Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union - Impact assessment {COM(2008) 69 final} {SEC(2008) 154}
Date: 2008-02-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: border control, external border of the EU, foreign national, free movement of persons, impact study, information system, management, migration policy

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 13.2.2008 
SEC(2008) 153 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the  

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2008) 69 final} 
{SEC(2008) 154} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1 

2. 

Procedural issues and consultations of interested parties .............................................4 

Problem definition ........................................................................................................5 

2.1. 

The current framework .................................................................................................5 

2.1.1.  Passenger flows ............................................................................................................5 

2.1.2. 

Integrated border management .....................................................................................7 

2.1.3.  Legislation and financial solidarity ..............................................................................7 

2.2. 

Problems and other issues in the current situation........................................................8 

2.2.1. 

Illegal immigration .......................................................................................................8 

2.2.2.  Terrorism and serious crime .........................................................................................9 

2.2.3.  Data gap ......................................................................................................................10 

2.2.4.  Bona fide passengers ..................................................................................................11 

2.2.5.  Economic migration....................................................................................................12 

2.2.6.  Subsidiarity .................................................................................................................14 

1. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

political orientations and objectives of the entry/exit system and measures for 
facilitate cross-border flows (automated border control and registered 
traveller programme) ..................................................................................................15 

Political orientations ...................................................................................................15 

Objectives of the entry/exit system.............................................................................16 

Objectives of the measures for facilitate cross-border flows......................................17 

policy options..............................................................................................................18 

Option 1: Status Quo ..................................................................................................21 

Option 2: Entry/exit System .......................................................................................24 

Option 3: Measures for facilitating cross border flows ..............................................28 

analysis of impacts......................................................................................................32 

Option 1: Status Quo ..................................................................................................34 

Option 2: Entry/exit System .......................................................................................35 

Option 3: Measures to facilitate cross-border flows (Registered Traveller 
Programme and Automated Border Control) .............................................................41 

Comparative assessment .............................................................................................47 

Preferred option ..........................................................................................................50 

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6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

7. 

elaboration of the preferred option .............................................................................54 

European value added and proportionality .................................................................54 

Legislative implications..............................................................................................55 

Measures to ensure data protection and protection of rights of travellers ..................56 

monitoring and evaluation ..........................................................................................58 

ANNEX 1..................................................................................................................................61 

ANNEX 2..................................................................................................................................63 

ANNEX 3..................................................................................................................................67 

ANNEX 4..................................................................................................................................75 

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Lead DG: Justice, Freedom and Security 

1 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATIONS OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

This strategic initiative is to be seen in the context of the progressive establishment 
of a European model of integrated border management of the external borders. In the 
Commission  Legislative  and  Work  Programme  (CLWP)  2008  it  is  stated  that  "the 
EU  needs  to  protect  its  external  borders  with  common  tools,  to  prevent  illegal 
migration,  and  maximise  efforts  to  counter human  trafficking and  reduce the  tragic 
death  toll  of  immigrants  in  the  sea  trying  to  reach  our  borders".  According  to  the 
CLWP  2008  the  main  aims  of  this  proposal  are  "to  strengthen  border  control 
procedures on third-country nationals to help better management of migration flows, 
preventing illegal immigration, as well as any possible threats to the security of the 
EU and to facilitate border crossing (both on arrival and on departure from the EU) 
to both EU citizens and third-country nationals bona fide travellers, thus allowing to 
better focus resources on border controls". This impact assessment report examines 
policy options in order to achieve the above mentioned goals.  

The report is based on data collected from interviews  as  well  as  from  case  studies, 
pilot projects and literature reviews. Interviews were mainly held with experts with 
regard to the already existing systems in the Member States. The data-gathering and 
a large part of the consultations with relevant authorities in the Member States were 
undertaken  through  two  external  studies  ordered  by  the  Commission  in  December 
2006 and June 2007 (launch of request for services)1. The external studies constitute 
the  main  support  for  this  report.  The  problem,  objectives,  policy  options  and 
technical  implementation  assessed  were  based  on  the  draft  final  reports  of  the  first 
study  and  the  interim  report  of  the  second,  prepared  in  close  consultation  with  the 
Commission  and  on  the  basis  of  a  desk  analysis  of  appropriate  analytical  methods 
and applicable legal documents. The Contractors provided the methodological tools 
in line with the Commission’s guidelines and the handbook on impact assessments. 
They  carried  out  an  integrated  assessment  of  the  direct  and  indirect  impacts  of  a 
range of policy options, derived after careful analysis of the problems and objectives 
by using the appropriate analytical methods. The external studies and this report have 
been drafted with input from numerous contacts between the Directorate-General for 
Justice,  Freedom  and  Security  and  the  contractors.  An  inter-service  meeting  with 
other services including Legal Service (SJ), Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (FISH), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) and External 
Relations  (RELEX)  was  held  in  November  2007.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that 
DG  TREN  formed  part  of  the  steering  committee  for  the  external  study  and  was 
involved in the process already from the very beginning. Taking in the account the 
nature  of  the  Impact  Assessment  and  the  Commission  Communication  Minimum 
standards for consultation were met. 

1 

Preparatory study to inform an Impact Assessment in relation to the creation of an automated entry/exit 
system at the external borders of the EU and the introduction of a border crossing scheme for bona fide 
travellers ('Registered Traveller Programme') made by GHK and Entry/exit Feasibility study made by 
Unisys. Studies will be published on the website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/evaluation/dg_coordination_evaluation_annexe_en.htm 

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During the Portuguese Presidency the use of new technologies for enhancing border 
management, including an entry/exit system and a Registered Traveller Programme 
were  discussed  at  the  Informal  Strategic  Committee  on  Immigration,  Frontiers  and 
Asylum (Scifa) on 4-5 September 2007 and the Informal Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) Council on 1-2 October 2007. Most Member States agreed there is a need to 
make better use of new technologies in the area of border control and welcomed in 
principle  the  introduction  of  an  entry/exit  system  and  a  Registered  Traveller 
Programme.  

The  Impact  Assessment  was  revised  to  take  into  account  the  opinion  issued  by  the 
Impact  Assessment  Board  (IAB)  on  4  and  14  December  2007.  All  the  comments 
made  by  the  IAB  were  taken  into  consideration  in  the  revised  Impact  Assessment. 
On the basis of the comments, amendments were made into the Impact Assessment, 
especially  regarding  economic  migration  and  its  management;  sanctions;  the 
responsibilities of the Commission and the Member States; also the assessment of the 
status quo and baseline was more defined and the omission of two policy options was 
better  justified.  The  impact  of  different  options  on  the  time  required  for  border 
crossing and the amount of border  guards  were considered only on a general level, 
due to the scarcity of available data and the fact that these impacts will vary from one 
border  crossing  point  to  another.  In  relation  to  productivity,  two  examples  were 
added.  They  indicate  that  the  productivity  is  completely  different  in  each  country 
and,  in  fact,  at  each  border  crossing  point.  The  traveller  flows  and  especially  the 
traveller profiles and the capacity of the border crossing point have an impact both 
on the border crossing time and on the productivity. 

This  Impact  Assessment,  the  Commission  Communication  and  the  separate 
Commission Staff Working Paper which will be published in the beginning of 2008 
are the Commission´s response to the invitation set by the European Council. Based 
on these documents, it is the aim of the Commission to launch a political discussion 
with  Member  States  on  the  way  forward  regarding  the  entry/exit  system  and  the 
Registered  Traveller  Programme.  The  Commission  will  consider  further  the 
preparation  of  concrete  proposals  and  the  substance  of  those  proposals  on  an 
entry/exit  system  and  a  Registered  Traveller  Programme  in  the  light  of  discussions 
with the Member States and the European Parliament.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

The current framework  

2.1.1.  Passenger flows 

The  passenger  flows  at  the  external  borders  of  the  European  Union  have  been 
growing  and  will  continue  to  increase  in  the  future.  Most  of  the  passengers  are  so 
called  bona  fide  travellers  and  are  granted  entry  in  compliance  with  the  existing 
Regulations  and  rules;  but  there  are  also  serious  crimes  closely  related  to  cross 
border movements of people: travel document and identity fraud, people smuggling, 
human trafficking and terrorism.  

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There are in the order of 300 million EU27 external border crossings per annum2 (i.e. 
approximately  150  million  movements  into  the  EU  and  150  million  out)  at 
designated  border  crossing  points3.  It  is  estimated  that  160  million  of  these  border 
crossings are made by EU citizens, 60 million 4 by third country nationals (TCN) not 
requiring  a  visa  and  80  million  by  TCN  requiring  visas5.  For  the  time  being,  only 
official data is provided by Eurostat. However, this data is based on overnight stays. 

In  accordance  with  the  data  from  the  Member  States  there  were  880  million  EU27 
external  border  crossings  in  2005  and  878  million  in  2006.  Member  States  do  not 
record such movements in a coherent manner, so the rates are based on estimations 
or samples. It is not known how many of the border crossings were made by TCN.  

Existing  regulations  require  that  checks  are  made  at  borders  (entry  and  exit)  of  the 
identities of passengers and whether passengers are listed in various databases. The 
required  resources  in  terms  of  border  guards  can  be  estimated  to  around  11,500 
persons  at a cost of 400 million euro6. No statistics are collected on the number of 
border guards in the field of border checks. 

It is estimated that there were up to 8 million illegal immigrants within the EU25 in 
20067. An estimated 80% were within the Schengen area. It is likely that over half of 
illegal  immigrants  enter  the  EU  legally  but  become  illegal  due  to  overstaying  their 
right to stay8.  

The  increasing  traffic  at  the  external  borders  has  had  both  positive  and  negative 
effects  on  the  Member  States.  One  of  the  positive  effects  is  increased  social 
interaction between people and growth of the economy in the Member States. As to 
negative effects, it is hard to know exactly or even reliably estimate the number of 
third  country  nationals  illegally  residing  in  the  Member  States.  The  term  "illegal 
immigration" is used to describe a variety of phenomena. However, border crossing 
procedures should be eased to the maximum for the bona fide majority of travellers, 
as long as the travellers´ current and future bona fide status can be guaranteed. 

2 

3 
4 

5 
6 

7 

8 

The figure was calculated by adding the number of trips of EU residents outside EU27 with the number 
of TCN travelling to EU27. See Annex 4, table 14, 15 and 16.  
See Annex 4, table 13. 
The figure was calculated on the numbers of trips made into Europe by the most important countries. 
See Annex 4, table 16. 
See Annex 4, table 11. 
This  estimate  is  based  upon  data  from  one  Member  State.  There  are  an  estimated  100  million 
passengers who enter that Member State per annum. 2930 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff are checking 
passengers as they enter the territory. If it is assumed that it costs an average of 45000 euro to employ 
them  (without  equipment)  the  total  costs  are  132  million  euro,  equivalent  to  1.32  euro  per  passenger 
entry. According to data for one other Member State, there are 16 million passengers who enter and exit 
that Member States. There is 1313 FTE staff who are working in the field of border checks. The average 
salary costs are 47900 per annum. Then the total costs are 63 million euro, equivalent to 3,90 euro per 
passenger  entry/exit.  It  should  however  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  organisation  and  tasks  of  national 
border  guard  authorities  differ  widely  between  Member  States  and  as  a  consequence  resource 
implications are not comparable, nor can they be aggregated. 
This estimate is consistent with that of the United Nation’s Trend and the estimates of EU25 Member 
States given. However, there are other estimates: 2-3 million (Global Migration Perspective 2005) and 
4.5 million (IOM 2000).  
There are varied estimates in different national studies undertaken in the Netherlands (‘large majority’), 
Italy (75% in 2004 ) and UK (31% in 2002 ). 

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It is obvious that there exists a dichotomy in this dilemma. On the one hand, the bona 
fide passengers should be ensured a smooth border-crossing and on the other hand, 
the  internal  security  of  the  Schengen  area  should  be  guaranteed.  These  challenges 
will be further examined in Chapter 2. It is also important to note that compared to 
air  and  sea  borders,  land  borders  are  more  complex  to  manage  in  instances  when 
individuals  arrive  at  land  border  crossing  points  in  groups  in  cars,  busses  or  even 
trains. Cars carried onboard ferries undergo similar checks as at land border. 

2.1.2.  Integrated border management 

Efficient, extensive and effective border control makes a significant contribution to 
the  level  of  security  in  the  Member  States.  The  Integrated  Border  Management 
System  is  used  in  the  European  Union  to  achieve  these  aims.  On  14  and  15 
December 2006, the European Council recalled the need to improve the management 
of  the  European  Union's  external  borders  on  the  basis  of  the  integrated  border 
management strategy discussed in the Council in 2006. Management of the external 
borders  is  built  up  around  three  pillars,  namely  common  legislation,  common 
operations and financial solidarity. 

In order to manage increasing passenger flows, it is necessary to take advantage of 
modern and rapidly developing new technology in an open manner. To increase the 
number of personnel participating in border control or to improve the functionality of 
border  crossing  points,  for  example  by  enlarging  the  border  crossing  points  or  by 
adding more  border check  booths  and  lanes,  is not  necessarily cost  efficient  and in 
some cases not even possible. Over the last years, the Integrated Border Management 
System  has  developed  significantly.  For  example  through  common  legislation, 
Frontex coordinated operations and financial burden sharing among Member States. 
This development should be systematically continued.  

2.1.3.  Legislation and financial solidarity 

Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  in  1999,  a  number  of  common 
measures  have  been  adopted  to  manage  the  external  borders of  the  European  Union  in 
accordance with Article 62 (1) and (2) of the EC Treaty. In particular, four Regulations 
dealing  with  different  aspects  of  this  policy  have  been  adopted  aiming  at  the 
harmonisation of the legal framework and improvement of practical co-operation: 

•  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2007/2004  establishing  a  European  Agency  for  the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (Frontex). 

•  The  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 

•  The European Parliament and the Council Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 laying 
down  rules  on  local  border  traffic  at  the  external  borders  of  the  Member  States 
and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention. 

•  The  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  863/2007 
establishing  a  mechanism  for  the  creation  of  Rapid  Border  Intervention  Teams 

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and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism 
and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers. 

There  are  also  several  other  Regulations  that  are  particularly  relevant  in  this  field, 
notably the European Parliament and the Council Regulation (EC) No XX/2007 on 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States 
on short stay-visas.  

In  addition,  the  Commission  Recommendation  establishing  a  common  Practical 
Handbook  for  Border  Guards  was  adopted  on  6  November  2006.  The  external 
borders  fund  (EBF)  was  set  in  place  on  23  May  2007,  which  on  the  basis  of  the 
principle of solidarity supports Member States with specific requirements for checks 
and surveillance of long or difficult stretches of external borders, and Member States 
confronted with special and unforeseen circumstances due to exceptional migratory 
pressures on their external borders. The EBF is operational already 2007 and it will 
apply for the financial period 2007-2013 with €1.82 billions.  

2.2. 

Problems and other issues in the current situation 

2.2.1. 

Illegal immigration  

Even if it is likely that the majority of illegal immigrants enter Europe legally (e.g. 
with  a  short-term  visa)  and  then  fail  to  depart  when  their  legal  entitlement  to  stay 
expires,  consistent  and  reliable  data  on  the  stock  and  inflow  of  illegal  migrants  in 
Europe is difficult to provide. 

According  to  data  collected  by  the  external  contractor  there  were  up  to  8  million 
illegal immigrants within the EU in 2006, over half of which entered the EU legally 
but become illegal or irregular due to exceeding their right to stay.  

In  2006  in  the  order  of  500,000  (year  2005  429  000;  year  2004  396  000)  illegal 
immigrants  were  apprehended  in  the  EU27  and  it  is  estimated  that  around  40%  of 
these were removed9. In 2006 the EURODAC database stored 25,162 fingerprints of 
people who were detected crossing borders irregularly10.  

Data collected at national level indicate that more than 75% of the illegal immigrants 
that  were  apprehended  on  the  territory  of  Member  States  in  2006  were  from  third 
countries  where  visas  to  visit  the  EU  are  required11.  It  is  therefore  likely  that  most 
overstayers originate from these third countries. 

Illegal entry, transit and stay of TCN who are not in need of international protection, 
without  effective  countermeasures,  undermine  the  credibility  of  the  common 
European and the Member States´ immigration policy. 

The  costs  of  identifying,  apprehending  and  returning  illegal  immigrants  are  high. 
Illegal immigrants are likely to be subject to exploitation including in particular by 
organised  crime.  One  of  the  factors  encouraging  illegal  immigration  into  the  EU  is 

9 
10 
11 

See Annex 4, table 3, 4 and 5. 
See Annex 3.  
See Annex 4, table 4. 

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the  possibility  of  finding  work.  Illegal  immigration  is  thus  a  widespread  and 
continuing problem and current measures to detect and reduce its incidence are only 
partially effective.  

Considerable  efforts  are  underway  within  the  EU  and  in  particular  within  the 
Schengen  area  to  combat  illegal  immigration.  These  are  described  under  the  status 
quo policy option in Section 4. Within the EU and elsewhere there are examples of 
initiatives  with  analogies  to  the  proposed  entry/exit  system  that  have  been 
implemented  with  a  view  to  reducing  illegal  immigration  such  as  the  US  –VISIT 
programme and the provision of advanced passenger information in the UK12.  

2.2.2.  Terrorism and serious crime 

Terrorism  and  serious  crime  are  major  problems  with  strong  international 
dimensions. Organised crime is growing and though difficult to predict terrorism is 
likely  to  remain  a  major  problem.  The  problems  are  extremely  difficult  to  combat 
and generate huge human and social costs. There are serious crimes closely related to 
cross  border  movements  of  people:  travel  document  and  identity  fraud,  people 
smuggling and human trafficking.  

Border  controls  play  a  role  in  combating  terrorism  and  serious  crime.  The  controls 
involve identity checks and the information is searched against various databases of 
known  persons  to  be  either  apprehended  or  denied  entry  to  the  territory.  These 
procedures can lead to refusals to enter the EU. In 2006 over 300,000 (year 2006 280 
000; year 2004 397 000)13 persons were refused entry at EU borders14. Most of these 
were  from  third  countries  where  visas  are  required15.  This  compares  with  the 
estimated  70  million  TCN  entries  into  the  EU  (both  visa  and  non  visa  holders); 
approximately 4 per thousand are refused for entry at borders. However, the majority 
of those refused entries are neither terrorists nor serious criminals but those without 
the  appropriate  travel  documents  and  suspected  of  being  prospective  illegal 
immigrants.  

Data available from the Schengen Information System (SIS) provide some indication 
of the scale and trends. Since 1995 more than 17 million records have been created 
on the SIS. The vast majority of these concern lost or stolen items, such as identity 
documents. Information from 2006 indicated that: 

– 

– 

More  than  13  million  records  have  been  created  on  stolen  identity 
documents  (passports,  identity  cards,  driving  licence)  of  which  a 
majority concern travel documents issued by the Member States; 

More  than  one  million  records  have  been  created  on  wanted  persons 
(894,776 wanted persons plus 312,052 aliases); 

12 
13 

14 
15 

See Annex 2.  
Excluding the figures for Spain that are very high (600,000) due to refusals made outside of the EU at 
Spanish enclaves in North Africa. 
See Annex 4, table 1 and 2. 
See Annex 4, table 2. 

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– 

The  vast  majority  of  wanted  people  are  TCN  who  should  be  denied 
entry under article 96 (e.g. people to be rejected on grounds of national 
security and public order and rejected asylum seekers); 

– 

Over 33,000 people have been placed under ‘discreet surveillance’. 

Specific restrictive EU measures are directed against certain persons and entities with 
a  view  to  combating  terrorism.  They  normally  include  groups  posing  a  threat  to 
public security, as well as the names of individuals belonging to such groups.  

In view of the latest terrorist acts in the EU, it can be noted that the perpetrators have 
mainly been EU citizens or foreigners residing and living in the Member States with 
official permits. Usually there has been no information about these people or about 
their  terrorist  connections  in  the  registers,  for  example  in  the  SIS  or  national 
databases.  

The international nature of crime and terrorism has contributed to the development of 
mechanisms  through  which  border  controls  contribute  to  the  detection  and 
apprehension of criminals and terrorists. These developments are described under the 
status quo policy option in Section 4.  

2.2.3.  Data gap 

As  stated  earlier  in  sub-paragraphs  2.1.  and  2.2.,  for  the  time  being  the  number  of 
overstayers  is  the  main  problem  in  the  European  Union.  There  is  no  information 
source  or  data  base  that  would  explicitly  provide  the  exact  number  of  illegally 
residing TCN in the European Union. It is precisely for this reason that it is difficult 
to make any reliable estimation on the matter. In other words, it is very difficult to 
identify those TCN who have overstayed their visa or visa free period. 

The  passport  of  every  TCN  should  be  manually  stamped  when  she/he  enters  and 
exits the Schengen area16. The time a third country national has spent in the area of 
the  Member  States  is  calculated  based  on  these  stamps,  which  are  however  often 
difficult  to  interpret;  they  may  be  illegible  or  the  target  of  counterfeiting.  Exact 
calculation  of  time  spent  in  the  Schengen  area  on  the  basis  of  stamps  in  the  travel 
documents is thus both time-consuming and difficult. In addition, there is no record 
of the time spent in the Schengen area for TCN. Due to these reasons, at the moment 
there is  

•  at the border crossing point no easy manageable and reliable mean of determining 

if a TCN has overstayed his/her right to stay, 

•  no  consistent  record  of  entries  and  exits  of  travellers  from  the  Schengen  area, 

which could help to improve border management, security and planning and 

•  no possibility to gather information on overstayers. 

16 

Except for certain categories of persons such as those who present a valid residence card of a family 
member of a Union citizen. 

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2.2.4.  Bona fide passengers 

It is reasonable to assume that many travellers cross the borders more than twice per 
annum  and  that  a  minority  of  the  crossings  are  made  by  frequent  travellers.  For 
example,  EU  and  TCN  business  travellers,  researchers  and  their  technical  staff, 
students, EU citizens with close family connections to third countries, TCN and EU 
citizens  living  in  regions  bordering  the  EU  are  all  likely  to  make  multiple  border 
crossings per annum.  

It is estimated that around 20% of border crossings of TCN applying for Schengen 
visas are regular travellers seeking multiple entry visas17.  

The  flows  have  been  growing  and  are  likely  to  increase.  Taking  into  account  the 
forecasts  for  international  travel  and  its  development  in  the  mid-term18,  the  current 
infrastructure at border crossing points will have even greater difficulties in dealing 
with the growing numbers than today. The increasing amounts of travellers can only 
be dealt with through the implementation of new systems and procedures or making 
considerable investment in physical infrastructure and human resources.  

The  biggest  amount  of  crossings  of  the  external  border  occur  at  the  airports.  Land 
border  crossing  points  are  the  next  most  frequently  used  type  of  border  crossing. 
There are 1792 designated EU external border crossing points with controls (665 air 
borders, 871 sea borders and 246 land borders)19. 

Existing  regulations  require  that  checks  are  made  at  borders  (entry  and  exit).  The 
process imposes costs on bona fide passengers. These costs relate to: the time taken 
at borders to complete formalities; the time and financial costs of getting appropriate 
travel  documents  and  visas;  and  the  consequences  of  mistakes  being  made.  These 
costs are generally higher for TCN requiring visas than for EU citizens, as they have 
to  spend  time  and  money  acquiring  visas  and  because  it  currently  takes  longer  to 
have their travel documents checked and processed at border crossing points. There 
are also costs associated with granting visas. In the order of 11.5 million Schengen 
visas are granted per annum.  

Given the very large numbers of border crossings small changes in the time taken to 
make border crossings are potentially very significant. However, many other factors 
contribute to time spent at border crossings. These include: check in times; customs 
checks;  time  spent  waiting  for  luggage;  air  traffic  delays;  and  security  checks.  At 
many border crossings, passport controls contribute just one component of delays.  

17

18 

19 

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?page=Advanced&typ=&lang=EN&fc=REGA

ISEN&srm=25&md=100&cmsid=639 
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2000-99-001/index.html. 
In 2006, the United States hosted 51 million international visitors, a 4 percent increase from 2005. The 
arrivals  forecast  for  2007-2011  predicts  that  by  2011,  international  arrivals  will  reach  61  million,  an 
increase  of  20  percent  between  2006  and  2011.  Forecasts  are  derived  from  Global  Insight,  Inc. 
econometric travel forecasting model and are based on key economic and demographic variables as well 
as DOC consultation on non-economic travel factors. The rates of the United States are used, because 
there does not exist comprehensive estimations from Europe. 
See Annex 4, table 13. 

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Within the EU and elsewhere there are examples of initiatives with analogies to the 
proposed Registered Traveller Programme that have been implemented with a view 
to  facilitating  bona  fide  border  crossings.  These  include  both  Registered  Traveller 
Schemes for particular border crossings and Automated Border Control systems that 
check the identity of passengers using biometric information. Several Member States 
have developed pilot programmes and projects at various airports throughout the EU 
(for  example,  in  the  UK  at  Heathrow,  Gatwick,  and  Birmingham  airports;  in  the 
Netherlands at Schiphol airport; in France at Charles De Gaulle airport; in Germany 
at Frankfurt airport; in Portugal at Lisbon airport).20  

This  seems  to  be  a  growing  trend.  Yet,  it  might  not  be  desirable  to  have  different 
national Registered Traveller schemes that are not interoperable across EU Member 
States  and  thus  common  standards  and  guidelines  might  need  to  be  considered  to 
avoid the need for multiple registrations with each programme individually. 

2.2.5.  Economic migration 

In this Impact Assessment, economic migration has mainly been considered from the 
perspective of work-related legal migration. Economic migration is important to the 
development and competitiveness of the EU. It was estimated that in 2003 there were 
in the order of 16 million TCN residents in the EU21. Legal economic migration to 
the  EU  mainly  involves:  those  with  skills  where  there is  demand  exceeding  supply 
and seasonal workers, largely working in the agriculture and tourist sector. Economic 
migration  to  the  EU  has  increased.  In  light  of  demographic  changes  (a  lower 
proportion of EU population will be of working age), economic migration is likely to 
grow.  

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, a number of common 
measures  have  been  adopted  in  the  areas  of  immigration.  Despite  such  important 
steps  forward  in  the  creation  of  a  common  policy  on  legal  migration,  no  common 
measures  yet  exist  to  admit  TCN  entering  the  EU  territory  for  employment,  even 
though  the  admission  of  economic  migrants  represents  the  cornerstone  of  any 
immigration policy.  

The reasons for proposing an EU policy on labour migration have been explored in 
SEC  (2005)  1680,  annexed  to  the  Policy  Plan  on  Legal  Migration,  where  the 
Commission has examined whether and for which reasons a common policy in this 
field would be necessary, by evaluating the following elements: 

•  interrelation of national immigration policies: at the current state of the acquis, it 
is acknowledged that admission of economic immigrants in a Member State can 
have an impact on other Member States and/or on the Community as a whole. For 
instance  a  regularisation  procedure  may  attract  illegal  immigration  into  one 
Member State, from which regularised migrants could afterwards move easily to 
other Member States; 

20 
21 

See Annex 2. 
See Annex 4, table 6. 

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• 

the EU labour market and demographic change: Eurostat projections concerning 
demographic ageing and its impact on the labour market indicate that there will be 
a  fall  in  the  EU  working  age  population  by  2011,  with  an  estimated  fall  of  52 
million between 2004 and 2050 (STAT/05/48). Already existing needs in the high 
qualifications' segment of the labour market will become more and more evident 
in  the  years  to  come  and  will  have  to  be  addressed  if  Europe  wants  to  remain 
competitive on the global market; 

•  the outcome of the public consultation on the Green Paper on managing economic 
migration:  some  elements  clearly  emerged,  i.e.  the  need  for  EU  common  rules 
regulating  admission  for  employment,  including  temporary  work,  coupled  with 
the request to ensure a secure legal position to all immigrants in employment. 

The  Commission  Communication  "Towards  a  Common  Immigration  Policy" 
concluded that a renewed commitment to develop a common immigration policy is 
required  to  enable  the  Union  to  turn  immigration  to  its  advantage  for  economic 
growth  and  competitiveness.  This  new  commitment  would:  build  on  an  assessment 
of  the  situation  of  migrants  in  the  Member  States,  including  the  current  and  future 
needs and skills gaps; define a plan leading to a common understanding of the kind 
of  immigration  Europe  needs  and  the  accompanying  measures  required  to  ensure 
proper  integration;  set  out  common  measures  on  how  to  effectively  tackle  illegal 
immigration, addressing both new arrivals and illegal migrants already present in the 
EU;  ensure  genuine  and  efficient  coordination  and  information  between  Member 
States as regards major decisions in the immigration field, particularly regularisation 
measures and measures to tackle illegal immigration; ensure policy consistency: all 
policy  fields  need  to  contribute  and  work  in  complementing  each  other  to  face 
common challenges; both national and EU levels and different sectorial policies; and 
continue the process of linking the EU immigration policy with the external agenda, 
including development.22 

In the EU, there currently exist 27 national systems for the management of economic 
migration.  These  national  systems  are  very  diverse  varying  from  databases  at 
national  level  to  micro  management  at  local  level.  Thus,  there  is  a  lack  of 
management systems at EU level and there are no EU wide real-time figures on the 
admission and return of third country workers for the whole EU area. The effective 
management  of  the  economic  migration  is  not  possible  without  comprehensive  and 
comparable data. In this Impact Assessment, impact of the entry/exit system and the 
Registered  Traveller  Programme  in  improving  the  management  of  economic 
migration  have  mainly  been  considered  from  the  perspective  of  work-related  legal 
economic migration. 

Several  EU  Member  States  have  strategies  to  attract  workers  with  the  desired  skill 
levels. For example, in 2002 Germany adopted a major reform of their immigration 
laws  to  facilitate  the  entry  of  highly  skilled  workers.  In  2005  the  UK  Government 
presented  its  five  year  strategy  for  immigration  and  asylum,  which  indicated  an 
emphasis on highly skilled migrants. 

22 

COM(2007) 780, 5.12.2007. 

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Steps  are  being  taken  to  harmonise  procedures  and  set  common  standards  for 
admitting  workers  from  outside  the  EU.  In  the  line  with  2005  Policy  Plan  on  legal 
migration23, the Commission adopted two legislative proposals on 23 October 2007 
in the area of economic migration. The first proposal sets out the conditions of entry 
and residence for the admission of highly qualified migrants to the EU, creating the 
EU  Blue  Card.  The  second  proposal  is  a  Framework  Directive  that  establishes  a 
single application procedure for a single residence and work permit and a common 
set  of  rights  for  third-country  workers  legally  residing  in  a  Member  State.24  The 
policy  plan  foresees  further  proposals  in  the  area  of  economic  migration  for  2008, 
namely Directives on the conditions of entry and residence of seasonal workers', of 
intra-corporate  transfers  (ICT)  and  remunerated  trainees.  In  addition  to  the  direct 
economic  contribution,  labour  migration  to  the  EU  generates  and  strengthens 
international links. Indeed, economic migration to the EU is an important factor for 
third  countries.  Those  TCN  working  in  the  EU  send  home  remittances  that  can 
represent  a  significant  proportion  of  the  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  of  the 
countries  of  origin.  At  the  same  time  outward  migration  can  also  be  a  source  of 
‘brain drain’ and ‘loss’ of the public investments made in human capital. 

To meet the key challenge of maintaining a good match between the requirements of 
the  EU  labour  markets  and  economic  migration  is  attained,  efficient  management 
arrangements need to be put in place. This in turn would maximise the reliability and 
public confidence in the system of control. Border controls have an important role to 
play in this.  

2.2.6. 

Subsidiarity 

Under  Article  62(2)(a)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  the 
Community has the power to adopt measures relating to the crossing of the external 
borders of the Member States. 

The need for intervention at the European level is clear. No Member State is able to 
combat alone against illegal immigration including overstayers. A person may enter 
the  Schengen  area  at  a  border  crossing  point  where  a  centralised  register  of 
entries/exits is used, but exit through a border crossing point where no such system is 
used. TCN that enter the Schengen area are able to travel freely within it. In an area 
without  internal  borders,  action  against  illegal  immigration  needs  to  be  undertaken 
on a common basis. This is the case not only at the common borders but also with 
regard to action to reduce pull factors. 

Any  measures  relating  to  border  control  would  have  to  apply  to  the  Schengen  area 
without  internal  border  controls  which  currently  includes  all  EU15  member  states 
except  UK  and  Ireland  and  two  other  European  countries  (Norway  and  Iceland). 
Nine new Member States are in the process of becoming full Schengen members by 
December 2007 (March 2008 for air borders). Schengen countries are committed to 
maintaining common EU borders and common standards for border controls. All the 
options are also relevant to non Schengen Member States as their citizens could be 
affected by their implementation when travelling elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, the 

23 
24 

COM(2005) 699, 21.12.2005. 
COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007 and COM(2007) 638, 23.10.2007. 

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14 

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objectives  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States  acting  alone  but 
better achieved at EU level.  

1. 

POLITICAL  ORIENTATIONS  AND  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  ENTRY/EXIT  SYSTEM  AND 
MEASURES  FOR  FACILITATE  CROSS-BORDER  FLOWS  (AUTOMATED  BORDER 
CONTROL AND REGISTERED TRAVELLER PROGRAMME) 

The  essential  rationale  of  the  introduction  of  an  entry/exit  system  is  that  it  would 
enable the maintenance of a record of TCN entering and exiting the EU. However, 
the introduction of such a system might increase the time necessary for TCN to go 
through EU external border controls. There could be, therefore, a basis for reducing 
the impact of new border control measures by introducing a cross border facilitation 
scheme which in a form of automated border crossing systems would apply to those 
assessed  to  be  eligible.  The  implementation  of  such  measures  to  facilitate  cross-
border flows would be voluntary and could have the extra benefits of enabling border 
guards to focus their resources on risky categories of persons. 

At first glance the set of objectives may look conflicting with the need to deal with 
an  ever  increasing  stream  of  travellers.  Any  additional  means  of  entry-exit  control 
invariably will lead to longer processing time at the point of border crossing and this 
in turn will lead to longer waiting queues overall. As it will be shown in the possible 
scenarios,  the  conflict  can  to  some  extent  be  resolved  by  leveraging  advanced 
biometrics  and  technology  for  automating  the  border  crossing  process  for  different 
types of travellers. 

The aim of the Impact Assessment is both to analyse the means to achieve defined 
policy  objectives  and  to  examine  different  implementation  options  for  both  the 
entry/exit  system  and  for  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme.  The  objectives, 
mainly  derived  from  various  documents  (The  Policy  Plan  on  legal  Migration,  The 
Communication  on  Policy  Priorities  in  the  fight  against  illegal  immigration,  The 
Action Plan on Combating terrorism, the Impact Assessment of the Visa Information 
System, Council Conclusions and the Commission Communication regarding EU-US 
Partnership) referring to the systems, had an essential part in making system options 
deal more with different traveller groups than with different systems.  

3.1. 

Political orientations 

The  idea  of  creating  an  automated  system  registering  the  entry  and  exit  of  third 
country nationals at EU level was first raised by Germany in a letter addressed to the 
Commission and to the UK Presidency in September 2005.  

After that the creation of an entry/exit system has been discussed as a possible policy 
option in several EU documents: 

•  The  Commission  included  the  "creation  of  an  entry-exit  system  and  the 
introduction of a border-crossing facilitation scheme for frequent crossers" among 
the  possible  long-term  developments  in  its  Communication  on  improved 

EN 

15 

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effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases 
in the area of Justice and Home Affairs25.  

•  The Policy Plan on Legal Migration26 considered an automated entry exit system 
as  a  component  of  a  possible  future  EU  scheme  for  the  admission  of  seasonal 
workers.  It  indicated  that  such  a  system  would  help  Member  States  to  verify 
overstayers and thus improve the management of economic migration.  

•  The Communication on Policy Priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of 
third-country  nationals27  noted  that  the  Community  rules  do  not  provide  for 
automated registration of TCN on entry to/exit from the EU territory. The creation 
of  an  automated  entry/exit  system  would  therefore  facilitate  the  management  of 
illegal  migration  as  checks  on  the  immigration  and  residence  status  of  TCN 
entering and exiting EU territory would be undertaken.  

•  In  the  context  of  the  EU  Action  Plan  on  Combating  Terrorism28  an  automated 
entry exit system was included amongst the border control measures that could be 
taken to prevent terrorism.  

•  The  question  of  setting  up  a  (biometric)  automated  entry/exit  system  at  the 
external  borders  of  the  EU  was  addressed  also  in  the  framework  for  the  Impact 
Assessment for the setting up of a Visa Information System (VIS)29.  

In relation to the setting up of a Registered Traveller programme, this issue has been 
raised in the Communication as mentioned above as well as in the framework of the 
relations with the United States:  

•  The  Commission  Communication  "A  Stronger  EU-US  Partnership  and  a  more 
open market for the 21st century”30 suggested examining the possibility of a travel 
initiative  for  a  special  status  of  ‘trusted  persons’  to  facilitate  the  movement  of 
international  travellers  and  ensure  compliance  with  security  procedures  at  the 
same time. 

On 14 and 15 December 2006, the European Council emphasized that existing and 
new technological possibilities will be fully utilised to enhance border control and to 
allow persons to be identified reliably; the Commission was invited to report before 
the  end  of  2007  on  how  to  improve  access  control,  including  on  the  feasibility  of 
establishing a generalised and automated entry-exit system for this purpose.  

3.2. 

Objectives of the entry/exit system 

The general objectives are, in order of priority: 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers); 

25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 

COM(2005) 597, 24.11.2005. 
COM(2005) 669, 21.12.2005  
COM(2006) 402, 19.6.2006. 
Council Document 5771, 27.1.2006. 
SEC(2004) 1628, 28.12.2004. 
COM(2005) 196, 18.5.2005. 

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16 

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•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime; 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example, 

seasonal workers). 

The specific objectives are 

•  To  generate  information  which  would  help  to  apprehend  irregular  and  illegal 

immigrants especially overstayers and to deter illegal immigration;  

•  To generate information that would prevent terrorism and serious criminal activity 
and that would lead to (or help ensure) the apprehension of terrorist and criminal 
suspects; 

•  To enable border control resources to better focus on checking riskier groups of 
travellers  and  tackle  illicit  movements  of  people  in  order  to  maximise  the 
reliability and public confidence in the system of control; 

The operational objectives are: 

•  To identify overstayers; 

•  To facilitate the sanctioning of overstayers; 

•  To  identify  the  cross  border  movements  of  potentially  dangerous  third  country 

nationals; 

•  To  identify  the  compliance  of  seasonal  and  other  categories  of  third  country 

national migrants to the EU to their conditions of migration. 

3.3. 

Objectives of the measures for facilitate cross-border flows  

The general objectives are, in order of priority: 

•  To  facilitate  the  crossing  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  while 

ensuring overall coherence of EU border policy; 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example, 

seasonal workers). 

The specific objective is: 

•  To enable border control resources to better focus on checking riskier groups of 
travellers  and  tackle  illicit  movements  of  people  in  order  to  maximise  the 
reliability and public confidence in the system of control. 

The operational objectives are: 

•  To  decrease  the  time  and  costs  of  border  crossings  to  (frequent)  bona  fide 

travellers, both EU citizens and third country nationals; 

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•  To  free  up  border  control  resources  from  the  checking  legitimate  cross  border 

movements.  

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

This Section describes each of the policy options and sub policy options in turn. The 
most  relevant  aspects  of  each  policy  option  and  sub  option  that  could  radically 
influence  its  feasibility,  costs  and  the  effects  it  might  have  relative  to  the  policy 
objectives are elaborated.  

Other policy options introducing various obligations on migrants to confirm return to 
the  country  of  origin,  and  possibly  combined  with  a  bond  system,  were  considered 
but  eliminated.  In  the  policy  option  "obligation  on  TCN  to  confirm  their  return  to 
country of origin" TCN requiring visas to visit the EU would be required to provide 
upon return to the country of origin a proof of having respected the duration of stay 
as  a  condition  to  re-enter  the  EU.  Such  travellers  will  have  to  provide  biometric 
information which will be stored in the VIS. Their identities will be checked on entry 
to and exit from the EU, passports will be stamped but the time and place of entry 
and exit will not be recorded. In order to verify that a TCN holding a visa had left the 
EU,  this  policy  option  foresees  they  would  have  to  return  to  the  visa  consulate  in 
their country of origin and provide biometric information to prove their identity and 
verify  that  they  had  left  the  EU  in  due  time.  Thus  the  sub  policy  option  would 
provide information on exits made within the provisions of visas and information on 
the  identity  of  ‘overstayers’  who  had  not  verified  that  they  had  left  the  EU  in  due 
time. 

This policy option would affect all TCN holding a visa with the possible exception of 
those holding multiple-entry visas. Around 11.5 million (Schengen) visas are granted 
each  year.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  well  over  5  million  ‘returns’  to  a  visa 
consulate would be required per annum.  

In the policy option "a system of bonds for TCN requiring visas to visit the EU" TCN 
requiring visas would be required to provide a bond (certain sum of money) to EU 
consular authorities if they have been granted a visa. This bond would be reimbursed 
to the TCN providing that they conformed to the requirements of their visa or right to 
stay. These requirements would normally include providing evidence that they have 
left the EU. Thus the policy option would provide information on exits made within 
the  provisions  of  visas  and  information  on  the  identity  of  overstayers  who  had  not 
reclaimed their bonds in due time.  

The policy option would not require investment in biometric recognition systems and 
thus  could  be  operational  in  the  short  term.  However,  this  option  would  need  data 
generated by a central register. The data could be used to verify that TCN holding a 
visa had in fact left the EU and should therefore receive back the bonds paid by them 
or on their behalf.  

These  options  were  too  wide  and  complex  -  both  in  the  political  sense  and  with 
regard  to  the  practical  implementation  -  to  be  carried  out  in  the  medium-term.  For 
example, fast and sufficient transfer of information on overstayers would have been 
difficult  to  arrange,  and  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  customer  the  options  can  be 

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18 

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regarded  unreasonable.  Traveller  should  first  go  to  a  consulate  to  register  or  pay  a 
bond  and  only  after  that  s/he  could  enter  the  Schengen  territory.  This  could  mean 
hundreds of kilometres of travel within the country of origin and also additional costs 
(time  and  money)  for  the  traveller.  Moreover, these options go well beyond border 
control measures and are rather migration management tools in a wide sense. They 
might  therefore  better  be  reflected  on  in  another,  larger  context  as  a  part  of  wider 
policy  considerations  for  the  management  of  economic  migration  and  international 
development.  However,  it  should  be  stressed  that  their  political  feasibility  would 
above  all  need  to  be  evaluated  from  the  perspective of  how they would fit into the 
overall EU policy of encouraging people-to-people exchange, whilst ensuring a high 
level of security, having regard to the clear deterrent effect on travel that any options 
of this nature would have. 

The  possibility  of  extending  the  entry/exit  system  to  EU  nationals  was  also 
considered  because  of  the  possible  benefits  with  respect  to  identifying  histories  of 
cross  border  movements  of  potentially  dangerous  persons  from  within  the  EU. 
However, questions as to the compatibility of any such system with Community rules 
on  free  movement  were  considered  to  outweigh  the  potential  benefits.  In  addition, 
several technical options for the entry/exit system for TCN were considered but the 
assessment  has  focussed  on  a  system  that  makes  use  of  the  developments  that  are 
taking place in the status quo and in particular the VIS. 

Also the use of alternative biometrics particularly iris recognition in the harmonised 
Registered Traveller Programme for EU citizens was briefly evaluated but this was 
considered  likely  to  be  very  expensive,  requiring  investment  over  and  above 
biometric equipment that would rely on current plans for e-passport development and 
the  VIS,  and  involving  longer  enrolment  times,  though  greater  accuracy  could 
potentially be achieved. 

A digital photograph and fingerprints have been established as biometric identifiers 
currently  in  use  in  EU  large-scale  IT  systems  -  also  in  the  VIS.  These  biometric 
identifiers  are  used  in  passports,  visas  and  residence  permits.  The  equipment  have 
already been partly acquired at the consulates and at the border crossing points, and 
these investments will continue. If other biometric identifiers, such as iris, were used 
in  the  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller  Programme,  the  consulates  and 
border  crossing  points  would  need  more  equipment  and  no  current  information 
systems, such as the VIS and the SIS, could be efficiently used. Also, including iris 
into  the  biometric  identifiers  would  require  further  training  and  place  greater 
demands on the personnel31. 

The  Biometric  Matching  System  (BMS)  is  a  system  that  will  store  the  minimum 
amount of data needed to perform identification and verification requests by the VIS 
on behalf of the Member States. Initially, the BMS will only provide services to the 
VIS. From an architectural and structural point of view it can easily be expanded to 
provide  services  to  additional  systems,  such  as  the  SIS  II,  EURODAC,  and  a 
potential  entry/exit  system  and  automated  border  crossing  systems  in  connection 
with a Registered Traveller Programme.  

31 

See  also  Study  on  Automated  Biometric  Border  Crossing  Systems  for  Registered  Passengers  at 
European Airports carried out by Frontex, p. 68. 

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Identifying synergies and making effective use of EU systems such as the VIS, the 
SIS  II  and  the  BMS  in  order  to  leverage  the  information  they  contain  can  greatly 
facilitate  the  implementation  of  an  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller 
Programmes.  There  are  definitely  potential  savings  from  a  shared  approach  to 
improving border control processes across the EU. 

It should be remembered when reading the Impact Assessment that any of the sub-
options  can  be  implemented  separately  and  individually.  The  already  existing 
systems  in  the  Member  States  exemplify  this.  For  example,  the  entry/exit  system 
only  for  TCN  requiring  a  visa  is  possible  because  the  implementation  is  relatively 
simple and requires minimal investments. The biometric identifiers of the TCN will 
be  stored  into  the  VIS  database  when  issuing  visas  at  the  consulates,  and  the 
Commission  is  preparing  a  legislative  proposal  which  would  make  a  search 
compulsory in the VIS system when the traveller is entering the Schengen area.  

It is also quite possible to implement the entry/exit system for TCN not requiring a 
visa. In the future, if necessary, it will be possible with the help of the VIS to identify 
the TCN requiring a visa also within the Schengen area. As to the TCN not requiring 
a visa this will not be possible, because without the entry/exit system their biometric 
identifiers  will  not  be  captured  and  stored  in  any  database.  Consequently  in  this 
option entries and exits of the TCN not requiring a visa would be registered, whereas 
the entries and exits of TCN requiring a visa would not. Yet, it would be possible to 
verify  the  identity  of  all  TCN  residing  in  the  Schengen  area  by  using  biometric 
identifiers. 

Respectively, any of the Registered Traveller Programme sub-options can be realized 
with justification as an own entity. 

However,  the  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller  Programme  could  be 
combined  as  both  have  impacts  on  the  border  checks  carried  out  at  the  external 
borders,  and  the  two  systems  clearly  share  a  common  ground  as  to  the  practical 
border  checks  and  management  of  resources.  The  entry/exit  system  and  the 
Registered Traveller Programme can be seen as the systems which complement each 
other;  the  entry/exit  system  will  entail  more  careful  and  time-consuming  border 
checks  especially  for  those  TCN  not  requiring  a  visa,  whereas  the  Registered 
Traveller  Programme  will  enable  smoother  border  checks  for  bona  fide  travellers. 
Roughly  estimated  these  systems  will  cancel  out  each  others´  effects  as  to  the 
management  of  border  check  personnel  and  the  average  time  required  for  border 
crossings.  Of  course,  in  practise  there  may  be  huge  differences  among  different 
border crossing points. 

One example of the costs and the required time (incl. legislation) to develop a large-
scale  information  system  is  the  VIS.  The  development  of  the  VIS  was  initiated  in 
2004,  and  the  system  should  start  operations  in  2009.  The  estimated  costs  of  the 
central  system  in  2004–2009  will  be  approximately  70  million  euro  (including  the 
development  of  the  Biometric  Matching  System,  network,  quality  assurance 
contractor costs, etc.). The aforementioned figure neither includes the costs incurred 
by  Member  States  nor  the  costs  for  maintaining  the  system.  Nevertheless,  the 
creation  of  an  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller  Programme  should  not 
incur comparable costs since the technical design of both should allow for maximum 
synergies with the VIS. 

EN 

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At  this  stage,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  a  potential  entry/exit  system  should  be 
based on a similar technical platform as the VIS and also could cover the Registered 
Traveller Programme. As concerns the specific issue of storing the entry/exit data for 
visa holders, the VIS database could be expanded to record the entries and exits of 
TCN  requiring  a  visa;  this  data  could  be  included  in  the  entry/exit  system  and 
Registered Traveller Programme database.  

In any case, only one new database would be needed in the future. The Commission 
will present a separate Commission Staff Working Paper on technical options of the 
entry/exit system and the Registered Traveller Programme in the beginning of 2008. 

4.1. 

Option 1: Status Quo 

The  status  quo  policy  option  needs  to  reflect  a  large  number  of  important 
developments that are underway and a substantial improvement in infrastructure for 
managing cross border flows are anticipated to occur. However, these improvements 
are  not  yet  in  place,  but  expected  to  be  fully  implemented  over  the  next  couple  of 
years. 

These measures are designed to contribute to policy objectives that are in place, or 
that will be put in place, irrespective of the adoption of proposals for the entry/exit 
system  and  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme.  The  precise  nature  of  these 
measures,  particularly  in  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  checks  that  will  be  made  on 
different  types  of  passengers  crossing  EU  borders,  are  critical  to  the  assessment  of 
the policy options.  

The most fundamental aspects of the status quo pertinent to this Impact Assessment 
are: 

•  In accordance with Article 7 of the Schengen Borders Code, all persons crossing 
the external border shall be subject to a "minimum check", both at entry and exit, 
consisting of the examination of the travel document so as to verify the identity of 
the  individual.  This  is  the  rule  for  EU  citizens  and  other  persons  enjoying  the 
Community  right  of  free  movement.  Third-country  nationals  must  be  subject,  at 
entry, to a "thorough check", which implies a check to determine their purpose of 
stay, whether they possess sufficient means of subsistence etc, as well as a search 
in the Schengen Information System and in national databases to verify that they 
are  not  a  threat  to  public  policy,  internal  security,  public  health  and  the 
international  relations  of  the  Schengen  States.  At  exit,  checks  may  be  less 
thorough, i.e. be limited to a verification of the travel document, but they may also 
entail checks in the SIS and national database(s); a check to see, if the person has 
overstayed and a verification that the person holds a valid visa, if this is required. 
Article 8 of the Schengen Borders Code states that border checks may be relaxed 
as result of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances leading to excessive waiting 
time.  When  border  checks  are  relaxed,  entry  checks  takes  priority  over  exit 
checks.  

EN 

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•  The  VIS  will  be  in  place  by  200932.  Given  a  minimum  two  year  worldwide  roll 
out period at consular posts all TCN requiring visas to travel to the Schengen area 
will  have  supplied  biometric  details  when  acquiring  a  visa  as  of  2011.  These 
biometric  and  other  data  will  be  held  in  the  central  VIS  database.  When  TCN 
holding  a  visa  cross  the  EU  external  borders  on  entry,33  and  optionally  on  exit 
also,  they  will  have  to  provide  their  biometric  information  for  verification.  Data 
will be compared with the visa record held in the VIS central data base so that the 
identity of the traveller can be automatically validated.  

•  The equipment required to carry out the biometric checks for TCN holding a visa 
will be available at all EU border crossing points. Mobile devices will be required 
as  part  of  the  VIS  implementation,  in  order  to  perform  biometric  checks.  These 
mobile devices are to be used for carrying out specific border checks, such as in 
trains and buses at the land border. 

•  The checks will be undertaken with a very high degree of reliability (in terms of 
the  identifications  being  correct)  and  at  very  high  speed.  It  is  estimated  that  the 
search with the fingerprints will take approximately 15-20 seconds and maximum 
of 5% of checks may be unreliable due to, for example, injuries. 

•  SIS  and  the  second  generation  system  that  will  replace  it  (SIS  II),  and  national 
databases are systematically checked as part of the visa application procedure and 
of the border checks at the external borders when TCN cross the border.  

The  following  measures  (legislative  instruments,  funding,  recommendations  and 
general measures) would be maintained in the status quo option:  

•  Directive  2002/90/EC  and  Framework  Decision  2002/946/JHA.  This  Directive 
and Framework Decision define the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence and sets a penal framework to prevent these phenomena. The Directive 
stipulates  that  Member  States  are  to  adopt  sanctions  on  "any  person  who,  for 
financial  gain,  intentionally  assists  a  person  who  is  not  a  national  of  a  Member 
State, to reside within the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the 
State concerned on the residence of aliens". However, the type of sanctions is not 
specified, i.e. sanctions are not harmonised34.  

•  Article 1 of the Framework Decision 2002/629 JHA on combating trafficking in 
human  beings.  This  Framework  Decision  provides  that  Member  States  are  to 
criminalise any form of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring and any 
other  treatment  of  a  person  for  the  purposes  of  labour  exploitation.  Article  3 
clarifies that these offences have associated penalties. 

32 
33 

34 

This is an assumption according to the current planning.  
The  Commission  has  presented  a  proposal  for  amending  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  so  that  the  VIS 
will  be  systematically  used  at  the  external  borders  during  entry  checks.  After  the  transitional  period 
search of the VIS will be mandatory by using the visa sticker number in combination with verification 
of fingerprints of the visa holder.  
In accordance with Article 3 “Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the 
infringements  referred  to  in  Articles  1  and  2  are  subject  to  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive 
sanctions”.  

EN 

22 

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•  The  Commission  has  elaborated  a  common  policy  on  the  return  of  illegally 
staying  TCN  in  the  2002  Return  Action  Programme.  This  was  followed  by  a 
directive  on the assistance in  case of transit for the purpose of removal by air35, 
and  a  directive  on  the  organisation  of  joint  flights  for  the  removals36.  The 
Commission has also proposed a directive37 on common standards and procedures 
in  Member  States  for  returning  illegally  staying  third  country  nationals.  The 
proposal, which is currently being discussed in the European Parliament and the 
Council, provides for common rules concerning returns, use of coercive measures, 
temporary custody and re-entry.  

•  Proposal  for  a  Directive  providing  for  sanctions  against  employers  of  illegal 
immigrants: One of the factors encouraging illegal immigration into the EU is the 
possibility  of  finding  work.  This  proposal  aims  to  reduce  that  pull  factor  by 
targeting  the  employment  of  third-country  nationals  who  are  illegally  staying  in 
the EU.38 

•  In  2007  the  Framework  Programme  Solidarity  and  Management  of  Migration 
Flows  for  the  period  2007-2013  was  launched.  This  Framework  Programme 
encompasses four new funds related to: (1) refugees; (2) external borders; (3) the 
integration of third-country nationals; and (4) return. 

•  Legislation  on  e-passports:  All  new  passports  issued  since  June  2006  contain 
biometrics  (i.e.  a  digital photo),  and all new  EU passports and travel documents 
issued from autumn 2009 at the latest will include two biometric identifiers (i.e. a 
digital  photo  and  fingerprints  placed  on  the  contact  less  chip)39.  Given  that 
passports are valid for up to ten years, all European citizens holding passports will 
have both biometrics in their passport by 2019 at the latest. The implementation of 
electronic 
identity 
travel  documents  allows  for  stronger  document  and 
verification,  as  well  as  automating  procedures  that  are  currently  manual  such  as 
the  introduction  of  automated  border  control  systems  at  EU  external  border 
crossings  for  EU  citizens.  Technological  advances  have  made  automation  of 
border  control  processes  more  feasible  and  less  expensive.  Automation  in  this 
context  can  also  bring  added  value  to  the  whole  system  by  enabling  a  more 
efficient use of border control resources.  

•  Member  States  are  transposing  the  Council  Directive  (EC)  No  71/2005  on  a 
specific  procedure  for  admitting  TCN  for  the  purposes  of  scientific  research, 
which  will  facilitate  and  speed  up  their  entry  and  residence  permit  procedures. 
TCN researchers would have the possibility to work in other Member States for a 
period  of  up  to  three  months  on  the  basis  of  the  residence  permit  delivered  by 
another Member State; no work permit would be needed any more. 

35 
36 
37 
38 
39 

Council Directive 110, 23.11.2003. 
Council Directive 573, 29.4.2004. 
COM(2005) 391, 1.9.2005. 
COM(2007) 249. 
Council Regulation 2252, 13.12.2004. 

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The following measures included in the Council Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 
2006  are  in  preparation  and  it  is  assumed  that  they  will  be  put  in  place  under  the 
status quo policy option:  

•  Improved  management  of 

the  continuous 
implementation  of  the  integrated  border  management  strategy  adopted  by  the 
Council in 2006.  

the  EU  external  borders  via 

•  Improved coordination and cooperation between countries of origin and countries 

of transit.  

•  Moves  towards  common  visa  offices  that  may  increase  efficiencies  in  the  visa 

issuing process.  

4.2. 

Option 2: Entry/exit System 

This  policy  option  would  involve  the  recording  of  the  time  and  place  of  entry  and 
exit  of  TCN  crossing  the  EU  external  border.  Improved  information  would  be 
generated on the cross border flows of TCN.  Such information could, for example, 
be used operationally to detect and or review the movements of overstayers. The data 
would also be useful in planning the use of border control resources and in migration 
management. 

As  stated  earlier,  the  question  of  setting  up  an  automated  entry/exit  system  at  the 
external  borders  of  the  EU  was  addressed  in  the  framework  for  the  Impact 
Assessment  for  the  setting  up  the  VIS.  In  that context, the view  was taken that  the 
entry/exit  system  would  have  been  too  costly  and  disproportionate40  based  on  the 
status quo at the time. However, the technical feasibility of an entry/exit system has 
in the meantime improved due the development of the VIS and it is therefore timely 
to reassess the option more thoroughly.  

There would be significant differences in the implications for applying an entry/exit 
system only to TCN requiring a visa and other TCN to enter the EU. In particular the 
latter group of passengers would need to be enrolled biometrically while the former 
are enrolled  already  under the VIS. Hence two  sub  options  have  been  defined:  one 
relating  to  TCN  requiring  a  visa  and  one  related  to  those  not  submitted  to  the  visa 
obligation wishing to visit the EU.  

Based  on  the  Schengen  Borders  Code,  as  a  general  rule,  persons  travelling  in 
vehicles  may  remain  inside  them  during  checks.  However,  if  circumstances  so 
require, persons may be requested to step out of their vehicles. Therefore one of the 
specificities  of  land  borders  and  ferry  traffic  at  sea  ports  concern  the  fact  that  it 
should be possible to perform border checks using devices that allow border guards 
to identify/verify travellers, when they are in a car or a bus. Concerning trains, the 
Schengen  Borders  Code  specifies  that  border  checks  are  carried  out  either  on  the 
platform in the first station of arrival or departure on the territory of a Member State; 
or on-board the train, during transit. 

40 

SEC(2004) 1628, 28.12.2004. 

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24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  minimum  set  of  information  that  is  required  to  describe  an  entry/exit  event, 
suitable  for  storage  in  a  database,  contain:  Border  crossing  point  of  entry  and  exit; 
date  and  time  of  event;  travel  document(s)  type,  number  and  issuing  country; 
traveller’s personal details extracted directly from the travel credential; further details 
depending  on  the  specific  border  type,  traveller  category  and  means  of  travel.  The 
entry/exit  system  that  would  be  established  should  include  the  following  solution 
components:  Data  store  for  entry  and  exit  data,  service  to  create  an  entry  record, 
service  to  create  an  exit  record,  service  to  track  and  calculate  the  time  spent  in  the 
area, service to retrieve overstayer information, service to transmit alert information, 
service  allowing  updates  to  length  of  stay  data  and  administration  service  (i.e.  an 
automated  housekeeping  procedure  which  cleans  up  aged  records  according  to  the 
retention times). 

The essential components of the entry/exit system are: 

•  There would be a system for recording the point and date of entry and of exit of 
TCN travellers at all EU external border (Schengen) crossing points. It is assumed 
that the information would be held in a database for an agreed retention period. 

•  Verification  would  be  carried  out  at  the  external  borders  in  accordance  with  the 

VIS Regulation and the Schengen Borders Code. 

•  The definition of who is identified as an overstayer, who is exempted under which 
circumstances  and  what  might  constitute  an  appropriate  sanction  should 
preferably  be  consistent  at  EU  level.  The  definitions  and  sanctions  would  not 
necessarily  be  harmonised  but  there  should  not  be  marked  variations  between 
countries.  

•  The system would identify and provide information to the responsible authorities 
of  those  who  had  entered  the  EU  but  (apparently)  not  left  before  the  expiry  of 
their right to stay.  

•  The system would include the facility to amend the date of the exit deadline in the 

light of the actual date of entry. 

•  The  system  would  take  account  of  TCN  being  forced  to  extend  their  stay  in  the 
EU  (e.g.  should  a  national  visa  be  granted  due  to  flight  cancellation,  illness  or 
other  humanitarian  reasons),  or  if  a  new  entitlement  to  stay  such  as  a  long-term 
residence permit is issued. 

With the help of information provided by an entry/exit system, it would be possible 
to  impose  a  sanction  on  TCN  who  has  not  complied  with  the  existing  rules. 
However,  sanctions  will  not  be  examined  in  this  Impact  Assessment  and  the 
feasibility of introducing such sanctions at European level will not form part of the 
Communication.  Dealing  with  the  sanctions  and  potential  harmonisation  of  the 
sanctions would require a separate initiative where the sanctions should be reviewed 
within  the  context  of  an  extensive  and  comprehensive  migration  policy,  not  only 
from the perspective of a border check or of the entry/exit system.  

Within  their  national  legislation,  the  Member  States  have  an  opportunity  to  issue 
sanctions  on  persons  who  have  exceeded  their  legal  time  of  residence  in  the 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
Schengen  area.  The  Member  States  have  made  use  of  this  option  and  issued 
sanctions, including fines.  

Various issues and measures may and will function as a sanction. Member States are 
responsible for issuing visas and the visa procedures belong under their competence. 
The  visa  administration  officers  could  exploit  the  information  on  overstayers  when 
handling  the  new  visa  application  form  of  a  previous  overstayer.  In  the  future,  this 
information could be available in the entry/exit system. 

If a TCN is found to be illegally staying within the area of the EU, the proposal for a 
Directive  on  common  standards  and  procedures  in  Member  States  for  returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals41, currently under discussion in the Council 
and  the  European  Parliament,  foresees  the  introduction  of  “a  re-entry  ban”,  which 
prevents a re-entry of an illegally staying TCN into the territory of all the Member 
States. The re-entry ban would accompany removal orders for illegally staying TCN. 
The  length  of  the  re-entry  ban  will  be  determined  with  due  consideration  to  all 
relevant circumstances of each case. Normally, the re-entry ban should not exceed 5 
years. It is the responsibility of a Member State to remove an illegally staying TCN 
from the area of the EU as soon as possible.  

The  Directive  2001/40/EC  on  mutual  recognition  of  decisions  on  the  expulsion  of 
third-country  nationals  in  combination  with  Council  Decision  2004/191/EC  setting 
out  the  criteria  and  practical  arrangements  for  the  compensation  of  the  financial 
imbalances  provides  for  a  legal  framework  for  mutual  recognition  of  expulsion 
decisions. See also status quo (4.1.) 

It  should  be  noted  that  a  coherent  and  proportionate  approach  at  EU  level  to 
sanctions could extend the impact of the entry/exit system, reinforcing the deterrent 
to  overstay  while  ensuring  that  sanctions  could  be  imposed  in  practice.  In  the  long 
term  a  coherent  approach  would  provide  the  ground  for  adequate  and  similar 
treatment of illegally staying TCN, regardless of the Member State which carries out 
the sanction. Mere awareness of the existence of a sanction can be considered as a 
threat  strong  enough  for  a  person  who  has  intentions  to  overstay  in  the  Schengen 
area. Therefore, it can be presumed that the sanctions could significantly decrease the 
amount of overstayers.  

In further consideration of this issue there are also a number of risks that would need 
to  be  taken  into  account.  Due  to  a  system  error  a  sanction  could  be  imposed  on  a 
person to whom the sanction should not be imposed. Therefore, a person has to have 
the right to appeal against the sanction and prior to imposing any sanction, it should 
be  carefully  examined  and  ensured  that  the  person  really  is  an  overstayer.  Another 
risk is that some third countries may interpret the sanction as discriminating to their 
citizens and aim to apply a similar kind of system in their own country without the 
real possibility of ensuring that the sanction is justified (= that it really is possible to 
verify  the  time  resided  in  the  country).  Yet  another  risk  is  the  extension  of  the 
duration of overstaying, since the overstayers already are well aware of the fact that 
there will be a sanction imposed on them. Sanctions might also entice the overstayers 

41 

COM(2005) 391, 1.9.2005. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
                                                 
to use illegal routes and/or means in order to leave the EU. An appropriate degree of 
proportionality would need to be found to limit any such effects.  

The entry/exit system should be based on the same technology as the VIS system. In 
practice the border check procedure at the border crossing point will remain almost 
the same, therefore there will most likely not be a need for extensive training or other 
demands  on  border  guards  when  using  the  entry/exit  system.  Once  the  VIS  is  in 
place,  the  border  guards  will  already  have  enough  experience  in  capturing  and 
storing fingerprints, so there should be no further requirements from this perspective, 
either.  The  only  major  change  would  probably  be  related  to  the  need  for  enrolling 
and  storing  fingerprints  at  the  border  crossing  points  as  regards  the  TCN  not 
requiring a visa. 

It is worth noting that when registering entries and exits at the external borders, the 
TCN to be registered should not be categorised on the basis of the purpose for entry, 
but  the  registering  should  take  place  by  following  the  same  principles  on  every 
traveller. Registering should be part of the border check process and one important 
aim of it should be to monitor the compliance  with the  duration  of stay in the EU. 
However, various authorities may, according to an agreed legal framework and when 
necessary,  access  and  use  the  information  on  the  different  target  groups  that  is 
available in the database. 

Sub Option 2a: Entry/exit for TCN requiring visas 

In  this  sub  option  the  entry/exit  system  would  apply  to  TCN  holding  a  visa.  Visas 
confer only limited rights to stay and work in the EU and hence TCN holding a visa 
could become overstayers. In terms of scope only holders of a short-term Schengen 
visa should be covered (excluding therefore holders of local border permits, holders 
of  national  long  stay  visas  as  they  are  not  covered  by  the  VIS,  and  holders  of 
residence permits). 

Since  biometric  identifiers  have  been  captured  already  when  issuing  a  visa,  no 
specific enrolment would be needed. The biometric identifiers of the TCN requiring 
a visa could be used as such in the entry/exit system, exploiting the already existing 
VIS system. No increases in visa fees would occur. 

The Commission would be responsible for acquisition and maintenance of the central 
database which for this category could be the central system of the VIS or a separate 
system. Member States would be responsible for arranging the required connections 
and equipment (including the fingerprint readers etc.) to all external border crossing 
points.  In  relation  to  the  VIS,  the  required  actions  and  investments  are  in  practice 
already on the way both by the Commission and by the Member States. Furthermore, 
the  Commission  is  responsible  for  the  necessary  amendments  of  the  current 
legislation such as the VIS Regulation and the Schengen Borders Code. 

Sub Option 2b: Entry/exit for TCN not requiring visas 

In this sub option the entry/exit system would apply to TCN not requiring visas. TCN 
not  requiring  visas  are  subject  to  limited  rights  to  reside  and  work  in  the  EU  and 
could  hence  become  overstayers.  If  biometric  verification  is  used  at  the  borders, 
TCN not requiring visas would have to be enrolled at the point of entry to the EU or, 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
for  example,  at  Member  State  consulates  and  would  provide  biometric  information 
equivalent  to  that  provided  by  TCN  holding  a  visa.  This  would  ensure  that  the 
recording of their entry and exit information could be verified in the same manner as 
TCN  holding  a  visa.  No  charge  would  be  made  for  enrolment  as  this  enrolment 
would be a condition of entry to the EU.  

If biometrics would not be used in the entry/exit system, the machine readable zone 
of  the  passport  may  be  used  to  save  a  traveller´s  entry/exit  information  into  the 
database.  Queries  concerning  TCN  are  already  being  made  in  the  SIS  and  in  the 
national data bases at the time of the entry. Therefore, recording entry/exit time and 
place  data  could  be  integrated  into  these  checks.  However,  it  is  clear  that  much 
improved  reliability  on  a  traveller´s  identity  can  be  achieved  with  the  use  of 
biometrics.  This  would  be  beneficial  when  comparing  the  identity  of  a  person 
entering and exiting the Schengen area. This, in turn, has an impact on several facts, 
such as reliability of information, possibility of a sanction etc. To register entries and 
exits of TCN without biometric identifiers is faster and requires less investment, but 
it is also less reliable. 

With third countries starting to issue passports with biometric identifiers, it could be 
possible  to  begin  saving  data  of  biometric  identifiers  of  the  passports  of  the  TCN 
both into the entry/exit system and into a voluntary Registered Traveller Programme. 
Naturally,  this  would  require  a  permission  from  the  third  country  in  question  to 
deploy the biometric identifiers as well as the cryptographic key with which to read 
and "open" the biometric identifiers. At the moment also a traveller´s permission is 
required when re-saving the biometric identifiers contained in a national passport, for 
example, in a Registered Traveller Programme. 

The Commission would be responsible for acquisition and maintenance of the central 
database,  as  there  would  be  a  need  for  a  separate  database.  This  same  central 
database could be used also for the Registered Traveller Programme (options 3a, 3b, 
3c)  and  for  sub  option  2a.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  arranging  the 
required connections and equipment (including the fingerprint readers) to all external 
border  crossing  points.  Due  to  the  roll-out  of  the  VIS  the  relevant  investments  by 
Member  States  as  concerns  border  crossing  points  are  already  on  track.  Additional 
investments may be needed for the purpose of enrolment and storage of fingerprints 
of  this  category.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  would  be  responsible  for  the 
necessary amendments of the current legislation such as the VIS Regulation and the 
Schengen Borders Code. 

Key differences with the Status Quo of Policy Option 2 

The key differences with the status quo are: there would be a systematic register and 
recording  of  the  time  and  point  of  entry/exit  of  TCN;  there  would  be  an  increased 
probability of being sanctioned for overstaying, including within the Schengen area 
for  non  visa  holders,  if  biometrics  are  used;  and  improved  information  would  be 
generated on the cross border flows of TCN. 

4.3. 

Option 3: Measures for facilitating cross border flows 

This  policy  option  could  take  several  forms,  and  be  applied  to  different  categories 
and apply different eligibility criteria. The aim of the policy option is both to shorten 

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28 

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the  existing  waiting  time  and  mitigate  the  effect  of  the  entry/exit  system  on  the 
border  crossing  times  at  the  external  border.  Three  sub  policy  options  have  been 
chosen so that the Impact Assessment process can assess the implications of the main 
differences  that  could  apply.  The  sub  policy  option  of  a  Registered  Traveller 
Programme for TCN would be, in part, a response to the additional constraints and 
implications  for  cross  border  travel  that  the  entry/exit  system  could  impose.  The 
assessment  of  the  two  sub  policy  options  relating  to  EU  citizens  illustrates  the 
differences  in  approach  between  establishing  a  single  EU  wide  system  and 
establishing minimum standards for the development of a number of systems tailored 
to  the  needs  of  particular  border  crossings  and  groups  of  EU  travellers  (e.g.  both 
Registered  Traveller  Schemes  and  Automated  Border  Control).  Technically,  the 
same  Automated  Border  Control  facilities could be used by TCN participating in a 
Registered Traveller Programme and by EU citizens.  

The essential components of this policy option that have been considered are: 

•  Travellers,  potentially  including  both  EU  citizens  without  e-passport  and  TCN, 

would be able to register for the programme on a voluntary basis.  

•  Criteria  and  administrative  procedures  would  be  put  in  place  to  enrol  a  TCN 
applicant.  EU  citizens  would  be  automatically  included  and  would  only  need  to 
enrol  if  they  do not  hold an  e-passport and choose to participate in a Registered 
Traveller Schemes (only option 3c). 

•  Applicants  would  provide  biometric  details42.  The  biometrics  taken  could  be 
similar  to  those  that  will  be  required  for  e-passports  (i.e.  two  fingerprints  and  a 
digitised facial image) or ten flat fingerprints as recorded on the VIS43.  

•  The biometric information would be held on a special token or on their e- passport 
or on a separate database identifying them as a member of a Registered Traveller 
Programme.  

•  Separate  channels  would  be  put  in  place  at  EU  external  border  crossing  points 

with automated lanes for those eligible to use them.  

•  TCNs  entries  and  exits  would  automatically  be  recorded  by  the  system.  The 

movements of EU citizens would not be recorded.  

•  For  Automated  Border  Control  e-passports  could  be  used  to  verify  EU  citizens’ 

identity and perform random checks within defined limits.  

Sub option 3a: A Registered Traveller Programme available to TCN 

42 

43 

In  accordance  with  the  Study  on  Automated  Biometric  Border  Crossing  Systems  for  Registered 
Passengers  at  European  Airports  made  by  Frontex:  "Although  biometrics  is  an  important  part  of  the 
whole concept and many questions were raised before such border crossing systems came to practise, it 
turns  out  that  biometrics  is  the  least  problematic  component  at  the  end".  See  also  Facilitation  of 
Aviation Security: Feasibility study of "Registered Passenger" Concept.  
The US –Visit experience of enrolling two fingerprints and the facial image at the borders shows that 
less than two minutes are necessary. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
                                                 
A separate sub option for TCN was assessed, because border control procedures for 
this  group  take  more  time  compared  to  EU  citizens,  as  TCN  must  be  subject  to 
thorough checks at entry. 

In  this  sub  option,  TCN  wishing  to  travel  to  the  EU  would  be  able  to  apply  to 
become  members  of  a  Registered  Traveller  Programme.  Awarding  the  status  of 
Registered  Traveller  and  providing  for  automated  checks  for  those  persons  will 
require  that  the  verification  of  certain  entry  conditions  at  the  border  is  waived 
(purpose  of  stay,  means  of  subsistence,  and  absence  of  threat  to  public  order).  The 
criteria for awarding such a status should as a minimum include a solid travel history 
(no  previous  overstays;  data  to  this  effect  can  be  retrieved  from  the  entry/exit 
system),  no  threat  to  public  order,  proof  of  sufficient  means  of  subsistence,  and 
holding a biometric passport. 

TCN  granted  multiple-entry  visas  could  be  granted  Registered  Traveller  Status 
automatically. Vetting, which could take place at visa consulates or, for travellers not 
requiring  visas,  at  the  point  of  entry  to  the  EU,  would  need  to  be  periodically 
updated. Searches would be made of relevant databases, national as well as European 
(e.g. SIS II). Biometric data captured could be the same as for the VIS. Some border 
crossing  points  could  introduce  separate  channels  and,  maybe,  additional  facilities 
such  as  parking  places  for  registered  travellers,  particularly  those  where  delays  to 
TCN are severe. A fee could be charged for programme participants. However, the 
cost savings gained through reductions in the supervision of the separate channels by 
border guards could provide a case for not making a charge.  

It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  numbers  of  TCN  that  would  chose  to  apply  and  be 
accepted  on  such  a  Registered  Traveller  Programme.  Demand  would  depend  upon 
the fees charged, the stringency of vetting, the time taken to process application and 
the difficulties faced in otherwise crossing borders. Eligibility criteria could limit the 
numbers deemed suitable. For example, the Programme could be limited to business 
travellers with strong verifiable connections to businesses in the EU. There are in the 
order  of  11.5  million  Schengen  visas  issued  each  year.  It  is  estimated  that  around 
20%  of  applications  are  for  multiple-entry  visas,  which  would  entail  around  2.3 
million  TCN  among  visa  holders  being  awarded  Registered  Traveller  Status. 
Considering  the  needs  of  business  and  economical  cooperation  including  constant 
international travel, the demand should, at least, be similar among non visa holders. 

The Commission would be responsible for acquisition and maintenance of a central 
database.  This  could  be  the  centralised  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller 
Programme  database.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  the  acquisition  and 
maintenance  of  other  components  of  the  system  (e.g.  equipment  to  store  the 
biometric identifiers, potential (semi-)automated border checks, separate lanes etc) as 
well  any  equipment  /  staff  needed  for  enrolment  of  registered  travellers  as  such. 
Furthermore, the Commission would be responsible for the possible amendments of 
the current legislation such as the Schengen Borders Code. 

Sub option 3b: A harmonised Registered Traveller Programme available to EU 
citizens 

In this sub option Member States would be obliged to introduce the required systems 
for the Registered Travellers at all external border crossing points.  

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
The  systems  would  be  harmonised  at  EU  level  to  be  identical  including  the  use  of 
biometric identifiers (one or two identifiers), technical compatibility, vetting criteria 
etc.  All  EU  citizens  (also  those  without  an  e-passport)  would  be  able  to  apply  to 
become  a  member  of  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme,  but  facilitated  border 
control  procedures  would  be  available  only  for  those  citizens  meeting  the  vetting 
criteria separately set at EU level. The vetting criteria could take into consideration, 
for  example,  the  need  for  frequent  crossings  of  the  external  border;  important 
business relations etc. Controlling the fulfilment of the vetting criteria would demand 
separate pre-screenings going beyond minimum checks as laid down in the Schengen 
Borders Code.  

Vetting  would  take  place  at  border  crossing  points.  The  Registered  Traveller 
Programme would not require biometric information over and above that which will 
be  required  for  e-passports.  The  EU  citizens  without  e-passport  could  be  issued  a 
specific  token  on  which  the  biometric  identifiers  would  be  stored.  Use  would  be 
made  of  biometric  identity  verification,  but  random  checks  could  still  be  made. 
Membership  of  the  Programme  would  enable  Registered  Travellers  to  use  special 
channels at all EU crossing points. No fees would be charged. 

It is difficult to estimate the numbers of EU citizens that would chose to apply and be 
accepted in such a Registered Traveller Programme. Demand would depend upon the 
stringency of vetting, the time taken to process application and the difficulties faced 
in otherwise crossing EU external borders. Around 80 million trips are made by EU 
citizens outside of the EU. It is reasonable to assume there are at least several million 
regular EU travellers who would wish to become members of such a Programme.  

The Commission would be responsible for acquisition and maintenance of a central 
database.  This  could  be  the  centralised  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller 
Programme  database.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  the  acquisition  and 
maintenance of other components of the system at all external border crossing points 
(e.g. equipment to store the biometric identifiers, potential automated border checks, 
separate  lanes  etc).  Furthermore,  the  Commission  would  be  responsible  for  laying 
down rules regarding eligibility, vetting and technical compatibility. 

Sub  option  3c:  Minimum  standards  are  established  for  Registered  Traveller 
schemes and Automated Border Control system for EU citizens 

In  this  sub  option  a  number  and  range  of  different  schemes  would  be  developed  at 
national  level  in  response  to  demand  and  in  order  to  improve  the  management  of 
passenger flows44. Member States would decide at which border crossing points they 
would like to set up the required systems. EU citizens holding e-passports would be 
able to benefit from Automated Border Control at all border crossing points in which 
the  facility  is  available  without  having  to  register  or  enrol  in  advance.  E-passports 
would be used to automatically verify EU citizens’ identity. If a EU citizen does not 
have  an  e-passport,  s/he  could  be  nationally  issued  a  specific  token  on  which  the 
biometric identifiers would be stored or the traveller could be asked to obtain an e-

44 

See  also  Facilitation  of  Aviation  Security:  Feasibility  study  of  "Registered  Passenger"  Concept.  The 
study came to the conclusions that the Registered Passenger scheme is best suited for large hub airports 
with high volumes of passengers and possibly some regional airports with a high percentage of frequent 
fliers, but not suited for all kind of airports.  

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
                                                 
passport.  No  pre-screening  would  apply.  Minimum  standards  would  be  established 
and  applied  to  parameters  such  as:  the  use  of  the  biometric  identifiers  (one  or  two 
identifiers),  random  checks;  technical  compatibility;  data  protection;  and  possibly 
pricing  policies.  The  standards  would  need  to  be  reviewed  in  the  light  of  best 
practices and technological developments.  

In  order  to  compensate  for  ever-increasing  queues  at  borders  corresponding  to  an 
increase  of  travellers,  including  EU  citizens,  an  automated  system  would  offer  EU 
citizens a more efficient service especially at busy border crossing points, and at the 
same time enable a more efficient use of border control resources.  

There would be no need for a central database. Member States would be responsible 
for  the  acquisition  and  maintenance  of  the  system  (e.g.  potential  automated  border 
checks  equipment,  separate  lanes  etc).  Furthermore,  the  Commission  would  be 
responsible  for  minimum  standards  of  the  systems.  However,  each  Member  State 
could decide the border crossing points where the system will be used. 

Key differences with status quo of policy option 3 

For  sub  option  3a  the  key  differences  with  the  status  quo  would  be  that  border 
crossings would need to be modified for two classes of TCN traveller, those on the 
programme and others; additional vetting of TCN in advance of travelling would be 
required.  

For sub option 3b the key differences with the status quo would be the provision for 
EU  travellers  to  use  separate  channels  at  border  crossings  through  being  part  of  a 
programme.  Registered  Traveller  Programme  facilities  are  introduced  at  all  border 
crossing points. 

For sub option 3c the key difference with the status quo would be the assurance that 
all  registered  traveller  schemes  and  Automated  Border  Controls  in  the  EU  met 
minimum  technical  and  performance  standards.  Member  States  can  identify  the 
border crossing points where such facilities should be installed. EU citizens holding 
e-passports  would  be  able  to  benefit  from  the  facility  without  having  to  register  or 
enrol in advance. 

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

This section considers each of the policy options and sub policy options described in 
Section  4  against  the  criteria  deriving  from  the  policy  objectives  and  the  wider 
considerations of the Impact Assessment introduced in Section 3. The policy options 
have  been  assessed  on  a  six  point  scale  with  respect  to  their  likely  performance 
relative to the general objectives. The baseline situation against which the ratings are 
made assumes the successful implementation of the status quo e.g. the VIS is used at 
the external borders. In other words, the policy options 2 and 3 have been assessed 
against  a  status  quo  option  which  foresees  dynamic  development  of  the  current 
situation, whereas the status quo policy option has been assessed against the current 
situation. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
Each policy option has also been assessed relative to a common set of criteria. These 
criteria  derive  from  the  general  economic,  social  and  environmental  criteria  and 
wider  considerations  applied  in  Impact  Assessments.  The  link  between  the  other 
relevant criteria and policy options was created so that whenever possible, the other 
relevant criteria were comprised in the assessment of the objectives. In practice, this 
means  that  the  assessments  of  the  other  relevant  criteria  were  used  when  weighing 
the objectives. 

The other relevant criteria are: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizen travellers.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide TCN travellers.  

•  Social and economic repercussions on the EU. 

•  Social and economic repercussions on third countries. 

•  Environmental impacts.  

•  Impacts on fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection.  

•  Net costs of implementation.  

•  Need for changes in Community legislation.  

•  Necessary pre conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts.  

•  Key risks of technical feasibility45. 

The relative merits of the policy options are then considered and the preferred option 
identified. 

The impacts have graphically been indicated with symbols: 

 - 

0 

√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

Negative impact 

No impact 

Small impact 

Medium impact 

Very significant impact 

√√√√ 

Exorbitant impact 

45 

To be presented in a separate Commission staff working paper on technical options in the beginning of 
2008. 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
                                                 
It  must  be  stated  that  with  the  Impact  Assessment  it  was  noted  that  it  is  extremely 
difficult to estimate the impact of the entry/exit system and the Registered Traveller 
Programme in practice on the number of border guards and on the travellers´ waiting 
time as these depend almost entirely on the individual border crossing point and the 
fact if the Registered Traveller Programme or Automated Border Control system is 
used at that specific border crossing point or not. It should also be borne in mind that 
in  practise  the  organisation  and  tasks  of  national  border  guard  authorities  differ 
widely between Member States, 

There are huge differences between the traveller profiles at different border crossing 
points at the external border (for example, the number of TCN vs. EU citizens differs 
greatly). In the case of TCN the main factor is whether the traveller requires a visa or 
not.  Also  the  current  capacity  to  manage  (infrastructure,  data  transmission  system, 
customs  and  security  checks  etc.)  the  passenger  flows  at  the  border  crossing  point 
has  a  huge  effect  on  the  travellers´  waiting  time  and  also  border  guard  resources 
needed.  As  a  result  of  the  above  factors,  precise  estimates  of  the  impact  of  each 
option  on  border  crossing  times  and  the  need  for  human  resources  could  only  be 
done based on a detailed analysis of the current situtation at each and every border 
crossing point of the Schengen area. 

5.1. 

Option 1: Status Quo 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √√ 

Improved identity checks through the use of biometrics at entry and possible exit of 
the  EU  will  deter  the  use  of  false  or  forged  identity  documents  to  enter  the  EU 
illegally.  The  provisions  of  the  VIS  and  harmonised  employer  sanctions  are 
anticipated  to  reduce  illegal  immigration.  The  identity  of  overstayers  issued  with  a 
visa who are apprehended can be more readily validated as they would have provided 
biometric  and  other  information  under  the  VIS.  Problems  of  overstaying  will 
continue. 

•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: - 

Possible  deterioration  for  TCN  requiring  visas.  In  practice  there  could  be 
deterioration  in  cross  border  travel  by  TCN  requiring  visas  as  waiting  times  may 
increase due to biometric checks being undertaken.  

However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  use  of  the  VIS  at  external  borders  should  not 
significantly prolong the duration of border checks. For example, in connection with 
the  Biodev  Study,  it  became  evident  that  verifying  biometric  identifiers  will  take 
approximately 10-20 seconds.  

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: √  

The identity checks at borders should be improved through the use of biometrics for 
TCN  requiring  visas.  These  checks  could  help  identifying  those  persons  who  have 
committed offences. Identity checks within the EU would also be possible for TCN 
requiring visas. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): √ 

The improvements anticipated in controlling illegal immigration through the VIS and 
the harmonisation of employer sanctions may increase the confidence to grant visa to 
temporary  migrants.  The  VIS  is  however  not  designed  as  a  system  to  manage 
economic migration. 

In this Impact Assessment the management of economic migration has mainly been 
considered  from  the  perspective  of  work-related  legal  migration.  However,  during 
the border checks the travellers are not generally categorised from one another, but 
the  border  checks  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  Schengen  Borders  Code, 
whether  the  illegal  entry  is  attempted  by  a  person  aiming  to  work  in  the  EU  or 
travelling  as  a  tourist,  irrespective  of  the  person´s  sex,  race  or  age.  In  the  case  of 
minors,  however,  the  best  interests  of  the  child  must  always  be  considered  in 
accordance with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 

Other  relevant  criteria  have  already  been  identified  in  the  Impact  Assessment  for 
setting up the VIS. 

5.2. 

Option 2: Entry/exit System 

Assessment of sub policy option 2a entry/exit system for TCN requiring visas 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √√ 

Legal  entry  into  EU  and  subsequent  overstaying  by  TCN  holding  a  visa  would  be 
discouraged  through  the  increased  probability  that  overstayers  would  be  identified 
and  sanctions  would  be  applied  as  necessary.  Most  overstayers  originate  from  the 
countries where visas to visit the EU are required. 

Information  on  a  group  of  illegal  immigrants,  i.e.  overstayers  would  improve  (on 
TCN holding a visa). The entry/exit system would allow generating data to analyse 
profiles  and  patterns  of  overstaying  and  provide  timely  and  reliable  information  on 
the identity and incidence of those entering the EU legally and overstaying their right 
to stay. This would allow border control resources to focus more on the detection of 
overstayers and illegal border crossings, and it would also contribute to maintaining 
internal security. Furthermore this would facilitate the apprehension and removals of 
illegal immigrants and enabling proper measures to be taken in order to review their 
status  in  the  territory  of  the  Member  States  and  thus  reducing  the  negative 
implications.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  locating  overstayers  and 
mobilising the capacity for apprehending and returning them. 

The simple presence of an effective entry/exit system would help to deter would-be 
over-stayers  and  criminals.  This  opportunity  results  from  the  psychological  effect 
associated with the presence of a system that would track in a consistent, permanent 
and seemingly infallible way the flow of TCN in and out of the Schengen area. 

•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: √ 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
Having  a  reliable  record  of  the  travel  history  of  TCN  holding  a  visa  could  help  to 
identify and facilitate bona fide travellers. The entry/exit system would contribute to 
a  risk-assessment.  As  this  group  would  already  provide  biometrics  at  each  entry 
under the VIS, no additional negative input should result from the entry/exit system. 
A register could give rise to changes in the visa policy, in the sense that citizens of 
certain countries would no longer require visas. 

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: 0/√ 

The  entry/exit  system  would  provide  travel  histories  of  passengers  including  those 
that  are  considered  suspects  and  thus  complementing  the  information  in  the  SIS  II. 
Such data on the movements of terrorists and serious criminal suspects could be of 
value in locating them and in subsequent prosecutions.  

It is worth noting that in the case of the TCN searches are already being made using 
the SIS system and national databases. In that respect, the entry/exit system does not 
bring any new dimension to the prevention of terrorism.  

EU citizens entries and exits would not be registered. Therefore, it would be difficult 
to identify those EU citizens who have connections to terrorism or serious crime. 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): √√ 

The  system  could  provide  for  a  tool  for  the  management  of  an  EU  level  seasonal 
workers scheme, for instance in that it could be used as a register for such workers 
and  would  allow  to  verify  whether  seasonal  workers  have  complied  with  their 
obligation  to  return  after  the  end  of  the  contract  and  are  thus  allowed  to  re-enter. 
Also, the entry/exit system might have the potential to reduce illegal immigration due 
to  overstaying  and  indirectly  increase  confidence  that  migration  policies  could  be 
adjusted  in  light  of  supply  and  demand.  To  this  end,  the  system  could  improve 
confidence  to  grant  visas  and  work  permits  to  temporary  migrants  due  to  the 
incentive to not overstay. Thus an entry/exit system would allow for the management 
of the common immigration policy and the efficient management of an EU migration 
instrument.  Initiatives  concerning  border  controls  tend  to  make  an  indirect  rather 
than direct contribution to the management of economic migration.  

It is likely that (Member States´) quotas for the admission of seasonal workers would 
be  agreed  with  third  countries,  as  a  component  of  future  EU  mobility  partnerships. 
The  system  would  allow  verifying  whether  the  agreed  quota  is  filled  and  whether 
return has taken place at the end of the agreed term. 

In  the  absence  of  a  centralised  system  it  is  difficult  to  assess  (at  least  for  Member 
States not having a national database) whether the amount of TCN admitted matches 
with the labour market needs. 

It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  impacts  of  the  entry/exit  system  with  respect  to 
numbers/spread  of  economic  migration  between  Member  States.  Numbers  of 
economic  migrants  admitted  depend,  and  will  continue  to  depend,  on  the  needs  of 
Member States labour markets and not on the system for management, be it national 
or at EU level. The aim is not to increase/decrease the numbers of seasonal workers 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
admitted, but to provide for flexible rules on the admission of such workers that can 
be managed efficiently. A separate Impact Assessment on the upcoming proposal for 
a Directive on criteria for admission of seasonal workers was launched in December 
2007. 

Other relevant criteria: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes 

Benefits  would  accrue  whether  or  not  there  are  adjustments  in  migration  and  visa 
policy. 

•  Social  and  economic  repercussions  on  the  EU  (including  impacts  on  enterprise, 

governments, NGOs etc.) 

Enterprises applying for visas for seasonal workers may be helped, if the sub policy 
option  improves  confidence  in  granting  visas  to  temporary  migrants  and/or 
enterprises  can  demonstrate  a  record  of  employees  complying  with  visa 
requirements. 

•  Social and economic repercussions on third countries 

The  repercussions  would  depend  on  the  changes  of  visa  policy.  Some  potential 
negative  effects  for  third  countries  would  occur  if  remittances  relating  to  illegal 
economic migration are reduced.  

•  Impacts on fundamental rights: particularly privacy, data protection, presumption 

of innocence, fair trial, etc. 

Potential significant impacts on data protection and protection of privacy as data on 
cross-border  movements  of  TCN  would  be  recorded  and  retained.  System  fallback 
procedures and the control of error rates would be critical as the consequences for the 
individual wrongly identified as an overstayer (e.g. missed flight, accident) could be 
severe. The scope of access to data should be limited to border control and migration 
authorities  and  duly  authorised  law  enforcement  authorities  (as  under  the  VIS 
Regulation).  Data  of  TCN  becoming  EU  citizens  or  their  family  members  would 
need to be deleted. 

The entry/exit system should follow the requirements set for the VIS system as to the 
privacy, data protection and fundamental rights of the travellers. 

•  Environmental impacts 

No effects. 

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizens travellers 

No effects. 

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide TCN travellers 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
The  sub  policy  option  would  be  able  to  confirm  that  TCN  holding  a  visa  had 
complied with the requirements of their visas. Some potential risk of subsequent visa 
applications being rejected or the TCN holding a visa being prevented from entering 
the EU due to system error. 

•  Capital/investment costs  

There are likely to be only small additional capital costs. 

•  Ongoing financial costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

Increases in ongoing resource costs could accrue, if additional capacity is required to 
respond to the alerts received of overstayers. However, apprehension rates would be 
anticipated to improve. 

•  Necessary pre-conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts 

Successful implementation of the status quo including the VIS, and in particular very 
high  levels  of  accuracy  with  respect  to  the  recording  and  validation  through 
biometric  identity  checks  of  the  timing  of  the  cross  border  movements  of  TCN 
holding a visa. 

All  border  crossing  points  should  be  equipped  to  be  able  to  register  the  time  and 
place of entry and exit of TCN holding a visa. 

Assessment  of  sub  policy  option  2b  entry/exit  system  for  TCN  not  requiring  a 
visa 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √√√  

Biometric identity checks would be applied to TCN not requiring a visa who might 
otherwise not be subject to them. Legal entry into EU and subsequent overstaying by 
TCN  not  requiring  a  visa  would  be  discouraged  through  the  increased  probability 
that  overstayers  would  be  identified  and  sanctions  would  be  applied  as  necessary. 
However,  evidence  on  the  countries  of  origin  of  those  illegal  immigrants  that  have 
been apprehended in the territory suggest that TCN not requiring a visa are a small 
proportion of all illegal immigrants. 

The  entry/exit  system  would  allow  generating  data  for  the  analysis  of  profiles  and 
patterns  of  overstaying  and  provide  timely  and  reliable  information  on  the  identity 
and  incidence  of  those  entering  the  EU  legally  and  overstaying  their  right  to  stay. 
This  would  allow  border  control  resources  to  focus  more  on  the  detection  of 
overstayers and illegal border crossings, and it would also contribute to maintaining 
internal security. Furthermore this would facilitate the apprehension and removals of 
illegal immigrants and enabling proper measures to be taken in order to review their 
status  in  the  territory  of  the  Member  States  and  thus  reducing  the  negative 
implications.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  locating  overstayers  and 
mobilising the capacity for apprehending and returning them. 

The  simple  presence  of  an  effective  entry/exit  system  can  help  to  deter  would-be 
overstayers  and  criminals.  This  opportunity  results  from  the  psychological  effect 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
associated with the presence of a system that would track in a consistent, permanent 
and seemingly infallible way the flow of TCN in and out of the Schengen area. 

Without verification of biometrics: √(√) 

•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: -/0 

TCN not requiring a visa would be required to enrol in the system. This would have 
time and cost implications for them. If additional border control resources were not 
available  for  the  enrolment  and  check  of  TCN  not  requiring  a  visa,  there  could  be 
negative impacts on the bona fide passengers' crossings. On the other hand, having a 
reliable record of the travel history of TCN not requiring a visa could help to identify 
and facilitate bona fide travellers. A register could give rise to changes in visa policy, 
in the sense that citizens of certain countries would no longer require visas. 

No particular negative impacts, if biometrics would not be used. 

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: √  

Biometric identity checks would be applied to TCN not requiring a visa who might 
otherwise not be subject to them. These might be used for identification purposes as 
in  status  quo  for  TCN  holding  a  visa.  Verification  of  TCN  not  requiring  a  visa  at 
border  crossing  points  helps  combating  terrorism  and  serious  crime.  Biometric 
information  would  allow  identifying  travellers  even  if  they  use  other  identities  to 
cross external EU borders. 

The  entry/exit  system  would  provide  travel  histories  of  passengers  including  those 
that  are  considered  suspects  and  thus  complementing  the  information  in  the  SIS  II. 
Such data on the movements of terrorists and serious criminal suspects could be of 
value in locating them and in subsequent prosecutions. However, known terrorists or 
criminals may be unlikely to enter (or exit) the EU legally. 

No impact, if biometrics would not be used except travel histories of suspects being 
available. 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): √ 

The  system  could  provide  for  a  tool  for  the  management  of  an  EU  level  seasonal 
workers scheme, for instance in that it could be used as a register for such workers 
and  would  allow  verifying  whether  seasonal  workers  have  complied  with  their 
obligation  to  return  after  the  end  of  the  contract.  Also,  the  entry/exit  system  might 
have  the  potential  to  reduce  illegal  immigration  due  to  overstaying  and  indirectly 
increase confidence that migration policies could be adjusted in light of supply and 
demand. To this end, the system could improve confidence to grant work permits to 
temporary migrants due to the incentive to not overstay. Initiatives concerning border 
controls tend to make an indirect rather than direct contribution to the management 
of economic migration.  

Other relevant criteria: 

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39 

   EN 

 
Effects of the other relevant criteria are the same as the sub policy option 2a, except: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes. 

Benefits  would  accrue  whether  or  not  there  are  adjustments  in  migration  and  visa 
policy.  

•  Social and economic repercussions on the EU 

There could be some negative effects on those sectors experiencing labour shortages 
that are currently filled by only low skilled illegal migrants.  

•  Social and economic repercussions on third countries  

Some  third  countries  may  ‘retaliate’  given  that  their  citizens  would  be  required  to 
enrol and face potential delays at borders. The repercussions would depend on visa 
policy,  that  may  become  more  ‘open’  to  exempting  some  third  countries  from  visa 
requirements should the sub policy option have the intended effect of reducing illegal 
immigration. 

No particular negative impacts, if biometrics would not be used. 

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizen travellers 

Potential  indirect  negative  effects  through  delays,  if  additional  resources  are  not 
available for the enrolment and for checks of TCN not requiring a visa. The border 
guards  deployed  at  border  crossing  points  may  be  increasingly  used  for  handling 
TCN. This could mean less resources for the checks of EU citizens. 

Existing  Border  Guard  resources  are  used  more  than  nowadays  to  enrol  and  check 
TCN. 

No particular negative impacts, if biometrics would not be used. 

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide TCN travellers 

There  would  be  significant  increases  in  the  time  taken  and  costs  of  crossing  EU 
external  borders  of  TCN  not  requiring  visas.  Several  minutes  is  estimated  to  be 
required for the enrolment46 of each of the circa 25 million TCN not requiring visas 
that  enter  the  EU  each  year.  Long  queues  and  serious  delays  could  occur  at 
bottlenecks.  Some  potential  risk  of  subsequent  TCN  not  requiring  visas  being 
rejected or the TCN not requiring visa being prevented from entering the EU due to 
system error. 

46 

Registered Traveller case studies indicated that fingerprints and facial images can be taken between 4 
and 6 minutes. However, there would be merit in running checks during the enrolment process and for 
one reason or another some passengers may not be able to provide reliable biometrics which would lead 
to the requirement for alternative mechanisms to be applied.  

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
                                                 
No  particular  impacts,  if  biometrics  would  not  be  used,  except  that  there  is  a 
potential risk of subsequent TCN not requiring visas being rejected or the TCN not 
requiring visa being prevented from entering the EU due to system error. 

•  Capital/investment costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

There are likely to be additional capital costs as the enrolment process would involve 
the  taking  of  biometrics  and  biometrics  should  be  checked  at  entry  and  exit.  The 
Member States would be obliged to acquire more equipment to save and check the 
biometric  identifiers  of  TCN  not  requiring  visas  at  the  border  crossing  points.  All 
control lines for TCN would have to be equipped with fingerprint readers.  

No particular impacts without biometrics. 

•  Ongoing financial costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

The  enrolment  of  TCN  not  requiring  visas  would  need  to  be  supervised  by  border 
guards. It is reasonable to assume that one official could supervise and process 8000 
enrolments  per  annum.  In  this  case  in  the  order  of  3100  FTE  additional  border 
control staff would be required. Furthermore, all border crossing points would need 
to  be  resourced  in  a  manner  that  would  allow  for  enrolment.  Increases  in  ongoing 
resource costs could also accrue, if additional capacity is required to respond to the 
alerts received of overstayers. However, apprehension rates would be anticipated to 
improve.  

No particular impacts, if biometrics would not be used. 

•  Necessary pre-conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts 

Successful implementation of the status quo including the VIS, and in particular very 
high  levels  of  accuracy  with  respect  to  the  recording  and  validation  through 
biometric identity checks of the timing  of the cross border movements of TCN not 
requiring a visa. 

All  border  crossing  points  should  be  equipped  to  be  able  to  register  the  time  and 
place of entry and exit of TCN not requiring a visa. 

5.3. 

Option  3:  Measures  to  facilitate  cross-border  flows  (Registered  Traveller 
Programme and Automated Border Control) 

Assessment  of  sub  policy  option  3a:  A  Registered  Traveller  Programme  for 
TCN 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √ 

A Registered Traveller Programme might have the potential to free up border control 
resources so that they could focus on groups of travellers assessed as being more and 
most  likely  to  be  linked  to  illegal  immigration.  To  reach  more  positive  effects  the 
entry/exit system should be used. This would prevent overstayers from exploiting the 
Registered Traveller Programme. 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: √√√ 

Benefits  due  to  reduced  or  limited  waiting  times  at  border  crossing  points.  The 
impact  of  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme  on  the  border  crossing  time  varies 
from  each  border  crossing  point.  For  that  reason,  it  is  difficult  to  make  exact 
estimations. 

However, some checks would still have to be carried out e.g random checks, second 
line  checks,  pre-screening  of  passengers  and  checks  against  watch  lists  including 
those from country of origin47 of TCN. 

The  improvements  would  only  accrue  to  Registered  Travellers  who  would  be  a 
minority of TCN travellers.  

The Registered Traveller Programme would be more beneficial to TCN than to EU 
citizens, because TCN are subject to thorough checks at the external borders.  

The border crossing points especially at the land borders have queues that may take 
hours. The basic reason for the queues is not more careful border checks of TCN, but 
rather  the  steady  increase  of  traveller  flows  and  the  respective  decrease  in  the 
capacity of the border crossing points. Facilitated border checks will have an impact 
only on a small fraction of the time generally required for border crossings. In order 
to  make  border  checks  smoother,  also  the  customs  checks  and  security  checks  at 
airports  should  be  made  more  fluent  and  faster.  To  decrease  the  time  required  for 
border crossing, the Registered Traveller Programme would enable building separate 
lanes in such a way that it would not be necessary to increase the number of border 
check personnel.  

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: - 

Potentially  negative  contribution.  Prospective  and  unknown  criminals  or  terrorists 
may seek to exploit the facility. 

Potential negative effect is also due to the fact that border guards are accustomed to 
observe  even  the  faintest  cues,  for  example,  reading  the  unusual  behaviour  of  a 
human  being,  or  observing  the  smallest  details  in  the  travel  documents  (change  of 
photo etc.). This human factor is removed if the checks of the Registered Travellers 
are eased . Only in random checks will the human factor still exist. It is possible to 
forge finger prints using modern techniques and materials48; finger prints can be even 
bought or stolen. 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): √ 

47 

48 

See  also  Facilitation  of  Aviation  Security:  Feasibility  study  of  "Registered  Passenger"  Concept.  The 
study  concluded  that  there  should  be  a  chance  to  reject  TCN  from  the  scheme  if  the  requisite 
background checks cannot be completed. 
See  also  Study  on  Automated  Biometric  Border  Crossing  Systems  for  Registered  Passengers  at 
European airports made by Frontex page 14. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Indirect effects: Benefits due to reduced or limited waiting times at border crossing 
points.  The  Registered  Traveller  Programme  could  encourage  also  those  TCN  who 
wish to commute daily from their own country to their work place in the Schengen 
area to look for a job in the Schengen area. 

May  enable  border  control  resources  better  focus  on  checking  riskier  group  of 
travellers and thus increase public confidence in the border control system. 

Other relevant criteria: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes. 

The  sub  policy  option  could  be  adjusted  within  scenarios  involving  increases  in 
travel and changes in migration and border control policy.  

•  Social and economic repercussions on the EU and third countries  

Positive effects on business and trade are likely. Small positive economic effect via 
traveller  time  savings.  There  would  be  a  need  to  cooperate  with  enforcement 
authorities in third countries in order to check would-be participants against national 
databases. 

•  Environmental impacts 

Additional channels may need to be built at certain border crossing points. 

•  Impacts on fundamental rights: particularly privacy, data protection, presumption 

of innocence, fair trial etc 

A provision would be required to provide TCN applicants with the reasons why they 
have not been accepted onto the programme. Data provided under the vetting process 
would need to be subject to data protection provisions.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizens travellers 

No effect. 

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide TCN travellers 

Benefits due to reduced or limited waiting times at border crossing points. 

•  Capital/investment costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

Resources  would  be  required  to  create  separate  channels  for  Registered  Travellers, 
although this would not necessarily need to take place at all border crossing points. 

One automated gate unit costs approximately 35.000 euro. 

•  On going financial costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

Resources would be required to vet applicants at visa consulates and/or at the border 
crossing points. Some potential resource savings as checks on Registered Travellers 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
would subsequently be lighter than on other TCN. Resource costs could be offset by 
charges for participation.  

•  Necessary pre conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts 

Not reliant on other policy options. 

Assessment  of  sub  policy  option  3b:  A  harmonised  Registered  Traveller 
Programme available to EU citizens 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √ 

A Registered Traveller Programme might have the potential to free up border control 
resources so that they could focus on groups of travellers assessed as being more and 
most likely to be linked to illegal immigration. 

•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: √√ 

Benefits  due  to  reduced  or  limited  waiting  times  at  border  crossing  points,  but 
smaller  than  for  TCN  as  minimum  checks  for  EU  citizens  is  already  the  rule.  The 
impact  of  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme  on  the  border  crossing  time  varies 
from  each  border  crossing  point.  For  that  reason,  it  is  difficult  to  make  exact 
estimations. 

The systems are available at all external border crossing points, but facilitated border 
control procedures would be available for only those EU citizens meeting the vetting 
criteria separately set at EU level. 

The  absolutely  most  useful  benefit  of  the  option  would  be  the  availability  of  the 
Registered  Traveller  Programme  at  all  border  crossing  points.  The  negative  point 
would  be  that  Member  States  would  have  to  implement  the  Registered  Traveller 
Programme also at those border crossing points where there is no actual need for the 
programme,  yet  there  would  be  substantial  costs  for  implementing  the  programme 
there.  

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: - 

Potentially  negative  contribution.  Prospective  and  unknown  criminals  or  terrorists 
may seek to exploit the facility. 

Potential negative effect is also due to the fact that border guards are accustomed to 
observe  even  the  faintest  cues,  for  example,  reading  the  unusual  behaviour  of  a 
human  being,  or  observing  the  smallest  details  in  the  travel  documents  (change  of 
photo etc.). This human factor is removed when border checks are automated. Only 
in random checks will the human factor still exist. It is possible to forge fingerprints 
using modern techniques and materials; fingerprints can be even bought or stolen. 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): 0/√ 

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
Indirect  effect:  May  enable  border  control  resources  to  better  focus  on  checking 
riskier  group  of  travellers  and  thus  increase  public  confidence  in  border  control 
systems. 

Other relevant criteria: 

Effects of the other relevant criteria are the same as the sub policy option 3a, except: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes. 

The  sub  policy  option  would  be  able  to  adjust  to  scenarios  involving  increases  in 
travel. 

•  Social and economic repercussions on the EU and third countries  

Possible small positive effects on business and trade. Small positive economic effect 
via traveller time savings. 

•  Impacts on fundamental rights: particularly privacy, data protection, presumption 

of innocence, fair trial etc. 

There  is  a  potential  issue  of  discrimination  assuming  that  people  that  are  not 
registered or accepted are suspicious, depending on the criteria applied to register in 
the programme. Data provided under the vetting process would need to be subject to 
data  protection  provisions.  Systems  of  appeal  for  refusal  of  applicants  would  be 
required. 

All  EU  citizens  have  the  same  rights  to  enter  and  exit  the  EU.  In  accordance  with 
Article  7  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code,  all  persons  crossing  the  external  border 
shall  be  subject  to  a  "minimum  check",  both  at  entry  and  exit,  consisting  of  the 
examination of the travel document so as to verify the identity of the individual. This 
is  the  rule  for  EU  citizens  and  other  persons  enjoying  the  Community  right  of  free 
movement.  The  sub  policy  option  would  arguably  be  a  source  of  discrimination 
conferring benefits to those that have registered and been accepted to the programme.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizen travellers.  

Potential travel time savings to registered travellers.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide TCN travellers.  

No effects. 

•  Capital/investment costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

Separate channels would be required, particularly at major bottle necks such as big 
airports with huge number of travellers from the EU. These channels would need to 
be consistent at all EU border crossing points, giving rise to need for the EU to fund 
the investment so as to ensure burden sharing.  

One automated gate unit costs approximately 35.000 euro. 

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
•  On going financial costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

The main costs would be in building up the system and processing applicants for the 
Registered Traveller Programme. 

•  Necessary pre conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts 

The  benefits  that  would  accrue  would  largely  depend  upon  the  disadvantages  and 
delays to EU passengers who are not registered in the Programme. If conditions for 
unregistered  passengers  are  poor,  then  the  benefits  for  registered  passengers  are 
potentially greater. 

Assessment  of  sub  policy  option  3c:  Minimum  standards  are  established  for 
Registered Traveller schemes and Automated Border Control for EU citizens 

•  To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers): √ 

A  Registered  Traveller  Programme  and  Automated  Border  Control  might  have  the 
potential  to  free  up  border  control  resources  so  that  they  could  focus  on  groups  of 
travellers assessed as being more and most likely to be linked to illegal immigration. 

•  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external  borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring 

overall coherence of EU border policy: √ 

Benefits  due  to  reduced  or  limited  waiting  times  at  border  crossing  points,  but 
smaller  than  for  TCN  as  minimum  checks  for  EU  citizens  is  already  the  rule.  The 
impact of Automated Border Control on the border crossing time varies across each 
border crossing point. For that reason, it is difficult to make exact estimations. 

Member States would decide the border crossing points where they would like to set 
up  the  systems.  EU  citizens  holding  e-passports  would  be  able  to  benefit  from 
Automated Border Control without having to register or enrol in advance.  

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime: - 

Potentially  negative  contribution.  Prospective  and  unknown  criminals  or  terrorists 
may seek to exploit the facility. 

Potential negative effect is also due to the fact that border guards are accustomed to 
observe  even  the  faintest  cues,  for  example,  reading  the  unusual  behaviour  of  a 
human  being,  or  observing  the  smallest  details  in  the  travel  documents  (change  of 
photo etc.). This human factor is removed when border checks are automated. Only 
in random checks will the human factor still exist. It is possible to forge fingerprints 
using  modern  techniques  and  materials;  fingerprints  can  be  even  bought  or  stolen. 
However the use of multimodal biometrics could help mitigate this risk. 

•  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic  migration  (for  example 

seasonal workers): 0/√ 

Indirect  effect:  May  enable  border  control  resources  to  better  focus  on  checking 
riskier  group  of  travellers  and  thus  increase  public  confidence  in  border  control 
systems.  The  system  might  reduce  also  TCN  border  crossing  time  and  in  that  way 

EN 

46 

   EN 

 
encourage  TCN  to  work  in  the  Schengen  area.  Smoother  border  checks  for  TCN 
would  be  possible  because  the  border  guards  could  be  transferred  to  check  TCN 
instead of checking EU citizens. 

Other relevant criteria: 

Effects of the other relevant criteria are similar as the sub policy option 3b, except: 

•  Robustness in the light of substantive and policy changes. 

The  sub  policy  option  would  be  able  to  adjust  to  scenarios  involving  increases  in 
travel.  It  would  also  be  able  to  take  account  of  the  increase  in  number  with  the 
variety of Registered Traveller Schemes and Automated Border Control Systems that 
could be implemented. 

•  Social and economic repercussions on the EU and third countries 

Minor  positive  effects  on  business  and  trade.  Minor  positive  economic  effects  via 
traveller time savings. 

•  Impacts on fundamental rights: particularly privacy, data protection, presumption 

of innocence, fair trial etc. 

The minimum standards would potentially strengthen aspects of the application and 
data  protection.  Defining,  monitoring  and  enforcing  ‘minimum  standards’  could  be 
problematic.  

•  Costs and benefits to bona fide EU citizen travellers. 

Potentially small travel time savings to EU citizens.  

•  Capital/investment costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

It  is  unlikely  that  the  minimum  standards  would  lead  to  significant  increases  in 
capital  costs,  indeed  the  standards  could  be  based  on  schemes  which  are  judged  to 
have been cost effective. Its feasibility is not dependent upon the status quo or other 
policy options. It could be implemented in the short term.  

One automated gate unit costs approximately 35.000 euro. 

•  On going financial costs (EU, MS, border authorities) 

The main costs would be in building up the system. 

•  Necessary pre conditions, accompanying measures to achieve impacts 

Not reliant on other policy options. 

5.4. 

Comparative assessment 

As indicated below in Table 1 and 2 policy option 2b would have a more significant 
effect  on  reducing  illegal  immigration  than  policy  option  2a.  There  are  biometric 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
identifiers  of  TCN  requiring  a  visa  in  the  VIS  system.  It  is  possible  to  identify 
biometrically a TCN requiring a visa both at the border crossing point and also if s/he 
travels  or  resides  in  the  European  Union  without  requisite  travel  documents. 
Whereas,  in  respect  to  TCN  not  requiring  a  visa  (2b),  this  is  not  possible  if 
biometrics are not captured. If biometrics are captured also from TCN not requiring a 
visa, policy option 2b is likely to be more effective in reducing illegal immigration. 

The  impacts  of  2a  and  2b  would  be  greater  than  the  status  quo  which  is  itself 
expected  to  reduce  illegal  immigration  to  some  extent.  However,  it  would  be 
unrealistic to expect that the policy options would eliminate illegal immigration. The 
push  and  pull  factors  that  lead  to  illegal  immigration  will  remain  strong  and  some 
amongst those who enter the EU legally will opt to overstay irrespective of whether 
sanctions  may  result.  Indeed  the  prospect  that  leaving  after  their  ‘due  date’  could 
limit their ability to re-enter the EU legally could have a perverse effect of prompting 
some to stay longer.  

Policy options 2a and 2b are likely to be effective in identifying overstayers and to 
lead to their apprehension if biometrics are captured also from the TCN not requiring 
a visa. Otherwise 2a is likely to be more effective. However, it should be noted that 
most overstayers are TCN requiring visas. 

However, detecting and apprehending overstayers in the European Union is difficult 
because there is no information about the whereabouts of the overstayers. It is only 
known  that  the  overstayers  are  somewhere  in  the  European  Union.  At  the  border 
crossing points it is easier to detect overstayers, as the entry/exit system informs the 
border guard when an overstayer is being checked. 

Only  policy  options  3a  and  3b  contribute  markedly  to  facilitating  the  cross  border 
crossing of bona fide travellers. However, both policy options 2a and 3c contribute to 
some extent, whereas option 1 and 2b may have a negative impact in this respect.  

None  of  the  policy  options  contribute  markedly  to  reducing  terrorism  or  serious 
crime but policy options 1 and 2b have the greatest potential in this respect. In view 
of the latest terrorist acts in the area of the EU, it can be noted that the perpetrators 
have mainly been EU citizens or foreigners residing and living in the Member States 
with  official  permits.  Usually  there  has  been  no  information  about  these  people  or 
about  their terrorist  connections  in  the registers, for example  in the SIS or national 
databases. The entry/exit system does not register entries or exits of the EU citizens 
or their relatives. Therefore, the entry/exit system will not be able to have an impact 
on this specific target group. 

Policy  option  2a  has  the  greatest  potential  to  contribute  to  the  management  of 
economic migration.  

Should  fingerprints  be  used  as  the  biometric  identifiers  in  the  entry/exit  system  for 
the  TCN  not  holding  a  visa,  this  development  will  increase  costs  and  time  of  the 
border  crossings  as  compared  to  using  only  alphanumeric  data  and  exploiting,  for 
example, only the machine readable zone of the passport. It is faster to read only the 
alphanumeric  data  than  verifying  fingerprints,  and  no  enrolment  of  the  TCN  is 
needed.  On  the  other  hand,  benefits  from  using  the  biometric  identifiers  would 
include an improved level of security in the European Union, better legal protection 

EN 

48 

   EN 

 
of  the  traveller  and  reliability  of  the  system.  Earlier  in  this  assessment,  there  have 
been references to potential sanctions that could be directed to the TCN overstaying 
in the Schengen area on the basis of information gathered from the system. Prior to 
any such sanctions, the authorities should be absolutely certain about the identity of 
the person in question. And vice versa, no such sanctions should be directed if there 
is  not  any  100%  proof  of  illegal  activities.  With  biometric  identifiers,  the  Member 
States  would  have  much  more  reliable  information  on  the  identity  of  the  person 
illegally  residing  in  the  Schengen  area  and  on  the  duration  of  the  illegal  stay. 
Verifying the identity of the persons illegally residing in a country would be easier 
and  more  reliable  with  the  help  of  biometric  identifiers,  also  within  the  Schengen 
area.  

Table 1 – Assessment of the status quo 

Policy  Option  (Anticipated  impacts  rated  from  –  (negative  contribution  to  objective)  to  √√√√√  (full  achievement  of 
objective) 

Objective to be achieved/ problem addressed 

Policy option 1 (status quo) 

Policy objective: To reduce illegal immigration (especially overstayers) 

Policy objective: To facilitate crossings of EU external borders for bona fide 
travellers, ensuring overall coherence of EU border policy 

Policy  objective:  To  contribute  to  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  serious 
crime 

Policy  objective:  To  improve  the  effective  management  of  economic 
migration (for example seasonal workers) 

Relative costs 

√√  

- 

√ 

√ 

NA 

Note: Status quo has been assessed against the current situation. 

Table 2 – Comparative assessment of other policy options and sub options (2a – 
3c) 

Comparative assessment of policy options and sub options 

Policy  Options  (Anticipated  impacts  rated  from  –  (negative  contribution  to  objective)  to  √√√√√  (full  achievement  of 
objective) 

Objective to be achieved/ problem addressed 

Policy 
option 2a 

Policy 
option 2b 

Policy 
option 3a 

Policy 
option 3b 

Policy 
option 3c 

Policy  objective:  To  reduce  illegal  immigration  (especially 
overstayers) 

√√ 

√√√ 

√ 

Policy  objective:  To  facilitate  crossings  of  EU  external 
borders  for  bona  fide  travellers,  ensuring  overall  coherence 
of EU border policy 

√ 

-/0 

√√√ 

Policy objective: To contribute to the fight against terrorism 
and serious crime 

Policy  objective:  To  improve  the  effective  management  of 
economic migration (for example seasonal workers) 

0/√ 

√√ 

√ 

√ 

- 

√ 

√ 

√√ 

- 

√ 

√ 

- 

0/√ 

0/√ 

EN 

49 

   EN 

 
 
Relative costs49 

Low 

Medium 

Low-
Medium 

Low-
Medium 

Preferred option 

√ 

√ 

√ 

Low 

√ 

Note:  The  baseline  situation  against  which  the  ratings  are  made  assumes  the 
successful  implementation  of  the  status  quo  (table  1).  Other  policy  options  (2a-3c) 
have  been  assessed  against  this  option.  As  an  example,  the  policy  option  2a  is  two 
ticks (√√=medium impact) more effective "to reduce illegal immigration (especially 
overstayers)" than the baseline.  

Note:  policy  option  2a=Entry/exit  for  TCN  requiring  visas;  2b=Entry/exit  for  TCN 
not  requiring  visas;  3a=Registered  Traveller  Programme  available  to  TCN; 
3b=Harmonised  Registered  Traveller  Programme  available 
to  EU  citizens; 
3c=Minimum  standards  are  established  for  Registered  Traveller  schemes  and 
Automated Border Control system for EU citizens. 

5.5. 

Preferred option 

There  is  a  clear  merit  in  pursuing  policy  option  2a,  the  entry/exit  system  for  TCN 
requiring  visas,  to  meet  the  specific  objective  of  deterring  illegal  immigration.  The 
costs are low and the policy benefits significant. There are no major risks associated 
with the policy option except those that concern the successful implementation of the 
status quo. Sub policy option 2a should thus be part of the preferred option. 

The balance of costs and benefits of policy option 2b, the entry/exit system for TCN 
not  requiring  visas  is  less  clear  cut.  There  would  be  costs  associated  with  the 
enrolment of TCN, if biometric identifiers are used and checked, but there would be 
benefits  in  reductions  of  illegal  immigration.  Data  on  non-visa  holders  should  be 
used in an identical way as for visa holders with regard to alerts, data collection and 
identifying 
law  enforcement  purposes.  This  would  allow  possibilities  for 
undocumented persons within the Schengen area. 

Given the importance of reducing illegal immigration and the improved information 
on patterns of overstaying that the sub policy option would provide, and because it 
could give rise to changes in visa policy, in the sense that citizens of certain countries 
would no longer require visas, there would be resource savings to the EU. A central 
EU  entry/exit  system  would  also  allow  automated  recording  of  entry  and  exit  of  a 
TCN  seasonal  worker  and  thus  verification  of  compliance  with  the  obligation  to 
return after the fixed period. The register would be at EU level which in turn would 
allow for the implementation of EU policies in the field of economic migration. It is 
proposed that sub policy option 2b should also be part of the preferred policy option.  

The  entry/exit  system  has  to  be  implemented at  all  types  of  borders  (air,  sea,  land) 
and  all  border  crossing  points.  In  the  absence  of  a  thorough  implementation  at  all 
types of borders the systems may displace the movements of would-be overstayers, 
criminals and terrorists towards those borders and entry points in which the system is 

49 

The costs of technical implementation will be presented in a separate Commission staff working paper 
on technical options in the beginning of 2008. 

EN 

50 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
not in place. As, in general, TCN enter and exit the Schengen area at border crossing 
points of their choice, a central solution is necessary to reconcile entry and exit data. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  the  entry/exit  system  would  help  Member  States  to  better 
profile traveller flows. In order to arrange and target the border checks and in order 
to manage economic migration, Member States will have real-time information about 
the current situation of legal and illegal migration (especially about the overstayers). 
At the same time, the fact-based statistics about the changes of illegal immigration at 
the level of the EU would be available (exempt from the illegal immigration outside 
the border crossing points).  

In  addition  to  this,  it  is  possible  to  gather  information  on  the  following  facts: 
traveller´s country of origin; the country of destination; the purpose of the visit; the 
amount of travellers requiring a visa or exempt from a visa etc. When individuals are 
applying  for  a  visa  they  inform  authorities  about  the  aforementioned  facts.  In  the 
case of the TCN not requiring a visa, those pieces of information should be added to 
the  database  when  biometrics  are  stored.  The  gathered  information  will  help 
authorities within the Schengen area to target their actions and measures to the right 
groups of individuals in the right country and/or in the right region. With the help of 
the  entry/exit  system  it  would  be  possible  to  verify  the  identity  of  the  TCN  not 
requiring a visa within the Schengen area. This opportunity will be most beneficial in 
a  situation  where  a  person  has  no  travel  documents  and  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
verify his/her identity through the authorised use of other databases such as Eurodac. 

With the help of the information created by the register it would be possible to define 
in  a  more  reliable  manner  which  TCN  should  be  required  a  visa  and  which  should 
not. In this way, the system could also have an effect on the visa policy of the EU. 

In  the  case  of  seasonal  workers,  the  register  would  allow  making  statistics  of 
migration and thus help managing migration policy. The Register would enable the 
authorities  to  check  if  the  seasonal  workers  have  obeyed  their  right  to  stay  in  the 
Schengen area. 

None  of  the  arguments  for  the  sub  options  within  policy  option  3  are  extremely 
strong,  because  the  benefits  to  travellers  of  being  on  Registered  Traveller 
Programmes derive in large part from the relative ‘costs’ of being ‘normal’ traveller. 
However,  on  balance  sub  policy  option  3a  which  would  provide  a  Registered 
Traveller  Programme  for  TCN  would  offer  forms  of  improved  service  to  TCN 
frequent  travellers  facing  the  challenges  arising  from  increased  security  levels, 
growing demand and limited resources50. Thus this sub policy option should be part 
of the preferred option.  

On  the  other  hand  the  benefits  of  the  introduction  of  sub  policy  option  3b,  a 
harmonised  Registered  Traveller  Programme  for  EU  citizens  would  be  unlikely  to 
offset  the  costs  and  could  be  seen  as  discriminatory.  At  the  same  time  sub  policy 
option  3c,  that  would  provide  a  framework  for  the  development  of  Registered 
Traveller schemes and Automated Border Control tailored to the needs of particular 
border crossings but maintaining minimum standards, would be of merit and of low 

50 

See Facilitation of Aviaton Security: Feasibility study of "Registered Passenger" Concept.  

EN 

51 

   EN 

 
                                                 
cost. Sub option 3c would allow Member States to consider at which border crossing 
points such measures would have an added value. There is no need for establishing 
this at all external border crossing points and moreover the systems do not need to be 
identical.  

The compatibility will be ensured with technical minimum standards. Hence, an EU 
citizen  with  an  e-passport  or  a  specific  token  can  use  the  system  of  any  other 
Member  States,  without  specific  enrolment.  The  latter,  which  would  involve 
additional vetting criteria as outlined under sub policy option 3b, could be seen as a 
step  backwards  compared  to  the  right  of  EU  citizens  to  be  subject  to  a  minimum 
check only under the current legal framework. Thus it is proposed to include policy 
option 3c in the preferred option. Each Member State would inevitably have to make 
a  precise  assessment  for  each  individual  border  crossing  point,  whether  the  system 
would bring added value to the throughput capacity of the border crossing point and 
thus decrease travellers’ border crossing time. 

The preferred option is not any of the policy options or sub options alone. It is thus a 
combination of an entry/exit system for all TCN (sub policy options 2a and 2b) and a 
Registered  Traveller  Programme  open  to  TCN  (sub  policy  option  3a)  and  a 
framework  for  the  development  of  ‘local’  Registered  Traveller  schemes  and 
Automated  Border  Control  (sub  policy  option  3c).  The  preferred  option  generates 
reasonable  benefits  and  contributes  considerably  to  the  achievement  of  the  main 
objectives.  The  potential  of  the  preferred  option  with  respect  to  reducing  terrorism 
and  serious  crime  is  however  not  substantial  due  to  the  nature  of  the  problem  and 
possibilities to tackle it by the means of border checks. The preferred option includes 
two complementary measures as the Registered Traveller Programme and automated 
border  crossing  systems  can  be  seen  as  compensatory  to  TCN  that  are  subject  to 
more  stringent  migration  and  border  controls  and  the  potential  costs  of  waiting  at 
borders through the entry/exit system. The Registered Traveller Programme for TCN 
and  Automated  Border  Control  for  EU  citizens  would  allow  border  control 
authorities  to  focus  their  resources  on  those  groups  of  travellers  that  require  more 
attention in terms of risk analysis.  

The  costs  would  not  increase  considerably  as  compared  to  the  status  quo  with  the 
possible exception of waiting times at the borders. However, the preferred option is 
highly dependent upon the success of the implementation of the status quo. Failure of 
the  VIS  system  for  carrying  out  identity  checks  at  EU  external  borders,  and  to 
operate efficiently and at all border crossing points would render the preferred option 
of limited benefit.  

In accordance with the draft final report of the entry/exit technical feasibility study 
the estimated costs of the centralised entry/exit and Registered Traveller Programme 
system  would  be  approximately  20  million  euro,  spread  out  over  2-3  years  and  the 
annual  maintenance  and  operational  costs  approximately  6  million  euro.  The  costs 
across  all  Member  States  would  be  approximately  35  million  euro,  but  could  vary 
greatly  depending  on  the  number  of  automated  gates  that  would  be  implemented. 
External  Borders  Fund  could  support  Member  States  in  relation  to  purchasing 
necessary  equipment.  For  third  countries  no  costs  would  occur.  After  possible 
adoption  of  the  entry/exit  system  and  Registered  Traveller  Programme,  third 
countries will be informed accordingly. 

EN 

52 

   EN 

 
The preferred option would require several safeguards: 

•  If there were errors on the identity checks of passengers, facilities would need to 
be available for manual checks and for amending the data on entry and exit at all 
border crossing points.  

•  Facilities  should  be  widely  available  to  update  information  in  the  entry/exit 
system to reflect changes, such as circumstances that might lead to overstay (for 
example plane cancellations, sickness etc.). 

•  Some form of ‘right to appeal’ against possible sanctions imposed due to apparent 

overstaying would need to be introduced. 

•  There  would  be  merit  in  a  measure  of  harmonisation  of  the  definition  of 
overstayers and of the possible sanctions applied to TCN that become overstayers 
and the procedures for removals. 

To  be  effective,  data  would  have  to  be  retained  on  the  histories  of  cross  border 
movements  of  TCN.  This  raises  data  protection  issues  that  will  need  to  be 
safeguarded. 

From the technical perspective concerning the entry/exit system, the VIS and the SIS 
II pursue different objectives and thus comprehensive synergies cannot effectively be 
applied in this context, although technical synergies could be found. The VIS system 
could be used for the purposes of the entry/exit system for registering the entry and 
exit  data  of  TCN  requiring  a  visa.  Regarding  TCN  not  requiring  a  visa,  at  least 
partially  separate  database  would  be  required,  but  which  could  build  on  the  same 
technical platform as the SIS II and the VIS  and use  the same Biometric Matching 
System  (BMS).  This  would  allow  for  exploiting  synergies  with  existing  biometric 
systems  keeping  costs  low  and  ensuring  interoperability.  To  maintain  consistency 
and interoperability the same guidelines that are used by the VIS should be followed 
for  the  collection  of  biometric  data,  including  quality,  capture  and  storage 
requirements.  As  long  as  similar  standards  and  procedures  are  followed,  the 
procedure for TCN not requiring a visa can be virtually identical to the process for 
TCN requiring a visa. This provides for maximum efficiency gains of technology as 
well  as  maximum  usability  and  minimal  costs  of  deployment  and  running  of  the 
solution. This system should be accessible via system interfaces from Member State 
border control systems. As for the Registered Traveller Programme, a separate data 
store  will  be  required.  It  is  possible  to  construct  one  single  centralised  entry/exit 
system  and  Registered  Traveller  Programme  database;  thus  in  any  case,  only  one 
new database would be needed. 

It is likely that mobile devices will need to operate in online and offline modes, i.e. 
always  when  connectivity  is  available,  they  will  communicate  with  Member  State 
and/or  EU  systems  to  record  the  entry  or  exit  and  to  verify  biometrics  stored  in 
central databases. In the event that connectivity is not available, in offline mode, the 
device will match against biometric samples stored on e-passports or another token 
and store events in local memory for upload to the central databases at a later time.  

EN 

53 

   EN 

 
6. 

ELABORATION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION 

This section of the report elaborates the preferred option. That is a combination of an 
entry/exit  system  for  all  TCN  and  a  Registered  Traveller  Programme  open  to  TCN 
and a legal framework for the development of ‘local’ Registered Traveller schemes 
(including  the  introduction  of  automated  border  controls)  for  EU  citizens,  that  are 
interoperable at EU level. 

6.1. 

European value added and proportionality  

The  entry/exit  system  for  TCN  requiring  visas  builds  on  the  VIS  and  status  quo 
policy option through which much of the necessary investment will have taken place. 
Its  implementation  and  effectiveness  will  require  the  cooperation  of  Schengen 
countries.  The  case  for  organisation  at  the  EU  level  is  compelling.  The  additional 
costs are low and the sub option is clearly proportionate.  

The entry/exit system for TCN not requiring visas must also be implemented at the 
Schengen  level.  It  could  have  important  implications  for  and  dependencies  on  visa 
policy  which  is  determined  at  the  Schengen  level.  The  policy  option  needs  to  be 
implemented at all EU borders and will have implications for burden sharing and the 
border guard resources of all Schengen countries. In order to fully meet its objectives 
an  entry/exit  system  should  be  applied  consistently  at  all  borders  and  all  border 
crossing points. A common database where all travellers at the external borders are 
registered  is  needed.  Otherwise  the  end  results  would  be:  "invisibility"  of  the 
overstayers  and  exploitation  of  those  border  crossing  points  without  the  entry/exit 
system by criminals. A person may enter the EU at a border crossing point where an 
entry/exit  system  is  used,  but  exit  through  a  border  crossing  point  where  no  such 
system is used. 

The  Registered  Traveller  Programme  open  to  TCN  has  to  be  implemented  at  the 
Schengen  level  although  special  facilities  for  the  passage  of  Registered  Travellers 
would not need to be introduced at all border crossing points. The net costs are likely 
to be low and proportionate to the benefits offered to bona fide registered travellers. 
TCN traveller would be properly screened, vetted and identified as a Member of the 
Registered  Traveller  Programme  before  facilitating  entry  to  the  Schengen  area. 
Screening  and  vetting  criteria  as  well  as  the  policies  on  validity,  expiry  and 
revocation would have to be defined EU wide. This in turn would establish the basis 
for a central database to be provided and shared on an EU level. 

The  minimum  standards  for  Registered  Traveller  Schemes  and  Automated  Border 
Control would similarly need to be introduced at the Schengen level. This is because 
the implications of failures of a Registered Traveller Scheme and Automated Border 
Control operating in one country could impact on other Schengen countries. It should 
be  noted  that  there  are  already  well  developed  schemes  in  a  number  of  Member 
States.  It  would  represent  a  major  step  forward  in  terms  of  facilitation  if  such 
schemes would be interoperable within the EU and a person could use the Automated 
Border  Control  System  of  another  Member  State.  Common  criteria  and  minimum 
standards would be a prerequisite for such interoperability. On the other hand, each 
Member  State  should  be  able  to  decide  if  it  will  use  the  programme  at  its  border 
crossing  points  or  not.  Otherwise  systems  would  be  set  up  in  such  border  crossing 
points where there is no actual need for the system. 

EN 

54 

   EN 

 
The preferred policy option would remain relevant also if there would be substantial 
changes in border control and migration policies and in the patterns of EU external 
cross  border  movements.  The  preferred  option  would  not  limit  the  scope  for  the 
introduction of other improvements. 

6.2. 

Legislative implications 

There  are  no  provisions  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  on  the  registering  of  cross 
border movements of the travellers. Currently the stamping of the travel document is 
the  sole  instrument  indicating  the  dates  of  entry  and  exit  at  the  disposal  of  border 
guards  and  immigration  authorities  to  calculate  the  duration  of  the  stay  of  TCN. 
Other tools to check persons at the external borders such as the databases of which 
consultation  is  compulsory  at  entry,  not  at  exit,  are  not  intended  to  have  this 
functionality. 

Entry/exit 

It is not envisaged that major legislation would be needed for the entry/exit system 
for TCN requiring visas. However, amendments to the Schengen Borders Code and 
the VIS Regulation would be necessary in order for cross border movements of TCN 
holding a visa to be systematically recorded using the biometric identifiers stored in 
the  VIS.  If  a  separate  entry/exit  database  were  developed  containing  records  of  all 
TCN then the VIS Regulation would not require an amendment. Whilst not essential 
for  the  efficacy  of  this  policy  option  there  would  be  merit  in  a  measure  of 
harmonisation of the definition of overstayers and of the possible sanctions applied 
to TCN that become overstayers and the procedures for removals.  

New  Community  legislation  would  be  required  to  implement  the  entry/exit  system 
for  TCN  not  requiring  visas  by  amending  the  Schengen  Borders  Code.  If  the 
fingerprints are captured, the requirement to enrol the TCN would be mandatory, a 
condition  of  entry  to  the  EU  and  the  information  generated  by  the  policy  options 
could be used to identify, apprehend and return overstayers and limit the possibilities 
for them to enter the EU or otherwise impose sanctions on them. Whilst not essential 
for  the  efficacy  of  this  sub  policy  option,  there  would  be  merit  in  a  measure  of 
harmonisation  of  the  definition  of  overstayers,  the  ‘sanctions’  applied  to  TCN  that 
become overstayers and the procedures for removals.  

Registered Traveller Programmes and Automated Border Control 

The  minimum  control  to  which  EU  citizens  are  systematically  submitted  each  time 
they cross the borders consists in the verification of the person's identity and of the 
validity  of  the  travel  document.  The  primary  requirement  of  an  Automated  Border 
Control process for EU citizens is to automatically verify the claim of EU citizenship 
through the authentication of the travel document and traveller. This type of checking 
does not require the intervention of border guards once it proves possible to be fully 
carried  out  with  recourse  to  the  new  technologies.  This  would  thus  not  appear  to 
require any legislative changes. However, it should be noted that checks against the 
SIS and national databases would still be carried out on a random basis. 

If  TCN  were  also  covered,  it  would  be  necessary  to  find  a  solution  specifying  the 
screening  to  be  carried  out  at  the  time  of  the  enrolment  in  the  programme,  which 

EN 

55 

   EN 

 
could  replace  certain  checks  at  borders  and  ensure  that  the  person  still  fulfils  the 
conditions of entry and stay at the time of the border crossing. In order to enable an 
EU-wide  recognition  of  Registered  Traveller  credentials,  and  having  regard  to  that 
border  checks  are  currently  harmonised  at  EU  level,  the  process  for  screening 
eligibility criteria and vetting would need to be harmonised across the EU. Only the 
fact  that  a  traveller  has  been  properly  screened,  vetted  and  identified  as  part  of  the 
enrolment process to the Registered Traveller Programme allows for the possibility 
to  facilitate  entry  to  the  Schengen  area.  Also  the  policies  on  validity,  expiry  and 
revocation would have to be defined EU wide. This in turn would establish the basis 
for a central database to be provided and shared on an EU level. It should be noted, 
that a legal change to remove the stamping obligation of a passport and a visa should 
be done.  

Given  that  a  legal  framework  should  be  established  enabling  the  development  of 
Registered  Traveller  schemes  for  TCN,  standards  would  be  settled  and  applied  to 
parameters  such  as:  eligibility  and  vetting  including  its  regularity;  automatic 
verification  systems;  random  and  second  line  checks;  data  protection;  protection  of 
privacy and fundamental rights and possibly pricing policies. This could be achieved 
through  amendments  to  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  and  through  other  legal 
instruments.  

If a traveller granted a Registered Traveller Status would not have complied with the 
rules  of  the  programme  e.g.  (s)he  overstays  or  an  alert  is  inserted  in  the  SIS  or 
national  database,  a  responsible  Member  State  should  immediately  revoke  the 
traveller's status and when necessary inform other Member States. 

6.3.  Measures to ensure data protection and protection of rights of travellers 

It  is  important  that  the  preferred  policy  option  should  comply  with  data  protection 
principles and the requirements of necessity, proportionality, purpose limitation and 
quality  of  data;  and  that  safeguards  and  mechanisms  are  in  place  for  the  effective 
protection of the fundamental rights of the individual travellers and in particular the 
protection of their private life and their personal data. Third country nationals must 
be  made  aware  of  these  rights.  However,  the  preferred  option  is  relevant  to  both 
migration  and  to  combating  terrorism  and  serious  crime  and  as  with  aspects  of  the 
status quo this poses data protection challenges.  

Respect for fundamental rights is a basic principle of any Community policy in the field 
of  fight  against  illegal  immigration.  The  Hague  Action  Plan  states  the  need  “to  ensure 
the full development of policies enhancing citizenship, monitoring and promoting human 
rights”. Thus, any policy initiative to reduce the amount of illegal immigration into the 
EU has to respect fundamental rights, which illegal immigrants enjoy. 

Although  some  of  the  information  generated  by  the  entry/exit  system  would  be,  in 
theory, already available51, the policy option would involve the systematic electronic 
recording and storing of information on the time and place of entry and exit of TCN. 
Most  travellers  crossing  the  EU  and  other  international  borders  provide  similar 
information  via  ticketing  information  held  by  carriers  or  on  other  records  of  entry 

51 

TCNs' passports are stamped on entry and exit. On exit border guards are able to ascertain whether the 
visa holder has overstayed. 

EN 

56 

   EN 

 
                                                 
and  exit52  and  may  not  consider  such  information  as  highly  confidential.  However, 
some will consider its retention on a database invasive, as the data would normally 
be held as confidential. Whether or not the information is considered confidential is, 
in  any  case,  irrelevant  from  the  perspective  of  data  protection  law  and  has  limited 
relevance as regards the protection of the right of privacy. 

The data would be stored in a form that could be easily manipulated and there is a 
potential problem, as with any data of this type, that it could be used inappropriately. 
According  to  Article  6  of  Directive  95/46/EC  Member  States  shall  provide  that 
personal  data  must  be  processed  fairly  and  lawfully,  that  they  are  collected  for 
specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes.  Furthermore  the  processing  of  personal 
data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to purposes for which 
they are collected and processed. 

The  provisions  of  data  protection  for  the  VIS  and  the  status  quo  including  the 
retention of information for just 5 years would be necessary to ensure adequate data 
protection  provisions  for  this  policy  option.  In  addition,  provisions  would  be 
necessary to ensure that, for the records of entry and exit that: 

•  The  data  generated  by  the  entry/exit  system  should  only  be  used  by  responsible 
migration  and  border  control  authorities  except  in  exceptional  circumstances 
where  duly  authorised  law  enforcement  authorities  seek  with  good  cause, 
evidence on the travel histories of named individuals. 

•  Individuals  should  have  the  right  to  access  to  information  held  on  them  and  to 

challenge and correct it, if errors have occurred. 

•  The  provisions  would  allow  for  appeals  in  cases  where  TCN  are  forced  to 
overstay, overstayed only apparently and/or if there were errors made in recording 
dates of entry or exit. 

On the other hand, the systematic recording of TCN travel movements could also be 
of  value  in  demonstrating  the  consistency  of  travel  history  with  the  rules  and 
requirements. 

The  basic  provisions  for  data  protection  and  protection  of  fundamental  rights  and 
privacy  would  need  to  be  similar  to  those  of  the  VIS  Regulation  plus  provisions 
relating  to  the  entry/exit  information.  However,  the  data  collected  on  TCN  not 
requiring visas would be less extensive than that given by visa applicants and hence 
issues of data protection would be slightly less challenging in this case. The rights to 
appeal in circumstances of errors occurring and forced overstaying would need to be 
ensured. At the same time given the large numbers of new travellers affected and the 
new requirement for  them to  provide biometric information the data protection and 
appeals mechanisms would need to be visible and evident.  

The Registered Traveller Programme open to TCN would also pose data protection 
challenges. The vetting process might involve the collection of personal information 
over and above that required to obtain a visa or enrol as a TCN not requiring a visa. 

52 

Road passengers in private vehicles would not normally give such information 

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At  the  same  time  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme  would  be  voluntary.  Data 
protection  provisions  including  the  right  of  access  to  personal  information  that  had 
been used to inform refusals of applications would be appropriate. In the same vein 
the  Registered  Traveller  Programme  in  this  sub  policy  option  could  include  the 
requirement of authorities to provide the reasons for refusal and the opportunity for 
applicants to appeal against refusal.  

Minimum  standards  for  the  Registered  Traveller  Schemes  would  itself  define  the 
minimum  standards  for  data  protection  and  identify  the  most  appropriate  means  of 
achieving  these.  Minimum  standards  would  also  include  procedures  on  authorities 
providing  reasons  for  refusal,  access  by  the  applicant  to  the  information  used  to 
inform  such  refusals  and  the  opportunity  to  appeal  against  refusal.  Particular 
consideration would need to be given to the use and transmission of biometric data. 
Limitation  on  the  access  to  the  information,  although  provided  voluntarily,  would 
nevertheless be extremely important.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The Commission shall ensure that systems are in place to monitor the functioning of 
the  entry/exit  system  and  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme  against  the  main 
policy  objectives.  Two  years  after  these  systems  start  operations  the  Commission 
should submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the technical 
functioning of the systems. Moreover four years after the entry/exit system and the 
Registered Traveller Programme start operations the Commission should produce an 
overall  evaluation  of  the  systems  including  examining  results  achieved  against 
objectives and assessing the continuing validity of the underlying rationale and any 
implications  of  future  options.  The  Commission  should  submit  the  reports  on  the 
evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council. 

Monitoring and evaluation indicators could be in particular: 

•  Entry/exit: 

–  Number of entries on the system; 

–  Numbers  of  ‘registered’  persons  identified  at  border  (terrorists,  cross-border 

criminals etc.); 

–  Numbers of illegal immigrants identified at border (excl. ‘registered’ persons and 

overstayers); 

–  Number of alerts on overstayers; 

–  Number of incorrect alerts on overstayers; 

–  Numbers of alerts leading to apprehensions; 

–  Numbers of overstayers that have been given permission to work legally; 

–  Average time of enrolment for visa-exempt TCN; 

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–  Processing time at the border crossing points; 

–  Overall time needed to cross an external border; 

–  System availability rate; 

–  Error rates e.g. Failure to Enrol (FTE) rates, false matches, etc. 

•  Registered Traveller Programme 

–  Number of entries on the system; 

–  Numbers of persons on the programme (TCN and EU citizens); 

–  Average time of enrolment; 

–  Processing time at the border crossing points; 

–  Overall time needed to cross an external border; 

–  System availability rate; 

–  Error rates e.g. FTE, false matches, etc.; 

–  Border guard resources replaced by RTP. 

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ANNEXES  

Annex 1 

Glossary 

Annex 2 

Case studies and key lessons 

Annex 3 

Databases and systems at EU level 

Annex 4 

Statistics 

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ANNEX 1 

GLOSSARY 

The following terms have been used in this report. 

Automated Border 
Control  

A system that enables the automated verification of travellers’ identity without the intervention of border guards.  

A document reader electronically reads the biometrics included in the travel documents or stored in a system or database and 
compares them against the biometrics of the passengers.  

Passengers can be checked against ‘watch’ lists in an automated fashion if necessary.  

Bona fide 

(From  Latin)  genuine,  real  or  legal;  not  false:  for  bona  fide  travellers,  refer  to  Registered  Traveller  Programme  and  Scheme 
definition below 

Border Control  

Border  Control  means  the  activity  carried  out  at  a  border,  in  accordance  with  and  for  the  purposes  of  the  Schengen  Borders 
Code, in response exclusively to an intention to cross or the act of crossing that border, regardless of any other consideration, 
consisting of border checks and border surveillance including risk analysis and crime intelligence. 

Biometrics  

Biometrics  are  “unique,  measurable  characteristics  or  traits  of  a  human  being  for  automatically  recognising  or  verifying 
identity.” (OECD, 2004)  

The primary purposes of biometrics are to allow for: 

(cid:131)  Verification  (also  called  authentication)  or  “confirming  identity”  (ICAO,  2003a):  a  one-to-one  match  is  intended  to 

establish the validity of a claimed identity by comparing a verification template to an enrolment template. 

(cid:131) 

Identification  (also  called  recognition)  or  “determining  possible  identity”  (ICAO,  2003a):  a  one-to-many  matches  is 
intended to check the biometric characteristics of a person against an existing enrolee dataset (e.g. check against a watch 
list, prevention of multiple enrolments). 

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Enrolment 

Enrolment  is  the  process  of  collecting  data  from  an  individual  for  registration  in  the  Registered  Traveller  Programme, 
determining programme eligibility and issuance of membership and optionally token.  

Entry/exit system   An entry/exit system: 

(cid:131) 

registers the entry and exit of individuals in a database or system,  

(cid:131)  generates automated alerts when the legal entitlement of an individual to stay in the territory has expired and there is no 

record in the system that he/she has left the country.  

Overstayers  

Registered 
Traveller 
Programme  

Persons that have entered the territory legally (i.e. with a valid travel documents and/or visa) but have remained in the territory 
beyond the period they were entitled to stay 

Registered Traveller Programmes facilitate border crossing procedures for voluntary participants. These users have previously 
enrolled in the system by providing information including biometric identifiers. The passengers are checked against ‘watch’ lists 
to make sure that they are not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or international relations 
of any of the Member States. Other criteria may be imposed. 

At airports with Registered Traveller Programmes, individuals undergo a biometric verification that allows automated check-in 
or out. These systems tend to use different types of biometric technologies (OECD 2004) 

Vetting 

Vetting refers to process of adjudicating an applicant to determine programme eligibility. 

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ANNEX 2 

CASE STUDIES AND KEY LESSONS 

Entry/exit systems 

Four  existing  systems  were  assessed  in  order  to  find  key  lessons  and  possible  best  practises;  The  United  States  Visitor  Status  Indicator 
Technology (US-VISIT) system, Malaysia Autogate and the entry/exit systems in Finland and Estonia. The Japanese Ministry of Justice is 
introducing a biometric border control program for all non-Japanese citizens (with some small exceptions) from November 2007. This is being 
introduced as a measure for preventing terrorism and illegal immigration. When entering the country, all non-Japanese citizens will have their 
photograph taken using a digital camera and two fingerprints captured using a LiveScan device. This is done by an officer at a border control 
desk  and  is  in  addition  to  the  usual  immigration  procedures  at  the  border,  including  inspection  of  travel  and  immigration  documents  and 
questioning by the officer. 

Entry/exit systems have been adopted with the view of tackling overstayers and preventing terrorists and serious criminal to enter the territory 
of a country. However, their implementation is particularly challenging. The entry element has generally been prioritised over the exit.  

In the US the exit element has not yet been fully implemented. However, there have been some biometrics exit pilots in air borders, and there 
are plans for thorough implementation of biometrics exit registration at air and sea borders53. 

In Finland, the exit registration has been implemented selectively, for example only when it is possible without disrupting border crossings.  

Some benefits have been achieved by the systems in terms of detecting forged or stolen documents at entry (when biometrics are used). In US, 
over the period 2003-2007, 14,000 persons were referred to the immigration enforcement unit, of which 315 (2.25%) were arrested.  

Some  minor  benefits  have  been  achieved  in  preventing  criminals  and  serious  criminals  to  enter  the  territory.  In  the  US,  the  entry  system 
enables to check the identity of the travellers against several databases of wanted person, known or suspected terrorists and sexual offenders. 
A total of 1,500 people were rejected at the border (but it is not clear how many of them could be classified as serious criminals or terrorist). 
Information on how many terrorists were rejected at the border is not available.  

53 

At the moment the idea of having biometrics exit points at land borders has been postponed.  

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In order to be effective, efficient and reliable, an entry/exit systems need to satisfy all these conditions: 

•  The  system  has  to  be  implemented  at  all  types  of  borders  (air,  sea,  land).  In  the  absence  of  a  thorough  implementation  at  all  types  of 
borders the systems may displace the movements of would-be overstayers, criminals and terrorists towards those borders and entry points 
in which the system is not in place.  

•  The  exit  element  needs  to  be  fully  operational.  The  entry  element  is  beneficial  for  deterring,  detecting  and  stopping  serious  criminals, 

however, if the exit element is not fully operational the system does not help to identify, sanction and deter overstayers. 

•  It should use biometrics to verify people’s identities and detect forged or stolen documents.  

•  It should have an automated enrolment and search facility to check people against overstayers lists or watch lists of criminals and terrorists 

and generate alerts.  

•  They should generate automated alerts to identify overstayers. 

•  The information on overstayers should be passed on to responsible law enforcement authorities.  

•  Information on overstayers should be used to detect them, and to impose a sanction as a fine. 

•  They may or may not have automated gates. 

Automated Border Control 

Two existing systems were assessed in order to find key lessons and possible best practises; Smartgate in Australia and e.channel in Hong 
Kong. 

The  main  rationale  of  automated  border  control  systems  has  been  to  improve  the  accuracy  and  efficiency  of  border  controls.  The  main 
elements are: 

•  Enabling the accurate verification of travel documents and identities with biometrics checks. Automated border controls have a positive 

effect on deterring forged or stolen passports and improving identity verification. 

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•  Increasing  border  efficiency  by  allowing  border  guards  to  focus  on  those  people  that  have  not  enrolled  into  the  scheme.  However,  this 

benefit can be achieved only if a significant number of travellers have registered for the systems (e.g. Hong Kong).  

•  Registration and pre-screening of travellers are not necessary. The system is just about identity verification. In the case of Hong Kong the 
system is open to all Hong Kong nationals in possession of a biometric travel document. In the case of Smartgate the system is open to all 
travellers holding an Australian e-passport and other ICAO-compliant e-passport. 

Automated Border Control processes normally consist of the following: Fingerprint matching would be used in conjunction with an automated 
gate and kiosk. The traveller enters the automated gate area, possibly by presenting their passport in order to open a door that closes behind 
them once they have entered (to ensure only one passenger uses the gate at a time). The kiosk prompts the traveller to present the e-passport 
for scanning (visual and electronic) and is prompted to present one or two fingerprints for scanning. The fingerprint image is captured and the 
system converts both the captured image and the image stored on the e-passport into templates and attempts to match them, according to pre-
determined thresholds. If a good match is achieved, a second gate opens and the traveller is allowed to cross the border. If there is not a good 
enough match, or any other problem occurs, the gate does not open and the traveller is directed for processing by a border guard. 

Registered Traveller Programme 

Six  existing  systems  were  assessed  in  order  to  find  key  lessons  and  possible  best  practices;  Privium  in  Netherlands,  Pegase  in  France,  Iris 
(which is part of the e-borders strategy) in the United Kingdom, Nexus in Canada/the United States of America, ABG in Germany and APEC 
Business  Travel  Card.  For  example,  Privium  aims  at  facilitating  the  airport’s  most  frequent  users  (around  1%  of  the  traveller  population 
responsible  for  around  10%  of  the  total  traveller  movements).  Membership  in  the  programme  is  open  to  citizens  with  passports  from  the 
European  Economic  Area  and  Switzerland,  namely  to  all  EU  Member  States,  Norway,  Iceland,  Liechtenstein  and  Switzerland.  Privium 
currently has 36,000 members and it is estimated that it registers about 600 new members per month. 

The essential elements of Registered Traveller Programmes are: 

•  Ensuring that registered travellers (RT) do not present a risk in terms of illegal immigration or internal security. This is generally done by: 

(1) 

Undertaking a risk assessment prior to the registration. For instance people are checked against watch lists and other police databases. 
Biometrics may also be collected for undertaking security searches in police databases, (i.e. fingerprints are collected, stored and used 
to run security checks in US and Canada, Germany and France).  

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(2) 

(3) 

Restricting the eligibility of participants. For instance, in France and the Netherlands only EU and Swiss nationals can participate; in 
the APEC countries the scheme is open only to business people that are frequent flyers and national of countries participating into the 
scheme. 

Eligibility might be extended to non-nationals providing that certain security conditions are met. For example in the UK, permanent 
residents, visa holders and work permit holders are eligible to enrol in the Iris programme. Participants to the APEC business Card are 
checked against watch lists of all participant countries.  

•  Ensuring  faster  border  checks.  This  is  done  by  creating  automated,  self-service  kiosks  and  creating  separated  lanes.  However,  borders 
checks takes approximately the same time that manual checks, the main advantage of RT is shorter queues because less people are part of 
the system. When the RT is applied to TCN, there are additional benefits for participants as they can go through a fast track immigration 
process (i.e. in ABTC scheme visa holders go through a faster immigration interview assessment).  

•  Ensuring the integrity of border checks by undertaking random checks. 

•  Verification of travellers’ identities with biometric checks. All the schemes use biometrics, even if there is a great deal of variation on the 

type of biometrics used (i.e. iris in UK and the Netherlands, fingerprints in France). 

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ANNEX 3 

DATABASES AND SYSTEMS AT EU LEVEL 

Databases containing information on potentially dangerous people, visa and asylum applicants have been set up and/or are being developed.  

SIS 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  is  a  computer  network  for  the  collection  and  exchange  of  information  relating  to  immigration, 
policing  and  criminal  law  for  the  purpose  of  law  enforcement  and  immigration  control.  SIS  was  established  after  the  1990  Schengen 
Convention for the implementation of the 1985 Schengen Agreement and became operational in 1995. The system applies to Member States 
that fully participates in the Schengen acquis.  

The main categories of data contained in the SIS are: 

•  Persons wanted for arrest, extradition and for transfer in the context of the European Arrest Warrant and to be placed under surveillance or 

subjected to specific checks; 

•  Third country nationals to be refused entry into the Schengen territory; 

•  Missing persons (minors and adults); 

•  Witnesses and persons required to appear before the judicial authorities; 

•  Person or vehicles to be put under surveillance or for specific checks;  

•  Certain categories of objects (e.g. stolen identity cards, vehicles, firearms, bank notes); 

The names of persons in the above categories can be introduced into the SIS by each Schengen State. The Schengen States are the owners of 
the data they introduce into the SIS and bear the responsibility for their legality and accuracy. 

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The SIS can be consulted by police, border police, customs and partially by authorities responsible for delivering visas and resident permits. It 
is up to each Member State to decide which national agencies are to have access to some or all categories of SIS alerts.  

The SIS enables the users to check persons and objects both at external borders and within the territory of the Schengen States. The SIS allows 
the law enforcement authorities to know if a person is wanted and why, what priority action is to be taken and if the person is violent and 
armed.  

Since  1995  more  than  17  million  records  have been  created  on  the  SIS.  The  vast  majority  of  records  concern  lost  or  stolen  items,  such  as 
identity  documents.  Since  2005  yearly  statistics  on  the  SIS  operations  have  been  published,  but  without  giving  details  relating  to  different 
Member States, as these are considered ‘sensitive national data’. Figures from 2007 indicated that54

: 

•  More than 13 million records have been created on stolen identity documents (passports, identity cards, driving licence);  

•  More than one million records have been created on wanted persons (894,776 wanted persons plus 312,052 aliases); 

•  The vast majority of wanted people are third-country nationals who should be denied entry under article 96; 

•  Over 33,000 people have been placed under ‘discreet surveillance’ and 7 to be checked.  

The SIS currently stores only alphanumeric data (letters and numbers), comprising (as regards individuals) data on55: 

•  names, including aliases; 

•  sex and “objective physical characteristics”; 

•  date and place of birth; 

•  nationality; 

54 
55 

Council document 6178, 13.22007. 
Article 94(3) of the Schengen Convention. 

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•  whether the persons are armed or violent; 

•  the reason for the alert; and 

•  the action to be taken. 

Very  often  these  details  are  not  enough  to  give  the  authorities  the  information  they  need,  and  thus  a  supplementary  system  with  extra 
information has been created since SIS became operational. 

Each  Member  State  holds  this  supplementary  information  on  persons  who  are  the  subject  of  its  alerts  on  the  SIS  in  a  national  data  bases 
known  as  SIRENE  (Supplementary  Information  Request  at  the  National  Entry).  Information  contained  in  SIRENE  databases  is  accessible, 
upon request, to law enforcement agencies in all Member States, as set out by the SIRENE Manual56. 

With the European enlargement, the SIS has proved insufficient, and SIS II is being developed.  

SIS II has been designed to function in an enlarged Europe, but also to deal with new challenges and use biometrics to verify people’s identity. 
SIS II is being developed to contain new functions, such as new categories of subjects, and new types of data such as biometrics. There is also 
the possibility that SIS II may be linked to other European databases, such as VIS. SIS II should provide for the following new functions: 

•  The addition of new categories of alerts;  

•  The addition of new categories of data, including ‘biometric’ data; 

•  The interlinking of alerts; 

•  Widening access to the SIS. For example, the national members of Eurojust, the EU prosecutors’ agency, which will have power to access 

alerts concerning extradition, missing persons, wanted persons and alerts on objects57; 

•  A shared technical platform with the Visa Information System (VIS). 

56 
57 

COM(2001) 720 and revised manual OJ L 317, 22.9.2006.  
Under SIS Eurojust can only access alerts concerning extradition and wanted persons. 

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In 2004 a Council Regulation and in 2005 a Council Decision were passed to introduce some new functions to SIS II for the fight against 
terrorism58.  

On 20th December 2006 two Regulations were approved on the establishment, operation and use of SIS II59.  

VIS 

The Visa Information System (VIS) is a system for the exchange of visa data between Member States that was initially put forward in 200460. 
All  functionalities  of  VIS  operate  on  applications  or  visa  decisions  attached  to  applications.  Visas  are  always  issued  as  a  result  of  an 
application in the system. After a first registration, an application can be amended, until a decision is made whether a Schengen visa should be 
issued or not. After visa issuance further decisions can take place, for example, an issued visa can be revoked due to bad behaviour of the 
traveller in the Schengen area, or a visa can be extended. VIS supports the storage, maintenance and retrieval of all this information. 

The main objectives of the VIS are: 

•  to facilitate the visa application procedure;  

•  to prevent the bypassing of the criteria for the determination of the Member State responsible for examining the application; 

•  to facilitate the fight against fraud; 

•  to facilitate checks at external border crossing points and within the territory of the Member States; 

•  to  assist  in  the  identification  of  any  person  who  may  not,  or  may  no  longer  fulfil  the  conditions  for  entry  to,  stay  or  residence  on  the 

territory of the Member States; 

•  to facilitate the application of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003; 

58 
59 
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Council Regulation 871, 28.4.2004. 
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. 
Council Decision (EC) 512, 8.6.2004.  

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•  to contribute to the prevention of threats to the internal security of any of the Member States. 

According to the text of the draft VIS Regulation agreed by the European Parliament and Council on 14 May 2007, the VIS will store personal 
data from the VISA applicants: 

•  Data on the applicant (i.e. name, address, occupation); 

•  Data on the visa application process (date and place of the application, visas requested, issued, refused, annulled, revoked or extended); 

•  Biometrics (photographs and fingerprints). 

Police authorities from Member States and Europol will have a restricted and indirect access to the VIS data. Each Member State will have to 
nominate an authority responsible for controlling police access to the database and the police will have to supply evidence that their query is 
necessary for criminal investigations. However, in case of emergencies the police can put a more direct query on the VIS.  

Transfer  of  data  to  third  countries  or  international  organisations  may  take  place  only  in  an  exceptional  case  of  urgency  and  only  for  the 
purpose of the prevention and detection of terrorists’ offence and serious crime offence and with the consent of the Member State that entered 
the data. Furthermore, a permanent Management Authority will be responsible for the VIS database and visa application will be stored for a 
maximum of five years.  

EURODAC 

Eurodac is a fingerprint database that stores and compares the fingerprints of asylum applicants and illegal immigrants and allows Member 
States to determine the State responsible for examining an asylum application according to Dublin II Regulation. The EURODAC central unit 
is responsible for operating a computerised central database for comparing fingerprints, an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) 
and a secure communication system for data transmission from and towards the national units (National Access Points) in Member States.  

Data collected for any asylum applicants over 14 years of age are: 

•  Fingerprint and control images; 

•  Date of the application; 

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•  The Member States where the asylum application was filled; 

•  The gender of the applicant. 

Data are collected for: 

Category 1: data of asylum applications. Fingerprints (full 10 fingerprints and 4 control images) of asylum applicants are sent to the Central 
Unit for comparison against fingerprints of other asylum applicants who have previously lodge their application in another Member State. The 
data  will  also  be  compared  against  the  ‘category  2’  data.  These  data  will  be  kept  for  10  years.  Data  should  be  erased  when  an  individual 
obtains the nationally of one of the Member States.  

Category 2: data of aliens apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of an external border and where not repatriated. These data (10 
fingerprints and 4 control images) are sent to the Central Unit for storage only, in order to be compared against data of asylum application 
submitted subsequently to the Central Unit. These data are kept for 2 years and are deleted if the individual received a residence permit, leave 
the territory of a Member State or obtain the nationality of one of them.  

Category 3: data of aliens found illegally present in a Member State. These data are not stored but are searched against the data of asylum 
applicants stored in the central database. The transmission of this category is not mandatory but optional for Member States.  

The Central unit can transmit three types of ‘hits’: 

•  Category 1 against category 1 hit. This gives an indication of the secondary movements of asylum seekers in the EU. 

•  Category  1  against  category  2  hit.  It  gives  information  on  whether  an  asylum  applicant  applies  in  the  same  MS  he/she  has  been 

apprehended or in a different MS.  

•  Category 3 against category 1 hit. It gives indications as to where illegal immigrants first applied for asylum before travelling to another 

MS.  

In 2006, EURODAC processed: 

•  187,223 fingerprints of asylum seekers (category 1), down by 20% compare to the previous year,  

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•  25,162 fingerprints of people crossing the borders irregularly (category 2), increased by 36% from the previous year, and  

•  46,299  fingerprints  of  people  apprehended  while  illegally  residing  on  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  (category  3).  This  figures  has 
increased by 15% from the previous year, demonstrating a growing interests from Member States to make use of this search possibility.  

The increase of category transaction may be due to the fact that Member States have completed the installation of fingerprint machines at their 
external borders.  

EURODAC data also provide information on multiple asylum applications. In 2005, 16% of aliens applying for asylum had already lodged 
one or more applications in the same Member State or in another Member State. Out of a total of 187,223 asylum applications, 31,363 were 
‘multiple applications”. See Table 1 for a comparison with year 2004 and 2006.  

Table 1 EURODAC information on multiple applications. 

Year 

Number  of  asylum  applications  recorded  by 
EURODAC (Category 1) 

At  least  one  asylum  application  before 
(in  the  same  country  or  in  another 
Member State) 

2004 

2005 

2006 

246,902 

232,205 

187,223 

17,287 

31,307 

31,636 

Source: The third EURODAC annual report, 200661.  

Currently the existing systems are not fully exploited and present some shortcoming such as: 

61 

SEC(2006) 1170.  

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•  Some  categories  of  alerts  in  the  SIS,  such  as  alerts  issued  for  discreet  surveillance  or  specific  checks  are  used  in  a  limited  and 
heterogeneous way. Besides the common databases, many Member States maintain separate lists for the same purpose (e.g. refusal of entry, 
dangerous people) possibly duplicating efforts62.  

•  The  number  of  EURODAC  category  2  transactions  (fingerprints  of  aliens  apprehended  crossing  illegally  the  external  borders)  remains 

surprisingly low, especially in some Member States63. 

•  There is a relatively high rate of rejected EURODAC transactions (6.12%). This does not depend on technology or system weaknesses but 
on the low quality of the fingerprints images submitted by Member States, to human error or to the wrong configuration of Member States’ 
equipment. Specific training to EURODAC national operators and purchase of state-of-the-arts equipment, such as live scanners, has been 
recommended to reduce rejection rate64.  

•  There is limited possibility to use data for internal security purposes. However, the Commission intends to explore the possibility to extend 
the scope of EURODAC with the view to use the data for law enforcement purpose and as a means to contribute to the fight against illegal 
migration65. 

62 
63 
64 

65 

EN 

COM(2005) 597.  
COM(2007) 299 and SEC(2006) 1170.  
COM(2005)  597.  The  Commission  will  organise  training  course  for  Member  States  to  improve  the  quality  of  data.  In  addition,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  use 
European findings to improve scan equipments. 
COM(2007) 299. 

74 

EN 

 
  
                                                 
STATISTICS 

ANNEX 4 

CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the crossing of Frontiers and Immigration) was set up to assist Member States 
in  effectively  studying  and  preventing  illegal  immigration,  and  in  facilitating  exchange  of  data  across  the  EU.  Figures  are  submitted  by 
Member States and are coordinated by CIREFI Unit within Eurostat.  

CIREFI  data  have  to  be  taken  with  caution.  Figures  are  submitted  by  Member  States,  but  sometimes  the  figures  are  not  submitted  for  all 
categories or submitted only partially. In addition, CIREFI data do not make a distinction between the number of rejected asylum seekers that 
were removed and the number of undocumented and irregular migrants. The data on removals also include the number of non-EU person that 
were removed for other reasons (e.g. non-EU convicted for criminal offences).  

EN 

75 

EN 

 
  
Table 1: Number of aliens refused at the external borders 2003-2006. 

Country  

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain* 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

The Netherlands 

2003 

4,143 

5,917 

31,166 

658 

42,072 

3,056 

17,300 

706,081 

31,317 

5,826 

24,003 

3,384 

5,151 

5,516 

n.a 

21,263 

805 

9,382 

EN 

2004 

2,030 

6,395 

37,534 

367 

30,155 

2,308 

14,338 

602,262 

32,865 

4,763 

24,003 

2,540 

2,267 

4,690 

n.a 

23,823 

607 

n.a 

76 

2005 

1,661 

6,561 

6,486 

333 

15,012 

1,924 

11,399 

598,510 

35,049 

4,807 

19,336 

2,018 

777 

3,886 

n.a 

21,159 

262 

n.a 

2006 

1,868 

5,765 

3,067 

210 

19,857 

2,655 

10,729 

630,305 

34,308 

5,833 

20,266 

1,825 

1,017 

3,332 

n.a 

23,015 

264 

n.a 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

EU 27 TOTAL 

Source: CIREFI 2003-2006 

22,305 

44,380 

3,695 

55,950 

38,589 

18,201 

2,910 

1,601 

n.a 

24,803 

65,403 

4,327 

61,818 

28,410 

19,896 

1,533 

557 

n.a 

23,295 

41,296 

4,146 

51,082 

28,401 

7,203 

951 

813 

n.a 

27,682 

39,812 

3,590 

48,210 

23,518 

2,897 

1,033 

668 

n.a 

1,104,671 

997,694 

886,367 

911,726 

* The high number for Spain is due to the number of people refused at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in North 
Africa.  

Table 2: Number of irregulars refused at the border by third-country nationality. 

Refused aliens in EU27 

 Third Countries  

Morocco 

Mauritania 

Romania 

EN 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

597,957 

591,582 

619,178 

30,092 

34,537 

48,594 

636,371 

64,150 

32,594 

77 

EN 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
Moldova 

Ukraine 

Poland 

ex-Yugoslavia (*) 

Hungary 

Russia 

Bulgaria 

Philippines 

Turkey 

Serbia & Montenegro (*) 

Belarus 

Bolivia 

China 

Others 

TOTAL 

Top 10 total 

% of TOTAL 

18,584 

26,164 

31,779 

28,432 

24,093 

23,847 

23,670 

16,300 

20,204 

36,863 

30,182 

19,247 

18,640 

22,010 

19,661 

16,300 

178,687 

1,104,671 

925,984 

83.82 

186,538 

997,694 

811,156 

81.30 

37,893 

40,130 

40,184 

35,797 

11,745 

23,030 

10,427 

12,005 

12,146 

8,547 

104,325 

886,367 

782,042 

88.23 

9,574 

18,053 

8,619 

13,430 

12,096 

8,557 

97,644 

911,726 

814,082 

89.29 

Source: CIREFI 2003-2006  

Note 1: *) Since February 2003 name changed to "Serbia & Montenegro” 

Note 2: Figures are not completed.  

EN 

78 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Number of irregulars or illegal immigrants apprehended on the EU territory by Member States. 

Countries  

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

2003 

22,164 

454 

23,142 

1,666 

26,493 

1,716 

47,915 

55,164 

54,092 

n.a 

59,535 

3,794 

518 

502 

n.a 

509 

945 

The Netherlands 

12,189 

EN 

2004 

20,606 

877 

18,675 

1,414 

22,558 

1,549 

42,834 

52,798 

55,283 

n.a 

61,024 

2,535 

366 

406 

n.a 

488 

1,723 

10,883 

79 

2005 

18,400 

1,190 

11,606 

1,064 

20,270 

2,703 

58,836 

41,939 

62,468 

n.a 

83,809 

1,281 

254 

863 

n.a 

17,373 

2,416 

10,803 

2006 

15,670 

1,238 

7,536 

867 

21,635 

2,069 

77,030 

95,765 

67,134 

n.a 

92,029 

631 

247 

1,156 

n.a 

15,622 

2,185 

11,939 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

EU 27 TOTAL 

Source: CIREFI 2003-2006 

43,448 

8,841 

17,886 

4,975 

4,214 

10,257 

1,588 

27,163 

n.a 

36,879 

8,191 

16,020 

4,981 

4,214 

8,571 

2,949 

19,877 

n.a 

37,934 

7,045 

17,223 

4,940 

4,971 

4,916 

2,757 

14,447 

n.a 

37,692 

6,396 

23,564 

4,809 

4,331 

4,035 

1,689 

20,926 

n.a 

429,170

395,701 

429,508

516,195 

EN 

80 

EN 

 
  
Table 4: Number of irregulars or illegal immigrants apprehended on the EU territory by country of origin. 

Third Countries 

Apprehended aliens in EU27 

2003

2004

2005

2006 

Romania 

Albania 

Morocco 

Ukraine 

Iraq 

Senegal 

Russia 

Brazil 

Algeria 

ex-Yugoslavia (*) 

Pakistan 

Bulgaria 

Serbia & Montenegro (*) 

China 

Moldova 

Turkey 

Others 

38,894 

41,846 

35,048 

34,082 

13,518 

43,839 

37,025 

33,942 

29,289 

17,991 

17,346 

14,182 

13,952 

14,634 

13,473 

11,914 

13,020 

193,164 

11,019 

11,989 

11,185 

173,799 

81 

84,009 

58,738 

40,920 

22,025 

22,527 

19,775 

17,594 

14,019 

13,654 

11,860 

63,172 

52,461 

34,092 

26,964 

14,351 

13,937 

12,009 

11,412 

13,101 

12,712 

175,297 

211,074 

EN 

EN 

 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL 

Top 10 total 

% of TOTAL 

Source: CIREFI 2003-2006  

429,170 

236,006 

54.99 

395,981 

222,182 

56.11 

429,508 

254,211 

59.19 

516,195 

305,121 

59.11 

*) Note: since February 2003 the name changed to Serbia&Montenegro  

EN 

82 

EN 

 
  
Table 5: Number of removed aliens by Member States.  

Country  

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

The Netherlands 

Austria 

2003 

9,996 

814 

2,602 

3,100 

30,176 

171 

40,930 

26,757 

11,692 

n.a 

31,013 

3,307 

375 

846 

n.a 

4,804 

847 

23,206 

11,070 

2004 

9,647 

1,271 

2,649 

3,093 

26,807 

101 

35,942 

27,364 

15,672 

n.a 

27,402 

2,982 

234 

306 

n.a 

3,980 

680 

17,775 

9,408 

83 

EN 

2005 

10,302 

1,608 

2,730 

2,225 

19,988 

60 

51,079 

25,359 

18,120 

n.a 

24,001 

3,015 

162 

182 

n.a 

4,348 

962 

12,386 

5,239 

2006 

9,264 

1,501 

1,228 

1,986 

15,407 

91 

54,756 

33,235 

21,271 

n.a 

16,597 

3,222 

141 

168 

n.a 

3,057 

781 

12,669 

4,904 

EN 

 
  
Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

EU 27 TOTAL 

Source: CIREFI 2003-2006  

5,879 

2,798 

500 

3,209 

1,293 

2,773 

7,355 

21,380 

6,042 

3,507 

650 

2,632 

2,528 

2,775 

11,714 

n.a 

5,141 

6,162 

616 

3,133 

2,569 

1,900 

8,122 

n.a 

9,272 

1,079 

680 

3,173 

2,185 

1,410 

3,793 

n.a 

246,893

215,161 

209,409

201,870 

Note: figures cover both voluntary and forced return. 

EN 

84 

EN 

 
  
Legal Migration 

Table 6: Third country nationals legally living in EU25 in 2003. 

Country  

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

The Netherlands 

Austria 

Total Non-EU Population  

% Non-EU Population  

274,000 

78,800 

204,800 

4,794,300 

267,500 

687,700 

2,193,400 

2,060,800 

135,200 

1,168,500 

33,300 

28,900 

32,500 

21,900 

112,700 

2,700 

477,900 

551,100 

2.64 

0.77 

3.8 

5.8 

19,72 

6.25 

5.2 

3.45 

3.14 

2.04 

4.65 

1.25 

0.93 

4.88 

1.11 

0.67 

2.94 

6.81 

EN 

85 

EN 

 
  
Poland 

Portugal 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Total  

Source: Eurostat estimate  

685,700 

183,400 

43,300 

91,300 

75,500 

269,100 

1,719,600 

16,190,900 

1.79 

1.8 

2.17 

1.7 

1.39 

3 

2.89 

3.55 

Note: EU nationals include citizens from EU10 even though data refers to a year before 2004 accession.  

EN 

86 

EN 

 
  
Table 7: Resident permits breakdown for selected countries.  

Member 
State  

Austria 

Denmark 

Estonia 

France  

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania

Hungary 

Romania 

Sweden  

United 
Kingdom 

Average  

Most important categories for granting residence permit for selected MS 

(percentage) in 2003 

Family reunification 

Study 

Employment  

Others  

43.1 

21.3 

29.9 

53.2 

31.4 

50.0 

39.6 

14.6 

12.6 

60.8 

47.1 

36.7 

8.2 

27.6 

10.7 

27.1 

2.8 

7.1 

8.4 

14.1 

29.5 

13.7 

n.a. 

15.0 

44.6 

22.2 

13 

4.8 

55.1 

26.9 

6.2 

59.5 

26 

25.5 

21.2 

28.0 

4.2 

28.9 

46.3 

14.9 

10.7 

15.9 

45.7 

11.8 

31.9 

0 

31.7 

22.0 

Source: Elaboration from Eurostat (Annual Report on Asylum and Migration 2003). 

Note:  Methodology  of  residency  permit  data  collection  varies  to  great  extent  from  Member  States  to  Member  States.  For  example,  some 
Member States have provided the stock of permit, some other only the flows, some include seasonal workers and other do not include seasonal 
workers.  For  this  reason,  only  percentages  are  given,  to  provide  an  indication  of  the  order  of  scale  between  the  different  residence  permit, 
instead of absolute numbers. 

EN 

87 

EN 

 
  
 
Table 8: Estimate of annual inflows of work permit in 16 EU countries. 

Member State  

All work 

permits holders 

Comments 

Denmark 

Germany 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Hungary 

The Netherlands 

Poland 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

1,600 

Figures from 2003. 

165,000 

Figures from 2003. Figures relate to non-EU persons arriving in 
Germany. The total includes multiple entries. 

65,000 

31,200 

16,100 

78,800 

2,800 

500 

40,300 

38,000 

5,600 

1,000 

13,100 

6,700 

89,200 

Approximate net estimate for 2002/2003. 

Figures from 2003. 

Figures from 2003. New member states (EU10) are excluded. 

Work permit issued to non-EU nationals in 2003 for self employment and 
contract work.  

Figures from 2002. 

Figures from 2003. 

Figures from 2003. 

Figures from 2003 

Estimated new permits (excl renewals) for non-EU persons in 2002. 

Total non-EU in-flow for 2002. 

Figures from 2003. 

Figures from 2002. 

Figures from 2003. Persons who entered the UK from abroad with a work 
permit in 2003. Excludes renewals and "first permissions" for those 
already resident in the UK.  

EN 

88 

EN 

 
  
Total 

EU25 

554,900 

633,200 

 Estimation 

Source: Source: Policy Plan on Legal Immigration COM (2005) 669. 

EN 

89 

EN 

 
  
 
Table 9: Regularisation of illegal immigrants in selected Member States. 

MS 

Year  

Number of regularisations  

Total  

1998 White Card  

Greece 

1998 Green Card  

Greece total  

Italy 

Italy total  

France 

France total  

Spain  

2001 

1986-87 

1990 

1995-96 

1998-99 

2002 

1981-82 

1997-98 

1985-86 

1991 

1996 

2000 

2001 

370,000 

220,000 

228,000 

118,700 

235,000 

238,000 

193,200 

634,700 

121,100 

77,800 

23,000 

109,134 

21,300 

153,463 

221,083 

818,000 

1,419,600 

198,900 

EN 

90 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 

1992-93 

1996 

2001 

Spain total  

Portugal  

Portugal  

Total  

Source: Policy Plan on Legal Immigration COM (2005) 669. 

500,000 

38,364 

31,000 

170,000 

1,027,980 

239,364 

3,464,480 

EN 

91 

EN 

 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Visas 

Table 10: Number of Schengen visa. 

Total number of visa (A,B,C, VTL, D+C) 

Belgium 

Germany 

Denmark 

Spain 

Finland 

France 

Greece 

Italy 

Luxembourgh 

The Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

Sweden 

Total Schengen  

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

2006 

155,669 

1,827,686 

73,940 

733,015 

570,726 

1,898,488 

578,527 

1,036,531 

4,780 

382,280 

92,258 

91,200 

189,331 

7,634,429 

404,335 

153,486 

EN 

92 

EN 

 
  
Czech republic 

Estonia 

Hungary 

Lithuania 

Latvia 

Malta 

Poland 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Total Non-Schengen  

Total  

Source: Council document No 10700/07 VISA 187 COMIX 556, 19.06.2007. 

Note 2006: Austria, Switzerland and Romania have not submitted the information. 

589,234 

127,444 

580,317 

420,878 

158,830 

14,093 

1,221,287 

95,131 

146,347 

3,911,381 

11,545,810 

EN 

93 

EN 

 
  
Table 11: Schengen types of Visa and Visa Fees.  

Type of Visa  

Fee to be charge (in Euro) 

Airport Transit Visa (Category A)  

Transit Visa (Category B)  

Short Stay Visa (1 to 90 days) (Category C)  

Visa with limited territorial validity (LTV) 

60 

60 

60 

60 

Visa issued at the border (Category B and C)  

60 (this Visa might be issued free of charge) 

Group Visa (Category A, B and C)  

60 (per person, 5 – 50 persons)  

National Long Stay Visit (Category D) 

The  amount  shall  be  fixed  by  Member  States,  who  may  decide  to  issue 
these visas free of charge.  

Source:  Council  Decision  (EC)  No  440,  1.6.2006  amending  the  Annex  12  of  the  Common  Consular  Instructions  and  Annex  14a  to  the 
Common Manual on the fees to be charged corresponding to the administrative costs of processing visa application.  

Table 12: List of States whose nationals are exempted by Schengen Visa.  

States whose nationals are exempted from Schengen Visa  

Australia and New Zealand  

Canada  

EN 

94 

EN 

 
  
Croatia, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Holy See  

Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Israel, Hong Kong, Macao 

Latin America States (except nationals from Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Guyana, Suriname)  

United State  

Source: Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001, recently amended by the Regulation (EC) 1932/2006. 

EN 

95 

EN 

 
  
Border crossing points and border crossings 

Table 13: Official Border Crossing Points of the Schengen and future Schengen States by Member States and type of borders.  

Member States 

Land Borders 

Sea Borders 

Air Borders 

Total 

Belgium 

Czech Rep.  

Denmark  

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary  

Malta 

Netherlands  

EN 

2 

0 

0 

0 

7 

11 

4 

9 

0 

0 

16 

29 

0 

27 

0 

0 

6 

0 

133 

119 

39 

53 

32 

42 

108 

7 

9 

2 

0 

1 

3 

12 

96 

6 

19 

38 

131 

7 

29 

31 

108 

50 

2 

4 

4 

1 

10 

4 

9 

14 

19 

171 

250 

53 

93 

67 

193 

158 

9 

29 

35 

1 

38 

4 

21 

EN 

 
  
Austria 

Poland  

Portugal 

Slovenia 

Slovakia  

Finland  

Sweden 

Iceland 

Norway 

Romania  

Bulgaria 

Total  

0 

29 

0 

57 

4 

26 

0 

0 

1 

23 

11 

256 

2 

19 

22 

3 

1 

66 

60 

25 

76 

10 

11 

70 

20 

8 

3 

8 

24 

31 

5 

25 

13 

5 

72 

68 

30 

63 

13 

116 

91 

30 

102 

46 

27 

871 

665 

1792 

Source:  List  of  border  crossing  points  referred  to  in  Article  2(8)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  562/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code).  

Notes:  

The table does not include the external border crossing points between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ Schengen States, and between the Member States 
and Switzerland/Liechtenstein, on the assumption that by the time an entry/exit system would be established, the abolition of internal border 
controls pursuant to the Schengen Convention would be fully applicable to these States. 

Both river and sea ports are included in sea borders.  

Both airports and aerodromes are included in air borders.  

EN 

97 

EN 

 
  
Denmark: The mainland of Denmark has 106 ports, the Faroe Islands have 11, and Greenland has 18. As for airports, the mainland has 24, the 
Faroe Islands have 1, and Greenland has 13.  

Cyprus: the de facto land borders within the country are not listed. 

Latvia: 4 external land border crossing points are open to local border traffic only. 

Slovenia:  the  land  border  crossing  points  are  listed  as  25  land  borders,  10  interstate  borders  and  22  land  borders  reserved  for  local  border 
traffic. 

Finland: most of the land border crossing points (17 of them) are open for limited use only and that traffic at these points ‘consists almost 
exclusively of timber freight’.  

France: land border crossing points with UK are: (1) Gare de Paris/Nord-London Waterloo; (2) Gare de Lille Europe – London Waterloo; (3) 
Gare de Frethun- London Waterloo; (4) Cheriton- Coquelles (5) Gare-de-Chessy-Marne-la-Valle (6) Gare d’Avignon. Border with Andorra: 
(7) Pas de la Case  

EN 

98 

EN 

 
  
Table 14: Number of trips made by EU resident populations outside the EU in 2005. 

Country  

Belgium  

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Number of trips made outside the EU in 2005 (Eurostat)* 

1,751,947 

4,087,974 

1,877,739 

1,557,080 

24,626,901 

131,291 

892,000 

711,925 

3,294,345 

9,659,104 

5,443,283 

245,080 

297,539 

739,950 

180,000 

1,615,061 

n.a 

EN 

99 

EN 

 
  
Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Total  

2,976,000 

2,551,274 

1,059,000 

n.a 

n.a 

1,818,103 

1,002,598 

1,011,000 

550,000 

12,250,869 

80,330,063 

Source: own calculation from Eurostat database on tourism  

Notes*:  

Data are provided by Member States on the basis of their own estimates. Data for some countries are not available. 

Data are based on the number of trips made by EU 27 resident population (every person living in that country for more that 12 months). 

EN 

100 

EN 

 
  
Table 15: Number of trips made by Non-EU to EU 27 in 2005.  

Country  

Belgium  

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Number of trips made by Non-EU to EU 27 in 2005 

1,186,471 

527,315 

1,519,292 

722,835 

8,214,155 

159,682 

n.a 

1,975,871 

6,647,613 

12,167,757 

14,304,009 

293,327 

141,666 

160,729 

107,416 

1,029,189 

119,695 

EN 

101 

EN 

 
  
Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Total  

2,711,100 

3,234,749 

1,156,236 

1,001,915 

n.a 

369,959 

236,305 

756,206 

2,125,176 

8,040,634 

68,909,302 

Source: Own calculation from Eurostat database on tourism  

Note: 

Data are provided by Member States on the basis of their own estimates. Data for some countries are not available.  

The  numbers  are  based  on  the  estimates  of  overnight  stays  in  hotel,  collective  accommodation  establishment  or  in  private  tourism 
accommodation.  People  staying  with  friends  and  relatives  are  not  counted.  Overnight  stays  are  registered  by  country  of  residence  of  the 
travellers. There is no age limit (children are covered). 

EN 

102 

EN 

 
  
Table 16: Number of trips made by third country nationals not requiring visa (most important countries) into EU.  

Country  

Canada  

US 

Brazil  

Japan  

South 
Korea  

Oceania  

total  

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

43,810 

292,050 

15,181 

111,985 

15,386 

37,964 

516,376 

n.a 

31,901 

n.a 

17,229 

n.a 

n.a 

49,130 

45,439 

303,641 

11,652 

153,980 

46,850 

48,896 

610,458 

9,210 

105,337 

4,227 

34,491 

3,636 

21,988 

178,889 

203,187 

1,949,825 

93,836 

730,232 

137,652 

220,328 

3,335,060 

3,254 

19,506 

n.a 

n.a 

450 

n.a 

8,066 

n.a 

101,230 

581,095 

14,601 

91,212 

360 

n.a 

0 

3,779 

n.a 

35,415 

n.a 

112,149 

900,287 

162,321 

1,455,435 

178,880 

629,690 

54,119 

147,083 

2,627,528 

377,239 

3,166,708 

n.a 

1,459,289 

n.a 

n.a 

5,003,236 

549,969 

4,333,905 

263,782 

1,634,470 

286,544 

669,646 

7,738,316 

2,342 

2,279 

1,625 

3,852 

9,280 

17,377 

19,561 

23,100 

18,882 

174,643 

3,162 

13,241 

n.a 

168 

321 

1,929 

n.a 

227 

1,502 

5,732 

8,848 

6,161 

112,127 

8,380 

n.a 

138 

372 

934 

n.a 

168 

4,330 

3,320 

2,315 

3,056 

17,454 

29,014 

33,042 

39,032 

20,437 

326,089 

7,575 

32,753 

Netherlands 

125,700 

966,900 

29,300 

156,900 

21,900 

105,100 

1,405,800 

Austria 

69,957 

539,674 

n.a 

277,518 

57,144 

129,863 

1,074,156 

EN 

103 

EN 

 
  
Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

Total  

22,051 

203,696 

6,935 

44,631 

23,928 

20,219 

321,460 

68,150 

229,695 

174,650 

99,686 

10,734 

38,202 

621,117 

n.a 

6,936 

5,348 

10,888 

40,760 

32,553 

87,054 

n.a 

n.a 

n.a 

n.a 

n.a 

1,012 

12,084 

2,943 

16,300 

674 

14,316 

11,969 

5,430 

n.a 

80,035 

70,290 

3,331 

70,434 

13,544 

17,453 

202,704 

18,093 

211,550 

0 

56,540 

8,621 

24,995 

319,799 

641,093 

3,220,952 

56,731 

315,776 

124,880 

957,554 

5,316,986 

2,496,017 

18,029,439 

857,887 

6,061,279 

821,822 

2,617,982 

30,884,426 

Source: own calculation from Eurostat database on tourism  

Notes: 

Data are provided by Member States on the basis of their own estimates. Data for some countries are not available. 

The  numbers  are  based  on  the  estimates  of  overnight  stays  in  hotel,  collective  accommodation  establishment  or  in  private  tourism 
accommodation.  People  staying  with  friends  and  relatives  are  not  counted.  Overnight  stays  are  registered  by  country  of  residence  of  the 
travellers. There is no age limit (children are covered). 

EN 

104 

EN