Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on enhancing the security of explosives {SEC(2007) 1421} {SEC(2007) 1423}
Date: 2007-11-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Commission, cooperation policy, explosive, fight against crime, marketing, private sector, terrorism, traceability

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 6.11.2007 
COM(2007) 651 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

on enhancing the security of explosives 

{SEC(2007) 1421} 
{SEC(2007) 1423} 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

on enhancing the security of explosives 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The European Union is an area of increasing openness and an area in which the internal and 
external aspects of security are intimately linked. It is an area of increasing interdependence, 
allowing the free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources. As a result it is also 
an  area  which  terrorists  may  abuse  to  pursue  their  objectives  and  which  has  already  been 
abused for this purpose. The foiled attacks in London and Glasgow on 29 and 30 June as well 
as  the  terrorism  related  arrests  which  took  place  in  Germany,  Denmark  and  Austria  were  a 
reminder of the threat. In this context, concerted and collective European action, in a spirit of 
solidarity, is indispensable to combat terrorism. 

Explosive  devices  are  the  weapons  most  used  in  terrorist  attacks  and  have  been  responsible 
for  the  vast  majority  of  victims  of  terrorist  attacks  over  the  last  50  years.  Consequently, 
enhancing  the  security  of  explosives  and  making  the  production  of  explosive  devices  for 
terrorists more difficult has been and continues to be a priority for the European Union.  

On 25 March 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid attacks, the European Council, 
in  its  Declaration  on  Combating  Terrorism,  established  as  a  priority  the  need  "to  ensure 
terrorist  organisations  and  groups  are  starved  of  the  components  of  their  trade".  The 
European  Council  noted  in  particular  that  “there  is  a  need  to  ensure  greater  security  of 
firearms,  explosives,  bomb-making  equipment  and  the  technologies  that  contribute  to  the 
perpetration of terrorist outrages". 

to 

the  European  Council's  declaration, 

In  response 
the  Commission  adopted,  a 
Communication  on  18  July  2005  on  "Measures  to  ensure  greater  security  in  explosives, 
detonators,  bomb-making  equipment  and  firearms"1.  One  of  the  principal  measures 
announced in this Communication was the Commission's intention to draw up an EU action 
plan  for  the  enhancement  of  the  security  of  explosives  based  on  recommendations  from  a 
group of experts. 

A  multi-stakeholder  dialogue  involving  both  public  and  private  sectors  was  taken  forward 
through  the  Explosives  Security  Experts  Task  Force,  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
relevant stakeholders, including industry and public authorities. The work of the Task Force, 
which  has  concentrated  through  four  separate  working  groups  on  the  issues  of  precursors, 
supply chain, detection and public security, culminated in June 2007 with the submission of a 
report  identifying  50  recommendations  for  measures  designed  to  heighten  the  security  of 
explosives in the EU. 

1 

COM(2005) 329. 

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Working  on  the  basis  of  the  Report  of  the  Task  Force,  the  Commission  has  developed  a 
comprehensive “Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives”, which deals with all 
aspects of security and draws extensively  on public-private cooperation in a spirit of Public 
Private  Security  Dialogue.  Since  a  clear  demarcation  between  public  and  private  sector 
activities  is  needed  in  certain  areas,  the  Action  Plan  also  includes  new  instruments  for 
cooperation between specialised services in the Member States. 

2. 

OBJECTIVE 

The  strategic  objective  of  the  Action  Plan  on  enhancing  the  security  of  explosives  is  to 
combat  the  use  of  explosive  devices  by  terrorists  within  the  EU,  thereby  protecting  society 
from  the  threat  of  attacks  using  explosive  devices  while  taking  full  account  of  the  multiple 
areas of economic activity in which explosives and their precursors are used for the benefit of 
all. 

3. 

SCOPE 

The primary focus of the Action Plan is on security issues. Although it is not meant to address 
safety concerns, some of the activities put forward in the Action Plan could also have positive 
implications for safety.  

Since a comprehensive approach to the security of explosives is required when dealing with 
the threat of terrorism, the Action Plan addresses both explosives themselves and precursors 
to explosives. It also targets both legally and illicitly manufactured explosives.  

4. 

STRUCTURE 

The  fight  against  terrorism  requires  a  comprehensive  approach  and  full  involvement  of  the 
public and private sectors.  

Prevention,  detection  and  response  should  form  the  pillars  of  the  EU’s  approach  to  the 
security  of  explosives.  These  pillars  should  encompass  specific  measures  concerning 
explosive precursors, the supply chain (storage, transport, traceability) and detection. At the 
same  time,  a  horizontal  set  of  measures  concerning  public  security  should  complement  and 
consolidate all of the pillars. 

Adoption of any specific legislative measures which may result from the implementation of 
the Action Plan will be preceded by further detailed consideration and subject to the positive 
assessment of their costs and benefits. 

5. 

PRECURSORS 

In general terms, precursors to explosives include any chemical compounds or elements that 
can  be  converted  into  an  explosive  compound  through  a  chemical  reaction  or  a  series  of 
reactions.  A  number  of  precursors  have  been  identified  which  need  to  be  addressed  as  a 
matter of priority. These currently include: 

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acetone 

citric acid 

hydrogen peroxide 

potassium chlorate & 
perchlorate 

ammonium nitrate 
(fertiliser) 

ammonium nitrate 
(technical) 

hexamine 

nitric acid 

potassium nitrate 

hydrochloric acid 

nitromethane 

sodium chlorate 

This list of precursors should be amended as and when the need arises.  

sulphuric acid 

6. 

HORIZONTAL MEASURES 

The security of the EU and its citizens and residents is dependent on efficient cooperation and 
coordination  among  the  Member  States,  the  EU  Institutions  and  all  other  relevant 
stakeholders.  

Significant progress has already been achieved concerning the security of explosives both in 
the  Member  States  and  at  EU  level.  Nevertheless,  more  can  be  done  in  areas  such  as 
enhancing 
information,  disseminating  best  practices,  establishing 
coordination  mechanisms  and  taking  joint  action  on  particular  issues.  These  are  areas  in 
which  the  EU  can  provide  significant  support  to  the  Member  States  on  the  question  of 
security. 

the  exchange  of 

The two horizontal priorities in the field of explosives security are: 

•  improving the exchange of timely information and best practices; 

•  stepping up explosives related research. 

6.1. 

Improving the exchange of timely information and best practices 

The  sharing  of  information  and  best  practices  among  the  Member  States  must  be  a 
cornerstone of the EU's efforts to increase the security of explosives.  

First of all, an Early Warning System (EWS) for explosives should be established to provide 
the relevant authorities in the Member States with information on immediate threats, the theft 
of  explosives,  the  theft  of  detonators,  the  theft  of  certain  precursors,  suspicious  transactions 
and the discovery of new modi operandi.  

Secondly, a European Bomb Data System should be created and promoted as a common EU 
instrument to give the relevant government bodies at EU and Member State levels access to 
information on explosives and explosive incidents. 

The  system  should  be  operated  on  a  24/7  basis  with  access  given  to  the  following  services 
(depending on the relevant national responsibilities): Police, Customs, Border Guard, Security 

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Services, Army / National Defence forces. At the Member State level, 27 National Bomb Data 
Centres should operate as national contact points. 

Sharing  experience,  knowledge  and  best  practices  should  continue  among  all  the  relevant 
stakeholders engaged in the security of explosives. Consequently, a conference on the security 
of explosives covering all the relevant issues should be organised every two years. 

Equally,  a  dialogue  should  be  established  with  external  partners  concerning  the  security  of 
explosives.  Measures  such  as  the  sharing  of  best  practices  and  encouraging  the  raising  of 
security standards outside of the EU should be an important element of the EU's explosives 
security efforts. External cooperation should primarily focus on the EU's neighbours.  

6.2. 

Stepping up explosives related research 

Security  research  plays  a  vital  role  in  enhancing  the  EU’s  ability  to  respond  to  security 
threats. Consequently, investment in research should be considered a priority.  

A number of research priorities can already be identified:  

•  improvised explosive devices and their properties; 

•  detection  of  explosives  and  precursors,  including  through  the  use  of  additives. 
This should include research into enhancing detectability (prior to explosion) and 
additives for traceability purposes (after and prior to explosion); 

•  mobile explosives testing kits; 

•  the  detection  of  improvised  explosive  devices  at  airports.  Special  attention  is 
being  paid  to  work  on  detecting  liquid  explosives  with  a  view  to  developing 
detection  techniques  that  would  allow  for  the  gradual  introduction  of  new 
screening equipment for detecting dangerous liquids irrespective of the quantities 
of the liquids concerned; 

•  finding  technical  solutions  for  Member  State  authorities  to  jam  mobile  phone 
signals  in  threatened  areas.  Given  the  confirmed  possibility  of  having  mobile 
phones  used  as  firing  switches,  it  should  be  possible  to  temporarily  jam  mobile 
telephone  signals  in  a  given  area  in  order  to  prevent  remote  detonation  of 
explosives; 

•  inhibitors that can be added to explosives precursors. 

Explosives  security  research  should  not  stop  with  the  above-mentioned  points.  Regular 
revision  of  priorities  is  necessary.  Moreover,  exchange  of  information  between  Member 
States needs to be improved so that any wasteful duplication of effort is avoided.  

The sensitivity of research must always be carefully scrutinised with a view to assessing who 
should  be  given  access  to  the  results.  In  certain  areas,  confidentiality  will  be  of  the  utmost 
importance.  

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7. 

PREVENTION 

Preventive  measures  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  enhancing  explosives  security.  A  broad 
range of measures can be undertaken at both EU and national levels in the prevention field.  

In terms of precursors, improving control over certain chemicals, increasing staff awareness 
and identifying suspicious transactions are among the priorities for action. 

More  broadly  in  the  field  of  explosives,  security  within  the  entire  supply  chain  needs  to  be 
addressed. The manufacturing, storage, transport and traceability of explosives should all be 
dealt with as a matter of urgency in an effort to decrease the likelihood or reduce the effects of 
diversion,  misappropriation  and  theft  of  explosive  material  and  devices.  A  number  of 
measures  already  exist  in  this  area.  These  measures  need  to  be  consolidated  by  specific 
security-oriented action.  

Consequently, the key priorities in terms of prevention include: 

•  improving staff awareness concerning precursors; 

•  improving the regulation of explosives precursors available on the market; 

•  improving control over transactions involving precursors; 

•  improving  control  over  explosives  and  pyrotechnic  articles  available  on  the 

market; 

•  improving the security of explosives facilities; 

•  improving the security vetting of personnel; 

•  improving the security of the transport of explosives; 

•  reducing  the  supply  and  quality  of  information  on  how  to  illicitly  manufacture 

explosives. 

7.1. 

Improving staff awareness concerning precursors 

The practical experience of law enforcement agencies indicates that alert employees are one 
of the most effective defences against illicit activities and in particular in detecting suspicious 
transactions and theft.  

Keeping those involved in dealing with precursors informed about security issues should be a 
primary concern for business and public authorities. Raising staff awareness about threats all 
along  the  supply  chain  among  manufacturers,  formulators,  distributors  and  retailers  of 
precursors should be pursued by way of dedicated campaigns. 

7.2. 

Improving the regulation of explosives precursors available on the market 

The second prevention priority involves improving the regulation of precursors available on 
the market through modifications to, or restrictions on, the nature of the relevant chemicals. 
Measures  should  be  taken  to  make  the  use  of  certain  precursors  in  the  manufacturing  of 

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improvised  explosives  devices  more  difficult  and  to  prevent  their  use  at  least  by  less 
sophisticated terrorists and amateur bomb makers. 

A system should therefore be established to consider and prepare the regulation of explosives 
precursors available on the market. It should include the creation of a Standing Committee of 
the  risks  associated  with  various  precursors  and 
Experts 
tasked  with 
recommending  suitable  action 
the 
the  Commission,  while 
proportionality  and  costs  of  various  measures.  These  recommendations  could  include 
restrictions on concentrations of certain precursors, sale bans, identification of alternatives to 
substances of concern, and research priorities.  

into  account 

identifying 

taking 

to 

The Standing Committee’s task would include giving detailed consideration to the following 
issues and monitoring, where relevant, the implementation of specific measures: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

Development of suitable additives and promotion of the use of these additives 
to  precursors  in  order  to  prevent  their  use  in  explosives,  where  technically 
possible. 

Restrictions  on  concentrations  of  certain  precursors  in  terms  of  their  sale  to 
end-users. 

A  complete ban on  concentrated  strong acids on EU consumer markets (non-
professional  markets)  when  a  substitute  is  available:  sulphuric,  hydrochloric 
and nitric acids in particular. 

Introduction of a market surveillance scheme for ammonium nitrate fertilisers 
and restricting the sale of high nitrogen fertilisers to the general public. 

Limiting the availability of pure nitromethane to the general public. It should 
be available to industrial customers via a customer qualification scheme. 

Restrictions on access of the general public to unphlegmatised sodium chlorate 
(weed killer). 

The  feasibility  and  added  value  of  introducing  a  complete  ban  on  selling 
certain precursors to minors. 

Based on the work of the Standing Committee concerning restrictions on the sales of certain 
quantities and/or concentrations of precursors, an obligation may be introduced to record the 
identity of the buyer. Subject to the relevant data protection rules, such information would be 
made available to law enforcement authorities. 

Finally, a European minimum standard and industrial guidance by way of an appropriate code 
should be defined for the security of storage of explosives precursors.  

7.3. 

Improving control over transactions involving precursors 

The  third  priority  concerns  the  introduction  of  controls  over  transactions  that  could  reveal 
malicious  intent.  The  measures  listed  below  should  also  be  considered  by  the  Standing 
Committee on explosives precursors. 

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A simple alert mechanism should exist in each Member State allowing anyone in the supply 
chain  to  inform  the  relevant  national  authorities  about  suspicious  transactions  or  theft.  A 
system  for  reporting  suspicious  transactions  should  be  established,  comparable  to  existing 
systems  for  drug  precursors  or  suspicious  financial  transactions. A binding  system  could  be 
created  for  notification  to  the  relevant  national  authority  of  any  transactions  involving 
precursors which could be considered suspicious. A “code of conduct”, similar to the EC code 
for  drug  precursors,  should  be  developed  for  industry  and  retailers,  identifying  the  kind  of 
behaviour that would give rise to suspicion.  

An  assessment  should  be  made  of  the  benefits  of  creating  a  scheme  for  each  precursor 
handled  by  the  retail  sector,  under  which  all  packaging  would  be  labelled  with  a  code 
specifying that the purchase of the substance may be subject to registration. The possibility of 
designing  a  European  symbol  to  indicate  that  the  product  for  retail  sale  is  subject  to 
registration could be considered.  

7.4. 

Improving  control  over  explosives  available  on  the  market  and  pyrotechnic 
articles 

Currently, all Member States have an authorising system for companies handling explosives. 
An authorising system for non-commercial handling of explosives, however, is often lacking. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  that  each  Member  State  has  a  formal  system  for 
authorising,  regulating  and  licensing  the  manufacture,  storage,  sale,  use  and  possession  of 
explosives including by private persons. The system should apply both to companies and to 
non-commercial activities.  

In cases where unauthorised explosives are found, there is an absolute necessity to identify the 
last  official  owner  of  these  explosives  as  quickly  as  possible.  For  this  reason  a  unique 
European marking on all explosives would be very helpful for the law enforcement agencies 
of the Member States. Such a unique marking scheme is in the process of being developed by 
the Commission and is likely to result in a proposal for a Directive on the identification and 
traceability of explosives for civil use. Under the proposed Directive all explosives would be 
marked with a unique identification both in human readable and in as bar code or matrix code 
format. Implementation of the scheme should be taken forward as quickly as possible.  

The threat posed by pyrotechnic articles should also be examined. Since they may be used in 
improvised  explosives  devices  control  should  be  improved.  Although  pyrotechnic  articles 
have  not  been  used  to  commit  terrorist  acts,  they  have  been  employed  in  criminal  activities 
(for example as parts of improvised pipe bombs). A new EU directive on pyrotechnic articles 
was adopted  by Council  on 16 April  20072. This instrument addresses mainly safety issues, 
although it also has some security implications.  

As  there  is  currently  no  harmonised  approach  towards  licensing  schemes  to  handle  large 
quantities  of  pyrotechnic  articles,  it  is  possible  in  some  Member  States  to  handle  large 
quantities  of  pyrotechnic  substances  without  regulatory  oversight  as  long  as  the  relevant 
storage and transport requirements are met. This gap should be closed by way of introducing 
harmonised EU requirements for the licensing and handling of large quantities of pyrotechnic 
articles. 

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Directive 2007/23/EC (OJ L 154, 14.6.2007, p. 1). 

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7.5. 

Improving the security of explosives facilities 

Member States have varying experience and approaches as regards the security of explosives 
facilities. The fact, however, that major thefts of explosives have occurred in Europe during 
the  past  ten  years  suggests  that  further  efforts  are  still  needed.  Further  work  is  needed  on 
approximating the levels of security of explosives facilities in the EU and possibly developing 
common minimum standards in this area.  

First  of  all,  effective  Security  Plans/Security  Management  Systems  should  be  operational  at 
all  explosives  facilities  (manufacture,  storage,  distribution  and  use).  These  Security 
Plans/Security  Management  Systems  must  be  risk-based  and  result  in  operational  security 
measures. Designated “Responsible Persons” and a “Security Manager” should be disclosed 
within the Security Plan/Security Management System. National authorities should have the 
possibility of allowing exemptions for small users. In terms of fixed storage facilities, levels 
of  necessary  access  prevention  and  detection  provisions  should  be  proportional  to  risk  and 
subject to a standard classification.  

Secondly, it should become obligatory for the relevant national authorities to keep explosives 
manufacturers and distributors informed as to the regional threat at all times. Response plans 
should be developed and tuned to existing alert levels. 

Thirdly, accounting for raw materials used in the manufacture of bulk explosives and finished 
products  should  be  improved.  Accounting  and  reconciling  systems  already  exist.  There  is 
however a need to ensure that theft and inconsistencies are recognised as quickly as possible.  

Finally,  the  task  of  improving  the  security  of  Mobile  Explosive  Manufacturing  Units 
(MEMUs) should be undertaken. Currently, many civilian explosives are manufactured in the 
Member  States  by  MEMUs.  This  amounts  to  a  significant  increase  in  safety  compared  to 
manufacturing  in  factories  and  the  ensuing  transport  of  explosives.  Nevertheless,  certain 
improvements  concerning  the  security  of  MEMUs  are  needed.  The  amount  of  explosives 
produced by MEMUs should be recorded by at least two independent systems. Each MEMU 
should be fitted with process locks to prevent unauthorised use and be parked on a site that is 
guarded or monitored when not in use. 

7.6. 

Improving the security vetting of personnel 

There  is  a  need  for  security  checks  of  all  persons  professionally  involved  in  dealing  with 
explosives,  covering  the  whole  supply  chain  (manufacture, storage, transport  and  use).  This 
includes the personnel of companies licensed to handle explosives as well as the personnel of 
service  companies.  Consequently,  all  personnel  employed  in  the  manufacturing,  storage, 
distribution and use of explosives, and who have access to explosives, should be vetted and 
hold a formal authorisation to have access to explosives. 

7.7. 

Improving the security of transport of explosives 

The transport of explosives is a particularly sensitive activity due to the threat of direct attack 
or  being  illicitly  diverted  to  a  destination  other  than  the  one  intended.  Therefore,  strict 
security arrangements for the transport of explosives must be a key aspect of increasing the 

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security  of  explosives  in  general.  Consequently,  certain  security  enhancement  solutions 
should be introduced into all EX/II and EX/III3 vehicles carrying explosives. 

include 

explosives 

A  debate  should  be  launched  on  the  need  to  review  the  classification  of  “desensitised 
like  RDX 
explosives”.  Desensitised 
(cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine)  and  PETN  (pentaerythritol  tetranitrate),  which  are  usually 
classified as Class 1 of the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods but 
when mixed with a desensitising substance can alternatively be classified in Class 4.1 of these 
Recommendations. Since there is a risk that Class 1 hazards are not completely nullified by 
the  desensitisation  process,  there  is  a  need  to  assess  whether  such  "desensitised  explosives" 
should  be  classified  as  Class  1  rather  than  Class  4.1.  Therefore,  a  timely  review  of  the 
classification of these substances should be undertaken. 

explosives 

high 

7.8. 

Reducing the supply and quality of information on how to illicitly manufacture 
explosives 

A detailed look should be taken at the use of the internet to spread bomb-making information. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  internet  provides  access  to  a  vast  wealth  of  information  which  is  of 
benefit  to  everyone;  on  the  other,  it  can  be  misused  to  spread  information  that  can  be 
employed  for  malicious  purposes.  It  is  necessary  to  fight  against  the  illicit  dissemination  of 
information and materials on bomb-making via the internet, while fully respecting the liberty 
of  the  press,  freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  of  information.  Common  minimum  criminal 
sanctions for disseminating bomb-making experience over the internet should be considered. 
The  Commission  is  already  addressing  this  issue  by  way  of  the  revision  of  the  Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism4. 

8. 

DETECTION 

Where prevention activities have failed or have been circumvented, it is up to detection tools 
and practices to minimise the risk of terrorists and other criminals making use of explosives 
for malicious purposes. Consequently, efficient and accurate explosive detection tools need to 
be developed. 

A comprehensive approach to detection is necessary. A number of detection techniques exist 
which can be used for explosives. These include Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), x-ray 
systems,  explosive  detection  dogs,  and  trace-  and  vapour  detection  systems.  Nevertheless, 
practice  has  shown  that  the  use  of  a  single  detection  technique  may  not  lead  to  satisfactory 
results. A combination of methods may therefore be necessary. 

The key priorities include:  

•  Establishing a scenario-based approach to identifying priorities in detection work; 

•  Developing minimum detection standards; 

•  Improving exchange of information; 

3 
4 

EX/II and EX/III refers to vehicles used specifically for the transport of dangerous goods. 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3). 

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•  Establishing certification, testing and trialling schemes; 

•  Making better use of detection technologies in specific locations. 

Significant steps have already been taken by the Commission in the field of aviation security. 
These  include  the  setting  of  mandatory  standards  for  both  the  performance  requirements  of 
explosive detection equipment and their use. This type of work should continue. 

8.1. 

Establishing  a  scenario-based  approach  to  identifying  work  priorities  in  the 
detection field 

Improving the detection of explosives is a complicated and time-consuming process requiring 
the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders.  

Matching the requirements of the law enforcement community in the field of detection with 
existing technologies and products is a key challenge. This process can be facilitated through 
the  development  of  a  scenario-based  approach  to  identifying  priorities  in  detection  work. 
Identifying  the  relevant  scenarios  and  the  technologies  available  to  deal  with  them  is  the 
crucial first step to identifying priorities for action in the future.  Such scenarios would  help 
focus  resources  and  research,  concentrate  debate  on  specific  issues  and  problems,  and 
enhance  the  understanding  of  the  problems  of  the  various  stakeholders  across  the  EU, 
including  the  challenge  of  the  time  of  detection  and  false/positive  alarm  rates.  The 
establishment  of  a  working  group  tasked  with  identifying  and  discussing  the  relevant 
scenarios  and  applicable  detection  requirements  would  facilitate  the  process.  Due  to  the 
sensitive nature of the topics under discussion, it would be composed of representatives from 
the  Member  States  and  the  Commission.  The  private  sector  and  research  community  may, 
however, have to be associated with some of the work of the group if deemed appropriate. In 
such  a  situation,  the  relevant  security  conditions,  such  as  the  vetting  of  participants  and  the 
use of secure premises, would have to be guaranteed. 

8.2. 

Developing minimum detection standards 

The  development  of  standards  is  a  cost-effective  and  efficient  means  of  improving  the 
performance  of  detection  equipment.  Notwithstanding  the  work  already  done  in  the  field  of 
aviation  security,  minimum  detection  standards  should  be  developed  in  the  EU.  These 
standards  would  be  updated  as technology  evolves.  Standards  can  be  developed  in  different 
forms  including  legislation  or  through  the  European  Committee  for  Standardisation  (CEN). 
The choice of approach will depend on security requirements and stakeholder preferences. 

8.3. 

Improving the exchange of information 

The  development  of  improved  detection  solutions  requires  close  cooperation  between  the 
private  and  the  public  sectors.  Information  exchanges  need  to  be  improved  between  those 
involved in detection, including between law enforcement services and the relevant security 
staff  tasked  with  physically  detecting  explosives  in  various  locations,  and  between  law 
enforcement  and  security  staff,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  manufacturers  of  detection 
equipment, on the other.  

Efficient  detection  requires  the  provision  of  updated  and  relevant  threat  information  to 
security personnel tasked with physically detecting explosives. Since many types and forms of 
explosives  can  be  used  by  terrorists,  security  personnel  should  be  updated  about  relevant 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
threats  and  possible  scenarios.  This  is  particularly  important  for  airport  personnel.  Airport 
security  staff  should  be  provided  on  a  continuous  basis  with  up-to-date  information  on 
terrorist  modi  operandi  and  other  threat  information.  Appropriate  levels  of  security  vetting 
will be required in order to undertake this process.  

Providing training data and the relevant information concerning certain types of explosives to 
the manufacturers of detection equipment would significantly contribute to the development 
of  better  solutions.  In  many  cases,  manufacturers  of  explosives  detection  equipment  do  not 
currently have access to certain explosives or sufficient amounts. If detection solutions have 
drawbacks in capabilities under certain situations this information should be communicated to 
the  manufacturer  in  order  to  improve  detection  capability.  This  could  be  in  the  form  of  a 
specific feedback process and should not be aimed at facilitating the passing of relevant tests 
by the solution provider. 

The work of detection experts could be further facilitated by the creation of a database with 
restricted  access  containing  the  specifications  of  explosives  placed  on  the  EU  market.  It 
would  include  the  specifications  of  explosives  needed  by  the  forensic  community  and  by 
detection  experts.  Existing  licensing  requirements  could  be  used  for  this  purpose,  with  a 
possible expansion of information requirements.  

Other measures in the area of detection could include the creation of a detection handbook for 
practitioners  (end-users)  and  the  setting-up  of  a  network  of  experts  on  the  detection  of 
explosives. 

8.4. 

Establishing certification, testing and trialling schemes in the EU for explosives 
detection systems 

EU-wide certification, testing and trialling schemes for explosives detection solutions should 
be  established.  Such  schemes  would  provide  significant  advantages  in  terms  of  costs  as 
duplication of activities across the Member States resulting in a waste of public resources and 
private  sector  resources  would  be  avoided.  Moreover,  such  systems  would  allow  those 
Member  States  which  do  not  have  their  own  certification  capacities  to  gain  access  to  the 
relevant certification information. Common certification, testing and trialling schemes would 
decrease  the  reliance  of  public  authorities  on  information  provided  by  the  manufacturers  of 
detection  equipment  and  would  allow  them  to  base  their  decisions  on  objective  results. 
Finally,  such  systems  would  be  of  benefit  to  the  private  sector  as  they  would  allow 
manufacturers  to  market  their  products  more  effectively.  Standardisation  of  certification, 
testing and trialling processes could be considered in order to ensure identical quality across 
participating entities.  

In terms of certification, a system is needed whereby a detection solution could be assessed to 
see  if  it  meets  certain  accepted  standards.  This  certification  process  would  be  conducted  by 
accredited  laboratories/organisations  in  the  Member  States  and  would  be  accepted  by  all 
Member States.  

An EU-wide testing scheme should also be pursued for overall assessment of the performance 
of a particular detection solution. Such a system would provide a framework for the exchange 
of test results between the public authorities and relevant institutes of the Member States. This 
aggregation of information on the performance of detection solutions collected in independent 
tests  would  be  helpful  for  public  authorities  and  other  stakeholders  as  it  would  facilitate 
decision-making in procurement procedures. 

EN 

12 

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Finally,  an  EU-wide  trialling  scheme  for  detection  solutions  should  be  established  whereby 
the performance of multiple new detection technologies could be assessed using identical or 
very similar scenarios. Such a system would make it easier to compare different technologies 
originating  from  various  solution  providers.  The  aim  of  the  trialling  scheme  would  be  to 
identify promising solutions and technologies and help bring them to the market. 

8.5.  Making better use of detection technologies in specific locations 

Better  use  needs  to  be  made  of  detection  technologies  in  specific  locations.  As  a  matter  of 
priority,  the  situation  at  airports  and  other  transport  and  public  facilities  which  could 
potentially be deemed as critical infrastructure should be examined in more detail. Significant 
progress  has  already  been  achieved  in  the  detection  of  explosives  at  specific  locations, 
including the establishment of EU rules on the performance and use of detection equipment at 
airports. This work should be supported, evaluated and enhanced on a continuous basis, and 
updated as the need arises. One should also bear in mind the need to minimise the impact of 
new detection technologies on travellers, whilst maintaining an appropriate level of security. 
Similar  work  could  be  considered  for  other  areas  of  concern,  including  other  modes  of 
transportation based on relevant scenarios and threat assessment. 

9. 

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 

In  the  event  that  prevention  and  timely  detection  should  fail,  appropriate  and  efficient 
response systems must be in place. Clearly it would be up to the relevant authorities in each 
affected Member State to take responsibility for the response effort. Nevertheless, there would 
be  benefit  from  EU  involvement  in  certain  areas  in  particular  through  the  exchange  of 
information  and  best  practices  concerning  preparedness  and  response  measures,  and 
information needed to bring the perpetrators to justice.  

The key priorities of the preparedness and response pillar would include: 

•  improving the exchange of information and best practices among Member States; 

•  developing threat assessments; 

•  developing specific preparedness and response measures for terrorist threats using 

explosives. 

9.1. 

Improving  the  exchange  of  information  and  best  practices  among  the  relevant 
Member State authorities 

A  European  Explosive  Ordnance  Disposal  Network  (EOD  Network)  should  be  created  to 
enhance  the  exchange  of  information  and  mutual  confidence.  It  would  contribute  to  the 
dissemination of best practices, to the organisation of joint training sessions and to keeping all 
interested parties up-to-date on recent developments.  

Dealing  with  large  quantities  of  chemicals  found  at  a  scene  under  investigation  can  be  a 
challenge  for  less  experienced  Member  States.  Improved  exchange  of  information  would 
benefit Explosive Ordnance Disposal experts in these countries, as some are not particularly 
well  equipped  to  deal  with  large  amounts  of  unexploded  explosives  with  a  view  to  making 
them safe and to take samples for laboratory examination and identification. 

EN 

13 

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9.2. 

Developing threat assessments 

Member  States  should  give  consideration  to  the need  for  a  specialised  threat  assessment  on 
explosives.  Different  threat  assessments  are  regularly  produced  on  specific  terrorist  issues. 
Whether  there  is  a  need  for  a  specific  threat  assessment  on  explosives  would  need  to  be 
further examined.  

9.3. 

Developing  specific  preparedness  and  response  measures  for  terrorist  threats 
using explosives 

Mobile  phones  can  be  used  by  terrorists  to  detonate  an  explosive  device.  Consequently, 
Member  States  should  ensure  that  the  law  enforcement  authorities  have  the  possibility  of 
requiring providers to shut down mobile telephone services in the relevant areas. 

10. 

MONITORING 

Monitoring should be a key part of assessing progress in the implementation of the EU Action 
Plan  on  Enhancing  the  Security  of  Explosives.  Each  Member  State  should  provide  the 
Commission on an annual basis with information concerning progress in the implementation 
of this action plan. Working on the basis of the Member State reports, the Commission will 
regularly assess the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan, with a view to 
identifying what further measures need to be taken and selecting new priorities. 

Peer  review  exercises  should  be  organised  to  assess  the  implementation  of  the  Action  Plan 
and enhance the exchange of best practices. 

11. 

FUNDING 

The  security  of  explosives  is  a  priority  for  the  Commission  and  will  be  eligible  for  EU 
funding. Specific funding opportunities for activities relating to the security of explosives will 
be made available under the "Prevention of and Fight against Crime" programme and the 7th 
Framework Research Programme (FP7). 

Research projects related to explosive detection and identification are being supported under 
theme 10 of FP7 dealing with Security Research. In addition, it is planned that theme 10 will 
finance  a  demonstration  project  on  Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological,  Nuclear  substances 
and  Explosives  (CBRNE).  In  parallel,  a  European  Security  Research  and  Innovation  Forum 
(ESRIF) has been created5, which will develop a mid- and long-term Joint Security Research 
Agenda  that  will  involve  all  European  stakeholders  from  both  the  supply  and  the  demand 
sides. This agenda should contain a research roadmap based on the future needs of the public 
and  private  end-users  and  the  state-of-the-art  security  technologies.  The  Commission  will 
ensure  that  the  necessary  links  will  be  established  between  the  activities  on  enhancing  the 
security of explosives and the appropriate ESRIF Working Groups. 

5 

The creation of ESRIF was announced in the Commission Communication on a public-private dialogue 
in the field of European security research and innovation - COM(2007) 511, 11.9.2007. 

EN 

14 

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On  12  February  2007,  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  adopted  the  specific  programme 
"Prevention of and Fight against Crime" for the period 2007-2013, with a budget of around 
€ 745 million.  

This  programme  provides  financial  support  for  activities  under  Title  VI  of  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  regarding  all  types  of  crime  (in  particular  terrorism,  trafficking  in  persons 
and  offences  against  children,  illicit  drug  trafficking  and  illicit  arms  trafficking,  corruption 
and fraud). One of the specific areas covered by the programme is explosives security.  

Funding will be made available for specific priorities identified annually by the Commission. 

12. 

CONCLUSION 

Combating  the  use  of  explosive  devices  by  terrorists  will  continue  to  be  a  priority  of  the 
Commission  in  the  security  field.  The  Action  Plan  on  enhancing  the  security  of  explosives 
will make a substantial contribution to achieving this objective. 

All  of  the  measures  identified  in  the  Action  Plan  will  be  addressed  in  the  years  ahead.  A 
number of these measures will have to be taken forward as a matter of priority including the 
establishment of the: 

•  European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network; 

•  Early Warning System concerning explosives; 

•  European Bomb Data System; 

•  Standing Committee of Experts concerning precursors; 

•  Working Group on detection. 

The  creation  of  the  European  Explosive  Ordnance  Disposal  Network,  the  Early  Warning 
System  concerning  explosives  and  the  European  Bomb  Data  System  will  be  taken  forward 
with the support of EU funding in an effort to enhance as quickly as possible the exchange of 
information between Member States concerning explosives. 

Establishment of the Standing Committee of Experts concerning precursors and the Working 
Group  on  detection  must  also  be  taken  forward  as  a  matter  of  priority  so  that  the  relevant 
experts can begin to discuss the detailed measures that need to be taken concerning explosives 
precursors and detection systems.  

In  parallel  with  the  implementation  of  the  Action  Plan,  the  Commission  will  make  funding 
available for activities in the area of explosives.  

EN 

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Annex – Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives 

Horizontal measures 

No. 

Measure/Action 

Competent body 

Deadline 

Status/Observations 

Priority 1: Improve the exchange of timely information and best practices 

1.1.1 

Establish an Early Warning System concerning explosives 

MS/Europol/Commission  End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 39 
and 40 

Such  a  system  would  be  used  in  order  to  exchange  information 
concerning: 

Immediate threats; 

• 
•  Theft of explosives (any kind); 
•  Theft of detonators; 
•  Theft of precursors; (to be discussed) 
•  Suspicious transactions; 
•  Discovery of new modi operandi. 

The  system  should  be  available  in  particular  to  Member  States  public 
security authorities (national contact points), Europol and all operational 
EOD units. 

1.1.2  Create a European Bomb Data System 

Europol/MS/Commission  End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 35, 
36, 37 

The system should provide a common EU instrument enabling authorised 
governmental bodies at EU and Member States level to have 24/7 access 
to relevant information on incidents involving explosive devices. 

At  least  all  operational  EOD  units  in  the  Member  States  should  have 
access to the database. Other competent authorities in the Member States 
should also be given access in line with national law. 

Competent  units  or  bodies  of  the  Member  States  should  be  strongly 
obliged to provide all necessary information for inclusion in the database. 

EN 

16 

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1.1.3  Regularly  (every  two  years)  organise  an  event  on  the  security  of 

Commission 

explosives covering all relevant issues. 

Ongoing every two 
years 

Task Force Recommendation No. 50 

Such an event/conference should involving officials from both the public 
and private sectors. 

1.1.4 

Engage  in  dialogue  and  exchange  of  best  practices  with  external 
partners 

MS/Commission 

Ongoing 

The raising of security standards outside of the EU, in particular in ENP 
countries, should be encouraged.  

Priority 2: Step-up explosives-related research  

1.2.1 

1.2.2 

1.2.3 

Improve the aggregation and spread of research results both at EU 
level as well as at national level across the EU Member States 

Perform further research on improvised explosive devices and their 
properties  

Perform  further  research  on  the  detection  of  explosives  and 
precursors including through the use of additives 

Enhancing both detectability and traceability should be considered. 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 49 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 47 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 47 

1.2.4 

Perform further research on mobile explosives testing kits 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 47 

1.2.5 

Perform further research to find inhibitors which could be added to 
precursors to explosives to prevent them being used to manufacture 
explosive devices 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 48 

1.2.6 

Perform  further  research  concerning  the  detection  of  Improvised 
Explosive Devices at airports 

MS/Commission 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 31 

Special  focus  should  be  given  to  research  on  the  detection  of  liquid 
explosives. 

Progress to be 
assessed annually 

EN 

17 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
1.2.7 

Support  further  research  in  order  to  find  technical  solutions  for 
Member State authorities to jam mobile phone signals in threatened 
areas 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 45 

EN 

18 

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Prevention measures 

No. 

Measure/Action 

Competent body 

Deadline 

Status/Observations 

Priority 1: Improve staff awareness concerning precursors 

2.1.1 

Public  authorities  to  provide  security  information  to  the  entire 
precursor  supply  chain,  from  manufacturers  to  the  retailers,  first 
responders (police, fire-departments, bomb-squads) and educational 
establishments to focus attention on products of concern 

MS 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 1 

2.1.2 

Campaigns  should  be  conducted  to  raise  staff-awareness  of  the 
the  supply  chain  amongst  manufacturers, 
threat  all  along 
formulators, distributors and retailers of precursors. 

MS 

Priority 2: Improve the regulation of explosives precursors available on the market 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 3 

2.2.1 

The  establishment  of  a  system  to  consider  measures  and  prepare 
recommendations concerning the regulation of explosives precursors 
available on the market 

Commission/MS 

Start by end of 2007 

Task Force Recommendation No. 4 

Ongoing 

Such a system should include the establishment of a Standing Committee 
of  Experts  tasked  with  identifying  the  risks  associated  with  various 
precursors  and  recommending  appropriate  actions  to  the  Commission. 
The Committee should consider and/or monitor the following issues: 

•  Development of suitable additives and promotion of the use of these 
additives to precursors in order to prevent their use in explosives, 
when it is technically possible. 

•  Restrictions on concentration concerning the sale of certain 

precursors to end-users. 

•  A complete ban on concentrated strong acids to EU consumer 

markets (non-professional markets) when a substitute giving an 
equal use is technically possible: sulphuric, hydrochloric and nitric 
acids in particular. 
Introduction of a voluntary market surveillance scheme for 
ammonium nitrate fertilizers and restricting the sale of high nitrogen 

• 

EN 

19 

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fertilizers to the general public. 

•  Limiting the availability of pure nitromethane to the general public. 
It should be available to industrial customers via a suitable customer 
qualification scheme. 

•  Restrictions on access of the general public to unphlegmatized 

sodium chlorate (weed killer). 

•  The feasibility and added value of introducing a complete ban on 

selling certain precursors to minors. 

The  work  of  the  Committee  should  take  into  account  the  detailed 
measures proposed in the Explosives Security Experts Task Force report. 

In order to avoid duplicating existing measures or adding unnecessarily 
to the burden faced by legitimate business, it is important that account is 
also  taken  of  existing  controls  on  similarly  sensitive  items.  Trading  in 
explosive materials, such as acetone, hydrochloric and sulphuric acid is 
already  covered  by  the  existing  Community  drug  precursor  legislation. 
This  legislation  offers  effective  controls  and  must  be  taken  into 
consideration  before  new  mechanisms  are  proposed.  To  be  effective 
controls  will  have  to  apply  to  imports,  exports,  transit  and  intra-
Community movements. 

2.2.2 

Introduce a system for the recording of the identity of the buyer of 
precursors  above  certain  quantities  and/or  concentrations.  The 
records  should  be  available  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  on 
request  or  provided  to  the  national  contact  point  in  case  of 
suspicious  transactions.  All  relevant  data  protection  rules  should 
apply 

The relevant quantities and/or concentrations would be set based on the 
work of the Standing Committee of Experts. 

2.2.3 

A European minimum standard and industrial guidance by way of 
an  appropriate  code  should  be  defined  concerning  the  security  of 
storage of explosives precursors  

It should not be in conflict with other Regulations. 

Commission/MS 

Start in 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 7 

Assess the need to 
setup a concrete 
system by end 2008 

Commission/MS 

End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 8 

EN 

20 

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Priority 3: Improve the control over transactions involving precursors 

2.3.1 

Establish a system of reporting suspicious transactions 

MS/Commission 

Start in 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 2, 5, 
6 

Simple  means  should  exist  for  anyone  within  the  supply  chain  to  alert 
the  relevant  national  authority  if  they  see  a  transaction  or  theft  which 
they suspect to have been made with the intention of illegally fabricating 
explosives. 

A binding system could be considered concerning the notification to the 
relevant national authority of any transactions involving the products on 
the list which can be considered suspicious. A “code of conduct”, similar 
to  the  EC  code  for  drug  precursors,  should  be  developed,  for  industry 
and  retailers,  identifying  the  behaviours  which  may  give  rise  to 
suspicion. 

2.3.2 

Assessing  the  benefits  of  creating  a  scheme  for  each  precursor 
handled  by  the  retail  sector,  under  which  all  packaging  would  be 
labelled  with  a  code  specifying  that  the  purchase  of  the  substance 
may be subject to registration  

The  possibility  of  designing  a  European  symbol  to  indicate  that  the 
product for retail sale is subject to registration could be considered. 

Assess the need to 
setup a concrete 
system by end 2008 

MS/Commission 

2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 9 

Priority 4: Improve the control over explosives available on the market and pyrotechnic articles 

2.4.1 

Ensure that each Member States has formal systems for authorising, 
regulating  and  licensing  the  manufacture,  storage,  sale,  use  and 
possession of explosives including by private persons 

MS 

2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 21  

This shall apply to companies as well as to non-commercial activities. 

2.4.2 

Ensure  the  identification  and  tracing  of  explosives  based  on  the 
system  proposed 
in  the  draft  Commission  Directive  on  the 
identification and traceability of explosives for civil use (Traceability 
Directive) 

Commission/MS 

End 2007 

Task Force Recommendation No. 22 

EN 

21 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 

Harmonise EU requirements for the licensing and handling of large 
amounts of pyrotechnic articles 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 43 

The  lack  of  any  harmonised  approach  towards  licensing  schemes  to 
handle large quantities of pyrotechnic articles means that it is possible to 
handle  such  materials  without  regulatory  oversight  as  long  storage  and 
transport requirements are met. Such a security gap should be closed. 

Priority 5: Improve the security of explosives facilities 

2.5.1 

Introduce effective Security Plans/Security Management Systems at 
all  explosives  facilities  (manufacturing,  storing,  distributing  and 
using) 

MS 

Ensure  that  the  levels  of  necessary  access  prevention  and  detection 
provisions  in  fixed  storage  facilities  should  be  proportional  to  the  risk 
and should be subject to a standard classification. 

2.5.2 

Introduce an obligation for the relevant national authorities to keep 
explosives  manufacturers  and  distributors  informed  as  to  the 
regional threat at all times 

MS 

Response plans should be developed tuned to the level of alert present. 

2.5.3 

Raw  materials  used  in  the  manufacture  of  bulk  explosives  and 
finished product should be periodically accounted for and reconciled 
as approved by the National Authorities 

MS 

This applies to all factories manufacturing bulk explosives. The relevant 
periods should not be long so that any losses, thefts and inconsistencies 
are recognized as quickly as possible. 

Launch debate in 
2008 

Task  Force  Recommendation  No.  12 
and 14 

Ongoing 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 13 

2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 20 

EN 

22 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.4 

Improve  the  security  of  Mobile  Explosive  Manufacturing  Units 
(MEMUs).  Amend  the  European  Agreement  on  the  International 
carriage of dangerous goods by road (ADR) by end of 2009 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task  Force  Recommendation  No.  15, 
16, 17 

The following specific actions should be undertaken: 

•  The amount of explosives produced on MEMUs should be 

ascertained by two independent systems. At least one of these 
should be fitted on the truck.  

•  Each MEMU should be fitted with process locks to prevent 

unauthorised use. 

•  Loaded MEMUs should be parked on a site which is guarded or 

monitored when they are not in use. 

Priority 6: Improve the security vetting of personnel 

2.6.1 

All  personnel  employed  in  the  manufacturing,  storage,  distribution 
and use of explosives, and who have access to explosives, should be 
vetted  (external  checks  by  relevant  national  authorities  under 
applicable  national  regulations)  and  hold  a  formal  authorisation  to 
have access to explosives 

Priority 7: Improve the security of the transport of explosives 

2.7.1 

All  EX/II  and  EX/III  vehicles  carrying  explosives  should  be 
equipped  with  certain  security  enhancement  solutions.  Amend  the 
European  Agreement  on  the  International  carriage  of  dangerous 
goods by road (ADR) by end of 2009. 

These security solutions include: 

1)  be fitted with 24 hour, remote monitoring systems (e.g. GPS based 

systems), that are monitored by an appropriately resourced 
monitoring station. The Monitoring systems (including the 
Monitoring Station) must reliably enable where technically possible: 
•  Vehicle location to be identified 
•  Alarm activation if vehicle is moved from specified location at 

certain times 

MS 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 11 

Commission/MS 

2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 18 

EN 

23 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Alarm activation if specified compartments are opened at 

certain times and/or at unauthorised locations 

•  A duress and/or a panic alarm facility 

2)  be capable of immobilising the engine remotely if safe and 

applicable subject to the Vienna Convention 

3)  be fitted with an anti theft system 
4)  have sufficiently secure compartments for explosives 
5)  be fitted with a means of communication 
6)  have a recognised marking affixed to the roof of the vehicle, to a 

specified size and description. 

2.7.2 

Launch  a  debate  on  the  need  to  review  the  classification  of 
“desensitized explosives”  

Commission/MS 

Immediately 

Task Force Recommendation No. 19 

End 2007 

This  should  be  done  with  a  view  to  making  sure  that  future  transport 
regulations (GHS-system) continue to cover such substances.  

Priority 8: Reduce the supply and quality of information on how to illicitly manufacture explosives 

2.8.1 

2.8.2 

Limit  the  illicit  spread  of  bomb-making  information  over  the 
Internet 

MS/Commission 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 41 

Harmonize  criminal  sanctions 
experience over the Internet 

for  distributing  bomb-making 

MS/Commission 

End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 41 

EN 

24 

EN 

 
  
 
Detection measures 

No. 

Measure/Action 

Competent body 

Deadline 

Status/Observations 

Priority 1: Establish a scenario-based approach to identifying work priorities in the detection field 

3.1.1 

Setup  a  working  group  tasked  with  developing  and  discussing 
detection  related 
identifying  detection 
technology requirements for the scenarios 

scenarios,  and 

then 

The  working  group  would  be  composed  of  Member  State  and 
Commission representatives. 

3.1.2 

Create a matrix of what is desired and of what is currently possible 
in  terms  of  the  detection  of  explosives  for  each  of  the  scenarios 
created by the working group 

Priority 2: Developing minimum detection standards 

Commission/MS 

As soon as possible 

Task Force Recommendation No. 23  

Commission/MS 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 24 

3.2.1 

Develop  minimum  detection  standards  based  on  relevant  scenarios 
and threat assessment 

MS/Commission 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 25  

These standards should be updated as technology evolves 

Priority 3: Improving the exchange of information 

3.3.1 

Ensure that the security staff (in particular at airports) are provided 
on a continuous basis with up-to-date information on relevant parts 
of  new  terrorist  modi  operandi  or  other  appropriate  threat 
information 

For airport security, this should complement the obligations for training 
security  staff  set  out  in  §12.2  of  the  Annex  to  the  EU  Regulation 
2320/2002  establishing  common  rules  in  the  field  of  civil  aviation 
security. 

MS 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 42 

EN 

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EN 

 
  
 
 
 
3.3.2 

Assess  and  improve  where  necessary  the  situation  as  regards  the 
availability  of  training  data  and  other  information/feedback  for 
manufacturers of detection solutions 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 30 

3.3.3 

Create  a  database  containing  the  specifications  of  explosives 
produced within the EU  

Commission/MS 

End 2010 

Task Force Recommendation No. 32 

The database(s) would target specifications of explosives needed by the 
forensic community and by the experts on detection. 

3.3.4 

Create  a  practitioner  (end-user)  focused  handbook  concerning 
detection 

Commission/MS 

End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 33 

The handbook would be classified at an appropriate level. 

3.3.5 

Create a network of experts on the detection of explosives 

Commission/MS 

End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 34 

Priority 4: Establish EU-wide certification, testing and trialling schemes for the detection of explosives 

3.4.1 

3.4.2 

Create a European wide certification scheme for explosives detection 
solutions 

Create  a  European  wide  testing  scheme  for  explosives  detection 
solutions 

Under  the  scheme  relevant  authorities  and  institutes  would  be  able  to 
exchange test results. 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 26 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 27 

3.4.3 

Create  a  European  wide  trialling  scheme  for  explosives  detection 
solutions 

Commission/MS 

End 2009 

Task Force Recommendation No. 28 

Such  a  system  should  be  supported  by  an  EU  programme  and  should 
allow  for  conducting  performance  trials  under  realistic  conditions  in 
same or similar scenarios. 

3.4.4 

Assess the need for the development of standardized procedures and  Commission/MS 

End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 29 

EN 

26 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
processes concerning certification, testing and trialling processes  

Priority 5: Make better use of detection technologies in specific locations 

3.5.1 

Improve the use of detection technologies at airports, other modes of 
transportation and other public facilities 

Commission/MS 

Ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 31 

Further  developments  in  this  field  should  be  supported.  The  situation 
should be evaluated and assessed on a continuous basis, and updated as 
the need arises.  

EN 

27 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Preparedness and response measures 

No. 

Measure/Action 

Competent body 

Deadline 

Status/Observations 

Priority 1: Improve the exchange of information and best-practices among the relevant Member State authorities 

4.1.1 

Establish a European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EOD 
Network) 

MS/Europol/Commission  End 2008 

Task Force Recommendation No. 38 

The  system  should  facilitate  information  sharing  and  trust  building.  It 
should contribute to the identification of best practice, the organisation 
of joint training exercises, and keeping EOD units up to date concerning 
the latest developments of relevance to the sector. 

The  network  should  be  made  available  to  all  EOD-Units  (police, 
governmental and military) dealing with explosives with the MS. 

The use of EU funding to establish the network should be assessed.  

4.1.2 

Exchange  information  and  assistance  on  dealing  with  big  amounts 
of chemicals found at a scene under investigation 

MS 

ongoing 

Task Force Recommendation No. 47 

Such exchange would assist EOD experts and could take place through 
the EOD network. 

Priority 2: Develop threat assessments 

4.2.1  Consider developing specialised threat assessments on explosives  

MS/Europol/Council 

ongoing 

Task Force Report section 4.10  

EN 

28 

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Priority 3: 

Develop specific preparedness and response measures for terrorist threats using explosives 

4.3.1  Create  the  possibility  for  relevant  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
request providers  to  shut down  mobile  phone antennas  in  the  case 
of a threat of a terrorist attack 

MS/(Commission) 

Ongoing 

Task  Force  Recommendation  No.  44 
and 46 

In a situation where there are reasons to believe that mobile phones will 
be used as firing switches, the responsible law enforcement authorities 
should be able to request providers to shut down relevant antennas. 

Relevant  experiences,  skills  and  best  practices  should  be  exchanged 
among the Member States via the EOD-Units network in this area. 

EN 

29 

EN