral and
Chemical Company Eurochem’, namely Novomoskovskiy
Azot and Nevinnomyssky Azot. These two companies,

(1) OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation

(EC) No 2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 17).

(2) OJ L 238, 22.9.2000, p. 15. Regulation as last amended by Regu-

lation (EC) No 1675/2003 (OJ L 238, 25.9.2003, p. 4).

(3) OJ L 365, 21.12.2006, p. 26.

due to their relationship, are treated as one legal entity
(the applicant) for the purpose of the present review. The
request was limited in scope to dumping as far as the
applicant is concerned.

The applicant alleged that the comparison of its own
normal value and,
in the absence of exports to the
European Community, export prices to an appropriate
third country,
the United States of
case,
America (USA), would lead to a reduction of dumping
significantly below the level of the current measures.

in this

3. Investigation

after

evidence,

consulting

determined,

Having
the Advisory
Committee, that the request contained sufficient prima
facie
on
interim
19 December 2006 the initiation of a partial
review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation
by a notice of initiation published in the Official Journal of
the European Union (4).

Commission

announced

the

The review was limited in scope to the examination of
dumping in respect of the applicant. The investigation of
dumping covered the period from 1 October 2005 to
30 September 2006 (the review investigation period or
RIP).

The Commission officially informed the applicant, the
representatives of the exporting country and the asso-
ciation of Community producers about the initiation of
the review. Interested parties were given the opportunity
to make their views known in writing and to request a
hearing within the time limit
in the notice of
initiation.

set

All interested parties, who so requested and showed that
there were particular reasons why they should be heard,
were granted a hearing.

In order to obtain the information deemed necessary for
its investigation, the Commission sent questionnaires to
Joint Stock Company ‘Mineral and Chemical Company
Eurochem’ and its
and received
replies within the deadlines set for that purpose.

related companies

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(4) OJ C 311, 19.12.2006, p. 51.

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(10)

information
The Commission sought and verified all
deemed necessary for the determination of dumping.
The Commission carried out verification visits at
the
premises of the applicant and its related companies:

far as the applicant is concerned, no conclusions were
reached with regard to the product produced and sold by
the Community industry in the Community market.

— JSC Mineral and Chemical Company (Eurochem),

Moscow, Russia,

C. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION

1. Preliminary remarks

— PJSC Azot (NAK Azot), Novomoskovsk, Russia,

— PJSC Nevinnomyssky Azot
nomyssk, Russia, and

(Nevinka Azot), Nevin-

(13) As announced in the notice of

initiation, since the
applicant did not have export sales of UAN to the
European Community during the RIP, the current inves-
tigation examined first to what extent export prices to a
third country should be used in deciding whether the
basis on which existing measures were established has
changed and whether these changes are of a lasting
nature.

— Eurochem Trading GmbH, Zug, Switzerland —

(14)

(Eurochem Trading).

(11)

(12)

B. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

1. Product concerned

The product concerned is the same as in the original
investigation,
i.e. a solution of urea and ammonium
nitrate, a liquid fertiliser commonly used in agriculture,
originating in Russia (UAN). It consists of a mixture of
urea, ammonium nitrate and water. The water content is
approximately 70 % of the mixture (depending on the
nitrogen content), the remaining part consisting equally
of urea and ammonium nitrate. The nitrogen (N) content
is the most significant ‘feature’ of the product, and it can
vary between 28 % and 32 %. Such variation can be
obtained by adding more or less water to the solution.
However, whatever their nitrogen content, all solutions
of urea and ammonium nitrate are considered to have
the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and
therefore constitute a single product for the purpose of
this investigation. The product concerned falls within CN
code 3102 80 00.

2. Like product

This review investigation confirmed that UAN is a pure
commodity product, and its quality and basic physical
the country of
characteristics are identical whatever
origin. The UAN solutions manufactured and sold by
the applicant on its domestic market in Russia and, in
the absence of exports to the European Community,
those exported to the United States of America have
the same basic physical and chemical characteristics
and essentially the same uses. Therefore, these products
are considered to be like products within the meaning of
Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. Since the present
review was limited to the determination of dumping as

The applicant supplied evidence that due to the duties in
force, the product could not be sold for export to the
Community market during the RIP. The applicant
provided prima facie evidence that export prices to the
USA, a representative third market, were not dumped
or at least to a lesser extent than the dumping margin
currently established for
to the European
Community and that it was appropriate to use export
prices to the USA. For the reasons set out in recital 43
and following, export prices to the third country USA
were found to be appropriate because the US market was
comparable to the Community market and therefore
representative.

exports

(15)

It should be noted that the measures currently applicable
are partly based on data not linked to the applicant’s
the product concerned,
own production and sales of
while during the
current RIP verified information
related to the applicant’s own data pertaining to the
to a third
normal value and export prices, albeit
country market, was available. On this basis,
it was
concluded that the dumping margin found during the
current RIP reflected more accurately the situation of
the
applicant during the RIP than the measures
currently in force.

(16)

In this context, it was also considered that the objective
of an anti-dumping duty is not to close the Community
market from third country imports but to restore a fair
level playing field.

(17) Given the above specific circumstances, it was therefore
concluded that the calculation of the dumping margin
during the RIP on the basis of export sales prices of
the applicant to the USA was appropriate.

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2. Normal value

(22)

(18)

In order to establish the normal value, it was first verified
that the total domestic sales of the applicant were repre-
sentative in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic
Regulation. Since the applicant did not have export
sales of UAN to the European Community during the
RIP, overall domestic sales quantities of the applicant
were compared to all exports of UAN by the applicant
to the United States. In accordance with Article 2(2) of
the basic Regulation, domestic sales should be considered
representative in case the total volume of such sales is
equal to or greater than 5 % of the total volume of the
corresponding export sales,
in this case to the United
States. The investigation showed that the applicant did
not sell representative quantities of UAN on the domestic
market.

(23)

(19)

Since on this basis the domestic prices of the applicant
could not be used to establish normal value, normal
value was constructed on the basis of the manufacturing
costs incurred by the applicant plus a reasonable amount
for selling, general and administrative costs (SG&A costs)
and for profits, in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of
the basic Regulation.

(20)

(21)

Regarding the cost of manufacturing, it should be noted
that gas costs represent a major proportion of the manu-
facturing cost and a significant proportion of the total
cost of production. In accordance with Article 2(5) of the
basic Regulation, it was examined whether the costs asso-
ciated with the production and sales of
the product
concerned were reasonably reflected in the records of
the applicant.

(24)

that

It was established on the basis of data published by
internationally recognised sources specialised in energy
markets,
the prices paid by the applicant were
abnormally low. By way of illustration, they amounted
to one forth and one fifth of the export price of natural
gas from Russia. In this regard, all available data indicates
that domestic gas prices in Russia were regulated prices,
which are far below market prices paid in unregulated
markets
for natural gas. Since gas costs were not
reasonably reflected in the applicant’s records, they had
to be adjusted accordingly. In the absence of any undis-
torted gas prices relating to the Russian domestic market,
and in accordance with Article 2(5) of the basic Regu-
lation, gas prices had to be established on ‘any other
reasonable basis, including information from other repre-
sentative markets’.

The adjusted price was based on the average price of
Russian gas when sold for export at the German/Czech
border (Waidhaus), net of transport costs and adjusted to
reflect local distribution costs. Waidhaus, being the main
hub for Russian gas sales to the EU, which is both the
largest market for Russian gas and has prices reasonably
reflecting costs, can be considered a representative
market within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the basic
Regulation.

be

that

alleging

the applicant claimed that any
Following disclosure,
its gas price paid on the domestic
adjustment of
market would
its
unwarranted
accounting records fully reflected the costs associated
with the activity of production and sales of
the like
product in the country of origin. To substantiate this
claim,
the applicant provided a study from an inde-
pendent consultancy firm that the gas price paid by the
applicant reflected full cost of production and sale of gas,
as incurred by the gas provider. It should first be noted
that, as the study itself sets out, the costs of gas as well as
the cost of the delivery of the gas to the applicant used
for the comparison were estimated costs and thus not
actual costs incurred during the RIP. It is also unclear
whether the costs thus established were full costs as
established in accordance with the basic Regulation, i.e.
including full costs of manufacturing and full SG&A
costs linked to the production and sale of gas. Finally,
it is also noted that the information available on the gas
provider’s
could not be verified within the
costs
framework of this proceeding.

that

address

the sole fact

this was found not
the

In any case, it is considered that under Article 2(5) of the
basic Regulation,
the price of gas
charged by the supplier to its client is cost covering is
as such not a criterion to establish whether the costs of
production of
the like product as booked in the
company’s accounts are reasonably reflecting the costs
associated with the production and sale of the product
under investigation. For the reasons set out above in
to be the case. The
recital 21,
applicant did not
significant
apparent
difference between the price for gas paid on the
Russian domestic market and the export price of
natural gas from Russia on the one hand and the one
paid by the Community producers on the other hand. It
did also not address the fact that domestic prices for
natural gas were regulated in Russia and could not be
considered to reasonably reflect a price normally payable
in undistorted markets. Therefore, even if the gas price
paid by the applicant covered the unit cost of production
and sales of
this
argument is irrelevant since the market price of gas is
not necessarily directly linked to costs of its production
and sales. The price
at which the applicant was
purchasing the gas during the RIP continues to be
State regulated and significantly below the price level in
non-regulated markets as explained in recital 21. This
claim therefore had to be rejected.

the gas incurred by its provider,

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(28)

(29)

(25)

(26)

(27)

de

facto

a methodology

In this regard,
economy

the like product and therefore also of

further claimed that by making a gas
The applicant
adjustment,
to determine
normal value was used which is not foreseen by the
basic Regulation. Thus, by replacing domestic gas costs
by costs calculated as described in recital 22, and due to
the fact that these costs constitute major part of the total
costs of
the
constructed normal value, the normal value would be
de facto determined by data from a third ‘representative’
for
market.
market
basic Regulation
however foresees, only the following methodologies to
determine the normal value:
the
domestic price of
in the ordinary
in case sales are not
cause of
made in the ordinary course of trade, (ii) on the basis
of the cost of production in the country of origin (plus a
reasonable amount for SG&A costs and for profits) or
(iii) representative export prices of the like product to an
appropriate third country. The applicant concluded that
on this basis normal value should not be based on data
from a third representative market.

the applicant argued that

trade, or alternatively,

(i) on the basis of

the like product

countries,

the

trade by reason of price,

In this regard and as also outlined in recitals 18 to 42, it
should first be noted that normal value was established
in accordance with the methodologies outlined in
Article 2(1) to (6) of the basic Regulation. However, in
order to establish whether domestic sales were made in
the ordinary course of
i.e.
whether they were profitable, it must first be established
whether the costs of the applicant were a reliable basis
within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the basic Regu-
lation. Only after costs have been reliably established,
can it be determined which methodology to establish
normal value should be used. It is therefore wrong to
claim that by determining reliable costs in accordance
with Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation a new metho-
dology to determine normal value was introduced. The
applicants arguments in this respect therefore had to be
rejected.

The applicant further argued that even in case that an
adjustment was to be made to its cost of natural gas on
the domestic market, Waidhaus price for Russian natural
gas was not a reliable basis for such an adjustment since
that price is set according to long term gas contracts
under which the price formula is linked to oil product
prices and thus unrelated to the costs of producing and
delivering gas to the applicant in Russia. The applicant
further argued that Waidhaus price for Russian gas is not
reliable because it is affected by excessively high and
possibly non-competitive domestic pricing on gas in
Germany, which is being investigated by German
Antitrust Authorities.

it

It

Firstly, it should be noted that one of the primary criteria
for the choice of the basis on which to establish the gas
prices was that it reasonably reflects a price normally
is undisputed that
payable in undistorted markets.
to the prices at
this condition is met with respect
Waidhaus. Furthermore, by far the greatest volume of
gas from Russia is imported via the Waidhaus hub
which represents therefore an appropriate basis for an
adjustment. On this basis, Waidhaus was considered as
a representative market and a reasonable basis for the
determination of gas costs within the meaning of
the basic Regulation. Secondly, as
Article 2(5) of
outlined in recital 24,
is on its own irrelevant
whether the price is cost driven as long as it reasonably
reflects a price normally payable in undistorted markets.
As regards the price of gas imported at Waidhaus, there
are no indications of State interference in price forming
and this condition is thus met. Finally, as regards the
claim about non-competitive domestic pricing on gas
in Germany it should be noted that
the Bundeskar-
tellamts investigation,
to which the applicant referred
is still ongoing and no conclusions were reached.
to,
investigation concerns prices at which
Besides,
the gas on the
sell
German main gas distributors
German domestic market and not the price at which
they purchase
In
contrast to what was claimed by the applicant, these
the
two prices
distributors
gas
interest
their
and
economic
customers
it can be
is exactly the opposite. Thus,
presumed that the distributors aim to keep the resale
price at the highest possible level whereby at the same
time it is in their economic interest to keep the purchase
price at the lowest possible level in order to maximise
profit levels. The applicants argument that the German
incumbents do not have an incentive to negotiate low
prices for Russian imported gas at Waidhaus is a mere
presumption without any factual background. Conse-
quently, these arguments were rejected.

imported from Russia.

are not necessarily

related since

the gas

this

of

such adjustment

The applicant further claimed that if an adjustment were
to be made to its cost of natural gas on the domestic
market,
should be based on non-
regulated gas prices available in Russia. Firstly, the fact
that the Commission could have chosen a different basis
does not render the choice of Waidhaus unreasonable.
The primary criterion for the choice of the basis on
which to establish the gas price is that it reasonably
reflects
in undistorted
this condition is met
markets.
with respect to the prices at Waidhaus. Secondly, the
fact that the volume of gas sold at non-regulated prices
in the domestic market was only minor during the RIP
and that such prices were significantly closer to the
regulated domestic price than to the freely-determined
export price strongly suggests that these non-regulated
prices were distorted by the prevailing regulated prices.
Therefore, the unregulated domestic prices could not be
used.

a price normally payable
It

is undisputed that

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(30)

further argued that domestic prices for
The applicant
natural gas in Russia regulated by the State are increasing
constantly and reaching levels covering the cost of
production of gas. Therefore, the price on the domestic
market cannot be considered as uncompetitive or unrea-
sonably low.

(31)

(32)

as

are profitable

This argument has no grounds since the correct standard
for choosing a representative market
is not whether
prices
such but whether prices
reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted
markets, as explained in recital 29. This is not the case
this
regulated by the State. Furthermore,
for prices
argument also contradicts public statements of
the
Russian gas supplier
(as confirmed by its published
audited accounts) that the Russian domestic gas prices
do not cover production, transportation and sales cost.
Therefore, this argument was rejected.

(35)

The applicant further proposed the use of Russian export
price to the neighbouring markets as an alternative basis
the adjustment, however without providing any
for
further information or evidence on such markets.
It
was considered that Russian export prices of gas to the
Baltic States, where some price information was available,
were not sufficiently representative, due to the relatively
low export volumes to these countries. Furthermore,
necessary data concerning transportation and distribution
cost were not available and therefore, reliable prices to
the Baltic States could in any case not be established.
Therefore, these prices could not be used as a basis for
the adjustment.

of Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, is the price after
export taxes and not the prices before these taxes. From
the perspective of the buyer it is the price it has to pay at
Waidhaus which is relevant, and in this regard it is irre-
levant what percentage of that price constitutes an export
tax and what percentage is paid to the gas supplier. The
latter, on the other hand will always try to maximise its
price and therefore charge the highest price its customers
are willing to pay. Given that this price is always well
above its costs of production, allowing the gas supplier
to make huge profits,
its price setting is not primarily
influenced by the amount of the export tax but by what
price its customers are willing to pay. It was therefore
concluded that the price including the export tax, and
not the price before that tax, is the undistorted market
driven price. Consequently,
the
applicant in this regard were rejected.

arguments of

the

In this context, the applicant also claimed that the mark-
up of the local distributor should not be added to the
export price at Waidhaus claiming that profits of the
distributors would already be included in the price at
Waidhaus. In this regard, the applicant claimed that the
local distributors in Russia were fully owned subsidiaries
of the gas supplier and therefore, addition of the profit of
these distributors could constitute double counting. The
comparative
applicant
It
advantage of Russia should be taken into account.
argued further
that since gas is largely available in
Russia but not in the Community, domestic prices in
Russia would be naturally lower than the price of the
exported gas, which should have been taken into account
when determining the adjustment to the gas prices paid
on the domestic market.

claimed

natural

also

that

(33) Alternatively, the applicant argued that if the export price
at Waidhaus was to be used, the Russian export duty
payable for all exports should have been deducted from
the Waidhaus price because it was not incurred domes-
tically.

(34)

Indeed the market price at Waidhaus, which was
considered as representative market within the meaning

(36)

It is first noted that the mark-up of local distributors do
not only include the profit margin of these companies
but also their costs between purchase and re-sale of the
natural gas.

(37)

Secondly, this argument could not be sufficiently verified
anymore. This is due to the fact that the gas supplier in
Russia and its affiliations were not subject to the present
investigation and that
therefore there was insufficient
information of the organisation and its cost structure
available. It is also noted that the situation in Russia in
this regard due to, inter alia, the close links between the
gas supplier and the Russian government is not suffi-
ciently transparent
to the
necessary evidence.

to allow sufficient access

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(38) Moreover, the applicant, who has the burden proof, was
not able to submit any further information or evidence
which showed whether and to what extend distribution
cost were indeed included in the Waidhaus price.
since domestic customers were purchasing
However,
the gas from local suppliers, it had to be assumed that
they would have to pay local distribution costs which are
not as such included in the unadjusted Waidhaus price.
Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding it had to be
this adjustment was warranted and
considered that
consequently the argument was rejected.

adjusted, for the reasons indicated in recital 21. In the
framework of this interim review, no information was
available to properly quantify such adjustment and to
establish SG&A costs and the relevant profit margins
such adjustment.
when selling these products after
Therefore, SG&A costs and profit were established
pursuant to Article 2(6)(c) of the basic Regulation on
the basis of a reasonable method.

(42)

the impact on the calculation of

the Community Institutions also considered
(39) However,
that
the dumping
margin of this specific adjustment may be significant.
Therefore, given the particular situation described in
the applicant
recital 37,
supplies sufficient verifiable evidence, the Commission
may consider the re-opening of the investigation in this
regard.

it was considered that

if

(40) As

far as

the claimed comparative advantages are
concerned regarding the availability of natural gas in
Russia, it should be noted that as mentioned in recital
28, the primary criterion for the choice of Waidhaus
prices as a basis on which to establish the gas prices is
that they reasonably reflect a price normally payable in
undistorted markets. The market conditions prevailing in
the domestic market are irrelevant in this context. This
argument had therefore to be rejected.

showed a

the world. Moreover,

In this respect, consideration was given to publicly
companies
information relating to major
available
operating in the nitrogen fertilisers business sector.
It
was found that
the corresponding data from North
American (USA and Canada) producers would be the
most appropriate for the purpose of the investigation,
reliable and complete
given the large availability of
information from listed companies in
public financial
this
the North
region of
American market
significant volume of
domestic sales and a considerable level of competition
from both domestic and foreign companies. Therefore,
SG&A costs and profit were established on the basis of
the weighted average of SG&A costs and profit from
three North American producers, which were found to
be amongst the largest companies in the fertilisers sector,
with regard to their North American sales of the same
general category of products (nitrogen fertilisers). These
three producers were considered to be representative of
the nitrogen fertilisers business (on average over 78,15 %
of the turnover of the company/business segment) and
their SG&A costs and profit as representative of the same
type of costs normally incurred by companies operating
successfully in that business segment. Furthermore, there
is no indication suggesting that the amount for profit so
the profit normally realised by
established exceeds
Russian producers on sales of products of
the same
general category on their domestic market.

(41)

SG&A costs and profit could not be established on the
basis of the chapeau of Article 2(6), first sentence, of the
basic Regulation because, after the adjustment for the gas
cost mentioned in recital 22, the applicant did not have
representative domestic sales of the product concerned in
the ordinary course of trade pursuant to Article 2(4) of
the basic Regulation. Article 2(6)(a) of the basic Regu-
lation could not be applied, since only the applicant is
subject
to the investigation. Article 2(6)(b) was not
applicable either, since for products belonging to the
same general category of goods natural gas is likewise
the by far most important raw material and therefore
manufacturing costs would very likely also need to be

3. Export price

(43) As mentioned in recital 13, the applicant did not have
export sales of UAN to the European Community during
the RIP. Therefore, for the reasons set out in recitals 14
to 17 it was considered appropriate to examine the
to other export
pricing behaviour of
markets in order to calculate the dumping margin. In
the notice of initiation, the USA was envisaged as an
appropriate market for comparison purposes, being the
applicants major export market representing over 70 %
of the applicants export quantities during the RIP.

the applicant

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the USA as

the most appropriate market

(44) None of the interested parties commented on the choice
of
for
comparison purposes. The investigation confirmed that
the USA market for UAN is the most appropriate for
European
comparison since
the
Community and the USA represent
the two major
UAN markets in the world, which are comparable both
in terms of volume and prices.

purpose

the

of

(45)

Since export sales of the applicant to the USA during the
RIP were made via a related trader located in Switzerland,
the export price had to be established in accordance with
Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. Thus, the export
price was constructed on the basis of prices actually
paid or payable to the applicant by the first independent
customer
its major export market. A
notional commission corresponding to the mark-up of
the related trader, which can be considered similar to the
role of an agent acting on a commission basis was
deducted from these prices.

in the USA,

4. Comparison

(46)

The normal value and export price were compared on an
ex-works basis. For
the purpose of ensuring a fair
comparison between the normal value and the export
price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was
made for differences affecting price and price compa-
rability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic
Regulation. Accordingly, adjustments were made for
differences in transport, handling,
loading and ancillary
and supported by verified
costs, where
evidence.

applicable

6. Lasting nature of
during the RIP

the circumstances prevailing

(49)

In accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation,
it was examined whether the circumstances on the basis
of which the current dumping margin was based have
changed and whether such change was of a lasting
nature.

(50)

There were no indications that the level of the normal
value or the export price established for the applicant in
the current investigation could not be considered of a
lasting nature. Although it could be argued that
the
evolution of the prices of natural gas as the main raw
material could have a significant influence on the normal
value, it was considered that the effect of a price increase
would affect all actors on the market and therefore have
an impact on both the normal value and the export
price.

(51)

The export price of the applicant to the United States of
America, the applicant’s major export market, during the
RIP was found to be similar to that of its exports to
other countries.

(52)

Therefore, there are reasons to consider that the dumping
margin found is based on changed circumstances of a
lasting nature.

(53)

In addition, the present review did not reveal any indi-
cation or evidence that the basis on which the injury
elimination level was established during the original
investigation will significantly change in the foreseeable
future.

5. Dumping margin

(47)

The dumping margin was established on the basis of a
comparison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average
in accordance with
Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation.

export price,

(54)

(48)

This comparison showed a dumping margin of 33,95 %,
expressed as a percentage of the cif North American
frontier price, duty unpaid.

In this regard, it is noted that although the circumstances
on the basis of which the determination of dumping was
based have changed since the imposition of the definitive
duties, which resulted in a higher dumping margin
IP, and
during the RIP as compared to the original
although there
the
dumping margin found is based on changed circum-
the anti-
stances of a lasting nature,
dumping duty in force should remain the same. Indeed,
as mentioned in recitals 55 and 56, the definitive anti-
dumping duties were imposed at the level of the injury
elimination level as found during the original
investi-
gation.

the level of

to consider

reasons

that

are

18.3.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 75/21

D. TERMINATION OF THE REVIEW

(55)

It is recalled that, in accordance with Article 9(4) of the
basic Regulation and as outlined in recital 49 of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1995/2000, the definitive duty in the
original investigation was established at the level of the
injury margin found, which was lower than the dumping
margin because it was found that such lesser duty would
be adequate to remove the injury to the Community
industry. In the light of the foregoing, the duty estab-
lished in this review should not be higher than the injury
margin established in the original investigation.

injury margin can be established in this
(56) No individual
partial
interim review, since it is limited to the exami-
nation of dumping as far as the applicant is concerned.
Therefore, the dumping margin established in the present
review was compared to the injury margin as established
in the original investigation. Since the latter was lower
than the dumping margin found in the present investi-
gation,
terminated without
review should be
amending the anti-dumping measures in force.

this

(58) As mentioned above, due

to this complexity,

the
applicant could not formulate an acceptable undertaking
offer within the statutory deadline. In view of the above,
the Council considers that the applicant should excep-
tionally be allowed to complete its undertaking offer
beyond the abovementioned deadline but within 10
calendar days from entry into force of this regulation.

F. DISCLOSURE

(59)

Interested parties were informed of the essential facts and
considerations on the basis of which it was intended to
terminate the present review and to maintain the existing
anti-dumping duty on imports of the product concerned
produced by the applicant. All parties were given an
opportunity to comment. Their comments were taken
into account where warranted and substantiated by
evidence,

E. UNDERTAKINGS

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

(57)

set

the

deadlines

offer within

The applicant expressed an interest in offering an under-
taking but failed to submit a sufficiently substantiated
undertaking
in
Article 8(2) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, no
undertaking offer could be accepted by the Commission.
However, it is considered that the complexity of several
issues, namely (1)
the
the volatility of
product concerned which would require some form of
indexation of minimum prices, while at the same time
the volatility is not sufficiently explained by the key cost
driver; and (2) the particular market situation for the
product
there were no
imports from the exporter subject to this review during
the RIP) points to the need to further consider whether
an undertaking combining an indexed minimum price
and a quantitative ceiling would be workable.

concerned (inter

the price of

alia,

that

Sole Article

interim review of

The partial
the anti-dumping measures
applicable to imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium
solution originating in
nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal
Russia, currently classifiable within CN code 3102 80 00,
initiated pursuant to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC)
No 384/96,
is hereby terminated without amending the
measures in force.

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 March 2008.

For the Council
The President

D. RUPEL