Commission opinion of 7 January 2008 on interim measures taken by the government of Denmark in respect of high velocity pressure/vacuum relief valves with flame screen of model HPV manufactured by Se-won Ind Co. in the Republic of Korea (Text with EEA relevance )
Date: 2008-01-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Community certification, Denmark, maritime safety, roadworthiness tests, tanker, technical standard

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I

(Resolutions, recommendations and opinions)

OPINIONS

COMMISSION

COMMISSION OPINION

of 7 January 2008

on interim measures taken by the government of Denmark in respect of high velocity
pressure/vacuum relief valves with flame screen of model HPV manufactured by Se-won Ind Co. in
the Republic of Korea

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2008/C 3/01)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

(3)

Having regard to the Treaty
Community,

establishing the European

Having regard to Council Directive 96/98/EC of 20 December
1996 on marine equipment (1), and in particular Article 13
thereof,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

The applicable testing standards for devices to prevent
the passage of flame into the cargo tanks in oil tankers
(high velocity valves only) are laid down in circulars
MSC 677 and MSC 1009 of the International Maritime
referring to the international
Organisation,
standard ISO 15364:2000.

the latter

the Danish Maritime
By letter of 27 February 2004,
Authority informed the Commission of interim measures
taken by the Authority in respect of high velocity pres-
sure/vacuum relief valves with flame screen of model
HPV (hereinafter,
‘the valves’) manufactured by Se-won
Ind Co. in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter, ‘the manu-
facturer’), whereby any such valves installed on board
ships flying the Danish flag were to be removed within a
period to be specified, on the grounds of
failure to
comply with Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 96/98/EC.

(1) OJ L 46, 17.2.1997, p. 25. Directive as last amended by Directive
2002/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 324,
29.11.2002, p. 53).

(4)

(5)

(6)

The letter from the Danish Maritime Authority was
accompanied by a copy of
two EC type-examination
certificates issued by the notified body Bureau Veritas,
under reference numbers 06842/A1 EC and 09149/A2
EC, both issued on 6 May 2002. Certificate number
06842/A1 EC concerned Combined High Velocity Pres-
sure/Vacuum Relief Valve with Flame Screen of
types
HPV 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, while certificate 09149/A2 EC
concerned type HPV 10.

Type-approval certificate No 06842/B0 EC was issued by
the Bureau Veritas on 8 May 2004 and superseded the
two type-approval certificates referred to above. This new
certificate concerned the ‘high velocity pressure relief
valve type HPV (P)-3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10’ of nominal
diameter 80, 100, 125, 150, 200, 250 (units unspeci-
fied).

had

the
The Danish Maritime Authority
above-mentioned interim measures following inspection
of valves installed on board ships flying the Danish flag
and based on the examination of
the documentation
submitted to it by the manufacturer, which was reported
mostly to date back to 1996.

taken

thermometers,

Based on this documentary examination,
the Danish
Maritime Authority found that: (a) the test records did
not include records for the calibration of gas concentra-
tion meters,
and time
recording devices; (b) no records had been provided for
the concentration and temperature of
the test gas
throughout the test nor for the gas flow rates used;
(c) no records had been provided confirming that the
tests had been conducted in the specified sequence;
for a minimum
(d) compliance with the requirement

flow meters

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efflux velocity of 30 metres per second at any time had
not been documented;
(e) no test records had been
provided in order to establish the relationships between
(f) no records had been
flow rate and pressure drop;
provided confirming that the fire testing had been carried
out in the absence of hammering; (g) no records had
been provided as regards the Maximum Experimental
Safe Gap (MESG) value of the test gas used, which in the
the Danish Maritime Authority made it
opinion of
impossible to comply with the ordering information
requirements of ISO 15364; and (h) the documentation
provided did not demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of the said standard.
Furthermore, the valves inspected by the Danish authori-
ties were reported not to comply with the requirements
of the said standard in terms of valve disc indicators and
drain design as well as inspection means for establishing
fouling/cleaning needs.

flash-back. The reports of

The Danish Maritime Authority highlighted that it had
witnessed the testing of this type of valves with proper
gas mixtures and flow rates by two notified bodies in
Denmark, and that this test had failed due to the occur-
these tests were
rence of
however not provided and therefore
is
their date
unknown; it would however seem that this remark of the
Danish authorities referred to tests which had led them
to issue a national ban against valves of this type prior to
the entry into force of the Directive. In their letter, the
Danish authorities confirmed that
the inspection of
valves bearing the wheel mark and installed on board
Danish ships had shown that
they were identical, or
nearly identical, to the valves which they had banned in
the past.

In its letter, the Danish Maritime Authority made no
evaluation of potential shortcomings in the testing stan-
dards themselves, considering that the problems observed
did not imply that the standards were insufficient.

Upon receipt of
the letter from the Danish Maritime
Authority the Commission entered into consultation with
the
the Danish Maritime Authority,
French Government as notifying Member State and the
notified body having issued the EC type-examination
certificates in question on the latter's behalf (hereinafter
referred to collectively as ‘the parties’).

the manufacturer,

The manufacturer's reply to the Commission's consulta-
tion included an item by item rebuttal of
the points
raised by the Danish Maritime Authority in its letter of
27 February 2004. The reply included documentation
comprising detailed drawings and the valves' instruction
manual, as well as calibration records and records of
several
tests including inter alia efflux velocity tests,
hammering tests, air leakage tests, hydrostatic pressure
tests and flash-back tests.

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

In its answer to the Commission, Bureau Veritas did not
address the Danish authorities' remarks in detail but
referred to the information and documentation provided
by the manufacturer and warned that the EC type-exami-

nation certificate granted to the valves referred to tests
carried out by the Research Institute of Marine Engi-
neering (RIME) in Japan.

(12) On 19 October 2004, the Danish Maritime Authority
provided a report concerning tests carried out on valves
reportedly removed from a Danish ship. The said report
had been issued on 8 October 2004 by the notified body
Force Technology to Messrs Pres-Vac Engineering A/S,
who are manufacturers of similar equipment and who
would seem to have provided the specimens tested,
namely two units of HPV valves of size 4. The test was
carried out at unspecified facilities in accordance with
circular MSC 677; it was witnessed by Force Technology,
who reported the occurrence of
flash-back within
50 opening cycles for both valves when tested for
cargoes within explosion group IIB (thus with an MESG
value of 0,65 mm).

(13)

reports,
This report was accompanied by two other
respectively issued to Messrs Pres-Vac Engineering A/S by
the Danish Institute of Fire Technology (DBI) in 1997
and by Force Technology themselves in 2000. These
institutes had each witnessed the testing of a specimen of
valve of the type Se-won HPV4; both tests had been
carried out by Pres-Vac Engineering with a propane gas
thus with an MESG
mixture (explosion group IIA,
value of 0,9 mm)
reportedly in accordance with
circular MSC 677, and had resulted in the occurrence of
flash-back; the DBI stated that it had not verified confor-
mity between the test specimen and the manufacturers'
drawings and specifications.

(14) While there is a considerable amount of data that suggest
that the valves might under certain conditions fail to
meet the applicable requirements for flash back, such
data cannot be considered conclusive given the uncer-
tainty on the circumstances of the tests, as regards inter
alia the condition of the tested valves, especially those
which had been removed from ships, the testing facilities
where the tests were carried out and the calibration of
the instruments used.

(15)

(16)

It is however clear from the documentation provided by
the manufacturer that the different tests which reportedly
formed the basis for type-examination had been certified
by up to seven different bodies (the University of Aachen,
the Korean Institute of Machinery and Materials, RIME,
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, the American Bureau of Shipping,
Lloyd's Register and Det Norske Veritas) at different
points in time between 1987 and 2002.

The documentation provided by the manufacturer shows
that at least part of the required tests had been carried
out by itself and witnessed by the certifying bodies
referred to above. In some cases,
it is not possible to
establish who carried out and witnessed the tests as the
results are given on paper without heading and with no
identification of the persons who sign. None of the docu-
ments provided attested to Bureau Veritas having carried
out, witnessed itself or in any way taken part in the tests
required by the applicable standards.

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(17)

(18)

Contrary to what had been stated by the notified body,
according to the documents provided by the manufac-
turer only fire safety tests would seem to have been
carried out or witnessed by the RIME in 1998.

The certificates delivered by Lloyd's Register and Det
Norske Veritas would seem to have been issued in whole
or in part based on documentary review. The certificate
delivered by Lloyd's Register refers to compliance with
this body's own type approval system;
the certificate
delivered by Det Norske Veritas appears to be incomplete
is not possible to ascertain its exact purpose,
and it
although it refers to a large number of tests required by
the applicable testing standards.

(19) Only part of the tests reports provided to the Commis-
sion indicate the testing standard used; in some cases this
is given in a separate explanatory document issued by the
manufacturer itself.

(20) As regards the flash-back and endurance burning tests,
the manufacturer states that the valves had in fact been
tested in 1987 against IMO MSC Circular 373 and that,
furthermore, the valves had been subsequently modified
and improved although the main components had not
changed. The applicable standards contained in circular
MSC 677 replaced those of circular MSC 373 in 1994,
well before the entry into force of the Directive, in order,
inter alia, to resolve a number of uncertainties concerning
hammering testing and hence flash back. The manufac-
turer provided a number of
tables preceded by the
mention ‘type approval test: Sewon/KIMM’ and reflecting
results of flashback and hammering tests which would
have been carried out in 1996; these documents do not
specify the standard used nor do they contain the formal
elements which are indispensable to establish their rele-
vance for the case as described in recital 16.

(21)

(22)

The calibration certificates provided by the manufacturer
appear to meet the demands of the Danish authorities in
that they concern all the apparatuses to which the latter
referred and for a period spanning between 1995 and
1997; however it is unclear how these certificates relate
to the different tests referred to in recital 15.

information and documents provided to the
The
Commission therefore raise reasonable doubt whether,
before delivering a type-examination certificate to the
manufacturer concerning the valves, the notified body
Bureau Veritas had effectively
a
the production envisaged,
specimen, representative of
complied with the provisions of the international instru-
ments that apply;
in particular, compliance with the
provisions of point 4 in the Section ‘EC TYPE-EXAMINA-
TION (MODULE B)’ of annex B to Directive 96/98/EC
and with Section 7.1 of ISO 15364:2000 has not been
sufficiently demonstrated.

ascertained

that

shown that

0,9 mm. While the type-approval certificate delivered by
Bureau Veritas in 2004 specifies that the valves may be
used on cargo tanks of chemical tankers carrying flam-
mable chemicals with MESG value of 0,9 mm or above,
the previous certificates delivered in 2002 contained no
such provision. However, the examination of the file by
the Commission has
the technical data
contained in the instruction manual provided by the
manufacturer refer to an MESG value of ‘0,53 (group B)’.
This incorrect information may be misleading for the
installation designer and for the authority issuing the
ship safety certificates;
it is therefore likely that ships
equipped with this model of valves may have been
authorised to carry cargoes of group IIB, for which the
valves have never been tested. This may entail a signifi-
cant safety hazard, given that it becomes increasingly
difficult for a flame arrestor to prevent the propagation
of flame as the MESG value of the medium decreases.

(24)

(25)

(26)

Concerning compliance with Sections 5 and 6 of
ISO 15364, the Danish authorities never specified their
claims as regards valve disc indicators and inspection
means for establishing fouling/cleaning needs, which thus
never received a specific answer from the manufacturer
or the notified body. However, on 28 July 2004 the
Danish authorities contended, based on the drawings
submitted by the manufacturer, that in violation of the
provisions of ISO 15364: (a) the vacuum spindle was
observed through a glass sighting tube; and (b) the drain
construction vented cargo vapour horizontally.

Section 5.2 of the said standard prohibits the use of
non-metallic materials, other than gaskets and seals, in
the construction of pressure-retaining components of the
device. Examination of
the drawings provided by the
manufacturer raises doubt as to whether the glass tube to
which the Danish authorities refer is effectively a pres-
sure-retaining component, or whether it should not be
considered to be a seal. Therefore, based on the docu-
mentation available to the Commission, it is not possible
to establish with reasonable certainty a violation of this
particular requirement.

Section 6.5 of the above mentioned standard provides
that the drain shall not allow vapour to escape unless the
drain is equipped with suitable means to prevent the
passage of flame and meets all requirements for efflux
velocity and direction; while Section 6.9 provides that
end-of-line devices shall be constructed to direct
the
efflux vertically upward under all flow rates intended by
the manufacturer. The drawings provided by the manu-
facturer show a drain with a horizontal outlet; however,
it is unclear whether, at its location, the drain can allow
It is therefore not possible for the
vapour to escape.
Commission to confirm the Danish authorities' appraisal.

(23)

The MESG is a measurable characteristic of a gas and
reflects its reactivity. The documentation provided by the
manufacturer indicates that the valves had been tested
with a propane gas mixture, which has an MESG value of

(27) No episodes of valve malfunction have been reported to
the Commission concerning this type of valves; however,
every reasonable effort must be made to remove any
potential threat to maritime safety,

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HAS ADOPTED THIS OPINION:

Article 1

The interim measures notified by the Danish Government to the
Commission by letter of 27 February 2004 in respect of valves
in the
of the model HPV manufactured by Se-won Ind Co.
Republic of Korea are adequate and proportionate for
the
protection of maritime safety and are therefore justified.

Article 2

The Commission recommends that the Member States ensure
the above mentioned valves are removed from their
that
markets until such time as a new type-examination certificate
has been delivered in full compliance with the Directive require-
ments.

Article 3

The Commission recommends that the Member States take all
appropriate action in order to guarantee the safety of ships

flying their flag which are equipped with the said valves,
including at least the following measures: (a) investigating any
episodes which may indicate valve malfunction, in particular as
regards hammering and pressure peaks during loading and
discharging; and (b) ensuring that no ships equipped with the
said valves are authorised to carry cargoes with an MESG value
lower than 0,9 mm.

Article 4

The Member States should as soon as possible inform the
Commission and the other Member States of any measures
taken pursuant to this opinion.

Done at Brussels, 7 January 2008.

For the Commission

Jacques BARROT

Vice-President