Communication from the Commission - Application of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty - Verification of the operation and efficiency of facilities for continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil - Report, 1990-2007
Date: 2007-12-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EAEC Treaty, EU Member State, health control, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, public health, radiation protection, radioactivity

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 20.12.2007 
COM(2007) 847 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

Application of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty 

Verification of the operation and efficiency of facilities for 
continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil 

Report, 1990-2007 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

Health and safety provisions in the EURATOM Treaty 

Chapter 3, Health and Safety, of Title II of the Euratom Treaty is concerned on the 
one hand with the establishment of Basic Safety Standards for the protection of the 
health  of  workers  and  members  of  the  public  (Articles  30  –  33),  on  the  other  hand 
specifically  with  levels  of  radioactivity  in  the  air,  water  and  soil  as  laid  down  in 
Articles  35  –  38  (to  some  extent  also  Article 34,  on  “particularly  dangerous 
experiments”,  i.e.  weapons  testing).  There  is  an  obvious  link  between  the  Basic 
Safety  Standards  and  levels  of  radioactivity,  the  main  purpose  of  controlling  them 
being the protection of the health of members of the public. 

The  Basic  Safety  Standards  have  been  updated  since  1959  to  take  into  account  the 
development of scientific knowledge and operational experience. The latest revision 
was in 19961. With regard to levels of radioactivity, in addition to the requirements 
of the standards, the main tasks of the Commission over five decades have concerned 
the  application  of  Article 36  (collection  and  publication  of  data  on  levels  of 
radioactivity to which the public is exposed as transmitted by Member States on the 
basis  of  measurement  facilities  established  by  them  according  to  Article 35,  first 
paragraph  and  Article 37  (Commission  Opinions  given  on  whether  plans  for  the 
disposal of radioactive waste submitted by Member States are liable to affect other 
Member States). 

The  Article 37  procedure  was  very  important  at  the  time  of  rapid  development  of 
nuclear energy, with “general data” submissions for each new nuclear power reactor, 
reprocessing  plant,  or  other  nuclear  installation.  The  rules  and  information  content 
for  general  data  submissions  have  been  clarified  in  a  series  of  Commission 
Recommendations,  the  latest  adopted  in  19992.  Reports  on  the  implementation  of 
Article 37 are transmitted to the Council and the European Parliament3. 

The  implementation  of  Article 36  has  focused  on  the  publication  of  those  data  on 
levels of radioactivity which are relevant to the assessment of the radiation exposure 
of the population as a whole, so as to allow comparison of levels of radioactivity in 
different Member States. The demand for data quality and the method for reporting 
were laid down for the first time in a Commission Recommendation in 20004. Since 
2007, Member States can import and manage their own dataset in the Commission's 
database.  This  database,  as  well  as  the resulting  annual  Monitoring  Reports  and  an 
electronic  platform  allowing  the  exchange  of  data  from  automatic  radiation 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the health 
protection  of  the  general  public  and  workers  against  the  dangers  of  ionizing  radiation  –  OJ  L159  of 
29/06/96, p. 1 
Commission  Recommendation  99/829/EURATOM  of  6  December  1999  on  the  application  of 
Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty – OJ L324 of 16/12/99, p. 23 
Report  on  the  application  of  Article  37  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  July  1994  to  December  2003, 
COM (2005)85 final, 14.03.2005 
Commission Recommendation 2000/473/EURATOM of 8 June 2000 on the application of Article 36 of 
the Euratom Treaty concerning the monitoring of the levels of radioactivity in the environment for the 
purpose of assessing the exposure of the population as a whole – OJ L191 of 27/07/2000, p. 37 

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monitoring  systems  set  up  in  the  Member  States,  is  managed  in  a  successful  co-
operation  between  DG  TREN  and  JRC-IES  in  accordance  with  Article  39  of  the 
Euratom Treaty. 

Article 35,  second  paragraph,  confers  a  right  of  access  to  the  Commission  for  the 
purpose  of  verification  of  the  facilities  for  monitoring  the  levels  of  radioactivity. 
Until  1989,  when  the  Commission  approved  an  initiative  to  resume  such 
verifications,  they  had  been  performed  sporadically.  Following  the  ruling  of  the 
Court  of  Justice  of  December  2002,  stating  that  it  is  not  appropriate  to  draw  an 
artificial distinction between the protection of the health of the general public and the 
safety  of  sources  of  ionizing  radiation,  and  the  decision  of  the  Commission  to 
consider  nuclear  safety  as  a  major  priority,  since  2003  it  became  obvious  that 
Article 35  verifications  would  become  a  priority  area  from  2004  onwards.  This 
Communication  is  the  first  report  on  the  application  of  Article 35  and  covers  the 
period  1990-2007.  Since  2004  these  verifications  have  become  systematic  and 
priority has been given to the most sensitive installations. 

Article 38  allows  the  Commission  to  make  specific  recommendations  to  Member 
States with regard to levels of radioactivity and, in case of urgency, issue directives 
and forthwith bring the matter before the Court of Justice in case of non-compliance. 
This Article confers in principle extensive powers on the Commission, but has never 
been applied except as the legal basis for a Commission Recommendation on radon 
in drinking water5 and a Commission Recommendation on the continued radioactive 
caesium  contamination  of  certain  wild  food  products  as  a  consequence  of  the 
Chernobyl accident6. 

The fact that Article 38 had never been applied reflects the effective compliance with 
the basic standards in the Member States concerned. Nevertheless, Article 38 offers 
an important lever to the Commission to give appropriate weight to the findings and 
observations  made  as  a  result  of  verifications  carried  out  under  Article 35,  second 
paragraph. 

1.2. 

Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty 

Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty stipulates: 

“Each Member State shall establish the facilities necessary to carry out continuous 
monitoring  of  the  level  of  radioactivity  in  the  air,  water  and  soil  and  to  ensure 
compliance with the basic standards. 

The Commission shall have the right of access to such facilities; it may verify their 
operation and efficiency.” 

5 

6 

Commission  Recommendation  2001/928/EURATOM  of  20 December  2001  on  the  protection  of  the 
public against exposure to radon in drinking water supplies – OJ L344 of 28/12/2001, p. 85 
Commission Recommendation 2003/274/Euratom of 14 April 2003 on the protection and information 
of the public with regard to exposure resulting from the continued radioactive caesium contamination of 
certain wild food products as a consequence of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station – OJ 
L99 17/04/2003, p. 55 

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Commission activities in application of Article 35 were sporadic up to the end of the 
1980s. Following a review of its activities in the whole area of radiation protection, 
the Commission announced to the Council in 1986 – after the Chernobyl accident - 
its intention to exercise more systematically its right of verification under Article 35. 
The European Parliament adopted several resolutions with the same aim. 

In December 1989 the Commission decided that the number of verifications should 
be increased. 

2. 

VERIFICATION PROGRAMME 

2.1. 

Verifications 1990 – 2003 

Between  1990  and  2003  a  total  of  23  verifications  were  carried  out.  With  few 
exceptions, the verification programme was established so as to provide an overview 
of the situation for a representative set of nuclear fuel cycle installations and for the 
facilities monitoring the levels of radioactivity in all Member States.  

2.2. 

Verifications 2004-2007 

From 2004 till now 25 verifications have been conducted. Since 2004/2005 priority 
has been given to the most sensitive installations and to the new Member States. By 
the  end  of  2006,  verifications  had  been  conducted  in  all  Member  States.  Romania 
and Bulgaria are in the programme for 2007. 

The Member States and respective nuclear sites visited in the framework of Article 
35 are listed in the Annex, Table 1. 

2.3.  Main procedures for the verifications 

Verifications were carried out along the lines of the protocols that had been agreed 
upon  individually  with  all  15  Member  States  between  1990  and  1993.  Since  the 
publication of a Commission Communication7 on 4 July 2006, this has become the 
basis  for  all  verifications.  The  protocols  and  the  Communication  foresee  the 
verification  of  both  monitoring  facilities  in  sensu  stricto  and  the  monitoring  of 
discharges necessary for the assessment of their impact on the public exposed. The 
verifications may concern the area around a specific site and/or the national territory 
of the Member State as a whole or in part. 

While  under  the  terms  of  Article  35  the  Commission  is  granted  access  to  the 
facilities, for a factual verification of their operation and efficiency, the verifications 
actually start with an audit of the monitoring and inspection activities by the relevant 
national authorities and of the legal framework. The factual on-site verifications are 
representative of the overall arrangements and not necessarily exhaustive. 

Verification Technical report 

7 

Communication from the Commission: Verifications of the levels of radioactivity monitoring facilities 
under  the  terms  of  Article  35  of  the  EURATOM  Treaty  –  Practical  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of 
verification visits in Member States; OJ C155 of 04/07/2006, p. 2 

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– 

The  technical  report  gives  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  regulatory 
requirements, of the arrangements for monitoring levels of radioactivity and for 
the  assessment  of  the  impact  of  discharges.  The  production  of  this  overview 
requires  the  synthesis  of  numerous  documents  towards  a  clear  picture  of  the 
Member  State’s  measures  for  implementing  Article 35,  first  paragraph.  The 
report also gives a detailed account of the verification activities carried out on-
site and its surroundings, and of the observations to which these gave rise. 

Verification Main Findings report 

– 

– 

The  main  findings  of  the  verification  are  based  on  the  observations  and 
conclusions listed in the technical report, and pointing to areas where there is 
room for improvement. 

In  all  cases  the  verification  missions  were  concluded  by  the  official 
transmission of the main findings and the technical report. 

For  all  verifications  carried  out  since  1999  both  the  technical  report  and  the  main 
findings, as well as any official comments supplied by the Member State visited, are 
put on the EUROPA web-site: 

ec.europa.eu / energy / nuclear / radioprotection / verification_en.htm 

3. 

ADDED VALUE OF VERIFICATIONS 

The  experience  gained  so  far  has  proven  that  the  verifications  yield  a  significant 
added value, both for the Commission and for Member States. For the Commission, 
they allowed in a number of cases sensitive issues to be assessed independently. The 
verifications  also  permitted  a  broad  overview  of  the  different  national  approaches 
and  the  way  these  are  implemented  and  encouraged  a  common  approach  for 
improved monitoring. 

For Member States, the Commission verifications allowed an independent validation 
of  their  approach  and  of  their  data,  so  as  to  provide  reassurance  both  to  their  own 
population  and  to  neighbouring  Member  States.  For  the  competent  authorities 
involved the visits were an opportunity to discuss their responsibilities in a broader 
perspective. For the utilities and laboratories visited, it was very often an opportunity 
to  have  their  efforts  spent  in  improving  their  performance  acknowledged.  Overall, 
the  Commission  verifications  certainly  enhanced  the  status  of  radioactivity 
monitoring programmes. 

The Commission verifications became an opportunity for some new Member States 
to set up national programmes and to start the implementation of the corresponding 
systems for monitoring the levels of radioactivity on their territories. 

The Commission verifications have been conducted with due respect to subsidiarity. 
No situations have occurred where they duplicated the task of national inspectorates. 
In quite a few cases the findings pointed to a need for a better separation of functions 
within the Member State and for the transparency of procedures. The observations of 
the  verification  team  permitted  the  authorities  to  strengthen  their  own  verification 
procedures. 

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Furthermore,  the  verifications  are  an  important  means  to  ensure  the  adequate 
implementation of the Commission Recommendation on the application of Article 36 
of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  to  discuss  on  a  bilateral  basis  whether  the  networks 
established to monitor the levels of radioactivity are adequate (covering the national 
territory and providing representative data on actual levels of radioactivity). 

3.1. 

Findings and Follow-up of past verification missions 

In a number of cases observations related to a lack of overall quality assurance of the 
facilities and laboratories and to a need for strengthening the supervisory function of 
the  competent  authority  had  to  be  issued.  It  was  often  found  that  improvements 
needed  to  be  made  in  record-keeping  so  as  to  facilitate  both  internal  quality  audits 
and verification by national or Community officials. Sampling programmes were not 
always  regularly  updated  or  the  practical  implementation  of  those  programmes  did 
not fully abide by the regulatory requirements. 

Specific technical recommendations have been made on many occasions. In general, 
subsequent feedback from the national authorities confirmed  that  shortcomings had 
been rectified. Non-technical  recommendations,  e.g.  management  recommendations 
or recommendations to strengthen regulatory supervision, are less tangible and hence 
more difficult to follow up. 

Verification  visits  were  conducted  specifically  to  satisfy  the  Commission  that  the 
recommendations  that  were  made  during  a  previous  mission  had  been  given  due 
attention: 

–  A former reprocessing site visited in 1993 and 1999 was the subject of a follow-

up visit in September 2004. 

In  1999  a  series  of  issues  had  focussed  attention  on  this  nuclear  complex, 
culminating  in  a  safety  audit  carried  out  by  the  national  safety  authorities.  The 
verification activities addressed in detail those aspects of the audit report which had 
implications  for  the  monitoring  of  radioactive  effluents  or  with  levels  of 
radioactivity. 

–  A first visit in 2000 to a research reactor was also followed up in 2005. 

On  both  occasions 
the  follow-up  verification  activities 
recommendations made had been implemented to satisfaction. 

indicated 

that 

the 

Only  one  verification  mission  (2002)  led  to  broadly  unsatisfactory  verification 
findings  bearing  on  fundamental  legal  shortcomings  that  had  to  be  addressed.  A 
Research  Reactor  was  operated  without  regulatory  authorisation  or  supervision,  in 
contravention  of  the  provisions  of  the  Basic  Safety  Standards  Directive.  Hence  an 
infringement procedure was initiated. 

In  November  2006  a  follow-up  verification  mission  was  conducted.  Although 
notable  improvements  had  been  achieved,  a  number  of  issues  had  still  not  been 
satisfactorily  resolved  of  the  time  of  the  verification;  the  licensing  procedure 
including  discharge  authorisations  for  both  airborne  and  liquid  effluent  was 
completed however in August 2007. 

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4. 

PERSPECTIVES 

4.1. 

Verification programme 

A structured and credible verification scheme would: 

–  cover all major nuclear installations with an acceptable frequency; 

–  yield  a  representative  overview  of  the  situation  with  regard  to  other  types  of 

installations; 

–  allow  the  situation  to  be  monitored  with  regard  to  non-nuclear  industries 
discharging natural radioactivity and with regard to hospitals and research centres; 

–  allow a representative view to be obtained of the arrangements for radioactivity in 

regions remote from installations discharging radioactivity; 

–  audit the monitoring and inspection activities of the Member States on a regular 

basis. 

Currently  some  five  to  seven  verifications  are  conducted  each  year  so  that  around 
one  verification  or  audit  is  conducted  in  each  Member  State  every  five  years.  This 
allows  a  credible  and  representative  verification  programme  to  be  established 
including  the  most  representative  installations.  The  frequency  by  which  important 
installations can be visited should be increased. With current resources a maximum 
of  around  ten  verifications  could  be  planned  for,  in  any  single  year.  It  is  of  course 
essential to maintain at least some flexibility so that arrangements can still be made 
to  respond  to  ad-hoc  requests  or  make  use  of  the  Commission's  right  of  access  in 
special circumstances. 

4.2. 

Differences with safeguards activity 

The Commission also has a right of inspection of nuclear installations under Title II, 
Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty. These inspections are different from Article 35 
verifications. They concern the safeguards of nuclear materials (Euratom Safeguards) 
and  the  specific  requirements  are  spelled  out  in  Commission  Regulation  (Euratom) 
302/2005 of 8 February 2005. 

Beyond the fact that the scope of the two types of verifications is different, a possible 
synergy  is  hindered  by  the  fact  that  nuclear  operators  have  direct  responsibilities 
towards the Commission and safeguards inspectors have direct access to the nuclear 
material and to the installations. Under Article 35, second paragraph, of the Euratom 
Treaty  the  verifications  pertain  to  how  Member  State  authorities  discharge  their 
responsibilities under the first paragraph of the same Article. The Commission has no 
direct access to the installations or monitoring facilities. 

4.3. 

Complementary means of strengthening implementation 

The  adoption  of  the  Commission  Recommendation  on  reporting  on  levels  of 
radioactivity  under  Article 36  (2000/473/EURATOM)  was  a  starting  point  for  the 

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development  of  further  guidance.  A  recommendation  on  the  monitoring  and 
reporting of discharges of nuclear installations was adopted on 18 December 20038. 
Further  developments  of  this  type  will  facilitate  the  development  of  a  clear 
methodology  for  the  conduct  of  verifications  and  transparent  criteria  to  judge 
compliance with the general requirement laid down in Article 35, first paragraph. 

The  Group  of  Experts  established  under  Article 31  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  has 
adopted guidance on the implementation of Article 45 of the Basic Safety Standards, 
in view of the realistic assessment of population exposure. This will be the basis for 
judging  the  adequacy  of  monitoring  programmes  in  the  vicinity  of  nuclear 
installations in view of the assessment of doses to reference groups of the population. 
Such guidance will be incorporated in a Commission proposal for a new Basic Safety 
Standards Directive. 

All  these  measures  will  considerably  reinforce  the  efficiency  and  credibility  of  the 
verifications under Article 35. 

5. 

CONCLUSION 

The  present  Communication  demonstrates  the  significant  achievements  of  the 
verification activities undertaken, especially during recent years. 

The Commission fully discharged its responsibilities under Article 35 of the Euratom 
Treaty,  and  thus  ensured,  in  conjunction  with  the  legislative  requirements  and  the 
implementation of Articles 36-37 of the Euratom Treaty, that levels of radioactivity 
in the air, water and soil were adequately monitored and controlled. 

8 

Commission  Recommendation  of  18  December  2003  on  standardised  information  on  radioactive 
airborne  and  liquid  discharges  from  nuclear  power  reactors  and  reprocessing  plants  in  normal 
operation - OJ L2 of 06/01/2004, p. 36 

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ANNEX 

VERIFICATIONS IN TERMS OF 
ARTICLE 35 EURATOM TREATY 

Verifications 1990 – 2007 

The list of verifications carried out to date is given in Table 1. Figure 1 provides a histogram 
of the number of verifications carried out each year. 

It should be noted that in view of the broader scope of the verifications the missions refer to a 
region  in  which  levels  of  radioactivity  are  monitored  which  then  include  the  major 
installations discharging into this region.  

The verifications carried out so far were planned essentially with the objective of obtaining a 
representative  view  of  the  monitoring  approach  adopted  in  Member  States.  A  few 
verifications  were  carried  out  in  response  to  requests  from  other  Member  States  or  were 
triggered by concerns expressed about certain installations. 

The distribution among Member States is the following: 6 in France (including Polynesia), 6 
in  the  UK,  3  in  Italy,  2  in  Finland,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  Spain  and 
Portugal, 1 in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden, as well as 1 in each of 
the new Member States with the exception of Bulgaria (planned for autumn 2007). 

The  installations  included  in  the  verification  activities  are  3 reprocessing  plants  (and  2 
adjacent  waste  disposal  sites),  20  nuclear  power  plants  (of  which  3  were  no  longer  in 
operation), 5 research institutes, 2 NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) related 
installations,  1  uranium  mine  and  7  hospitals  in  4  Member  States.  Several  Member  States 
were  visited  which  have  no  nuclear  installations  on  their  territory,  but  which  have  an 
extensive monitoring programme, and in most Member States parts of the national monitoring 
systems of the levels of radioactivity on their territory were verified in the context of a site-
specific visit. 

In the case of one nuclear power plant, close to the border of another country, the verifications 
were extended to the relevant monitoring provisions on such territory. 

The focus of the verification programme on nuclear installations does not imply that these are 
more  important  in  terms  of  the  impact  of  radioactive  discharges.  The  verifications  were 
carried out in industries processing naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) such as 
phosphate industries or coal mines. The departments of nuclear medicine of several hospitals 
were  verified  in  4  Member  States.  Special  attention  was  brought  to  the  discharge  of 
radioactive materials, in particular the monitoring facilities and the monitoring approach taken 
by these hospitals. 

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Table 1: Overview of verification missions 1990 - June 2007 

INSTALLATION 

DATE 

United Kingdom 

Dounreay (site) 

COUNTRY 

Germany 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

United Kingdom 

France 

Denmark 

Spain 

Italy 

France 

Belgium 

France 

NPP Philipsburg 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity 

NPP Borssele 
Bilthoven (RIVM institute) 

NFRP Sellafield 
Drigg repository 

NPP Belleville-sur-Loire 9 

RR Risø + laboratories 

NPP Vandellos-2 

NPP Caorso 

French Polynesia (Mururoa) 

NPP Tihange 

NFRP La Hague 
Centre de stockage de la Manche 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity 

13. 

Ireland 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

Sweden 

Finland 

NPP Barsebäck 

NPP Olkiluoto 

United Kingdom 

Dounreay (site) 

Germany 

NPP Krümmel 

France / Belgium 

NPP Chooz 

Greece 

RR Democritos (Athens); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

United Kingdom 

NPP Dungeness A+B 

Austria 

RR Seibersdorf 
Vienna; AKH (hospital) 

22. 

Portugal 

RR Sacavém (Lisbon); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

France 

NPP Belleville-sur-Loire 

United Kingdom 

NFRP Sellafield 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

9 

10 – 12.10.1990

12.3.1991

10 – 14.5.1993

27 – 29.9.1993
30.9 – 1.10.1993

6 – 10.12.1993

14 – 17.2.1994

22 – 24.8.1994

7 – 10.11.1994

22 – 24.3.1995

1.9 – 6.10.1995

10 – 14.6.1996

22 – 26.7.1996

10 – 13.9.1996

26 – 30.5.1997

31.8 – 4.9.1998

15 – 18.3.1999

13 – 17.9.1999

22 – 26.11.1999

23 – 25.5.2000

6 – 11.11.2000

25 – 29.6.2001

14 – 17.5.2002

17 – 21.9.2003

8 – 12.3.2004

Spain 

NPP Trillo; National monitoring 

27.6. – 2.7.2004

Verification not concluded by an approved technical report 

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26. 

United Kingdom 

27. 

Hungary 

28. 

Lithuania 

29. 

Czech Republic 

30. 

Slovakia 

31. 

Greece 

32. 

Estonia 

33. 

France 

34. 

Latvia 

35.  Malta 

36. 

Cyprus 

37. 

Italy 

38. 

Italy 

39. 

Slovenia 

40. 

Poland 

system of the levels of radioactivity 

Dounreay (site); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

NPP Paks; National monitoring 
system of the levels of radioactivity 

NPP Ignalina; National monitoring 
system of the levels of radioactivity 

NPP Temelín; National monitoring 
system of the levels of radioactivity 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity  

RR Democritos (Athens); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

Sillamäe, Paldiski; National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity  

NFRP La Hague; National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

RR Salaspils; Baldone radioactive 
Waste; National monitoring system 
of the levels of radioactivity  

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity; plant 
fertilisers (phosphor-gypsum) – 
NORM industry  

NPP Caorso (decomm.); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity  

NPP Latina (decomm.); National 
monitoring system of the levels of 
radioactivity 

NPP Krško; National monitoring 
system of the levels of radioactivity 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity; Piast coal 
mine (NORM industry). 

28 – 30.9. 2004

8 – 12.11.2004

21 – 25.2.2005

14 – 18.3.200510

10 – 15.4.2005

12 – 16.9.2005

19 – 23.9.2005

10 – 14.10.2005

21 – 24.3.2006

25 – 27.4.2006

8 – 12.5.2006

15 – 19.5.2006

15 – 19.5.2006

12 – 16.6.2006

13 – 17. 11.2006

41. 

Portugal 

RR Sacavém – legal framework; 

22 – 24.11.2006

10 

A  first  visit  conducted  on  9.6.2004  with  a  limited  scope  was  incorporated  in  the  comprehensive 
verification report 

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42. 

Luxembourg 

43. 

Finland 

44. 

Ireland 

45. 

Romania 

46. 

Germany 

47. 

Spain 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity. Uranium 
mine 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity; Several 
hospitals (nuclear departments) 

National monitoring system of the 
levels of radioactivity  

National monitoring system of 
levels of radioactivity ; hospital 
(nuclear department) 

NPP Cernavoda; National 
monitoring system of levels of 
radioactivity  

Former uranium mining area in 
Saxony 

NPP Cofrentes; National 
monitoring system of levels of 
radioactivity 

5 – 8.3.2007

20 – 23.3.2007

1 – 4.5.2007

4 – 8.6.2007

27 – 31.08.2007

22 – 26.10.2007

48. 

Bulgaria 

NPP Kozloduj; National monitoring 
system of levels of radioactivity 

26 – 30.11.2007

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
 
Figure 1: Overview of verification missions 1990- June 2007 

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

EN 

13 

   EN