Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes - Impact Assessment {COM(2007) 654 final} {SEC(2007) 1422}
Date: 2007-11-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Union, air transport, data protection, disclosure of information, fight against crime, impact study, personal data, terrorism, third country, traveller

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 6.11.2007 
SEC(2007) 1453 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 

on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2007) 654 final} 
{SEC(2007) 1422} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES... 3 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 3 

Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 3 

Impact of the consultations .......................................................................................... 5 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................... 7 

Description of the problem........................................................................................... 7 

Parties affected by the problem.................................................................................. 12 

EU right to act ............................................................................................................ 12 

Respect of fundamental rights.................................................................................... 13 

OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 15 

POLICY OPTIONS ................................................................................................... 16 

Refraining from addressing the issue on an EU level ................................................ 16 

Introducing new legislative proposal for the use of passenger data for law 
enforcement purposes................................................................................................. 16 

4.2.1.  A proposal covering travel by air with a decentralised collection of the data ........... 16 

4.2.2.  A proposal covering travel by air with a centralised collection of data..................... 17 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS........................................................................................ 18 

Impacts of the option of refraining from addressing the issue at an EU level ........... 18 

Impacts of the option of introducing a new legislative measure covering air travel 
with a decentralised collection of data ....................................................................... 20 

Impacts of the option of introducing a new legislative measure covering air travel 
with a centralised collection of data........................................................................... 23 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................. 25 

Synopsis of the impacts of the policy options............................................................ 27 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION .............................................................................. 28 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION ..................................................................... 29 

ANNEX A – ANALYSIS OF OTHER PARAMETERS ........................................................ 30 

ANNEX B – TABLE OF REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ........................................ 38 

ANNEX C – TABLE OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PREFERRED OPTION ................... 40 

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Impact Assessment 

On A Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name  
Records (PNR) Data for Law Enforcement Purposes 

1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

On 5 September 2007, the Impact Assessment Board of the European Commission delivered 
an opinion regarding a preliminary version of this Impact Assessment report. In the opinion, 
the Board in brief stated that the IA report should be further improved by better illustrating 
the  risk  of  no  EU  action,  by  explaining  in  more  detail  the  choices  made  in  shaping  and 
selecting  the  preferred  policy  option,  and  by  elaborating  on  the  consequences  for  relations 
with third countries.  

It further stated that: 

(1) The limitation of the scope to extra-EU flights should be better explained.  

(2) The choice of the preferred option should be better explained.  

(3) Impacts on relations with third countries should be further elaborated.  

(4) The problem definition should be strengthened by illustrating the risk of divergent national 
measures.  

The present version of the Impact Assessment report has been significantly redrafted, with a 
view  to  taking  these  recommendations  fully  into  account.  Additional  information  and 
modifications have been introduced to this end in many of its sections. 

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

Work on the Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) Data for Law 
Enforcement  Purposes  commenced  in  2005  following  several  calls  to  that  effect  by  the 
European Council. More specifically, the European Council in its Declaration on combating 
terrorism of March 2004 called on the European Commission to bring forward a proposal "for 
a common EU approach to the use of passengers' data for border and aviation security and 
other law enforcement purposes". A European policy in this area has been announced in the 
Commission Communication "Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A global 
EU approach" of 16 December 20031. The request for European action on PNR was repeated 
in  the  Hague  Programme  and  by  the  extraordinary  JHA  Council  of  13  July  2005  in  its 
Declaration on the EU response to the London bombings of July 2005. More recently, the EU 
Action  Plan  on  combating  terrorism  calls  for  the  development  and  implementation  of  the 
exchange and analysis of airline passenger name records (PNR). 

In this context, the Commission has also actively participated in the work of the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to establish guidelines for the use of PNR data. 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise 

Several meetings and consultations were organised under the negotiations on the transfer of 
PNR data to the United States and on the transfer of Advance Passenger Information and PNR 
data  to  Canada.  Further  to  the  meetings  organised  by  the  Commission  services  with 
associations  of  air  carriers  and  representatives  of  computer  reservation  systems,  three 

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COM(2003) 826. 

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dedicated meetings on a possible initiative on the development of an EU policy on the use of 
passenger data have been organised by under the umbrella of the Forum on the prevention of 
organised  crime.  These  meetings  brought  together  representatives  of  data  protection 
authorities,  border  control  and  law  enforcement  authorities,  and  Europol,  and  took  place  in 
November 2003, May 2005 and July 2005. 

For the purposes of the preparation of this report, the Commission services further consulted 
all the relevant stakeholders on the basis of a questionnaire which was sent out in December 
2006. Subsequently, the Commission  invited one representative of each Member State, who 
could be accompanied by an expert, to a meeting in Brussels on the 2nd February 2007, during 
which the representatives of the Member States had the opportunity to exchange their views. 

The questionnaire was sent to: 

•  All the Member States 

•  The data protection authorities of the Member States 

•  The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 

•  The Association of European Airlines (AEA) 

•  The Air Transport Association of America 

•  The International Air Carrier Association (IACA) 

•  The European Regions Airline Association (ERA) 

•  The International Air Transport Association (IATA) 

Replies  were  received from 24 Member States,  namely Austria, Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, 
Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Such replies were sent either by the Ministry of the 
Interior  or  the  Ministry  of  Justice  of  the  Member  States,  whichever  was  responsible  for  the 
file. A joint reply was received  from the national data protection authorities of the Member 
States. Replies were also received from the EDPS, the Air Transport Association of America, 
the  International  Air  Carrier  Association  (IACA),  the  Association  of  European  Airlines 
(AEA),  the  European  Regions  Airline  Association  (ERA),  the  International  Air  Transport 
Association  (IATA),  LOT  Polish  Airlines  and  Austrian  Airlines.  A  table  summarising  the 
replies of the Member States is attached as Annex B hereto. 

Furthermore, extensive discussions were held with air carriers, data protection authorities and 
border and law enforcement authorities since 2003, notably between 2003-2004 and in 2006 
during the negotiations for the agreements on the transfer of PNR data to the US and during 
the years 2004-2005 for the agreement on the transfer of PNR and API data to Canada. The 
implementation  of  the  PNR  agreement  with  the  US  has  been  the  subject  of  a  joint  review 
between the Commission, assisted by national authorities, and US authorities.  

The data protection authorities of the Member States,  meeting as a consultative  body to the 
Commission  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Article  29  Working  Party,  have  issued  a  number  of 
opinions on the use of PNR data2. 

2 

Opinion 1/2005 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name 
Record  and  Advance  Passenger  Information  from  airlines,  January  2005,  Opinion  6/2004  on  the 
implementation of the Commission decision of 14-V-2004 on the adequate protection of personal data 

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A  steering  group  has  been  set-up  to  steer  the  group  of  the  impact  assessment.  The  group 
consisted of officials from the various services of the Commission, it met once to discuss the 
issue and further comments where provided in writing.  

1.3. 

Impact of the consultations 

The  replies  that  the  Commission  received  to  the  questionnaire  have  had  a  major  impact  on 
shaping  the  present  report  and  will  have  an  impact  on  any  legislative  proposal  that  the 
Commission might submit.  

More specifically, such impact affected: 

•  The choice of the policy option: it became clear from the replies which were received to the 
questionnaire  that  most  of  the  Member  States  are  clearly  in  favour  of  a  legislative 
instrument  which  would  regulate  a  common  EU  approach  on  the  matter.  The  Art.29 
Working  Party  was  not  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  such  a  proposal  and  is  therefore 
opposed  to  the  proposal,  but  it  noted  that  once  the  necessity  is  established  or  several 
Member  States  would  be  considering  the  development  of  a  national  PNR  systems,  then 
harmonisation of such measures at an EU level should be preferred. 

•  The scope of the proposal as regards the modes of transport: the majority of the consulted 
parties agree that the scope of the proposal should be limited to air transport as a first step, 
with  the  possibility  of  extending  it  to  other  forms  of  transport  at  a  later  stage.  This 
approach is generally based on the fact that air carriers/operators already have systems with 
which they capture PNR data and it would therefore be easier for them to comply with the 
proposal. 

•  The  geographical  scope  of  the  proposal:  most  parties  consulted  believe  that  the 
geographical scope of the proposal should be limited to flights from third countries to the 
EU  and  from  the  EU  to  third  countries.  At  this  stage,  it  is  thought  disproportionate  to 
extend  the  scope  of  the  proposal  to  flights  from  one  Member  State  to  another  Member 
State and to internal flights within a Member State. 

•  The use of and purpose for collecting the PNR data: The collection of PNR data should be 
used  for  the  purposes  of  the  third  pillar  only,  i.e.  the  prevention  of  and  fight  against 
terrorism and related crimes and organised crime.  

•  The data retention period: It was commonly agreed that, for the system to be effective, the 
data  need  to  be  retained  for  a  period  of  5  years,  unless  they  were  used  for  a  crime 
investigation or an intelligence operation. 

•  The body receiving the PNR data: The majority of the Member States are in favour of the 
idea  that  the  data  be  received  by  a  Passenger  Information  Unit  which  will  be  identified 
within  each  Member  State,  while  other  Member  States  are  in  favour  of  a  centralised  EU 
Unit which would receive data from carriers from all the Member States. 

•  The  method  of  data  transmission:  The  "push"  method  of  transmission  is  preferred  to  the 
"pull" method by all parties consulted. The main difference of the two methods is that in 
the "push" method, the data are being transmitted by the carrier to the national authority, 

contained in the Passenger Name Records of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of 
Customs  and  Border  Protection,  and  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European  Community  and  the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, June 2004, and others. 

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whereas in the "pull" method the national authority obtains access to the reservation system 
of the carrier and takes the data. 

•  The onward transfers of the PNR data: Most of the consulted parties are in favour of the 
PNR  data  being  transmitted  to  the  national  competent  authorities  and  to  the  competent 
authorities of other  Member  States. Some Member  States are in favour of the data being 
transmitted also to the competent authorities of third countries. 

•  IT security: For the purposes of security in the transmission of the data, most parties which 
were consulted agree that common encryption standards could be adopted to ensure such 
security. 

The  choice  of  dealing  with  the  issue  by  means  of  encouraging  cooperation  between  the 
Member States was one which was considered initially but rejected by all, except two parties 
consulted. Such encouraged cooperation could be in the form of exchange of best practices. 
However,  it  is  considered  that  the  option  of  encouraging  co-operation  between  the  Member 
States, would not achieve the desired objectives, for the following reasons: 

•  It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure a common EU approach on the 
matter  in  this  way,  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  ensure  that  such  best  practices  are 
actually exchanged.  

•  Further, the problems of terrorism and organised crime affect most of the Member States 
and  are  not  limited  to  some  Member  States  only.  Because  of  the  open  internal  borders 
within  the  EU,  in  case  that  some  Member  States  refused  or  failed  to  co-ordinate  their 
activities, they would create a substantial loop-hole to the security of the Union which we 
are  aiming  to  increase.  The  security  of  the  EU  is  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  Member 
States  and  all  Member  States  should  act  in  a  harmonised  manner  in  order  to  achieve 
results.  The  goal  of  increasing  security  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  merely  by 
encouraging  co-operation  between  Member  States.  Such  encouraged  cooperation  would 
not  contribute  towards  achieving  the  objectives  of  Article  29  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union, i.e.  "… to  provide  citizens  with a high level of  safety  within an area of freedom, 
security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields 
of police and judicial cooperation…". 

•  The airlines and the data protection authorities of the Member States, even though against 
the  general  idea  of  making  available  PNR  data  for  law  enforcement  purposes,  were 
adamant that if any action is taken, then that should lead to harmonisation. Otherwise, we 
expect to end up with diverging requirements which will be ultimately very costly for the 
airlines and the Member States. It would be very costly for air carriers if, for example, they 
have to send 20 PNR elements to the UK, 25 to France and all to Denmark, retain the data 
on  behalf  of  one  Member  State  but  not  for  the  others,  use different  encryption  standards 
and protocols for each Member State in order to safeguard the secure transmission of the 
data. 

•  It  is  further  noted  that  the  guidelines  of  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation 
(ICAO) on PNR data are not binding and have proved not to provide a sufficient basis for 
the required co-operation. 

•  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  the  option  of  encouraging  co-operation  between  the  Member 

States in this field is rejected at this initial stage and will not be further examined. 

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2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Description of the problem 

Terrorism  currently  constitutes  one  of  the  greatest  threats  to  security,  peace,  stability, 
democracy and fundamental rights, values on which the European Union is founded, as well 
as  a  direct  threat  to  European  citizens.  The  threat  of  terrorism  is  not  restricted  to  specific 
geographic zones. Terrorists and terrorist organisations can be found both within and outside 
the borders of the EU and have proved their ability to carry out attacks and acts of violence in 
any continent and against any country. The "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007" 
of Europol identified that almost all terrorist campaigns are . It is clear that the internal and 
external aspects of the fight against terrorism are interlinked and that, for any measure to be 
effective,  a  close  cooperation  and  an  enhanced  exchange  of  information  between  Member 
States  and  their  respective  services,  as  well  as  with  Europol  and,  where  appropriate,  the 
competent authorities of third countries, is necessary. 

The  Europol  "EU  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  2007"  notes  that  there  were  498 
reported terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006. The Report identifies that, although there were no 
successful Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006, the type of the attempted attacks shows 
that  the  attacks  are  aimed  at  indiscriminate  mass  casualties  and  at  the  transportation 
infrastructure of the Member States. 

The same Report notes that 706 individuals were arrested in the EU in 2006 on suspicion of 
terrorist offences, out of which 257 were arrested in relation to Islamist terrorist attacks. The 
Report concludes that investigations into Islamist terrorism are clearly a priority for Member 
States' law enforcement. The acquittal rate at the trial stage for terrorism charges was recorded 
at 15% in 2005 (similar data for 2006 are not yet available). 

As regards organised crime, over the last few years the European Union and the world have 
experienced more than ever before its geographic spread. Criminals have taken full advantage 
of the effects of globalisation and are using more and more opportunities to travel, exchange 
information and communication to perform their business. Intelligence has further indicated 
that, due to the increasing access that law enforcement authorities have to e-communications, 
terrorists and criminals tend to prefer to travel and meet to discuss their business rather than 
communicating long-distance. It is becoming therefore, more and more important to obtain as 
much information as possible about the travel of such persons.  

After  9/11  the  US  proceeded  immediately  with  the  introduction  of  PNR  legislation.  Even 
though the EU had agreed initially in 2004 to make PNR data available to the US, it has been 
more  reluctant  to  introduce  such  measures  itself  internally.  Since  then,  and  because  the 
terrorist  threat  remains  and  is  even  intensified,  the  Member  States  of  the  EU  are  realising 
more and more the need to raise their level of awareness of this threat. At this point, it seems 
appropriate  to  proceed  with  the  introduction  of  PNR  legislation  and  the  Member  States 
indicate  that  there  is  a  strong  need  for  the  EU  to  take  proactive,  rather  than  solely  reactive, 
measures in order to combat terrorism and organised crime effectively.  

This  impact  assessment  aims  to  assess  whether  there  is  a  need  for  a  proposal  at  European 
Union  level  aimed  at  setting  up  a  coherent  legal  framework  regarding  the  obligation  of 
carriers to transmit Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to the relevant competent authorities 
for  the  purposes  of  preventing  and  fighting  terrorist  offences  and  organised  crime.  Such  a 
measure would aim to contribute towards building intelligence about terrorists and criminals 
and  to  identifying  behaviour  patterns  of  such  persons.  The  European  Union  Strategy  for 
Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism notes, for example, the importance of 

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identifying persons who travel to conflict zones in order to prevent terrorist training. To that 
extent,  the  proposed  measure  would  aim  to  identify  both  terrorists  coming  from  outside  the 
EU  as  well  as  those  already  in  the  EU.  Such  a  measure  could  also  contribute  towards 
depriving terrorists and criminals of the opportunity to travel and enter the territory of the EU 
and  towards  preventing  the  means  of  transport  themselves  to  be  used  as  weapons.  The 
measure could further contribute to making transport safer, and enhancing legitimate travel. 

Currently  air  carriers  have  an  obligation  to  communicate  Advance  Passenger  Information 
(API)  to  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States,  under  Council  Directive 
2004/82/EC3. This measure aims to provide a means to border control authorities to enhance 
border  control  and  to  fight  illegal  immigration.  Under  this  Directive,  Member  States  are 
obliged to take the necessary national measures to ensure that carriers transmit, at the request 
of  the  authorities  responsible  for  carrying  out  checks  on  persons  at  external  borders, 
information  concerning  the  passengers  of  a  flight.  Such  information  includes  only  the  API 
Data, which  is  basically biographical data. Such data  include the number and type of travel 
document used, nationality, full names, the date of birth, the border crossing point of entry, 
code of transport, departure and arrival time of the transportation, total number of passengers 
carried on that transport and the initial point of embarkation. The information contained in the 
API  data  may  also  help  to  identify  known  terrorists  and  criminals  by  running  their  names 
against alert systems, such as the SIS.  

PNR data include passport data, name, address, telephone numbers, travel agent, credit card 
number, history of changes in the flight schedule, seat preferences and other information. The 
PNR data of a certain passenger usually does not contain all PNR fields, but only those that 
are actually provided by the passenger at the time of the reservation and information received 
upon check-in and boarding. It must be noted that air carriers already capture the PNR data of 
passengers for their own commercial purposes, but that non-air carriers do not capture such 
data. 

Currently, the competent authorities of the Member States may obtain the information which 
is contained in the PNR data of a passenger of an international flight by looking at his ticket 
and the boarding card that he is required to fill in for the purpose of border control. It is only 
in very rare cases that the PNR data of a passenger, as processed in the reservation system of 
the carrier, will contain some additional information. The added value of the proposal would 
be that the competent authorities of the Member States would be able to receive the data in an 
electronic form and well in advance of a flight's arrival. This will provide the authorities with 
the possibility of processing it electronically and in substantially less time than if it were done 
manually. This, in turn, is beneficial both for the authorities as well as the passengers since it 
reduces the time that they have to wait for border control. 

PNR data can be used by law enforcement authorities in five ways: 

•  Running  the  PNR  data  of  passengers  against  alert  systems  in  order  to  identify  known 

terrorists and criminals 

•  Once  a  known  terrorist  or  criminal  is  identified,  PNR  can  be  used  to  identify  another 
passenger  who  is  connected  to  the  known  terrorist/criminal.  This  can  be  done  by 
comparing the PNR data of the known terrorist/criminal to those of other passengers and 
identifying those who might share the same address, credit card number, contact details etc 
with  him.  This  exercise  can  be  very  useful  in  obtaining  evidence  by  association  and  in 
identifying previously unsuspected passengers.  

3 

OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24. 

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•  Running  the  PNR  data  of  passengers  against  a  combination  of  characteristics  and 
behavioural patterns, aimed at creating a risk-assessment. When a passenger fits within a 
certain risk-assessment, then he could be identified as a high-risk passenger. 

•  Running  the  PNR  data  of  passengers  against  risk  intelligence  relevant  at  a  certain  time, 
with the aim of identifying high-risk passengers. For example, when intelligence exists that 
a travel agency in a certain country has connections with a specific terrorist organisation or 
criminal  group,  PNR  data  can  help  identify  which  passengers  have  bought  tickets  from 
such suspected agency. 

•  Providing intelligence on travel patterns and associations after a terrorist offence has been 

committed. 

For the purposes of the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the information contained 
in the API data would be sufficient for the first purpose mentioned above, i.e. for identifying 
persons by using alert systems. API data are official  data,  as  they  stem  from  passports,  and 
sufficiently accurate as to the identity of a passenger. The advantage however, that PNR data 
has over API data for this purpose, is that PNR data can be available much earlier than API 
data. In case therefore, that PNR reveals that a highly dangerous person will be on a certain 
flight, measures can be taken to prevent that person from boarding the flight. On the contrary, 
if only API data are available, that person is already on the flight in which case there are two 
alternatives, none of which is sufficiently satisfactory: first, to make the airplane redirect or 
turn back, or secondly, deal with the dangerous person upon arrival. On this basis, it is clear 
that the provision of PNR data would provide an advantage to the mere provision of API data.  

As regards the other four uses of PNR which are mentioned above, it is clear that API cannot 
be put to any of those uses. API data cannot provide characteristics and patterns of behaviour 
of passengers, cannot provide evidence by association and cannot be run against intelligence. 
As such, API data are unable to help identify unknown high-risk passengers. 

The  rationale  behind  identifying  unknown  high-risk  passengers  is  that  this  allows  for 
secondary  screening  upon  their  arrival  and  to  further  questioning  by  border  control  officers 
and in specific circumstances, in combination with other information, to a refusal of entry in 
the  territory  of  the  destination  country.  On  the  other  hand,  low-risk  and  unsuspected 
passengers are subjected to minimum border controls.  

For the purposes of the fight against terrorist offences and organised crime, the use of PNR 
data  in  combination  with  API  data  is  an  especially  useful  and  necessary  one,  especially  in 
obtaining  evidence  by  association.  Without  the  API  data,  PNR  data  would  be  unable,  in 
themselves to provide the behavioural analysis and to be used for obtaining intelligence and 
evidence by association. A case of obtaining evidence by association would be for example 
when a known terrorist who is identified by his API data, travels together with another person 
who has used the same credit card for purchasing the ticket, or used the same home address 
etc.  Further,  the  examination  of  the  travel  patterns  of  certain  suspected  passengers  during  a 
period of time can help point towards possible planned attacks. Information linked to travel 
prior  to  and  in  preparation  of  an  attack  can  also  provide  essential  data  for  law  enforcement 
purposes. 

As stated above, API data are currently transmitted (or should be transmitted once the Council 
Directive  2004/82/EC  is  transposed  in  all  Member  States)  only  by  air  carriers  and  only  for 
international flights. Therefore it is advisable that any proposal for the use of PNR data should 
also be limited to air carriers operating international flights. However, it might be useful in the 
future to consider the extension of the scope of the API Directive to further cover at least sea 
travel, at which point the PNR data collection could also be extended. 

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Currently, arrangements for the transmission of PNR data in the context of the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime have been concluded between the EU and the United States and 
Canada  and  are  limited  to  travel  by  air.  This  implies  that  air  carriers,  which  were  already 
capturing the PNR data of their passengers for their own commercial purposes, are obliged to 
transmit these data to the competent authorities of the USA and Canada. On the basis of an 
exchange of information with these third countries, the EU has been able to assess the value 
of  PNR  data  and  to  realise  its  potential  for  law  enforcement  purposes.  The  EU  has  further 
been able to learn from the experiences of such third countries in the use of PNR data, as well 
as from the experience of the UK from its pilot project. The UK experience shows that, in the 
two years of working its pilot project (which covers only air and only limited routes), 12,044 
alerts  have  been  issued  by  the  system,  1050  arrests  for  various  crimes  have  been  made  and 
substantial intelligence has been obtained for a range of suspects The US has also indicated a 
successful  operation  of  its  system,  with  several  arrests,  identification  of  human  trafficking 
networks and gaining of valuable intelligence.  

Some  Member  States,  namely  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Denmark,  have  already 
enacted  primary  legislation  for  the  capture  and  use  of  PNR  data,  and  are  in  the  process  of 
considering secondary legislation to implement such national PNR systems4.  

An  analysis  of  the  national  legislation  of  the  UK,  France  and  Denmark  indicates  that  their 
provisions are diverging and can be summarised as follows: 

•  The  UK  suggests  the  use  of  PNR  data  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  all  crimes  and 
illegal immigration. PNR will be required from all flights, including intra-EU and domestic 
flights. The period of retention of the data is not mentioned. There will be wide sharing of 
the  data  between  its  agencies.  PNR  will  be  required  from  air,  sea  and  rail  carriers  to  the 
extent that such exist.  

•  France suggests the use of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration 
(not  for  other  crimes).  PNR  will  be  required  from  all  flights,  including  intra-EU.  The 
period  of  retention  is  24  hours  for  immigration  purposes  and  5  years  for  terrorism 
purposes. PNR data will be required from air, sea and rail carriers to the extent that such 
exist. 

•  Denmark  suggests  the  use  of  PNR  data  only  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  crimes 
against the State. The proposed period of retention is 1 year and covers only air travel. It 
does not proposes a system of transmission of PNR data but a system of retention of the 
data  by  the  air  carriers  while  giving  direct  access  to  such  data  to  some  law  enforcement 
agencies. Informal talks with Denmark indicated that they are considering amending their 
legislation because the system of retention of the data by the air carriers is thought to be 
ineffective. 

These  provisions  indicate  that  there  is  divergence  as  regards  the  purpose  of  the  system,  the 
period  of  retention,  the  structure  of  the  system,  the  geographical  scope  and  the  modes  of 
transport  which  are  covered.  It  is  also  very  likely  that  there  will  be  divergence  on  the 
measures  taken  to  safeguard  the  security  of  the  transmission  of  the  data,  i.e.  will  introduce 
different encryption standards and transmission protocols. 

It is interesting also to note that such legislation was enacted in the three Member States in the 
context of transposing the API Directive. 

4 

For the UK, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; 
For Denmark, the Air Navigation Act; 
For France, Article 7 Division IV et V - art. 8 de la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978. 

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Furthermore, it can be anticipated that more third countries are likely to request the provision 
of PNR data from the EU directly or from individual Member States. For example Australia 
and  New  Zealand  have  already  officially  requested  the  conclusion  of  bilateral  agreements 
with  the  EU  for  the  provision  of  such  data,  and  more  third  countries  are  expected  to  put 
forward  such  requests.  The  consultation  has  further  indicated  that  more  Member  States  will 
prepare their own legislative instruments regulating PNR data collection and transmission to 
their relevant authorities and/or third countries in the near future. Such a development might 
lead  to  the  establishment  of  many  and  even  potentially  27  considerably  diverging  systems. 
Carriers  would  be  faced  with  the  very  difficult  task  of  having  to  comply  with  a  number  of 
different  systems,  and  the  national  authorities  would  have  to  develop  systems  to  be  able  to 
receive and transmit data in potentially many different ways. For example, carriers would run 
the risk of having to transmit different PNR elements to different Member States, "push" them 
to  some  authorities  and  "pull"  them  from  others.  For  this  reason,  the  carriers  associations 
which were consulted for the purposes of this report, were strongly in favour of harmonisation 
of the field at an EU level, rather than being faced with various diverging systems. 

The issue of ensuring adequate protection of the privacy of the affected passengers is also one 
to  be  considered.  As  more  and  more  Member  States  adopt  national  legislation  for  the 
transmission by carriers and use of PNR data and  as  more  and  more  third  countries  request 
such transmission from carriers, it is important to ensure that the data are transmitted and used 
under adequate safeguards and with sufficient redress mechanisms for the passengers, rather 
than  to  reply  on  systems  based  on  consent,  i.e.  systems  under  which  the  passenger's  data  is 
obtained  with  his  consent  and  with  no  other  safeguards.  Additionally,  the  development  of 
potentially  27  national  diverging  systems  for  the  collection  and  use  of  the  data  would 
unnecessarily  affect  the  right  of  privacy  of  passengers.  The  Art.29  Working  Party  on  Data 
Protection,  even  though  not  in  favour  of  the  use  of  PNR  data,  strongly  prefer  a  European 
instrument  with  strong  data  protection  guarantees,  rather  than  various  diverging  national 
systems with diverging data protection standards. 

Another aspect to be taken into account is that the number of travellers is increasing rapidly. 
This, together with the additional border and security controls that are being put forward by 
national  authorities,  have  started  creating  a  problem  of  managing  the  flows  of  passengers 
efficiently.  This  problem  is  expected  to  become  worse  as  the  number  of  travellers  grows. 
Long  queues  of  travellers  waiting  for  security  controls  may  become  a  terrorist  target 
themselves.  The  collection  and  use  of  PNR  data  will  contribute  towards  managing  this 
problem  more  efficiently.  The  possibility  of  performing  border  and  security  controls  of  a 
traveller's  PNR  data  before  he  or  she  actually  arrives  in  the  country  of  destination,  will 
provide  the  possibility  of  clearing  unsuspected  travellers  and  subjecting  them  only  to  the 
absolute minimum controls at the border. 

The problem 

•  Insufficient  access  of  law  enforcement  authorities  to  all  passenger  information  for  fighting 

terrorism and organised crime. 

•  Risk of legal uncertainty  for carriers in terms of diverging legal requirements imposed upon 
them as regards transmission of PNR data and risk of distortion of the internal market through 
diverging legal requirements. 

•  Risk of not being able to appropriately manage an ever growing number of travellers and the 

increase of border and security controls. 

•  Risk to the protection of citizens' fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy, if the 

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exchange of PNR takes place on the basis of incompatible systems. 

•  Absence  of  an  EU  position  in  this  area  may  hamper  an  appropriate  EU  response  to  the 
international  dimension  of  the  matter  and  the  definition  of  a  global  approach  to  the  use  of 
passenger data in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. 

2.2. 

Parties affected by the problem 

The problem potentially affects all citizens in the EU, the governments of the Member States 
as well as the air carriers/operators. Effects may be both direct, in the form of casualties from 
a terrorist attack, and indirect, in the form of effects on society, economy, and disruption of 
certain  services  in  case  of  an  attack  affecting  the  provision  of  such  services,  as  well  as 
affecting their privacy. 

•  Member States are affected by the problem since they are at a constant risk of a terrorist 
attack which will affect their citizens and/or their infrastructure. Member States also have 
to  deal  with  organised  crime  in  its  various  forms,  which  affects  their  societies  and 
economies. 

•  European citizens are affected since they are at an unpredictable risk of being victims of a 
terrorist  attack,  which  might  result  in  loss  of  life,  destruction  of  property,  disruption  of 
services. Further, because of the sensitivity of the matter in potentially interfering with the 
right  of  privacy  of  individuals,  the  potential  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  applicable  rules 
makes it difficult to ensure compliance with the data protection principles. 

•  Carriers  are  affected  since  they  face  the  risk  of  their  means  of  transport  being  used  in 
themselves  as  weapons,  and  they  also  face  the  risk  of  potential  liabilities  in  case  of 
insufficient controls carried out by them. Further, if each Member State develops its own 
PNR system, diverging legal requirements might be imposed upon them, putting them in a 
very difficult position in terms of compliance. As regards the number of flight movements 
and passengers affected by the possible introduction of PNR measures, air carriers carried 
approximately 500.000.000 passengers on 3.300.000 flights going in and out of the EU-27 
in 20065.  

2.3. 

EU right to act 

The  right  of  the  EU  to  act  in  this  field  is  enshrined  in  Title  VI  on  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union.  

Because of the nature of the terrorist and organised crime threats, investigations carried out by 
the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  are  largely  dependent  on  international  and 
trans-border cooperation. It is impossible for the Member States alone to achieve appropriate 
harmonisation  of  legal  obligations  in  this  area,  including  the  provision  of  harmonised 
categories of passenger data, to be imposed on all air carriers operating flights into or from the 
European Union. In addition, action at the EU level will help to ensure harmonised provisions 
on safeguarding privacy, whereas if Member States are left to legislate independently, it might 
be more difficult to achieve harmonisation of such safeguards. 

As  this  issue  concerns  the  security  of  each  individual  Member  State  and  of  the  Union  as  a 
whole,  the  exchange  of  such  information  in  a  harmonised  manner  is  particularly  important, 
especially  today  where  free  circulation  of  persons  is  a  reality  in  the  Schengen  area,  where 
there  exists  an  increase  in  the  level  of  outbound  and  inbound  travellers  in  the  European 

5 

Figures according to Eurocontrol on the basis of CFMU IFR Flights. 

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Union, and where the need for timely identification of possible security threats is greater than 
ever, while facing the need to appropriately manage an ever-increasing number of travellers. 

A  further  reason  for  which  EU  action  would  be  more  appropriate  is  that,  the  diverging 
national  requirements  in  this  area  of  Member  States  which  already  established  similar 
mechanisms and of the Member States which very possibly would develop such mechanisms 
in the near future, might trigger negative effects for the economic operators, i.e. the carriers 
and those authorities having responsibility for the security of citizens in the European Union. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Denmark  have  already  enacted 
primary legislation and are in the process of enacting secondary legislation through which the 
PNR data is captured and used for specific purposes, and already it is clear how different such 
mechanisms are. 

In addition, one of the purposes of the use of PNR is to provide competent authorities with the 
relevant information available in the reservation systems of carriers. Without action at an EU 
level,  carriers  might  choose  to  increase  their  flight  activities  to  those  Member  States  not 
requiring  the  provision  of  passenger  information.  This  could  lead  to  market  distortion  for 
transport  activities  and  create  an  impossible  task  for  the  competent  border  and  law 
enforcement  authorities,  especially  if  a  legal  differentiation  on  the  provision  of  passenger 
information  would  exist  between  Member  States. This could also lead to important security 
gaps and severely affect the effectiveness of PNR data as a security instrument. 

As indicated above, in the absence of EU action, carriers would be faced with diverging legal, 
technical and financial issues to respond to a multitude of requirements regarding PNR data 
transfer imposed on them by several States. It has been the aim of the European Union and 
subsequently  of  the  guidelines  of  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO)  on 
PNR to minimise the cost burden on industry. The current report has been elaborated along 
those lines. One of the major cost-cutting elements is to strictly limit the obligation to provide 
PNR  data  to  those  data  elements  which  are  collected  by  air  carriers  in  their  reservation 
systems as those have been agreed and defined in the ICAO guidelines. 

The report will aim to minimise the impact on national public authorities by permitting them 
to  continue  using  existing  control  infrastructures.  Furthermore  the  creation  of  national 
"Passenger Information Units" or a Centralised EU Unit will provide Member States with a 
'single-window' point to obtain the relevant information from the carriers. In particular two or 
more Member States may establish or designate a common structure to serve as a Passenger 
Information  Unit.  As  such  it  will  present  an  economy  of  scale  compared  to  the  current 
situation  whereby  the  various  authorities  have  to  establish  individual  contacts  with  carriers 
and operational infrastructures to deal with the passenger information per department. 

On the basis of the above, it can safely be concluded that the EU is both entitled to act and 
better placed to do so than the Member States. 

2.4. 

Respect of fundamental rights 

The  proposed  measure  would  aim  to  prevent  and  combat  terrorism  and  organised  crime.  The 
purpose of such a measure is for the EU to ensure the right of the European citizens to enjoy all 
their fundamental rights, and especially the right to life and physical integrity. 

The proposed actions involve the collection, processing, exchange and use of some personal 
data of citizens travelling to and from the EU. As such, they might interfere with the right to 
the protection of private and family life and to the protection of personal data as protected by 
Art.7 and 8 (subject to the limits set in Article 52) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of 

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the  European  Union  and  Art.8  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights.  The  right  to 
private  and  family  life  however  is  not  absolute,  but  subject  to  exceptions  for  reasons 
necessary "in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others", provided interference is done "in accordance 
with the law" and is "necessary in a democratic society". As the proposed actions aim to combat 
terrorism and organised crime, they would clearly come under the umbrella of the exceptions. 
The proposed proposal would have to ensure that any such interference would be proportionate 
done "in accordance with the law" and "necessary in a democratic society". 

The measure would come under Title VI TEU. Until the time of drafting of the present impact 
assessment, the Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters6 
has not yet been adopted, but it is expected to be adopted shortly. 

In view of this, the aim should be to observe the data protection standards as set in European 
instruments,  such  as  the  Convention  108  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with  Regard  to 
Automatic  Processing  of  Personal  Data  of  the  Council of Europe.  To that effect, it  should be 
ensured that, to the extent that "sensitive" data7 are contained in the PNR, they will be filtered 
out  and  deleted  immediately,  that  the  purpose  limitation  of  the  use  of  PNR  data  is  clearly 
defined, that the period of retention of the data is limited to the necessary one, that the rights 
of  access,  correction  and  deletion  as  well  as  liability  provisions  are  regulated  and  that  the 
transmissions  of  the  data  is  sufficiently  secure.  In  practice,  all  Member  States  should  also 
already  have  national  legislation  in  place  to  cover  data  processing  by  law  enforcement 
authorities. 

In addition, the competent authorities should be able to use only those PNR elements which are 
considered necessary for the purposes of the fulfilment of the purpose of the measure, and not 
all PNR elements. It is suggested that the minimum PNR data elements which should be used 
are: 

Data for all passengers 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

PNR record locator 

Date of reservation/issue of ticket 

Date(s) of intended travel 

Name (s) 

Address and Contact information (telephone number, e-mail address) 

All forms of payment information, including billing address 

All travel itinerary for specific PNR 

Frequent flyer information  

Travel agency /Travel agent 

(10)  Travel  status  of  passenger  including  confirmations,  check-in  status,  no  show  or  go 

show information 

6 
7 

COM(2005) 475. 
As defined in Article 6 of the Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe. 

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(11)  Split/Divided PNR information 

(12)  General remarks (excluding sensitive information) 

(13)  Ticketing field information, including ticket number, date of ticket issuance and one-

way tickets, Automated Ticket Fare Quote fields 

(14)  Seat number and other seat information 

(15)  Code share information 

(16)  All baggage information 

(17)  Number and other names of travellers on PNR 

(18)  Any collected API information 

(19)  All historical changes to the PNR listed in numbers 1 to 18 

Additional data for unaccompanied minors under 18 years 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Name and gender of child 

Age 

Language(s) spoken 

Name and contact details of guardian on departure and relationship to the child 

Name and contact details of guardian on arrival and relationship to the child 

Departure and arrival agent 

It also important to note that any measure should not oblige carriers to introduce mandatory 
fields in their collection of PNR from their passengers. The carriers will continue to collect 
and make available to the competent authorities only those data that are voluntarily given by 
the passenger for the reservation of his flight, or which have been collected following check-
in and boarding. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

One  of  the  fundamental  goals  of  the  European  Union  is  the  development  of  a  genuinely 
European  area  of  justice,  freedom  and  security.  Such  an  area  aims  to  ensure  that  the 
fundamental rights of its citizens, such as life, physical integrity and the protection of citizens' 
personal data and privacy, are guaranteed.  

In  the  Hague  programme  for  2005-2010,  the  Council  has  called  again  for  a  common  EU 
approach to the use of passengers' data for law enforcement purposes. A European policy in 
this area has been announced in the Commission Communication "Transfer of Air Passenger 
Name  Record  (PNR)  Data:  A  global  EU  approach"  of  16  December  20038.  The 
implementation of a genuinely European approach with regard to the use of passenger data for 
law enforcement purposes should take due account of the following issues: 

•  The prevention of and fight against terrorism and organised crime, 

•  The right to privacy and the protection of fundamental rights, 

•  The security and convenience of passengers, 

8 

COM(2003) 826. 

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•  The impact on carriers, in particular in terms of legal certainty and compliance cost, 

•  The international dimension of this issue, 

•  The non-distortion of competition. 

Such general issues translate into the following operational policy objectives: 

•  Fighting  terrorism  and  organised  crime  by  using  PNR  data  and  protecting  citizens'  life  and 

physical integrity, the EU as a whole and each Member State, 

•  Providing  legal  certainty  to  carriers  in  terms  of  the  legal  requirements  imposed  upon  them, 

while avoiding a distortion of the internal market through diverging legal requirements, 

•  Protecting citizens' fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy, while recognising the 

need for a wider sharing of relevant personal data for law enforcement purposes, 

•  Developing an EU position in this area with the aim to encourage a global approach to the use 

of passenger data in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The Commission considers that there are two main policy options, which are described below: 

4.1. 

Refraining from addressing the issue at an EU level 

This policy option entails no action to be taken by the EU. In effect this means that the issue 
of  exchange  of  PNR  data  for  the  purpose  of  combating  terrorism  and  organised  crime  will 
remain  unresolved  at  an  EU  level  and  there  will  remain  only  the  Council  Directive 
2004/82/EC9 on the obligation to carriers to communicate passenger data for the purposes of 
border control (API data). 

This  policy  option  may  also  entail  all  or  some  Member  States  enacting  national  legislation 
obliging  carriers  to  communicate  PNR  data  to  the  relevant  authorities  for  the  purposes  of 
combating terrorism and organised crime or additional purposes. It might also result in some 
Member States agreeing with third countries to exchange such data with them. 

4.2. 

Introducing  a  legislative  proposal  for  the  use  of  passenger  data  for  law 
enforcement purposes 

In  this  policy  option,  a  legislative  instrument  from  the  EU  would  change  the  current  legal 
situation to ensure that Member States collect, use and share a particular set of passenger data 
for specific law enforcement purposes, subject to a number of safeguards aimed to provide the 
highest level of protection of personal data. Such safeguards should be aimed at ensuring the 
appropriate purpose limitation, defining the period of retention of the data, and setting rules 
for the security of the data and redress mechanisms.  

Such  a  legislative  proposal  might  take  the  form  of  two  alternative  options  which  vary  in 
scope, namely: 

4.2.1.  A proposal covering travel by air with a decentralised collection of the data 

Under this policy option, air carriers would be obliged to transmit the PNR data of 
their passengers to a Passenger Information Unit which would be identified in each 

9 

OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24. 

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Member State. Such a Unit would process the data and transmit them to the relevant 
law enforcement authorities. 

4.2.2.  A proposal covering travel by air with a centralised collection of data 

Under this policy option, air carriers would be obliged to transmit the PNR data of 
their passengers to a Centralised Unit at an EU level. Such Unit would process the 
data and transmit them to the relevant law enforcement authorities. 

Some  Member  States  suggested  that  the  measure  should  also  cover  travel  by  sea  and  rail. 
Such  an  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  measure  seems  to  be  premature  for  the  following 
reasons: 

•  Currently  only  air  carriers  collect  such  information.  The  data  are  given  by  the  passenger 
voluntarily and are collected and processed by the air carriers for commercial purposes via 
their Computerised Reservation Systems (CRS). The nature of air travel implies that, as a 
minimum, the name and flight numbers are known for each passenger at the time that the 
booking is made. This situation does not exist for most of sea and rail travel. For example, 
only Eurostar collects some PNR-like data, Thalys collects some data when the reservation 
is made online and cruise ships collect some PNR-like data. On the other hand, ferries and 
intercity trains do not collect any data about their passengers and do not have computerised 
reservation systems which are similar to those of air carriers. 

•  The setting up of a system to collect such data on such modes of transport would be very 
costly, both for the carriers but also for the public authorities. The carriers would have to 
set up the systems of collection, and the public authorities would have to set up the systems 
for  verification  of  the  information,  i.e.  they  would  have  to  install  passport  control  points 
before boarding a ferry or a train and on arrival. Such changes would involve tremendous 
costs. 

•  Such changes would also cause inconvenience to passenger by leading to the extension of 

time between check-in and departure for such additional modes of transport. 

•  API data are currently available only for air travel and without such data PNR data are less 

useful. 

•  By applying PNR  obligations to any other carrier than airlines, considerable costs would 
arise.  They  would  lead  to  a  multiplication  of  data  collected  and  processed.  Such  an 
extension  to  sea  and  rail  travel  could  be  considered  for  the  future,  once  we  will  have 
learned from the experiences with PNR collection from air travel.  

On the basis of the above, this option is dismissed as from this point and will not be analysed 
below. The option should be left open to Member States to extend the scope of the proposal to 
such modes of transport, should they so choose. 

The  policy  option  of  a  legislative  proposal  would  have  to  include  a  number  of  different 
parameters which would be common for the two alternative options mentioned above. These 
parameters refer to the geographical scope of the proposal, the purpose and uses of data, the 
data retention period and possible exceptions to that period, the method of transmission of the 
data  by  the  carriers,  the  data  to  be  transmitted  from  the  Unit  to  the  law  enforcement 
authorities and the authorities which will receive such data. An analysis of these parameters is 
attached hereto as Annex A. 

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5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  

The report will try to identify the social and economic impacts of the options, whether direct 
or  indirect,  in  the  short  term  and  in  the  long  term.  It  should  be  noted  at  this  stage  that  no 
significant  environmental  impacts  could  be  identified  for  these  policy  options.  The  most 
significant impacts that have been identified will be analysed below for the following areas: 
security in the EU, protection of privacy, costs and administrative setup, relations with third 
countries, competition in the internal market and convenience to passengers. 

5.1. 

Impacts of the option of refraining from addressing the issue at an EU level 

This policy option entails no action to be taken by the EU. In effect this means that the issue 
of exchanging of PNR data for the purpose of combating terrorism and organised crime will 
not  be  dealt  with  at  an  EU  level.  The  status  quo  will  therefore  remain.  The  status  quo,  as 
explained, is that air carriers will be obliged to transmit API data to border control authorities 
under  the  Council  Directive  2004/82/EC10  on  the  obligation  to  carriers  to  communicate 
passenger  data  (API)  for  the  purpose  of  combating  illegal  immigration,  and  the  national 
measures  of  the  Member  States.  As  analysed  above,  currently  three  Member  States  have 
relevant legislation. However, the consultations suggested that in the very near future, more 
and  more  Member  States  will  start  taking  such  internal  measures  as  well.  Therefore,  in  our 
assessments,  the  status  quo  takes  into  account  the  expected  developments  in  the  very  near 
future. 

•  Security  in  the  EU.  A  "no  action"  policy  will  hamper  the  ability  of  the  EU  to  fight 
terrorism  and  organised  crime  and  hence  affect  European  citizens'  security.  The  EU  will 
have less means of identifying when a member of a terrorist organisation or a criminal will 
be entering their territory and will be left more exposed to terrorist activities. Furthermore, 
it will deprive the  Member States  from  a very important  source of obtaining  intelligence 
allows  to  establish  movements  and  associations  of  terrorists  and  criminals.  Moreover,  in 
case  that  some  Member  States  develop  their  own  systems,  terrorists  and  criminals  might 
choose to enter the EU through a Member State which will not have such a system or have 
a system of a lower standard. In addition, in view of the free movement of persons within 
the  Schengen  area,  a  system  introduced  in  any  Member  State  might  prove  to  be 
insufficient, as it cannot go beyond its territory. Furthermore, the security of the EU is the 
joint responsibility of the Member States and all Member States should act in a harmonised 
manner  in  order  to  achieve  results.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  aim  of  increasing  the 
security of the EU can be sufficiently achieved merely by relying on national measures. 

○ 

Impact on security in the EU: + 

•  Protection of privacy. The choice of this option would mean that, at an EU level, the right 
to  privacy  of  the  European  citizens  would  not  be  interfered  with  at  an  EU  level.  Each 
Member State would have to safeguard the right to privacy of passengers under their own 
national  systems,  if  such  are  developed.  The  development  of  different  legal  frameworks 
and  mechanisms  to  tackle  the  matter  by  each  Member  State  might  make  it  more 
complicated  for  passengers  to  be  informed  and  to  claim  their  rights  under  each  national 
system,  but  such  a  complication  would  not  affect  the  passengers'  actual  rights.  It  is 
indicatory that the joint reply of the Art.29 Working Party on Data Protection was adamant 
that  in  the  case  that  Member  States  commence  implementing  national  measures,  then 

10 

OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
harmonised EU action would become necessary. 

○ 

Impact on protection of data: 0 

•  Costs  on  public  authorities:  Public  authorities  in  Member  States  deciding  to  introduce 
national PNR legislation would need to set up systems to receive data from carriers. This is 
anticipated  to  lead  to  the  development  of  a  number  of  different  national  systems  of 
collection  and  transmission  of  data,  thus  having  a  serious  negative  impact  on  efficiency 
and  ultimately  on  costs,  since  at  the  end  of  the  day,  each  national  authority  will  have  to 
develop  technology  based  systems  of  transmission  to  potentially  26  different  systems  of 
other Member States. Alternatively, one common system for data exchange connecting to 
different national systems would also be possible, but could be costly to implement, given 
expected differences between national systems which might be established. 

○ 

Impact on costs on public authorities: - 

•  Costs for carriers: National legislation obliging carriers to communicate PNR data to the 
relevant  national  authorities  for  law  enforcement  purposes  would  mean  that  carriers 
capturing  this  data  would  need  to  put  in  place  systems  ensuring  the  connection  with 
different national PNR systems. This could create for them substantial financial, legal and 
technical problems. Considerable costs for carriers can be expected if they would have to 
respond to multiple, requirements which differ substantially from one another. 

○ 

Impact on costs for carriers: --- 

•  Relations with third countries: It is anticipated that more and more third countries will 
request the provision of PNR data from the EU. In the absence of a joint EU approach in 
this  field,  it  will  become  increasingly  difficult  for  the  EU  to  ensure  consistency  in  such 
bilateral agreements with third countries and to insist on certain standards.  

○ 

Impact on relations with third countries: - 

•  Competition in the internal market. In case that some, but not all, Member States choose 
to  develop  their  own  systems  of  PNR  capturing  and  transmission,  carriers  operating 
predominantly  from  countries  which  will  not  have  PNR  legislation  might  be  in  an 
advantageous  position  compared  to  carriers  in  countries  subject  to  more  stringent 
requirements.  This  could  lead  to  a  distortion  of  competition  in  the  EU.  Requirements 
differing between countries might also act as a barrier for entering new European markets.  

○ 

Impact on competition in the internal market: - 

•  Convenience  of  passengers.  If  the  EU  refrains  from  taking  any  action,  it  is  anticipated 
that,  in  an  effort  to  increase  security,  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  Member  States 
will increase the checks at border control points, making it increasingly more inconvenient 
and  time-consuming  for  low-risk  passengers  to  go  through  passport  controls.  It  is,  of 
course,  possible  that,  Member  States  which  enact  national  legislation  to  capture  and  use 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PNR  data  will  not  face  such  a  problem,  or  will  face  such  a  problem  to  a  lower  extent. 
However,  the  decisions  of  the  EU  cannot  be  based  on  an  assumption  that  all  Member 
States will enact such legislation and that such legislation will cover all relevant points of 
entry into the EU.  

○ 

Impact on convenience of passengers: - 

5.2. 

Impacts  of  the  option  of  introducing  a  new  legislative  measure  covering  air 
travel with a decentralised collection of data 

This policy option entails that air carriers would be obliged to transmit the Passenger Name 
Record data of their passengers to a Passenger Information Unit which would be designated 
by  each  Member  State,  either  directly  or  through  an  intermediary,  and  either  filtered  out  of 
sensitive  and  non-required  PNR  elements  or  unfiltered  of  such  data.  Such  Unit  would  filter 
when  necessary,  process  the  data  and  transmit  them  to  the  relevant  law  enforcement 
authorities  of  its  own  Member  State  and  to  the  corresponding  units  of  the  other  Member 
States. 

•  Security  in  the  EU:  This  option  would  contribute  towards  a  substantial  increase  of 
security in the EU since air is the most common means of transport for travelling to and 
from the EU territory from the vast majority of third countries, and because of its speed, it 
presents  the  most  attractive  means  of  travel.  As  a  result,  even  if  this  measure  is  limited 
only to air, a very high percentage of travellers would be covered by it. Further, because of 
the dramatic effect that an aircraft which crashes has, and because of the destruction that it 
causes with its crash, it seems to be a preferable means for terrorists, in the case when they 
seek to use the aircraft itself as a means of performing an act of terror. However, such an 
option would not cover all controlled border crossings to the EU, and there would continue 
to  be  a  risk  of  terrorists  and  criminals  entering  its  territory  via  other  border  crossings. 
Further, there remains a risk that those wishing to enter the territory of the EU might use 
alternative means of transport to do so, for example ship, ferry, train, bus, thus making the 
instrument  less  effective.  Overall,  this  option  could  sufficiently  achieve  the  goal  of 
increasing security in the EU. The extension of the scope of the measure to all flights to 
and  from  any  third  country  would  ensure  that  the  law  enforcement  authorities  are  given 
sufficient tools for identifying when a potential suspect will attempt to enter the territory of 
the  EU  and  will  allow  them  to  establish  travel  patterns  over  a  given  period  of  time.  As 
regards the decentralised aspect of the collection of the data, this option would potentially 
entail  a  faster  transmission  of  the  captured  PNR  data  from  a  Passenger  Information  Unit 
which  would  be  identified  in  each  Member  State  to  the  relevant  competent  law 
enforcement authorities, than under the Centralised Unit option. Such faster transmission is 
important  since  it  allows  more  time  to  process  the  data  and  identify  the  high-risk 
passengers, especially in cases in which tickets for travel were bought at the last minute. 
Such  option  would  thus  contribute  to  increasing  security  in  the  EU  quite  substantially. 
There is a risk, however that the Passenger Information Units of the Member States apply 
diverging criteria in assessing high-risk passengers, in which case there might be risks of 
high risk passengers entering the Union unidentified. 

EN 

20 

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○ 

Impact on security in the EU: ++ 

•  Protection of privacy: This option would involve the capturing and processing of the data 
of only air passengers. This would contribute towards minimising the interference with the 
passengers'  right  to  privacy.  As  regards  the  decentralised  aspect  of  the  collection  of  the 
data, the bulk of the transmitted data would remain within one Member State and only the 
PNR data of identified high-risk passengers would be transmitted to other Member States. 
This  would  involve  less  interference  with  the  right  to  privacy  of  passengers,  making  it 
more  likely  for  such  inference  to  be  deemed  proportionate.  Provision  will  be  made  to 
ensure  that  sensitive  data  are  filtered  out  and  deleted  either  by  the  receiving  national 
authority  or  an  intermediary  which  the  carrier  appoints  for  this  purpose,  and  other  data 
protections safeguards will be ensured, i.e. rights of access and correction, limited periods 
of retention, measures to safeguard data security, clear purpose limitations. 

○ 

Impact on protection of privacy: ++ 

•  Costs  on  public  authorities:  The  costs  for  establishing  the  system  would  admittedly  be 
substantial  for  the  Member  States  since  each  Member  State  would  have  to  set  up  or 
identify  a  Passenger  Information  Unit  which  would  receive  the  data  and  would  have  to 
develop  the  necessary  mechanisms  for  the  filtering  and  processing  of  the  data  and  their 
transmission  to  the  relevant  law  enforcement  authorities  and  the  Passenger  Information 
Units  of  the  other  Member  States.  The  operation  of  such  a  Unit  is  estimated  to  require 
between 30-50 members of staff for Member States with few international flights and 70-
100 for Member States with many international flights. Since the setting-up and operation 
of such a Unit will involve substantial costs, there should be a possibility of two or more 
Member States establishing or designating the same Passenger Information Unit to receive, 
filter,  process  and  forward  the  data.  This  option  would  be  especially  helpful  to  Member 
States  which  have  few  international  flights  or  which  do  not  face  a  severe  threat  to  their 
security or intense problems with organised crime. 

○ 

Impact on costs on public authorities: -- 

•  Costs  on  carriers:  Air  carriers  are  the  only  providers  of  transport  services  that  already 
have  mechanisms  with  which  to  capture  the  PNR  data  of  passengers.  These  mechanisms 
were developed and are used for commercial purposes. Other types of carriers would have 
to set up such mechanisms from scratch and change their operational systems substantially. 
This  option  would  not  therefore  entail  quite  substantial  costs  and  administrative  changes 
for the carriers. Carriers would have to bear the cost of "pushing" the data to the Passenger 
Information  Unit,  which  is  estimated  at  around  0,04  Euro  per  passenger,  or  the  cost  of 
"pulling" data which is estimated at around 0,03 Euro per passenger The carriers will also 
have  to  bear  the  cost  of  setting-up  the  system  (hardware  and  software)  which  is  non-
recurring, as well as personnel and maintenance costs, which are recurring costs. 

○ 

Impact on costs on carriers: -- 

•  Relations with third countries: It is anticipated that more and more third countries will 
request the provision of PNR data from the EU. This option will provide the EU with the 

EN 

21 

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ability to insist on certain standards and to ensure consistency in such bilateral agreements 
with third countries. It will also provide the possibility of requesting reciprocal treatment 
from third countries with which the EU has an agreement, something that is not possible 
today. Since the proposed measure will request specific action from non-EU carriers, there 
is  a  possibility  that  the  third  countries  in  which  such  carriers  are  based  will  introduce 
similar measures or refuse to provide such data unless bilateral agreements are concluded 
with  the  EU  as  retaliatory  actions.  Even  though  such  retaliatory  actions  from  third 
countries are possible from a legal and a practical point of view, it is not anticipated that 
they  will  occur.  This  is  based  on  our  experience  with  the  US,  Canadian,  Australian  and 
New  Zealand  national  measures.  This  experience  shows  quite  clearly  that,  despite  such 
national measures which affect carriers worldwide, only the EU has refused to permit its 
carriers  to  provide  such  data  unless  there  were  special  agreements  to  that  effect.  This  is 
probably  based  on  the  very  high  data  protection  standards  that  exist  in  the  EU. 
Additionally, the setting up and operation of a PNR system requires a high investment by 
the  country  that  introduces  it  which  can  be  a  dissuasive  factor  for  most  third  countries. 
Therefore, our consultations and experience shows that the possibility of retaliatory action 
by third countries does not present such a great risk as to outweigh the advantages that the 
proposed measure offers to security. 

○ 

Relations with third countries: + 

•  Competition  in  the  internal  market:  The  distinction  between  air  and  other  forms  of 
travel  bears  a  risk,  albeit  a  minor  one,  that  air  carriers  might  be  put  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage  as  they  would  have  to  incur  expenses  for  complying  with  the  system  that 
non-air will not have. This might lead to a distortion of competition in the EU. However, 
this would depend on which routes are considered to be in competition with other routes, 
and  which  markets  are  considered  separate.  As  regards  the  decentralised  aspect  of  the 
collection of the data, it is not foreseen that this option would have any significant impact 
on competition in the internal market. 

○ 

Impact on competition in the internal market: - 

•  Convenience  of  passengers:  This  option  would  contribute  towards  increasing  the 
convenience of air passengers, because it would minimise checks at border control for air 
passengers and make it more convenient and quick to go through such checks. The reason 
for  this  is  that,  the  transmission  of  PNR  data  to  the  receiving  Member  State  before  the 
passengers  actually  arrive  makes  it  possible  for  the  border  control  authorities  to  identify 
the passengers who seem to present a high risk to the receiving State. As a result, it will 
become possible for all other passengers to be subjected only to minimum border controls 
and  therefore  limit  the  time  required  to  go  through  such  controls.  This  option  would 
therefore  contribute  towards  achieving  great  convenience  for  legitimate  passengers.  As 
regards  the  decentralised  aspect  of  the  collection  of  the  data,  it  is  not  foreseen  that  this 
option would have any significant impact on passenger convenience. 

○ 

Impact on the convenience of passengers: ++ 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. 

Impacts  of  the  option  of  introducing  a  new  legislative  measure  covering  air 
travel with a centralised collection of data 

This policy option entails that air carriers would be obliged to transmit the Passenger Name 
Record data of their passengers to a Centralised Unit at an EU level, either directly or through 
an intermediary, and either filtered out of sensitive data and non-required PNR elements, or 
unfiltered  of  such  elements.  Such  Unit  would  filter  when  necessary,  process  the  data  and 
transmit them to the relevant law enforcement authorities of the Member States. One of the 
existing bodies and agencies of the EU could serve as such a Centralised Unit, and it would 
not  be  necessary  to  create  a  new  body.  Europol  could  be  the  most  suitable  under  the 
circumstances, to perform the functions of the Centralised Unit.  

•  Security  in  the  EU:  This  option  would  contribute  towards  a  substantial  increase  of 
security in the EU since air is the most common means of transport for travelling to and 
from the EU territory from the vast majority of third countries, and because of its speed, it 
presents  the  most  attractive  means  of  travel.  As  a  result,  even  if  this  measure  is  limited 
only to air, a very high percentage of travellers would be covered by it. However, such an 
option would not cover all controlled border crossings to the EU, and there would continue 
to  be  a  risk  of  terrorists  and  criminals  entering  its  territory  via  other  border  crossings. 
Further, there remains a risk that those wishing to enter the territory of the EU might use 
alternative means of transport to do so, for example ship, ferry, train, bus, thus making the 
instrument  less  effective.  Overall,  this  option  would  sufficiently  achieve  the  goal  of 
increasing security in the EU. The extension of the scope of the measure to all flights to 
and from any Member State would ensure that the law enforcement authorities are given 
sufficient tools for identifying when a potential suspect will attempt to enter the territory of 
the EU. As regards the centralised aspect of the collection of the data, this option would 
ensure  the  application  of  common  criteria  for  identification  of  high-risk  passengers  and 
would provide the possibility of identifying travel patterns and behavioural characteristics 
more  accurately  because  they  would  be  based  on  PNR  data  for  the  whole  of  the  EU.  As 
such,  it  would  be  expected  that  the  option  of  a  centralised  collection  of  data  would 
contribute  substantially  to  increasing  security  in  the  EU.  However,  for  the  purpose  of 
performing the risk assessment of the passengers, the responsible central authority would 
have to gather intelligence and information from all the Member States. Such intelligence 
will  have  to  be  current  at  all  times,  and  the  processing  system  will  have  to  be  fed  with 
information  almost  every  day.  In  addition,  the  responsible  authority  would  have  to  have 
direct access to a variety of different national databases in order to be able to carry out the 
risk  assessments.  Such  direct  access  is  considered  by  the  Member  States  to  be  highly 
sensitive and the consultations with the Member States indicated that they would be very 
reluctant to exchange such information and give such direct access. This reluctance would 
mean  that  such  an  option  would  bear  a  high  probability  of  failure  and  would  not  able  to 
work well in reality. This is expected to hamper substantially the positive impact that the 
measure is expected to have on security.  

○ 

Impact on security in the EU: + 

•  Protection of privacy: This option would involve the capturing and processing of the data 
of only air passengers. This would contribute towards minimising the interference with the 
passengers' right to privacy. As regards the centralised aspect of the collection of the data, 
the advantage is that an EU Centralised Unit might be in a better position to ensure that the 
data is transmitted and used with adequate and uniform safeguards and redress mechanisms 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
 
 
for  the  data  subjects.  This  might  ultimately  involve  less  interference  with  the  right  to 
privacy  of  passengers,  making  it  more  likely  for  such  inference  to  be  deemed 
proportionate. Such Unit would also ensure that sensitive data are filtered out and deleted , 
and other data protections safeguards will be ensured, i.e. rights of access and correction, 
limited periods of retention, measures to safeguard data security, clear purpose limitations. 

○ 

Impact on the protection of privacy: ++ 

•  Costs  on  public  authorities:  The  costs  for  establishing  the  system  would  admittedly  be 
substantial.  Such  costs  would  be  borne  by  the  EU  budget  and  each  Member  State 
separately would not have to bear any costs since they would not have to develop their own 
Passenger  Information  Unit.  However,  the  costs  of  setting  up  the  EU  Centralised  Unit 
would  be  very  high  since  such  a  Unit  would  have  receive  the  data  and  develop  the 
necessary mechanisms for the processing of the data and their transmission to the relevant 
law  enforcement  authorities.  The  mechanism  which  would  have  to  be  developed  would 
have  to  be  of  an  especially  high  capacity  in  order  to  deal  with  the  vast  amounts  of  data 
from carriers and would have to be quite complicated. Such a system might run a risk of 
being  subject  to  frequent  crashes  because  of  the  vast  traffic  of  data,  with  a  risk  of  being 
unworkable. A centralised system can be distinguished from systems such as SIS and VIS 
since the traffic of data which will be put in such a system will be substantially more than 
those in SIS and VIS. SIS and VIS contain the data of specified individuals which are put 
into the systems by each Member State. On the contrary, the Passenger Name Record data 
which  will  have  to  be  handled  by  such  a  Centralised  Unit  would  relate  to  approximately 
500.000.000  passengers  who  fly  in  and  out  of  the  EU  every  year.  Such  figures  are  also 
expected to rise every year. 

○ 

Impact on costs on public authorities: -- 

•  Costs  on  carriers:  Air  carriers  are  the  only  providers  of  transport  services  that  already 
have  mechanisms  with  which  to  capture  the  PNR  data  of  passengers.  These  mechanisms 
were developed and are used for commercial purposes. Other types of carriers would have 
to set up such mechanisms from scratch and change their operational systems substantially. 
This option would not therefore entail substantial costs and administrative changes for the 
carriers. Carriers would have to bear the cost of "pushing" the data to the Centralised Unit, 
which is estimated at around 0,04 Euro per passenger,, or the cost of "pulling" data which 
is estimated at around 0,03 Euro per passenger, Carriers will also have to bear the cost of 
setting-up the system for "pushing" or "pulling" (hardware and software) which is a non-
recurring cost, as well personnel and maintenance costs which are recurring costs. 

○ 

Impact on costs on carriers: -- 

•  Relations with third countries: It is anticipated that more and more third countries will 
request the provision of PNR data from the EU. The proposed measure will provide the EU 
with  the  ability  to  insist  on  certain  standards  and  to  ensure  consistency  in  such  bilateral 
agreements with third countries. It will also provide the possibility of requesting reciprocal 
treatment from third countries with which the EU has an agreement, something that is not 
possible  today.  Since  the  proposed  measure  will  request  specific  action  from  non-EU 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
carriers, there is a possibility that the third countries in which such carriers are based will 
introduce  similar measures or  refuse  to  provide such data  unless bilateral  agreements are 
concluded  with  the  EU  as  retaliatory  actions.  Even  though  such  retaliatory  actions  from 
third countries are possible from a legal and a practical point of view, it is not anticipated 
that they will occur. This is based on our experience with the US, Canadian, Australian and 
New  Zealand  national  measures.  Such  experience  shows  quite  clearly  that,  despite  such 
national measures which affect carriers worldwide, only the EU has refused to permit its 
carriers  to  provide  such  data  unless  there  were  special  agreements  to  that  effect.  This  is 
probably  based  on  the  very  high  data  protection  standards  that  exist  in  the  EU. 
Additionally, the setting up and operation of a PNR system requires a high investment by 
the  country  that  introduces  it  which  can  be  a  dissuasive  factor  for  most  third  countries. 
Therefore, our consultations and experience shows that the possibility of retaliatory action 
by third countries does not present such a great risk as to outweigh the advantages that the 
proposed measure offers to security.  

○ 

Relations with third countries: + 

•  Competition  in  the  internal  market:  The  distinction  between  air  and  other  forms  of 
travel  bears  a  risk,  albeit  a  minor  one,  that  air  carriers  might  be  put  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage as they would have to incur expenses for complying with the system that the 
carriers who provide other types of transport services will not have. This might lead to a 
distortion  of  competition  in  the  EU.  However,  this  would  depend  on  which  routes  are 
considered  to  be  in  competition  with  other  routes,  and  which  markets  are  considered 
separate. As regards the centralised aspect of the collection of the data, it is not foreseen 
that this option would have any significant impact on competition in the internal market. 

○ 

Impact on competition in the internal market: - 

•  Convenience  of  passengers:  This  option  would  contribute  towards  increasing  the 
convenience of air passengers, because it would minimise checks at border control for air 
passengers and make it more convenient and quick to go through such checks. The reason 
for  this  is  that,  the  transmission  of  PNR  data  to  the  receiving  Member  State  before  the 
passengers  actually  arrive  makes  it  possible  for  the  border  control  authorities  to  identify 
the passengers who seem to present a high risk to the receiving State. As a result, it will 
become possible for all other passengers to be subjected only to minimum border controls 
and  therefore  limit  the  time  required  to  go  through  such  controls.  This  option  would 
therefore  contribute  towards  achieving  great  convenience  for  legitimate  passengers.  As 
regards  the  decentralised  aspect  of  the  collection  of  the  data,  it  is  not  foreseen  that  this 
option would have any significant impact on passenger convenience. 

○ 

Impact on the convenience of passengers: ++ 

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

The "no action" policy option does not present any real strength in improving security in the 
EU. On the contrary, it is anticipated that, bearing in mind the way that this field is currently 
developing,  it  will  have  negative  impacts  in  the  sense  of  creating  administrative  difficulties 
stemming  from  numerous  diverging  systems,  increased  costs  of  compliance  with  such 

EN 

25 

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diverging  systems  and  distorting  competition.  The  costs  of  compliance  with  potentially  27 
diverging  systems  would  be  enormous  both  for  the  public  authorities  and  the  carriers.  The 
development  of  different  legal  frameworks  and  mechanisms  to  tackle  the  matter  by  each 
Member State would bear more risks of leaving the citizens exposed to more threats to their 
privacy. It would be more difficult to ensure that the data protection principles are followed 
under each such diverging system. 

The legislative proposal policy option possesses the clear advantage of increasing security in 
the form of reducing the risk of terrorist attacks and of organised crime being committed on 
the territory of the EU. It presents further advantages in the form of preventing the distortion 
of competition by imposing the same requirements for all carriers which operate flights to and 
from the EU. The costs for the carriers and the administrative setup would ultimately be much 
less  than  in  case  that  the  Member  States  develop  their  own  systems.  The  convenience  to 
passengers  would  increase,  thus  minimising  the  time  required  for  border  control  for  all 
unsuspected  passengers.  Finally,  this  policy  option  would  provide  harmonisation  of  the 
various aspects of the systems for the exchange and use of PNR and of the safeguards given to 
passengers aimed to protect their right to privacy. 

Between  the  "no  action"  policy  and  the  legislative  proposal  policy,  the  legislative  proposal 
presents clear advantages. 

Between the two options for a legislative proposal, the option of a decentralised collection of 
data presents advantages over the centralised option in relation to the increase to the security 
of the EU. The option of a centralised collection of data would have a high risk of failure both 
on  a  political  level  because  of  failure  to  ensure  adequate  co-operation  between  the  Member 
States, and on a practical level because of failure of the system to be operable and reliable. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
Synopsis of the impacts of the policy options 

Table of symbols (distinguishes between (-) for negative impact and (+) for positive) 

Table of symbols  

Small impact 

Medium impact 

Significant impact 

No impact 

Summary table 

- / + 

-- / ++ 

- - - / +++ 

0 

Policy option 

Increased 
security 

Increased 
convenience 
to passengers 

Relations 
with third 
countries 

Protection 
of privacy 

Impact 
Competition 

on 

Costs 
on 
carriers 

on 

Costs 
public 
authorities 

+ 

- 

- 

0 

++ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

- 

- 

--- 

- 

-- 

-- 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

- 

-- 

-- 

No  action  by 
EU 

Legislative 
proposal 
covering 
travel  by  air 
with 
decentralised 
collection  of 
data 

Legislative 
proposal 
covering 
travel  by  air 
with 
centralised 
collection  of 
data 

EN 

27 

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7. 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

On the basis of the above, the creation of a new legislative proposal applicable to travel by air 
with a decentralised collection of data seems to be the best policy option. This option would be 
preferable since it would provide better means of increasing security in the EU, while at the same 
time ensuring the better protection of data and minimising the costs for its setup and operation. It 
should  be  noted  that  it  is  not  believed  that  this  option  presents  the  ultimate  solution  to  the 
problem but, at the current stage, it is the most feasible solution. It presents a good starting point 
and will help towards gathering experience in this very new field. It is foreseen that this proposal 
will be evaluated and, if possible, extended to a wider application at a later stage. It should be left 
up to the Member States to extend the scope of such proposal to other modes of transport at this 
point. Further, Member States should be able to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
arrangements for the purpose of enhancing or facilitating the provisions of such proposal. 

The EU needs to act as soon as possible in this area in order to decrease/minimise the chance of 
various incompatible systems  being  developed by each  Member  State. Different  approaches  by 
different  Member  States  would  lead  to  inconsistencies,  uncertainty  and  different  rights  for 
individuals,  which  would  entail  citizen  dissatisfaction  as  well  as  high  costs  for  implementation 
and compliance. 

It might be argued that, since the PNR data are initially captured by the carriers in the course of a 
commercial activity, namely the sale of travel ticket and the provision of a service, the measure 
could be adopted under community law. However, according to the judgement of the European 
Court of Justice of 30/5/2006 in joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/0411, it is important to take into 
account the reason for which the captured data will be transmitted, in order to decide on the legal 
basis of a legislative proposal. In the current case, the transmission of the data would be made for 
the clear purpose of improving access to information for the purpose of combating terrorism and 
organised  crime.  Therefore,  the  proposal  should  most  suitably  take  the  form  of  a  Framework 
Decision under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 

Costs of preferred option 

An analysis of the costs of the preferred policy option appear in detail in Annex C. Such costs are 
differentiated between costs for public authorities and costs for carriers. 

In relation to public authorities, the estimated costs for all Member States together are: 

Setting-up cost (non-recurring cost) 

614,833,187 Euro 

BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years 

122,966,637 Euro 

Annual personnel costs (recurring) 

Annual maintenance costs (recurring) 

11,686,749 Euro 

61,483,319 Euro 

In relation to all EU carriers together, such costs are: 

Setting-up cost for PUSH (non-recurring costs) 

11,647,116 Euro 

BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years 

2,329,423 Euro 

11 

European Court Reports 2006, page I-04721. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Transmission costs PUSH twice per passenger (recurring) 

2,250,080 Euro 

Personnel and maintenance costs (recurring) 

5,435,321 Euro 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

It  is  important  that  the  proposal  includes  provisions  for  its  monitoring  and  evaluation.  Such 
arrangements could be: 

•  Each  Member  State  could  prepare  and  annual  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  systems 
containing  information  on  the  volumes  of  data  received,  the  cases  which  have  ended  in 
successful identifications of suspects and the cases in which data received were used towards a 
criminal or intelligence investigation. 

•  The  setting  up  of  a  group  of  experts  of  each  Member  States  by  the  Commission  for  the 
development of the common protocol or encryption standards. This may be done between the 
adoption of the legislative measure and its coming into force. 

•  The Commission could review the operation of the Framework Decision after five years from 

its entry into force and submit a report to the Council. 

•  The Commission could prepare an assessment on the possibility of extending the measure to 
sea and rail travel if and when the API Directive is amended to that effect as well. This would 
provide  the  opportunity  to  have  a  transitional  period  and  to  gain  experience  from  the 
functioning of the PNR gathering for air travel, before extending it to other modes of travel. 

EN 

29 

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ANNEX A – ANALYSIS OF OTHER PARAMETERS 

The  preferred  policy  option  entails  the  Commission  initiating  a  legislative  proposal  for  a 
Framework Decision which would create an obligation on air carriers to transmit the PNR data to 
Passenger Information Unit which would be established in each Member State.  

This  policy  option,  as  well  as  any  other  option  based  on  a  legislative  measure,  has  a  series  of 
other parameters which complement the measure. The Member States and other organisations as 
mentioned  in  the  Report  were  consulted  on  these  parameters  and  the  synopsis  of  the  results 
appear in Annex B. This Annex is based on a preliminary analysis of these parameters. 

Modes of transport 

The  options  available  are  to  limit  the  effect  of  the  measure  to  (i)  air  carriers,  (ii)  air  and  sea 
carriers, or (iii) air, sea and rail carriers.  

As  a  first  step,  it  seems  more  proportionate  that  the  proposal  is  limited  to  air  carriers.  Such  a 
limitation would challenge the effectiveness of the measure in relation to increasing security in 
the  EU.  However,  the  costs  and  administrative  adaptations  which  would  be  involved  in  the 
development of mechanisms for the capturing of PNR data by non-air carriers would be so high, 
at this stage, as to outweigh the disadvantages to security. Further, the costs of running the system 
would also be much more costly in case of extension of the measure to other modes of transport, 
since the volume of the data which will be involved will be much higher than if only air data are 
involved. 

Even though this might not use the full potential of the measure, it appears to be the most feasible 
currently, especially in view of the fact that API data are at present collected only for air carriers. 
It  might  be  useful,  however,  to  consider  extending  the  ambit  of  this  proposal  to  sea  and  rail 
travel.  This  may  be  done  by  foreseeing  a  review  of  this  proposal  in  five  years,  and  taking  that 
opportunity to assess the viability of such an extension.  

Geographical scope 

The options available are to limit the effect of the measure to (i) travel from a third country to a 
Member  State,  (ii)  and  from  a  Member  State  to  a  third  country,  or  (iii)…  and  from  a  Member 
State to a Member State. 

It would seem inadequate to choose to apply this proposal only to travel from a third country to a 
Member  State.  Such  a  choice  would  give  only  a  limited  input  towards  the  sought  goal  of 
increasing  security  and  providing  a  tool  to  fighting  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  because  the 
competent  authorities  would  not  be  able  to  establish  travel  patterns  and  behavioural 
characteristics sufficiently without the data for outgoing flights as well 

The  option  of  making  the  instrument  applicable  to  all  travel,  including  intra  community  and 
internal  travel,  would  might  be  considered  disproportionate  to  the  objective  sought.  The  first 
reason is political, because to do so would in effect reintroduce border controls within the EU, as 
in order to identify a high-risk passenger upon his/her entry into one Member State, the passports 
of all passengers would have to be read as for third country nationals. This might have a serious 
effect on the way of travel that EU citizens are now used it in the EU and it would create serious 
inconvenience for the passengers who would have to be reintroduced to long queues at passport 
controls. Furthermore, API data is currently only required for international flights. (API Directive 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
2004/82/EC),  and  without  the  existence  of  API  data,  PNR  data  cannot  fulfil  its  full  potential. 
Additionally, the very large numbers of travellers on intra-EU flights would mean that the costs 
for setting up and operating the system would be much higher. The hardware and software that 
will  be  required  to  set  up  the  system  would  have  to  have  a  much  larger  capacity,  and  thus  be 
much  more expensive. According to  our analysis and our consultations with stakeholders, such 
increased costs would outweigh the benefit of the measure. 

The  most  reasonable  and  proportionate  option  at  this  stage  would  be  to  extend  the  measure  to 
travel from a third country to a Member State and from a Member State to a third country. This 
option  would  provide  a  substantial  input  towards  the  purpose  of  the  instrument,  while  not 
presenting serious negative impacts. The risk to distortion of competition would not outweigh the 
benefits  to  security  under  this  option.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  this  option  is  foreseen  to 
include also connecting flights via a Member State, i.e. flights commencing from a third country, 
and connecting to one Member State via another Member State, using the same ticket. 

Purpose and use of the data 

The options are to limit the purpose and use of the data for (i) preventing and fighting terrorism 
and related offences, (ii) … and other serious crimes, including organised crime, or (iii) … and 
other more general policy options. 

The  limitation  of  the  purpose  and  use  of  the  data  to  the  fight  against  terrorism  would  seem  to 
miss  the  full  potential  of  this  proposal  without  adding  any  strong  advantages  to  it.  More 
specifically,  the  advantage  to  the  protection  of  privacy  of  passengers  would  outweigh  the 
disadvantage to security.  

On  the  other  hand,  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  proposal  to  other,  more  general,  policy 
options, would seem quite interesting, especially as regards the use of the data in the fight against 
illegal immigration and as regards less serious crimes. Such a step however is premature, and the 
need to use PNR data for such policy options is not as clear and direct. 

The option of extending the scope of the instrument to the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime  would  seem  to  be  the  most  proportionate  and  appropriate.  The  definition  of  what 
constitutes  a  terrorist  offence  could  be  taken  from  the  Framework  Decision  on  combating 
terrorism 2002/475/JHA12 and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of terrorism 
of 2005. However, it is important that care is taken in the definition of "organised" crime.  The 
definition of "organised" crime could be taken from the Council Framework Decision on the fight 
against organised crime (xx/xx).  

Data retention period 

The options are to delete the data from the databases of the Passenger Information Units (i) upon 
arrival at the country of destination or (ii) after longer periods. 

The  option  of  deleting  the  data  upon  the  arrival  of  the  passengers  at the  country  of  destination 
seems to be insufficient for ensuring an adequate level of security and would miss the potential of 
PNR  as  an  instrument.  Even  though  such  a  period  of  retention  was  deemed  adequate  for  the 
purposes  of  tackling  illegal  immigration  under  Council  directive  2004/82/EC,  the  objectives 

12 

OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3. 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
                                                 
sought by that Directive, i.e. border control, are very different in nature from the objectives of the 
current  Directive,  which  are  more  complex  in  nature.  For  example,  it  would  be  impossible  to 
develop  the  risk-assessment  mechanisms  and  behavioural  patterns  if  the  data  would  be  deleted 
immediately. Also, in case that a person is identified as a criminal or a terrorist after the flight has 
landed, it would be impossible to find the persons with whom he was flying. 

It would seem clear that a longer period of retention of the data is needed. The question of how 
long  this  period  should  be,  is  one  that  depends  on  what  would  be  deemed  proportionate. 
Obviously,  the  longer  the  data  is  retained  for,  the  better  it  is  for  the  purposes  of  the  law 
enforcement authorities. For the purposes of this report, the period of 5 years is proposed for the 
retention of the data in an active database. This proposal was the result of our consultations with 
the Member States and of experience gained from international agreements that the EU signed in 
the  field.  This  period  was  deemed  as  striking  an  acceptable  balance  between  what  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  wanted  and  what  is  considered  adequate  and  acceptable.  Any  period 
which  is  chosen  however,  must  be  fixed  so  as  to  ensure  legal  certainty  for  the  carriers  and  the 
Passenger Information Units and to meet data protection requirements. It would not be advisable 
to adopt a minimum and maximum period, and leave it to the Member States to decide which to 
adopt. All authorities and bodies involved in the capturing and exchange of the PNR data should 
keep them for the same period, no matter for whom they are keeping them. 

This  proposal  further  proposes  that,  upon  the  expiry  of  the  five  year  period  of  retention  of  the 
data, such data are transferred to a dormant database and kept there for a period of eight years. 
During such eight years, the data should be accessed, processed and used only with the approval 
of the responsible Minister and only in exceptional circumstances in response to a specific case, 
threat or risk. 

Exceptions to the period of retention 

The options are to (i) not have any exceptions to the above periods of retention, or (ii) allowing 
exceptions  to  the  period  of  retention  of  the  data  is  being  used  for  a  crime  investigation  or 
intelligence operation. 

The  option  of  not  having  any  exceptions  to  the  period  of  retention  of  data  seems  to  be 
disproportionately  inflexible  in  comparison  to  the  advantages  that  this  option  carries  with  it. 
More specifically, the obstacles that such an option would pose to law enforcement, in the form 
of time restraints to investigating and prosecuting a crime, would be substantial.  

On  the  basis  of  the  above,  it  seems  clear  that  the  period  of  retention  should  be  subject  to 
exceptions.  Such  exceptions  could  be  situations  in  which  there  is  an  ongoing  criminal  or 
intelligence  operation.  The  exceptions  should  be  valid  for  active  and  dormant  data  retention 
periods. 

Body receiving the data from the carriers 

The options are that the data is received from the carriers by (i) a Passenger Information Unit to 
be established in each member State, or (ii) a Centralised EU Unit. 

An important impact of the choice between the two options relates to the political and technical 
feasibility  of  the  system..  The  option  of  creating  Passenger  Information  Units  in  each  Member 
State  would  entail  costs  which  will  be  borne  by  each  Member  State  directly.  The  costs  would 
need  to  cover  the  creation  of  the  Unit,  its  staff,  the  development  of  the  mechanism  for  the 

EN 

32 

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processing  of  the  data  and  their  transmission  to  the  competent  authorities.  Such  costs  are  not 
foreseen to be enormous since the mechanisms would not need to be particularly complex, as can 
be seen in Annex C. In the case of creation of a Centralised EU Unit, its costs would be borne by 
the  EU  budget.  Such  costs  are  foreseen  to  be  much  greater  than  the  first  option  since  the 
mechanisms would have to be much more complex. It would be suggested that one of the existing 
agencies  of  the  EU  acts  as  such  a  Centralised  Unit.  In  this  way,  it  would  not  be  necessary  to 
create another body, hence reducing substantially the amount of costs which will be required. In 
general, it could be foreseen that the ultimate total costs of the first option would be more than 
the second option. 

An  effective  Centralised  EU  Unit  would  also  present  advantages  to  increasing  security,  to 
applying uniform standards of identification of suspects everywhere in the EU and for ensuring 
adequate protection of data. However, for the purpose of performing the risk assessment of the 
passengers,  the  responsible  central  authority  would  have  to  gather  intelligence  and  information 
from  all  the  Member  States.  Such  intelligence  will  have  to  be  current  at  all  times,  and  the 
processing  system  will  have  to  be  fed  with  information  almost  every  day.  In  addition,  the 
responsible authority would have to have direct access to a variety of different national databases 
in  order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  the  risk  assessments.  Such  information  is  considered  by  the 
Member States to be highly sensitive and the consultations with the Member States indicated that 
they  would  be  very  reluctant  to  exchange  such  information  and  give  such  direct  access.  Such 
reluctance would mean that such an option would bear a high probability of failure and would not 
able to work well in reality. This is expected to hamper substantially the positive impact that the 
measure is expected to have on security. 

Finally,  on  the  basis  of  all  the  above,  it  seems  that  the  option  of  the  national  Passenger 
Information Units would be preferable because of the fact that the data will be used and shared 
with  fewer  authorities  and  entities  than  under  the  Centralised  Unit.  The  data  would  also  be 
accessible by fewer individuals and authorities. Since the setting-up and operation of such a Unit 
will  involve  substantial  costs,  there  should  be  a  possibility  of  two  or  more  Member  States 
establishing  or  designating  the  same  Passenger  Information  Unit  to  receive,  filter,  process  and 
forward  the  data.  This  option  would  be  especially  helpful  to  Member  States  with  few 
international  flights  or  which  do  not  face  a  severe  threat  to  their  security  or  considerable 
problems with organised crime. 

Method of transmission of the data by the carriers 

The  options  are  that  the  data  is  transmitted  by  (i)  "push",  (ii)  "pull",  or  (iii)  a  combination  of 
these. 

'Push’ is the method under which carriers transmit (“push”) the required Passenger Name Record 
data into the database of the authority requesting them, whereas "Pull" is the method under which 
the  authority  requiring  the  data  can  reach  into  ("access")  the  carrier's  reservation  system  and 
extract ("pull") a copy of the required data into their database. 

The  advantages  of  the  "push"  system  over  the  "pull"  system  are  undisputable.  The  risks  to  the 
protection of the data of passengers when using the "pull" system are so high as to outweigh the 
advantage  that  it  offers  on  costs.  The  risks  of  the  "pull"  system  are  that  the  authority  which 
receives  the  data  will  be  able  to  access  all  data  in  the  reservation  systems  of  the  carriers  and 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
would then have to filter them out themselves. The carriers are left therefore with no control as to 
what happens to the data which they have collected and for which they are responsible. 

Furthermore, "push" systems are currently being developed and finalised in Europe and will most 
probably be available before a potential framework decision is adopted. 

Nevertheless, in case of carriers that do not yet have the technology to "push", or that do not wish 
to bear the costs of "pushing", or that do not object to "pull", the Passenger Information Units of 
the Member States might have to "pull". It is intended that as a general rule, EU carriers will be 
obliged to use the "push" method and Passenger Information Units should make every effort to 
receive data by "push" before resorting to "pull" as regards non-EU carriers. 

Carriers  may  also  choose  to  transmit  the  data  to  the  Passenger  Information  Units  through  a 
designated intermediary which can be an independent entity. Such entity will be contracted by the 
carrier to receive the data from it and to transmit them to the relevant Passenger Information Unit. 
Carriers may also authorise intermediaries to filter the data before transmitting them to the Units. 
Such intermediaries will be obliged to use the "push" method for transmitting data to the Units 
and  they  shall  be  deemed  to  be  acting  on  behalf  or  as  representatives  of  the  carriers.  The 
databases of intermediaries will have to be held in the EU. 

Data to be transmitted from the Passenger Information Units to the competent authorities 

The options are that the data is transmitted (i) in bulk, or (ii) on a case-by-case basis 

The advantage to the increase of security in the case of bulk transmissions of data is minor and 
does not outweigh the disadvantage on the protection of data. 

It seems preferable that there is a filtering of the data which will be transmitted to the competent 
law  enforcement  authorities.  And  this  filtering  could  best  done  by  the  Passenger  Information 
Units  of  the  Member  States  or  the  EU  Centralised  Unit  (depending  on  which  option  is  finally 
adopted). This would mean that the Passenger Information Unit or Centralised Unit will run the 
PNR data through the alert systems, the special intelligence and the risk-assessment systems and 
will  identify  the  "high-risk  passengers".  Then  the  Units  will  send  only  the  PNR  data  of  such 
passengers  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities.  Such  law  enforcement  authorities  will  not  have 
access to the PNR data of unsuspected/legitimate passengers. This way, the costs of this exercise 
would  be  borne  by  the  Member  States  or  the  EU  budget,  and  further,  the  risk  of  abuses  to  the 
protection of the data of unsuspected passengers would be minimised. 

In addition, there is an added value in permitting the Passenger  Information Unit or any of the 
designated competent authorities of a Member State to request the Passenger Information Unit of 
any  other  Member  State  to  provide  it  with  specific  data  which  are  kept  in  the  latter's  active  or 
inactive  database  subject  to  different  rules.  The  request  may  be  based  on  any  one  or  a 
combination of data elements.  

Bodies receiving data from the Passenger Information Units 

The  options  are  that  the  data  is  transmitted  by  the  Passenger  Information  Units  to  (i)  only  the 
national competent law enforcement authorities of the country of destination/departure, (ii)… and 
to  national  competent  law  enforcement  authorities  of  other  member  States,  or  (iii)…  and  to 
competent authorities of third countries which satisfy certain criteria. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
to 

the  competent  national 

law  enforcement  authorities  of 

The  Passenger  Information  Units  should  perform  the  filtering  and  the risk-assessment  and  then 
the  country  of 
send 
destination/departure  only  the  PNR  data  of  the  identified  high-risk  passengers.  The  Passenger 
Information  Units  should  also  send  the  PNR  data  of  the  identified  passengers  to  the  Passenger 
Information Units of the other Member States, which should then, in their turn, transmit them to 
their competent national law enforcement authorities. The possibility of sending the PNR data of 
identified  high-risk  passengers  to  the  competent  authorities  of  third  countries  should  be  the 
prerogative of the Member State which performs the filtering, whereas a Member State which is 
merely the recipient of such data should not be able to transmit them to a third country. 

In  cases  in  which  the  EU  has  an  international  agreement  with  a  third  country  for  the 
exchange/transmission  of  PNR  data  to  such  third  country,  such  agreements  shall  be  duly  taken 
into account. The carriers should send the PNR data to the Passenger Information Units according 
to the normal practice under the current measure. The Passenger Information Unit which receives 
such data shall transmit them to the competent authority of the third country with which such an 
agreement exists. 

The  choice  of  this  option  seems  to  offer  the  best  balance  between  ensuring  security  and 
protecting the data of passengers.  

Summary table on impacts of parameters of preferred option 

Table of symbols (distinguishes between (-) for negative impact and (+) for positive) 

Table of symbols  

Small impact 

Medium impact 

Significant impact 

No impact 

- / + 

-- / ++ 

- - - / +++ 

0 

Policy option 

Increased 
security 

Increased 
convenience  to 
passengers 

Protection 
of privacy 

Impact 
on 
Competition 

Costs 
Business 

for 

for 

Costs 
public 
authorities 

Modes 
transport 

of 

Air 

Air and sea 

Air, sea, rail 

Geographical 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++  

+ 

- 

EN 

- 

- 

-- 

35 

- 

- 

0 

- 

-- 

--- 

- 

-- 

--- 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
scope 

From 
country to MS 

third 

…  and  from  MS 
to third country 

+ 

++ 

…  and  from  MS 
to MS 

+++ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

- 

Purpose  and  use 
of data 

Fight  and  prevent 
of  terrorism  and 
related crimes 

other 

and 

… 
transnational 
organised crime 

…and 
policy objectives 

other 

Data 
period 

retention 

Delete 
arrival 
destination 

after 
at 

Delete  after  3.5 
years 

+ 

++ 

Delete 
longer periods 

after 

+++ 

Exceptions 
data 
periods 

to 
retention 

No exceptions 

- 

+++ 

Exceptions  when 
for  crime 
used 
investigation/ 
intelligence 
operation 

Body 
data 
carriers 

receiving 
from 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

- 

-- 

--- 

- 

-- 

--- 

+++ 

- 

--- 

++ 

-- 

-- 

-- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

- 

-- 

--- 

- 

- 

- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-- 

-- 

--- 

- 

- 

- 

+ 

- 

--- 

0 

0 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Passenger 
Information  Unit 
in MS 

Centralised 
Unit 

EU 

Method 
of 
transmission  of 
data by carriers 

"Push" 

"Pull" 

to 

Data 
be 
transmitted from 
PIU  to  national 
authorities 

In bulk 

On  case-by-case 
basis 

Bodies  receiving 
data from PIU 

National 
competent 
authorities  

…and  authorities 
of other MS 

…and  authorities 
of third countries 

+++ 

+++ 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

--- 

-- 

++ 

- 

-- 

--- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-- 

-- 

+ 

+ 

- 

- 

- 

+++ 

+++ 

-- 

-- 

- 

-- 

- 

-- 

--- 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX B – TABLE OF REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 

Replies from MS on the questionnaire 

"A common approach to the use of PNR Data for law enforcement purposes" 

AT  BE BU CY CZ DA DE EL ES ET
2 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

FR  HU IT LT LV LU NL PL PT RO SL SK SV  UK 
2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

2 

Genera
l 
remark
s 

1 

2 

1 
(1 st 
step) 

2 
(1st 
step) 

3 

2 

3 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 (1st 
step) 

1 (1st 
step) 

2 
(maybe 
3 
as next 
step) 

1 

2 

1 

3 

2 

3 (progressi 
vely) 

1 

2 

1 (1st 
step) 

3 

3 

1 

1 

1(ev.2)

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

2 

2 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 (maybe 
even 3) 

2 plus illegal 
immigration 
minus 
social and 
fiscal crimes 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 year 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3(5 years) 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2? 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1? 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

evaluate

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

combin
e 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 ог З 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

combin
e 

2 

evaluate

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

Rather 
1 

combin
e 

3 

3 

3 

2 

2 

1 

Policy Option 
1: Nothing 
2: Legal instrument 
3: Encourage Cooperation 

Scope (forms of transport): 
1:Air 
2: Air and sea 
3: Air, sea and rail 

Scope (geographic): 
1 : From third country to MS 
2: ... and from MS to third country 
3: ... and from MS to MS 

Use/Purpose of collecting PNR data: 
1 : Preventing and fighting terrorism and 
related crimes 
2: ...and other transnational, serious, 
organised crimes 
3: ... and more general public policy 
purposes 
Data retention period: 
1 : delete on arrival in destination country  
2: delete after 3.5 years from transfer date  

3: delete after longer period 
Exceptions 
1: None 
2: Where used for crime 
investigation/intelligence operation 

Body receiving PNR data 
1: Passenger Information Unit in MS  
2: Centralised System 

Method of transmitting PNR data 
1: Push Method  
2: Pull Method  

3: Hybrid 

Bulk or case by case transfers 
1: Bulk 
2: Case by case 

EN 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Onward Transfer of PNR data 
1 : Only to national competent authorities  
2: ... and other MS's competent authorities 
3: ... and third countries' competent authorities 

Security Data 
1 : Specify common encryption levels 
2: Require common transmission protocols 

1 

3 

3 

2 

3 

2 

1 

both 

1 

1 

evaluate

1 

2 

combin
e 

2 option 
3 if 
mutual 
agree
me 
combin
e 

2 

3 

3 

2 

3 

3 

2 

3 

1 

2 

2 

2 

evaluat
e 

combi
ne 

2 

1 

evaluat
e 

EN 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX C – TABLE OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PREFERRED OPTION 

Proposal On A Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name  
Records (PNR) Data for Law Enforcement Purposes 

If the act assessed is the transposition of an act adopted at another level, insert 
here the name and reference of that 'original' act 

Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) 

Time 
(hour) 

Price 
(per action or 
equip) 

Freq (per 
year) 

Nbr of 
entities 

Total nbr 
of actions

Total cost  Regulatory origin (%)

No. 

Ass. 
Art. 

Orig. 
Art. 

Type of 
obligation 

Description of required action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat  Reg

Submission  of 
(recurring) 
reports 

Submitting the information (sending it 
to the designated recipient) 

non-recurrent costs for airlines 
(installation of IT systems and 
software) 

Submission  of 
(recurring) 
reports 

Adjusting existing data 

recurrent  costs 
for  airlines 
(personnel  and  operation  of 
the system) 

Submission  of 
(recurring) 
reports 

Submitting the information (sending it 
to the designated recipient) 

recurrent  costs 
(transmission of PNR data) 

for  airlines 

Other 

Other 

Inspecting  and  checking  (including 
assistance  to  inspection  by  public 
authorities) 

non-recurrent  costs  for  public 
administrations  (installation  of 
IT systems and software) 

Inspecting  and  checking  (including 
assistance  to  inspection  by  public 
authorities) 

recurrent  costs 
administrations 
and maintenance) 

for  public 
(personnel 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

EN 

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2.329.423

100%

1

5.435.321

100%

1 54.880.000

2.250.080

1

1

1

122.966.637

100%

1

73.170.068

100%

100%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2.329.423,00

5.435.320,94

0,04

122.966.637,04

73.170.067,09

0,00

0,00

0,00

0,00

0,00

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposal On A Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name  
Records (PNR) Data for Law Enforcement Purposes 

If the act assessed is the transposition of an act adopted at another level, insert 
here the name and reference of that 'original' act 

Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) 

Time 
(hour) 

Price 
(per action or 
equip) 

Freq (per 
year) 

Nbr of 
entities 

Total nbr 
of actions

Total cost  Regulatory origin (%)

No. 

Ass. 
Art. 

Orig. 
Art. 

Type of 
obligation 

Description of required action(s) 

Target group 

i 

e 

i 

e 

Int 

EU 

Nat  Reg

Total administrative cost 
(€)

206.151.529

explanation:  type  of  obligation  "other":  refers  to  the  receipt  of  the  PNR  information  by  the  passenger  information  units,  screening  of  data  and 
transmission to law enforcement authorities (TBC). 

Airlines 

Statistics from Eurocontrol show a total number of XXX European carriers operating international flights 
in 2006.  

XXX of these carriers operate less than 1000 flights per year.  

non-recurring cost 
source Lufthansa (costs incurred in joint project with 5 other European airlines. 

Cost for European airline of PULL system to USA: 

Cost for European airline of PUSH system to USA/Canada: 

Additional costs would have to be borne for increasing the capacity of existing systems to cope with EU 
PNR obligations. It is assumed that this would double the costs mentioned above. 

Total estimated cost for European airline for setting up PULL: 

Total estimated cost for European airline for setting up PUSH: 

Total number of outbound flights operated by EU carriers per year (2006, source Eurocontrol) 

Within which total number of LH-operated flights  

€ 200 000,00

€ 600 000,00

€ 400 000,00

€ 1 200 000,00

Extrapolation of set-up cost of PUSH to total number of flights operated by EU carriers  

Assuming an amortisation period of 5 years, the yearly cost would amount to:  

€ 11 647 116,00 

€ 2 329 423,00

Carriers  with  less  than  1000  international  outbound  flights  per  year  (representing  13%  of  the  total 
number of flights) are expected to use the intermediary method of transmission, which would diminish 

560 236 

57 721
(10,3%)

.

EN 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
non-recurrent costs. 

This  administrative  costs  calculation  is  limited  to  costs  for  EU  carriers,  which  account  for  49%  of 
international flights.  

Estimating the costs of non-EU carriers was not judged feasible due to the diverse economic conditions 
applying there.  

source Lufthansa (costs incurred in joint project with 5 other European airlines. 

recurring cost extraction/transmission 

1) push/pull 

CA push 

US pull 

source: Lufthansa 

Estimated cost of one push per PNR (source: data from EU flights to CA) in EUR: 

Estimated cost of one pull per PNR (source: data from EU flights to US) in EUR: 

€ 0,04

0,03

total number of passengers flying in and out of Europe per year (source eurocontrol) 

56 000 000

EU carriers operate 49% of international flights and will be obliged to use the PUSH system. 

It is assumed that out of the 51% of non-EU carriers, 50% would resort to PUSH and 50% PULL. For 
the purpose of this calculation, only the cost for EU carriers is calculated. 

Number of passengers on EU carriers on international flights: 

Yearly transmission cost for EU carriers using PUSH: 

Yearly cost for EU carriers using PUSH twice per passenger: 

2) preparation of PNR personnel and maintenance 
source: Lufthansa for current US/Canada PNR transmission 

Cost for European airline for personnel 

Cost for European airline for maintenance 

27 440 000

€ 1 125 040,00

€ 2 250 080,00

€ 200 000,00

€ 80 000,00

Additional costs would have to be borne for increasing the capacity of existing systems to cope with EU 
PNR obligations. It is assumed that this would double the costs mentioned above 

EN 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
Total estimated cost for European airline for personnel 

Total estimated cost for European airline for maintenance 

€ 400 000,00

€ 160 000,00

Share of Lufthansa in total number of outbound flights operated by EU carriers per year 

10,3%

Extrapolation of personnel and maintenance costs of EU carriers based on the above  

€ 5 435 321,00

Carriers  with  less  than  1000  international  outbound  flights  per  year  (representing  13%  of  the  total 
number  of  flights)  are  expected  to  use  the  intermediary  method  of  transmission,  which  would 
substantially diminish personnel and maintenance costs. 

This  administrative  costs  calculation  is  limited  to  costs  for  EU  carriers,  which  account  for  49%  of 
international flights.  

Estimating the costs of non-EU carriers was not judged feasible due to the diverse economic conditions 
applying there.  

Public administrations 

non-recurring costs 

source UK 

estimation of setting up costs for a big MS (soft and hardware) for API and PNR 

€ 250 000 000,00

It can be assumed that the proportion of costs for PNR are substantially lower than for API, 
as API covers all modes of transport in that MS. Therefore, it is assumed that 30% of set-up costs 
are for PNR. 

Estimated hard- and software costs for a big MS for PNR: 

€ 75 000 000,00

It  is  assumed  that  international  flights  of  EU  carriers from  the  UK are  predominantly  operated  by  UK 
companies: 

Number of outbound flights operated by UK companies: 
source Eurocontrol) 

Share of these flights in the total number of outbound flights (EU carriers): 

Extrapolation of hard- and software costs for MS based on the above: 

Assuming an amortisation period of 5 years, the yearly cost would amount to: 

Member States with few international flights are expected to use the option of having common  

€ 68 340,00

€ 614 833 187,00

€ 122 966 637,00

12,2%

EN 

43 

 
 
 
 
Units  with  one  or  more  Member  States  in  which  case  the  non-recurring  costs  are  expected  to 
substantially less 

recurring costs 

personnel 

Source UK 

Estimated number of FTEs for running a central passenger information unit dealing with API and PNR 
in a big MS: 

It can be assumed that 70% of this personnel is working on API. 

Estimated number of FTEs working on PNR in a big MS:  

Share of UK in the total number of outbound flights (EU carriers): 

Total number of FTE required for operating PNR in all MS: 

estimated hourly wage in EUR (average emplyoyment costs + 50% overheads) 

(EU 
www.mercerhr.com/pressrelease/details.jhtml/dynamic/idcontent/1175865) 

Consulting, 

Mercer 

figures 

25 

by 

11 

April 

2005, 

working hours per year (8 hours * 20 days * 11 months) 

total yearly personnel costs for all MS 

maintenance 

In  analogy  to  the  maintenance  costs  for  airlines,  this  is  calculated  as  a  percentage  of  set-up  costs 
maintenance  costs  for  airlines  are  10%  of  set-up  costs.  The  same  ratio  is  assumed  for  public 
administrations. 

total yearly maintenance costs for all MS: 

sum total yearly maintenance and personnel costs for all MS: 

€ 11 686 749,00

€ 61 483 319,00

€ 7 3170 068,00

EN 

44 

100

30

12,2%

246

27

47 520