Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Multi-annual contracts for rail infrastructure quality {SEC(2008) 131} {SEC(2008) 132} {SEC(2008) 133}
Date: 2008-02-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: financial management, financing, maintenance, rail transport, transport infrastructure, transport policy

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 6.2.2008 
COM(2008) 54 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Multi-annual contracts for rail infrastructure quality 

{SEC(2008) 131} 
{SEC(2008) 132} 
{SEC(2008) 133} 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

Multi-annual contracts for rail infrastructure quality 

1. 

GENERAL CONTEXT 

1.1. 

The financing of rail infrastructure  

The  European  Community's  transport  policy  is  concerned  with  developing  and  optimising 
transport  infrastructure  and  ensuring  its  sound  management  in  terms  of  quality,  reliability, 
flexibility  and  customer  orientation.  This  requires  mobilising  appropriate  sources  of 
financing. Six years after the adoption of the rail infrastructure package1, there is still concern 
about  the  sustainable  financing  of  existing  rail  infrastructure,  the  quality  of  infrastructure 
service and how to get infrastructure managers to perform better. This is one of the outcomes 
of extensive stakeholder consultations conducted between May 2006 and September 20072.  

This  Communication  sets  out  the  measures  that  Member  States  and  infrastructure  managers 
should  take  to  combine  financial  equilibrium  with  an  appropriate  level  of  rail  infrastructure 
services. The Commission recommends that these measures be applied consistently and fully 
in the European Union, but will consider whether to propose binding legislation to ensure that 
the  rail  services  market  in  the  European  Union  complies  fully  with  Member  States' 
responsibilities to develop rail infrastructure.  

1.2. 

The strategic reference framework for rail infrastructure development 

The provision of rail infrastructure is a key requirement for a competitive rail service market. 
Infrastructure  development  concerns  two  main  players:  the  Member  States,  usually  the 
national governments  that  own  the  infrastructure, and the managers of rail infrastructure. In 
accordance with their respective roles, as provided for in the rail legislation, they have to take 
decisions on the scope and nature of infrastructure development and the associated financial 
resources as part of a coherent approach. 

The  first  prerequisite  is  a  consistent  strategic  transport  policy  framework.  The  state  should 
decide  on  the  long-term  infrastructure  needs  for  all  modes  of  transport  within  its  transport 
policy in accordance with future user needs. This should generate the parameters necessary to 
decide on the best level of infrastructure quality and the extent of the rail network. This may 
involve  pruning  certain  lines  where  no  demand  can  reasonably  be  expected,  or  enhancing 
capacity to cope with growing demand3.  

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Directives  2001/12/EC,  2001/13/EC  and  2001/14/EC  are  collectively  known  as  the  'infrastructure 
package'. 
Consultations  took  the  form  of  a  stakeholder  workshop  in  May  2006,  two  stakeholder  consultations 
under  studies  the  Commission  launched  in 2006  and 2007,  and  a  public  consultation which  closed  in 
September 2007.  
For example, the Dutch government adopts its annual rail infrastructure management plan on the basis 
of a national ten year mobility plan covering all modes of transport. 

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1.3. 

The level of public intervention 

EU  Member  States  reported  financial  expenditure  on  maintenance4  and  on  new  railway 
infrastructure  of  €13.9  billion  in  2006,  not  including  funds  from  public-private  partnerships 
(see Annexes 1 and 2). Adding on revenues from user charges, the cost of rail maintenance 
amounts to about €35 billion a year. Revenue from user charges only covers about 30 to 50%, 
with outliers at 10% and 100%. 

The EU contribution is mainly focused on co-financing transport infrastructure under its TEN 
budget and parts of the cohesion and regional funds. This is for construction and rehabilitation 
of  infrastructure  on  the  trans-European  rail  network  (TERN),  and  accounts  for  only  a  small 
part of the network. 

Community  legislation  considers  rail  infrastructure  charging  at  the  cost  of  operating  an 
additional train service as the rule, whereas it allows full cost recovery only as the exception 
and  only  on  certain  conditions5.  In  many  cases,  Member  States  play  the  dominant  role  in 
ensuring  the  financial  stability  of  their  rail  infrastructure  managers.  The  rail  infrastructure 
managers have to cover a major share of maintenance expenditure from own revenues or from 
state transfers. This raises the question of the relationship between the state and infrastructure 
managers as far as such transfers are concerned. 

2. 

STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION 

2.1. 

The legal framework in the European Union 

EU legislation requires setting incentives to reduce the cost of infrastructure provision and of 
consequent  infrastructure  charges.  Costs  have  to  be  reduced  with  due  regard  to  safety  and 
maintaining and improving the quality of the infrastructure service. Whereas the Community 
has  established  detailed  requirements  for  safety  management  and  accident  (data)  reporting, 
there are no such obligations as yet at Community level for monitoring infrastructure service.  

Member  States  may  choose  to  meet  this  obligation  by  way  of  regulatory  measures  and/or 
contractual agreements, known as multi-annual contracts.6 Such agreements are concluded for 
at least three years, i.e. longer than the traditional annual budgeting. Contract terms and the 
structure of payments have to be decided in advance for the entire contract duration.  

Infrastructure managers in some European countries have gained valuable experience in using 
multi-annual  contracts.  The  Commission  thinks  it  would  be  useful  if  this  approach  were 
applied more widely on the basis of existing best practices. It has therefore invited Member 
States to continue setting their relationship with the infrastructure managers on a contractual 
basis for the funding of maintenance and modernisation of the railway infrastructure. This is 
also the appropriate framework for a performance-based system7. 

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This term includes renewal and upgrading of rail infrastructure. 
Directive 2001/14/EC, Articles 7 and 8  
Directive 2001/14, Article 6, in particular paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 
See Commission Communication COM (2006) 189 final of 3 May 2006 on the implementation of the 
1st railway package, conclusions, page 10 

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2.2. 

Further legal requirements 

Apart  from  the  above  rules,  which  refer  directly  to  multi-annual  contracts,  the  EU's  rail 
directives set out other provisions which may be helpful in terms of implementation: 

•  Member  States  must  take  the  measures  necessary  to  develop  their  national  railway 
infrastructure8. They may accord the infrastructure manager financing consistent with the 
tasks,  size  and  financial  requirements,  in  particular  in  order  to  cover  new  investment9. 
Infrastructure managers should set up a business plan to ensure financial equilibrium and 
to make sure the means are commensurate with the objectives10. 

•  Member  States  are  required  to  ensure  that  the  infrastructure  managers'  expenditure  and 
revenue are in balance over a reasonable period of time. This includes all activities, even if 
they do not relate directly to infrastructure maintenance. 

Furthermore, specific provisions address the eligibility and transparency of financial transfers 
from the state, taking into account the requirement for management independence on the part 
of the infrastructure manager and the economic nature of its activities:  

•  Community  law  prohibits  transferring  public  funds  between  infrastructure  managers  and 

railway undertakings.  

•  There  is  an  obligation  to  keep  and  publish  profit  and  loss  accounts  separately  for 

infrastructure management. 

•  EU rail infrastructure managers are required to have a performance regime as part of their 

price system for infrastructure use.  

•  Finally, state aid rules have to be respected 11.  

2.3. 

The current use of multi-annual contracts 

The  state  of  play  regarding  the  use  of  multi-annual  contracts  varies  considerably  across 
Member  States  (see  Annex  4).  About  half  neither  use  nor  plan  to  make  use  of  them.  Some 
Member States provide no finance for rail infrastructure maintenance in the first place, some 
are in the process of negotiating contracts for the first time, and some are preparing to extend 
them  for  a  new  multi-annual  period.  At  the  same  time,  an  increasing  number  of  Member 
States  plan  to  introduce  them,  having  put  in  place  the  requirements  under  the  first  railway 
package. 

Infrastructure managers in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Romania  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  concluded  multi-annual  contracts  with  their  states. 
Some states are renewing contracts, e.g. the UK, while others are preparing contracts for the 

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See Article 7 paragraph 1 of directive 91/440. 
See Article 7.3 of Directive 91/440. 
See Article 7.4 of Directive 91/440. 
The  Commission  is  considering  whether  specific  guidelines  on  State  aid  to  the  rail  sector  would  be 
required, covering among other things, transfers to railway infrastructure . 

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first time, such as Germany. In Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia 
and the UK, payments for infrastructure provision are already dependent on quality criteria.12  

3. 

WIDELY CONTRASTING FORMS OF MAINTENANCE FINANCING 

The competitiveness of the railway sector depends to an large degree on the availability and 
quality of the infrastructure. However, maintenance of infrastructure does not always get the 
attention and finance that railway operators expect in order to compete with other modes of 
transport.  

Almost one third of infrastructure managers state that the finance available is not sufficient to 
maintain their network13. There are huge differences in expenditure on maintenance per track 
km  in  the  various  Member  States14,  sometime  up  to  30  times.  Infrastructure  managers  in 
certain Member States received no state transfers for infrastructure in 2003 to 2006, despite 
their significant networks. The Member States that joined the EU in 2004 spent €280 million 
on infrastructure development in that year, compared to over €13 billion in EU 15 (see Annex 
1).  

This  discrepancy  suggests  that  some  networks  may  be  building  up  maintenance 
backlogs, which the infrastructure manager is not able to finance.  

By  way  of  illustration,  the  figure  below  shows  the  development  of  equity  and  debts  of  the 
bigger European railway companies (both infrastructure managers and railway undertakings) 
from  1995  to  2004.  While  equity  declined  steadily,  railways'  debts  multiplied.  There  are 
contributing factors other than infrastructure maintenance, such as lack of compensation for 
public  service  obligations,  but  the  outcome  as  regards  the  lack  of  financial  stability  is  the 
same.  

2006  expenditure  on  maintenance  per  kilometre  of  track  range  from  as  little  as  €220  in 
Slovakia  and  €16 000  in  Poland  up  to  €160 000  in  Germany  and  €360 000  in  the  United 
Kingdom15. This large discrepancy, over and above differences in cost levels, may imply that 
in  some  cases  maintenance  may  not  be  sustainable,  whereas  in  other  cases  infrastructure 
managers  may  not  have  exploited  cost  reduction  potentials  in  the  same  way  all  over 
Europe.  

The  rail  sector  has  succeeded  in  improving  its  safety  performance,  despite  setting  out  from 
high initial levels. However, the same does not always apply to infrastructure quality. Where 
income does not suffice to maintain large, often oversized, networks, the infrastructure service 
quality  declines.  Without  (common)  performance  indicators  being  defined  and  published, 
reduced  infrastructure  quality  is  not  easily  revealed.  Only  at  the  end  of  a  long  period,  at  a 
point  where  speed  limits  have  to  be  lowered  for  safety  reasons,  does  the  true  size  of  the 
problem become visible. 

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Source  Community  of  European  Railways  and  Infrastructure  Managers,  CER,  2006.  Switzerland  is 
renewing its multi-annual contract, in which payments depend on infrastructure quality.  
A study entitled 'Guidelines for sustainable partnerships in railway maintenance' carried out by Ecorys 
in 2006 has revealed that 31% do not have an adequate budget. Those without an adequate budget have 
average annual deficits varying from 10% to 89% of total costs.  
See table in Annex 2 
See Annex 2 of Commission staff working document. 

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The  case  study  presented  in  Annex  6  illustrates  how,  as  a  result  of  deficient  infrastructure, 
transport  service  quality  drops  and  customers  opt  for  road  instead  of  rail.  This  triggers  a 
vicious  circle,  as  infrastructure  managers  lose  income  that  is  no  longer  available  for 
maintenance.  Similar  problems  can  be  found  where  public  service  obligations  in  rail 
passenger transport are not duly compensated. 

Figure: Capital and debt of railways in central and eastern European countries 

4. 

THE ROLE OF MULTI-ANNUAL CONTRACTS 

Multi-annual  contracts  represent  a  long-term  financing  arrangement  for  infrastructure 
maintenance. Annex 3 gives an overview of the main elements of a multi-annual contract and 
the potential advantages such an agreement can bring, if properly prepared and negotiated.  

4.1. 

A long-term financing framework for maintenance 

Preserving an existing network based on engineering criteria and fixed renewal intervals has 
been the dominant approach to rail maintenance for many years. What is needed, though, is 
for rail infrastructure to respond to future transport demand patterns and thus boost traffic and 
revenues from user charges. Multi-annual contracts should force both parties to take a long-
term  view  and  develop  maintenance  plans  on  the  basis  of  the  infrastructure  manager's 
business  plan  and  thus  on  future  service  demand.  The  stakeholder  workshop  concluded  that 
multi-annual  contracts  also  lead  to  more  informed  trade-offs  between  taxpayers'  and  users’ 
interests,  between  maintenance  and  quality  of  the  network,  and  between  short-term 
maintenance and renewal.  

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4.2. 

Complementing the charging system 

In  a  situation  where  most  infrastructure  managers  are  not  able  to  recoup  full  maintenance 
costs  from  user  charges,  the  transfers  made  through  multi-annual  contracts  will  supplement 
user charges to achieve the necessary financial stability. Thus, a multi-annual contract has to 
be consistent with the charging framework, which has to comply with the existing charging 
rules16, without pre-empting the infrastructure manager's right to set the charges17.  

4.3. 

Enabling effective cost control 

Long-term  planning  of  rail  maintenance  and  renewal  can  reduce  unit  costs,  because 
maintenance  equipment  and  staff  will  be  better  adapted  to  the  type  and  volume  of  works 
envisaged, whereas there will be less need to change plans at short notice. This holds for both 
in-house works and outsourced maintenance.  

Annual budget allocation requires funds to be spent before the end of a year, even if it is more 
cost-effective  to  postpone  the  works,  and  vice  versa.  In  shifting  from  annual  allocations  to 
multi-annual  ones,  the  infrastructure  manager  can  make  use  of  funds  in  a  more  flexible 
manner  which  is  better  adapted  to  business  needs,  rather  than  the  rigid  rules  of  public 
spending.  

The table below sets out maintenance cost reduction potentials as quantified by infrastructure 
managers and transport ministries in the 2007 consultation exercise. Based on their replies, an 
absolute potential cost reduction of €580 million is estimated, just for those states that do not 
yet use multi-annual  contracts, of  which €370 million  stems  from  maintenance  works  being 
scheduled more effectively (see impact assessment).  

Multi-annual contract will reduce maintenance cost 
because of 

Expected cost 
reduction 

Number of 
replies 

more efficient use of resources 

increased efficiency in outsourcing maintenance 

more advanced personnel reduction policies 

2 – 5% 

5-10 % 

0,1- 3 % 

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Table:  Maintenance 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007  

cost 

savings.  Source:  EU 

rail 

infrastructure  managers, 

Under the pressure of 'use it or lose it', maintenance activities tend to peak towards the end of 
the year. The logic of public budgeting is such that budgets tend to be cut if they are not fully 
used in previous years. Massive maintenance works at this time also cause more delays and 
disrupt  the  service.  Abandoning  yearly  planning  in  favour  of  multi-annual  schemes  thus 
reduces overall disruption as maintenance works can be planned such that traffic is disrupted 

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According to Directive 2001/14/EC Article 4, Member States have to establish a charging framework 
and uphold the management independence of the infrastructure managers.  
As an example, see the England and Scotland case study in Annex 6 of the Commission staff working 
document 

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as  little  as  possible.  Once  effective  performance  regimes  have  been  introduced  everywhere, 
this  strategy  will  pay  off  even  more,  as  the  infrastructure  manager  will  have  to  compensate 
users for any disruption he causes. 

Where  a  multi-annual  contract  includes  only  certain  parts  of  life  cycle  costs,  e.g.  either 
renewal or maintenance costs, this can create incentives for exceeding life cycle costs or can 
lead infrastructure managers to do too little maintenance, knowing that renewal costs can be 
recovered  from  the  state  at  a  later  stage.  Such  deferred  maintenance  can  lead  to  lower 
infrastructure quality. 

4.4. 

Enabling benchmarking and regulatory supervision 

Infrastructure managers should not ask for information, and in particular certain cost data on 
maintenance, to be treated as confidential. There is normally no competition for infrastructure 
services  due  to  the  infrastructure  being  a  natural  monopoly.  The  requirement  to  publish 
financial data accords with the public's right to be informed about the way public funds are 
used.  

When performance targets can be set more effectively, then it is easier to gauge the relative 
positions of infrastructure managers. Consequently, cost effectiveness can be agreed not only 
by reference to the national infrastructure manager's cost data, but also with regard to his/her 
performance  relative  to  other  infrastructure  managers.  In  parallel,  regulatory  bodies  enforce 
the  infrastructure  managers'  obligation  to  make  available  information  on  deteriorating 
infrastructure well before lower speed limits have their adverse effect on rail performance.  

4.5. 

Improving performance and quality control 

Multi-annual  contracts  facilitate  the  shift  from  input  specifications  –  i.e.  to  compensate  the 
infrastructure  manager  for  a  particular  expenditure  –  to  output  specifications  –  i.e. 
performance-related  payments.  Quality  indicators  will  have  to  comply  with  the  SMART18 
principles. 

There are two groups of quality criteria currently in use: indicators based on the quality of the 
train service, e.g. speed and safety, or on infrastructure provision. The first group quantifies 
delays  resulting  from  lower  speed  limits,  or  accident  data  required  under  law  for  railway 
accident statistics. Indicators related to infrastructure provision can be maintenance costs per 
km  track,  or  the  percentage  of  lines  under  temporary  speed  restrictions.  The  infrastructure 
manager  collects  and  calculates  most  of  these  data  already  to  support  his  system  of  track 
access charges.  

Increasingly frequent irregularities (e.g. broken rails, rail cracks) are early warning indicators 
that  infrastructure  quality  is  declining.  Reducing  the  remaining  lifetime  for  infrastructure 
assets can hint at unsustainable maintenance, i.e. the network being run down. Availability of 
track  is  another  important  performance  indicator,  with  a  distinction  being  made  between 
planned  and  unplanned  availability.  When  aggregating  availability  to  a  network  basis,  the 

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SMART  stands  for  Specific  as  regards  the  indicators'  relation  to  objectives,  Measurable  as  regards 
quantifiability, Achievable in a given market situation and resource availability, Relevant with a view to 
the business plan of the infrastructure manager, and Time-framed in terms of an agreed point in time 
when a criterion is measured and compared. 

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statistics for the different parts of the network should be weighted according to the importance 
of a line.  

A  basic  prerequisite  is  for  the  infrastructure  manager  to  monitor  the  condition  of  the  fixed 
assets by means of an infrastructure register. Registers are already compulsory for the trans-
European  rail  network19.  They  are  designed  to  keep  the  infrastructure  manager  informed  of 
the  date  of  putting  into  service  of  an  asset  and  its  expected  lifetime.  It  is  thus  an  important 
factor in assessing the maintenance backlog.  

The  figure  below  shows  delays  in  minutes  caused  by  the  UK  infrastructure  manager 
NetworkRail  and  its  train  operators.  Since  multi-annual  contracts  were  introduced,  delays 
attributable to infrastructure (see lowest curve) have been falling steadily. 

Figure: Breakdown of overall delay by responsible party 

State, regulatory body and infrastructure users, particularly railway undertakings and shippers, 
can compare the performance of different infrastructure managers (benchmarking) and agree 
targets accordingly. This will give them better information on the quality of the infrastructure 
they can expect when they come to draw up their business plans. Users will also be able to 
assess and monitor maintenance in relation to the expected demand.20 

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Directive 2001/16/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system, Article 24, 
requires infrastructure registers for the conventional rail system to be published and updated annually. 
The  norm  leaves  detailed  features  of  the  register  to  be  stipulated  in  a  Technical  Specification  on 
Interoperability. A similar provision was made in Directive 96/48EC on the interoperability of the trans-
European high-speed rail system. 
See Annex 5 of Commission staff working document for background information 

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4.6. 

Securing the effectiveness of the contractual agreements 

To  be  credible,  any  contractual  agreement  needs  to  have  sanctions  to  deal  with  non-
compliance. Firstly, the contract has to lay down clear and transparent procedures on how to 
determine breach of a contractual obligation, such as under-financing or non-compliance with 
the agreed financing rules by the state, thereby affecting the infrastructure manager's ability to 
deliver. Vice versa, the  infrastructure manager  may  not  have  complied  with  one  or  more  of 
the  agreed  performance  criteria.  An  independent  body,  rather  than  the  state  or  the 
infrastructure  manager,  should  lead  this  monitoring  process.  In  practice,  an  independent, 
strong and competent regulatory body has proved to be best suited, provided it is not part of 
the contracting authority and has the requisite qualified staff, budget and access rights to data.  

Sanctions  can  consist  of  penalties  (fines),  reduced  output  levels  corresponding  to  reduced 
financial input, a replacement of managers or a reallocation of rail infrastructure to a different 
infrastructure  manager.  However,  before  sanctions  are  imposed,  the  two  parties  (and  the 
regulatory body) should endeavour to reach an amicable settlement.  

Sanctions  should  be  progressive  and  appropriate  to  the  infringement.  At  the  beginning,  the 
parties  might  find  a  consensus,  where  necessary  with  the  mediation  of  a  monitoring  body. 
Where the infrastructure manager does not meet its contractual obligations, sanctions can be 
imposed by the state in its function as shareholder, e.g. replacements of managers. They can 
also  take  the  form  of  penalties  or  a  change  in  the  franchise,  with  certain  parts  of  the 
infrastructure being transferred to another infrastructure manager. 

Where  the  state  disregards  part  of  its  funding  commitment,  this  will  normally  involve  a 
relaxation  in  the  quality  requirements  or  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  network.  Again,  the 
regulatory  body  should  be  involved  in  mediating  and/or  renegotiating  the  contract.  The 
infrastructure  manager  should  be  able  to  assess  the  effect  of  different  funding  levels  on  the 
infrastructure quality. Having a model to use in the input-output relationship might be a useful 
way of adding transparency to this process.  

5. 

PROMOTING BEST PRACTICE IN THE USE OF MULTI-ANNUAL CONTRACTS  

In  the  light  of  the  above,  the  need  for  further  action  is  considered  at  three  levels:  Member 
States, infrastructure managers and regulatory bodies. 

Best practice requires that Member States should conclude multi-annual contracts with their 
infrastructure managers, including the elements set out, and aiming at the advantages given in 
Annex 3. However, where no such contracts exist, Member States should at least provide for 
the  infrastructure  manager  to  commit  resources,  including  in-house  provision  or 
contracting, for periods of more than three years.  

Member States and their infrastructure managers have to ensure that multi-annual contracts 
are  consistent  with  the  national  strategic  transport  plans  and  the  infrastructure  manager's 
business  plan.  The  same  holds  true  for  infrastructure  franchises  and  for  any  framework 
contracts between railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. 

The  state  should  consult  stakeholders  on  any  proposal  for  multi-annual  contracts  before 
letting a new contract or renegotiating existing provisions. It then negotiates the size and the 
quality of the network.  

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Member  States  should  step  up  their  efforts  and  reduce  costs  and  charges  for  infrastructure 
provision and use. To this end, Member States should agree, monitor and enforce quantified 
cost reduction targets over periods of at least three years.  

Infrastructure  managers  should  measure  track  condition  at  least  once  a  year  on  all  their 
lines, and more frequently on their main lines. 

Based on these measurements, infrastructure managers have to define and publish indicators 
making it possible to assess and predict infrastructure quality and performance on an annual 
basis for the duration of the multi-annual contract.  

Discretionary  intervention  by  the  state  in  infrastructure  management  should  be  limited  to 
cases  provided  for  in  the  contract,  while  the  infrastructure  manager  pursues  the  agreed 
objectives with a broad measure of management independence. Otherwise the agreement or 
contract needs renegotiating.  

Infrastructure  managers  should  report  in  the  network  statement  when  lines  are  not 
appropriately  maintained  and  infrastructure  quality  is  deemed  to  be  in  decline;  otherwise 
infrastructure will be taken out of service. This information should be timely enough to enable 
it to act as an early warning system for users.  

An  independent  body  should  be  tasked  with  monitoring  compliance  with  a  multi-annual 
contract and with mediating between the parties to the multi-annual contract in the event of 
any dispute. This presupposes having the appropriate staff and expertise to carry out this type 
of assessment.  

Finally  multi-annual  contracts  can  be  a  precursor  for  making  better  use  of  competitive 
tendering for infrastructure services. Since it will be difficult to put an entire national network 
out  to  tender  at  once,  tendering  might  involve  an  increasing  number  of  infrastructure 
managers,  network  statements,  charging  systems  and  access  conditions.  To  minimise  any 
possible  negative  effects,  safeguard  measures  need  to  be  taken  to  ensure  simple  and  non-
discriminatory access rules, ensuring respect of the rules on competition. 

At  this  stage  the  Commission  will  consider  including  a  number  of  the  previous 
recommendations in its proposal for recasting the first rail package, planned for 2008. 

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