Special report No 7/2007 on the control, inspection and sanction systems relating to the rules on conservation of Community fisheries resources together with the Commission's replies
Date: 2007-12-28
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU control, audit, conservation of fish stocks, data collection, disclosure of information, fishery management, fishing controls, offence, report, sustainable development

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IV

(Notices)

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

COURT OF AUDITORS

SPECIAL REPORT No 7/2007

on the control, inspection and sanction systems relating to the rules on
conservation of Community fisheries resources together with the
Commission’s replies

(pursuant to Article 248(4) second paragraph, EC)

(2007/C 317/01)

CONTENTS

Paragraph

Page

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Objective and main characteristics of the management of the Community fisheries
resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Main policies and measures

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Volume of finance involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Main regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AUDIT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Audit subject and questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I-III

1-13

1-5

6-9

10-11

12-13

14-17

14

Audit approach and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15-17

OBSERVATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18-120

Quota uptake data unreliable and monitoring rudimentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National catch recording systems have many shortcomings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Insufficient Commission monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Limited effectiveness of national inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Absence of general control standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection pressure is difficult to evaluate and not always adequate . . . . . . . . . . . .

Failure to optimise inspection activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18-51

19-43

44-51

52-87

53-58

59-73

74-87

3

4

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

12

13

13

14

15

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Paragraph

Page

Systems for following up infringements and imposing sanctions are often inappro-
priate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National systems on the whole lack severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88-106

89-94

Means of applying pressure to Member States are effective only exceptionally . . . .

95-106

The control context: fishing overcapacity jeopardises compliance with rules and effective-
ness of controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107-120

Overcapacity, a major risk factor for the failure of Community action . . . . . . . . . .

108-112

An approach now based essentially on limiting the fishing effort

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113-120

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121-136

Quality of catch data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127-128

Effectiveness of inspection systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

129-130

Application of deterrent penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

131-133

Reduction of overcapacity and appropriate accompanying measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

134-136

Annex — Simplified flowchart showing collection and monitoring of catch data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commission’s replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

17

18

19

19

20

21

21

22

22

22

23

24

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFP

common fisheries policy

DG FISH Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

EFF

European Fisheries Fund

EU

GT

European Union

gross tonne, unit for measuring vessel capacity

ICES

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

ISO

kW

International Organization for Standardization

kilowatt, unit for measuring vessel engine power

MAGP

multiannual guidance programme

STECF

Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries

TAC

total allowable catch

VMS

Vessel Monitoring System — system whereby vessels transmit their positions to the control
authorities at regular intervals

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.
The Common Fisheries Policy was instituted in 1983 with the objective of sustainable exploitation of
living aquatic resources. Setting total allowable catches (TAC) and national quotas in order to limit catch vol-
umes is the cornerstone of this policy. The existence of complete and reliable data and the application of effec-
tive inspection and penalty systems are essential to the success of such an approach.

The audit covered these three elements, and the results of testing at the Commission and in the six prin-

II.
cipal Member States (1) in fisheries terms led the Court to conclude that:

— catch data are neither complete nor reliable, and the real level of catches is thus unknown. As a conse-
quence this prevents proper application of the TAC and quota systems. In the Member States, the regu-
latory framework and the procedures in force guarantee neither that the data collected are complete, nor
that inconsistencies are detected when it is validated. For its part, the Commission is not in a position to
identify satisfactorily errors and misstatements in the data forwarded by the Member States and to take
the timely decisions necessary to protect the resource (paragraphs 18 to 51),

— the inspection systems do not provide assurance that infringements are effectively prevented and detected;
the absence of general control standards is an impediment to adequate control pressure and optimisation
of inspection activities in the Member States. Moreover, in actual fact it restricts the extent and scope of
the Commission’s work of evaluating national arrangements and consequently limits the latter’s ability to
give an opinion of the overall effectiveness of national systems (paragraphs 52 to 87),

— the procedures for dealing with reported infringements do not support the assertion that every infringe-
ment is followed up and still less that infringements attract penalties; even when penalties are imposed
their deterrent effect is, on the whole, limited. As regards infringements of Community legislation by a
Member State, the only instrument of proven effectiveness available to the Commission is an action before
the Court of Justice for failure to fulfil an obligation; however, some of the inherent characteristics of such
actions limit the utility of such actions and make this an insufficiently responsive instrument (para-
graphs 88 to 106),

— overcapacity detracts from the profitability of the fishing industry and in a context of decreasing autho-
rised catches is an incitement to non-compliance with these restrictions. It also affects the quality of the
data forwarded. After the failure of the programmes for adapting fishing capacity, the current approach,
which is essentially based on reducing the fishing effort, is unlikely to resolve the problem of overcapacity
(paragraphs 107 to 120).

If this situation continues, it will bring grave consequences not only for the natural resource, but also for the
future of the fishing industry and the areas associated with it.

III.
If the political authorities want the CFP to achieve its objective of sustainable exploitation of the fish-
eries resources, the present control, inspection and sanction systems must be strengthened considerably, in par-
ticular by implementing the following recommendations:

— the Member States should improve the quality of their catch data by carrying out systematic compliance
checks on all operations, including checks on operations across national boundaries. They should also
have their data certified by an independent body,

— the Commission should ensure that the electronic system for recording and reporting fishing activity data
is implemented as quickly and widely as possible and should strengthen controls on the data forwarded
to it, notably by extending the analyses that it performs on individual data,

— the Member States should develop analytical, programming and follow-up tools for their inspection activi-
ties to enable them to ensure that there is adequate overall control pressure and optimal deployment of
resources,

— the Member States should remind the competent authorities of the need to impose deterrent sanctions,

(1) Denmark, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom (England and Wales).

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— the Community legislator should specify in the regulations the various elements essential to an effective

inspection and sanction system,

— the Community legislator should reinforce the Commission’s ability to put pressure on defaulting Mem-

ber States,

— the Commission and Member States should adopt active measures to reduce structural overcapacity in the

fishing industry.

INTRODUCTION

Objective and main characteristics of the management of the
Community fisheries resources

1.
Each year more than 4,4 million tonnes of fish and crus-
taceans with a total value of EUR 6 100 million are landed in
Community ports (1). The fishing industry accounts for 230 000
jobs in the European Union (EU) and in certain coastal regions
plays a major role for which there is no easy substitute.

2.
The Community fishery resources (2) are part of our com-
mon heritage. The objective of the common fisheries policy (CFP)
is to ‘ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides
sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’ (3).
Even though the formulation was different, the concept of sus-
tainable fishing has existed since the CFP was instituted in
1983 (4).

3.
Almost twenty years later the Commission could not avoid
a negative assessment of the CFP, recognising that the policy had
not attained its target and had ‘not delivered sustainable exploi-
tation of fisheries resources’ (5). It stated that the failure was envi-
ronmental, ‘many stocks are at present outside safe biological
limits’, as well as economic and social, ‘the fisheries sector is char-
acterised by economic fragility resulting from over-investment,
rapidly rising costs and a shrinking resource base: this is reflected
in poor profitability and steadily declining employment’.

(1) Source: Eurostat, Facts and figures on the FCP, 2006 edition.
(2) Under international law coastal states have sovereign rights to all natu-
ral resources in their ‘exclusive economic zone’ (EEZ), i.e. in the waters
inside a 200 nautical mile limit of their shores. In the Mediterranean,
however, there are no exclusive economic zones and the waters under
national sovereignty are limited to the territorial sea, i.e. the 12 nau-
tical mile zone. At Community level management of the fishery
resources contained within each Member State’s territorial waters or
EEZ is the exclusive responsibility of the European Union. Resources
outside these waters are governed by international agreements.
(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the
conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under
the Common Fisheries Policy, Article 2(1) (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002).
(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing
a Community system for the conservation and management of fish-
ery resources, Article 1 (OJ L 24, 27.1.1983).

(5) Green paper on the future of
COM(2001) 135 final, 20.3.2001.

the common fisheries policy,

4.
This diagnosis is confirmed by the latest figures available.
Scientists at the International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea (ICES), which is responsible for biological appraisal, have
studied the exploitation rate for a number of stocks in the north-
eastern Atlantic, the area where most of the Community fisheries
resources are concentrated (6). Their work showed that 81 % of
the stocks evaluated were over-exploited (7). From the economic
viewpoint, the diagnosis of failure is supported by the Eurostat
figures which showed a steady decrease in the volume of Com-
munity catches in the north-eastern Atlantic. Over the period
1995-2005 the overall decrease was 30 %.

5.
Moreover at the Johannesburg Earth Summit on sustain-
able development in 2002 the European Union subscribed to an
action plan whose objectives included restoring all fish stocks to
levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield by 2015
at the latest.

Main policies and measures

6.
Fish is a renewable natural resource that is not easily quan-
tifiable, and the reproduction and movement factors are not
directly controllable. Catch limitation is therefore the only way of
influencing stocks and ‘conservation, control and enforcement’
activity thus plays a key role in that its aim is, firstly, to define the
arrangements for conserving and managing resources and, sec-
ondly, to ensure that the corresponding regulations are properly
implemented.

7.
The European Union’s main resource management mea-
sure is limiting catch volumes by setting total allowable catches
(TAC) for the main species and dividing them between the vari-
ous Member States in the form of quotas. The TAC are adopted
annually by the Council on the basis of Commission proposals
which, in turn, are based on scientific opinions (8). The latter

(6) In 2005 the north-eastern Atlantic accounted for 76 % of the 5,6 mil-
lion tonnes caught in all regions of the world by the Community fleet.
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in focus 10/2007, 15.1.2007.

(7) Commission, Memo/06/268, 5 July 2006.
(8) Scientific opinions delivered by the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and submitted by the Commission to
the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF), comprising national experts, representatives of the fisheries
sector and other stakeholders, including environmental NGOs.

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provide an indication of the quantity of fish that can be taken
without jeopardising the renewal of stocks. The data used by the
scientists are the results of their own work, together with the
catch quantities declared by the fishing industry.

Main regulations

8.
In the past, limitation of authorised catches was accompa-
nied by a compulsory policy of reducing fishing fleet capacity.
However, this policy was abandoned as self-defeating in the 2002
CFP reform. Today’s Community measures simply set an upper
limit on capacity and influence the fishing effort, i.e. the activity
of the fishing fleet. The last element of the system is the ‘technical
measures’. Basically, these ‘measures’ specify the characteristics of
fishing gear and/or set minimum sizes for particular species.

12.
The base regulation is the Council Regulation on the con-
servation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under
the Common Fisheries Policy (4). Chapter V specifies the objec-
tives and the different Community means of action for achieving
them.

13.
The provisions on the control system (5), on the one
hand, and the collection of catch data (6), on the other hand, form
part of older specific regulations. Other obligations relating to
control are included in annexes to the annual ‘TAC and quota’
regulations (7) and in the regulations establishing recovery mea-
sures or multiannual plans for the sustainable exploitation of spe-
cific stocks (8).

9.
Although the various policies are defined at Community
level, it is the Member States (1) who have general responsibility
for ensuring effective control, inspection and enforcement of the
CFP rules (2). This means they have total freedom with regard to
arrangements for administering their quotas, organising inspec-
tions and the nature of sanctions to be applied in cases of infringe-
ment. For its part, the Commission is responsible for evaluating
and controlling the application of CFP rules by the Member States
and for facilitating coordination and cooperation between them.

AUDIT CHARACTERISTICS

Audit subject and questions

Volume of finance involved

10.
The Community contribution to ‘control and enforce-
ment’ activity is limited to 46 million euro if only the appropria-
tions directly allocated (3) to it are considered. The financial issues
are far more substantial if one takes into account all the activities
designed to deal, if only partially, with the consequences of the
serious shortcomings of the resource management policy, espe-
cially the structural assistance for fisheries (837 million euro) and
the international fisheries agreements (156 million euro).

Moreover fish stocks are an asset which is the direct con-
11.
cern of the European Union in that the EU is responsible for man-
aging them. The difficulties of evaluating that asset in monetary
terms must not obscure the reality and significance of it.

(1) Each Member State controls the activities carried out in its territory or

in waters under its sovereignty or jurisdiction.
(2) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23(1).
(3) All figures relating to appropriations are 2007 payment appropria-

tions.

14.
Limitation of catch volumes, by setting TAC and quotas,
is the cornerstone of the Community policy for the management
of the fisheries resources. The existence of complete and reliable
data and the application of effective inspection and penalty sys-
tems are essential to the success of such an approach. The Court
therefore deemed it appropriate to perform an audit that aimed
to answer the following question:

‘Are the Commission and the Member States taking the necessary
steps for an effective system of control, inspection and sanctions
for the conservation of fisheries resources?’

(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002.
(5) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establish-
ing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy
(OJ L 261, 20.10.1993).

(6) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 of 22 September 1983
laying down detailed rules for recording information on Member
States’ catches of fish (OJ L 276, 10.10.1983).

(7) Council Regulation (EC) No 27/2005 of 22 December 2004 fixing for
2005 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain
fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters
and, for Community vessels, in waters where catch limitations are
required (OJ L 12, 14.1.2005).

(8) Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 establish-

ing measures for the recovery of cod stocks;
Council Regulation (EC) No 811/2004 of 21 April 2004 establishing
measures for the recovery of the Northern hake stock;
Council Regulation (EC) No 2166/2005 of 20 December 2005 estab-
lishing measures for the recovery of the Southern hake and Norway
lobster stocks in the Cantabrian Sea and Western Iberian peninsula;
Council Regulation (EC) No 388/2006 of 23 February 2006 establish-
ing a multiannual plan for the sustainable exploitation of the stock of
sole in the Bay of Biscay.

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Four specific audit objectives were investigated:

OBSERVATIONS

(a) Are catch data reliable and monitored effectively? (without
stating an opinion as to the quality of individual declarations)

Quota uptake data unreliable and monitoring rudimentary

(b) Are the inspection systems as effective as possible?

(c) Are the systems for following up infringements appropriate

and effective?

(d) How far is the inherent risk constituted by overcapacity in

the fishing industry dealt with in reality?

18.
The basis for the TAC and quota system is catch quantity
limitation. The quality of its implementation depends on the
existence of, firstly, a recording and validation system (see Annex)
that provides complete and reliable data, and secondly, an effec-
tive system for monitoring that data, in order to avoid quota over-
runs. However, neither of the systems mentioned, taken as a
whole, met these criteria.

Audit approach and methodology

National catch recording systems have many shortcomings

15.
The audit work focused mainly on analysis of data col-
lection, inspection and sanction systems, and was carried out at
Commission headquarters and in the Member States. Audit evi-
dence was collected and examined by means of interviews and
analysis of documents and data. In order to supplement, test and
cross-check their knowledge of the system the auditors carried
out a series of tests of control on catch records, on the one hand,
and inspection reports on the other. In the absence of specific
regulatory requirements the criteria adopted were the standards
recognised by international organisations and generally appli-
cable to this area (1).

16.
The basis on which these six Member States were selected
for the audit was the size of catch volumes and the value of their
landings. The Member States in question were Denmark, Spain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which
together account for almost 70 % of catch volumes and more
than 80 % of the value of landings (2). On-the-spot visits took
place between April and November 2006.

17.
This report is being published almost five years after the
publication of the last general regulation on the CFP, at a time
when the Commission is preparing to begin the recasting of the
‘control’ regulation with a view to presenting the text of a pro-
posal to the Council in 2008.

(1) The sources of such standards were: General criteria for the operation
of various types of bodies performing inspection (ISO/IEC 17 020:
1998); COSO Enterprise Risk Management — integrated framework
(2004); Office of the Auditor General Norway ‘Study on the manage-
ment of the fisheries resources’; ECA Opinion on the single audit
model (OJ C 107, 30.4.2004); COM(2003)130 final: Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament —
Towards uniform and effective implementation of the CFP; EU Com-
mission Internal Control Standards numbers 11, Risk analysis and
management, 17, Supervision, 7, Objective setting, 10, Monitoring
performance and 9, Annual management plan.

(2) 2003 catch figures and 2002 landing figures published by Eurostat.

19.
The national systems for collecting, validating and com-
piling catch data are affected by numerous shortcomings, some of
them serious, so that the quality of the data forwarded to the
Commission is unreliable.

Declaration data incomplete and collection systems that are not
proof against infringements.

logbooks (3),

20.
Quota uptake monitoring relies on a declaration system
fed via three main types of document completed by fishermen or
first buyers:
landing declarations (4) and sales
notes (5). These documents, or copies of them, as appropriate,
must be forwarded to the authorities of the flag Member State
and/or Member State of landing and/or of first sale: up to three
Member States may thus be involved. The Member State of land-
ing is always the one responsible for forwarding the catch data to
the Commission and may, therefore, be a different State from the
one that holds the quota from which the catches will be deducted
(the flag Member State).

(3) The logbook is the document in which the master of the vessel keeps
a daily record for each species with an estimate of the quantities caught
and stored on board, as well as the date and position of the catches; a
copy must be forwarded to the authorities of the flag Member State;
Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83, Annex IV, section 4.

(4) The landing declaration is the document in which the master specifies
for each species the exact quantities landed; one copy must be for-
warded to the authorities in the flag Member State and another to the
authorities in the Member State of landing, if they are not one and the
same; Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83, Annex IV, section 4.

(5) The sales note is the document made out by auction centres or first
buyers specifying for each species the weight and the geographical
zone of origin; it must be forwarded to the authorities of the Member
State in which the fish are first placed on the market; Regulation (EEC)
No 2847/93, Article 9.

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An over-flexible regulatory framework decided by the Council

21.
The conditions for establishing the declaration data, as
laid down by Community regulations, are the first weak point in
the system. They do not, in fact, ensure that the data obtained are
as accurate and precise as possible:

(a)

in the current regulations, the time allowed for forwarding
logbooks is 48 hours from completion of landing (1), even
though all the information that is entered should be entered
before landing starts. Under these circumstances it is very
often possible that at the point where he is finalising the
catch declarations a fisherman knows whether there will be
an inspection, and this may impact on the quality of the fig-
ures declared. The Commission’s work showed that, all things
being equal, the quantities declared are higher if there is a
landing inspection (2);

(b) weighing the quantities landed is not a general Community
obligation. In some cases the quantities entered on landing
declarations are only estimates, more or less correct and
more or less precise;

(c)

the tolerance margin for quantity estimates declared in log-
books is set at a level of 20 %. This does not allow the impo-
in under-
sition of penalties for practices that result
declarations that may be as high as 36 % in the absence of
landing inspections (3);

(d) as regards sales notes, the differences of interest between
buyers and sellers should guarantee the quality of the infor-
mation entered in the notes, but this was not always seen in
practice. In certain types of fishery some operators actually
control both fishing activity and processing or distribution
activity.

The Commission was aware of these weaknesses and for
22.
some specific fisheries undertook to introduce special provisions,
with the aim of remedying some of the shortcomings. For
example, within the framework of recovery plans, the tolerance
margin was reduced to 8 %, and weighing at auction and submis-
sion of the logbook copy immediately on entering port were
made obligatory. Some Member States went further and extended
or generalised this type of provision.

(1) Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83, Annex IV, section 4.2.
(2) The difference reached 48,7 % in the case of landings of cod in Poland;
Source DG Fish, Evaluation Report Catch Registration Baltic Sea 2005
to 2006.

(3) Taking an exact catch quantity of 1 000 kg, a declaration of 800 kg
in the logbook will lie within the 20 % tolerance if there is a landing
inspection; if there is no inspection, a declaration of 640 kg on the
landing declaration will show a difference of 20 % from the logbook,
and if the difference between the two declarations is discovered no
penalties can be applied, even though the total under-declaration is
36 %.

In addition, a Regulation published in December 2006 (4)
23.
provides that paper declarations are, in part, gradually to be
replaced by an electronic declaration system. This should save
time and produce gains in terms of reliability and cost. Further-
more, the obligatory transmission of logbook data before enter-
ing port will eliminate the control weakness associated with the
period of 48 hours allowed for lodging the paper document.
However, this obligation will only begin to be effective 24 months
after the implementing procedures enter into force — and they
still have to be drafted and approved.

One country outside the EU, namely Norway, has insti-
24.
tuted procedures that control sales operations more strictly and
provide improved safeguards. Once the last catch has been taken,
the fisherman forwards a detailed cargo list to a sales organisa-
tion. The cargo is then sold in an electronic auction the same
day (5), before landing and compulsory weighing; the sales note
is made out and signed by the buyer and the fisherman before the
ship leaves the quay. The presence of the sale proceeds and the
corresponding supporting document in the same place at the
same time makes the inspectors’ work easier.

Catches unrecorded in the data collection system: discards

25.
Quantities of fish, most of them already dead, are thrown
overboard for either statutory (6) or economic (7) reasons. This
phenomenon, estimated at 13 % for the north-east Atlantic
zone (8), is not only a significant waste of the resource, but also
entails a reduction in the quality of the information used by the
scientists responsible for evaluating the state of fish stocks.

26.
In Norway, on the other hand, if a fisherman catches fish
that he is not authorised to take, he is not allowed to throw them
overboard. In order to make this obligation as economically neu-
tral as possible for fishermen, the latter receive a small propor-
tion of the proceeds of the sale of these ‘illegal’ fish to cover their
costs and the remainder is transferred to public funds.

(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 1966/2006 of 21 December 2006 on
electronic recording and reporting of fishing activities and on means
of remote sensing (OJ L 409, 30.12.2006).

(5) The auction here is not in a physical environment — it is simply a
fully automated system in which the sales organisation forwards infor-
mation about catches still at sea to buyers who make remote bids
without viewing the goods.

(6) Fishermen are not allowed to land fish that are below minimum size

or of unauthorised species (quota used up, no licence, etc).

(7) Fishermen may prefer not to keep low-value species on board — they
must be processed and take up space in the hold, or, in the case of
quota species, the individual fish have relatively low value because of
their size.

(8) Discards in the world’s marine fisheries. An update, FAO, 2005.

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Late or incomplete data collection

27.
Firstly, in some Member States some fishing activities
were completely outside the catch declaration data collection
system:

(a)

in Spain none of the catches by vessels under 10 metres in
length were taken into account by quota monitoring, even
though such vessels account for a substantial part of the
national fleet (1);

(b)

in France activities in the Mediterranean and the overseas
departments (DOM) were not monitored in any way by the
national statistics processing system.

Secondly, some Member States had not yet integrated
28.
collection of one or another of the three key declaration docu-
ments into their information systems, even though this has some-
times been obligatory for more than 20 years:

(c)

in Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there were no
systems for checking the serial numbers of declaration docu-
ments in order to ensure that the series was complete;

(d)

in Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom there were no systematic cross-checks on the con-
sistency of VMS data (3) with the data in declaration docu-
ments; in four out of these five countries where it tested this
aspect, the Court identified apparent anomalies for which the
responsible authorities were unable to account satisfactorily.

30.
Lastly, delays in the collection and validation of data may
also adversely affect its completeness. This applies where catches
are not validated before the final date for forwarding final figures
for the previous year to the Commission. Several anomalies of
this type were discovered:

(a)

in France landing declarations have been required by the
national authorities only since 2005 and were not always
taken into account by the national catch data monitoring
system in 2006;

(a)

in the United Kingdom, the effect of corrections made after
the final date of 15 February 2006 (4) was to reveal that 2005
quotas had been exceeded in the case of three stocks and to
increase the overruns already recorded for three others;

(b)

in Italy and in Spain monitoring of quota uptake was based
on one type of document only;

(b)

(c)

in Spain and in France the sales notes for frozen produce
were not recorded, even though the quantities they repre-
sented were very substantial (2);

(d)

in the United Kingdom the recording of sales notes was only
made obligatory in 2006.

29.
Furthermore, the collection systems in place in the Mem-
ber States did not always allow missing documents to be identi-
fied and requested:

(a)

(b)

in France, according to the department responsible for cen-
tralising catch data, no catch data were recorded for the year
2005 for 5 % of vessels over 10 metres in length;

in the United Kingdom there was no mechanism for verify-
ing the completeness of sales notes submitted in respect of
vessels under 10 metres, even though these documents are
the only source of information for monitoring catches by
this part of the fleet;

(1) Vessels less than 10 metres in length account for 67 % of the fleet in
terms of the number of ships and 11 % and 3 % respectively in terms
of capacity expressed in kW and GT.

(2) In Spain, according to the subdirectorate-general for marketing at the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 298 000 t in 2005; in
France according to INSEE data they accounted for 40 % of the quan-
tities landed in 2005.

in Italy, the department responsible for quota monitoring
received eight additional declarations for bluefin tuna after
the cut-off date for final figures; the declarations were sub-
mitted to it by a fisherman who was surprised when the
authorities reduced his individual quota for the new year
because the catch volume declared in 2005 had been low:
when the additional quantities were taken into account, an
overrun of the national quota appeared.

Validation checks limited in scope and not always effective

None of the Member States visited were able to identify all the anomalies
in declarations.

31.
The Community Regulations (5) require Member States
to establish a validation system that includes cross-checks and
validation of the data obtained from the various obligatory dec-
larations and VMS data. The Regulations also provide that each
Member State is to create a database in order to facilitate these
checks, but they specify neither the nature nor the scope of the
validation checks to be carried out.

(3) System by which vessels transmit their positions to the inspecting

authorities at regular intervals.

(4) Partly due to delays in recording and partly due to national inspectors

finding undeclared landings.

(5) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 19.

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No Member State had a fully integrated validation sys-
32.
tem, i.e. that allowed all declaration data of a similar type to be
checked automatically and systematically:

Finally, in all the Member States visited, shortcomings in
36.
the validation systems made it possible for the Court to discover
declaration anomalies (3) that had not been detected or dealt with.

(a)

in none of the Member States visited were there any auto-
matic and systematic cross-checks between the data in the
three main declaration documents and the corresponding
VMS data;

Lack of integration and harmonisation at Community level

(b)

in France landing declarations were not taken into account
and the validation system consisted of supplementing incom-
plete (1) and sometimes irrelevant (2) sales data with esti-
mated logbook figures;

Very limited inter-operability between the systems of the different
Member States adversely affects the completeness of controls.

(c)

in Italy the use of a single declaration document to monitor
the only quota species made cross-checks of data impossible;
moreover, the model in use in 2005, and still partly in use in
2006, did not comply with the Community Regulations;

(d)

in Denmark and Spain the landing declaration and sales note
there was a physical
data were cross-checked only if
inspection.

Moreover, in all the Member States visited, with the
33.
exception of the Netherlands, any figures obtained from counts
carried out during physical inspections were not included in the
system for validating catch declarations, even though they are, a
priori, more reliable than those in the declarations.

Not all the anomalies identified by the Member States are the subject of
appropriate follow-up

34.
In all the countries visited, cross-checks were insuffi-
ciently documented for it to be possible to verify whether they
were actually carried out and whether anomalies identified had
been the subject of appropriate follow-up.

35.
In France the validation system is weakened by legal con-
siderations. There is an ongoing debate within the national admin-
istration about the statistical nature (or otherwise) of declaration
data. Also, in the absence of legal certainty, inspectors are not sys-
tematically notified when deviations in excess of the tolerance
margin are detected by the departments responsible for process-
ing catch data.

(1) Only auction sale figures taken into account, although a very substan-
tial proportion of sales (more than 20 % of quantities landed) were not
auction sales.

(2) The auction data include sales of produce landed in another Member
State which must therefore be reported to the Commission by that
Member State, and not by France.

The lack of

37.
inter-operability and inter-connection
between the different national systems for collecting catch data
reduces the opportunities for checking, and thus limits the extent
of the validation systems’ effectiveness. For example, in the case
of first sale in a country other than the flag state or country of
landing, it is not possible to perform an automatic control by
cross-checking the sales note data, on the one hand, against the
data in the logbook and the landing declaration on the other
hand (4).

National conversion factors imprecise and inconsistent

38.
TAC and quotas are set in tonnes expressed as live-weight
equivalent (LWE), i.e. whole fish at the time of catch. On the other
hand, in the declaration documents used as reference material for
monitoring catches (5), it is the net weight that is used. The dif-
ference between the two units is mainly due to the fish being cut
up on board ship. Conversion factors are available for converting
from one set of units to the other. They are based on long estab-
lished data (6) which were never rigorously validated, and often
differed from one Member State to another. The result is lack of
precision in validated catch figures and unjustified, and some-
times significant, differences between the tonnages used to moni-
tor quotas, depending on whether landing took place in one
country rather than another (7).

(3) In particular, the existence of differences in excess of the tolerance laid
down in the regulations between the quantities mentioned in the land-
ing declarations and/or sales notes and those shown in the logbooks.
(4) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 provides that copies of the logbook and
landing declaration are to be sent both to the authorities of the State
where landing takes place and to the flag state, but the sales note is to
be sent only to the competent authorities of the Member State in
whose territory the first marketing takes place.

(5) Landing declarations and sales notes.
(6) Before the Community TAC and quota system was put in place.
(7) 100 kg of gutted fresh cod will correspond to quota uptake of 124 kg

if landed in France, and 111 kg in Lithuania;
100 kg of gutted/headed fresh anglerfish will correspond to a quota
uptake of 250 kg if landed in Sweden and 325 kg in Germany.

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Serious traceability problems

39.
The traceability of data was not assured in two of the
countries visited, that is to say, it was not possible to verify
whether the consolidated data forwarded to the Commission
actually corresponded to the sum of the individual validated data.
This is a major anomaly, since it is not possible to make the link

between the data used for quota monitoring and the data appear-
ing in individual declarations:

(a)

in France, for the six species analysed, the totals in the
detailed statement drawn up by the national authorities
showed significant differences from the final figures for-
warded to the Commission (see Table 1); the French authori-
ties provided explanations for the possible origin of these
differences, but were not able to provide a reconciliation;

Table 1

Species (tonnes)

ANF
(anglerfish)

BFT
(bluefin
tuna)

COD
(cod)

HKE
(hake)

SRX
(skate)

WHG
(whiting)

Total on detailed statement
provided to auditors

19 910,5

1 683,1

5 537,7

13 167,4

Data forwarded to DG FISH

15 981,9

1 864,4

6 528,9

7 425,1

Difference (in tonnes)

3 928,6

– 181,3

– 991,2

5 742,3

56,9

48,5

8,4

Difference %

24,6 %

– 9,7 %

– 15,2 %

77,3 %

17,3 %

13 391,4

12 914,4

477,0

3,7 %

(b)

(c)

in Spain, for 2005, the data declared to the Directorate-
General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG Fish) for land-
ings by Spanish ships in Spain are approximately 40 % (1)
less than the data recorded in the national databases; the
Spanish authorities have acknowledged the omissions in dec-
larations to DG Fish as around 148,5 thousand tonnes relat-
ing to species not subject to quota, and were unable to
provide explanations for the other 20,5 thousand tonnesto
make up the difference;

in Italy, a document drawn up by central departments
recorded landings of 97,5 tonnes of bluefin tuna in 2005 in
the Salerno district. During the on-the-spot visit the respon-
sible control authorities maintained that there had been no
landing of this species in the year in question. Of the seven
catch declarations that provided evidence of the quantities
landed, two showed a port in another region. Analysis of
VMS signals did not provide any information about the exact
location of the vessels in question on the landing date
shown (2).

(1) 262,9 thousand tonnes against 431,9 thousand tonnes, a difference of

169,0 thousand tonnes.

(2) In fact, two of the vessels were not equipped with this system, and in
the case of the five others no signal was received on the day of the
landing (in one case the vessel had not emitted any signals for more
than three years before the landing date shown, and in another case
for more than two years).

Quota monitoring data ultimately unreliable

No comprehensive system of audit or certification by the Member States.

40.
None of the Member States visited had carried out a com-
prehensive audit of the catch data collection and validation sys-
tems to evaluate the quality of the IT applications. Similarly, the
data produced by the systems and forwarded to the Commission
had never been subject to a procedure involving certification by
an independent body.

In the original version of the Regulation on control (3),
41.
however, it was stipulated that in the year following the entry into
force of the Regulation, each Member State was to submit to the
Commission a report describing the way in which data are col-
lected and verified, and specifying the reliability of such data. This
obligation was not retained in later versions of the text (4).

(3) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 19(5).
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2846/98, Article 1(13)(c).

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The Commission is aware of this situation.

The Commission is aware of the unreliable quality of the

42.
data that it receives (1), and it has already said so publicly.

43.
Nevertheless it is these data of unreliable quality that are
being used by the Commission in trying to prevent and, where
appropriate, penalise quota overruns.

Secondly, not all Member States systematically forward their
reports within the specified deadlines, thereby reducing the Com-
mission’s scope for reaction. Moreover, since the information is
cumulative over the year, it is possible neither to test the consis-
tency of data from one year to the next over specified periods, nor
to identify processing delays. Lastly, in the absence of some
simple logical tests it is not possible to identify even gross mis-
statements in declarations immediately (3).

Insufficient Commission monitoring

Absence of data quality evaluation

44.
As the Member States have primary responsibility for
managing and monitoring their quotas, it is they who must take
the necessary steps to avoid quota overruns, if necessary by clos-
ing the fisheries concerned. It is for the Commission, for its part,
to verify that the Member States fulfil their obligations. For this
purpose it has the possibility of halting fishing for a particular
stock on its own initiative (2).

Information system unsatisfactory

45.
There are a number of shortcomings in the information
system through which the Commission receives monthly the
catch data prepared by the Member States. Firstly, as stated above,
information forwarded is unreliable.
the quality of

the

Data are forwarded to DG Fish as part of fisheries policy
46.
implementation, but the Commission does not cross-check them
against similar data received through Eurostat (4), which in some
cases are significantly different.

47.
Since 1999 the Commission has had a right of access to
duplicates of national IT files (5). This facility should enable it to
evaluate the quality of the data forwarded to it. It was not until
2007, however, that it sent its first request on the subject of catch
data to the Member States. The Commission attributes the low
utilisation of this facility to the fact that its control and inspec-
tion units do not have sufficient staff with real data analysis, pro-
cessing and control skills.

Examples of differences between DG Fish data and Eurostat data

Table 2

2005 bluefin tuna (BFT)

Member State

Quota

DG FISH data

Eurostat Data

France

Italy

Spain

6 983

4 888

5 857

8 936

4 879

5 850

9 726

4 272

5 650

(tonnes)

Difference

tonnes

– 791

607

200

%

– 8,8 %

12,4 %

3,4 %

(1) The Compliance Scoreboard 2005, p. 12, states, ‘The data forwarded
by Member States to the Commission is based on the declarations of
catches and landings made by vessel owners or agents. The Commis-
sion believes that this data may not always reflect reality. Scientific
reports have repeatedly emphasised the possibility that misreporting
or underreporting of catches or landings may negatively impact the
accuracy of vital stock assessments, and this suspicion is supported by
the observations made by Commission inspectors over a number of
years.’ http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control_enforcement/score-
board/archives/scoreboard2005/management_en.htm

(2) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 21(3).

(3) In 2005 the Italian authorities were thus able to declare catches of
bluefin tuna, a quota species, under the heading of non-quota species.
(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1382/91 of 21 May 1991 on the sub-
mission of data on the landings of fishery products in Member States
(OJ L 133, 28.5.1991, p. 1).

(5) Council Regulation (EC) No 2846/98 of 17 December 1998 amend-
ing Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system appli-
cable to the common fisheries policy (OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, p. 5).

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Limited monitoring

Limited effectiveness of national inspections

For each of the stocks subject to quota (1) the early warn-
48.
ing and monitoring system established by the Commission con-
sists of automatic comparison of quota totals and reported
catches. When the uptake level reaches a predefined limit, a warn-
ing notice is sent to the Member State concerned, inviting it to
forward information about the action that it intends to take.

52.
The success of the policy on the sustainable management
of fisheries resources depends on effective application of the vari-
ous regulatory provisions. That presupposes the existence of
effective control and inspection systems capable of preventing
and detecting infringements. This requires general reference stan-
dards, adequate inspection pressure, and optimisation of inspec-
tion activities. None of
these three conditions could be
substantiated.

49.
The delays affecting catch declarations and the monitor-
ing of quota trading between Member States, together with the
complexity engendered by the existence of special conditions (2),
possibilities for compensation, carryovers or proportionate
deductions the following year and under various conditions, as
well as the low volume of human resources assigned to this pro-
cedure, all combine to weaken the effectiveness of this procedure.
In 2005, the system did not prevent 26 quotas from being offi-
cially exceeded, 11 of them significantly so (3).

Absence of general control standards

The absence of general standards …

Limited scope for action

50.
The Commission has the right to close a fishery on its
own initiative (4). In practice, because of the necessity of assem-
bling sufficient evidence to provide assurance that a quota has
been used up, the scope of this provision is confined to stocks
involving a small number of ships and landings. In addition,
because of the desire to avoid any legal risk, the Commission sets
a very high confidence level as a preliminary to action, thereby
deferring the date of its decision and hence reducing the effective-
ness of the measure.

In conclusion, quota monitoring is deficient because the
51.
data on which it is based are of doubtful quality, subject only to
limited checks by the Commission and without any real possibil-
ity of coercive action. Furthermore, administrative checks, even if
they are efficient, do not always guarantee the substance of the
information in declarations. They must be supplemented by
physical inspections.

(1) 229 in 2005.
(2) For example, it is sometimes possible to charge to certain quotas
catches taken in a different zone during a certain period of the year
and within a particular limit, or for some species additional catches of
certain species are in part incorporated in the authorised quantities of
the target species.

(3) Significant excess: higher than 5 % of the quota and/or 10 % of the
TAC and/or over 100 tonnes; once found each of these 26 excess
amounts was deducted from the corresponding 2006 quotas; Regu-
lation (EC) No 742/2006.

(4) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 21(3) and Regulation (EC)

53.
Community legislation places an obligation on Member
States to take the necessary measures to implement effective con-
trol and inspection of CFP rules (5). However, no guideline as yet
defines these concepts.

After the reform of the CFP in 2002, in the recovery
54.
plans in particular, the Commission added inspection standards,
quantitative control objectives and obligations on the existence of
national control programmes to the legislation. However, these
are still limited to specific cases, and there is a risk that the mul-
tiplication of such requirements will merely lead to overlapping
and confused obligations that cannot easily be administered and
adhered to without significantly weakening the level of control on
fisheries that are not targeted by these plans.

… leads to divergent and ill-tolerated practices …

55.
In the absence of common standards, each Member State
has implemented its own system in its area of responsibility, with
its own characteristics. These multiple national approaches have
resulted in varying procedures and practices. This diversity gives
operators the opportunity to criticise practices which they con-
sider discriminatory and to question the relevance of the CFP,
thereby making them less inclined to observe the rules.

2371/2002, Article 26(4).

(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23.

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… and limits the scope of the Commission’s evaluations

56.
The task of the Commission is to evaluate and monitor
the application of the CFP rules by Member States (1) and, in par-
ticular, the way in which they discharge their obligations to
implement effective control and inspection systems. The results
of their work are published in triennial reports (2).

57.
Having no legislative norms at its disposal, and not hav-
ing developed universally accepted standards, the Commission
has not carried out general evaluations of the systems in place in
the Member States. Its inspection work has tended to focus on
those procedures in the national systems that are the subject of
specific legislative norms, as the only way of reaching conclusions
that are viable in legal proceedings. However, this approach does
not allow it to form an opinion of the overall effectiveness of the
inspection and control systems that each Member State is obliged
to set up under the terms of Community legislation.

For its part, the Court used the standards applicable to
58.
any control system (3) as the basis for its evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of the inspection and control systems of the various
Member States visited. These standards fall into two large catego-
ries: those which provide adequate overall inspection pressure
and those which ensure that inspections are effectively targeted.

Inspection pressure is difficult to evaluate and not always
adequate

59.
Every control system, in order to be effective, needs a
minimum level of physical inspection aimed at checking on the
ground that regulations are being observed. This level must be
evaluated from the point of view of both quantity and quality.
This requires definition of the minimum characteristics of an
inspection, monitoring of inspection activity and tests of the real-
ity and quality of inspection operations.

Absence of general legislative standards for inspections

60.
As stated above, the concept of inspection is not defined
in Community law. The term ‘inspection’ can, therefore, equally
refer to a check on a fishing licence, which takes a few minutes,
involving
or to an operation taking place over several days,
numerous inspectors, and including an exhaustive inspection of
cargo, fishing gear and all documentation. Moreover, this situa-
tion allows some Member States to include in their control sta-
tistics inspections that are not directly related to compliance with
the provisions on resource conservation but which concern, for
example, health or safety conditions.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 26(1).
(2) Pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 35. Last published
report: Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the monitoring of the Member States’ implementation
of the common fisheries policy 2003-2005, COM(2007) 167 FINAL,
10.4.2007.

(3) See paragraph 15.

Not every check has to be exhaustive in order to be use-
61.
ful. To be effective, however, each inspection, depending on its
nature, must have certain features. For example, a landing inspec-
tion where the inspectors are not present from the start to the fin-
ish of the operation and do not check the contents of the hold at
the end of their work, cannot be used as the basis for an opinion
on the accuracy of the catch quantities declared.

Not all Member States have actually defined the criteria
62.
necessary for each of the main types of inspection to be effective.
It was not until 2007 that the Commission took such a step, by
defining the criteria to be met by national inspections if they are
to be counted as such in its triennial evaluation reports. However,
the weakness of the information systems in place in the Member
States could make identification and counting of the inspections
that meet these criteria problematic.

Poorly documented inspections …

63.
Proper documentation of inspections is essential. Firstly,
it allows verification of the individual quality and scope of the
checks carried out, and it then becomes a vital factor as regards
the effectiveness of any action taken in cases of infringement.

Community Regulations do not provide model inspec-
64.
tion forms for use by all inspectorates (4). In the absence of stan-
dardised practice, however,
this would provide greater
transparency and facilitate cooperation between the various
inspection bodies in all the Member States.

65.
In the Member States, the Court’s audit identified the fol-
lowing weaknesses with regard to the documentation of inspec-
tion work:

(a)

in Italy, inspections were the subject of a report only if there
was a finding of infringement, and only the incriminating
evidence was detailed in the report;

(b)

in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom it
was not possible to ascertain from the inspection reports
whether certain essential conditions for the effectiveness of
inspection (5) had been satisfied, or the reports contained
conflicting information.

… and not always recorded in centralised databases

Centralised recording of all inspection reports in a com-
66.
puterised database is essential. This in itself, by facilitating the
process of tracing and using data, allows a global assessment of
inspection activity, and of its volume and results in particular.

(4) A proposal for standardised inspection reports was drawn up in 1999
by the Commission departments, but did not go beyond that stage.
(5) A landing inspection, for example: the presence of an inspector from
start to finish of the landing operations, the weighing of an adequate
sample of the catch; for an inspection at sea, logbook entries match-
ing the actual cargo.

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In this area also, Community law has not defined any
67.
obligations or standards, leaving each Member State to develop
(or not develop) the system of its choice.

Failure to optimise inspection activities

At the time of the Court’s audit visits, Spain, France, Italy
68.
and the United Kingdom did not have any centralised systems for
recording inspection reports.

74.
In addition to adequate overall inspection pressure, the
effectiveness of a control system requires optimum use of the
available resources.

Limited quality control

Restricted access to the data needed for programming and
inspection target selection.

69.
An effective control system depends on the existence of
a quality control system providing assurance that the work per-
formed complies with the applicable standards on the subject.
Although all the countries visited review work that results in pro-
posed sanctions, review of other inspection reports is non-
existent, which prevents the identification of certain inspection
anomalies and prevents remedial action.

70.
In five of the six Member States visited, the Court noted
cases where infringements had been found but the follow-up
action provided for in the procedures had not been taken, and the
reasons for this decision had not been documented. In the sixth,
Italy, this was not a possibility, since inspections are documented
only if they result in an infringement being found.

Number of inspectors sometimes inadequate

The number of inspectors and the proportion of their
71.
activity devoted to fisheries policing must be sufficient to provide
a satisfactory volume of inspections and constitute a deterrent
presence. However, it is not possible to establish universal norms
on this aspect, because of variations in local circumstances (1).

72.
Nevertheless, by the end of the audit, the inadequacy of
the volume of inspection activity was recognised or recorded in
several Member States:

(a)

(b)

in Spain, work carried out in 2003 by the national authori-
ties assessed the required number of inspectors as 139,
whereas in 2006 the figure was 91;

in Denmark and the United Kingdom (in England and Wales),
the rate of attendance by inspectors was definitely inad-
equate; each team of two inspectors was, on average, respec-
tively in charge of 11 and 10 landing places, in use several
times a day.

73.
In France and Italy, by contrast, it was not possible to
form a judgement of the volume of activity devoted to fisheries
policing by some inspection units. In fact, these units performed
control duties in other fields and lacked an adequate analytical
tool and were thus unable to provide precise, verifiable informa-
tion about their fisheries control activities (see paragraph 83).

Sound knowledge of the various fishery activities, the
75.
actors involved, infringements found and penalties imposed in
the past is essential for the establishment of sound risk analysis,
the definition of a suitable control strategy and the preparation of
a relevant programme.

76.
Similarly, at the operational level, the effectiveness of
inspections depends on the inspectors’ ability to select from dif-
ferent potential control targets the one that is most interesting in
view of its characteristics (2). To achieve this, it is essential to have
databases containing the various types of information and data
that is reliable, complete and up-to-date. Lastly, each inspector
must have immediate direct access to them from the place of
inspection.

In some cases, Member States did not have any informa-

77.
tion system for collecting, archiving and retrieving data:

(a) no inspection database in Italy and too limited in France;

(b) a catch registration system that could not provide relevant
data; in France, for example, it was not possible to obtain
information about landing volumes by port.

In other cases the systems were not accessible to all per-

78.
sonnel who might need them:

(a)

in Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, the inspec-
tors did not all have direct access to catch and/or VMS data
from their operational bases;

(b)

in no country did inspectors have direct operational access to
the data recorded by other Member States (information on
catches landed in another country, VMS positions of foreign
vessels before they entered waters in the inspectors’ national
jurisdiction, etc.).

(1) For example, the type of fishing practised, the size and composition
of the fleet, length and nature of the coastline, area of waters under
jurisdiction, marketing practice, etc.

(2) Fishing licences, fishing rights, catch history, inspection history, his-

tory of penalties, turnover, history of VMS movements, etc.

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Inadequate strategic programming and tactical targeting

(b)

Most Member States did not carry out a risk analysis lead-
79.
ing to a formal strategy document that identified inspection pri-
orities and could be used as the basis for a rational allocation of
resources, particularly as regards the cost/benefit aspect of inspec-
tions. Even where general inspection programmes existed, they
did not always specify the resources to be deployed and the quan-
tified objectives to be observed.

80.
In this situation, it is not possible to ensure a correct bal-
ance between the type of resources deployed, the programmed
inspection tasks, and the principal inherent risks of the fishing
activities carried out in the area for which a particular Member
State is responsible. In Spain, in the two regions visited, it was
noted that a large part of the inspections concentrated on fishing
activities with a relatively low rate of infringement.

81.
At the operational level, the absence of relevant target-
ing of inspections impaired the efficiency of inspections. In the
United Kingdom, it was found that the inspectors had increased
inspections of vessels where no infringement could be found,
while at the same time other, nonetheless active and sizeable ves-
sels had never been inspected.

82.
However, conducting integrated inspections incorporat-
ing verification of businesses’ accounting data, e.g. in joint inspec-
tions with the tax administration, was seen to be effective in
several countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. These inspections in fact showed up inconsis-
tencies between the data forwarded to the fisheries administra-
tions and management data, particularly in those businesses
which combined fisheries activity with that of first buyer. How-
ever, in the absence of statutory requirements this approach is still
marginal.

… sometimes complicated by multiple inspecting bodies

83.
The multiplicity of inspecting bodies may increase the
risk of overlap or of an area of activity falling into a ‘blind spot’
when their areas of operations are allocated, and may lead to rigid
structures which limit the scope for redeploying inspection
resources in the light of changing priorities:

(a)

in France, eight government directorates from five ministries
were involved in the system of inspection and enforcement
without the responsible authority, the Ministry of Fisheries,
having any direct means of control over the entities on which
it relied and whose activities and resources it was responsible
for coordinating;

in Spain there was an overlap of responsibilities for inspec-
tion of the fishing activities of vessels operating in both inter-
nal (1) and external waters; moreover, cargo landed by a
vessel operating in external waters could be inspected twice
at the same location and at the same time, by national
inspectors as landing operations and by regional inspectors
as first sales;

(c)

in France and Italy, the national authorities were not in a
position to assess precisely the financial, human and mate-
rial resources devoted to fisheries inspection; ignorance of
this information actually limits the scope for reallocating
resources.

No performance monitoring as regards inspections

84.
Performance measurement is one of the basic compo-
nents of an effective inspection system. Indicators need to be put
in place so that the quality of the overall control system can be
evaluated, as well as the validity of the approaches taken in indi-
vidual areas.

85.
Among the Member States studied, only one had devel-
oped a true performance indicator, but the quality of the indica-
tor was affected by the weakness of the system for monitoring
inspections (2). In other cases, the evaluation indicators employed
only measured overall operational activity (3) and supplied no
information about specific regions or fisheries. It was therefore
not possible to form an opinion regarding the effectiveness of
control and inspection activity.

The Community Fisheries Control Agency (Vigo), a coordination
instrument with limited powers

86.
A Community fisheries control agency, with its head-
quarters in Vigo (Spain), has been created ‘to organise operational
coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the
Member States and to assist them to cooperate so as to comply
with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in order to ensure
its effective and uniform application’ (4). Contrary to what its
name might suggest, the Agency has no powers of its own in rela-
tion to fisheries control.

(1) In Spain internal waters means, for a given region, the area extending
from the coast to an imaginary straight line (Líneas de Base Recta)
between the two furthest coastal points of that region.

(2) France measures the offending rate (ratio of the number of infringe-
ments found/number of inspections); the figure published by the
authorities is 6,6 % and the rate calculated on the basis of the data
received by the auditors is 12,4 %.

(3) Total number of inspections on land or at sea, total number of hours

spent on inspections, etc.

(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 768/2005 of 26 April 2005 establishing
a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation
(EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the
common fisheries policy (OJ L 128, 21.5.2005, p. 1).

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Since the first work programme adopted by the Agency
87.
was the programme for 2007, it is still too soon to judge the
eventual impact of its activities on the various weaknesses iden-
tified during the audit. However, it is already possible to regret
that the power of the so-called Community inspectors (1) is lim-
ited to action at sea and that cooperation as regards following up
and penalising offences lies outside the Agency’s sphere of
competence.

Systems for following up infringements and imposing sanctions
are often inappropriate

88.
An effective system for following up infringements and
imposing penalties presupposes that every presumed offence is
dealt with and that when a penalty is imposed, it serves as a deter-
rent. This applies equally to infringements by operators subject to
the jurisdiction of national authorities and Member States whose
failings have been identified by the Commission.

National systems on the whole lack severity

89.
National systems for following up offences and impos-
ing penalties must, according to Community law, ensure that
every infringement is subject to appropriate follow-up proceed-
ings leading, if necessary, to a deterrent penalty (2). Weaknesses at
both the procedural level and in the sanctions imposed are a hin-
drance to the observance of this obligation.

Follow-up actions are sometimes limited for legal or procedural
reasons

90.
In some cases, the applicable procedures are not imple-
mented because they are deemed too expensive by the respon-
sible authorities, or are not applied for legal reasons, which
prevents any convictions:

(a)

in the United Kingdom and more specifically in England and
Wales, there is no system of administrative sanctions, and
decisions to pursue a case are subject to a ‘public interest’
assessment founded,
in particular, on whether the ratio
between the cost of proceeding and the applicable penalty is
considered too high. Hence, 90 % (3) of infringements iden-
tified in 2005 were not pursued through the Courts and led
only to a warning from the inspectorate;

(b)

in France, for legal reasons, anomalies identified in the regis-
tration of catch data were not forwarded to the inspectors
with a view to possible judicial proceedings (see paragraph 35).

(1) In fact, they are national inspectors designated by each Member State
to take part in inspections in the context of operations coordinated by
the Agency.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25.
(3) Out of 202 infringements found during landing inspections (includ-
ing on-board controls) there were 167 oral warnings, 14 written
warnings, 20 cases passed to the judicial authorities and one case
pending.

Incomplete information about sanctions and previous history

In several Member States visited, there is no central com-
91.
puterised repository for all the information relating to fisheries
offences and perpetrators of them. For this reason, prosecuting
authorities are not able to base their decision on complete knowl-
edge of the previous history. Moreover, due to the lack of infor-
mation about the penalties awarded for each type of offence it is
not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of inspection activities,
and that same lack is therefore an impediment to good strategic
planning and appropriate targeting of inspections (see para-
graph 63). In Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there
is no database that contains all sanctions imposed in the area of
fisheries. In Denmark, it has only existed since 2004.

Lack of integration and harmonisation at Community level

92.
The lack of Community integration and harmonisation
impairs the effectiveness of sanctions. An initial difficulty is that
of effectively applying the penalty imposed on a foreign national
once he or she is beyond the jurisdiction of the State in which the
offence was committed. A second is the difficulty, or even impos-
sibility, of the authorities in one country taking into account
infringements recorded by another Member State, whether for
reasons of access to information or for legal reasons.

93.
A catalogue of measures to be applied by Member States
in relation to serious infringements (4) was to be drawn up by the
Council, but has not yet been created. To date, the Commission
has still not presented the Council with a proposal to this end.

Penalties, on the whole,
Commission

insufficient deterrent, according to the

94.
Nevertheless, even without precise tools, the Commis-
sion was able to conclude that overall the penalties imposed were
not a good deterrent. It stated it publicly in these terms, ‘the
amount paid by the fisheries industry as a consequence of sanc-
tions imposed […] is roughly equal to two thousandths of the
[…] landing value. Such an amount entails the risk that the fish-
ing industry may consider penalties imposed for infringements to
the CFP rules just as an ordinary running cost for the enterprise
and see no real incentive to be compliant’ (5).

(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25(4).
(5) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament — Reports from Member States on behaviours which
seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2004,
COM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006. See also third edition of the Common
Fisheries Policy Compliance Scoreboard (page 40).

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Means of applying pressure on Member States are effective
only exceptionally

95.
In order to get Member States to respect their obligations,
the Commission may either have recourse to the Court of Justice
and the general procedure for failure to fulfil an obligation, or it
may use one of the procedures specific to the CFP. Each of these
procedures, however, has features that make it difficult to use and
effective only exceptionally.

Proceedings
cumbersome and effective only exceptionally …

failure to fulfil an obligation are long,

for

96.
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation are inher-
ently long. In fact, before they reach the Court of Justice the
observed failure must be the subject of a formal notice, then of a
reasoned opinion. Each of these stages not only requires exten-
sive preparatory work and formal consultation between the rel-
evant departments of DG Fish, but also involves the Commission’s
legal service. The delays inherent in each of these tasks are com-
pounded by the fact that decisions on infringements are taken by
the Commission only once in every quarter. In total, for fisheries
as for other areas, proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation
take several years.

inspection work on the part of

Furthermore, proceedings for failure in the implementa-
97.
tion of control, inspection or sanctions procedures require a sig-
nificant volume of
the
Commission. Due to the absence of easily verifiable assessment
criteria, the Commission has to increase the volume of evidence
in order to demonstrate that the failure is both general and per-
manent. This requires numerous missions; especially as in prac-
tice Commission inspectors
cannot officially record an
infringement without national inspectors being present. All in all,
the size of the task in fact makes it difficult to pursue more than
one case of this type at a time (1).

And lastly, a judgment of failure to fulfil an obligation (2)
98.
is not in itself effective, since the Member State’s obligation is con-
fined to taking the measures required to execute the judgment. In
order to result in a financial penalty, the first judgment must be
followed by a second one (3), for non-implementation of the pro-
visions of the first one. For that the Commission must bring evi-
dence that the failure has continued without any interruption
since the first judgment.

(1) The Commission estimated that in 2005 15 % of its inspection unit’s
resources had to be assigned to work linked to the legal action against
France.

(2) Under Article 226 of the Treaty.
(3) Under Article 228 of the Treaty.

In practice, in the area of fisheries, there has only been
99.
one case in which a Member State was sentenced to pay a finan-
cial penalty (4). The judgment in question was delivered in 2005
for non-compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case in
which the first infringements had been recorded in 1984, 21
years earlier.

Nevertheless the impact of this one decision was very
100.
important. It allowed national authorities to impose within
months the introduction and application of numerous procedures
that had previously been absent or deficient, despite having been
compulsory for many years, not only in the country fined but also
in the other Member States against which similar proceedings
were in progress.

… and limited specific procedures which are difficult
implement …

to

101.
One of the specific lines of action available to the Com-
mission is the possibility of taking preventive measures (5) where
there a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to conser-
vation of resources. But the difficulty of gathering the necessary
evidence and observing the principle of proportionality have so
far dissuaded the Commission from taking such action, especially
as the effect of such a decision would be limited, with a maximum
application period of six months.

102.
On the other hand, where it is found that previous quo-
tas were exceeded (6), the Commission has the power to reduce
the future fishing opportunities of the offending Member State (7).
This possibility requires the Commission to obtain sufficient evi-
dence that the final catch figures submitted by the Member States
are erroneous. In practice it has been possible to implement this
provision only once (8), on the basis of information obtained in
national inspections of one of the Member States sanctioned.

103.
The Commission does not have the possibility of sus-
pending aid allocated to a Member State under the CFP in case of
failure to apply the control rules.

(4) Case C-304/02 Commission/France; action for failure to fulfil obliga-
tions under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay a lump sum of 20 mil-
lion euro and a penalty payment of 57,8 million euro for each period
of six months (judgment given on 12 July 2005); in fact France paid
the lump sum and one penalty payment.
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 26(3).
(6) That is to say, other than those relating to the last complete fisheries
year for which an administrative mechanism exists, allowing the reat-
tribution, under certain conditions, of excess amounts from one year
against the relevant quotas for the following year.

(7) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23(4).
(8) Commission Regulation (EC) No 147/2007 of 15 February 2007
adapting certain fish quotas from 2007 to 2012 pursuant
to
Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the con-
servation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the
Common Fisheries Policy.

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Furthermore, it has never assessed the extent to which
104.
Member States have implemented the obligation imposed upon
them to recover aid granted under the fisheries structural funds
from beneficiaries who do not comply with CFP rules (1).

… allowing serious shortcomings to persist in the Member States

105.
Finally, in view of the weaknesses just described in the
system of sanctions, it is not surprising that the Court was able to
find serious inadequacies in Member States’ application of mea-
sures aimed at sustainable management of fisheries resources,
even though the Commission has been aware of this situation for
several years.

This situation is also linked to the fact that, following its
106.
inspection reports,
formally ask
national authorities to comment on the failings found and, where
appropriate, present an action plan to rectify them.

the Commission does not

control

The
compliance with rules and effectiveness of controls

overcapacity

context:

fishing

jeopardises

Overcapacity, a major risk factor for the failure of
Community action

108.
Overcapacity may be defined as a fleet’s excess catch
capacity relative to the level of catch that would allow the
resource to be sustainably exploited. Despite the difficulties in
measuring it, the finding of overcapacity in the Community fleet
is highlighted in the Green Paper (2). According to the Commis-
sion, ‘What is clear, in any event, is that the fleet is currently much
too large’ and ‘that the necessary reductions of fishing mortality
for the prudent management of stocks should be about 40 % and
in many cases much higher’.

Overcapacity encourages over-fishing

109.
Overcapacity is a factor in over-fishing. It influences the
behaviour of the industry and the legislator, by reducing the prof-
itability of enterprises in the sector, which have to bear the costs
associated with the overcapacity of their means of production.

110.
The fishing industry is exposed to the temptation of
exploiting its over-sized vessels to the full and to fish beyond the
authorised limits. There is a risk of their underdeclaring their
catches or throwing the less profitable part overboard (see
paragraph 25).

107.
In addition to the weaknesses described above, the
effectiveness of inspection and control systems is impeded by the
existence of a very high inherent risk associated with the exist-
ence of significant fishing overcapacity. This situation is, in fact,
a strong incitement for the fishing industry not to observe the
regulations, and, everything else being equal, the only way to
achieve effective controls is to step up inspection resources and
pressure of controls. Although the situation has been known
about for many years, it has not been dealt with effectively.

111.
When the Council of Ministers adopts the TAC and
quotas it acts as an arbiter between divergent short-term interests,
environmental on the one hand, and socio-economic on the
other. In doing so it may authorise catch quantities that are higher
than those recommended by the scientists (see Table 3), in order
to protect the immediate social and economic interests of those
employed in the industry. Furthermore, the Council’s choices are
made without any means of evaluating objectively how the catch
levels will impact on any of those interests.

Examples of differences between scientific opinions and TAC

Table 3

Cod
North Sea

Herring
North Sea

Horse mackerel
North Sea

Whiting
North Sea

2006 scientific opinion (tonnes)

0

< 425 000

< 18 000

TAC 2006 (tonnes)

23 205

454 751

42 727

2007 scientific opinion (tonnes)

0

< 245 000

< 18 000

TAC 2007 (tonnes)

19 957

341 063

42 727

< 17 300

23 800

< 15 100

23 800

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying
down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community
structural assistance in the fisheries sector, Article 18 (OJ L 337,
30.12.1999, p. 10).

(2) Green paper on the future of the CFP, COM(2001)135, section 3.3.

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Failure of past capacity-reduction policies

112.
The first action aimed at reducing the overcapacity in
the Community fleet goes back to 1986, the date at which the
first multiannual guidance programme (MAGP) was put in place.
This was followed by three other similar programmes setting ceil-
ings for capacity or effort (1) for various segments of the Com-
munity fleet. However, the combined effects of over-modest
objectives, management problems, and the use of structural funds
for shipbuilding and modernisation resulted in the failure of these
programmes. This led the Commission to abandon this approach
in 2003.

An approach now based essentially on limiting fishing effort

113.
With the reform of the CFP in 2002, the European
Community ceded its powers to the Member States as regards
reducing fishing capacity and confined itself to provisions that
aimed to control the fishing effort.

Abandonment of the Community objective of reducing fishing
capacity

Furthermore, measurement of fishing capacity in terms
117.
of tonnage (GT) and engine power (kW) has two major weak-
nesses. One is the inadequacy of the standard units used for evalu-
ating the true catch capacity, and especially the productivity gains
associated with advanced technology, which, according to the
Commission, may be between 1 and 3 % per year, or even more
in some fisheries (2). The other comes from the difficulty of actu-
ally measuring the data corresponding to these two units of mea-
surement (3) consistently and accurately.

118.
Each Member State must also send an annual report to
the Commission on the efforts it has employed to achieve a sus-
tainable balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportuni-
ties (4). However, only some of them present an evaluation of
their situation in terms of overcapacity. Moreover, different States
use different methodological approaches. Consequently,
the
Commission does not have a precise picture of the imbalances
that exist and has not, so far, verified the quality of the evalua-
tions provided.

A risk that Community assistance could lead to increases in
capacity

114.
Capacity reduction objectives have been replaced by the
concept of reference ceilings which are expressed in capacity units
and constitute maximum levels which national fleets may not
exceed. These ceilings were set on the basis of historic levels and
are only reduced in cases where vessels are decommissioned from
the fleet with Community aid. This system does not oblige, or
even encourage, Member States to reduce their overcapacity.

119.
The new European Fisheries Fund (EFF) grants aid to
renew the engines of fishing vessels, provided that the rating of
the new engine is, according to circumstances, lower than or
equal to that of the old one. Knowing the problems of monitor-
ing kilowatts, a provision like this could, in fact, lead to a real
increase in fishing capacity.

Reductions in fishing effort do not necessarily result in capacity
reduction

115.
Community action is now directed essentially towards
limiting the fishing effort Since this is defined as the product of
capacity (in GT or kW) times activity (days at sea), a reduction in
it can be obtained by simply decreasing one of these factors, activ-
ity. In this case, overcapacity continues to have a direct bearing
on the profitability of the fishing industry, which may even be
tempted to compensate for its reduced activity by increasing its
productivity and investing in technological equipment, such as
sonar or more efficient fishing gear, which will de facto increase
its effective fishing capacity.

Mechanisms which are difficult to check

116.
The statutory mechanisms for limiting fishing effort
apply to an ever-increasing number of fisheries, making their
implementation and
and
problematic.

increasingly

complex

control

(1) Fishing effort is the product of capacity times duration of fishing

activity.

120.
In conclusion, Community policies have not been able
to end significant overcapacity in the European fleet (5). The cur-
rent system of giving responsibility for managing capacity to the
Member States and focusing Community action on fishing effort
limitation does not include any measure of constraint which
could lead to a reduction in this overcapacity. The problem of
overcapacity therefore seems likely to persist in years to come and
will continue to have a bearing on compliance with CFP rules in
general, and TAC and quotas in particular.

(2) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on improving fishing capacity and effort indicators
under the common fisheries policy, COM(2007) 39 final of 5.2.2007.
(3) As regards engine power, the use of electronic limiters makes verifi-
cation of the reality of the declared figures problematic; as regards ton-
nage, the harmonisation of the unit used has been introduced too
recently to allow reliable comparisons with historic data.

(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 14.
(5) The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF) stresses that ‘Not only are the reported reductions rather
trivial, compared to the existing imbalance between fishing opportu-
nities and fleet capacity, to achieve such a balance, there is a need to
reduce the EU fleet’s capacity (ability) to catch fish, and not simply its
physical capacity’. Opinion on the annual report from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament on the Member
States’ efforts during 2005 to achieve a sustainable balance between
fishing capacity and fishing opportunities, COM(2006) 872 final of
9 January 2007.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The incompleteness and unreliability of catch data pre-
121.
vent the TAC and quota system, which is a cornerstone in the
management of Community fisheries resources, from function-
ing properly. The regulatory framework and the procedures in
force guarantee neither the exhaustiveness of data collection, nor
the detection of inconsistencies during validation. Nor is the
Commission in an overall position to identify errors and anoma-
lies in the data forwarded by Member States, and, to take all the
timely decisions required to protect the resource (see para-
graphs 18 to 51).

122.
The inspection systems do not prevent infringements
and do not ensure that they are effectively detected. The absence
of general standards has resulted in the existence of divergent
national systems that neither ensure adequate inspection pressure
nor optimise inspection activities. Furthermore, it actually limits
the scope and effect of the Commission’s work of evaluating
national arrangements, and as a consequence limits the latter’s
capacity to form an opinion as to the overall effectiveness of the
national systems (see paragraphs 52 to 87).

123.
The procedures for dealing with infringements found
do not support the assertion that every infringement is followed
up and even less that it is subject to penalty. Even when penalties
are imposed, taken as a whole they prove to have very little deter-
rent effect. With regard to infringements of Community legisla-
tion by a Member State,
the only instrument of proven
effectiveness available to the Commission is an action before the
Court of Justice for failure to fulfil an obligation. This however
has certain features which limit its use and make it an insuffi-
ciently responsive instrument (see paragraphs 88 to 106).

124.
Overcapacity affects the profitability of the fishing
industry and, in a context of decreasing authorised catches, is an
incitement to non-observance of these restrictions and affects the
quality of the data forwarded. After the failure of programmes to
adapt fishing capacity, the current approach, based essentially on
managing the fishing effort, is unlikely to resolve the problem of
overcapacity (see paragraphs 107 to 120).

125.
In all, the Court’s work has shown that, despite recent
improvements, the control, inspection and sanction mechanisms
in place are not capable of ensuring that the rules on managing
the fisheries resources, and the TAC and quota system in particu-
lar, are effectively applied. This situation is all the more problem-
atic in that the existing imbalance between capacity and fishing
opportunities creates a context that is unlikely to promote spon-
taneous compliance with the regulatory provisions. After a sig-
nificant downturn in landings in recent years, the continuance of
this situation will inevitably have serious repercussions not only
on the resource itself but also on the future of the fishing indus-
try and the regions associated with it.

If the political authorities want the CFP to achieve its
126.
objective of sustainable exploitation of the fisheries resources, the
present control, inspection and sanction mechanisms must be
strengthened considerably, in particular by implementing the rec-
ommendations listed below.

Quality of catch data

127.
In order to improve the quality of the catch data used
for management of fisheries resources the systems for collecting,
validating and monitoring catch data should also be improved.
This presupposes that the Member States:

(a)

ensure that all the declarations provided for by the regula-
tions are actually produced, correctly drawn up and recorded
as quickly as possible by the responsible authorities;

(b) use IT tools to systematically verify the consistency of all the
data contained in these documents and, where relevant, to
check the data against VMS data;

(c)

establish interoperability between their respective systems so
as to be able to verify the documentary consistency of quan-
tities landed in one country and first sold in another;

(d) attest the reliability of data forwarded to the Commission by
providing annual certification by an independent body of the
last cumulative monthly reports.

128.

This improvement also requires the Commission to:

(a)

establish and approve as quickly as possible procedures for
implementing the Regulation on electronic recording and
reporting of fishing activities and on means of remote sens-
ing (1), ensuring that as far as possible the conditions for
implementing the tool are impervious to fraud and facilitate
the interoperability of national systems;

(b)

redefine the format of the reports forwarded by the Member
States to facilitate analysis of them and achieve effective
controls;

(c) make regular use of its right of access to the duplicates of IT
files containing relevant information: access rights should no
longer be subject to advance application;

(d) harmonise the conversion factors used in the various Mem-
ber States for obtaining ‘equivalent live weight’ quantities;

(e) verify the consistency of the data received through Eurostat

on the one hand and DG Fish on the other.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1966/2006.

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Effectiveness of inspection systems

129.
For the effectiveness and consistency of controls and
inspections implemented by the Member States, and so that the
Commission improves its knowledge and evaluation of them, the
Member States must, where they do not yet do so:

(a) define the minimum characteristics of inspections and the

basic controls that must be included in them;

(b) ensure adequate access to all the information needed for

planning and targeting controls;

(c)

establish a control strategy based on a risk analysis;

(d) evaluate their control activities with the help of relevant

objectives;

(e)

safeguard the quality of inspection work by supervising
controls;

(f) make a record all their inspection work in centralised

databases.

130.

On the other hand, the Commission should:

(a) propose to the Council that all the recommendations made
in the preceding paragraph be put into the legislation, as
essential elements of effective regulation;

(b)

require Member States to draw up action plans in respect of
each major weakness identified.

Application of deterrent penalties

In order to avoid the migration of offenders to Member
132.
States where infringements are punished less severely, it is desir-
able for the Council to encourage Member States to compare and
harmonise the penalties imposed by, amongst other things, pub-
lishing a catalogue of measures applicable by Member States for
the most serious infringements, as provided in the legislation (1).

133.
To reinforce the Commission’s capacity to put pressure
on the Member States, it is desirable that the Community legisla-
tor should ensure that the management measures adopted are
verifiable; examine whether strengthening the powers of the
Commission inspectors and broadening the mandate of the Com-
munity Fisheries Control Agency would be appropriate; and lastly
introduce more responsive instruments of sanction such as, for
example, the capacity to suspend payments of Community aid in
the fisheries sector if a Member State fails to respect its control
obligations.

Reduction of overcapacity and appropriate accompanying
measures

134.
The efforts made by the Member States and the Com-
mission in order to reduce the pressure of excessive fishing must
be reinforced by setting ambitious targets for capacity reduction
and adopting socio-economic measures to benefit populations
which make their living by fishing.

Since definition of appropriate measures requires a
135.
sound knowledge of the socio-economic realities of the fishing
industry and the impact of decisions regarding catch limitation,
the Commission must develop its information tools and analyti-
cal applications in this area.

131.
To ensure that penalties have a deterrent effect, Mem-
ber States should remind the competent authorities that, before
imposing a sanction, it is their duty to take into account, in accor-
dance with European law, both the deterrent nature of the pen-
alty in relation to the economic advantage which the operator
derives from his offence and the seriousness of the damage that it
has caused to the Community resource.

In addition to the technical

136.
improvements recom-
mended for control, inspection and sanctions systems, the suc-
cess of the CFP and the continuation of this activity can only be
achieved through the awareness of all parties and by granting
appropriate financial aid to facilitate the development of sources
of income that are supplements or alternatives to exploitation of
this natural resource.

This Report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of
25 October 2007.

For the Court of Auditors
Hubert WEBER
President

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25(4).

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SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART SHOWING COLLECTION AND MONITORING OF CATCH DATA

ANNEX

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COMMISSION REPLIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is aimed at the conservation and management of aquatic resources.
The Community has a legislative power where the Council decides after consulting Parliament. The applica-
tion and enforcement of the CFP rules is the responsibility of the Member States.

The Commission considers that the success of the CFP is dependent on the quality of control and inspections
and sanctions.

In the area of control and enforcement, Community legislation is intended to harmonise the actions of Mem-
ber States as well as to prevent policy failure where Member States have not sufficiently taken up their
responsibility.

The Commission shares the conclusions of the Court concerning the shortcomings of the provisions concern-
ing control, inspection and enforcement, which endanger the effectiveness of the CFP.

In the light of that situation, the Commission has already started a reflection in view of an ambitious reform of
the European policy for fisheries control.

The recommendations made by the Court with regard to improving the situation, can serve as an effective con-
tribution to the success of this reform.

Nevertheless, over the past years some efforts have already been made to improve the control and enforce-
ment of the rules of the CFP and to better align and harmonise the actions in the Member States. In particular,
the 2002 CFP reform and the establishment of the Community Fisheries Control Agency have opened up new
possibilities.

For the CFP to be effective, procedures need to be simplified and the Commission’s powers and the mandate of
the Community Fisheries Control Agency need to be strengthened.

The success of the CFP depends for a large part on the commitment of Member States and their efforts to effec-
tively control and enforce CFP rules. It has proved difficult to get some Commission proposals adopted in
Council, in particular, where they address the ambition to limit access to depleted resources, to bring fishing
capacity in line with resources, or to increase Commission powers.

II.
In order to ensure proper application of the CFP rules, the Commission addresses weaknesses in the
national control and enforcement systems, as appropriate, with infringement proceedings and other enforce-
ment actions, active support to improved cooperation between national authorities, new legislation, and direct
support to Member States’ control authorities. However, these actions have not always been sufficiently effec-
tive or successful.

Concerning recording and reporting, Member States need to put in place the necessary systems for recording,
cross checking and validating data on fishing activities and to improve the control and enforcement of the
reporting obligations.

III.
The Commission shares the analysis and conclusions of the Court. These recommendations have
already been subject of past Commission proposals and need to be taken on in the context of the foreseen
reform of the European policy for fisheries control.

The application of national sanctioning systems is the responsibility of the Member States. Harmonisation of
such systems at Community level is decided upon by the Community legislator.

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INTRODUCTION

1-9.
The CFP is aimed to ensure exploitation of living aquatic
resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and
social conditions. Based on this, the current CFP legislation con-
tains a framework regulating fishing activities by way of catch
limitations, capacity restrictions, effort limitation and technical
measures.

The success of this policy depends mainly on the involvement of
all parties concerned. Whilst it is the responsibility of the Com-
mission to propose new legislation and to control the application
of the rules by the Member States, the commitment from Mem-
ber States is vital for achieving the CFP objectives. Only the Mem-
ber States can ensure the formal adoption of CFP rules and take
the actions necessary for their proper application.

In order to improve the effectiveness of the system, the reform of
2002 introduced a new approach to fisheries managements,
based on in long term management plans, and for more acute
situations, recovery plans. In addition, the longstanding system
for management of fishing capacity was altered by strengthening
the management of fishing effort within the existing limits of fish-
ing capacity.

The majority of findings of the Commission inspectors are fol-
lowed up through contacts with the Member State concerned or
by further inspection missions. More severe cases or matters of
principle are addressed on a political level. In case of serious
shortcomings or ongoing shortcomings, infringement procedures
are launched against the Member State concerned.

The judgement from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case
C-304/-02, Commission v. France (3), has provided the Commu-
nity with a clear confirmation of the role and obligations of Mem-
ber States with regard to control and enforcement of CFP rules.
Following this ruling, France was ordered to pay a lump sum
of 20 million euro and a periodic six-month penalty of
EUR 57 761 250. At the end of the second six-month period, the
Commission considered, that the progress made by France to
improve the system of controls, prosecutions and penalties could
be considered to be generally satisfactory and of such nature that
imposing a second fine would be disproportionate. It was how-
ever pointed out to France that what mattered for the future was
that France would continue its efforts and further consolidate this
progress.

Apart from infringement proceedings which take a long time, the
Commission assists Member States in their task, by providing
information and guidance to Member States, by creating the plat-
form for exchanging best practises and by establishing for some
fisheries a list of minimum standards for each type of inspection.

In accordance with Chapter V of the Basic Regulation (1) and the
Control Regulation (2), Member States are to adopt the measures,
allocate the financial and human resources and set up the admin-
istrative and technical structure necessary for ensuring effective
control, inspection and enforcement of CFP legislation.

Finally, inspection missions in the Member States, provide the
Commission with information needed for its task of evaluating
the existing CFP framework, and where relevant, it will present to
the Council new legislative proposals to address existing short-
comings and discrepancies.

The rules are based on the obligation for Member States to achieve
an effective control system, where relevant in accordance with
detailed rules established by the Commission.

AUDIT CHARACTERISTICS

In this regard, the Commission’s approach has been to adopt
detailed rules on control inspection and enforcement tasks either
directed at specific fisheries or areas or, in case common factors
exist, more generally applicable and within the limits of the pow-
ers attributed and focussing on priority issues for achieving the
CFP objectives, the Commission evaluates the application of the
CFP rules by the Member States.

In this regard, the Commission undertakes inspection missions in
the Member States on the basis of horizontal and specific inspec-
tion programmes. The shortcomings found during such inspec-
tion missions have been addressed by the Commission in
whatever way deemed most appropriate and effective, having
regard to their gravity as well as to matters of urgency and politi-
cal sensitivity.

17.
The comments in this report will be taken into account
in the preparation of the review and revision of the Control
Regulation.

OBSERVATIONS

18.
Evaluation of the catch recording and verification sys-
tems in place in the Member States will be completed in 2008 as
the issue of unreliable data is the core of the problem. This is
being treated in the review and revision of the Control Regulation.

The shortcomings in national catch recording systems
19.
mentioned by the Court have also been detected by the services
of the Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002.
(2) Regulation (EC) No 2847/93.

(3) 12 Member States seconded a French motion that next to a penalty

payment no lump sum should be imposed.

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In order to improve the reliability of data, in particular for those
stocks subject to international agreements (e.g. Greenland Hali-
but, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)), the
Commission makes cross checks at its own initiative with the data
from third countries and has put in place alert systems.

Moreover, the Commission has launched infringement proce-
dures against some Member States, focussing amongst others on
the reliability of catch data (e.g. United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain,
Portugal and Poland).

In order to improve the communication of data between
20.
Member States and the Commission, Council Regulation (EC)
No 2371/2002 provides for the obligation for Member States to
appoint a single authority responsible for coordinating the col-
lection and verification of information on fishing activities and
for reporting to and cooperating with the Commission. In addi-
tion, the system was further strengthened by requiring that first
sales shall only take place at registered auctions or through reg-
istered buyers.

Moreover, the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation laying
down detailed implementing rules for electronic reporting will
increase the efficiency of the validation systems. For example, it
provides for immediate electronic transmission of a copy of the
sales note to the flag State and landing State authorities so that it
can be cross checked with the landing declaration.

21.

(a) The introduction of the electronic logbook will combat the
problems identified by the Court. The obligation to electroni-
cally record and transmit logbook, landing declaration and
transshipment data on a daily basis will enhance significantly
the efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring, control and
surveillance operations both at sea and on land.

(b) The Commission has continuously supported the develop-
ment of a general system to determine the weight of all fish
and notes that the obligation to weigh is already present in
some specific fisheries such as in the pelagic fishery and,
from 2008, in the Baltic Sea.

(c) The Council has already agreed on a lower margin of toler-
ance for some specific fisheries subject to recovery measures
(e.g. hake, cod, sole). Further, the Commission is reviewing
the issue of margins of tolerance in the review and revision
of the Control Regulation.

The regulation concerning the electronic recording and
23.
reporting will increase the efficiency of the validation systems, for
example by providing for immediate electronic transmission of a
copy of the sales note to the flag State and landing State authori-
ties so that it can be cross checked with the landing declaration.
After publication of the Council Regulation on 30 Decem-
ber 2006, the Commission immediately prepared the proposal
for implementing rules. This proposal has already been discussed
with Member States during the first half of 2007 and is expected
to be adopted before the end of 2007.

24.
The Commission is assessing the posibilities for improv-
ing the situation with regard to the data on catches and on sales
and the timing of reporting.

Nevertheless, the Norwegian system of monitoring of landings
and sales applies solely in a national context and the responsibili-
ties of the Community are of a different nature from those of the
Norwegian State, in particular where it concerns the principle of
subsidiarity.

The Commission considers that the national
25. and 26.
administrations and the scientists can reliably estimate the quan-
tity of discards. The problem lies however in them not being
taken into account in the catch declarations. However, discarded
quantities (usually estimates) are taken into account by the scien-
tists (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea) in the
assessments of most stocks. In order to attack the problem of dis-
cards, the Commission presented a first action plan (1) in 2002.
This plan did however not yield the expected results and, there-
fore, the Commission now proposes a completely new approach
in its Communication on ‘A policy to reduce unwanted by-catches
and eliminate discards in European fisheries’ (2). A comprehen-
sive consultation process on this Communication is under way
and the Commission intends to come forward with first concrete
proposals for the implementation of the new policy on discards
in 2008. This new approach is similar to the discard bans in place
in some third countries such as Norway.

Infringement proceedings are taken where shortcomings
27.
in the control and enforcement systems are identified in Member
States.

(a) The problems in the Spanish catch registration and report-
ing system are being addressed in the context of ongoing
infringement procedures against Spain.

(b) As regards fishing activities in the Mediterranean, there is the
Mediterranean Regulation, as well as the Regulation concern-
ing Bluefin Tuna (3), that both foresee the statistical follow up
of catches. In addition, the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), applicable on the Atlantic
Ocean and the Indian Ocean, impose obligations regarding
catch and effort statistics. In this context France transmits
data to the Commission which is forwarded to those Regional
Management Fisheries Organisations.

(d) The quality of information in sales notes in the event of con-
vergence of interest between buyers and sellers is one of the
issues which is being addressed in the review and revision of
the Control Regulation.

(1) COM(2002) 656.
(2) COM(2007) 136.
(3) See Regulations (EC) No 1967/2006 (OJ L 36, 8.2.2007, p. 6) and (EC)

No 643/2007 (OJ L 151, 13.6.2007, p. 1).

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In order to improve the situation, the Commission has
28.
included the problems of cross checking and verification of data
in the ongoing infringement proceedings against the Member
States concerned.

The issue of efficiency of validation systems is one of the priori-
ties to be adressed in the review and revision of the Control
Regulation.

(b) The shortcomings in the monitoring of quota uptake in Italy
and Spain are subject of ongoing infringement proceedings.

(c) The Commission is aware of problems concerning the moni-
toring of catches in Spain and France and has taken the nec-
essary actions.

(d) The Commission has identified a number of shortcomings in
the United Kingdom’s control and enforcement system and
has opened an infringement procedure against this Member
State to address the situation.

29.
As pointed out in the replies to points 27 and 28, the
Commission has opened infringement proceedings against Mem-
ber States for the shortcomings in their control and enforcement
system.

(c) The Commission considers, as underlined by the Court, that
this problem of completeness of declaration documents
needs to be addressed in the context of the review of the con-
trol policy.

(d) The shortcomings in cross checking with vessel monitory
system (VMS) data have also been identified by the Commis-
sion. For Italy, France, Greece and the United Kingdom these
issues form part of ongoing infringement proceedings. For
the Netherlands and Denmark the Commission has not
found shortcomings sufficient to justify the opening of an
infringement procedure.

30.
The Commission is aware of the situation. For that rea-
son the Commission relies not only on the data transmitted by
the Member States, but also makes use of other relevant data in
its possession and has closed fisheries where its own estimations
showed that the stock was exhausted.

In the framework of the 2006 and 2007 recovery plans
33.
for Greenland Halibut from NAFO, the Commission has requested
Spain to correct the catch figures of vessels coming from the
NAFO zone on the basis of the results of inspections in ports.
This, in fact, allowed the Commission to have a real time follow
up of the consumption of the Spanish quota.

34.
The issue mentioned is subject of ongoing infringement
proceedings against several Member States, such as for example
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Poland.

35.
The shortcomings of the control and enforcement sys-
tem in France have been addressed by the Commission in the fol-
low up of the judgement from the ECJ in case C 304/02. The
Commission remains however attentive to ensure that France
continues its actions to further consolidate the progress made.

Missions of the Commission inspectors in the Member
36.
States have resulted in similar findings, a number of which have
been or are being addressed in the context of infringement
proceedings.

37.
The incompatibility between validation systems in the
Member States has been subject to investigations by Commission
services.

Moreover, the forthcoming Commission Regulation laying down
detailed implementing rules for electronic reporting will increase
the efficiency of the validation systems. For example, it proposes
immediate electronic transmission of a copy of the sales note to
the flag State and landing State authorities so that it can be cross
checked with the landing declaration.

38.
Community legislation requires that for the calculation of
catches onboard fishing vessels the conversion factor used shall
be those adopted by the Member State whose flag the vessel is
flying.

(a) The amounts over-fished by the United Kingdom in 2005
have been fully deducted from the United Kingdom’s 2006
quota.

There is certainly a need to continue the efforts to harmonise con-
version factors.

(b) The Commission is aware of the problems in Italy concern-
ing the catch declarations for bluefin tuna and is preparing
further actions to address this situation.

Member States have the obligation to set up a system
31.
allowing effective verifications and cross checks to be made. The
Commission like the Court regrets that the verification and cross
checking of data are not applied effectively at this moment.

32.
It is due to the findings during the inspection missions in
the Member States that the control on cross checking systems in
Member States have become one of the priority issues for the
Commission and have been taken into account in several infringe-
ment proceedings.

In November 2006, for the first time, conversion factors have
been agreed, within ICCAT for bluefin tuna.

The discussions at Community level are ongoing and the Com-
mission considers that the progress achieved within ICCAT can
serve as an example in this respect.

The Commission shares the opinion of the Court on the neces-
sity to establish harmonised, precise and coherent coefficients at
Community level.

39.
With regard to the problems concerning the traceability
of catch data, an evaluation of catch recording systems is cur-
rently in progress and the results will become available in 2008.

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The Control Regulation does provide for a report on the
41.
way in which data was collected and verified after 12 months
from the entry into force of the Regulation. The information pro-
vided by the Member States consisted of mainly lengthy general
descriptions of the system in place, lacking useful elements for
proper assessments thereof.

The Commission makes use of all coercive means avail-
51.
able including infringement proceedings and fishery closures. Fur-
thermore, the Commission’s inspection service has adapted its
strategy to focus on the analysis of landing data and reports of
physical controls.

The introduction of reporting obligations will be one of the issues
to be considered in the review and revision of the Control
Regulation.

42.
The Report from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Monitoring of the Member States’
Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2003-2005 (1)
highlights the unreliable quality of the data.

The poor quality of data has also been addressed in the 2003,
2004 and 2005 editions of the Compliance Scoreboard.

43.
With regard to the uncertainties at hand, the Commis-
sion establishes the amount over-fished not only on the basis of
the information received from Member States, but also on other
data in its possession, such as information derived from findings
during inspection missions in the Member States.

45.
The forthcoming review and revision of the Control
Regulation will be used to improve the presentation and break-
down of data. However the core of the problem can only be
detected by inspection missions for analysing the basic data on
the spot and physically checking the landings, which is primarily
the responsibility of Member States.

To address this issue, a Memorandum of Understanding
46.
between the Directorate-General
for Fisheries and Maritime
Affairs, and EUROSTAT was signed in April 2006 to avoid dis-
crepancies between quota monitoring of the Directorate-General
for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs and catches/landings statistics
of EUROSTAT.

The Commission will moreover examine if and in what way fur-
ther improvements can be achieved.

49.
For the 26 cases of exceeded quota in 2005 the Commis-
sion has deducted these amounts fully from the 2006 fishing
opportunities for the Member States concerned.

50.
Normally, a Member State will close the fishery provi-
sionally, followed by a Decision from the Commission. However,
on some occasions, where Member States failed to act, the Com-
mission was forced to close the fishery at its own initiative. These
cases have once more underlined the need for increased powers
for the Commission inspectors to freely collect evidence in the
Member States. However, so far the powers of the Commission
inspectors have remained limited. Further efforts in this context
are thus necessary and the Commission considers this an issue of
priority to be addressed. in the review and revision of the Control
Regulation.

(1) COM(2007) 167 final.

In order to strengthen the control of the data by the Commission,
the Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs has
asked the Joint Research Centre (JRC) to improve the possibilities
to detect anomalies in data through more sophisticated data
analysis techniques. It is however very difficult to detect fraud in
the analysis of a simple aggregated database.

52.
Inspections undertaken by the Commission inspectors
have actually allowed the Commission to detect the shortcomings
subject of this report and they have been the basis for addressing
the non-compliance by Member States.

The shortcomings in the national inspection systems are being
addressed by way of infringement proceedings or other action.

53.
The Commission’s approach has been to establish spe-
cific detailed rules in the context of management and recovery
plans as well as in the context of certain fishing areas and types
of fishery.

Where appropriate the Commission has established a list of mini-
mum standards for each type of inspection to be used by Mem-
ber States and suggested guidelines to follow. Nevertheless, the
Commission considers it appropriate to define certain general
rules for inspection procedures (format for inspection reports,
inspection procedure, vademecum for follow up of infringe-
ments), which will effectively contribute to a level playing field.
The Community Fisheries Control Agency could contribute to
this task in line with its mandate. At the initiative of the Com-
mission, similar provision have already been put in place at the
level of certain Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.

The current system has been established on the basis of
55.
an obligation for Member States to achieve an effective control
system.

The Commission considers that the scope for developing com-
mon rules is limited given the absence of common factors.

Moreover, as pointed out in reply to point 53, the absence of
detailed rules does not diminish Member States’ obligation to
achieve an effective control system.

57.
The inspections undertaken have provided the Commis-
sion with a good knowledge on the application of specific provi-
sions and the functioning of the inspection and monitoring
systems of Member States and have, in fact, allowed the Commis-
sion to detect key weaknesses in Member States.

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While the Commission has focussed its resources on high risk
cases, general evaluations have also been undertaken through
horizontal inspection programmes on catch reporting systems
(2005-2006), market regulations (2004), third country vessels
landings (2005), VMS implementation (2004-2006) and deep-sea
fisheries in European waters (2005-2006).

Moreover, since 2004, the Commission has regularly used a series
of questionnaires and evaluation sheets to evaluate the systems of
control in Member States, notably in terms of compliance with
recently adopted rules and with the quality of individual inspec-
tions. Furthermore, indicators of compliance (intensity and qual-
ity of inspections) have been defined and used to evaluate Member
States compliance with the CFP in the context of infringement
proceedings.

The Commission began discusions on the documenta-
63.
tion of individual inspections already in 2005 and continued
them in 2006 in the context of case C-304/02 against France.

In view of the establishment of a database integrating all inspec-
tion reports, in line with the opinions expressed by the Commis-
sion in some of its communications (e.g. the communication on
serious infringements (2)), the Commission launched, in spring
2007, a debate with Member States.

64.
The Commission expects the Community Fisheries Con-
trol Agency to play an important role in improving transparency
and harmonisation and to coordinate the establishment of com-
ment practices under the scope of the joint deployment plans.

59.
The Commission has worked on establishing bench-
marks and priorities in certain fisheries, which have proved
effective.

65.
The Commission considers that standardized inspection
skills and reports would enhance the quality control of the fish-
eries inspection and intends to address this issue with priority in
the review and revision of the Control Regulation.

Further steps in this direction are foreseen in the review and revi-
sion of the Control Regulation.

66. and 67.
The Commission considers this to be a good
example of best practice and intends to address the issue in the
review and revision of the Control Regulation.

60.
It is against this background that the Commission has
recently (1) made efforts to establish benchmarks as pointed out
in the reply to point 59.

Moreover, it has established guidelines for the Member States for
defining, per type of inspection, the minimum standards to be
ensured. These efforts have been welcomed by the Member States.

The review and revision of the Control Regulation will be an
opportunity to incorporate these standards into the CFP legisla-
tion. In addition, it will remain necessary to continue the coop-
eration between Member States. In particular, the Community
Fisheries Control Agency is expected play an important roles in
this regard.

61.
As regards the desirability of checking fish holds at the
end of a landing, the Commission believes that this should be part
of a full inspection. This approach is also reflected in legislation
covering the pelagic fisheries from 2005 and the Baltic fisheries
from 2008. See also the replies to point 60 and 62.

The Commission has been systematically attentive to this
62.
issue for many years, finally allowing it in 2007 to establish gen-
eral criteria for effective inspections.

The Commission notes that there are differences between Mem-
ber States and that some of them have in fact established proce-
dural guides for their inspectors.

In the framework of recovery and multiannual management
plans, benchmarks of inspection have been established, inter alia
cod recovery programme North Sea, Baltic, Bluefin Tuna and
Greenland Halibut.

68.
Progress has been made since the Court’s visit to the
Member States concerned. two of the four Member States men-
tioned (United Kingdom and France) have already implemented
such a system.

Only inspections fulfilling the minimum quality stan-
73.
dards should be taken into account when assessing the volume
and scope of inspection activities.

77.

See the reply to point 63.

78.
An increasing number of Member States now provide for
their inspectors to have real-time access to such data at their work
place. However, the current situation still remains unsatisfactory
and the issue of access to VMS data therefore remains a priority
for the Commission.

An increasing number of Member States have started
79-81.
using risk analysis techniques in order to deploy limited resources
in the most effective manner.

Cross-checking by Member States of catch data with data
82.
collected for other purposes (fiscal, customs and/or other) is
indeed important and the Commission is certainly favourable to
steps in that direction. Yet, this will have to be done carefully with
due regard to the fact that the data in question have been col-
lected for completely different purposes (problem of the compa-
rability of data and data protection requirements).

83.
The variety of inspection services can indeed create risks
and the Commission has already underlined this problem on sev-
eral occasions (3). However, under the EC Treaty, Member States
remain free to define the structure of their administration.

(1) Meeting with Member States on 7 March 2007.

(2) COM(2007) 448 final.
(3) COM(2004) 849; SEC(2004) 1718; COM(2001) 526.

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Early in 2007, the Commission introduced a
84. and 85.
standard template to be used in reporting statistics of inspection
activity. Moreover, indicators could be applied: for assessing the
activity, the number of inspectors could be used; the assessment
of results could for example be based on the number of gaps in
VMS transmissions, the number of reported delays in the data col-
lection system, the coherence between the logbooks, landing dec-
larations and VMS, etc.

86. and 87.
The Commission considers the establishment of
the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) will improve
the situation.

The CFCA is mandated to organise operational cooperation
between Member States by the adoption of Joint Deployment
Plans giving effect to specific control and inspection plans. It has
to assess amongst other things whether sufficient national means
of inspection and surveillance are available. Moreover the CFCA
has to ensure coordination so as to ensure that these means are
used in a rational manner. Finally, it will assist Member States in
order to harmonise inspection methodologies and procedures. In
this way control and inspection activities should be improved
both quantitatively and qualitatively. An enhanced mandate could
further improve the situation.

88.
In the Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on reports from Member
States on behaviour which seriously infringed the rules of the
CFP (1) the Commission called on Member States to ensure a sys-
tem of sanctions that has a deterrent effect and to amend as
appropriate their legislation so that sanctions have a dissuasive
effect.

92.
Further integration and harmonisation could be of added
value for improving the implementation by Member States of an
effective sanction system. In that regard, the Commission is cur-
rently exploring the possibility to include in the foreseen new ini-
tiatives regarding illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU)
fishing harmonised sanctions to be applied for certain specific
‘IUU-offences’ In addition, the forthcoming review and revision of
the Control Regulation will be an opportunity to address this
issue.

93.
Further improvement of the homogeneity of information
provided by Members States in their reports on serious infringe-
ments pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 as well further
study of the relevant serious infringements is needed in order to
prepare a proposal concerning the catalogue of sanctions. As
pointed out in reply to point 92, the Commission intends to
address this issue in the near future.

from infringement proceedings, Regulation (EC)
Apart
No 2371/2002 empowers the Commission to take preventive
measures, to close the fishery when it deems a Member State has
exhausted its quota and to suspend Community financial
assistance.

96. and 97.
Infringement proceedings against Member States
are circumscribed by the provisions of Article 226 of the EC
Treaty. Modification of both their substantive objectives as well as
the procedural steps would require an amendment of the Treaty.

The handling by the Commission of infringement proceedings is
shaped by the case law of the ECJ. The Commission has the bur-
den of proof in infringement proceedings, which becomes par-
ticularly relevant in cases where the alleged non-compliance by a
Member State consists in a particular administrative practice. In
such a case, it is actually decisive to demonstrate that the short-
comings are both general and ongoing. This requires a continu-
ous effort on the side of the Commission to assemble the
appropriate means of proof.

The case C-304/02 underscored the difficulties of assem-
99.
bling proper means of proof in a situation where an administra-
tive practice of a Member State was at issue and the efforts made
have in fact contributed to the imposition of a significantly higher
fine than those imposed for any of the other five cases ever
decided upon by the ECJ on the basis of Article 228 of the EC
Treaty.

Preventive measures pursuant to the Article 26 of Regu-
101.
lation (EC) No 2371/2002 can only be provisional in nature and
limited in time (up to a maximum of six months, as indicated).
Consequently, such preventive measures can only come into play
in exceptional circumstances.

102.
Since 1996, the obligation to deduct amounts from
future fishing opportunities, has been implemented yearly by way
of applying Regulation (EC) No 847/96, which establishes the
conditions for the year-to-year management of total allowable
catches (TACs) and quotas. In normal circumstances over-fishing
will have been detected in the year of or the one following the
over fishing and thus there was never a need for additional action.

In 2007 however, for the first time, following a national investi-
gation, two Member States reported to the Commission signifi-
cant amounts of catches which had been landed in the period
from 2001 to 2004 without having been recorded. Given that
Regulation (EC) No 847/96 does not envisage deductions for such
‘historic overfishing’, the Commission had to adopt an ad hoc
Regulation. This ad hoc Regulation (2) provided a solution based
on an analysis of the biological and socio-economic consequences
of this Regulation.

95.
The infringement proceedings have not been without
effect. The Commission has opened infringement proceedings
against several Member States. After the judgement of the ECJ in
case C-304/02, Member States subject to such proceedings have
been induced to make serious efforts to improve the compliance
with the respective obligations.

Finally, in response to this situation, the Council, during its meet-
ing on 11 and 12 June 2007, has invited the Commission to
develop principles in the forthcoming review of the EU control
regulations to be applied in respect of any such over-fishing
which comes to light in any EU fishery.

(1) COM(2007) 448 final.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 147/2007 (OJ L 46, 16.2.2007, p. 10).

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The current CFP legislation only allows the Commission
103.
to suspend Community funding in case of non-compliance with
the rules concerning fishing capacity. The Commission believes
that further extension of such measures would be useful and will
explore the possibilities for proposals in that direction in the
review and revision of the Control Regulation.

104.
The control on the compliance by beneficiaries with
CFP rules is the responsibility of the Member States. In the pro-
cess of closing fisheries structural funds programmes (in accor-
dance with Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999), the role of the
Commission is to control the proper execution of programmes
by Member States and, where irregularities are detected, to recover
Community funds irregularly paid.

The general approach towards fishing capacity has
113.
changed. Under the current legal framwork, fishing capacity is
managed by the entry/exit regime which freezes the capacity of
Member States’ fleets at the level of 1 January 2003 (or date of
accession for Member States that joined the Union thereafter).
The long term plans and effort limitations are also an incentive to
adjust fleet capacity. Capacity reductions are also favoured
through aid for scrapping of fishing vessels under the European
Fisheries Fund (EFF), which is reinforced in case of recovery plans.

114.
Member States remain free to keep their fleet capacity
at any level below the level at 1 January 2003 (or, for Member
States that joined the Union after that date, or their respective
dates of accession), but the entry/exit regime has the effect that
fishing capacity can only diminish,
(fleet capacity has been
reduced by 6,27 % in tonnage and 7,28 % in engine power dur-
ing the period 2003-2005 (1)).

105.
There have been real improvements in several Member
States, in particular in the control of the pelagic fisheries and port
state control of third country landings.

115.
According to management plans which establish the
framework for effort reduction, it is the responsibility of the
Member States to decide whether such reduction will be accom-
plished through:

106.
Article 27(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 requires
the Commission to make inspection mission reports available to
the Member State concerned and to provide the Member State
with the possibility to comment on the mission findings.

(a) a reduction of fishing time, without reducing capacity;

(b) a reduction of capacity, without reducing the fishing time; or

(c) a combination of the two.

In addition, it is envisaged to include, in the transmission of mis-
sion reports, a request to the Member State to inform the Com-
mission of the steps it will take to address the shortcomings.

As regards the increased use of technology, this issue is indepen-
dent of the problems linked with effort reductions. Optimising
the catching efficiency of vessels, in the Commission’s view, is a
behaviour that occurs always, whatever the effort limitations are.

European fleets, fishing capacity are not in balance with
107.
the available resources, although substantial differences exist
between Member States in this respect. The Commission will rein-
force its efforts to improve the assessment of overcapacity by
Member States and urge them to bring their capacity in line with
fishing opportunities.

116.
The Commission proposed rather simple and control-
lable effort regimes, but during discussions in Council the system
was made considerably more complicated, due to a high number
of derogations. These were introduced on request by Member
States and indeed have reduced considerably the controllability of
the whole system.

111.
Progress has been made on assessing the impact of the
level of catches with an increasing amount of data and advice on
ecological and socio-economic consequences of decisions on
TAC levels available. The Commission’s efforts in the data collec-
tion and the increasingly important contribution of the Scientific,
Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) are
contributing to improvements in the situation. In particular, the
new Data Collection Regulation will contribute to improve the
situation regarding shortcomings in the amount and quality of
information due to lack of data from Member States.

117.
The Commission recently adopted a Communication
launching a debate on improving fishing capacity and effort indi-
cators for the CFP (2).

The Commission confirms that not all Member States
118.
assess their matching of capacity and available resources and has
repeatedly urged those concerned to comply with this obligation.

(1) Annual report 2005, COM(2006) 872.
(2) COM(2007) 39 final.

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The Commission is aware of the risks con-
119. and 120.
cerning the reliability of the current measurement of engine
power and is taking action to closely monitor this and to try to
improve the situation.

The Commission will continue to put pressure on Mem-
127.
ber States to help improve the situation and intends to use the
forthcoming review and revision of the Control Regulation as an
occasion to, where appropriate, address the issue of reliability of
catch data in Community context.

The provision mentioned was not included in the original Com-
mission proposal.

128.

Finally, in order to avoid increases in fishing capacity these mea-
sures have been strictly limited and designed to achieve further
reduction in capacity both through the requirement of a reduc-
tion of 20 % in case of engine replacement for larger vessels, as
well as through the financing of scrapping of fishing vessels. At
the same time this percentage will be permanently deducted from
the authorised fleet capacity ceiling.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

121.
The Commission shares the conclusions of the Court
on the shortcomings of the provisions concerning control, inspec-
tion and enforcement, which endanger the effectiveness of the
Common Fisheries Policy.

In the light of that situation, the Commission already started a
reflection in view of an ambitious reform of the European policy
for fisheries control.

The recommendations made by the Court with regard to improv-
ing the situation, can serve as an effective contribution to the suc-
cess of this reform.

(a) The Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture is due to vote
on the proposed implementing rules for the electronic
recording before the end of 2007.

(b) A redefined format for transmission of reports by Member
States to facilitate their analysis and control has been success-
fully tested and will be presented to Member States in the
autumn of 2007.

(c) This is an issue being addressed in the review and revision of

the Control Regulation.

(d) From 2005 the Commission has made efforts to improve the
application of the conversion factors, starting with the com-
pilation of conversion factors in use by Member States in
2005 and the publication of a comprehensive list on the
website, by producing two non-papers following meetings
with Member States and with Norway. A further refinement
of the last paper is currently under preparation and will be
discussed with Member States before the end of 2007, after
which the Commission intends to prepare a legislative pro-
posal on the matter.

124.
The current approach to capacity management has
been the result of a difficult compromise made during the CFP
reform in 2002, and it is based on:

(e) To ensure that there is coherence in the data received by both
parties, the Commission is working closely with Eurostat on
the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding.

(a) an entry-exit regime preventing capacity increase;

(b) cessation of public aid to ship building and modernisation
(except for safety reasons and where the capacity to catch
fish does not increase);

(c) multiannual management regimes that include effort man-
agement and that provide a mid-to-long term perspective to
the fishing industry;

(d)

financial incentives for permanent withdrawal of capacity;
and

(e) a formal obligation for Member States to put measures in

place to adapt the capacity of their fleets.

The issue of effectiveness and coherence of national
129.
control systems is being addressed in the review and revision of
the Control Regulation.

130.

(a) The recommendations of the Court, mentioned in reply to
point 129 are being taken into account in the review and
revision of the Control Regulation.

(b) As mentioned in reply to point 106, the Commission will
request Member States to present a plan of action to address
shortcomings found by the Commission inspectors during
their missions in the Member States.

Therefore, effort management, although important, is not the
only element of the said regime, and it will be the combined effect
of all the elements that will determine the effectiveness of this
new policy to address overcapacity. If properly and fully imple-
mented, capacity adjustment will be an inevitable result of the
new policy.

131.
The Commission considers that further integration and
harmonisation is needed in order to improve the implementation
by Member States of an effective sanction system and will explore
the possibilities thereto in the review and revision of the Control
Regulation.

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The Commission has proposed in October 2007 a first
132.
harmonisation of sanctions in the context of the fight against IUU
fishing. In parallel, the possibilities for revising the list of serious
infringements as well as establishing a catalogue of all sanctions
will be explored in the context of the revision of the Control
Regulation.

133.
The possibilty to introduce cross-compliance measures
is an issue of priority, and is being addressed in the review and
revision of the Control Regulation.

134.
The Commission supports efforts to reduce capacity
and can propose the respective frameworks in order to ensure a
level playing field, but cannot impose specific capacity reduction
targets on Member States. The Commission plans to further
reflect on how to best measure the balance between capacity and
resources so Member States can address their obligations to adjust
their
fishing capacity under Article 11(1) of Regulation
2371/2002 on a level playing field. It will also think about how
to best incite and encourage capacity reductions; however, it is
not the intention of the Commission to propose a system at Euro-
pean level that would contain specific capacity targets per fleet
segment as had been done in the multiannual guidance pro-
grammes (MAGPs) until 2002, since this sort of micro-
management system did not provide the desired effects and was

clearly rejected by a majority of Member States during the 2002
CFP reform.

135.
The Commission has earmarked resources to enhance
its impact assessment capability both internally (by creating an
Economic Unit within the Directorate-General for Fisheries and
Maritime Affairs) and externally (e.g. enhanced role of STECF in
delivering socio-economic advice, more frequent use of impact
assessment studies by external consultants). In addition, the Com-
mission has invested heavily to improve the EU socio-economic
data collection system via the Data Collection Regulation.

136.
The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) is designed to pro-
vide Member States with a number of possibilities to use the fund
for the necessary restructuring of their fishing sector and accom-
panying measures to mitigate their social impact. In this respect,
the Commission is currently examining the national strategic
plans that Member States have to draw up under Article 15 of
Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 and subsequently the operational
programmes that Member States are required to present to the
Commission for approval.

Similarly Axis 4 of the EFF enables Member States to implement
local strategies to diversify activities and develop the economic
base of areas where fisheries are significant.