Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 January 2008 at the request of the Swedish Parliament on a draft amendment to the Law on Sveriges Riksbank concerning the terms of office of members of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board (CON/2008/4)
Date: 2008-01-14
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Sweden, appointment of staff, board of directors, central bank, national law

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 14 January 2008 

at the request of the Swedish Parliament on a draft amendment to the Law on Sveriges Riksbank 

concerning the terms of office of members of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board 

(CON/2008/4) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 9 October 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finance Committee of 

the  Swedish  Parliament  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  amendment  to  the  Law  on  Sveriges  Riskbank 

concerning the terms of office of members of Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board (hereinafter the ‘draft 

amendment’). 

The  ECB’s  competence  to  deliver  an  opinion  is  based  on  Article  105(4)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 

European Community and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 

on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national  authorities  regarding  draft  legislative 
provisions1,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  Sveriges  Riksbank.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of 

Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted 

this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft regulations 

At  present  all  members  of  Sveriges  Riksbank’s  Executive  Board  are  appointed  for  six-year  terms.  The 

underlying assumption when the system was established in 1999 was that one member of the Executive 

Board  would  be  replaced  each  year.  However,  this  cycle  has  been  disturbed  because  several  Executive 

Board members have left before the end of their terms of office, and this may happen again in future. To 

deal with this, the draft amendment provides that Executive Board members’ terms can be either five or 

six years. This provides some flexibility when appointing new Executive Board members, allowing their 

terms  to  be  arranged  so  as  to  avoid  a  situation  where  the  terms  of  several  members  expire  at  the  same 

time. 

2.   General observations 

2.1  The proposed terms of office comply with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of 

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’), which inter alia 

1 

OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  

 
 
 
 
                                                      
lays  down  a  minimum  five-year  term  of  office  for  Governors  of  national  central  banks  (NCBs). 

However,  the  ECB  would  nonetheless  make  the  following  comments  and  recommendations 

concerning the draft amendment and the requirements of central bank independence. 

2.2  Various  Treaty  and  ESCB  Statute  provisions  require  comparable  security  of  tenure  to  that  of 

Governors  for  all  members  of  NCBs’  decision-making  bodies.  Article 14.2  of  the  ESCB  Statute 

does not restrict the security of tenure of office to Governors, whilst Article 108 of the Treaty and 

Article 7 of the ESCB Statute refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather 
than to Governors specifically2. This  applies  in  particular where  a  Governor  is  first among  equals 

between  colleagues  with  equivalent  voting  rights  or  where  such  other  members  may  have  to 
deputise for the Governor3. Personal independence would be jeopardised if the same rules for the 

security of tenure of office did not also apply to other members of the decision-making bodies of 
NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks4. 

2.3  Although the ECB in principle encourages having terms of office of equal length for all members 

of NCBs’ decision-making bodies, there may be justifiable exceptions. If Member States wish to 

have different terms of office for their Executive Board members, this is acceptable provided that 

the  reasons  behind  the  approach  are  clearly  stated  and  the  arrangement  does  not  infringe  the 

principles of central bank independence. In the current case, the explanatory memorandum explains 

clearly that the intention behind the change in the law is that one member of the Executive Board 

should be replaced each year. This is an arrangement that the ECB does not oppose, since both of 

the proposed terms of office (6 and 5 years, respectively) comply with Article 14.2 of the ESCB 

Statute. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 January 2008. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Jean-Claude TRICHET 

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3  
4  

ECB Convergence Report May 2007, p. 19.  
ECB Convergence Report May 2007, p. 19. 
See:  paragraph  8  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2004/35  of  4  November  2004  at  the  request  of  the  Hungarian  Ministry  of 
Finance  on  a  draft  law  amending  the  Law  on  Magyar  Nemzeti  Bank;  paragraph  8  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2005/26  of 
4 August  2005  at  the  request  of  Národná  banka  Slovenska  on  a  draft  law  amending  the  Act  No  566/1992  Coll.  on 
Národná  banka  Slovenska,  as  amended,  and  on  amendments  to  certain  laws;  paragraph  3.3  of  ECB  Opinion 
CON/2006/44  of  25  August  2006  at  the  request  of  the  Banca  d’Italia  on  the  amended  Statute  of  the  Banca  d’Italia; 
paragraph 2.6 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/32 of 22 June 2006 at the request of the French Senate on a draft law on the 
Banque  de  France;  and  paragraphs  2.3  and  2.4  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2007/6  of  7  March  2007  at  the  request  of  the 
German Ministry of Finance on a draft Eighth Law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank. 

2