Proposal for a Council Regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia
Date: 2008-01-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, North Macedonia, Russia, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, ferro-alloy, import, originating product

EN 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 28.1.2008 
COM(2008) 34 final 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, 
Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia 

(presented by the Commission) 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  

1. 

Context of the proposal 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of 
22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members 
of  the  European  Community,  as  last  amended  by  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005 (‘the basic Regulation’). 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and 
is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and 
procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Not applicable. 

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  already  had  the  possibility  to 
defend their interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic 
Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee  a  general  impact  assessment  but  contains  an 
exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3. 

Legal elements of the proposal 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

On 29 August 2007, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports  of  ferro-silicon  originating  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  Egypt, 
Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia. 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The investigation found dumping of the product concerned, which caused injury to the 
Community  industry.  The  investigation  also  showed  that  there  was  no  compelling 
Community interest aspect against the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures. 
On this basis, provisional measures were imposed by means of Commission Regulation 
(EC)  No  994/2007.  The  continuation  of  the  investigation  has  confirmed  the  essential 
provisional findings. 

Therefore,  it  is  suggested  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a 
Regulation in order to impose definitive measures. 

•  Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22 December  1995  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  as  last 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005. 

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The proposal falls under the exclusive competence of the Community. The subsidiarity 
principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no 
scope for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Community, 
national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is 
minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instrument: Regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 

Other  means  would  not  be  adequate  because  the  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee 
alternative options. 

4. 

Budgetary implication 

The proposal has no implication for the Community budget. 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, 
Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,  

Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 (the 'basic 
Regulation'), and in particular Article 9 thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

PROCEDURE 

1.1. 

Provisional measures 

(1) 

The  Commission,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  994/20072  (the  'provisional  Regulation') 
imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon ('FeSi'), currently 
classifiable within CN codes 7202 21 00, 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90, originating in 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  ('PRC'),  Egypt,  Kazakhstan,  the  former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Russia. 

1.2. 

Subsequent procedures 

(2) 

(3) 

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on  the  basis of 
which  it  was  decided  to  impose  provisional  anti-dumping  measures  ('provisional 
disclosure'),  several  interested  parties  made  written  submissions  making  their  views 
known  on  the  provisional  findings.  The  parties  who  so  requested  were  granted  an 
opportunity to be heard. The Commission continued to seek and verify all information 
it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. 

The  Commission  continued  its  investigation  with  regard  to  Community  interest 
aspects  and  carried  out  analysis  of  data  within  the  questionnaire  replies  provided  by 
some  users  in  the  Community  after  the  imposition  of  the  provisional  anti-dumping 
measures. 

1 

2 

OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p.1, Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p.17). 
OJ L 223, 29.8.2007, p.1 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

In  recital  (166)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  the  Commission  undertook  to  analyse 
further  and  in  more  detail  the  effect  of  provisional  measures  on  the  situation  of  the 
users, before any final determination is made. 

For  this  purpose,  the  Commission  contacted  and  sent  questionnaires  directly  and  via 
associations to around 500 foundries located in the Community, since this category of 
user industry had not shown any particular interest in the current proceeding prior to 
the imposition of provisional measures. In addition, all steel producers cooperating at 
provisional stage were requested to provide additional information in order to enable 
the  Commission  to  analyse  the  possible  effect  of  provisional  measures  on  their 
activity.  

Questionnaire  replies  were  received  from  only  seven  foundries  and  additional 
information was received from eight steel producers. All seven of the former and three 
of the  latter  undertakings provided  the  necessary information to analyse in  depth the 
effect of the provisional measures on their economic situation.  

In  view  of  the  complex  structure  in  which  the  Chinese  exporting  producer  granted 
market  economy 
the  period  under 
treatment  ('MET')  was  operating  during 
investigation,  additional  information  was  requested  in  order  to  reach  definitive 
findings. Moreover, as indicated in recital (49) of the provisional Regulation, because 
of  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  exporting  producer  was  purchasing  electricity  from  a 
related  supplier,  its  costs  associated  with  the  production  of  FeSi  were  also  further 
investigated.  

(8) 

In  view  of  the  above,  three  additional  verification  visits  were  carried  out  at  the 
premises of the following companies: 

–  Erdos, Ordos City, Inner Mongolia, electricity supplier in the PRC  

–  Trompetter Guss, Chemnitz, Germany, user (foundry) in the Community 

–  Arcelor Mittal, Genk, Belgium, user (steel producer) in the Community  

(9) 

The  oral  and  written  comments  submitted  by  the  interested  parties  were  considered 
and, where appropriate, the findings have been modified accordingly.  

(10)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which  it  was  intended  to  recommend  the  imposition  of  definitive  anti-dumping 
measures  on  imports  of  FeSi  originating  in  the  PRC,  Egypt,  Kazakhstan,  the  former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  and  Russia  and  the  definitive  collection  of  the 
amounts  secured  by  way  of  the  provisional  duty.  They  were  also  granted  a  period 
within which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure. 

(11) 

It is recalled that the investigation of dumping and injury covered  the period from 1 
October 2005 to 30 September 2006 ('investigation period' or 'IP'). With respect to the 
trends relevant for the injury assessment, the Commission analysed data covering the 
period from 1 January 2003 to the end of the IP ('period considered'). 

2. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

2.1. 

Product concerned 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
(12)  As indicated in recitals (15) and (16) of the provisional Regulation, several exporters 
alleged that slag containing significantly less then 45 % silicon, i.e. low purity FeSi, 
should be excluded from the scope of the investigation due to alleged lack of the same 
basic physical characteristics and the same basic uses. The Commission undertook to 
clarify  the  matter  further.  Further  comments  were  received  from  several  interested 
parties on this issue after provisional disclosure. 

(13) 

It is firstly noted in this regard that the product concerned by the current investigation 
refers  to  FeSi  containing  at  least  4%  iron  and  more  than  8%  and  less  than  96%  of 
silicon. The investigation also revealed that slag with silicon content below 45% can 
be used in the steel industry under the form of briquettes as it is the case for FeSi with 
silicon  content  above  45%.  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  slag  shares  the  same 
basic  physical  characteristics  and  is  interchangeable  with  other  types  of  FeSi  with 
higher silicon content. On the basis of the above, the provisional conclusions set out in 
recital (16) of the provisional Regulation that low purity FeSi should be considered as 
product concerned are hereby confirmed.  

(14)  One  unrelated  importer  claimed  that  "atomised"  FeSi  powder  of  15%  and  of  45% 
silicon  content  should  be  excluded  from  the  product  scope  of  this  investigation. 
However,  an  exclusion  of  "atomised  powder  FeSi"  from  the  present  investigation  is 
not  warranted,  in  particular  since  FeSi  with  15%  and  45%  of  silicon  content  falls 
under  the  definition  of  the  product  concerned.  In  addition,  following  a  hearing,  this 
importer did not submit any evidence to substantiate its claim, despite a request by the 
Commission. The claim had therefore to be rejected.  

2.2. 

Like product 

(15) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  like  product,  recital  (17)  of  the 
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

3. 

DUMPING 

3.1. 

Market economy treatment (MET)  

(16)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  one  Chinese  exporting  producer  reiterated  its 
comments  described in recital (26) of the provisional  Regulation  as to  the  change in 
the  estimated  useful  life  of  its  assets.  However,  the  exporting  producer  failed  to 
provide  any  new  arguments  not  brought  forward  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
investigation,  which  would  substantiate  its  claim  that  the  provisional  findings 
concerning the MET situation as described in recital (23) of the provisional Regulation 
were not correct.  

(17) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  concerning  MET,  recitals  (18)  to  (26)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

3.2. 

Individual treatment (IT) 

(18) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  with  regard  to  IT,  recitals  (27)  to  (31)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

3.3. 

Normal value 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
3.3.1.  Analogue country 

(19)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  one  Chinese  exporting  producer  argued  that 
Norway is not an appropriate analogue country due to high electricity costs which are 
allegedly  not  representative  for  the  industry  worldwide,  and  due  to  differences  in 
access  to  raw  materials  compared  to  Chinese  producers.  The  exporting  producer 
claimed  also  that  Norwegian  producers  mainly  sell  to  export  markets  since  most  of 
their domestic consumption is captive and that Norwegian producers focused largely 
on  specialty  grades  FeSi  while  Chinese  exporting  producers  manufacture  only 
standard  grades  during  the  IP.  On  that  basis,  the  exporting  producer  claimed 
adjustments to the Norwegian normal value.  

(20) 

It should be noted that, while it is true that Norwegian producers sell large quantities 
on  export  markets,  given  the  size  of  the  domestic  market  and  the  conditions  of 
competition thereon, as stated in recital (35) of the provisional Regulation, Norway is 
considered to be an appropriate analogue country. 

(21)  With  regard  to  the  other  claims  of  the  company,  it  was  found  that  the  share  of 
electricity  in  the  costs  of  production  of  Chinese  producers  was  significantly  greater 
than that of Norwegian companies. In addition, the Chinese exporter did not provide 
any  evidence  that  the  price  of  electricity  was  higher  in  Norway  or  that  the  alleged 
difficulty in access to raw material had an impact on normal value in Norway. These 
claims were therefore rejected. 

(22) 

It was found, however, that the types of FeSi sold by Norwegian producers in Norway 
were different to those exported from the PRC to the Community, insofar as purity is 
concerned. It was therefore considered that an adjustment was warranted, as explained 
in recital (25) below.  

(23) 

In the absence of any other comments concerning the analogue country, recitals (32) to 
(36) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

3.3.2.  Methodology applied for the determination of normal value  

(24) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  methodology  applied  for  the 
determination of normal value, recitals (37) to (47) of the provisional Regulation are 
hereby confirmed.  

3.3.3.  Determination of normal value  

A. PRC  

(25)  One  Chinese  exporting  producer  which  did  not  obtain  MET  claimed  that  the  normal 
value was incorrectly calculated as it did not reflect the differences in the various types 
of the product concerned sold in Norway and the like product exported from the PRC. 
Having  examined  this  claim,  it  was  considered  appropriate  to  recalculate  the  normal 
value to take into account the differences in physical characteristics between product 
types sold on the Norwegian domestic market and those exported from the PRC to the 
Community. Normal value was calculated on a product type basis with adjustments for 
the titanium impurity and FeSi contents in case of product types which could not be 
matched directly.  

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
(26)  The one Chinese exporting producer which was granted MET is part of a very large 
Chinese group comprising almost one hundred related companies operating in various 
industrial sectors. Because of the complex structure of the group and the operations of 
consolidation which concerned companies involved in the production and the sale of 
FeSi,  updated  data  concerning  the  group  was  further  requested  and  examined. 
Moreover,  it  had  been  foreseen  in  recital  (49)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  that  the 
costs  associated  with  the  production  and  sale  of  electricity  would  be  further 
investigated.  

(27)  The  additional  investigation  showed  that  the  exporting  producer's  purchase  price  of 
electricity from a related supplier had to be rejected as it did not allow for the recovery 
of all the costs incurred in producing the electricity. Further, the selling, general and 
administrative ('SG&A') costs of the exporting producer were adjusted to take account 
of  the  full  amount  of  financial  costs  associated  with  the  production  of  the  product 
concerned.  Indeed,  the  investigation  showed  that  some  of  these  costs  were  borne  by 
related parties and had not been taken into account in the calculation of the provisional 
normal value.  

(28)  Having  made  the  above  adjustments  to  costs  in  accordance  with  Article  2(5)  of  the 
basic Regulation, it was found that the domestic sales prices of all types of the product 
concerned that were sold for export to the Community were unprofitable. As a result, 
the  normal  value  for  the  company  had  to  be  constructed.  The  normal  value  was 
constructed on the basis of the company's own cost of manufacturing plus amounts for 
adjusted  SG&A  costs  as  described  above.  In  regard  to  profit,  in  the  absence  of 
profitable transactions of the company and lack of possibility of using profits for the 
same  general  category  of  products  of  other  Chinese  exporting  producers,  a  profit 
margin  of  5%  was  applied  for  the  construction  of  normal  value  in  accordance  with 
Article  2(6)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  This  margin  is  in  line  with  that  used  in 
constructing normal value for the exporting producer in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of  Macedonia  as  stated  in  recital  (45)  of  the  provisional  Regulation.  No  information 
was provided that this amount of profit would exceed the profit normally realised by 
other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category on the 
Chinese market. 

B. Egypt 

(29)  Following  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  one  of  the  Egyptian  exporting 
producers  claimed  that,  when  determining  the  normal  value  based  on  constructed 
value,  a  lower  profit  margin  should  be  used  in  line  with  that  used  for  the  exporting 
producer in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

(30) 

It  should  be  noted  that  constructed  normal  values  were  established  in  line  with  the 
methodology set out in recitals (43) to (45) of the provisional Regulation. The profit 
margin used reflects the market situation in Egypt and has been applied in accordance 
with the requirements of the chapeau of Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation. Hence, 
the  margin  applied  was  based  on  the  exporting  producer's  own  actual  profitable 
domestic sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product during the IP. The 
basic Regulation does not provide that this profit level be substituted by another level 
as suggested by the company concerned. Consequently, this claim had to be rejected.  

C. Kazakhstan 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
(31) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  determination  of  normal  value  for 
Kazakhstan, recital (51) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.  

D. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(32) 

In the absence of any comments concerning the determination of normal value for the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, recital (52) of the provisional Regulation is 
hereby confirmed.  

E. Russia  

(33)  Following the provisional disclosure, one Russian exporting producer claimed that the 
exchange  rates  applied  in  the  calculation  of  normal  value  did  not  correspond  to  the 
actual timing of sales. After verification it was found that the claim was justified, and 
the calculation was amended accordingly. 

(34)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure,  one  Russian  exporting  producer  contested  the 
adjustment of its energy costs by arguing that the prices of energy set by the Russian 
authorities  are  not  compulsory  but  rather  indicative.  This  was  demonstrated  by  the 
company's  claim  that  they  paid  above  the  recommended  price  and  that  its  electricity 
supplier was profitable. The company also argued that the electricity supplier is one of 
the few independent electricity suppliers in Russia that does not belong to the United 
Electricity System of Russia and therefore this supplier is not involved in any cross-
subsidisation  practices  highlighted  in  the  OECD  report  which  is  referred  to  in  the 
provisional Regulation. 

(35) 

In  the  light  of  the  substantiated  arguments  submitted  by  the  company  concerning 
electricity, it is considered that an energy cost adjustment should not be made in the 
definitive calculation of its normal value.  

3.4. 

Export price 

A. PRC 

(36)  Following the provisional disclosure, one Chinese exporting producer pointed out that 
in  calculating  its  export  price,  the  exchange  rate  that  was  applied  between  the  RMB 
and the Euro was that at the end of the IP, which overstated the value of the exchange 
rate.  The  company  suggested  using  the  IP  average  exchange  rate  instead.  Having 
examined this claim, in the definitive calculation, it has been decided that the average 
exchange rate of the month during which the actual sale transactions took place should 
be used.  

(37) 

In the absence of any other comments concerning Chinese export prices, recitals (55) 
to (56) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

B. Egypt  

(38)  Following  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  one  of  the  Egyptian  exporting 
producers claimed that there were some errors in the exchange rates applied for export 
transactions to the Community and also in the determination of the weighted average 
net  export  value  for  some  types  of  the  product  concerned.  It  was  found  that  these 
claims were justified and the export prices were revised accordingly.  

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
C. Kazakhstan  

(39) 

In the absence of any comments concerning Kazakh export prices, recital (58) of the 
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.  

D. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(40) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  export  prices  for  the  former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, recital (59) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.  

E. Russia 

(41)  Following the provisional disclosure, one Russian exporting producer claimed that the 
profit margin of its related importer in the EC used in constructing the export price in 
accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation was overstated. It is recalled that 
the profit used in constructing the export price at the provisional stage was that of the 
related importer concerned. However, in line with the institutions' consistent practice, 
the  amount  of  profit  to  be  used  should  be  based  on  that  achieved  by  unrelated 
importers. In these circumstances, the profit margin used at the provisional stage had 
to  be  corrected.  The  effect  of  this  change  was  to  slightly  increase  the  profit  used 
contrary to the claim of the company that the profit level was overstated.  

(42)  Following the provisional disclosure, another Russian exporting producer claimed that 
the provisional calculation of its export price was incorrect as the SG&A and profit of 
its  related  trading  company  based  in  the  British  Virgin  Islands,  as  well  as  transport 
costs, were deducted from the price to the first independent customer to arrive at ex-
factory  level.  The  company  claimed  that  the  trading  company  is,  in  fact,  the  sales 
department  of  the  manufacturer.  Both  companies  are  under  common  control  and 
perform complementary tasks which would normally fall under the responsibility of a 
single  management  structure.  Additionally,  it  was  stressed  that  the  trading  company 
does not handle any other product. On this basis, the company claimed that excessive 
deductions were made in establishing the ex-factory price. In this regard, it was found 
that invoices were issued by the trading company to customers in the Community and 
payments  were  received  by  the  trading  company  from  the  customers  in  the 
Community.  Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  sales  made  by  the  related  trader 
included  a  mark-up.  Also,  the  financial  accounts  of  the  trader  showed  that  it  bore 
selling, general and administrative costs. The company did not demonstrate that these 
costs were not incurred in selling, inter alia, the product concerned to the Community. 
On this basis, the company's claim was rejected. Similar to the adjustment mentioned 
in the preceding recital concerning the level of profit used in constructing the export 
price  for  the  other  Russian  exporting  producer,  the  profit  margin  used  at  the 
provisional stage had to be corrected. The effect of this change was to slightly reduce 
the profit used. 

3.5. 

Comparison  

3.5.1. 

Import charges 

(43)  Following  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  one  of  the  Egyptian  exporting 
producers  argued  that  it  should  be  granted  an  allowance  for  the  payment  of  customs 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
duties  on  imported  raw  materials  used  in  producing  the  product  concerned  that  was 
sold on the domestic market.  

(44) 

In  reply  to  this,  it  should  be  recalled  that  pursuant  to  Article  2(10)(b)  of  the  basic 
Regulation, an adjustment shall be made for an amount corresponding to any import 
charges  or  indirect  taxes  borne  by  the  like  product  and  by  materials  physically 
incorporated therein, when intended for consumption in the exporting country and not 
collected or refunded in respect of the product concerned exported to the EC. 

(45)  The  claim  for  an  allowance  for  import  charges  for  one  raw  material  used  for  the 
production of the product concerned sold on the domestic market was accepted, since 
it  was  demonstrated  that  appropriate  customs  duties  were  paid  for  the  raw  material 
imported  and  physically  incorporated  in  the  product  concerned  sold  in  Egypt. 
However, the claim for an allowance relating to two other imported raw materials had 
to  be  rejected,  since  the  investigation  revealed  that,  during  the  IP,  all  such  imports 
were used for exports of the product concerned. The company did not demonstrate that 
during the IP it had paid import duties which were not subsequently reimbursed and 
consequently borne by the like product when sold on the domestic market. 

3.5.2.  Level of trade 

(46)  One of the Egyptian exporting producers made a claim for a level of trade adjustment 
based on an alleged difference between sales on the domestic market and on the export 
market. The company claimed that sales on the domestic market were all made to end-
users while sales to the Community were made to distributors. The company provided 
information  and  claimed  that  a  special  adjustment  should  be  made  under  Article 
2(10)(d)(ii). 

(47) 

(48) 

In this regard, it should be noted that a claim for a level of trade adjustment, pursuant 
to  Article  2(10)(d)(i)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  can  only  be  considered  where  it  is 
demonstrated that there exist consistent and distinct differences in functions and prices 
for the different levels of trade in the domestic market. 

In  the  present  case,  following  the  provisional  disclosure,  it  was  confirmed  that  all 
domestic sales in Egypt were made to end-users. In accordance with Article 2(10)(d)(i) 
of  the  basic  Regulation,  a  difference  in  level  of  trade  between  domestic  and  export 
sales could not be quantified because of the absence of the relevant different levels of 
trade on the domestic market in Egypt. 

(49)  As  regards  the  company's  export  sales  to  the  Community,  it  is  confirmed,  having 
analysed  the  comments  of  the  company  following  the  provisional  disclosure  that  all 
sales  were  made  to  distributors.  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article 
2(10)(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether there were grounds for 
making  a  special  adjustment  for  a  level  of  trade  as  claimed  by  the  company  on  the 
basis of its own data.  

(50) 

It was considered, however, that the data provided by the company did not provide an 
appropriate basis for quantifying any special adjustment. Given that Article 2(10)(d)(i) 
provides that "the amount of the adjustment shall be based on the market value of the 
difference"  it  was  considered  that,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  there  was  a  price 
difference  on  the  Community  market  for  sales  to  different  types  of  customers,  this 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
could  be  deemed  an  appropriate  basis  to  quantify  the  market  value  of  the  difference 
equally under Article 2(10)(d)(ii). In this regard, the information received from various 
interested  parties  in  the  Community  in  relation  to  their  sales  to  different  types  of 
customers  was  examined.  It  was  found  that  differences  existed  in  prices  on  the 
Community  market  when  sold  by  the  Community  industry  to  different  types  of 
customers (in this case, sales prices to end-users and to distributors were examined). It 
was  considered  that  a  special  adjustment  equivalent  to  the  said  difference  in  prices 
should therefore be made to the Egyptian exporter's normal value. 

(51)  Following the final disclosure of the facts and considerations on the basis of which it 
was  intended  to  recommend  the  imposition  of  definitive  measures,  one  Russian 
exporter  claimed  that  to  not  grant  it  a  claimed  level  of  trade  adjustment  was 
discriminatory as one of the Egyptian exporters had been granted a similar adjustment. 
In the case of the Russian exporter's claim, it was found that there was no justification 
for such an adjustment. On the basis of verified data provided by the company, there 
was no consistent price difference in prices for sales of FeSi to the different levels of 
trade on the Russian market. On this basis, no adjustment was warranted under Article 
2(10)(d)(i) of the basic Regulation. 

(52)  With the exception of the adjustment mentioned in recital (50) above, recitals (61) to 

(63) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

3.6. 

Dumping margins 

3.6.1.  General Methodology  

(53)  Further analysis after the provisional stage proved that the level of cooperation from 
Russia  had  been  incorrectly  estimated.  In  fact,  while  the  co-operation  was  around 
100%  it  was  wrongly  estimated  to  be  32%  (see  recital  (76)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation). Therefore, the residual dumping margin should be set at the level of the 
company  with  the  highest  dumping  margin  (rather  than  on  the  methodology  used  at 
provisional stage, i.e. the weighted average dumping margin of the most representative 
product type with the highest dumping margin).  

(54) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  concerning  the  general  methodology  of  the 
dumping  margin  calculation,  recitals  (64)  to  (68)  (but  for  the  change  described  in 
recital (46) above) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

3.6.2.  Dumping margins  

A. PRC  

(55)  For  the  companies  granted  MET  or  IT,  the  weighted  average  normal  value  of  each 
type  of  the  product  concerned  exported  to  the  Community  was  compared  with  the 
weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, as 
provided for in Articles 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. 

(56)  On  this  basis,  the  definitive  dumping  margins  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  CIF 

Community frontier price, duty unpaid, are: 

– 

Erdos Xijin Kuangye Co., Ltd  15,6% 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
– 

Lanzhou Good Land Ferroalloy Factory Co., Ltd 29,0% 

(57)  The basis for establishing the countrywide dumping margin was set out in recital (71) 
of  the  provisional  Regulation.  In  light  of  the  changes  to  Chinese  normal  values  and 
export  prices  as  set  out  above,  the  countrywide  margin  has  also  been  adjusted  and 
should be now set at 55,6% of the CIF Community frontier price, duty unpaid.  

B. Egypt  

(58)  Following  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures,  one  of  the  Egyptian  companies 
complained  about  the  method  of  calculation  of  the  anti-dumping  duty  without 
elaborating any further. In reply to this,  it should be noted that the company did not 
substantiate its comments. Consequently, the claim had to be rejected.  

(59)  The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at 

the Community border, duty unpaid, are the following: 

– 

– 

– 

The Egyptian Ferroalloys Company, Cairo 15,4% 

Egyptian Chemical Industries KIMA, Cairo 24,8% 

All others 24,8% 

C. Kazakhstan  

(60) 

In the absence of co-operation, only a country-wide dumping margin was established. 
The definitive dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at 
the Community border, duty unpaid, is set at 37,1%. 

D. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(61)  The  co-operating  exporting  producer  is  the  only  known  FeSi  producer  in  the  former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia.  The  definitive  dumping  margins,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  the  CIF  import  price  at  the  Community  border  duty  unpaid,  are  the 
following: 

– 

– 

E. Russia 

SILMAK DOOEL Export Import, Jegunovce 5,4% 

All others 5,4% 

(62)  The two co-operating Russian exporting producers are the only known FeSi producers 
in  Russia.  The  definitive  dumping  margins,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  CIF 
import price at the Community border, duty unpaid, are the following: 

– 

– 

Chemk  Group  (Chelyabinsk  Electrometallurgical  IntegratedPlant  and 
Kutznetsk Ferroalloy Works), Chelyabinsk and Novokuznetsk 22,7% 

ICT Group of Companies (Bratsk Ferroalloy Plant, TD North West Ferro 
Alloy  Company  and  Bakersfield  Marketing  Ltd),  Bratsk  and  Saint 
Petersburg 17,8% 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
– 

All others 22,7% 

4. 

INJURY 

4.1. 

Definition of the Community industry 

(63)  Certain interested parties claimed that the injury assessment should not be made on an 
aggregate  basis  but  on  a  company-by-company  basis,  in  view  of  alleged  divergent 
injury trends between the different Community producers. 

(64)  Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation the examination of injury shall include 
an evaluation of the relevant factors having a bearing on the Community industry. The 
term  "Community  industry"  is  defined  in  Article  4  of  the  basic  Regulation  as 
Community producers as a whole of the like products or those whose collective output 
represents a major proportion of the total Community production. From the above it is 
clear that the determination of injury shall be conducted at the level of the Community 
industry  examined  as  a  whole,  rather  than  on  the  individual  situation  of  each 
Community producer in isolation. 

(65)  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  the  claims  were  rejected  and  recitals  (78)  to  (80)  of  the 

provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

4.2. 

Community consumption 

(66)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the  Commission  did  not  provide  in  its  provisional 
Regulation essential information for its injury analysis, such as a monthly breakdown 
of  demand  of  FeSi,  price  development  on  the  EU  market,  including  Community 
industry price and cost developments. 

(67)  The  basic  Regulation  does  not  require  Community  producers  or  other  interested 
parties to provide data for the period considered on a monthly basis. It is considered 
that  this  would  be  unduly  burdensome  for  all  interested  parties  and  it  is  common 
practice to request data on a yearly basis for the investigation of dumping and injury. 
In  addition,  the  party  did  not  provide  any  evidence  demonstrating  that  a  monthly 
analysis was necessary in the current case to assess injury. In fact, the tables provided 
in recitals (81), (85), (96) and (97) of the provisional Regulation reflect adequately the 
Community  consumption,  prices  on  the  Community  market,  profit  and  thus  the  cost 
development of the Community industry during the period considered. Therefore, this 
claim had to be rejected.  

4.3. 

Imports into the Community from the countries concerned 

(68)  One interested party claimed that imports from Russia should not be cumulated with 
those  from  the  PRC  for  the  purpose  of  the  injury  assessment  since  these  imports 
allegedly did not operate under similar conditions of competition on  the Community 
market.  In  particular,  it  claimed  that  i)  the  majority  of  Chinese  exporting  producers 
operate under non-market economy conditions, ii) the Russian companies sell through 
related  companies  whereas  the  Chinese  exporting  producers  sell  directly  to 
independent  customers,  iii)  the  dumping  and  undercutting  margins  for  Chinese 
companies  are  significantly  higher  than  those  of  the  Russian  companies  and  that  iv) 
Chinese  exporting  producers  have  been  increasingly  penetrating  the  EU  market  with 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
penetration  in  the  first  6  months  of  2006  being  50%  higher  than  Russian  exporting 
producers.  

(69)  Regarding  the  first  claim,  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  Chinese  exporting  producers 
operate  under  non-market  economy  conditions  is  not  one  of  the  reasons  for 
decumulation foreseen in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. The fact whether or not 
the product concerned is produced under market economy conditions in the domestic 
market is therefore not relevant for deciding on the cumulation of imports. 

(70)  As to the second claim concerning the alleged difference in sales channels, it is noted 
that, even though the Russian exporting producers were using related traders, the like 
products  imported  both  from  the  PRC  and  Russia  are  sold  to  the  same  type  of  end-
customers in the Community, namely to users and distributors. 

(71)  As to third claim regarding the dumping and undercutting margins, it is noted that for 
both  countries  dumping  margins  have  been  established  above  de  minimis  levels  as 
required  by  Article  3(4)(a)  of  the  basic  Regulation  and  that  for  both  countries 
undercutting was found to exist. 

(72)  Regarding  the  last  claim  on  import  volumes,  it  is  noted  that  the  volumes  imported 
from  Russia  (and  the  PRC)  were  not  negligible  as  required  by  Article  3(4)(a)  of  the 
basic Regulation as they reached a market share of 18% and 21%, respectively, during 
the IP. 

(73)  For all these reasons, a decumulation of imports from Russia is not warranted and the 

claim is rejected.  

(74)  Another interested party claimed that the Commission did not analyse the conditions 
of  competition  between  the  products  imported  from  the  countries  concerned  and 
submitted  that  the  effects  of  the  dumped  Egyptian  imports  on  the  situation  of  the 
Community industry should, therefore, be assessed separately.  

(75)  As suggested in recitals (83) and (89) of the provisional Regulation, the conditions of 
competition between the imported products regarding the likeness of the product and 
the  similarity  of  the  exporters'  behaviour  (i.e.  the  significance  of  the  import  volume 
level,  the  development  and  level  of  the  price  of  imports  and  their  undercutting  of 
prices of the Community industry and the similarity of sales channels) were analysed. 
It  was  thereby  found  that  the  conditions  justifying  the  cumulative  assessment  of 
imports  from  the  countries  concerned  were  met.  On  this  basis,  this  claim  had  to  be 
rejected and recital (84) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.  

(76)  One  Egyptian  exporting  producer  also  claimed  that  its  limited  export  volume  during 
the  IP  had  not  caused  injury  to  the  Community  industry  and  that  thus  its  situation 
should be assessed separately. In this regard, it is noted that pursuant to Article 3(4) of 
the basic Regulation the effect of dumped imports on the situation of the Community 
industry shall be cumulatively assessed if, amongst others, the volume of imports from 
each country subject to the investigation is not negligible. Since imports from Egypt 
were  found  to  have  reached  a  market  share  of  3,7%  during  the  IP,  they  were  not 
negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, this 
claim had to be rejected.  

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
(77) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  in  this  regard,  recitals  (82)  to  (89)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

4.4. 

Price undercutting  

(78)  One  interested  party  claimed  that  the  undercutting  margins  found  in  the  provisional 
Regulation should be reduced by 3% to 5% in order to reflect "locally sourced" FeSi, 
since the steel producer in the Community would allegedly pay a premium for locally 
(EU)-sourced material reflecting reliability, quality and timing of supply.  

(79)  Recitals  (38) and (87) to  (89) of the provisional Regulation explain the basis  for  the 
comparison  of  the  prices  charged  by  the  Community  industry  with  those  charged  by 
the exporters concerned. The comparison took account of the various qualities of the 
product concerned as defined in recital (13) of the provisional Regulation. Moreover, 
as  regards  reliability  and  timing  of  supply,  the  investigation  did  not  reveal  that  the 
payment  of  any  such  premium  was  taking  place  or  that  this  potential  competitive 
advantage  was  included  in  the  price  charged  by  the  Community  industry  to  steel 
producers. Finally, the interested party did not provide any evidence to substantiate its 
claim which therefore had to be rejected. 

4.5. 

Situation of the Community Industry  

(80)  Certain  interested  parties  questioned  the  methodology  used  in  recital  (93)  of  the 
provisional  Regulation  to  calculate  the  production  capacity  of  the  Community 
industry.  In  particular,  they  suggested  applying  a  capacity  figure  taking  into  account 
closures  for  maintenance  and  electricity  cuts,  instead  of  the  "theoretical  nominal 
capacity" as used in the provisional Regulation.  

(81)  The investigation has shown that any closures of the Community industry machinery 
for maintenance or electricity cuts were of a temporary nature and that these did not 
occur on a regular basis within the period considered. It is worth noting that, even if 
adjustments were to be made to production capacity, as suggested by these interested 
parties,  the  trends  concerning  the  production  capacity  and  of  the  capacity  utilisation 
would remain unchanged. The conclusions reached on the existence of material injury 
suffered  by  the  Community  industry  would  also  remain  the  same.  Consequently,  the 
claim to apply a different definition of production capacity has to be rejected. 

(82)  Based  on  the  above  facts  and  considerations,  the  conclusion  that  the  Community 
industry  suffered  material  injury,  in  recitals  (107)  to  (110)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5. 

CAUSATION 

(83)  Certain  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  assessment  of  the  causal  link  between  the 
injury  suffered  by  the  Community  industry  and  the  dumped  imports  should  not  be 
made on an aggregate basis but on a company-by-company basis, in view of alleged 
divergent causation factors between the different Community producers. 

(84)  As  already  noted  in  recital  (64)  above  concerning  injury,  there  is  no  legal  ground  in 
Articles 3(5), 3(6) and 3(7) of the basic Regulation suggesting that causation should be 
assessed on the basis of individual Community producers included in the definition of 
the Community industry. The latter is defined in Article 4 of the basic Regulation as 

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
Community producers as a whole of the like products or those whose collective output 
represents a major proportion of the total Community production.  

5.1. 

Effect of dumped imports  

(85) 

It is recalled that the dumped imports volume from the countries concerned and market 
share  increased  significantly  during  the  period  considered.  There  was  also  a  clear 
coincidence in time between the surge of dumped imports and the deterioration of the 
economic situation of the Community industry. That industry was not able to increase 
its sales prices to the necessary level to cover its full costs, as its prices were undercut 
during the IP by dumped imports. 

(86)  On that basis, the findings and the conclusions reached in recitals (112) to (114) of the 

provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

5.2. 

Price setting of Ferro-silicon 

(87)  Certain  interested  parties  claimed  that  FeSi  is  a  commodity  traded  on  the  global 
market  and  that  market  prices  for  FeSi  were  set  by  fluctuating  demand  of  the  steel 
industry and were not cost-based.  

(88) 

In market economies and in normal market conditions, the prices are generally set by 
the levels of the demand and the offer for a certain product in the market. However, 
there might be other factors such as the presence of low priced-dumped imports, which 
are playing a major role in the level of the prices. In the current case, the investigation 
showed  that  indeed  the  price  setting  mechanisms  for  FeSi  were  influenced  by  the 
presence  of  significant  quantities  of  dumped  imports.  While  it  is  certainly  true  that 
global  demand  for  FeSi,  in  particular  from  the  steel  industry,  influenced  the  price 
setting in certain parts of the period considered, the information available has shown 
that there were periods in which FeSi contractual prices decreased despite the growing 
demand.  

(89)  The  same  interested  parties  provided  information  showing  the  development  of  EU 
crude  and  stainless  steel  production  and  EU  FeSi  spot  prices  from  2002  onwards. 
From this data the interested parties drew the  conclusion  that  FeSi prices could  only 
have been driven by demand (primarily from steel producers). However, the analysis 
of this information confirmed the conclusion reached in recital (88), namely that even 
on  the  Community  level,  FeSi  prices  were  in  certain  periods  decreasing  despite  an 
increasing demand from the steel industry. 

(90)  Therefore, the claim that the low level of FeSi prices was determined by demand and 

not by the dumped imports has to be rejected. 

5.3. 

Competitiveness of the Community industry 

(91)  One interested party claimed that the injury suffered by the Community industry had 
to  be  attributed  solely  to  the  alleged  lack  of  competitiveness  of  the  Community 
producers  and  not  to  the  dumped  imports.  In  particular,  this  interested  party  cited  a 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
working document3 where raw materials and energy were cited as the most important 
competitiveness factors for the EU metals industry.  

(92)  The  analysis  of  the  aforementioned  working  document  showed,  however,  that  no 
conclusion  is  drawn  in  the  text  which  refers  to  any  lack  of  competitiveness  of  the 
European Ferro-alloys industry. On the contrary, this working document indicates that 
the  Ferro-alloy  producers  "are  facing  growing  imports  from  third  countries  e.g.  the 
PRC, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and Kazakhstan. This might become a threat to the long-
term sustainability of the EU Ferro-alloys industry  if a  level  playing  field  with third 
country competitors is not rapidly ensured4". On the basis of the above, the claim was 
rejected.  

(93)  The same interested party further argued that most of the Community producers were 
already  unprofitable  before  any  injurious  dumping  took  place  in  the  Community 
market. Therefore, it would not be the dumped imports but vulnerable costs structures 
that have caused the weak economic situation of the Community industry. 

(94)  As  it  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  recital  (97)  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  the 
Community  industry  was  profitable  in  2003  with  a  pre-tax  profit  margin  of  2,3%, 
which increased to 2,7% in 2004. In 2005, however, a significant downwards trend in 
profitability took place and losses reached –9,2% of turnover. The highest losses of –
12,9% were  incurred during the IP. In this context, it is recalled that part of 2005 is 
covered  by  the  IP.  Consequently,  the  argument  that  the  Community  industry  was 
already unprofitable before any injurious dumping took place has to be rejected. 

5.4. 

Imports from other third countries 

(95)  With  regard  to  imports  form  other  third  countries,  in  the  absence  of  any  new 
comments,  the  conclusion  reached  in  recital  (121)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  that 
these imports have not materially contributed to the injury suffered by the Community 
industry is confirmed.  

5.5. 

Effects of further factors 

5.5.1.  Comments by the interested parties 

(96)  Various  interested  parties  reiterated  the  claims  put  forward  before  the  imposition  of 
the provisional measures, that the material injury suffered by the Community industry 
was  allegedly  caused  by  factors  other  than  the  dumped  imports.  These  claims  were 
already  duly  addressed  in  the  provisional  Regulation.  More  specifically,  the  claims 
referring  to  alleged  self-inflicted  material  injury  were  addressed  in  recitals  (134)  to 
(136)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  and  the  claims  concerning  the  downturn  in  steel 
demand were addressed in recital (124) of the provisional Regulation. Even though no 
new  elements  were  provided  to  support  these  claims,  the  main  findings  and 
conclusions set out in the provisional Regulation are further clarified below. 

5.5.1.1.  Increase in costs of production of the Community industry 

3 

4 

Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Analysis  of  economic  indicators  of  the  EU  metals  industry:  the  impact  of  raw  materials  and  energy  supply  on 
competitiveness, Brussels 2.8.2006, SEC (2006)1069. 
Ibid. p.88. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(97)  Several  interested  parties  claimed  that  the  sharp  increase  in  costs,  in  particular  raw 
materials  and  electricity,  suffered  by  the  Community  industry  and  the  reduction  in 
production  capacity  of  one  Community  producer  have  caused  the  material  injury 
found during the IP. 

(98)  With  regard  to  the  alleged  reduction  in  production  capacity  of  one  Community 
producer, it is recalled that an adjustment to capacity was made as mentioned in recital 
(93) of the provisional Regulation to take full account of this particular situation. 

(99)  With  regard  to  cost  increases,  the  Community  industry  alleged  that  cost  increases 
observed  in  the  alloy  industry  usually  occur  on  a  worldwide  scale  thereby  affecting 
equally  the  worldwide  industry.  An  analysis  of  the  price  development  of  major  cost 
items over the period considered shows that costs have increased (electricity, quartzite 
and electrode paste). However, the investigation has shown that even if these increases 
were  partly  compensated  by  sale  price  increases  the  presence  of  low-priced  dumped 
imports did not allow the Community industry to pass on the full effect of its increases 
in  costs  in  its  sales  price.  Recitals  (131)  to  (140)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
therefore confirmed.  

(100)  Several interested parties argued that one specific Community producer had problems 
with its electricity supplier leading to reduced production quantities in 2005 and 2006. 
They argued that this fully explained the decrease in production and sales volume by 
the Community industry and the loss in profitability. 

(101)  As  already  mentioned  in  recital  (84)  above,  the  cause  of  the  injury  suffered  shall  be 
analysed at the level of the Community industry as a whole. However, for the sake of 
argument,  even  if  the  data  pertaining  to  this  producer  could  be  excluded  from  the 
injury  assessment,  the  trends  observed  for  the  remainder  of  the  Community  industry 
would  remain  highly  negative  and  continue  to  show  material  injury.  Therefore  this 
claim had to be rejected. 

5.5.2.  Conclusion on causation 

(102)  Given the above analysis which has properly distinguished and separated the effects of 
all other known factors on the situation of the Community industry from the injurious 
effects of the dumped imports, it is hereby confirmed that these other factors as such 
do  not  reverse  the  fact  that  the  material  injury  assessed  must  be  attributed  to  the 
dumped imports.  

(103)  Given  the  above,  it  is  concluded  that  the  dumped  imports  of  FeSi  originating  in  the 
PRC,  Kazakhstan,  Egypt,  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  and  Russia 
have caused material injury to the Community industry within the meaning of Article 
3(6) of the basic Regulation. 

(104)  In the absence of other comments in this respect, the conclusions in recitals (137) to 

(140) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

6. 

COMMUNITY INTEREST 

6.1. 

Interest of the Community industry and of the other Community producer 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
(105)  Certain interested parties argued that the market of FeSi has recovered since the end of 
the IP and that prices have allegedly reached record levels. The Community industry 
could thus resume production and increase its profitability without the need to impose 
any  anti-dumping  measures.  In  addition,  it  was  also  alleged  that  only  exporting 
producers  located  in  third  countries  not  concerned  by  anti-dumping  measures  would 
be  the  beneficiary  from  the  imposition  of  measures  rather  than  the  Community 
industry. 

(106)  According  to  Article  6(1)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  information  relating  to  a  period 
subsequent to the IP shall normally not be taken into account to reach a finding. In any 
event, while the information available shows that FeSi prices have indeed followed an 
upward trend in the months following the IP, the prices for major cost inputs of FeSi 
have also increased in the same period. On this basis, it cannot be concluded that the 
Community industry has recovered to the extent that the imposition of measures would 
not be warranted. This argument had therefore to be rejected. 

(107)  With  regard  to  the  argument  that  only  exporting  producers  located  in  third  countries 
not  concerned  by  anti-dumping  measures  would  in  fact  be  the  beneficiary  from  the 
imposition of measures rather than the Community industry, it is recalled that the aim 
of  anti-dumping  measures  is  to  correct  the  trade  distorting  effects  of  dumping  and 
restore effective competition on the Community market. On the one hand, the imports 
from  the  countries  concerned  will  therefore  not  be  prevented  from  entering  the 
Community  market  where  effective  competition  will  prevail  for  the  benefit  of  all 
operators. Likewise, the Community industry will reap the benefits of the restoration 
of effective competition on the Community market. On that basis, it is considered that 
the argument is unfounded and must therefore be rejected. 

(108)  In the absence of any other comments in this particular regard, the findings set out in 

recitals (143) to (149) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

6.2. 

Interest of the suppliers of raw materials 

(109)  In  the  absence  of  comments  from  suppliers,  following  the  disclosure  of  provisional 

findings, recitals (150) to (152) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

6.3. 

Interest of the importers 

(110)  One  interested  party  importing  FeSi  from  the  PRC  and  delivering  it  mainly  to 
foundries alleged that the imposition of any anti-dumping measures will have serious 
negative  effects  on  the  iron  casting  industry  resulting  in  the  closing  down  of 
undertakings  in  such  industry  and  consequently  in  job  losses  in  the  Community 
market. 

(111)  However, as outlined in recital (115) below, despite a very limited cooperation from 
foundries,  the  further  investigation  carried  out  after  the  imposition  of  provisional 
measures showed that the imposition of measures is not likely to have a significantly 
negative effect on foundries. Therefore, this claim had to be rejected.  

(112)  In the absence of any other comments in this particular regard, the findings set out in 

recitals (153) to (158) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

6.4. 

Interest of users 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
(113)  As outlined in recitals (3) to (5) above, the possible effect of provisional measures on 
the  situation  of  the  user  industries,  in  particular  foundries  and  steel  producers,  was 
further  examined.  Although  more  than  500  questionnaires  were  sent  to  interested 
parties, their cooperation, as explained in recital (5) above, was very poor.  

(114)  The  additional  analysis  concentrated  on  the  two  main  groups  of  users,  namely  steel 
producers and foundries. Based on additional information received, it was confirmed 
that  on  average  FeSi  accounts  for  approximately  0,7%  of  the  cost  of  production  of 
steel producers. For foundries, this share was found to be higher (1,4% of the cost of 
production).  

(115)  On that basis, and taking into account that the average definitive duty rate is 23,4%, 
the  impact  of  measures  on  the  steel  and  the  foundry  industry  is  not  expected  to  be 
significant  as  it  will  effect  at  maximum  their  financial  results  by  0,16%  and  0,33%, 
respectively.  This  worst  case  scenario  situation  should  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the 
beneficial  effects  the  correction  of  the  trade  distortion  will  have  on  the  Community 
market  overall.  Moreover,  if  the  fact  that  imports  from  the  countries  concerned 
account for about 50% of Community consumption is factored into this analysis, then 
the effect of the measures to the financial results of the user industries would indeed be 
significantly lower.  

(116)  Given the above, recital (166) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

6.5. 

Previous proceedings  

(117)  Several interested parties claimed that because the anti-dumping measures imposed in 
the  past  allegedly  did  not  have  the  expected  remedial  effect  on  the  Community 
industry, the institutions decided to let the anti-dumping measures lapse5 in 2001. 

(118)  Without  commenting  on  the  correctness  of  the  above  claim,  the  basic  Regulation 
requires that decisions are taken on the basis of the information gathered and analysed 
during the relevant investigation and not on the basis of previous investigations. The 
above  assumption  made  by  these  interested  parties  is  therefore  not  relevant  in  the 
present case and must be rejected. 

6.6. 

Conclusion on Community interest 

(119)  Given the results of the further investigation of the Community interest aspects of the 
case described above, the findings and conclusions contained in recitals (141) to (168) 
of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

7. 

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

7.1. 

Injury elimination level 

(120)  Several interested parties contested the provisional finding that a profit margin of 5% 
would  be  the  profit  margin  that  could  reasonably  be  achieved  by  an  industry  of  this 
type in the sector under normal conditions of competition. 

5 

Commission Decision of 21 February 2001, OJ L 84, 23.3.2001, p. 36, recital (129) 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(121)  One interested party claimed that the profit margin for the Community industry used 
for  the  determination  of  the  injury  elimination  level  should  be  set  at  the  level  of  the 
profit realised by the Community industry in the year 2003, i.e. 2,3%, and in no case 
more  than  that  of  the  year  2004  which  was  an  exceptionally  prosperous  year  for  the 
alloy sector. 

(122)  The determination of the injury elimination level has to be based on an evaluation of 
the level of the profit margin which the Community industry can reasonably expect to 
achieve  in  the  absence  of  dumped  imports,  on  the  sales  of  the  like  product  on  the 
Community  market.  The  profit  margin  realised  at  the  beginning  of  the  period 
considered  in  a  given  investigation  may  be  considered  as  the  profit  realised  in  the 
absence of dumped imports. However, it is also recalled that during the expiry review 
investigation which led to the termination of the anti-dumping measures applicable to 
imports  of  FeSi  originating  in  Brazil,  the  PRC,  Kazakhstan,  Russia,  Ukraine  and 
Venezuela the profits realized by the Community industry in the absence of dumped 
imports reached levels up to 11,2%6. Accordingly, the applied target profit of 5% used 
in the present investigation as explained in recital (171) of the provisional Regulation 
reflects a rather conservative approach. On the basis of the above, the claim had to be 
rejected. 

(123)  In the absence of any other comments concerning the injury elimination level, recitals 

(169) to (171) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

7.2. 

Form and level of the duties 

(124)  In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  and  in  accordance  with  Article  9(4)  of  the  basic 
Regulation, a definitive anti-dumping duty should be imposed at the level sufficient to 
eliminate  the  injury  caused  by  the  dumped  imports  without  exceeding  the  dumping 
margin found.  

(125)  In  view  of  the  comments  received  by  certain  interested  parties  following  the 
provisional disclosure and in view of the revisions described in this Regulation, certain 
margins have been amended.  

(126)  The rate of the definitive duties are definitively set as follows: 

Country 

Company 

Injury 
elimination  
margin 

Dumping 
margin 

Anti-
dumping 
duty rate 

PRC 

Erdos Xijin Kuang Co., Ltd. , Qipanjing Industry 
Park 

21,4 % 

15,6% 

15,6% 

Lanzhou  Good  Land  Ferroalloy  Factory  Co., 
Ltd., Xicha Village 

31,4 % 

29,0 % 

29,0 % 

All other companies 

31,2 % 

55,6 % 

31,2 % 

Russia 

Chelyabinsk  Electrometallurgical 
Integrated 
Plant,  Chelyabinsk  and  Kuznetsk  Ferroalloy 

31,3 % 

22,7 % 

22,7 % 

6 

Commission Decision of 21 February 2001, OJ L 84, 23.3.2001, p. 36, recital (105) 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Works, Novokuznetsk 

Bratsk Ferroalloy Plant, Bratsk 

18,8 % 

17,8 % 

17,8 % 

all other companies 

31,3 % 

22,7 % 

22,7 % 

Egypt 

The Egyptian Ferroalloys Company, Cairo 

27,1 % 

15,4% 

15,4% 

Egyptian Chemical Industries KIMA, Cairo 

18,0 % 

24,8 % 

18,0 % 

all other companies 

18,0 % 

24,8 % 

18,0 % 

Kazakhstan 

All companies 

33,9 % 

37,1 % 

33,9 % 

All companies 

19,0 % 

5,4 % 

5,4 % 

The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 

(127)  Some interested parties proposed to impose a minimum import price instead of an ad 
valorem  duty.  However,  it  was  considered  that  the  imposition  of  a  minimum  import 
price  was  not  appropriate  in  this  case.  It  was  found  that  FeSi  is  imported  in  a  wide 
range  of  different  types  with  significantly  different  price  levels.  In  addition,  all  co-
operating exporters have different duty levels (some based on dumping margins, some 
on the injury margins) requiring a multitude of different minimum import prices. The 
imposition  of  a  minimum  import  price  would,  in  these  circumstances,  be  a  highly 
inefficient measure. This proposal was therefore rejected. 

(128)  The  individual  company  anti-dumping  duty  rates  specified  in  this  Regulation  were 
established  on  the  basis  of  the  findings  of  the  present  investigation.  Therefore,  they 
reflect  the  situation  found  during  that  investigation  with  respect  to  these  companies. 
These  duty  rates  (as  opposed  to  the  country-wide  duty  applicable  to  "all  other 
companies") are thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the 
countries  concerned  and  produced  by  the  companies  and  thus  by  the  specific  legal 
entities mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically 
mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including 
entities  related  to  those  specifically  mentioned,  cannot  benefit  from  these  rates  and 
shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to "all other companies". 

(129)  Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty 
rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of 
new  production  or  sales  entities)  should  be  addressed  to  the  Commission7  forthwith 
with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities 
linked  to  production,  domestic  and  export  sales  associated  with,  for  example,  that 
name  change  or  that  change  in  the  production  and  sales  entities.  If  appropriate,  the 
Regulation  will  then  be  amended  accordingly  by  updating  the  list  of  companies 
benefiting from individual duty rates. 

7 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Office J-79 4/23, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
7.3. 

Undertakings 

(130)  The undertaking offered by the exporting producer in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia was accepted at the provisional stage by Commission Regulation (EC) No 
994/2007. Following the disclosure of the definitive findings, one exporting producer 
in Egypt, the two co-operating producers in Russia and one Chinese exporter offered 
price undertakings in accordance with Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation.  

(131)  It is noted, however, that since the imposition of the provisional measures the product 
concerned  and  the  like  product  have  shown  a  considerable  volatility  in  prices  and 
therefore  FeSi  is  not  considered  anymore  suitable  for  a  fixed  price  undertaking.  In 
order to overcome this problem, the possibility to index the minimum import price to 
the  price  of  the  main  cost  input  was  examined.  It  was  concluded,  however,  that  the 
volatility  in  prices  on  the  market  cannot  be  merely  explained  by  an  increase  in  the 
price of the main cost input, thus it is not possible to index the minimum import prices 
to the price of the main cost input. On the basis of the above, it was concluded that the 
undertakings offered by the exporters cannot be accepted. 

(132)  In examining whether or not the four undertakings offered following the disclosure of 
the  definitive  findings  should  be  accepted,  the  Commission  also  examined  the 
workability  of  the  undertaking  accepted  at  provisional  stage  from  the  exporting 
producer  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  under  the  changed 
circumstances  of  price  volatility.  Due  to  the  above  described  high  volatility  of  the 
price, the minimum import price of the undertaking is no longer sufficient to eliminate 
the injurious effect of dumping as established by the investigation. Indeed, prices have 
considerably  increased  in  the  months  following  the  acceptance  of  the  undertaking. 
Given the fact that the minimum import price cannot be indexed, it was concluded that 
the undertaking in its current form, namely with fixed minimum prices is not workable 
any longer. Thus the acceptance of the undertaking offered by the exporting producer 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should be withdrawn. In this regard, 
the  Commission  withdrew  its  acceptance  of  the  undertaking  by  Commission 
Regulation (EC) No [INSERT]/20088.  

7.4. 

Definitive collection of provisional duties and special monitoring 

(133)  In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of 
the  injury  caused  to  the  Community  industry,  it  is  considered  necessary  that  the 
amounts  secured  by  way  of  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty,  imposed  by  the 
provisional  Regulation,  i.e.  Regulation  (EC)  No  994/2007,  should  be  definitively 
collected  to  the  extent  of  the  amount  of  the  definitive  duties  imposed.  Where  the 
definitive duties are lower than the provisional duties, amounts provisionally secured 
in  excess  of  the  definitive  rate  of  anti-dumping  duties  shall  be  released.  Where  the 
definitive duties are higher than the provisional duties, only the amounts secured at the 
level of the provisional duties shall be definitely collected. 

(134)  In order to minimize the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in the duty 
rates, it is considered that special measures are needed in this case to ensure the proper 
application  of  the  anti-dumping  duties.  These  special  measures,  which  only  apply  to 

8 

OJ L [INSERT REFERENCE]. 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
companies for which an individual duty rate is introduced, include the presentation to 
the  customs  authorities  of  the  Member  States  of  a  valid  commercial  invoice,  which 
shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex. Imports not accompanied by 
such an invoice shall be made subject to the residual anti-dumping duty applicable to 
all other exporters. 

(135)  It  is  recalled  that  should  the  exports  by  the  companies  benefiting  from  lower 
individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the anti-
dumping measures, such increase could be considered as constituting in itself a change 
in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 
13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, and provided the conditions are 
met,  an  anti-circumvention  investigation  may  be  initiated.  This  investigation  may, 
inter  alia,  examine  the  need  for  the  removal  of  individual  duty  rates  and  the 
consequent imposition of a country-wide duty. 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of ferro-silicon falling within 
CN codes 7202 21 00, 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 and originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Kazakhstan, Egypt, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia.  

2.  The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net,  free-at-Community-
frontier price, before duty, of the products manufactured by the companies listed below shall 
be as follows: 

Country 

Company  

AD duty rate 
(%) 

TARIC 
additional code 

The People’s 
Republic of China 

Erdos  Xijin  Kuangye  Co.,  Ltd., 
Qipanjing Industry Park 

15,6 

A829 

Lanzhou Good Land Ferroalloy 
Factory Co., Ltd, Xicha Village 

29,0 

A830 

All other companies 

Egypt 

The  Egyptian  Ferroalloys  Company, 
Cairo 

All other companies 

Kazakhstan 

All companies 

The former 
Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia  

All companies  

31,2 

15,4 

18,0 

33,9 

5,4 

A999 

A831 

A999 

- 

 - 

Russia 

Bratsk Ferroalloy Plant, Bratsk  

17,8 

A835 

All other companies  

22,7 

A999 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
3.  The  application  of  the  individual  duty  rates  specified  for  the  companies  mentioned  in 
paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member 
States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the 
Annex. If no such invoice is presented, the duty rate applicable to all other companies shall 
apply.  

4. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.  

Article 2 

Amounts  secured  by  way  of  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  pursuant  to  Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 994/2007 on imports of ferro-silicon falling within CN codes 7202 21 00, 
7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 and originating in the People's  Republic of China,  Kazakhstan, 
Egypt, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia shall be definitely collected. 
The amounts secured in excess of the amount of the definitive anti-dumping duties shall be 
released. Where the definitive duties are higher than the provisional duties, only the amounts 
secured at the level of the provisional duties shall be definitively collected. 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 3 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, […] 

For the Council 
The President 
[…] 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 

A declaration signed by an official of the company, in the following format must appear on 
the valid commercial invoice referred to in Article 1(3): 

1.  The  name  and  function  of  the  official  of  the  company  which  has  issued  the  commercial 
invoice. 

2. The following declaration "I, the undersigned, certify that the [volume] of ferro-silicon sold 
for  export  to  the  European  Community  covered  by  this  invoice  was  manufactured  by 
(company  name  and  registered  seat)  (TARIC  additional  code)  in  (country  concerned).  I 
declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct. 

Date and signature" 

EN 

27 

   EN