Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing - Impact Assessment {COM(2007) 602 final} {SEC(2007) 1310} {SEC(2007) 1312}
Date: 2007-10-17
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: common fisheries policy, conservation of fish stocks, fishery management, fishing controls, fishing regulations, fraud, impact study

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 17.10.2007 
SEC(2007) 1336 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the  

Proposal for a  

COUNCIL REGULATION 

establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate  
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

{COM(2007) 602 final} 
{SEC(2007) 1310} 
{SEC(2007) 1312} 

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Table of contents 

Glossary...................................................................................................................................... 6 

Executive summary.................................................................................................................... 8 

Section 1: Procedural issues and consultation ........................................................................... 9 

Section 2:  Problem definition................................................................................................ 10 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Background ................................................................................................................ 10 

Definition ................................................................................................................... 11 

Impacts of IUU fishing .............................................................................................. 11 

1.2.1.  Environmental damages............................................................................................. 11 

1.2.2.  Socio-economic consequences................................................................................... 12 

1.2.3. 

IUU fishing undermines effort for better oceans governance.................................... 13 

1.3. 

1.4. 

Scale of IUU fishing .................................................................................................. 14 

The economics of IUU fishing................................................................................... 15 

1.4.1.  Economic incentives to engage in IUU fishing ......................................................... 15 

1.4.2.  Fighting IUU: the economics perspective.................................................................. 16 

1.5. 

Drivers of IUU fishing ............................................................................................... 17 

1.5.1. 

IUU fishing remains a profitable activity .................................................................. 17 

1.5.2.  No substantial hurdles for the IUU operators ............................................................ 18 

2. 

Main challenges faced by the Community in its policy against IUU fishing ............ 19 

2.1.  What has been achieved by the Community so far? .................................................. 20 

2.2. 

2.3. 

Examples of specific mechanisms implemented by third States against IUU fishing22 

Current challenges that the Community needs to face to curtail IUU fishing ........... 23 

Section 3:  Objectives............................................................................................................. 27 

Section 4:  Policy options....................................................................................................... 28 

Option 1: continue current policy and focus on implementation and enforcement of existing 

framework .................................................................................................................. 28 

Option 2: Focus on fishing activities outside the EC only....................................................... 29 

Option 3: Case by case approach, specific to stocks and areas subject to IUU fishing ........... 31 

Option 4: Undertake a new and comprehensive initiative, covering both Community and non 

Community waters ..................................................................................................... 32 

Section 5:  Likely environmental, economic and social impacts of the different options ..... 42 

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1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

Continuation of current policy and focus on implementation and enforcement of 
existing framework .................................................................................................... 44 

Impact on IUU fishing ............................................................................................... 44 

Socio-economic impact.............................................................................................. 47 

Environmental impact ................................................................................................ 47 

Focus EC policy on fishing activities outside the Community.................................. 48 

Impact on IUU fishing ............................................................................................... 48 

Socio-economic impact.............................................................................................. 49 

Environmental impact ................................................................................................ 49 

Case by case approach, specific to species and areas subject to important IUU fishing
.................................................................................................................................... 49 

Impact on IUU fishing ............................................................................................... 49 

Socio-economic impact.............................................................................................. 51 

Environmental impact ................................................................................................ 53 

Undertake a new and comprehensive initiative, covering both Community and non 
Community waters ..................................................................................................... 54 

Impact on IUU fishing ............................................................................................... 54 

Socio-economic impacts ............................................................................................ 58 

4.2.1.  Economic impacts of Option 4 in the Community .................................................... 58 

4.2.2.  Overall economic impacts of Option 4 on third countries ......................................... 63 

4.2.3.  Specific economic impacts on processors/exporters and on fishermen from developing 
countries..................................................................................................................... 64 

4.2.4.  Social impacts of Option 4......................................................................................... 67 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

4.6. 

Environmental impact ................................................................................................ 68 

Impact on the Community trade obligations and position ......................................... 68 

Impact on RFMOs and international position of the Community ............................. 69 

Contribution to a simplification of the Community framework derived from the 
measures agreed by RFMOs ...................................................................................... 70 

4.7. 

Administrative costs................................................................................................... 70 

Section 6:  How do the options compare?.............................................................................. 72 

Section 7: How could future monitoring and evaluation be organised? .................................. 77 

1. 

Trade measures .......................................................................................................... 77 

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2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

3. 

4. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

4.6. 

4.7. 

4.8. 

4.9. 

5. 

6. 

Measures for identification and sanction of vessels and States involved in IUU 
activities ..................................................................................................................... 77 

Community action within RFMOs and towards developing States........................... 77 

EC measures............................................................................................................... 78 

Compliance within EC waters and by EC nationals .................................................. 78 

overall assessment of the efficiency of the Regulation.............................................. 79 

Introduction................................................................................................................ 81 

Consultation procedure .............................................................................................. 81 

General observations.................................................................................................. 82 

Summary of the responses to the public consultation by issue.................................. 83 

Improve control of third country vessels and their catches accessing fishing ports of the 
European Community ................................................................................................ 83 

Improve control of compliance of conservation and management measures by third 
country fishery products transported by other means than fishing vessels................ 83 

Close the EU market to IUU fisheries products......................................................... 84 

Address IUU activities carried out by nationals from the European Community ..... 85 

Improve the legal means to ascertain IUU fishing activities ..................................... 85 

Introduce an efficient regime of penalties aiming to deter serious infringements to 
fisheries measures ...................................................................................................... 86 

Improve action against IUU fishing within Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations ............................................................................................................. 86 

Support the policy and means of developing countries against IUU fishing............. 87 

Increase synergies in the field of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance .................. 88 

new measures advanced by the respondents.............................................................. 88 

Conclusions................................................................................................................ 89 

6.1. 

Les coûts administratifs ............................................................................................. 90 

6.1.1. 

Incidence des nouvelles tâches induites par la mesure .............................................. 90 

6.1.2.  Etape 1 : identification et classification des obligations d’information..................... 91 

6.1.3.  Etape 2 : Détermination des actions requises ............................................................ 91 

6.1.4.  Etape 3 : Classification en fonction de la source de la réglementation...................... 92 

6.1.5.  Etape 4 : les groupes cibles........................................................................................ 92 

6.1.6.  Etape 5 : Fréquence des actions ................................................................................. 93 

6.1.7.  Etape 6 : Indication de facteurs de coûts pertinents................................................... 94 

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7. 

8. 

Coût de main d’œuvre................................................................................................ 94 

Nombre d’heures de travail rendu nécessaire par la mesure de certification............. 95 

8.1.1.  Conclusion : le coût administratif de la mesure......................................................... 96 

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ACP 

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries  

GLOSSARY 

CCAMLR  Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 

CDS 

CFP 

Catch Documentation Scheme 

Common Fisheries Policy 

COFI 

FAO Committee on Fisheries 

EC 

EEZ 

EU 

FAO 

FOC 

FPA 

European Commission 

Exclusive Economic Zone 

European Union 

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 

Flag of Convenience 

Fisheries Partnership Agreements 

GATT 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

GDP 

Gross Domestic Product 

GFCM 

General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 

ICCAT 

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 

ILO 

International Labour Organisation  

IOTC 

Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 

IPOA-IUU 

International  Plan  of  Action 
unreported and unregulated fishing 

to  prevent,  deter  and  eliminate 

illegal,  

IUU 

MCS 

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 

Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 

NAFO 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 

NEAFC 

North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 

NGO 

Non-Governmental Organisation 

OECD 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

RFMO 

Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 

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SEAFO 

Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 

SIOFA 

Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Arrangement 

TAC 

UN 

Total Allowable Catch 

United Nations  

UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

UNFSA 

UN Fish Stocks (Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species) Agreement 

VMS 

Vessel Monitoring System 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This  report  presents  possible  options  designed  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  policy  of  the 
Community in order to curb Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and minimise 
its environmental and socio-economic impacts. 

The report highlights the important damages caused by IUU fishing on the marine environment 
and on the economic situation of the fishing industry (both within and outside the Community). 
It  provides  data  on  the  scale  of  the  problem  and  clarifies  which  drivers  are  encouraging 
operators to carry out IUU fishing.  

The report summarizes the main results achieved so far by the Community in its policy against 
IUU fishing, since the adoption of its Action Plan on the matter in 2002. It sets out which are 
the  current  challenges  that  the  Community  needs  to  address  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  its 
action (prevent the importation into the Community of fisheries products stemming from IUU 
fishing;  discourage  fishing  operators  and  States  from  supporting  or  engaging  in  IUU  fishing, 
notably  via  the  use  of  "Flags  of  non-compliance";  improve  compliance  with  the  rules  of  the 
Common Fisheries Policy within Community waters). 

The  report  analyses  the  efficiency  and  impacts  of  four  options  for  future  action  by  the 
Community: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Continue  the  current  policy  and  focus  on  implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing 
framework only, without tabling new regulatory proposals; 

Focus  on  fishing  activities  outside  the  EC  only  (through  international  and  RFMOs 
actions); 

Pursue a case by case approach, specific to  stocks and areas subject to important IUU 
fishing; 

Develop  a  comprehensive  package,  comprising  both  regulatory  measures  and  political 
principles  guiding  the  EC  policy,  which  would  cover  both  EC  and  external  waters, 
complete the current framework and ensure better compliance with applicable rules, as 
well as allow the EC to adopt unilateral ambitious measures when multilateral measures 
fall short of EC expectations. 

The report suggests that the latest option would be the only one able to address effectively the 
current  challenges  of  the  Community  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  its  action  against  IUU 
fishing. Its comprehensive scope would allow covering the current loopholes which affect the 
Community system and encourage the continuation of IUU fishing. This options supports far-
reaching measures in all areas concerned (certification  scheme  for imports; possibility for  the 
Community  to  implement  unilateral  measures  towards  States  or  fishing  vessels  engaging  or 
supporting  IUU  fishing;  approximation  of  maximum  levels  of  sanctions  in  relation  to  serious 
infringements  to  CFP  rules).  This  option  would  entail  important  changes  and  would  not  be 
exempt  from  some  costs,  notably  related  to  the  commercial  dimension  of  the  approach 
promoted. It appears however that the ambitious approach promoted via this option would be 
the only one commensurate with the scale of the problem. 

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SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION 

This impact assessment report lays the ground for the legislative package to be proposed by the 
Commission  to  enhance  the  Community  policy  to  fight  against  Illegal,  Unreported  and 
Unregulated  (IUU)  fishing.  This  package,  which  should  comprise  a  Communication  and  a 
proposal for a Council Regulation, is part of the Commission Legislative and Work Programme 
for 2007. 

Work on this impact assessment was kicked-off by setting up an Inter-Service Steering Group 
(ISG)  in  November  2006  mandated  to  carry  out  the  analysis  on  possible  fields  of  action  and 
their  respective  measures.  The  ISG  comprised  representatives  of  Directorates  General  for 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Trade, Health and Consumer Protection, Taxation and Customs 
Union,  Development,  Environment,  Energy  and  Transport,  EuropeAid,  Justice,  Freedom  and 
Security, Legal Service and Secretariat General of the Commission.  

The data for this impact assessment was gathered following a diversified consultation process 
with the stakeholders as well as from external expertise. A wide consultation process was held 
between January and March 2007, on the basis of a public document tabled by the Commission 
services. Numerous meetings were organised and several written contributions received by the 
Commission as a result of this consultation. The issue was debated within an informal Council 
of  Fisheries  Ministers  on  17  April  2007.  In  addition,  the  European  Parliament  passed  a 
resolution on that matter on 15 February 20071. The outcomes of the consultation process have 
been summarized in a Report annexed to the present document. 

The  Commission  services  made  use  of  external  expertise  to  support  some  of  the  elements 
relating to the present report. Two Specific Conventions were concluded within the framework 
contracts (respectively FISH/2003/02 and FISH/2006/20) in force between the Commission and 
the external consultancy firm Oceanic Development. 

The  Specific  Convention  no.36/2006  had  as  purpose  to  analyse  the  impact  of  trade  measures 
envisaged in the IUU package under elaboration within the Commission. The specific Contract 
no.5 /2007 was assigned to provide other necessary external elements and input that could be 
used  by  the  Commission  in  the  final  preparation  of  the  impact  assessment  pertaining  to  the 
measures that might be part of the future proposals of the Commission against IUU fishing. 

Certain parts of the present report (notably on the social impact of "option 4", the impact of this 
option  on  our  trade  relationships  with  third  countries  and  the  justification  for  proposing  an 
approximation  at  Community  level  of  the  maximum  levels  of  sanctions  corresponding  to 
serious infringements to the CFP) have been introduced or clarified to take into consideration 
the opinion delivered by the "Impact assessment Board" of the European Commission. 

1 

European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)). 

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SECTION 2:  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

1. 

BACKGROUND 

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is one of the most serious threats worldwide 
to the sustainability of fish stocks and to marine biodiversity. There is a large consensus within 
the international community on the recognition of the particular gravity of this problem and the 
imperious need to adopt appropriate measures to prevent, deter and eliminate it. This consensus 
has  been  expressed  in  various  international  instruments  and  most  notably  in  the  voluntary 
International Plan of Action on this matter adopted under the auspices of the FAO in 20012.  

Since then, calls for strong actions against IUU fishing have intensified within the international 
community, be it within international arena (notably via the annual Resolutions by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on sustainable fisheries3, the 2005 Rome Declaration on IUU 
fishing  at  the  Ministerial  Meeting  on  Fisheries  within  the  FAO  in  2005,  or  the  Declaration 
agreed Ministerial level at the St John's Conference on the Governance of High Seas fisheries 
and the UN Fish Agreement in 2005), or at regional level (notably within all the 13 Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations to which the Community is party, or, notably, at the North 
Atlantic  Fisheries  Minister  Conference  in  2006  and  within  the  ACP-EU  Joint  Parliamentary 
Assembly in 20064).  

The issue has been extensively documented, in particular by the OECD5 as well as independent 
consultancy agencies6. Non Governmental Organisations have also produced numerous reports 
and studies on the various manifestations of IUU fishing in the world.  

The international legal regime relating to the conservation and management of marine resources 
stems  from  various  international  binding  instruments  to  which  the  Community  is  Party,  and 
most  notably  the  United  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea7,  the  Agreement  to  promote 
compliance with international conservation and management measures by fishing vessels on the 
high  seas  ("FAO  Compliance  Agreement")8,  and  the  UN  fish  stocks  agreement9.  Those 

2 

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4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

International  Plan  of  Action  to  prevent,  deter  and  eliminate  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  fishing, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2001. 
Cf.  for  2007  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  61/105  of  6  March  2007  "Sustainable 
fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United 
Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  of  10  December  1982  relating  to  the  Conservation  and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related Instruments". 
Resolution  adopted  by  the  ACP-EU  Joint  Parliamentary  Assembly  on  fisheries  and  their  social  and 
environmental aspects in developing countries on 22 June 2006 (notably paragraphs K and 17). 
Cf.  in  particular  the  OECD  publications  "Fish  Piracy:  Combating  Illegal,  Unreported  and  Unregulated 
Fishing" (2004), and "Why Fish Piracy Persists: The Economics of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (2005),as well as the report of the High Seas Task Force (2006), which was hosted by the OECD: 
"Closing  the  net:  Stopping  illegal  fishing  on  the  high  seas  (Governments  of  Australia,  Canada,  Chile, 
Namibia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  United  Kingdom,  WWF,  IUCN  and  the  Earth  Institute  at  Columbia 
University)". 
Cf. notably "Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing on developing countries, 
July 2005", report by Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG). 
Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 concerning the conclusion by the European Community 
of the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement of 28 
July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof (OJ L 179, 23.6.1998, p. 1). 
Council  Decision  96/428/EC  of  25  June  1996  on  acceptance  by  the  Community  of  the  Agreement  to 
promote compliance with international conservation and management measures by fishing vessels on the 
high seas (O J L 177, 16.7.1996, p. 24). 

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provisions  set  out  the  principle  that  all  States have  the  duty  to  adopt  appropriate  measures  to 
ensure  sustainable  management  of  marine  resources  and  to  cooperate  with  each  other  to  this 
end. They notably spell out which are the obligations of a State towards fishing vessels flying 
its flag. 

The  Community  adopted  its  own  Plan  of  Action  against  IUU  fishing  in  2002  as  part  of  the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy10.  The  Commission  considers  that,  more  than  five  years  after  this 
adoption, time has come to review the Community policy against IUU fishing and evaluate how 
it could be improved. 

1.1. 

Definition 

The  only  internationally  agreed  definition  of  "IUU  fishing"  is  to  be  found  in  the  IUU  FAO 
Action Plan. In line with this definition, and for the sake of clarity, the Commission considers 
that  the  scope  of  the  Community  policy  to  deter,  prevent  and  eliminate  IUU  fishing  should 
cover: 

•  behaviours  infringing  applicable  rules  on  the  management  and  conservation  of  fisheries 

resources, occurring in waters subject or beyond the jurisdiction of a State; 

•  fishing  activities  carried  out  in  an  high  seas  area  and  subject  to  a  Regional  Fisheries 
Management  Organisation  (RFMO)  by  fishing  vessels  without  flag  or  flying  the  flag  of 
States  not  party  to  the  RFMO  and  in  a  manner  contravening  with  the  rules  issued  by  this 
organisation; 

•  and  fishing  activities  carried  out  in  an  high  seas  area  not  subject  to  any  conservation  and 
management measures and conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for 
the conservation of fisheries resources under international law. 

1.2. 

Impacts of IUU fishing 

The  necessity  for  a  strengthened  Community  action  lies  in  the  multiple  detrimental  impacts 
associated with IUU fishing. 

1.2.1.  Environmental damages 

IUU  fishing  firstly  results  in  disastrous  environmental  damages  to  marine  biodiversity.  The 
General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  recognises  that  "IUU  fishing  remains  one  of  the 
greatest threats to marine ecosystems and continues to have serious and major implications for 
the conservation and management of ocean resources"11. 

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Council  Decision  98/414/EC  of  8  June  1998  on  the  ratification  by  the  European  Community  of  the 
Agreement for the implementing of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 14). 
Communication from the Commission "Community action plan for the eradication of illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing" - COM(2002) 180, 28.5.2002 -, and Council Conclusions of 7.6.2002. 
United Nations General Assembly, Res. 61/105 of 6 March 2007 "Sustainable fisheries, including through 
the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of  the  Sea  of 10 December  1982 relating  to  the  Conservation  and  Management  of  Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related Instruments", chap IV, p. 9. 

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It greatly damages sustainability of fisheries. This is the case in many fisheries where catches 
get un-or misreported to public authorities and contribute to overfishing. Those practices have 
negative short term consequences, but they also distort the scientific assessment of the stocks 
concerned and thereby undermine their future management, as the catch data used for reference 
do  not  reflect  the  reality  of  the  fishery.  Other  widespread  manifestations  of  IUU  practices 
include fishing activities targeting juveniles, in contravention with rules on minimum sizes, or 
fishing during periods or in areas normally closed to let the stocks spawn. They jeopardize the 
renewal of fish stocks concerned and may put into question their survival. 

According to the FAO, 25% of the marine fish stocks are overexploited, depleted or recovering 
from depletion. This proportion rises to 66% for high-seas and straddling fish stocks, which are 
particularly  vulnerable  to  IUU  fishing.  For  those  stocks,  IUU  practices  trigger  dramatic 
consequences. This is for instance the case for blue fin tuna in the Mediterranean, where IUU 
fishing is estimated to reach such high levels that a perpetuation of those illegal practices would 
lead the stock on the brink of extinction. While some stocks are currently subject to particularly 
high  level  of  IUU  fishing,  those  practices  impact  the  global  state  of  fisheries  and  should  be 
addressed as such. 

The  environmental  consequences  of  IUU  fishing  go  beyond  damages  to  fish  stocks.  Those 
practices  may  also  endanger  marine  ecosystems  and  habitats.  Fishing  with  prohibited 
methods  can  notably  result  in  a  high  proportion  of  unwanted  species  (fish  species,  but  also 
seabirds  or  turtles  for  example)  being  discarded.  This  is  the  case  for  example  for  driftnet 
fishing.  Fishing  in  protected  areas  may  trigger  irreversible  damages  to  vulnerable  marine 
ecosystems, like coral reefs. 

1.2.2. 

Socio-economic consequences 

IUU fishing does not only damage the marine environment. It also has serious socio-economic 
consequences. Estimates on illicit practices are by nature difficult to perform. The value of IUU 
fishing has been assessed to amount worldwide between 10 billion € a year12. By comparison, 
the value of landings by the Community fleet was worth 6,8 billion € in 200413.  

This  has  an  important  impact  on  the  Community  fishing  industry,  which  is  subject  to  a 
comprehensive set of rules and has to face fierce competition from IUU operators disregarding 
any  kind  of  obligations  and  active  on  the  same  fishing  grounds  or  targeting  the  same  final 
markets  (ex.  cod  from  Barents  Sea).  Community  fishermen  operating  legally  face  unfair 
practices from IUU operators, which notably result in loss of market shares for the Community 
industry and decrease of market prices due to the sale of cheap products stemming from illegal 
operators.  

The Community trade, processing and retail industry is also affected by IUU fishing. They 
face  indeed  competition  from  a  limited  number  of  firms  deliberately  engaged  in  the  trade  of 
IUU products. More generally, the difficulty to guarantee the legality of the fisheries products 
which they purchase may also harm their image among their trade partners and final consumers, 
who may see those firms as taking part in the laundering of fisheries products stemming from 
IUU fishing.  

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13 

Study  "Impact  of  trade  measures  envisaged  in  the  IUU  package  under  elaboration  within  the 
Commission", Oceanic Development (May 2007), 2003/FISH/02. 
Figures  for  2004,  from  the  "Annual  Economic  report  2005  on  the  Economic  Performance  of  selected 
European fishing fleets" (March 2006). 

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IUU fishing has also dramatic consequences for coastal communities in developing countries. 
Fish  resources  play  a  major  role  in  food  security  and  poverty  alleviation  for  many  of  those 
populations. They constitute an important source of income for some countries, via the wealth 
generated  through  the  supply  of  the  local  market  or  through  exports  (in  some  cases,  income 
derived from exports of fisheries products constitutes a non negligible share of the total exports 
and  an  important  source  of  foreign  currencies).  Coastal  developing  countries  often  lack  the 
means  and  capacity  necessary  to  manage  and  control  properly  maritime  waters  under  their 
jurisdiction.  Unscrupulous  illegal  operators  take  advantages  of  those  weaknesses  to  carry  out 
their activities without authorization from the coastal States and to plunder resources which are 
vital to local fishermen. This represents theft of fish resources, as well as a financial loss for the 
public authorities as those operators do not pay the fees which are legally due as a counterpart 
from the awarding of licences and fishing possibilities by coastal States. This may also result in 
job  losses  for  legal  fishermen  facing  competition  from  operators  practicing  illegal  fishing, 
which  has  specific  detrimental  consequences  in  regions  particularly  dependent  on  fishing 
activities where there are few other employment alternatives. 

Beyond the fishing sector itself, it is detrimental to the local processing and marketing sector, 
and  notably  to  women  who  represent  the largest share  of employed persons in this field.  The 
existence of important IUU fishing activities in coastal waters of a given country also dissuades 
economic  actors  from  investing  in  its  local  fishing  sector.  This  is  a  major  problem  for  Sub 
Saharan African coastal countries, where losses resulting from IUU fishing have been assessed 
to  reach  800  million  €  each  year.  The  situation  in  West  Africa  is  of  special  concern  in  that 
regard.  

1.2.3. 

IUU fishing undermines effort for better oceans governance 

Some firms practicing illegal fishing operate substandard vessels flying the flag of States which 
maintain  a  very  poor  level  of  social  standards,  or  no  standards  at  all,  and  where  crews  often 
coming  from  poor  parts  of  the  world  and  working  far  from  their  home  country,  must  endure 
unacceptable living and working conditions. This undermines efforts for international progress 
on social standards  for fishermen,  notably those reflected in the new consolidated convention 
on  work  in  the  fishing  sector  adopted  within  the  International  Labour  Organisation  in  June 
2007.  

IUU  operators  trading  fisheries  products  also  tend  to  circumvent  applicable  Community  rules 
for imports pertaining to health and hygiene standards or to the origins of fisheries products.  

For  all  those  reasons,  the  continuation  of  illicit  practices  undermines  the  legitimacy  among 
Community fishermen of the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Indeed, fishermen 
practising their activities legally are tempted to denounce the flaws of a regime which results in 
multiple obligations imposed on them, but which does not permit to stop illegal operators from 
developing their activities outside any kind of framework.  

All those elements demonstrate that IUU fishing represents a major danger for the sustainability 
and  future  of  common  resources  from  the  oceans  and  jeopardizes  the  very  foundation  of  the 
European Community policy designed to ensure sustainable management of fisheries resources 
within and beyond Community waters and improve oceans governance. 

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1.3. 

Scale of IUU fishing 

IUU activities are of a very complex nature and wide-world spread. Estimating the volume and 
value of catches of vessels infringing conservation and management measures is a very difficult 
exercise due to the clandestine nature of those activities. Some Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations  provided  some  estimation  related  to  their  fields  of  competence  but  those  are 
empiric and partial estimations based on the occurrences in their specific areas. 

Several  studies  have  attempted  to  evaluate  the  magnitude  of  IUU  fishing.  When  considering 
just high seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of African countries, it is estimated 
that the sales from IUU fishing to be roughly 2 billion euros for a volume ranging from 1.5 to 2 
million tons per year. When extrapolated to a global scale, estimated sales from IUU fishing 
could amount to some 10 billion euros per year or 19% of the worldwide reported value of 
catches from marine capture fisheries. 

On  the  high  seas,  the  most  important  catches  from  IUU  fishing  comprise  shark  species  and 
small  pelagic  species,  along  with  tuna  and  tuna-like  species  (Indian  and  Pacific  Ocean),  cod 
(Barents Sea) and cephalopods. Illegal catches on the high seas totalise a value at first sale of 
about 1 billion euros and almost 45% of this value stems from catches of tunas and tuna - like 
species (bigeye, yellowfin, albacore, and swordfish) and 20% from catches of demersal species 
(cod and redfish) from the North Atlantic.  

The  Exclusive  Economic  Zones  (EEZs)  of  Sub-Sahara  African  countries  are  also  subject  to 
high level of IUU fishing. The main species targeted there, in large majority by foreign-flagged 
fishing vessels, are crustaceans (40 000 tons), tuna and tuna- like species, in particular on the 
coast of Atlantic and Indian Ocean (220 000 tons), and other fish species and shellfish (170 000 
tons).  In  some  countries  (Somalia,  Liberia,  Guinea  Conakry),  the  value  of  IUU  fishing  can 
represent more than 50% of the value of the total catches. It is assessed that the overall value of 
IUU fishing in those areas amounts to approximately 800 million €. 

Cod and other demersal species form the principal species subject to IUU fishing in the EEZs of 
the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea (including in Community waters). They are estimated to reach 
approximately  45  000  tons  per  year,  with  an  estimated  value  of  50  millions  euros.  Within 
Community  waters,  other  stocks  like  Northern  stock  of  European  hake  are  considered  to  be 
subject to important illegal fishing (misreporting and non respect of minimum landing size). 

Other stocks are affected by IUU fishing in other EEZs of coastal countries around the world. 
Assessments are difficult to perform as to their magnitude, and those activities have a less direct 
impact on the Community as fishing or trade entity.  

Due to its appeal, the EC market attracts a substantial share of many products stemming from 
IUU fishing. Studies show that species such as tuna and cod are among the most concerned, as 
are all fish, shellfish and mollusc species with high commercial value fished in coastal zones of 
developing countries. On the whole, IUU fishing imports are estimated to be the equivalent of 
9% of the tonnage imported into the EC (500,000 tons) and 10% of the value of the imports (1.1 
billion euros). Seen from another angle, the EC market provides a commercial outlet for 10% of 
fish caught in violation of conservation and management measures. 

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1.4. 

The economics of IUU fishing14 

1.4.1.  Economic incentives to engage in IUU fishing 

Incentives to engage in IUU fishing activities are economic by nature. They can be of two main, 
complementary, types: to earn higher revenues and/or to incur lower costs than otherwise would 
be the case if rules were observed. 

1.4.1.1.  Higher expected revenues 

The premise is that everything else being equal, a vessel may engage in IUU fishing to catch 
more fish than it could have expected when complying with the rules. 

This  is  one  fundamental  factor  influencing  IUU.  It  is  normally  the  result  of  an  imbalance 
between the vessel's fishing technical capabilities and fishing possibilities. In cases where some 
countries are committed to developing their own fishing fleets, the imbalance between fishing 
capacity and fishing possibilities decided within RFMOs may act as a powerful driver for these 
nations to tolerate IUU activities under their flags. 

Two other factors further increase the likelihood that vessels, in particular those flying flags of 
convenience,  will  fish  more  than  regular  ones:  the  incompleteness  of  the  international  legal 
framework and the failure of some States to implement international obligations. 

A related powerful driver of IUU fishing is the prospect of earning higher revenues than when 
complying  with  the  rules.  This  driver  is  the  more  powerful  the  closer  are  the  prices  between 
regular and illegal catches of a given species and the higher the market price of a given species 
is. 

1.4.1.2.  Lower costs 

As long as the overall costs of IUU fishing remain lower than those of regular fishing activities, 
there would be a net positive incentive to engage in IUU fishing. 

Regarding operating/fixed fishing costs, on the one hand, IUU fishing is associated with poor 
labour,  safety  and  hygienic  conditions  on  board,  with  poor  repair  and  maintenance  and  with 
deficient  insurance  coverage.  On  the  other  hand,  IUU  fishing  is  associated  with  additional 
steaming  and,  hence,  fuel  consumption.  On  balance,  though,  operating  fishing  costs  are  in 
general  lower  for  IUU  vessels  than  from  regular  vessels.  The  same  applies  to  fixed  (capital) 
costs  of  IUU  fishing.  Many  IUU  vessels  are  very  old,  more  often  than  not  transferred  from 
fleets characterised by overcapacity.  

Regarding IUU-specific costs, first IUU vessels need to invest in avoidance costs. These costs 
can take the form of costs associated with the early detection of MCS devices or costs resulting 
from activities intended to deceive control (manipulating VMS data, changing names, flags or 
the physical appearance of the vessel). Generally speaking, these costs will be lower for fishing 
on the high seas than for fishing in EEZs. 

14 

This section is largely based on the OECD publication Why Fish Piracy Persists; the economic of illegal, 
unreported, unreported and unregulated fishing and on the final report of the Task-force on IUU fishing 
on the High Seas, stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas. 

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In  addition,  in  order  to  convert  IUU  catches  into  revenues,  it  is  necessary  to  circumvent 
reporting,  labelling,  fiscal  or  any  other  regulatory  measures.  In  practice,  they  can  do  so  by 
various means (misnaming catches, repackaging and re-labelling), but any of them will involve 
some extra costs. 

Furthermore, IUU fishing can result in some moral/reputation costs. They can take the form of 
being outlawed from the fishing community or boycotted. These costs could become important 
as consumers are becoming more aware of conservation issues. 

Finally, IUU-fishing vessels continuously face the risk of being caught and sanctioned, which 
depends on national MCS capabilities and on expected the level of sanctions.  

In  the  EEZ  of  coastal  countries,  the  probability  of  being  caught  depends  on  the  enforcement 
capacity of the coastal state, the quality of MCS, the size of the fishing ground and whether or 
not  fishing  grounds  are  close  to  the  high  seas.  Avoidance  and  circumvent  costs  are  therefore 
expected  to  be  higher  than  when  engaging  in  IUU  fishing  on  the  high  seas.  However,  IUU 
vessels will not pay access rights to the coastal state.  

On  balance,  these  factors  should  lead  to  expected  revenues  that  should  be  lower  than  these 
resulting from engaging in IUU fishing on the high seas. However, the enforcement capabilities 
of  coastal  states  are  a  crucial  factor  in  that  respect.  It  is  not  surprising  that  IUU  fishing 
concentrates  on  the  EEZ  of  some  countries  (in  particular  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa)  which  as  a 
result  of  their  political  and/or  economic  situation  or  other  factors  are  unable  to  exercise  any 
meaningful control. 

The continuation of IUU fishing supports the view that, on balance, IUU costs are lower. 

1.4.2.  Fighting IUU: the economics perspective 

Curbing economic incentives for engaging into IUU fishing would require taking actions to (a) 
reduce  the  expected  revenues  from  IUU  fishing  and  (b)  increase  the  expected  costs  of  IUU 
fishing. Both actions are necessary to ensure success against IUU. 

Other  types  of  actions  are  also  important:  first  these  aim  at  improving  the  economic,  social 
situation and prospects of countries where IUU fishing is known to be taking place. This could 
reduce the incentives to engage in IUU fishing, for instance by increasing the opportunity cost 
of  labour  and  the  fraud  costs  incurred  by  IUU  operators.  Second,  actions  intended  to  match 
fishing capabilities and possibilities. It has to be noted that actions within the latter category are 
costly  (e.g.  scrapping  programmes)  and  require  time  to  yield  positive  effects.  Others,  such  as 
reducing  or  eliminating  subsidies  for  vessel  construction  or  modernisation  could  imply  a 
significant political cost. 

1.4.2.1.  Reducing IUU revenues 

The possible avenues to reduce the revenues of IUU fishing are limiting IUU catches, limiting 
IUU trade or increasing the value of legal catches. 

As regards reducing catches, it is important to reduce the gaps and shortcomings of the current 
international  legal  framework,  notably  via  the  adhesion  by  all  Flag  States  to  international 
conventions  on  conservation  and  management  of  fisheries  resources,  an  extension  of  the 
coverage  of  high  seas  areas  by  new  RFMOs  as  well  as  a  higher  participation  by  interested 
States to existing RFMOs.  

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Further actions could be proposed, in particular those intended to increase MCS capabilities and 
cooperation  between  States  to  address  the  cross-border  dimension  of  IUU  fishing.  This  is  of 
particular importance in coastal developing countries. 

Trade measures intend to prevent IUU catches from entering regular markets. They could take 
different  forms  (certification  schemes,  import  restrictions  and/or  embargoes  of  fish  products 
from countries the flag of which is used by vessels involved in IUU fishing or where operators 
dealing  with  IUU  fishing  products  are  located).  Regarding  ways  of  increasing  the  value  of 
regular catches, the central question is whether consumers are willing to pay a higher price for 
regular  fish.  Some  evidence  from  the  CCAMLR  shows  that  this  could  be  the  case.  Measures 
intended to educate and inform customers, such as labelling or certification schemes, are keys 
for success, although their proliferation could be counterproductive if they confuse customers. 

1.4.2.2.  Increasing IUU costs 

A  very  important  field  of  action  is  that  of  the  expected  sanctions,  which  depends  on  the 
probability of detection and on the level of sanctions. MCS capabilities have to be enhanced. 
Enforcement  failures  (either  by  insufficient  material  means,  by  dispersion  of  competences  or 
both)  favour  IUU  activities.  Enhanced  MCS  capabilities  will  add  to  deterrence.  Furthermore, 
enhanced MCS capabilities are also likely to increase avoidance costs. 

Measures intended to (i) widen the risk incurred, in particular the extra-territorial application of 
domestic  sanctions  to  fishing  firms  or  individuals  (in  particular  skippers  or  fishing  masters 
working on IUU vessels), and (ii) making the trade of IUU fish illegal, so that processors and 
distributors are exposed to sanctions, are also important.  

Other possible ways of increasing the operating costs of IUU vessels, are: 

•  Restrictions of the provision of goods and services to IUU vessels or flags; 

•  Port control measures intended to prohibit transhipments and/or landings; 

•  The ratification and implementation by flag States of international conventions regarding the 

working conditions of fishers (notably ILO conventions). 

1.5. 

Drivers of IUU fishing 

The  most  important  drivers  supporting  the  continuation  of  IUU  fishing  are  briefly  described 
below. 

1.5.1. 

IUU fishing remains a profitable activity 

Incentives  to  practice  IUU  fishing  persist  as  long  as  it  remains  a  profitable  activity  for  the 
operators concerned.  

•  As already discussed in the previous section, operators practising IUU activities are able to 
maintain  low  operating  costs  and  enjoy  substantial  benefits.  The  operating  costs  of  the 
firms  involved  in  illegal  fishing  are  generally  lower  than  those  of  average  fishing  firms 
operating legally, although the circumvention of control measures infers costs which should 
not be neglected. Costs resulting from social and tax charges can be reduced to a minimum 
or be inexistent for fleets carrying out IUU activities under cover of offshore companies or 
flags  of  convenience.  Non  respect  of  fisheries  rules  and  trade  of  catches  outside  official 

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channels also result in lower expenses. Finally, IUU operators are rarely penalized, and the 
sanctions they incur are usually not deterrent and can be perceived as any other operational 
costs.  While  operating  costs  are  low,  benefits  expected  from  IUU  activities  are  generally 
high,  notably  as  illegal  operators  tend  to  target  valuable  species  which  command  higher 
market prices (for example toothfish, blue fin tuna or cod). 

•  In  some  fisheries,  the  overcapacity  of  fishing  fleets  compared  to  the  fishing  possibilities 
available also generates illicit fishing activities, as some vessels tend to overpass the catch 
limits  to  which  they  are  subject  in  order  to  maintain  a  level  of  catch  ensuring  their 
profitability.  

In  a  context  of  steady  increase  in  the  consumption  of  fisheries  products  worldwide,  the 
incentives for supplying illegal fisheries products to the final markets will remain high as long 
as operators are able to gain benefits out of their activities.  

1.5.2.  No substantial hurdles for the IUU operators 

Profitability  explains  why  the  IUU  fishing  phenomenon  persists.  Another  key  element  in  the 
explanation of IUU fishing is how it persists. The continuation of IUU practices relies to a large 
extent on the easiness with which illegal operators are able to pursue their activities along the 
whole supply chain and escape any kinds of obligation or constraint which would hamper them 
to do so. 

IUU operators firstly take advantage of the benefits they can gain from national systems 
of flag registration.  

A large number of fishing vessels, in particular those operating outside Community waters, are 
registered in States which run open registers and are unwilling or unable to exercise a proper 
control  over  their  fishing  fleet  as  to  the  respect  of  conservation  and  management  measures. 
Registration in those States hosting "flags of convenience" or "flags of non compliance" proves 
to  be  a  very  simple  and  inexpensive  operation,  which  can  be  completed  within  some  hours. 
Under the law of the sea, the duty to exert control over a vessel is primarily incumbent upon the 
Flag  State.  Whenever  the  Flag  State  does  not  discharge  this  duty,  and  in  the  absence  of  an 
internationally-agreed  understanding  of  what  the  "genuine  link"  between  a  Flag  State  and 
fishing vessels flying its flag should consist of, there are only limited means to remedy illegal 
harvesting  activities  committed  by  such  vessels.  As  a  result,  most  of  the  vessels  identified  as 
committing IUU activities in different parts of the world are registered in States known for the 
absence of adequate control over their fishing fleet. Registration is often made under cover of 
offshore companies, often located in the Flag State. The beneficial owners of the operation have 
no  or  very  limited  contact  with  this  State  which  renders  their  identification  is  difficult. 
Estimations  have  been  provided  according  to  which  the  number  of  fishing  vessels  over  24 
meters flying flags of convenience amounts to approximately 1300 vessels, registered in a small 
number of countries (among them Panama, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Vanuatu, Marshall Island, 
Mauritius, Bolivia, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Georgia, Bolivia, Belize, Togo…). 

These  problems  are  exacerbated  by  the  insufficient  cooperation  at  international  level 
between States and international bodies in charge of control of fishing activities.  

IUU fishing is by essence an international activity. IUU operators tend to exert their catching 
activities  in  fishing  grounds  where  control  activities  are  difficult  to  perform  (notably  remote 
high  seas  areas)  or  where  control  capacities  of  the  competent  public  authorities  are  reduced 

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(notably in the Exclusive Economic Zones of developing countries). To dissimulate their illegal 
origin, catches can then be transported along complex routes before reaching their final market, 
including transhipments at sea, landings in "ports of convenience" and processing in a country 
which is different from the Flag and the market States. Those activities can be qualified in some 
instances as cross-border organised crime, where the working methods and patterns are similar 
to other illegal activities, like drug or arm smuggling. In addition, the small probability of being 
penalized  and  the  actual  sanctions  they  sometimes  incur  can  be  seen  as  still  insufficient  to 
constitute an actual deterrent to engage in IUU fishing.  

Cooperation  at  all  levels  (international,  regional,  Community  and  national)  is  of  paramount 
importance  in  order  to  properly  track  and  investigate  those  activities.  It  should  encompass 
control at sea, monitoring of trade flows as well as port State measures. Despite some progress, 
the coexistence of scattered services in charge of various aspects of maritime surveillance and 
border  control  and  the  absence  of  sufficient  exchange  of  information  between  control 
authorities have not allowed to put in place efficient mechanisms able to deter IUU operators 
from continuing their activities.  

Illegal operators within Community waters also use the weakness of the control, inspection and 
enforcement  system  of  Member  States  to  develop  their  activities.  The  volume  of  fisheries 
products  which  are  harvested  in  contravention  of  Community  rules  and  then  sold  outside 
official  channels  on  the  Community  market  (so-called  "black  fish")  can  reach  a  very  high 
proportion in some fisheries (for example cod in the Baltic Sea). 

2. 

MAIN  CHALLENGES  FACED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  IN  ITS  POLICY  AGAINST  IUU 
FISHING 

The Community has one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, with approximately 90 000 
fishing  vessels  with  a  global  capacity  of  6,7  million  kW.  Its  landings  amounted  to 
approximately  5,7  million  tons  of  fish  worth  6,8  billion  €15  in  2004,  which  makes  of  the 
Community the third catching power in the world.  

It  is  also  the  biggest  market  and  the  first  importer  for  fisheries  products.  The  Community 
market for fisheries products depends for 60% on imports. In particular, the processing industry 
within the Community relies heavily on  imported products. As a result, the value of fisheries 
products imported into the Community rose to nearly 14 billion € in 200516, representing 40% 
of the total of importations of fisheries products worldwide. Due to the poor state of many fish 
stocks in Community waters and the rising demand for fisheries products, this dependency on 
imported products is deemed to increase in the coming years. 

In  addition,  Community  operators  are  believed  to  feature  among  those  registering  a  large 
number of fishing vessels in States hosting flags of convenience. 

Given  its  status  of  major  fishing,  Flag  and  Market  power,  and  in  line  with  its  international 
commitments  and  its  overall  objective  to  improve  management  and  avoid  overexploitation  of 
natural resources (as set out in the EU Sustainable development Strategy agreed at the European 

15 

16 

Figures  for  2004,  from  the  "Annual  Economic  report  2005  on  the  Economic  Performance  of  selected 
European fishing fleets" (March 2006). 
Sources Eurostat. 

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Council  of  June  2006),  the  Community  has  a  specific  responsibility  in  leading  international 
efforts on the fight against IUU fishing. 

2.1.  What has been achieved by the Community so far? 

The fight against IUU fishing has emerged relatively recently as one of the main priorities of 
the Community in its international fisheries policy.  

Building on by its 2002 action plan17 derived from the international plan of Action adopted by 
the FAO in 2001, the first objective of the Community policy against IUU fishing has been to 
establish international and regional norms designed to curtail those practices.  

It is also fair to say that the fight against IUU fishing has been seen over the past years as an 
international problem rather than as an internal issue for the Community. 

The  main  measures  and  initiatives  adopted  by  the  European  Community  against  IUU  fishing 
are briefly presented below.  

At  international  level,  the  European  Community  has  been  fostering  progress  against  IUU 
fishing in bodies in charge of fisheries and law of the sea (FAO, UN). 

The European Community notably supports international discussions to define the genuine link 
between Flag States and their fishing fleets. 

The  EC  was  also  actively  involved  in  the  work  led  by  FAO  to  establish  a  model  port  State 
scheme endorsed in 2005, and has supported the initiative agreed by the Fisheries Committee 
("COFI") of the FAO in 2007 to develop a new legally binding instrument based on this model 
port State scheme.  

Fighting  IUU  fishing  occurring  on  the  high  seas  requires  the  development  of  a  strategy  at 
regional  level.  This  has  triggered  important  changes  in  the  mandate  of  Regional  Fisheries 
Management Organisations: while their initial purpose was mainly to determine and allocate in 
a fair and sustainable manner fishing possibilities in a given high sea area among their Parties, 
those RFMOs have been engaged for some years in the elaboration of a policy for control and 
inspection,  which  constitutes  nowadays  a  growing  part  of  their  activities.  In  addition,  the 
Community has actively contributed in the recent years to the setting up of new RFMOs in high 
seas  areas  which  were  not  subject  to  any  multilateral  regulation  (cf.  SIOFA,  SEAFO,  South 
Pacific…).  Here  again,  the  willingness  to  prevent  IUU  fishing  has  been  instrumental  in  the 
policy carried out by the Community.  

Most  measures  in  place  to  combat  IUU  fishing  within  RFMOs  have  been  introduced  at  the 
initiative of the Community, or with its active support. Most RFMOs have now developed sets 
of rules against IUU fishing. They include inter alia: 

•  the establishment of control and inspection schemes, 

•  the obligation for vessels to be equipped with VMS, 

17 

Communication from the Commission "Community action plan for the eradication of illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing" - COM(2002) 180, 28.5.2002 -, and Council Conclusions of 7.6.2002. 

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•  the registration of catches, 

•  the regulation of fishing gear, 

•  specific measures targeting non-Parties vessels present in the RFMO areas, 

•  the  imposition  of  accompanying  documents  for  certain  species  to  certify  compliance  with 
conservation and management measures, without which no commercialization is possible, 

•  lists of vessels authorised to fish;  

•  lists of vessels identified as having engaged in IUU activities ("IUU vessels"), and which are 
subject  to  a  large  array  of  penalties  (notably  prohibition  to  land  and  be  provided  with 
services in the ports of the Parties to the Organisation),  

•  the adoption of port state control measures, 

•  trade measures towards States non complying with relevant measures, 

•  regulation of transhipments at sea…. 

These rules have been progressively been put in place over the past years or are in the process 
of establishment. 

In  relation  to  coastal  developing  countries,  Fisheries  Partnership  Agreements  provide  an 
adequate framework to undertake actions to control unlawful fishing. An important part of the 
assistance  for  developing  countries  provided  under  those  agreements  is  devoted  to  combating 
IUU  fishing  and  strengthening  control  and  surveillance  methods.  Joint  initiatives  with  the 
countries  concerned  are  under  way,  particularly  in  West  Africa,  East  Africa,  Southern  Africa 
and  the  Pacific,  to  improve  infrastructure,  means  of  control  and  the  legislative  framework. 
These initiatives may also move forward on a regional basis, as reflected in the recent launching 
of a regional plan of action for the Indian Ocean.  

Through  the  European  Development  Fund  (EDF),  the  European  Community  provides 
assistance for a range of fisheries initiatives both at national and regional levels, notably with a 
view to combating IUU fishing. The EC is currently financing about 15 fisheries initiatives in 
ACP countries, mostly under the 8th and 9th EDF (programming periods 1997-2002 and 2002-
2007  respectively),  with  a  total  financial  envelope  of  roughly  170  million  €.  Monitoring, 
Control and Surveillance features as one of the key theme under this program. 

At  EU  level,  an  important  set  of  rules  has  been  established  since  1993  already,  instituting  a 
system  of  control,  inspection  and  enforcement  of  fisheries  rules18.  Its  scope  extends  to 
Community waters as well as to Community operators and it aims at ensuring compliance with 
the  rules  of  the  Common  Fishery  Policy.  Implementing  those  provisions  fall  within  the 
competence of Member States. The duties of Member States in respect of fishing vessels flying 
their flags, as well as in respect of other fishing vessels acting within Community waters, are 
clearly spelt out within this regulatory framework.  

18 

Cf. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to 
the common fisheries policy. 

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Insofar  as  this  system  is  designed  to  deter  and  sanction  illegal  fishing  activities,  it  should  be 
seen as participating to the efforts of the Community to curtail IUU fishing, despite the fact that 
this terminology has often been used in the past to qualify "external" fishing practices. Over the 
past years, the policy of the Community in this field has notably consisted in pressing Member 
States to fulfil their obligations for implementing international and European Community law 
provisions19.  The  European  Community  legislation  has  also  been  reinforced  to  establish  the 
responsibility of the beneficiaries of infringements (responsibility of nationals, regardless of the 
flag under which the vessels concerned operate). 

2.2. 

Examples  of  specific  mechanisms  implemented  by  third  States  against  IUU 
fishing 

In addition to their contribution to international solutions against IUU fishing, some of the most 
important fisheries partners of the Community have developed their own tools to prevent those 
activities.  This  section  provides  for  a  brief  description  of  some  of  those  tools,  as  they  might 
constitute useful precedents for the Community. 

In  the  United  States,  the  domestic  legislation  entitles  the  authorities  to  take  severe  sanctions 
against operators importing into the US territory fisheries products harvested in violation to the 
rules of a foreign country. According to the Lacey Act20, "it is unlawful for any person (…)to 
import,  export,  transport,  sell,  receive,  acquire,  or  purchase  (…)  any  fish  or  wildlife  taken, 
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation 
of any foreign law". On this basis, operators importing fisheries products caught in violation of 
rules of third countries or RFMOs have been sentenced to very heavy fines and imprisonment 
terms.  
The new US legislative framework on the conservation and management of fisheries21 requires 
that the US authorities identify those fishing nations whose vessels are engaged in IUU fishing 
and  put  in  place  adequate  procedures  to  certify  whether  those  nations  have  taken  adequate 
corrective  actions  to  address  the  problem.  On  the  basis  of  this  certification  exercise,  the  US 
authorities are entitled to adopt import prohibitions and other measures towards those nations 
which are not positively certified. 

In  Canada,  specific  rules  are  in  place  with  regard  to  the  access  of  foreign  fishing  vessels  to 
Canadian  waters  and  ports22.  Access  is  authorized  only  for  those  vessels  which  have  been 
awarded  licences  to  this  end  by  the  Canadian  authorities.  The  licences  are  granted  to  foreign 
fishing  vessels  (1)  flying  the  Flag  of  States  which  are  considered  as  fulfilling  their  general 
obligations as Flag State under international law and (2) which, among other criteria, carry out 
their  activities  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  norms  on  conservation  and  management  of 
fisheries  resources.  If  those  conditions  are  not  met,  no  licence  is  granted,  and  the  vessels 
considered shall not be entitled to access Canadian waters and ports.  

In Norway, on the basis of a domestic legislation, the authorities operate their own "black list" 
and "IUU list" of fishing vessels. Fishing vessels are listed when it has been demonstrated that 
they have been carrying out IUU fishing or have been alleged to do so. Depending on the kind 
of listing, the vessels concerned are subject to a set of measures designed to restrict their action 

19 

20 
21 

22 

Cf.  for  example  the  judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  of  12  July  2005  in  Case  C-304/02: 
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. 
The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. 16 United States Code § 3371. 
Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and management reauthorization act (p. l. 109-479) amending the 
High seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (new Section 609), 2007. 
Cf. the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and its implementing Regulations. 

EN 

22 

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(prohibition  to  sail  in  Norwegian  waters,  to  access  Norwegian  ports,  to  be  registered  under 
Norwegian flag…) or increase scrutiny over their activities (systematic inspection in ports). 

2.3. 

Current challenges that the Community needs to face to curtail IUU fishing 

During the last decade, the main focus of the Community action against IUU fishing has been 
the  setting  up  and  consolidation  of  norms  and  bodies  mainly  dedicated  to  the  monitoring, 
control and surveillance of activities occurring at sea. At this stage, such action was necessary 
in order to establish the first mechanisms designed to address IUU fishing at international level.  

A  screening  of  the  current  situation  has  shown  that  it  is  now  necessary  to  develop  a  new 
approach to the IUU problem.  

This assessment is notably based on the following considerations:  

–  The international commitments of the Community against IUU fishing require the adoption 
of  additional  measures  in  different  fields  (notably  to  implement  the  instruments  agreed 
within the FAO and the UN);  

–  Various  events  have  demonstrated  the  deficiencies  of  the  current  system  in  some  areas, 
notably  the  difficulty  to  exert  an  adequate  control  over  the  legality  of  fisheries  products 
imported into the Community; 

–  The  outcome  of  the  consultation  launched  by  the  Commission  in  January  2007  shows  a 
general  support  for  the  idea  that  the  Community  should  step  up  its  action  against  IUU 
fishing. Most of the contributions also encourage the Commission to initiate new proposals 
in all the fields of action identified in the "consultation paper"; 

–  Numerous measures against IUU fishing have been adopted within RFMOs; such measures 
vary from one organisation to the other, notably with respect to their scope and their degree 
of  sophistication.  As  a  result,  different  measures  are  incorporated  into  the  Community 
legislation,  whose  application  depends  on  the  areas  and  species  covered.  This  is  source  of 
confusion  for  Community  operators  and  control  authorities,  and  reflects  a  lack  of 
consistency  and  efficiency.  To  remedy  this  situation,  a  generalization  throughout  the 
Community of the most advanced measures adopted within RFMOs could be envisaged; 

–  External  studies  commissioned  by  the  Commission  have  also  confirmed  that  serious 
weaknesses undermine some aspects of the current approach of the Community against IUU 
fishing.  

On the substance, there is a widespread recognition that a new approach should aim to complete 
the  existing  framework,  improve  its  efficiency  and  place  the  focus  on  the  need  for  better 
enforcement and compliance with the measures agreed at international and Community levels 
to deter, prevent and eliminate IUU fishing. 

More precisely, this assessment relies on the following findings: 

•  the  vulnerability  of  the  Community  market  to  the  importation  of  fisheries  products 
which  have  been  illegally  caught  has  been  illustrated  at  several  occasions.  The  current 
Community legislation lays down the requirements that foreign-flagged vessels must follow 
in order to be entitled to land fishing products in Community ports (prior notification, data 
on the origins of the catches…). Its scope is however limited to direct landings of fisheries 

EN 

23 

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products  in  fishing  ports,  which  represent  only  about  2%  of  the  total  amounts  of  fishing 
products  imported  into  the  Community23.  Various  examples  have  also  shown  that  this 
legislation contains loopholes, including the cases of foreign-flagged fishing vessels landing 
their  products  into  Community  ports  without  being  subject  to  a  proper  control  as  to  their 
legality.  Suspicions  have  arisen  that  those  products  may  stem  from  illegal  fishing,  but  the 
current legal framework does not allow performing adequate checks in that regard. A recent 
report  by  the  inspection  services  from  the  Commission  has  concluded  that  the  current 
framework  is  not  even  implemented  in  a  satisfactory  manner  by  national  authorities.  It 
should  be  underlined  that  the  legislation  applying  to  landings  of  catches  by  Community 
fishing  vessels  is  much  more  complete  than  the  legislation  covering  landings  and  imports 
into  the  Community  of  fisheries  products  caught  by  foreign-flagged  vessels.  Under  the 
relevant legislation applying to Community fishing vessels24, information on the quantity of 
catches,  the  location  of  the  fishing  grounds,  the  gear  used  and  the  period  considered  are 
collected by the master and transmitted to the control authorities, through various documents 
(log  book  during  operation  at  sea,  landing  declaration  handed  over  to  the  Port  authorities, 
and sales note transmitted to the buyer of the catches). All Community fishing vessels over 
15  meters  also  have  an  obligation  to  have  a  VMS  system  on  board,  which  provides 
information  on  their  location.  This  system  allows  national  authorities  to  check  if  catches 
from Community fishing vessels have been harvested in conformity with the rules in place. 
Under the current regime, this can not be said for landing and imports of fisheries products 
caught  by  foreign-flagged  vessels.  Taking  account  of  all  modes  of  transport,  it  is  being 
assessed  that  approximately  500000  tons  worth  1,1  billion  €  fisheries  products  caught 
illegally  by  foreign-flagged  fishing  vessels  end  up  on  the  Community  market  every  year. 
This easiness to use the Community market as outlet for fisheries products caught illegally 
represents a clear incentive for the operators concerned to continue their practices. This issue 
has  been  recognised  widely  in  the  consultation  process.  The  Community  fishing  industry 
complains  about  the  massive  arrival  on  the  Community  market  of  imported  products 
stemming from IUU fishing which drives prices down. The Community processing and retail 
sectors depend to a large extent for their supply on imported products; they are not satisfied 
with  the  current  situation,  under  which  they  suffer  from  a  lack  of  clear  rules  which  would 
guarantee  that  imported  products  have  been  harvested  legally,  and  they  are  sometimes 
blamed  for  allegedly  laundering  illegal  products.  Problems  have  also  arisen  due  to  the 
presence in Community ports of foreign vessels listed as IUU by RFMOs, as well as to the 
fact  that  the  status  for  those  vessels  depends  on  the  regime  put  in  place  in  the  various 
RFMOs, and is not regulated in a consistent way all over the EU territory. As a Market and 
Port public entity, the Community needs to adopt the necessary measures to avoid that IUU 
fishing is encouraged via the arrival of illegal products into its territory. 

•  Despite improvements in the international legislation, the situation is still worrying in high 
seas  areas  and  in  waters  of  developing  countries  where  IUU  fishing  remains  a  very 
serious  problem.  As  explained  above  in  section  2,  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  this 
continuation lies in the fact that a large number of fishing vessels carrying out IUU fishing 
are  registered  in  States  which  do  not  exert  an  adequate  control  over  their  fishing  fleet. 
Operators  opt  for  those  registers  in  order  to  disregard  rules  for  the  conservation  and 

23 

24 

On an annual basis, direct landings of fisheries products from countries flying the flag of third countries 
into  Community  ports  amount  to  75 000  tons,  while  the  overall  volume  of  importations  of  fisheries 
products is 4,5 million tons.  
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the 
common fisheries policy. 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
management of fisheries resources without being subject to prosecution or sanction by their 
Flag State. They are qualified as "Flags of non compliance". A limited number of measures 
have been enacted at regional level, within RFMOs, to counteract this problem. Black lists of 
vessels  have  been  adopted  in  most  RFMOs.  The  possibility  to  implement  specific  trade 
measures against States identified as non-cooperative by the Parties is also foreseen in some 
of those bodies. Such measures represent valuable steps in the right direction, but they have 
been only seldom used, notably because of the decision-making process of RFMOs, which 
rely  on  consensus  and  annual  meeting.  In  addition,  in  waters  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
developing States, operators responsible for IUU fishing benefit from the lack of appropriate 
control capacities from the competent national authorities. Devising solutions which would 
be  efficient  enough  to  curb  the  activities  of  those  vessels  and  address  the  complacency  of 
those States towards IUU fishing is a major challenge for the Community policy against IUU 
fishing. 

•  The  problems  set  out  above  result  from  the  activities  of  foreign-flagged  fleets  committed 
outside  community  waters,  and  IUU  fishing  is  often  assimilated  to  those  practices.  The 
definition  of  IUU  fishing  agreed  by  the  FAO  encompasses  however  also  illegal  activities 
occurring in the EEZ of coastal States. This requires that the state of the implementation of 
the  rules  of  the  CFP  within  the  Community  is  also  taken  into  account  as  part  of  the 
assessment  of  the  impact  of  IUU  fishing  on  the  Community.  The  current  Community 
framework provides for a comprehensive system of control, inspection and enforcement of 
fisheries  rules  applying  within  Community  waters  and  to  Community  operators.  The 
Community  is  however  deeply  affected  by  illegal  fishing  taking  place  within 
Community  waters  and/or  carried  out  by  Community  operators.  This  has  been 
acknowledged again recently by the Commission which has stated that "compliance with key 
rules  of  the  CFP  remains  poor  in  many  fisheries"25.  Noticeable  examples  include  the  cod 
fishery in the Baltic Sea, with important levels of catches going underreported, or the fishery 
for  the  Northern  stock  of  European  hake,  where  landing  of  undersized  fish  is  still  a 
considerable  problem  in  many  Member  States.  Reaching  a  higher  degree  of  compliance 
within Community waters and by Community operators shall constitute a major task for the 
Community  in  its  efforts  to  step  up  its  policy  against  IUU  fishing.  This  is  a  necessity  to 
avoid that the rules and principles of the CFP designed to conserve and manage fish stocks 
are put in jeopardy, as well as for the credibility of the international action of the Community 
against IUU fishing.  

From the elements described above, it results that the main challenges which the Community 
has to face in its policy against IUU fishing are the following:  

•  How  to  prevent  the  importation  of  IUU  products  from  3rd  countries  into  the  Community 
market?  This  should  be  considered  as  the  main  challenge  for  the  Community,  given  the 
shortcomings of the current Community system against IUU fishing in that respect. 

•  How  to  enact  more  efficient  measures  for  identification  and  sanction  of  vessels  and  States 
engaged  in  or  supporting  IUU  activities  in  the  high  seas  or  in  waters  of  developing 
countries? 

•  How to improve the level of compliance with the rules of the Common Fishery Policy within 

25 

Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  the  monitoring  of  the 
Member States' implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2003-2005 - COM(2007) 167. 

EN 

25 

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EC waters and/or by EC operators? 

Those  three  challenges  can  be  considered  as  constituting  the  main  problems  caused  by  IUU 
fishing to the Community, and for which an adequate strategy needs to be devised.  

EN 

26 

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SECTION 3:  OBJECTIVES 

General Objective 

The general objective of the Community is to review and enhance its contribution to the fight 
against IUU fishing in order to increase the efficiency of action against this international plague 
and its environmental, economic and social consequences.  

This objective should result in improved management of fisheries resources, and should be seen 
within the general aim of the Common Fisheries Policy to "ensure exploitation of living aquatic 
resources  that  provides  sustainable  economic,  environmental  and  social  conditions26"  and, 
more  generally,  as  contributing  to  the  Sustainable  Development  Strategy  agreed  by  the 
European Council in June 2006 via its focus on the protection of natural resources. It is also in 
line  with  the  objectives  set  out  at  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development  in  2002 
regarding fisheries management27. 

Striving  for  better  ocean  governance  is  also  one  of  the  main  principles  guiding  the  current 
reflections on a future Maritime Policy for the Community.  

Specific objectives 

In line with section 2, pursuing this general objective implies that the following specific goals 
are attained: 

•  Reduce  the  vulnerability  of  the  Community  market  to  imports  of  fisheries  products 
stemming  from  IUU  fishing  so  that  only  products  legally  harvested  are  imported  into  the 
Community; 

•  Improve  mechanisms  designed  to  identify  and  sanction  vessels  and  States  engaged  in  or 

supporting IUU fishing in the high seas and/or in the waters of developing countries; 

•  Increase  compliance  with  the  rules  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  with  a  view  to 
adequately  sanctioning  illegal  fishing  carried  by  Community  operators  within  or  beyond 
Community waters. 

It is critical that the strategy by the Community is comprehensive and cover all the facets of the 
IUU problem and all activities along the supply chain (from the net to the plate). Against this 
background,  the  Community  policy  should  aim  to  fulfil  all  the  specific  objectives  identified 

26 

27 

Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries 
resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 59). 
Report  of  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development,  Johannesburg,  South  Africa,  26  August  -  4 
September  2002  (United  Nations  publication),  cf.  in  particular  paragraph  31"  To  achieve  sustainable 
fisheries, the following actions are required at all levels: (…) Urgently develop and implement national 
and, where appropriate, regional plans of action, to put into effect the international plans of action of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in particular the International Plan of Action 
for the Management of Fishing Capacity by 2005 and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and  Eliminate  Illegal,  Unreported  and  Unregulated  Fishing  by  2004.  Establish  effective  monitoring, 
reporting  and  enforcement,  and  control  of  fishing  vessels,  including  by  flag  States,  to  further  the 
international plan of action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing". 

EN 

27 

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below  according  to  a  coherent  approach,  as  leaving  aside  one  of  them  would  result  in  major 
gaps remaining in place and jeopardizing the whole approach.  

For  all  those  three  specific  objectives,  the  Community  should  be  guided  by  its  overarching 
approach consisting in a full implementation of its existing international commitments against 
IUU fishing and a consolidation of its action at international, regional and Community levels on 
this matter. 

SECTION 4:  POLICY OPTIONS 

The  policy  options  which  should  underpin  the  future  Community  policy  against  IUU  fishing 
should  be  assessed  against  their  relevance  in  respect  of  achieving  the  objectives  identified  in 
section 3.  

The following different policy options will be considered: 

–  Continue current policy and focus on implementation and enforcement of existing framework 

only, without tabling new regulatory proposals; 

–  Focus  on  fishing  activities  outside  the  EC  only,  through  action  at  international  level  and 

within Regional Fisheries Management Organisations; 

–  Develop a policy based on a case by case approach, which would be adapted to the specific 
features of the various fish species and areas subject to important levels of IUU fishing; 

–  Undertake  a  new  and  comprehensive  initiative,  covering  both  Community  and  non 
Community  waters,  relying  on  clear  political  principles  and  regulatory  measures,  which 
would  the  complete  the  current  framework  and  ensure  better  compliance  with  applicable 
rules,  as  well  as  allow  the  EC  to  adopt  unilateral  ambitious  measures  when  multilateral 
measures fall short of EC expectations. 

OPTION 1: CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 

OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK  

The starting point for this option lies in the observation that the continuation of illegal fishing 
by  Community  operators  depends  to  a  large  extent  to  the  deficient  application  of  the  current 
Community system for control, inspection and enforcement of the rules of the CFP.  

Within the Community regime, the implementation of those rules falls within the competence 
of  Member  States.  They  have  to  establish  appropriate  mechanisms  and  adopt  action 
guaranteeing  that  operators  from  the  fishing  sector  abide  by  the  rules  agreed  at  Community 
level.  In  numerous  occasions,  the  Commission  has  raised  serious  concerns  as  to  the  lack  of 
sufficient measures by Member States for this purpose and the low priority given to improving 
the situation28. 

28 

Cf.  report  by  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  CFP,  footnote  n°  8,  and  the  annual 
"compliance scoreboard" published under the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control_enforcement/scoreboard_en.htm. 

EN 

28 

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While  situations  differ  from  one  Member  State  to  another,  a  global  assessment  denotes  the 
persistence  of  major  shortcomings.  The  resulting  need  for  action  has  been  highlighted  by  the 
European Parliament in its Resolution adopted on 15 February 2007, which states that the EP 
"reiterates its conviction that a crucial and obvious first step for the European Union to take is, 
first,  to  fully  implement  the  existing  provisions  of  the  CFP  and  other  relevant  Community 
legislation in an effective, fair and rigorous manner, in order to reduce unreported and illegal 
fishing by Community vessels and in Community waters"29. 

Instead of launching new regulatory initiatives, which might just face the same implementation 
deficit as previous regulations and not be properly applied, the Community should give priority 
to an improvement of the implementation of the current framework.  

The  Commission  could  make  a  better  and  more  frequent  use  of  its  own  powers  under  its 
responsibility to ensure that Member States control, inspect and enforce adequately the rules in 
place. 

Better  regulation  and  good  governance  in  the  CFP  decision-making  process  should  also  help 
improving the culture of compliance among fishing operators with regard to the implementation 
of measures affecting their activities.  

Finally,  this  option  could  also  rely  on  the  best  practices  developed  by  the  sector  itself  to 
contribute to the combat against IUU fishing, notably by Community operators involved in the 
importation  of  fisheries  products  investing  in  the  establishment  of  their  own  certification 
schemes  designed  to  avoid  purchasing  and  selling  fisheries  products  stemming  from  IUU 
fishing. 

Technical  aspects  could  be  solved  via  a  minimalist  regulatory  initiative.  This  would  allow 
updating  elements  pertaining  to  control,  inspection  and  enforcement  in  Community  waters 
which for their majority date back from 1993.  

Under this option, the Community should in the first place enhance the implementation of the 
current framework designed to address illegal fishing and use all existing means to this end. 

OPTION 2: FOCUS ON FISHING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE EC ONLY  

IUU fishing affects all oceans and many stocks.  

Important fish stocks (notably tuna species) subject to high level of IUU fishing are composed 
of migratory species which spend a large part of their life on the high seas.  

The  accession  to  high  sea  fishing  grounds  by  new  fleets  and  the  development  of  new 
technology  for  fishing  practices  have  contributed  to  increase  fishing  effort  in  all  parts  of  the 
oceans. International fish trade has also considerably increased over the past decades. It is not 
uncommon for  catches  from a fishing  vessel flying the flag of a  State A  to be transhipped to 
another vessel with the flag of a State B, landed and processed in country C, re-embarked on a 
container ship flying the flag of a State D, before eventually reaching its final destination on the 
market of a State E.  

29 

European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)), paragraph 8. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Operators  carrying  out  IUU  fishing  are  taking  advantage  of  this  increased  globalisation  of 
fishing activities.  

There is general consensus on the international dimension of IUU fishing, and on the fact that 
an effective response to the problem must be given at international level.  

On its own, the Community is unable to address all the features of IUU fishing, notably when it 
comes  to  fishing  activities  occurring  outside  Member  State's  jurisdiction  (non  Community 
fishing vessels on the high seas or in waters of developing countries). The only way to regulate 
those areas and deter IUU practices there is via multilateral efforts. 

Multilateral instruments dedicated to ensure sustainable management of fisheries resources are 
in  place,  both  at  global  (FAO  in  particular)  and  regional  (various  RFMOs)  levels.  They  have 
developed  over  the  past  decade  policies  and  instruments  designed  to  combat  IUU  fishing. 
Together  with  some  of  its  international  partners,  the  Community  was  a  pioneer  in  prompting 
those bodies to make of the fight against IUU fishing one of their main fields of activity. 

Discussions at global level within FAO focus currently on the need to improve and generalize 
the  instruments  and  practices  of  Port  State  to  tackle  IUU  fishing.  To  this  end,  Parties  to  this 
body have agreed to work on the text of a future international binding convention covering Port 
State control.  

Other  negotiations  have  been  engaged  as  to  the  content  of  what  should  the  "genuine  link" 
between a vessel and its Flag State consist of. This is instrumental with a view to deterring the 
practices of some States to register fishing vessels over which they do not exert any control, and 
which are carrying out IUU fishing in total impunity. 

Multilateral  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  are  also  of  particular  importance  to 
enhance  Monitoring,  Control  and  Surveillance  (MCS)  capabilities  and  efficiency  of  national 
administrations  in  charge  of  the  fight  against  IUU  fishing.  To  this  end,  projects  are  under 
development within the international MCS Network.  

The Community is an important actor in those international negotiations, and should intensify 
its efforts to reach multilateral solutions to the problems caused by IUU fishing. 

The same can be said at regional level within RFMOs. Those organisations are the best able to 
regulate  fishing  activities  in  high  seas  areas,  which  escape  any  national  jurisdiction.  Bringing 
together  coastal  States  and  long  distant  fishing  nations  with  an  interest  in  the  area,  their 
decisions constitute the single binding framework applying to the area considered. While their 
first  purpose  was  mainly  to  allocate  fishing  possibilities  between  its  members,  RFMOs  now 
devote an increasing amount of efforts to the establishment of an array of measures designed to 
combat  IUU  fishing.  As  a  member  of  the  vast  majority  of  RFMOs,  the  Community  should 
continue  to  push  for  the  implementation  of  ambitious  schemes  against  IUU  fishing  in  those 
bodies. 

Under  this  option,  the  priority  should  be  for  the  Community  to  continue  and  strengthen  its 
action to promote multilateral effective answers to the damages generated by IUU fishing. 

EN 

30 

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OPTION  3:  CASE  BY  CASE  APPROACH,  SPECIFIC  TO  STOCKS  AND  AREAS  SUBJECT  TO  IUU 

FISHING 

IUU fishing is a world-wide problem. Yet it does not have the same intensity everywhere. It is 
clear that some fish stocks are subject to illegal harvesting at a larger scale and intensity than 
others. Current indications point out that, for example, blue fin tuna in the Mediterranean, cod 
in  the  Barents  Sea  or  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  red  fish  outside  the  Icelandic  EEZ,  toothfish  in  the 
Antarctic feature as some of the stocks particularly hit by IUU fishing. 

Against  this  background,  it  would  seem  appropriate  for  the  Community  to  promote  measures 
targeting the most important manifestations of IUU fishing. For each fishery, a specific analysis 
of the characteristics of IUU fishing would be performed, and tailor-made solutions would have 
then to be devised. 

It  should  not  result  in  uniform  application  of  similar  rules  which  may  be  excessively 
burdensome for fishing industry and administrations. 

This variety would be reflected in the different manners according to which the Community is 
affected via the various manifestations of IUU fishing. IUU fishing does not call for the same 
Community  action  in  all  circumstances;  this  depends  notably  on  whether  the  Community  is 
directly affected when illegal fishing occurs within Member State's waters or indirectly affected 
as  a  market  for  fisheries  products  caught  illegally  beyond  those  waters.  It  also  depends  on 
which degree the Community is concerned by those practices. 

Different  approaches  should  be  devised  depending  on  whether  the  Community  has  direct 
jurisdiction over the offenders or if the Community intends to act against IUU fishing occurring 
outside  areas  under  its  jurisdiction.  In  both  situations,  focus  should  be  placed  on  the 
identification  of  fisheries  subject  to  particularly  high  levels  of  IUU  fishing  and  the 
implementation of specific measures to remedy their problems. The nature and types of action 
to be promoted would however have to be different. 

As far as illegal fishing occurring within Community waters or by Community operators 
outside  those  waters  is  concerned,  the  Community  has  direct  means  to  act  for  a  better 
enforcement  of  rules  in  place.  Those  activities  fall  under  the  respective  competences  of  the 
Community  or  Member  States  as  Flag  States  or  coastal  States.  For  those  stocks  identified  as 
being subject to important illegal activities, specific monitoring and control measures could be 
put  in  place  by  the  Community  (for  example  more  stringent  catch  reporting  procedures  than 
within the normal Community framework, increased inspection rate for vessels involved in the 
fisheries concerned…). 

Member  States  should  monitor  in  priority  the  implementation  of  those  rules  using  all  legal 
instruments  at  their  disposal  to  this  end,  and  the  Commission  would  also  pay  particular 
attention to their correct enforcement by national authorities. Under the current situation, stocks 
concerned  by  this  approach  should  include  cod  in  the  Baltic  Sea  or  the  Northern  hake  stock. 
Depending on the evolution of illegal fishing practices, new stocks could become subject to this 
particular scrutiny. 

The  Community  on  its  own  is  not  in  a  position  to  directly  halt  illegal  fishing  activities 
occurring outside its jurisdiction. 

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31 

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The  Community  acts  within  RFMOs  to  achieve  that  aim.  As  outlined  in  paragraph  2,  this  is 
necessary  but  insufficient.  The  main  difficulty  would  still  be  the  impossibility  to  adopt  and 
implement stringent measures towards vessels flying flags of non compliance. 

As a complement to its policy within RFMOs, the Community, acting as Market State, may also 
use  various  instruments  to  prevent  products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing  from  reaching  its 
territory. One of them is the establishment of certification systems which would apply to stocks 
subject to intense IUU fishing, on the model of the one covering toothfish under the CCAMLR, 
as  well  as  those  existing  and  under  development  in  RFMOs  competent  for  regulating  tuna 
stocks  (notably  ICCAT).  Under  such  schemes,  all  consignments  of  fisheries  products  from  a 
given  stock  should  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  guaranteeing  their  legality;  without  such 
certificates,  trade  of  such  products  is  prohibited.  Building  upon  those  precedents,  the 
Community  could  decide  on  the  establishment  of  certification  schemes  covering  imports  of 
fisheries products stemming from certain stocks. The stocks should be selected according to a 
combination of two criteria: the importance of the volume of importation of products from this 
stock for the Community, and the suspected high degree of IUU fishing affecting it. This could 
for  instance  be  applied  to  cod  from  the  Barents  Sea  or  tuna  stocks  (insofar  as  they  are  not 
covered by existing schemes developed under the auspices of RFMOs). Such schemes could be 
extended to new stocks if their situation warrants it. 

OPTION  4:  UNDERTAKE  A  NEW  AND  COMPREHENSIVE  INITIATIVE,  COVERING  BOTH 

COMMUNITY AND NON COMMUNITY WATERS 

This  option  relies  on  the  fundamental  principle  that  an  efficient  strategy  against  IUU  fishing 
should  cover  all  the  facets  of  the  problem,  along  the  whole  supply  chain,  at  international, 
regional and Community levels. If one link of the chain is not covered, this loophole is used by 
illegal operators and the whole system is undermined. 

All  the  objectives  identified  in  section  3  of  this  report  should  be  addressed  via  adequate 
measures, and according to a coherent approach. 

The  first  objective  relates  to  the  need  to  reduce  the  vulnerability  of  the  Community 
market to imports of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing so that only products 
legally harvested are imported into the Community. 

To this end, the Community should use instruments at its disposal as trade entity. They should 
allow  prohibiting  or  at  least  discouraging  the  importation  into  the  Community  of  fisheries 
products caught in contravention of applicable norms. The compatibility of such measures with 
WTO requirements would have to be ensured. 

Two alternative approaches could theoretically be followed in that respect:  

(1) 

the  bilateral  trade  agreements  of  the  Community  with  its  international  partners  could 
include  a  clause  allowing  preferential  market  access  for  imports  of  fisheries  products 
subject to the compliance of the third country with agreed conservation measures. This 
approach would however raise substantial difficulties. It could be read as establishing a 
preferential  treatment  to  the  benefits  of  countries  respecting  international  conservation 
and  management  rules,  while  other  countries  would  not  be  granted  this  advantage  but 
still  continue  to  be  entitled  to  export  their  products  into  the  Community.  This  would 
actually not solve the problem of the Community linked to the arrival on its territory of 

EN 

32 

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fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing. Moreover, most of the major partners of 
the Community for fisheries trade, as well as many developing countries, already enjoy 
preferential treatments for access to the Community market. The impact of the measure 
would  then  be  limited  to  a  small  number  of  third  States,  and  not  be  comprehensive. 
Finally, the procedure would require a change in existing agreements or an inclusion of 
a  specific  clause  in  forthcoming  trade  agreements,  which  would  take  a  long  time.  It 
would also imply that illegal fishing activities will contribute to the EC budget through 
the  payment  of  the  customs  duties.  For  those  reasons  ,  this  approach  does  not  seem 
suitable to reach the objective of the Community to close its doors to the importation of 
fisheries  products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing,  and  will  not  be  analysed  further  in  the 
present report; 

(2) 

another  approach  would  consist  in  declaring  illegal  under  Community  law  the 
importation  of  fisheries  products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing,  and,  as  a 
complement,  making  the  imports  of  fisheries  products  into  the  Community 
conditional upon the certification by the Flag State of the vessel which caught the 
products  that  they  stem  from  non-IUU  fishing.  Fishing  vessels  are  indeed  placed 
under  the  primary  jurisdiction  of  their  Flag  State.  It  is  therefore  incumbent  on  Flag 
States  to  ensure  that  their  fishing  fleet  carries  out  its  activities  in  accordance  with  the 
relevant rules on conservations and management of fisheries resources. 

Approaches based on the certification of the legality of catches have been developed by some 
RFMOs. The scope of such measures is however limited to some stocks (for example toothfish 
in  the  CCAMLR,  or  tuna  species  for  tuna  RFMOs,  where  such  schemes  are  under 
development).  Within  the  NEAFC,  new  measures  have  entered  into  force  on  1st  May  2007, 
which oblige fishing vessels wishing to land in the port of another Party to obtain a guarantee 
by its Flag State that catches on board are legal. The scope of those measures covers a delimited 
area  (North  East  Atlantic),  certain  types  of  products  (frozen  products)  and  transport  means 
(fishing vessels and vessels used for processing or transhipment operations). 

The  Community  has  been  initiating  or  supporting  those  measures  within  RFMOs,  and  will 
continue to promote their adoption and generalisation. This will however not be achievable on a 
short term basis. In addition, this multilateral approach will not be suitable for stocks under the 
jurisdiction of third States, which are sometimes heavily exploited by foreign vessels practicing 
IUU fishing (for example in some Sub-Saharan African coastal States). 

Against  this  background,  the  Community  could  consider  the  establishment  of  its  own 
certification scheme, applying to all imports of fisheries products into its territory. Under this 
scheme, each consignment of fisheries products imported into the Community would have to be 
accompanied  by  such  certificates.  Those  documents,  based  on  the  model  existing  for  some 
stocks in  some RFMOs, would gather all information  relevant for  defining the  legality of the 
fisheries products concerned. The presence and exactitude of the certificate would be checked 
by the authorities of the Member States at the moment of the entry into the Community of the 
products  concerned.  If  there  are  no  certificates  or  if  they  are  not  complete  or  found  to  be 
invalid, the entry would be refused. 

To be efficient and comprehensive, the certification scheme should encompass all importations 
of  products  stemming  from  marine  capture  fisheries,  including  processing  products.  This 
notably  implies  that  third  countries  where  fish  is  processed  before  being  exported  into  the 
Community  are  able  to  guarantee  that  the  products  processed  stem  from  legal  fishing,  even 
when  the  vessel  which  harvested  the  catches  flies  the  flag  of  another  country.  All  means  of 

EN 

33 

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transportation  should  be  covered  (fishing  ports,  but  also  maritime  ports  and  airports  notably). 
To a certain extent, this certification scheme would rely on an approach similar to the system on 
health requirements which apply to all products imported into the Community30. 

In case of doubts on the validity of catch documents, the third countries concerned (flag states 
countries of processing or transit) would be requested to cooperate in their verifications. 

To assist control authorities from Member States in their tasks, an alert system could be set up, 
designed  to  inform  them  about  the  doubts  pertaining  to  the  compliance  with  conservation 
measures  by  products  which  could  be  exported  to  the  EC.  Similar  mechanisms  applying  to 
imports  currently  exist  in  the  sanitary  field  as  well  as  within  the  context  of  preferential  tariff 
arrangements31.  

To complete those trade measures, specific provisions could apply to transhipments at sea and 
access to Community ports.  

When operated at sea (in particular on the high seas), transhipment operations generally escape 
any  kind  of  proper  control  by  public  authorities  as  to  the  legality  of  the  catches  and  the 
activities  of  the  vessels  concerned.  Transhipments  at  seas  therefore  constitute  a  privileged 
manner  for  operators  involved  in  IUU  fishing  to  dissimulate  their  catches  and  render  their 
tracking difficult. With a view to ensuring a better monitoring of the supply chain and closing 
such loopholes, the Community should continue to press for the adoption of tighter regulation 
of  transhipments  at  sea,  which  could  include  a  total  ban  of  those  practices.  To  show  its 
commitments  to  adopt  stringent  measures  in  that  respect,  the  Community  could  already,  in 
parallel  to  international  progress  on  the  issue,  propose  initiative  on  that  matter  which  would 
apply to Community fishing vessels wherever they operate.  

A generalization of stringent measures prohibiting access by vessels listed as IUU by RFMOs 
to  Community  ports,  or  authorizing  access  on  the  condition  that  their  catches  are  confiscated 
should also be put in place in an harmonized manner across the Community. 

The second objective consists in improving mechanisms designed to identify and sanction 
vessels  and  States  engaged  in  or  supporting  IUU  fishing  on  the  high  seas  and/or  in  the 
waters of developing countries. 

Increase monitoring and surveillance of those areas and sanction adequately vessels responsible 
for IUU fishing and States hosting their flags should be the two pillars of Community action to 
attain this objective.  

•  The  first  step  in  that  direction  consists  in  a  consolidation  and  intensification  of  the 

Community policy against IUU fishing at multilateral and bilateral levels. 

At  multilateral  level,  the  Community  should  pursue  its  action  for  the  development  and 
implementation  of  control  and  inspection  schemes  covering  high  seas  areas  subject  to  the 

30 

31 

Cf. Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 laying down the health conditions for the production 
and placing on the market of fishery products (OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 15). 
Cf.  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  setting  out 
conditions,  in  the  context  of  preferential  tariff  arrangements,  for  informing  economic  operators  and 
Member  State  administrations  of  cases  of  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  origin  of  goods  (OJ  C  348, 
5.12.2000, p. 4). 

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34 

   EN 

 
                                                 
competence  of  RFMOs.  In  addition,  the  recent  approach  by  those  bodies  consisting  in 
identifying  and  listing  vessels  carrying  out  IUU  fishing  should  also  be  intensified.  The  same 
logic should apply to the identification of States supporting IUU fishing, which has resulted in 
the application of trade sanctions against some of them in only one RFMO (ICCAT) so far.  

The  Community  should  also  support  international  progress  towards  better social  standards  on 
board all fishing vessels. More specifically, it should promote a rapid and large ratification of 
the new consolidated international labour convention on work in the fishing sector adopted by 
the  International  Labour  Organisation  in  June  2007.  The  Convention  establishes  minimum 
standards  for  working  and  living  conditions  on  board  ships  and  introduces  enforcement  and 
inspection  mechanisms.  In  line  with  the  communication  on  the  contribution  of  the  EU  on 
promoting decent work for all in the world of 24 Mai 2006 and the Council Conclusions of 1 
December  2006  on  decent  work,  the  Commission  intends  to  explore  ways  to  facilitate  the 
speedy ratification and implementation of this Convention by EU Member states.  

A  similar  approach  should  be  promoted  in  relation  to  international  instruments  on  safety  for 
fishermen and fishing vessels. This is in particular the case for the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol 
of the International Convention for the safety of fishing vessels, which has so far been ratified 
by an insufficient number of countries to enter into force.  

In  relation  with  coastal  developing  States,  the  Community  should  also  make  use  of  all 
instruments at its disposal to contribute to improve management and control of their maritime 
waters. In that context, at bilateral level, the mutation from purely fisheries access agreements 
to  Fisheries  Partnership  Agreements  (FPAs),  initiated  in  2004,  should  be  confirmed.  An 
important  part  of  those  FPAs  is  dedicated  to  the  support  and  financing  by  the  Community  of 
measures  precisely  designed  to  ameliorate  the  management  and  control  of  fishing  activities 
accruing in the Economic Exclusive Zones of our Partner countries.  

Within its development policy, the Community also attaches a great importance to this aspect. 
To render this strategy more efficient, the Community has recently engaged a shift towards a 
regional approach, implying all coastal States concerned to put in place a coherent strategy in 
areas known for their vulnerability to IUU fishing. A first step has been recently achieved in the 
South-West Indian Ocean, where a Regional Plan for Surveillance of fishing activities has been 
agreed in January 2007 gathering the Community and five coastal and island States, supported 
by  Community  financing  of  MCS  actions  for  an  amount  of  7  Million  €  over  three  years.  An 
extension of such regional schemes to new areas should be promoted in the future. The future 
Economic  Partnership  Agreements  under  negotiation  between  the  Community  and  different 
ACP regions could also be used as a framework for developing and funding action against IUU 
fishing. 

•  The second step would be based on a generalisation, at Community level, of the most 
advanced  measures  adopted  within  RFMOs  against  IUU  fishing.  RFMOs  have  all 
developed  policy  and  instruments  dedicated  to  the  combat  IUU  fishing.  Yet,  this  has 
been according to the proper agenda and priorities of each of those bodies. Being Party to a 
large  number  of  those  organisations,  the  Community  is  bound  to  implement  all  their 
decisions  (which  cover  different  areas),  but  is  also  able  to  assess  their  different  degree  of 
efficiency  and  ambition  on  the  various  items  covered.  As  far  as  possible,  the  Community 
should continue to press for a harmonized approach amongst RFMOs in their fight against 
IUU fishing. Without waiting for such convergence to be achieved, the Community should 
generalize  the  implementation  of  the  most  advanced  action  agreed  within  RFMOs  on 
control,  inspection  and  enforcement  as  far  as  Community  operators  are  concerned.  This 

EN 

35 

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would  provide  for  simpler  rules  for  them  and  for  national  administrations  as  there  would 
only be a single set of measures to consider. This should also provide for better efficiency in 
action against IUU fishing.  

Measures  concerned  by  such  generalisation  could  notably  include  provisions  adopted  within 
CCAMLR on prosecution and sanction of "nationals" of Parties supporting or engaged in IUU 
fishing  outside  the  territory  of  their  Flag  States,  or  provisions  adopted  within  ICCAT  on  the 
sightings of vessels infringing the rules by vessels from Parties to the organisation.  

•  Finally, the Community should consider the adoption of unilateral action to overcome 
the  problems  faced  by  the  international  community  in  identifying  and  sanctioning 
properly  vessels  and  States  engaged  in  or  supporting  IUU  fishing.  While  progress 
realised  within  RFMOs  to  list  IUU  vessels  and  adopt  measures  against  their  Flag  States 
should be supported, the Community also considers that it is under its responsibility to enact 
unilateral  measures  when  there  are  clear  and  objectives  elements  demonstrating  that  those 
efforts  fall  short  of  effectively  addressing  the  problem  created  by  Flag  States  unwilling  or 
unable to exert an adequate control over their fishing fleet. The behaviour of such States is a 
major  reason  for  the  persistence  of  IUU  fishing,  and  the  decision-making  process  within 
RFMOs, relying on consensus by all Parties and annual meeting, sometimes hinder them to 
enact  efficient  measures  targeting  those  States  or  vessels  flying  their  flag.  The  diplomatic 
demarches engaged  by the  Community in respect of States hosting flags of fishing vessels 
suspected or confirmed to have carried out IUU fishing usually result in limited outcomes. 

Under  the  current  situation,  the  number  of  vessels  listed  as  IUU  by  RFMOs  is  rather  limited 
compared  to  the  overall  activity  of  vessels  suspected  of  carrying  out  IUU  fishing.  In  2007,  it 
amounted  to  121  vessels  within  the  main  RFMOs32  to  which  the  Community  is  a  Party,  less 
than  10%  of  the  estimated  overall  number  of  fishing  vessels  flying  a  flag  of  convenience.  In 
addition, those vessels-based lists established by RFMOs by nature do not cover vessels active 
outside areas covered by those Organisations (for example in the EEZ of third countries off the 
West African coast).On the model of what is being done by some of our international partners 
(notably  Norway),  the  Community  should  put  in  place  mechanisms  for  the  identification  and 
subsequent  application  of  penalty  measures  in  respect  of  "IUU  vessels",  which  would 
complement  lists  drawn  up  by  RFMOs.  The  rights  of  the  operators  should  be  guaranteed 
through a contradictory procedure with its Flag State, the criteria for the listing should be clear, 
objective  and  transparent,  and  the  de-listing  process  when  the  criteria  are  not  met  any  longer 
should also be foreseen.  

As to measures directed towards States hosting "flags of non compliance", their adoption is 
only foreseen in very few RFMOs, and they have been under-used so far anyway. Addressing 
those  shortcomings,  the  Community  should  build  itself  a  transparent  and  fair  mechanism  to 
identify  those  States  which  place  themselves  outside  the  international  legality  and  thereby 
facilitate  IUU  practices,  and  to  apply  appropriate  measures  to  encourage  them  to  ensure 
compliance  by  their  vessels  with  management  and  conservation  rules.  The  procedure  for 
adopting those measures should comply with all the requirements laid down under the GATT 
agreement,  notably  prior  hearing  of  the  authorities  of  the  third  State  concerned  and  full 
motivation.  

32 

ICCAT, IATTC, IOTC, CCAMLR, NAFO, NEAFC. 

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36 

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The listing by the Community should be based on a combination of criteria, including: 

–  the  status  of  a  State  as  Party  or  not  to  the  international  instruments  dedicated  to  the 

conservation and management of fisheries resources,  

–  it participation to RFMOs and its willingness to apply the rules agreed by those organisations 

–  its  track  record  and  current  practices  in  relation  to  manifestations  of  IUU  fishing,  and 
notably its cooperation with the Community in the investigation and follow up given to such 
activities,  as  well  as  whether  effective  enforcement  measures  have  been  adopted  against 
operators responsible for IUU fishing activities, 

–  the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of IUU fishing activities carried out by 
vessels flying the Flag of the State considered, by its nationals or by vessels operating in its 
waters  or  using  its  ports,  or  involving  the  importation  into  its  market  of  fisheries  products 
stemming from IUU fishing .  

The  measures  should  also  be  proportionate  and  not  introduce  arbitrary  or  unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries or disguised restrictions on international trade. Such measures 
should  include  trade  measures  (including  import  bans)  as  well  as  restrictions  for  Community 
operators to engage in commercial relations pertaining to fishing activities with operators from 
the third State concerned. A procedure for the de-listing of the States concerned should also be 
put  in  place,  once  they  are  able  to  demonstrate  that  they  are  fulfilling  their  international 
obligations with respect to IUU fishing. 

The  relevance  of  using  trade-related  measures  towards  States  failing  to  comply  with  their 
international obligations for the conservation and management of fisheries resources has been 
highlighted, albeit usually within a multilateral context, by the UN General Assembly, notably 
in  its  latest  Resolution  on  sustainable  fisheries,  which  "requests  States  and  relevant 
international bodies to develop, in accordance with international law, more effective measures 
to trace fish and fishery products to enable importing States to identify fish or fishery products 
caught  in  a  manner  that  undermines  international  conservation  and  management  measures 
agreed in accordance with international law (…)". This should also be considered against point 
10  of  the  declaration  drawn  up  at  a  Ministerial  Conference  held  in  2005  in  St  John’s 
(Canada):“We recognize that States, REIOs or entities that are neither members of RFMO/As 
nor have agreed to apply their conservation and management measures shall not have access to 
the fisheries resources to which those measures apply and any catches of such fishery resources 
should be denied market access in accordance with international law”.  

The  European  Parliament  also  "considers  that  the  Commission  should  include  the  following 
actions in its proposal to be adopted in EU law: the legal origin of fish must be demonstrated 
before  it  is  allowed  to  be  offloaded  in  EU  ports  or  imported  into  the  EU;  such  proof  must 
include, for both landings from fishing vessels and transhipments:  

–  in the case of fish products from waters regulated by an RFMO, documents establishing that 
the fish products to be landed have been caught in accordance with the rules of that RFMO 
and that the quotas allocated to the contracting party under whose flag the vessel is sailing 
have been respected;  

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–  in  the  case  of  fish  products  caught  in  the  exclusive  economic  zones  of  third  countries, 
documentation  establishing  that  the  vessel  is  authorised  to  fish  or  is  in  possession  of  a 
fishing licence for those waters and for the species to be landed33" 

The third objective would aim at addressing the lack of compliance with the rules of the 
CFP by Community operators within or beyond Community waters. 

•  As outlined in option 1, one key aspect is the improvement of the policy carried out by 
the Community and the strengthening of the means devoted by Member States to the 
enforcement of Community rules. This should be the first step to improve compliance by 
Community operators within or beyond Community waters. 

•  A  second,  complementary  step  would  be  to  promote  at  Community  level  the 
approximation of sanctions corresponding to serious infringements against the rules of 
the CFP perpetuated by Community operators.  

Sanctions  in  place  within  the  Community  vary  to  a  great  extent  across  Member  States. 
Furthermore  their  levels  are  often  too  low  to  ensure  the  loss  by  violators  of  the  financial 
benefits gained from their illegal activities.  

This  can  be  deducted  from  the  various  provisions  on  penalties  corresponding  to  serious 
infringements in force in the Member States. An examination of the existing legislation in 10 
Member  States34  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
United Kingdom) reveals that the maximum levels for such penalties vary between 6000€ and 
300 000€ (bearing in mind the fact that, in some countries, judges are free to decide on fines 
exceeding maximum levels in the most serious cases, and there may be no maximum set out in 
the legislation in some other Member States).  

Accompanying sanctions may also be pronounced in addition to fines (essentially confiscation 
of the catches or gear, and withdrawal of fishing licences). In the legislation of some Member 
States,  the  level  of  fines  may  be  linked  to  the  value  of  illegal  catches.  In  some  others,  the 
maximum levels of sanctions vary depending on the size of the vessels (notably in Ireland). Jail 
sentences are foreseen in two Member States (Netherlands and Italy). In most Member States, 
various administrative penalties are also in place (suspension or withdrawal of fishing licence, 
deduction of quotas, confiscation of catches or gear, prohibition to carry out fishing activities 
for  a  certain  period  of  time,  interdiction  to  receive  public  aid  for  a  certain  period  of  time 
following the conviction, written warnings, fines…).  

The  application  of  the  national  systems  on  sanctions  has  been  documented  by  the 
Commission  since  2000  in  yearly  reports,  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  reporting  by  Member 
States35.  Data  show  notably  that  the  number  of  serious  infringements  recorded  by  Member 

33 

34 

35 

European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)), paragraph 18. 
Cf.  Study  by  Océanic  Développement  (FISH/2006/20)  on  the  definition  of  a  new  list  of  serious 
infringements against the rules of the CFP, and introduction a maximum level for sanctions corresponding 
to serious infringements and offences (2007). 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 establishing a list of types of behaviour which 
seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy ( OJ L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 5), and yearly reports 
by  the  Commission  on  that  basis  (cf.  for  the  latest  edition  covering  2004:  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  -  Reports  from  Member  States  on  behaviours 
which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2004 - COM(2006) 387). 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
                                                 
States  has  been  steadily  growing  since  2000,  while  no  tangible  increase  in  the  amount  of  the 
penalties imposed can be noticed. The average amount for the sanctions pronounced in relation 
to  the  most  serious  infringements  (fishing  without  authorisation  or  without  licence, 
misreporting  of  catches,  non  respect  of  minimum  landing  sizes)  amounts  to  approximately 
2000€.  In  average,  this  is  equivalent  to  the  value  of  the  turnover  generated  by  a  vessel  for 
between one to four fishing days (depending on the fisheries concerned).  

The  confiscation  of  catches  coming  as  a  complement  to  fines  is  used  only  in  relation  to  one 
third of the serious infringements detected, while the suspension of the fishing licence is even 
less  common  (less  than  20%  of  the  cases).  There  are  considerable  variations  in  the  manner 
according to which similar infringements are penalized across the Community. As an example, 
the  average  level  of  fines  pronounced  in  relation  with  serious  infringements  to  fisheries  law 
amounts  to  approximately  50€  in  Estonia,  while  reaching  a  level  of  approximately  13000€  in 
the United Kingdom. Moreover, the use of accompanying measures coming in addition to fines 
is widespread in some Member States and less common in others. The same difference prevails 
with respect to the use of administrative measures. 

Fisheries policy falls within the exclusive competence of the Community. As a result, all rules 
pertaining to this activity are adopted at Community level. Those rules feature in Regulations 
and  are  directly  binding  on  all  Community  fishermen.  It  is  vital  for  the  credibility  of  the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy  that  those  rules  are  applied  evenly  in  all  Member  States.  This  is 
currently not the case: the same breach of the same rule is punished very differently depending 
on the Member State concerned. As a result, IUU firms are encouraged to operate, tranship or 
land in States where penalties can be assumed as regular operational costs, and the overall level 
of sanctions within the Community is generally viewed as not sufficiently dissuasive. 

An effective sanctioning system is considered essential to deter illegal operators to perpetuate 
their activities. This in line with the FAO Plan of Action36, according to which "States should 
ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, nationals 
under  its  jurisdiction  are  of  sufficient  severity  to  effectively  prevent,  deter  and  eliminate  IUU 
fishing and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing". And the European 
Parliament "considers that the Commission should include the following actions in its proposal 
to  be  adopted  in  EU  law:  (…)  common  minimum  penalties  for  serious  infringements  must  be 
applicable in all Member States, and must be sufficiently dissuasive37". 

At Community level, progress has been made recently towards the definition of infringements 
and  corresponding  sanctions  in  the  field  of  environmental  crime38  or  ship  source  pollution39. 
Just  like  in  those  two  sectors,  illegal  fishing  can  be  in  some  instances  qualified  as  a  criminal 
activity.  Nothing  can  be  done  by  a  single  Member  State  to  remedy  the  current  problem  of 
inconsistent and insufficient levels of sanctions across the Community. It is therefore legitimate 
for the Community to act in that domain. In 2002, within the framework of the CFP reform, the 

36 

37 

38 

39 

International  Plan  of  Action  to  prevent,  deter  and  eliminate  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  fishing, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2001, paragraph 21. 
European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)), point 18. 
Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  protection  of  the 
environment through criminal law - COM(2007) 51, 9.2.2007. 
Directive 2005/35/EC of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties 
for  infringements  and  Council  Framework  Decision  2005/667/JHA  of  12  July  2005  to  strengthen  the 
criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution. 

EN 

39 

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Council undertook to adopt future initiatives pertaining to the establishment of "a catalogue of 
measures to be applied by Member States relating to serious infringements40".  

Along this line, a system to approximate the maximum levels of sanctions that Member States 
must  impose  in  respect  of  serious  infringements  to  fisheries  laws  could  be  defined  at 
Community level. In line with the case law of the Court of Justice41, the Community shall not 
be  prevented  from  taking  measures  which  relate  to  the  criminal  law  of  the  Member  States 
which  it  considers  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  rules  which  it  lays  down  are  fully 
effective and when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties 
by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious offences in 
the area covered.  

The definition of serious infringements would rely on lists of such infringements adopted under 
Community law (cf. Council Regulation 1447/1999) and by some RFMOs (notably NAFO or 
NEAFC). The maximum level of  sanctions should be set at a much higher  level than what is 
currently  observed  in  the  Member  States,  to  reflect  the  imperative  need  to  impose  strong  and 
deterrent measures dissuading fishermen from infringing the rules. Given that one primary aim 
of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  is  to  manage  properly  and  conserve  natural  resources,  the 
levels  should  be  comparable  to  those  proposed  by  the  Commission  for  the  protection  of 
environment through criminal law. This would notably imply that prison sentences are foreseen 
for the most serious offences. 

It could be accompanied by a regime of immediate enforcement measures, applying to persons 
found in flagrante delicto while committing serious infringements, and designed to prevent the 
continuation of those infringements. Those measures would include the immediate cessation of 
fishing  activities,  the  rerouting  to  port  of  the  vessel,  the  ordering  of  a  bond,  the  temporary 
seizure of illegal fishing gear, catches or fisheries products, and the temporary immobilisation 
of  the  vessel  or  the  suspension  of  the  fishing  licence.  In  addition,  the  Community  could 
encourage  the  adoption  by  Member  States  of  accompanying  sanctions  to  fines  (such  as  the 
confiscation  of  catches  or  gear,  suspension  or  withdrawal  of  fishing  licences...)  as  they  often 
constitute more deterrent penalties than "traditional" financial penalties. 

Finally, in line with the objective to prohibit the importation into the Community of fisheries 
products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing,  the  infringement  against  this  prohibition  should  be 
subject to the regime of sanctions defined at Community level. The scope of such regime would 
extend to Community waters, to persons on board Community vessels, as well as to Community 
legal and natural persons wherever they exercise their activities.  

Such system would create a level playing field within the Community in terms of sanctions of 
fisheries offences, and address the problem caused by infringements from Community nationals 
involved in international IUU activities. 

•  Specific provisions on Community nationals would also have to be devised, with a view 
to  forcing  Member  States  to  prosecute  and  sanction  effectively  those  who  carry  out 
IUU fishing outside the Community. Transparency should be increased as to the legal and 
financial  links  maintained  by  Community  nationals  with  fishing  vessels  flagged  in  third 

40 
41 

Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. 
Cf.  ruling  of  the  Court  of  13  September  2005  (Case  C-176/03  Commission  v  Council)  and  the 
Communication by the Commission on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 
(COM(2005) 583 final/2, 24.11.2005). 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
                                                 
countries.  The  recent  progress  made  by  some  RFMOs  regarding  rules  to  improve  the 
investigation, prosecution and sanction of Community nationals should also be generalized 
within the Community. 

•  Finally,  the  Community  should  contemplate  the  setting  up  of  a  black  list  of  fishing 
vessels  flying  the  flag  of  Member  States.  Such  lists  have  been  established  so  far  only 
within RFMOs.  

The  list  could  be  directed  towards  those  Community  vessels  seriously  suspected  to  have 
committed serious infringements, pending their sanction by their Flag States. In the absence of 
sanction  by  this  Flag  State,  and  if  elements  demonstrate  that  the  infringement  effectively 
occurred,  the  vessels  in  question  would  be  subject  to  a  set  of  penalties  decided  by  the 
Commission, on the model of the measures in place in RFMOs targeting vessels placed on an 
IUU list. The main impact of this list would be to address the situation of Flag States within the 
Community which do not properly sanction vessels flying their flag despite their involvement 
in illegal fishing.  

Alternatively, the black list of Community vessels could gather those vessels which have been 
repeatedly sanctioned by their Flag State (or coastal States in the waters of which they infringed 
applicable rules). The list would be maintained by the Commission or the Community Fisheries 
Control Agency. All vessels listed would be subject to particular attention by their Flag State as 
well as by Port or coastal States where the vessels carry out their activities or wish to land. In 
particular, they would be subject to a systematic inspection when halting in Community ports. 

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41 

   EN 

 
SECTION 5:  LIKELY ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE 

DIFFERENT OPTIONS 

The  different  actors  which  may  be  affected  by  the  future  policy  of  the  Community  are  the 
following: 

The Community fishing sector. It suffers from competition by operators responsible for IUU 
fishing  on  fishing  grounds  as  well  as  on  the  final  market  (notably  for  species  subject  to 
important international trade like tuna, swordfish, cod, shrimps or cephalopods). It is composed 
of  approximately  70 000  SMEs,  for  a  total  of  fishing  vessels  registered  in  the  Community 
reaching  some  90  000  units.  The  number  of  Community  fishermen  working  on  board  those 
vessels is assessed to amount to 210 000 persons. The overall turnover of this sector has been 
estimated at amounting to around 8,8 billion €. 

The  Community  industry  active  in  the  processing  and  marketing  of  fisheries  products. 
This  sector  relies  heavily  on  the  supply  of  imported  products  (which  represent  60%  of  the 
fisheries products market within the Community) for raw material and semi-processed products. 
The  majority  of  the  6  000  firms  concerned  generate  a  turnover  of  approximately  18 billion  € 
and  employ  some  150000  workers.  An  important  feature  of  this  sector  is  its  high  degree  of 
internalisation: in order to benefit from reduced labour costs and preferential tariffs, important 
firms from this sector have invested in third countries and delocalized part of their production. 
This  is  notably  the  case  in  the  tuna  sector,  where  Community  firms  have  created  subsidiary 
companies processing raw material on the spot (canning or filleting). 

The tables below present a repartition of employment in those sectors broken down by Member 
States,  as  well  the  regions  within  the  Community  where  employment  linked  to  the  fisheries 
sector has the highest proportion42.  

42 

Cf.  European  Commission  "Employment  in  the  fisheries  sector"  Luxembourg:  Office  for  Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2006. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
For the retail industry and consumers, which are at the end of the supply chain, the policy of 
the Community should also have some impact. 

The authorities of Member States in charge of control of fishing activities and customs will 
also be impacted by the proposals by the Commission, which may entail some additional tasks 
and a more active role in their practices against IUU fishing. 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
 
 
The  fishing  sector  from  third  countries  will  be  affected  by  the  future  strategy  of  the 
Community.  This  is  in  particular  true  for  trade  measures  which  might  be  adopted  by  the 
Community to avoid the importation of IUU fisheries products into its market.  

The fishing trade and processing  sector  from third countries should also be considered in 
the context of those possible trade measures decided by the Community. 

Public authorities from third  States will also be affected in so  far  as  Community  measures 
may imply a strengthening of their policy with regard to fishing vessels flying their flags, with 
regard to the monitoring of their maritime waters and in respect of the monitoring of products 
which  are  processed  in  or  transit  via  their  territory.  Specific  attention  should  be  paid  to 
developing countries exporting fisheries products into the Community; 

Regional  Fisheries  Management  Organisations  might  also  be  affected  by  the  measures 
envisaged by the Commission 

Finally, operators carrying out IUU fishing should be the main target of the strategy by the 
Community. 

As  outlined  in  section  2,  IUU  fishing  has  multiple  negative  environmental,  economic  and 
social consequences. The impacts of the four policy options identified in section 4 will be 
assessed against their efficiency to curtail IUU fishing and thereby reduce those negative 
consequences.  In  addition,  the  impacts  of  those  options  which  are  not  directly  linked  to  the 
fight against IUU fishing needs also to be considered. 

Due  to  the  clandestine  nature  of  IUU  fishing,  reliable  data  on  IUU  catches  and  trade  do  not 
exist  or  are  not  publicly  available.  As  described  in  the  preceding  sections,  there  are  rough 
estimations  of  IUU  catches,  value  of  landings  and  imports  into  the  Community,  but  even  the 
authors of such estimations warn against the accuracy and usefulness of their own estimations. 

As a consequence the measurement of economic impacts will largely be of a qualitative nature. 
It  is  expected  that  some  of  the  measures  advocated  in  the  different  policy  options  (increased 
cooperation for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of fishing activities, certification scheme 
applying to imports of fisheries products) will significantly enhance the quantity and quality of 
data relevant for measuring IUU catches and trade. However, any positive effect in this respect 
will  only  arise  in  the  medium  to  long  term.  Potentially  measurable  or  at  least  tangible  socio-
economic and environmental impacts will result mainly from some of the measures included in 
the different options, which will be discussed in the present section.  

1. 

CONTINUATION  OF  CURRENT  POLICY  AND  FOCUS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION  AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK 

1.1. 

Impact on IUU fishing 

The development of an approach focused on a better implementation of the current framework 
and  aiming  to  increase  compliance  by  Community  operators  could  contribute  to  a  certain 
reduction of illegal practices.  

One key aspect in that regard should be for Member States to substantially step up their control 
and  enforcement  policies  and  practices.  In  many  Member  States,  the  efforts  devoted  to  the 
control of fishing activities are too limited, notably when carried out by services responsible for 

EN 

44 

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multiple  tasks  and  for  which  fisheries  control  is  a  low  priority.  Prosecutions  and  sanctions  of 
offenders seldom result in deterrent penalties. 

The Commission has at its disposal several instruments which could be used to remedy some of 
those  weaknesses.  The  main  tool  is  the  possibility  to  launch  infringement  procedures  under 
Article  226  of  the  EC  Treaty  against  those  Member  States  which  do  not  comply  with  their 
duties to implement correctly the provisions on control, inspection and enforcement laid down 
in  Regulations  2847/93  and  2371/2002.  Those  procedures  could  rely  to  some  extent  on  the 
findings by Commission inspectors whose missions are precisely to investigate the state of the 
implementation of the CFP by public authorities from Member States.  

Various  examples  have  shown  that  the  launching  of  comprehensive  infringement  procedures 
pertaining to the main shortcomings of the national system of control and sanction of a Member 
State  has  been  able  to  prompt  significant  changes  in  its  enforcement  policy  and  practices.  In 
some  cases,  those  changes  occurred  at  an  early  stage  of  the  procedure,  even  before  the 
submission of the case by the Commission to the Court. 

Cases brought before the Court also produced important impacts, compelling for example one 
Member  State  (France)  to  improve  considerably  its  control  system  in  order  to  implement  the 
Court ruling C-304/02 delivered on 12 July 2005. This ruling resulted in a fine to France of a 
total amount of 78 Million € for failing to comply with its obligation to monitor the landing of 
undersize  fish  and  sanction  offenders.  The  consequences  included  notably  for  the  French 
administration  a  substantial  increase  in  control  means  and  staff  dedicated  to  fishing  activities 
and  an  amendment  to  its  sanctioning  system  to  fix  higher  levels  of  fines  corresponding  to 
infringements to fisheries rules. 

Infringement procedures by the Commission can therefore produce significant improvements in 
the  national  control  systems  of  Member  States.  Other  instruments  could  also  be  used  by  the 
Commission  against  failure  by  Member  States  to  implement  correctly  their  duties  under  the 
CFP.  Early  fishery  closures  for  a  given  Member  State  or  preventive  measures  decided  by  the 
Commission on its own constitute very efficient and immediate measures43. The logic is that the 
Commission  should  be  entitled  to  adopt  decisions  impacting  fishing  activities  and  potentially 
suspending those when it is clear that Member states have not acted according to CFP rules.  

Going  beyond  the  simple  "repressive"  side  of  the  question  of  illegal  fishing,  it  seems  also 
essential to develop a culture of compliance among fishing operators. In some cases, fishermen 
infringe the rules because they do not perceive them as legitimate or justified. In that regard, it 
is of high importance to associate the fishing sector to the decision-making process leading to 
the adoption of the rules governing their professional activities.  

In  that  context,  a  key  element  for  Community  institutions  is  an  early  consultation  of 
representatives  of  the  fishing  sector  and  due  consideration  given  to  their  advice  before  the 
tabling  of  new  policy  or  regulatory  proposals  pertaining  to  the  management  of  fisheries. 
Interesting work has been engaged since the reform of the CFP in 2002 with the setting up of 
the  Regional  Advisory  Councils,  and  it  should  be  intensified  to  raise  fishing  operators' 
ownership of Community rules. 

43 

Cf. in particular the measures foreseen in Article 23(4) and 26(2), (3) and (4) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No  2371/2002;  for  an  example  of  the  use  of  those  measures,  cf.  Commission  Regulation  (EC) 
No 804/2007 of 9 July 2007 establishing a prohibition of fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea (Subdivisions 
25-32, EC Waters) by vessels flying the flag of Poland (OJ L 180, 10.7.2007, p. 3). 

EN 

45 

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Pursuing  this  option  could  trigger  some  important  improvement  in  reducing  illegal  fishing 
carried out by Community operators within and beyond Community waters, as they would be 
subject to more frequent and adequate control and sanctions by their national administrations. 
On  a  longer  term,  better  ownership  of  the  rules  should  lead  to  better  respect  of  legality  by 
operators, dissuading those who infringe the law to continue to do so.  

Increasing effort towards better compliance within the existing framework is an absolute 
necessity, but it will not on its own allow to address all the facets of the IUU problem and 
its implications for the Community. 

The first reason is that the means to ameliorate the situation remain quite limited compared to 
the scope of the problem. The efficiency of the powers of the Commission is restrained due to 
the lengthiness of the infringement procedure under Article 226 (it takes several years for a case 
to  be  brought  before  the  Court)  or  the  punctual  effect  of  some  of  its  autonomous  decisions, 
which  are  usually  linked  to  a  precise  issue  (for  example  overfishing  of  a  specific  stock  for  a 
given year). 

The  second  major  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  that  it  does  not  tackle  the  international 
dimension  of  IUU  fishing,  and  notably  the  weakness  of  the  Community  with  respect  to  the 
importation of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing. 

On this point, it could be envisaged to rely on and encourage private initiatives from the fishing, 
processing and retail sectors to ensure full traceability of the products along the supply chain. 
Some schemes are already being developed under the initiative of the European processing and 
retail industry, most notably the one applying to cod from the Barents Sea under the auspices of 
the  European  Fish  Processors  and  Traders  Association  (AIPCE/CEP).  Reference  is  also  often 
made  to  the  certification  schemes  developed  by  the  Marine  Stewardship  Council,  aiming  to 
guarantee the sustainability of fisheries.  

It is however difficult to envisage that such privately-run mechanisms will effectively result in a 
comprehensive protection of the Community market against all importations of IUU products. 
The first reason is that their scope remains focused on a limited number of stocks so far, and 
that the adherence to the various schemes in place remains voluntary. The second reason lies in 
the  fact  that  the  private  sector  is  generally  not  in  a  position  to  determine  fully  the  legality  of 
catches;  the  processing  industry  has  at  its  disposal  well  developed  means  to  ensure  the 
traceability  of  the  raw  material  which  is  used  in  their  plants.  This  allows  tracing  back  the 
origins of the products, and notably the different steps which have been followed from the point 
where the fish was caught until its arrival in the processing facility.  

However,  the  fact  that  the  catches  have  been  harvested  legally  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain 
without guarantee provided by public authorities which are in charge of controlling this aspect. 
This  point  has  been  outlined  by  the  European  Fish  Processors  and  Traders  Association 
(AIPCE/CEP) in their contribution to the consultation process: "As processors and purchasers 
of fishery products, we are able to put traceability processes in place back to the fishing vessels 
and  original  purchase,  but  would  find  it  difficult  to  validate  legality  of  catch.  This  is  the 
authorities’ responsibility44". 

44 

Cf. AIPCE- CEP, 8 March 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/contributions150107/aipce_cep.pdf 

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46 

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This option would therefore contribute to a certain extent to a reduction of illegal fishing within 
Community  waters,  but  would  not  be  sufficient  to  address  the  major  problem  caused  by  the 
continuation  of  IUU  fishing  on  the  high  seas  and  in  waters  of  third  countries,  and  the 
subsequent importation of products stemming from those practices into the Community. 

1.2. 

Socio-economic impact 

The economic and social impact of this option would remain quite limited, due to its moderate 
consequences on the overall IUU fishing problem. In particular, there would be no impact on 
the socio-economic difficulties encountered by third States as a consequence to the continuation 
of IUU fishing in their waters or on the high seas. 

For  illegal  operators  carrying  out  their  activities  within  Community  waters,  increased  control 
and sanction would reduce incentives to pursue their practices. This would indeed entail higher 
costs for them, as they would need to invest in additional means to avoid being controlled and 
would be more severely sanctioned when arrested. This should also reduce their possibility to 
sell their catches due to tighter controls. 

Illegal operators acting outside the Community, however, would not see their activities affected 
by this policy. 

For the Community fishing sector, this option would yield some reduced economic advantages. 
Legitimate  operators  who  suffer  from  direct  competition  with  illegal  operators  fishing  within 
Community waters are likely to benefit from an improved situation. Prices of some fish species 
may rise as a consequence from this option. Given the high degree of international competition 
on  the  fisheries  market  and  the  dependence  of  the  Community  over  imported  products,  this 
impact will however be of limited importance. 

For national administrations in charge of control of fishing activities, the option would require a 
significant effort over the medium term to improve and intensify their activities. This will in the 
first place affect those Member States which have not so far implemented comprehensive and 
efficient  strategies  to  control,  inspect  and  sanction  illegal  fishing  activities  occurring  in  their 
waters and by their vessels.  

1.3. 

Environmental impact 

A  reduction  of  illegal  fishing  within  Community  waters  would  entail  positive  environmental 
impact.  

This would be in particular tangible for fish stocks which are subject to heavy exploitation. For 
those stocks indeed, overfishing via under or misreporting of catches might lead to very serious 
threat as to their sustainability. A reduction of illegal practices implies a direct release of fishing 
effort  which  is  of  particular  importance.  The  example  of  cod  in  the  Baltic  illustrates  this 
situation.  

Eradication  of  illegal  practices  within  Community  waters  should  also  trigger  the  complete 
disappearance of prohibited fishing gear or techniques, which are particularly detrimental to the 
marine  environment.  Example  includes  the  use  of  driftnet  which  is  widely  recognised  as 
entailing a significant amount of bycatches (notably mammals). 

This option would however not entail any reduction of the environmental damages created by 
IUU fishing occurring outside Community waters. 

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47 

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2. 

FOCUS EC POLICY ON FISHING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY 

2.1. 

Impact on IUU fishing 

A  multilateral  approach  to  IUU  fishing  is  undoubtedly  the  most  appropriate  in  order  to  solve 
what is in essence an international problem. Due to the features of the international governance 
system, the most tangible outcomes of a strategy which would solely be based on a multilateral 
approach risk however to be felt only on a medium or long term basis. This would be clearly 
insufficient given the urgency to reduce rapidly IUU practices. 

The  main  advantage  of  the  multilateral  approach  consists  in  bringing  a  maximum  number  of 
actors  together.  This  has  triggered  a  clear  recognition  by  the  international  community  of  the 
seriousness of the IUU phenomenon and a consensus for call for action to address it. 

On this basis, international principles and Plan of Actions have been agreed, and the tools for 
implementing them have been elaborated at regional level within RFMOs. 

At international level however, moving from words to action often proves difficult or lengthy. 
As an example, international negotiations on the definition of the "genuine link" between a Flag 
State  and  its  fishing  vessels  have  been  going  on  for  a  certain  number  of  years  and  seem 
currently stalled. Due notably to the link with maritime shipping, there does not seem to be a 
wide consensus to see them reach a conclusive outcome. 

At  regional  level,  at  the  initiative  or  with  the  support  of  the  Community,  the  creation  of  new 
RFMOs  has  extended  the  scope  of  fishing  grounds  subject  to  international  regulation.  Within 
existing  RFMOs,  the  Community  has  been  and  still  is  supportive  of  the  measures  aiming  to 
identify and penalize IUU operators (via the adoption of lists of IUU vessels and of subsequent 
sanctions)  or  to  encourage  States  to  ensure  compliance  with  conservation  and  management 
rules for their fishing fleets, including by means of trade measures.  

The  "IUU  lists"  contain  however  a  limited  number  of  vessels,  which  often  change  flags  and 
names. The efficiency of the listing procedure may sometimes can be questioned in cases when, 
despite clear indications as to their implication in IUU fishing, fishing vessels escape any black 
listing  due  to  the  opposition  of  their  Flag  State to  support  a  proposal  in  that  sense  within  the 
RFMO to which it is a Party. Trade measures directed towards States have been seldom used by 
RFMOs and have not proven to be fully efficient as they cannot properly address the issue of 
how to detect marketing channels for IUU products.  

One of the main shortcoming of action within RFMOs and at international level is that it has 
not  been  sufficiently  efficient  so  far  to  target  the  behaviours  of  States  qualified  as  hosting 
"Flags of non  compliance", which  support  IUU  fishing  practices  and act as free  riders on the 
international arena. 

An international action which would be purely directed towards IUU fishing on the high seas 
and  promote  multilateral  solutions  to  this  end  would  not  either  provide  an  answer  to  IUU 
fishing  occurring  in  the  EEZs  of  third  countries  (and  notably  developing  countries)  or  within 
Community waters. 

Pursuing  and  enhancing  the  policy  of  the  Community  against  IUU  fishing  within  multilateral 
bodies  is  a  necessity  to  provide  for  a  consistent  approach  within  the international  community 
against this plague and develop a better governance of the high seas.  

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Those efforts alone would however not bring the expected results which are urgently required 
to  curtail  IUU  fishing,  in  particular  with  the  need  to  implement  more  stringent  measures 
towards fishing fleets carrying out IUU fishing on the high seas and States which are not acting 
under their international obligations to put an end to those practices. 

2.2. 

Socio-economic impact 

The overall socio-economic impact of this option is quite limited. This is due to the fact that it 
does not provide solutions which are commensurate to the IUU problem as a whole, and that its 
effects on IUU fishing will probably be felt by economic operators in the medium rather than in 
the short term. 

The option might entail a certain decrease of IUU fishing on the high seas, and therefore benefit 
legal operators from the Community as well as from third countries who abide by the rules and 
target  high  seas  stocks  (essentially  tuna  species),  via  a  reduction  of  competition  from  unfair 
practices. 

It  may  also  impact  some  parts  of  the  processing  industry,  which  could  see  certain  sources  of 
supply for its facilities reduced due to the difficulties encountered by operators to continue their 
illegal activities.  

For the rest of the actors involved in the fishing sector within and outside the Community, the 
socio-economic consequences would be negligible. 

2.3. 

Environmental impact 

The  most  tangible  environmental  impact  will  concern  fish  stocks  which  are  subject  to  the 
regulation of RFMOs and targeted IUU fishing. An intensification of the anti-IUU measures in 
those bodies should lead to a reduction of fishing pressure and yield positive consequences for 
those stocks. Those stocks which are currently known as being overfished due to IUU fishing 
should  normally  be  the  main  beneficiaries  of  this  policy  (for  example  blue  fin  tuna  in  the 
Mediterranean). 

The  slowness  of  the  decision-making  process  within  RFMOs  notably  in  respect  of  IUU-
condoning States might however limit those positive impacts, notably for stocks which require 
urgent recovery measures. The current limited system for sanctioning those vessels and States 
which act outside the rules agreed by RFMOs could also undermine the positive effects of those 
measures for the marine environment. 

The main limitation for this option lies obviously in the fact that it would not cover fish stocks 
falling  outside  the  competence  of  RFMOs  (present  in  Community  or  third  countries  waters), 
and which are also subject to IUU fishing.  

3. 

CASE BY CASE APPROACH, SPECIFIC TO SPECIES AND AREAS SUBJECT TO IMPORTANT 
IUU FISHING 

3.1. 

Impact on IUU fishing 

The  case-by-case  strategy  should  theoretically  entail  significant  progress  in  the  fight  against 
IUU fishing in Community waters and on the high seas and be able to effectively curtail some 
IUU practices. With the definition of clear priorities associated with targeted and strong actions, 

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it  would  allow  to  concentrate  control  measures  towards  the  stocks  which  are  the  most 
threatened  by  IUU  fishing.  For  those  selected  stocks,  this  approach  is  likely  to  entail  a  real 
decrease in IUU practices. 

Within  the  Community,  such  focus  on  better  control  of  designated  stocks  has  produced 
encouraging results,  as illustrated by the considerable improvement  observed for the  situation 
of pelagic fisheries: while important underreporting of catches used to be a major problem for 
these  fisheries,  the  introduction  since  2004  of  new  Community  measures  (such  as  prior 
notification of landing at designated ports and compulsory weighing of landings), coupled with 
active scrutiny by the Commission on the control policy of Member States, has led to solve the 
problem of 'black fish' landings.  

The specific measures in place within CCAMLR with respect to the monitoring and control of 
toothfish (notably with trade measures through a certification scheme) have also been assessed 
as yielding positive consequences on the reduction of illegal fishing. 

In  practice,  however,  the  adoption  of  this  case-by-case  approach  is  likely  to  face  substantial 
difficulties.  Essentially,  it  may  be  very  difficult  to  ensure  that  such  a  system  is  watertight 
enough to prevent IUU activities and products from escaping targeted controls and seep through 
the system's loopholes. IUU fishing is a fast evolving activity and fisheries which are currently 
exempt of IUU practices could be hit in the future. Such evolution is difficult to anticipate. The 
regime  would  need  to  be  intrinsically  adaptive  and  even  so  it  would  be  difficult  to  ensure  a 
timely response to evolving practices.  

Operators  responsible  for  IUU  fishing  easily  change  fishing  grounds  or  species  which  they 
target;  they  are  used  to  adapting  their  practices  in  order  to  escape  specific  constraints. 
Misreporting  of  catches  is  notably  a  current  practice.  Submitting  trade  of  a  given  stock  to  a 
certification scheme could be circumvented by illegal operators who would report the catches 
under  the  name  of  another  species  or  as  stemming  from  fishing  areas  not  covered  by  the 
scheme.  Such  misreporting  has  already  been  observed  for  toothfish  caught  in  the  CCAMLR 
zone, and which were reported as stemming from areas adjacent to this zone. This could also 
occur  if  the  approach  relies  on  stocks  (i.e.  a  species  in  a  given  area)  rather  on  species:  while 
some stocks of cod for example are known to suffer from high IUU pressure, this is the not the 
case for other stocks from this species. Introducing measures covering one cod stock could be 
undermined  by  the  possibility  for  illegal  operators  to  declare  their  cod  catches  as  stemming 
from those stocks which are healthy and not subject to the specific anti-IUU provisions. 

Moreover,  a  specific  approach  relying  on  stocks  on  the  high  seas  or  in  Community  waters 
would  not  produce  tangible  results  in  the  fight  against  illegal  fishing  occurring  in  waters  of 
developing  countries.  In  those  areas,  IUU  fishing  generally  affects  various  species  caught  in 
mixed fisheries more than single stocks (with the exception of tuna which is a highly migratory 
species and can be harvested both in EEZs and in the high seas, and the catches of which are 
considered to represent around one third of the overall value of IUU fishing affecting African 
countries).  Selecting  some  stocks  particularly  hit  by  IUU  fishing  in  those  waters  would 
constitute a very difficult task. 

Fisheries  products  caught  in  the  coastal  waters  of  third  countries  are  estimated  to  represent 
approximately  two  thirds  of  the  importation  of  IUU  products  into  the  Community,  with  an 

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overall  value  of  more  than  700  million  €45.  The  main  products  concerned  are  cephalopods, 
crustaceans  and  frozen  fish  from  various  species.  If  those  products  are  not  covered,  other 
measures  should  be  devised  to  counteract  this  problem.  Otherwise,  developing  countries  will 
continue  to  be  particularly  vulnerable  to  IUU  fishing.  There  is  even  a  probability  that  the 
fishing effort by illegal operators on those coastal species rises as a consequence of the entry 
into force of the measures covering other species, as they would tend to transfer their activities 
towards those stocks which are exempt of specific trade measures. Failing to address this major 
problem would represent a considerable shortcoming for the future Community policy against 
IUU fishing. 

Another problem lies in the absence of efficient measures which would result in the sanctioning 
of vessels and States which would not abide by those new rules.  

This selective approach would therefore leave an important number of gaps. 

3.2. 

Socio-economic impact 

Operators  responsible  for  IUU  fishing  which  currently  target  and  supply  the  Community 
market with products from the stocks which would be covered by this specific approach would 
be the first actors affected. It would result for them in a rise in their operating costs in case they 
would try to escape the new rules and develop fraudulent techniques to this end (for example 
via  the  forging  of  certification  documents  or  the  tampering  with  VMS).  It  could  also  entail  a 
change in their organisation if they decide to stop marketing their products in the Community 
and shift for new outlets, or in the case where they would decide to focus their activities on new 
stocks and abandon those which are covered by the new policy of the Community. 

Within  the  Community  market,  this  approach  would  entail  a  certain  reduction  of  supply  of 
fisheries products subject to the targeted measures and a subsequent increase in prices for those 
products (for example cod and tuna species). This would be the case both for fisheries products 
from stocks within Community waters and those outside those waters. This would benefit in the 
first  place  legitimate  Community  and  foreign  operators  who  target  those  stocks.  They  would 
indeed  see  a  reduction  of  competition  from  unfair  practices  and  consequently  a  drop  in  the 
supply which stemmed from illegal operators. The tendency by illegal operators to circumvent 
the rules may however undermine their effectiveness and therefore reduce those benefits. 

This  approach  would  not  produce  any  significant  change  in  the  harvesting  and  supply  of 
fisheries products which are not covered by the specific measures. Legitimate Community and 
foreign  operators  targeting  those  species  would  still  continue  to  face  unfair  competitive 
practices.  This  option  would  therefore  not  be  efficient  to  halt  the  importation  into  the 
Community of a substantial amount of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing.  

For the Community processing and retail sectors, this approach would have various impacts. 
It should firstly guarantee that products covered by the specific measures do not originate from 
IUU  fishing.  This  would  bring  certainty  for  those  important  buyers  of  fisheries  products  and 
reduce their exposure to the risk of being involved in the trade of products from IUU fishing, as 
well as to the criticisms from the civil society on this point. It would also probably trigger some 
increase in costs for those products, further to the reduction of the volume of fisheries products 
proposed  on  the  market  as  a  consequence  of  the  introduction  of  the  measures.  Soaring  prices 

45 

Study  "Impact  of  trade  measures  envisaged  in  the  IUU  package  under  elaboration  within  the 
Commission", Oceanic Development (May 2007), 2003/FISH/02, p. 18. 

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would  concern  all  products  subject  to  the  measures  and  thus  the  entire  processing  and  retail 
sector; it should therefore not result in any competitive advantages for one or the other firms. 
Obviously, firms which deliberately or by negligence currently rely on the supply of fisheries 
products  illegally  caught  would  face  significant  problems  with  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
approach.  

For all those operators, this option will in addition create non negligible administrative costs. 
They will have indeed to check if the products which are proposed for sale to them are covered 
or not by the specific measures (notably if they should be subject to certification or not). This 
would  mean  that  they  would  have  to  follow  different  procedures  in  their  purchase  policy 
depending on whether a given fishing product comes from a certain species or a certain area. 
They would in particular have to refuse the purchase of products for which a required certificate 
is lacking or not providing sufficient information. This implies that they should have a perfect 
knowledge of the different stocks affected by the certification schemes and of the data which 
should be attached to them. 

For  national  administrations  in  charge  of  customs  and  control  of  the  entry  of  fisheries 
products into the Community, this option will also trigger important additional administrative 
tasks.  They  will  need  to  check  whether  the  products  imported  into  the  Community  should  be 
accompanied or not by a specific certificate. The current certification systems in place within 
some  RFMOs  encompass  a  very  limited  number  of  stocks  (essentially  toothfish  from  the 
CCAMLR area and, to a lesser extent, some tuna species from the ICCAT area). The products 
concerned  by  those  existing  schemes  represent  a  very  limited  amount  of  the  importations  of 
fisheries  products  into  the  Community.  In  actual  fact,  the  quasi-totality  of  those  products  is 
directed towards Asian markets. As a consequence, many customs and fisheries services within 
Member  States  have  little  experience  in  the  management  of  those  certification  regimes.  The 
introduction of new certification schemes which would only cover certain well defined stocks 
would imply that a change in the practices of customs services, notably as it would only makes 
sense if they are able to differentiate the products subject to the certificate from those which are 
exempt from it. 

For  third  countries,  this  option  seems  to  create  a  cost-effective  approach  for  addressing  the 
problem  of  halting  imports  of  some  products  derived  from  IUU  fishing  into  the  Community. 
Requiring that those countries guarantee the legality of the products caught by their fishing fleet 
corresponds  to  their  obligation  as  Flag  State  to  manage  and  conserve  fisheries  resources  in  a 
sustainable  manner.  Limiting  this  scheme  to  the  stocks  which  are  particularly  hit  by  IUU 
fishing  would  seem  to  be  proportionate  to  the  goals  pursued  and  not  entail  over  prescriptive 
burden on the side of those third States.  

This  option  presents  the  weakness  that  it  would  not  allow  to  alleviate  substantially  the 
considerable  losses  suffered  by  developing  countries  as  a  consequence  of  IUU  fishing.  As 
outlined  above,  given  the  limitation  of  the  scope  of  this  approach  to  some  stocks,  and  the 
subsequent  difficulty  to  extrapolate  this  policy  to  the  diverse  local  stocks  present  in  national 
waters from those countries, developing countries would only gain limited benefits from it.  

Beyond this important problem, the impact will also differ depending on the extent with which 
third States are involved in fishing activities, and on their capacities to monitor the activities of 
fishing vessels flying their flag.  

For  all  commercial  partners  of  the  Community  involved  in  the  trade  of  fisheries  products 
targeted by the specific approach, this option will create administrative burdens which should 

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not be underestimated. This will indeed require that they establish a system for certification for 
the exportation of those fisheries products. This will also entail the obligation to invest time and 
resources  to  make  this  system  run.  The  limitation  of  the  scope  of  the  certification  scheme  to 
some stocks will generate important additional burden. Indeed, this would require that in depth 
controls are carried out by national administrations in order to check before all exportations of 
fisheries  products  towards  the  Community  whether  or  not  they  should  be  subject  to  the 
certificate. In operational terms, the additional workload would be considerable.  

Developed  countries  should  not  face  substantial  difficulties  in  showing  how  their  national 
system is managed in view of guaranteeing the legality of the catches by their fishing vessels. 
Developing countries with a long distant fishing fleet under their flag, as well as those which 
have  developed  a  significant  processing  industry  would  have  to  face  the  most  important 
administrative impacts. As the products from stocks likely to be covered by the specific trade 
measures would be either targeted by their fleet or processed in their facility, they would have 
to  demonstrate  that  they  have  been  harvested  legally  or  that  the  processed  products  stemmed 
from  legal  fishing  activities.  This  may  in  particular  affect  South-East  Asian  countries  which 
have  an  important  long  distant  fishing  fleet  as  well  as  other  developing  countries  which  are 
specialised  in  the  processing  industry  and  exportation  into  the  Community  (for  ex.  Thailand, 
Seychelles, Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal…). For developing countries without long 
distant  fishing  fleet  and  limited  or  no  processing  industry,  the  impact  of  the  option  will  be 
negligible as they would probably not be concerned by the products subject to the certification 
schemes. 

3.3. 

Environmental impact 

For those stocks covered by the specific approach, the environmental impact should be globally 
positive.  It  should  indeed  result  in  a  lower  fishing  effort  towards  the  stocks  concerned.  As 
stocks subject to important IUU fishing are often those which are also affected by a very high 
fishing pressure, or even fished beyond sustainable level (for ex. cod in the Baltic Sea, blue fin 
tuna), a decrease in fishing activity would provide a real relief necessary to ensure the survival 
of  the  stocks  concerned.  Fraud  against  the  measures  in  place  could  reduce  those  positive 
impacts. 

Here again however, the main shortcoming of this approach is its lack of comprehensiveness. 
While  some  stocks  would  be  subject  to  stringent  anti-IUU  measures,  other  would  face  a 
continuation of the current situation. As already explained, fish stocks in developing countries 
waters  risk  being  among  the  less  protected  through  this  approach.  This  would  just  compound 
the state of fisheries resources in those areas, which are usually subject to limited or inexistent 
management regime. 

Another important negative side effect of this option would be the incentives created in favour 
of  a  transfer  of  fishing  activities  from  the  stocks  identified  as  warranting  specific  attention 
towards  new  stocks  which  are  not  covered  by  those  measures.  The  temptation  would  be 
considerable for operators engaged in IUU fishing to leave a fishery subject to strict anti-IUU 
measures in order to carry on their activities elsewhere, this time targeting other stocks which 
fall outside this selective regime. 

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4. 

UNDERTAKE A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVE, COVERING BOTH COMMUNITY 
AND NON COMMUNITY WATERS  

4.1. 

Impact on IUU fishing 

This option would allow the Community to have at its disposal strong and efficient instruments 
against IUU fishing; it should result in a reduction of those practices and place the Community 
at the forefront on the international arena in the fight against this plague.  

The option is structured around three objectives, and should bring tangible outcome for each of 
them. 

The  first  objective  is  to  remedy  the  vulnerability  of  the  Community  market  to 
importations  of  fisheries  products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing.  The  approach  pursued  by 
this  option  should  result  in  a  much  stricter  control  of  the  legality  of  those  importations,  and 
constitute an important step towards closing the doors of the Community to fisheries products 
stemming  from  IUU  fishing  by  foreign-flagged  vessels.  The  Community  represents  the  first 
market for fisheries products in the world, which absorbs yearly about 1,1 billion € of fisheries 
products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing:  this  option  would  therefore  directly  reduce  economic 
incentives for illegal operators, which are the main drivers of IUU fishing 

Making  the  importation  of  fisheries  products  coming  from  IUU  fishing  illegal  under 
Community law and requiring that all importations of fisheries products be accompanied by a 
certificate under which the Flag State guarantees the legality of the catches should have direct 
impact on the operators involved in IUU fishing and trading their products into the Community.  

The  certification  requirement  applying  to  all  consignments  of  fisheries  products  to  be 
imported  into  the  Community  should  provide  border  control  authorities  with  new  means  to 
avoid  the  arrival  of  IUU  products  into  the  Community  market.  They  would  have  at  their 
disposal a sound legal basis and a simple way to exercise a first and systematic control over the 
legality of all fisheries products imported into the Community. The wide scope of the measure, 
which would cover all fisheries products for importation notwithstanding their origin (high seas 
or  waters  under  the  jurisdiction  or  sovereignty  of  a  State)  or  mode  of  transportation,  ensures 
that the approach followed encompasses the problem in its entire and global dimension.  

Operators  responsible  for  IUU  fishing  would  probably  face  substantial  difficulties  in  getting 
their catches certified as legal by their Flag State. In the case of fishing vessels flying a Flag of 
Non Compliance, the State concerned may not be in a position to deliver any certificate or to 
guarantee the validity of the certificate at all.  

The  operators  would  then  be  barred  from  accessing  the  Community  market.  Those  States 
usually run open registers and lack the willingness or operational means to exert a control as to 
legality  of  the  activities  of  their  fishing  fleet.  They  may  well  be  tempted  to  issue  certificates 
without effectively checking the reality of the operations performed by their fishing fleet. They 
would however in such situation be faced with the prospect of being the subject of verifications 
under the alert system, of being placed by the Community on its lists of States which do not act 
according  to  their  international  obligations  as  Flag  States  and  be  subject  to  a  set  of  sanctions 
directly  targeted  against  them  (cf.  below).  This  should  be  seen  by  many  of  those  States  as 
sufficiently  deterrent  to  avoid  a  generalized  practice  of  producing  fake  certificates.  Fishing 
vessels which would have carried out IUU fishing but which fly the Flag of States exercising a 

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proper  control  over  their  fishing  fleet  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  receive  the  required 
certification , as this should logically be refused by the Flag State.  

The penalisation of the importation of such products would imply that the continuation of the 
activities of operators carrying out IUU fishing would become more risky. They would indeed 
be liable to sanctions which could reach a potentially quite high level, and this would represent 
an important stiffening compared to the current situation.  

The establishment of the certification scheme would represent a major change compared to the 
current situation, and address the key problem of the vulnerability of the Community market to 
importation of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing, which is the principal weakness 
undermining the existing framework. 

There may be a risk that illegal operators continue their activities, but divert their exportations 
from the Community to other markets (mainly Japan and the United States, which represent the 
other  largest  fisheries  importation  States  in  the  world,  with  characteristics  similar  to  the 
Community market). In such cases, the reduction of IUU fishing could be less important than 
expected.  It  should  however  be  noticed  that  those  countries  work  in  close  collaboration  to 
combat IUU fishing. This includes notably exchange of trade data on fisheries products, which 
would allow to detect any suspect shift in trade flows resulting  from the establishment of the 
certification scheme by the Community. Those exchanges of information take place within the 
framework  of  RFMOs  and  on  more  informal  basis.  They  should  be  improved  via  the 
reinforcement  of  the  international  MCS  Network  and  the  setting  up  of  the  Community  alert 
system.  Once  our  trade  partners  receive  information  on  the  arrival  on  their  market  of  suspect 
products,  they  should  be  able  to  take  appropriate  action  to  prevent  their  importation  and/or 
sanction  the  operators  concerned.  In  addition,  the  trade  measures  by  the  Community  only 
represent one element of the global approach advocated under this option. The intensification of 
the Community multilateral efforts via RFMOs (for high seas areas) and the Community policy 
with  respect  to  coastal  States  with  a  view  to  improving  management  and  conservation  of 
fisheries resources in their waters should also be taken into consideration. They should entail a 
reduction of IUU fishing even when the catches are not traded into the Community. Moreover, 
it  is  not  excluded  that  the  trade  policy  promoted  by  the  Community  could  inspire  other 
international  partners  which  could  develop  similar  schemes  in  order  to  protect  their  market 
from imports of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing.  

Together  with  the  certification  scheme,  a  tightening  of  the  rules  on  transhipments  at  sea 
would  prove  a  useful  complementary  action.  Regulate  or  even  forbid  those  practices  would 
improve  the  control  of  the  supply  chain  and  render  more  difficult  or  even  deprive  illegal 
operators of techniques widely used as part of clandestine channels to trade and launder their 
catches.  

Finally,  generalizing  and  harmonizing  within  the  Community  the  various  measures  derived 
from recommendations adopted by RFMOs and pertaining to access to ports and to the supply 
of port services to vessels listed as IUU by those organisations would also help the Community 
to  reach  a  robust  protection  against  the  activities  of  operators  engaged  in  IUU  fishing.  This 
would  remove  the  inconsistencies  between  the  various  regimes  applying  throughout  the 
Community, which have been a source of a certain confusion benefiting illegal operators over 
the  past  years.  Such  initiative  would  simplify  the  regulatory  framework  and  provide  a  sound 
basis for national port authorities to adopt efficient measures towards vessels placed on the IUU 
lists of RFMOs. 

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This option would also bring an appropriate answer from the Community to the second 
main challenge in its policy against IUU fishing, which is related to the identification and 
sanction  of  vessels  and  States  engaged  in  or  supporting  IUU  fishing  on  the  high  seas 
and/or in the waters of developing countries. 

In  relation  to  IUU  fishing  occurring  within  the  waters  of  coastal  developing  countries,  the 
action by the Community would rely on two pillars; strengthen its contribution to enhance the 
capacities of local authorities to manage and control fishing activities in their EEZs, and reduce 
the  opportunities  for  illegal  operators  active  in  those  areas  to  trade  their  products  into  the 
Community market (via the certification scheme applying to all imports). Both measures should 
result in the establishment of new hurdles hampering the continuation of IUU fishing in those 
vulnerable areas.  

Via  the  possibility  for  the  Community  to  produce  its  own  lists  of  vessels  and  States 
engaged in or supporting IUU fishing, and apply its own set of sanctions, the Community 
would  overcome  the  difficulties  experienced  in  RFMOs,  place  illegal  operators  and 
unscrupulous States in front of their responsibilities and reduce their scope of action. The link 
with  IUU  fishing  and  the  multiple  problems  caused  by  vessels  flying  the  Flag  of  States 
unwilling  or  unable  to  exert  appropriate  control  over  their  fishing  fleet  has  been  regularly 
condemned  by the  international community.  Despite some progress on the  international arena 
for  better  governance  on  the  high  seas  and  positive  evolution  in  some  regions,  such  vessels 
continue  to  operate  and  nothing  demonstrates  that  their  activities  have  decreased  on  a  global 
scale.  Given  the  urgency  of  the  situation  and  its  status  as  a  major  fishing  power,  the 
Community's most effective policy against those vessels and their supporting States would be to 
foresee the possibility to enact specific measures targeting them. The Community would then 
send a clear signal to those operators and authorities, as well as to the rest of the international 
community,  showing  its  determination  to  effectively  tackle  the  problem  of  Flags  of  non 
compliance.  

Targeting  illegal  operators  via  the  listing  of  their  vessels  used  for  these  activities  represents 
prima facie the most adequate solution. This would allow to concentrate on the actual culprits 
and, through the sanctions to be applied by the Community (notably prohibition to land, import 
and  access  into  the  Community),  substantially  hamper  the  continuation  of  their  activities, 
notably  through  an  increase  in  their  operational  costs.  The  possibility  for  the  Community  to 
decide  unilaterally  on  the  listing  and  subsequent  sanctioning  of  private  operators  is  not  a 
complete  novelty:  it  is  already  being  used  in  other  fields,  like  aviation  safety  (listing  of 
airlines46). 

Beyond  the  listing  of  vessels,  the  listing  by  the  Community  of  irresponsible  States  also 
seems  an  adequate  means.  In  accordance  with  the international  legal  order,  it  is  primarily  for 
States  to  make  sure  that  international  rules  on  management  and  conservation  of  fisheries 
resources are properly implemented. Their failure to do so is at the roots of the choice by illegal 
operators to opt for such flags. The Community approach aims to emphasise that States which 
place  themselves  outside  the  international  legality  should  face  the  consequences  of  their 
behaviours.  It  is  not  uncommon  that  the  Flag  State  of  fishing  vessels  black-listed  by  RFMOs 

46 

Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 on 
the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community 
and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and repealing Article 
9 of Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 15). 

EN 

56 

   EN 

 
                                                 
does not really feel concerned by the problem and does not react very swiftly to the listing. This 
might be different if the country itself is placed on a black list by the Community. This "name 
and shame" policy would probably result in much more attraction towards the State concerned 
and encourage it to adopt the measures necessary to be de-listed. The simple prospect of being 
listed  could  actually  be  viewed  as  sufficiently  dissuasive  to  impose  a  change  of  policy  and 
practices. It should be recalled that, in the shipping sector, Community law47 foresees that, for 
safety  reasons,  port  access  should  be  denied  to  vessels  flying  the  flag  of  certain  States  and 
having being subject to detention in another port in a previous period. 

The need for a dual approach targeting both fishing vessels and irresponsible States is in actual 
fact a necessity in order to address the problem of flag-hopping which would result in fishing 
vessels  flying  the  flag  of  a  State  featuring  on  a  black  list  leaving  the  register  of  this  Flag  in 
order to opt for a new one.  

Finally, this option should considerably help improving compliance with the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy within Community waters and among Community operators.  

As  set  out  below  (section  5,  paragraph  1.1),  enhancing  control  means  and  turning  the  fight 
against IUU fishing into a priority within Member States are a prerequisite in order to reduce 
illegal  practices  occurring  in  Community  waters  or  perpetuated  by  Community  operators 
outside the Community. 

The  efficiency  of  this  approach  would  greatly  improve  if  it  is  completed  with  a  Community 
initiative  addressing  the  problem  caused  by  the  absence  of  a  deterrent  system  for  sanctioning 
infringements to the rules of the CFP within the Community and the large variations observed 
between penalties in that area across Member States.  

The  fixation  at  Community  level  of  maximum  levels  of  sanctions  corresponding  to  serious 
infringements  against  the  rules  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  means  that  national  judicial 
authorities  would  be  in  a  position  to  pronounce  much  higher  fines  than  what  is  currently  the 
case, while keeping their discretion as to the sanction effectively issued, which would depend 
on  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  fixation  of  each  penal  sanction  would 
obviously remain within the remits of the judge, and there would be no guarantee that he would 
opt  for  going  up  to  the  maximum  levels  set  by  Community  law.  The  probability  for  illegal 
operators to be subject to very high fines and even jail sentence is however a key element for 
deterring them to pursue their activities.  

In  addition,  the  Community  initiative  would  be  completed  by  specific  provisions  on 
administrative enforcement measures which should be adopted by Member States with regard 
to  fishing  operators  found  in  flagrante  delicto  while  committing  serious  infringements.  Those 
measures  are  issued  by  national  enforcement  authorities  and  have  an  immediate  effect  on  the 
operators  concerned.  They  are  generally  considered  as  very  efficient  and  usually  entail 
important operating costs for the operators affected. A generalization of such practices within 
the  Community  would  increase  the  chances  for  illegal  operators  to  be  rapidly  penalized  and 
constitutes  another  step  towards  the  establishment  of  a  real  level  playing  field  within  the 
Community in terms of sanctions against IUU fishing.  

47 

Cf.  Article  7(b)  of  Directive  95/21/EC  on  port  State  control  of  shipping,  the  objective  of  which  is  to 
reduce substandard shipping in EU waters and promote compliance with safety, environment protection 
and decent working conditions on board ships of all flags. 

EN 

57 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Finally, the establishment of a black list of Community vessels would reinforce the scrutiny of 
public  authorities  towards  those  vessels  infringing  the  rules  of  the  CFP  and  encourage  the 
adoption  of  strict  measures  towards  them.  This  would  highlight  the  need  to  effectively  tackle 
the problem of Community fishing vessels in situation of serious infringements and provide a 
clear tool to publicize the names of the offenders and call for a reaction by public authorities. 

4.2. 

Socio-economic impacts  

4.2.1.  Economic impacts of Option 4 in the Community 

The basic result of the IUU package as described in option 4-if successful- is expected to be a 
significant  reduction  of  the  imports  of  IUU  fish  into  the  Community  and  to  dissuade  illegal 
operators  to  target  the  EU  market  in  the  future.  This  will  be  basically  the  result  of  the 
combination of the general certification scheme, the black lists of countries and vessels and the 
alert system.  

It is to be expected that a significant reduction of IUU imports into the Community will result 
on a sudden reduction of products placed on the market and, consequently, on short term first 
sale price increases for fish, in particular for these species most affected by IUU such as cod, 
tuna and sword fish, but maybe also for species which are substitutes to them. 

The above trend is supported by the fact that fishermen firmly believe that imports of IUU fish 
into  the  Community  are  currently  putting  a  downward  pressure  on  sale  prices  of  legal  fish. 
Furthermore,  evidence  from  CCAMLR  shows  that  fish  certified  under  the  CCAMLR  catch 
document scheme commands a premium of 20-30% over uncertified fish. 

Furthermore,  significant  price  increases  were  also  the  result  of  commercial  actions  (import 
bans) imposed in the context of ICCAT against countries non respecting management measures 
for tuna and associated species (swordfish in particular). 

Other pieces included in the package are required either to reduce further the expected revenues 
of  IUU,  in  particular  the  measures  which  would  generalise  RFMOs  measures  within  the 
Community  and  the  consolidation  and  intensification  of  actions  in  RFMOs,  or  to  increase 
further  the  costs  of  IUU,  in  particular  the  provisions  on  nationals  and  the  approximation  of 
sanctions. 

As indicated before, both types of elements are required to change in a significant manner the 
incentives  to  engage  in  IUU  fishing  by  private  operators.  Without  them,  the  package  will  be 
incomplete  and  its  effectiveness  will  be  severely  hampered.  Individual  pieces  of  the  package 
can by bypassed by means of forged documents, misnaming catches or changing the appearance 
of vessels. As the relatively successful experience of CCAMLR against IUU has shown the key 
for  success  is  the  combination  of  elements  and  in  particular  actions  at  government  level 
combined with actions against traders and individuals, so that all fronts are covered 

4.2.1.1.  Economic impacts on the EU fishermen 

The  decrease  in  quantities  will  result  on  first  sale  price  increases.  This  will  benefit  legal 
Community  fishermen.  It  is  very  difficult  to  provide  an  accurate  extra  figure  of  what  the 
additional income would be, as doing it will require a level of data desegregation much higher 
than what is available. 

EN 

58 

   EN 

 
According to the very rough estimation done by Oceanic48, 8% of the total EU imports of fish 
in total weight will come from IUU fishing; i.e., 500000tonnes a year.  

Species 

High Sea Species 

-  Weight 

IUU 
equivalent  
(K Tonnes) 

Value 

(€ million) 

Tuna 

150 - 220 

Deep water red fish 

Cod 

Third countries EEZ's 

Crustaceans 

White fish (fillets) 

Molluscs 

Total 

11.5 

100 

68 

42 

105 

500 

210 

23 

200 

378 

91 

269 

1100 

As seen in the above table, the yearly market value of Community IUU imports will be around 
€740 million or 10% of the total value of Community imports per year. It can be assumed then 
that if IUU imports into the Community would be totally blocked, the income of Community 
fishermen will be increased by a figure corresponding to that amount. Most of this additional 
income  will  be  received  by  Community  fishermen  catching  species  most  affected  by  IUU 
fishing and imports into the Community. 

Furthermore,  the  use  of  data  about  price  flexibilities  (i.e.  the  percentage  of  price  increase 
resulting  from  a  quantity  decrease  of  10%)  could  allow  to  come  to  a  rough  estimation  of  the 
price  increase  that  could  be  expected  following  a  reduction  of  IUU  imports  into  the 
Community. The price flexibilities in the table below have been estimated on the basis of data 
on quantities and prices available from Eurostat. 

For the sake of the analysis, it is assumed that the entry into force of the package referred to 
Option  4  will  result  on  a  decrease  of  IUU  imports  and  hence  of  imported  quantities  into  the 
Community  equivalent  to  the  estimation  of  these  imports  made  by  Oceanic  in  his  study  of 
IUU49 for individual species. 

Species 

Estimation  of  IUU 
imports  (in  %  of 
total)50 

Estimation  of  Price  Increase 
if IUU disappears 

Estimation  of  average  price 
flexibility51 

48 

49 

50 
51 

Étude d'impact des mesures commerciales considérées dans le paquet INN en cours d'élaboration par la 
Commission, p. 13-19. 
Study  "Impact  of  trade  measures  envisaged  in  the  IUU  package  under  elaboration  within  the 
Commission", Oceanic Development (May 2007), 2003/FISH/02, p. 13-19. 
Estimations by Oceanic Development 2003/FISH/02,(May 2007). 
Price flexibilities are different for every point of the demand curve. Values in the table are averages of 
point price flexibilities. 

EN 

59 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Cod 

Tuna 

Frozen hake 

10% 

10% 

19% 

Frozen lobster 

19% 

+11.66% 

+7% 

+7.33% 

+63.3% 

+1.27 

+0.35 

+0.37 

+3.1 

Even if they can not be taken at face value, the above results show a significant potential for 
price increases, in particular for cod and frozen lobster. The lower values for tuna and frozen 
hake  can  be  explained  by  the  much  globalised  nature  of  trade  of  these  species,  with  many 
suppliers and buyers.  

It is further expected that prices increases of a magnitude close to some of these above, would 
attract  more  imports,  this  time  of  legal  products,  which  could  attenuate  the  increase  in  prices 
until a new equilibrium is reached. However, end prices will still be higher than at the present 
time,  because  of  the  elimination  of  the  very  negative  effect  on  prices  resulting  from  IUU 
imports. 

Further benefits are to be expected for legal Community fishermen: the elimination or reduction 
of IUU fishing will alleviate pressure on fishing resources. This could reduce some operating 
costs  of  catching  (fuel  consumption  travelling  distance,  fishing  time).  Crew  share  will  also 
increase, accordingly. 

Higher  prices  and  reduced  costs  could  have  a  positive  effect  on  profitability,  in  particular  of 
these fleets specialised in species currently affected by IUU. These profitability increases could 
bet  attenuated  if  additional  imports  of  legal  fish  occur.  However,  the  mid  to  long  term  effect 
would still be positive.  

Compliance  costs  would  normally  be  the  same,  although  they  could  get  somewhat  reduced  if 
Community IUU operators would start abiding by the rules. 

However, it is quite impossible to quantify these figures and, in any event, any effect will only 
materialize in the medium to long term 

4.2.1.2.  Specific  economic  impacts  resulting  from  concrete  measures  included  in  the 

Community package 

To  the  extent  that  the  intended  measures  will  only  apply  to  imports  into  the  Community,  the 
specific economic impact of the proposed certification scheme and alert system will be neutral 
for the majority of the Community fleet. It could however be positive if, as expected, first sales 
prices of the species more affected by IUU fishing increase. If so, the positive effect will be felt 
on fleets, mainly long distance and industrial fleets specialised in these species. 

Part of the fleet, however, will be affected by the obligation to obtain a certification of origin 
from their flag States. These are Community vessels landing in developing countries and selling 
to  local  processing  facilities  before  the  fish is  exported  to  the  Community.  Oceanic  estimates 
that around 500 Community vessels will be affected; most of them long distance vessels from 

EN 

60 

   EN 

 
Spain, Portugal, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark52. Getting the certificate would 
imply  some  costs  for  them,  but  they  are  difficult  to  quantify.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the 
implementation of RFMOs certification schemes did not entail negative comments by operators 
in relation with their costs. 

The impacts of the rest of measures foreseen in option 4 will depend on the current behaviour 
pattern of Community fishermen or groups of fishermen.  

For legal Community fishermen, the economic impacts of all these measures will be neutral.  

It  is  to  be  expected  that  for  Community  fishermen  currently  involved  in  or  considering 
engaging  in  IUU  activities  either  in  the  high  seas,  in  the  EEZs  of  third  countries  or  in 
Community  waters,  the  combination  of  measures  taken  at  the  RFMO  level  and,  in  particular, 
the approximation of sanctions and the provisions on nationals should reduce their incentives to 
carry out IUU fishing. 

These effects will take some time to materialize. Hence their main effect will only be felt in the 
medium  to  long  term.  However,  they  could  have  some  positive  effects  in  the  short  term, 
following the announcement of the new policy. 

4.2.1.3.  Economic impacts on the Community processing and distribution sectors 

A  distinction  has  to  be  made  between  likely  economic  impacts  on  fish  processors  and  the 
distribution sector, in particular big retailers. 

Regarding  Community  processors,  they  will  be  forced  to  concentrate  supplies  on  secure, 
certified-sources  of  supply,  irrespective  of  pure  market  considerations  (quality  or  price).This 
could alter their market behaviour and expose them to costs increases, resulting from possible 
price  increases  of  fish  and  to  some  additional  cost  increases  resulting  from  the  necessity  to 
ensure compliance with the certification requirement, and to security of supply issues. This is 
likely to affect more severely small firms operating with different traders purchasing fisheries 
products from various sources, and which may not be in a position to receive a regular supply 
of certified products.  

Generally  speaking,  costs  increases  are  not  expected  to  have  a  significant  negative  economic 
impact on Community processors, given the strong internal demand for fish products, as they 
will  normally  be  able  to  pass  at  least  part  of  the  cost  increases  further  down  the  distribution 
chain. 

Security of supply could be more delicate, in particular if alternative, certified sources of supply 
do  not  have  the  same  production  capacity  or  are  less  efficient  than  current  suppliers.  This 
potential negative effect will get attenuated overtime as developing countries improve their own 
internal capabilities and procedures to deal with the certification requirement. However, it is not 
to  be  excluded  that  the  same  countries  decide  that  it  not  worth  for  them  to  comply  with  the 
certification  scheme  for  perfectly  legitimate  reasons,  either  because  fish  exports  are  not  very 
important  for  them  or  because  the  Community  is  not  an  important  destination  of  their  fish 

52 

Study  "Impact  of  trade  measures  envisaged  in  the  IUU  package  under  elaboration  within  the 
Commission", Oceanic Development (May 2007), 2003/FISH/02, p. 64. 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
                                                 
exports.  The  economic  impact  on  Community  processors  dependent  on  supplies  from  these 
countries could then be quite severe53. 

It  is  not  expected  that  the  certification  requirement  will  force  Community  processors  to 
delocalise as delocalising will not avoid that the Flag State certifies the legality of the fish. 

On the other hand, they could benefit from the positive image of certified fish.  

The  effects  on  big  retailers  are  expected  to  be  similar  but  less  severe,  because,  as  they  are 
further  down  the  distribution  chain,  they  have better  chances of passing  on  to consumers any 
cost increases and are more flexible than processors to deal with security of supply issues. 

Being closer to the consumer also means that they could get more significant benefits from any 
image  issue  favouring  fisheries,  although  they  are  also  more  sensitive  to  the  proliferation  of 
brands/logos. One of the means they are developing to fight that proliferation is to develop their 
own certification programs. 

Other measures included in this Option have some potential impacts on Community processors 
and distributors. This is in particular the case of sanctions.  

The fact that trading IUU fish would be made a serious infringement would make Community 
processors  and  distributors  liable  for  sanctions  if  they  deal  with  fisheries  products  stemming 
from IUU fishing. By doing so, imports of IUU products will be more difficult, as processors 
and  distributors  control  the  many  channels  through  which  IUU  products  get  into  the 
Community.  Furthermore,  exposure  of  processors  and  distributors  to  sanctions  would  also 
decrease  the  income  of  IUU  fishers  or  processors  from  third  countries  in  proportion  with  the 
risk of being sanctioned run by processors/distributors in the Community. 

The  impact  of  the  certification  scheme  on  the  various  labels  or  certification  procedures 
developed by the private sector (above all in the processing and distribution sectors) should 
also be assessed. The establishment of a general certification scheme for all imported products 
might  be  seen  as  adding  to  the  confusion  created  by  the  current  proliferation  of  brands  and 
labels.  It  could  be  argued  that  consumers  might  find  it  misleading  to  be  confronted  with  yet 
another  certificate.  This  risk  remains  moderate  though,  as  the  certification  scheme  envisaged 
under option 4 should normally be primarily used by operators trading fish products and should 
not serve to inform consumers. Its purpose is also different as it would demonstrate the legality 
of the imported products and apply to all of them, while the current private labels usually refer 
to the sustainability of a given fishery and cover a very limited number of stocks.  

For the retail and processing operators which have developed their own certification schemes, 
the  establishment  of  new  public  and  general  certification  scheme  would  also  have 
consequences.  Those  actors  acknowledge  that  their  own  certification  procedures  do  not  fully 
guarantee the legality of the products covered but provide useful information as to their origins 
and the supply chain which they followed. The existence of a certification scheme guaranteed 
by  public  authorities  would  remove  the  uncertainty  pertaining  to  the  legality  of  the  products. 
The information gathered by the operators through their own arrangements on the traceability 
of  the  products  should  actually  ease  their  adaptation  to  the  new  certification  scheme,  as  they 
already  have  steady  relations  with  their  suppliers  based  on  a  good  knowledge  of  the  trade 

53 

From  information  in  the  Oceanic  study,  Chile,  Argentina and India  could  be  countries  not  interested  in 
taking the necessary steps to comply with certification scheme. 

EN 

62 

   EN 

 
                                                 
channels used. Thanks to their investments in this area, they should be able to ensure that they 
only deal with responsible operators, and those operators should normally not meet substantial 
difficulties in getting their products certified under the new scheme. 

4.2.1.4.  Economic impacts on providers of port services 

The prohibition to provide goods and services to blacklisted IUU vessels or vessels flying a flag 
of convenience was referred to before as one possible means to increase operating costs of IUU 
vessels.  In  fact,  these  prohibitions  are  already  part  of  the  NEAFC,  NAFO  and  CCAMLR 
regulatory  measures  and  hence  they  are  applicable  in  the  Community.  As  part  of  Option  4, 
these measures will be generalised. 

The general prohibition to deal will have some negative economic impacts on providers of port 
services. However, these impacts are not expected to be significant when compared to what is 
already the case and will concentrate on a handful of Community ports. 

4.2.2.  Overall economic impacts of Option 4 on third countries 

For  developing  countries,  the  disappearance  of the  Community  as  a  market  for  IUU  products 
taken  in  their  waters  would  reduce  their  losses  both  in  terms  of  catch  and  value.  Figures 
indicate that for sub-Saharan region, the elimination of IUU in EEZs would mean an increase of 
19%  of  total  value  of  catch  and  23%  of  declared  value  of  the  catch.  Losses  from  the  Sub-
Saharan  Africa  waters  amount  to  800  million  €  per  year,  roughly  equivalent  to  a  quarter  of 
Africa's total annual fisheries exports. 

To the extent that IUU activities are replaced by legal ones, income from landing fees, licence 
fees  taxes  and  other  levies  would  increase.  Significant  positive  impacts  on  other  economic 
activities  upstream/downstream  are  to  be  expected.  This  would  then  positively  contribute  to 
GNP,  both  to  private  operators  and to  Government  income.  Furthermore,  it  will  contribute  to 
sustainable livelihoods (in terms of contribution to food security and per capita consumption of 
fish proteins). 

These  positive  economic  impacts  are  expected  to  be  particularly  important  for  developing 
countries for which export of fish products to the EU account are an important component of 
their  balance  of  payments.  Examples  of  these  countries  are  Senegal,  Mauritania,  Tanzania, 
Kenya, Maldives or Seychelles54 . 

In the end, compliance with the certification scheme and other measures proposed in Option 4 
could  be  a  source  of  significant  competitive  advantage  between  nations  and  could  result  in 
additional price increases for certified fish. 

This of course presumes that IUU activities are effectively reduced. If instead, IUU products are 
simply derived to other markets, the net, positive effect on developing countries of action by the 
EU will be small.  

As will be explained below, positive effects depend crucially on whether governments will take 
the necessary actions to comply with the new EU requirements, in particular by increasing their 
own MCS activities, as required in particular by the certification scheme. Enforcement is very 

54 

See  Study  "Impact  of  trade  measures  envisaged  in  the  IUU  package  under  elaboration  within  the 
Commission", Oceanic Development (May 2007), 2003/FISH/02, p. 62. 

EN 

63 

   EN 

 
                                                 
expensive and will compete with other pressing needs for the attribution of resources from the 
national budgets.  

On  the  positive  side,  this  fact,  combined  with  specific  measures  that  could  be  taken  against 
flags of non compliance, would mean that the attractiveness of those flags would in general be 
severely  reduced  from  the  point  of  view  of  IUU  operators.  Maybe  some  of  them  (or  their 
representatives)  would  further  engage  in  criminal  activities  to  put  in  place  fake  certification 
schemes. However, if they do so, the costs for IUU operators will likely increase, in accordance 
with  the  perceived  value  of  the  certification  scheme  as  a  guarantee  of  access  to  the  lucrative 
Community market.  

There  would  be  cases,  however,  where  even  if  Governments  would  like  to  put  in  place  the 
necessary means and procedures to comply with the certification scheme, they will not be able 
to do so. 

It would be then necessary to provide assistance to them. In that respect, the measure of Option 
4 which proposes to use all available instruments (FPAs, development, regional approach ) to 
contribute  to  better  control  and  management  of  maritime  waters  under  jurisdiction  of  those 
States, should necessarily be part of the anti-IUU package. 

As  indicated  above,  for  (more)  developed  countries,  complying  with  the  certification  scheme 
could be cost-ineffective. If they are not truly interested in making the necessary effort to abide 
by the certification scheme, exports of fish products from the fishing sector of those countries 
into the Community will be penalised.  

Finally, the certification scheme creates a potential for commercial conflict with third countries. 
Many people and governments in these countries could consider the certification scheme as a 
classic  non-tariff  trade  barrier  unilaterally  imposed  by  the  Community  to  protect  its  market 
from third country imports.  

It is difficult to anticipate the risk of a serious commercial incident. However, it is important to 
have  a  package  which  is  as  complete  as  possible  to  cover  all  possible  angles  of  attack  to  the 
IUU  problem,  also  including  measures  that  apply  to  Community  nationals  and  mechanisms 
which  could  mitigate  the  impact  of  the  certification  scheme.  In  this  respect,  the  alert  system 
could be very important. There are already similar procedures in place dealing with food safety 
hazards55 or rules of origin.  

4.2.3. 

Specific economic impacts on processors/exporters and on fishermen from developing 
countries 

Developing  countries  have  a  51  %  share  of  the  global  fish  export  destined  for  human 
consumption  (2004).  ACP  countries  represent  nowadays  the  most  important  supplier  of 
fisheries  products  to  the  Community:  the  value  of  the  importations  from  those  countries 
amounted to nearly 2 billion € in 2005, worth 14% of all imports into the Community. Other 
countries like China, Morocco, Thailand, Ecuador, India or Brazil featured in 2005 in the list of 
the top ten suppliers of the Community market for fisheries products. 

Fishermen and processors/exporters in developing nations could be the main beneficiaries of a 
situation  in  which  IUU  activities  get  significantly  reduced.  Compliance  with  the  Community 

55 

Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). 

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64 

   EN 

 
                                                 
future  scheme  as  described  in  Option  4  will  give  their  products  an  easier  access  to  the 
Community and could also put them in a position to get better prices for their certified products.  

However,  the  materialisation  of  these  benefits  crucially  depends  on  whether  the  relevant 
governments will put in place the means to ensure continued compliance with the package in 
Option 4, in particular with the certification scheme. If they do not, either because of  lack of 
resources or of willingness, the expected benefits could turn into significant negative effects for 
their domestic fishermen, processors and exporters. 

In  that  case,  the  certification  scheme  could  have  severe  economic  impacts  on  some  third 
countries. 

As it will apply to all species – even to those for which there are not suspicions of significant 
IUU catches – and countries, its effects risk being negatively significant for exporters in some 
developing  nations  for  which  the  Community  market  is  very  important.  Not  only  for  those 
exporting  to  the  Community  directly,  but  also  for  those  which  do  that  indirectly,  through 
processing  in  intermediate  countries.  This  will  affect  particularly  exporters  from  African 
countries  suffering  from  significant  IUU  activities  by  foreign  fleets  in  their  respective  EEZs. 
The  persistence  of  IUU  activities  can  be  seen  as  an  indicator  that  Governments  in  these 
countries do not have the means to eradicate IUU fishing and hence, are unlikely to be able to 
comply properly with the certification system. 

The  certification  will  be  an  additional  requirement  fish  products  will  need  to  comply  with  to 
enter  the  Community  market.  It  will  need  to  be  added  to  existing  phyto-sanitary  and  quality 
requirements. In cases where the flag state is not able to  certify the origin, products exported 
from that country will be unable to access the Community markets. As a result, local exporters 
will be forced to find alternative markets. However, the Community, Japan and the US account 
for two thirds of all fish consumed in the world. Exports of fish products by African countries 
to  the  US  are  negligible  and  Japan  does  not  seem  to  be  as  significant  a  destination  as  the 
Community for these products.  

Hence, exclusion from the Community market would severely impact some of these countries. 
These  negative  economic  impacts  will  affect  not  only  processing,  marketing  and  distribution 
activities.  Auxiliary  services  driven  by  fish  trade  would  also  be  very  negatively  affected  and 
risk having significant social consequences. Access to foreign currency will also be reduced. In 
summary, they run the risk of getting progressively disconnected from the global market. 

Being  at  the  end  of  the  chain,  the  negative  effects  described  above  for  processors/exporters 
would  get  amplified  as  regards  fishermen  in  developing  countries,  in  particular  for  artisanal 
fishermen. In order to survive, it is not to be excluded that they would engage on further IUU 
activities  and/or  over  fishing.  This  is,  however,  more  theoretical  than  practical  as  artisanal 
fisheries play a negligible role on exports markets. 

It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  impact  of  the  option  4  for  developing  countries  may  vary 
sensibly depending on the States concerned.  

Developing  countries  which  have  already  developed  policies  and  means  of  control  over  their 
waters and fishing vessels flying  their flags and are committed to pursue those efforts should 
not face  substantial difficulties  in demonstrating their ability to fight against IUU fishing and 
getting their products certified. This should be particularly true for those States whose exports 
mostly  stem  from  their  local  fishing  fleet  (the activities  of  which  are  easier  to  monitor).  This 

EN 

65 

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would also be the case for countries specialised in  the processing of fisheries products  which 
are able to trace back their origins. New compliance costs may have to be covered in the short 
term. Those costs should be outweighed in the long run by the advantages resulting from their 
compliance with the Community rules, which would ensure a reduction of IUU fishing in their 
waters  and  a  sound  access  to  the  Community  market  for  their  local  fleet;  this  could  even 
encourage foreign fleets operating legally to register their vessels in States which have made the 
necessary efforts to comply with the Community obligations.  

The measures under consideration by the Commission would have a more negative impact on 
third  States  exporting  fish  products  to  the  Community  which  do  not  maintain  any  kind  of 
control over their fishing fleets and run open registers to attract foreign vessels, or which attract 
fish products for processing purposes without any control as to their legality. This represents a 
fairly  limited number  of  developing  countries. In  most  cases,  those  States  can  be  qualified  as 
hosting "Flags of non compliance". Vessels able to export their products to the Community and 
flying  those  flags  are  often  owned  by  foreign  companies  with  limited  or  no  contact  with  the 
Flag State. The economic advantages generated to the benefit of the local economy from those 
vessels  are  often  restricted  to  a  few  thousands  Euros,  representing  the  fees  paid  for  the 
registration of the vessels.  

The  Community  measures  may  lead  long  distant  fishing  vessels  to  de-register  and  try  to  find 
another shelter to pursue their activities.  This would generally not represent a significant loss 
for  the  Flag  State  concerned,  insofar  as  those  vessels  are  operated  by  foreign  companies.  In 
most  cases,  the  local  fleets  in  such  countries  do  not  export  fisheries  products  into  the 
Community. If this were the case, they would indeed be penalized due to the poor performance 
of  their  Flag  States  against  illegal  fishing.  The  Community  measures  may  then  result  in 
pressure from the local fishing sector against public authorities, asking them to effectively enact 
measures to address the IUU fishing problem. In many cases, the continuation of IUU fishing in 
developing countries is closely linked to poor governance and such pressure may contribute to 
put this problem on the front scene. 

It should be underlined that a large number of developing countries are Parties to international 
conventions  on  conservation  and  management  of  fisheries  resources,  as  well  as  to  some 
RFMOs.  There  is  nothing  more  in  the  provisions  under  the  certification  scheme  than  a 
requirement  that  those  international  standards  are  effectively  implemented.  In  addition,  the 
assistance  granted  to  those  countries  by  the  Community  under  its  fisheries  and  development 
policies  will  be  confirmed  and  will  contribute  to  mitigate  the  costs  resulting  from  the  new 
certification  scheme.  Finally,  the  assessment  by  the  Community  will  take  the  situation  of  the 
various States concerned into consideration when deciding on its trade policy towards each of 
them.  

To a certain extent, the measures proposed bear similarities with the regime put in place at the 
beginning of the 1990's by the Community with respect to the health requirements applying to 
fishery products imported into the Community56. Nearly 90 countries are currently considered 
by  the  Commission  as  fulfilling  those  health  requirements,  which  are  set  out  by  the 
Community57.  This  demonstrates  that  the  vast  majority  of  our  international  trade  partners, 

56 

57 

Cf. Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 laying down the health conditions for the production 
and placing on the market of fishery products (OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 15). 
Cf. Commission Decision 97/296/EC of 22 April 1997 drawing up the list of third countries from which 
the import of fishery products is authorized for human consumption (OJ L 122, 14.5.1997, p. 21), as lastly 
amended via Commission Decision 2006/200/EC of 22 February 2006. 

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including many developing countries, have been able to put in place the necessary means and 
structures  to  comply  with  Community  health  standards  for  fisheries  products  in  view  of  their 
exportation into the Community. A similar outcome could be expected as to the respect by the 
same countries of Community requirements relating to international norms on conservation and 
management of fisheries resources. 

As regards suspected IUU vessels, the prohibition to land and obtain products and services will 
certainly increase their operating costs and probably will also reduce their expected revenues. 
As any landings will be illegal, operators involved in such landings will pay less for the fish, 
according to their perceived risk of being caught.  

4.2.4. 

Social impacts of Option 4 

The elimination or significant reduction of IUU activities resulting from Option 4 will destroy 
employments  on  board  vessels  carrying  out  IUU  fishing  and  probably  on  other  IUU-related 
activities  down  the  production  and  distribution  chain.  IUU  is  often  associated  with  very  poor 
labour,  social  and  safety  conditions,  and  it  is  expected  that  at  least  part  of  the  losses  will  be 
replaced by additional employments created in legal activities in particular in third countries. 

Regarding, EU fishermen, as indicated above, some IUU-related employments will be lost, but 
they are impossible to quantify. Generally speaking, to the extent that crew share will increase, 
the income of legal fishermen will also increase, in particular for fishermen working in fleets 
catching  species  affected  by  IUU.  It  is  not  expected  that  significant  numbers  of  new 
employments  will  be  created  because  quotas  and  effort  limitations  will  put  a  limit  to  such 
increases.  The  measures  will  help  safeguard  employments  on  board  EU  fleets  which  target 
species  particularly  hit  by  IUU  fishing  (notably  tuna  and  cod),  via  the  elimination  of 
competitors  using  illegal  and  unfair  practices.  The  attractiveness  of  the  sector  for  new 
generations of workers may also increase. It should be underlined that, to an extent which can 
be  very  important  in  some  segments  of  the  Community  fleet  (notably  the  long  distant  fleet), 
people employed on board Community fishing vessels are not Community nationals but come 
from developing countries. 

Some employment losses could be felt also to the extent that small, vulnerable EU processors 
would leave the industry. However, it is not expected that such losses would be very significant 
and could at least partially be compensated by job creation in other processors. The Community 
processing industries depending on the supply by Community fleets of species like tuna or cod 
should also benefit from the measure, which should have a positive effect on employees of the 
facilities concerned. 

The  population  in  the  Community  dependent  on  tuna  activity  is  estimated  to  amount  to 
approximately 85 000 persons (direct and indirect jobs), and 55 000 in Spain alone58.  

As indicated above, port services in some very concrete EU ports could be negatively affected. 
Some job losses could then be expected, but most likely they would be negligible. 

As  regards  third  countries,  the  net  effect  of  the  elimination  or  significant  reduction  of  IUU 
activities in their waters will be very positive in terms of direct employment in fisheries and in 
indirect employment in related activities.  

58 

Océanic  Développement,  Poséidon  Aquatic  Resources  Management  Ltd  and  Megapesca  Lda  (2005) 
"Study on the European tuna sector", p. 261. 

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67 

   EN 

 
                                                 
However,  for  countries  which  do  not  have  the  willingness  or  the  means  to  put  in  place  the 
mechanisms required to comply with the package in Option 4 severe job losses could happen all 
along  the  national  production  and  distribution  chain.  The  second  category  of  countries  is 
particularly  worrying  as  many  of  them  are  significantly  dependent  from  fishing.  As  indicated 
above,  all  available  instruments  should  be  used  to  help  them  put  in  place  the  required 
mechanisms and so compensate or at least attenuate these potential negative impacts. 

4.3. 

Environmental impact 

Through  the  combination  of  measures  at  international,  regional  and  Community  levels,  this 
option  is  the  most  efficient  one  for  addressing  the  different  components  of  IUU  fishing.  It 
would indeed cover all stocks, whether in Community waters, on the high seas or in the EEZs 
of  third  States.  It  will  therefore  be  able  to  mitigate  the  negative  impacts  of  IUU  fishing  on 
fisheries resources and on the marine environment. This should result in a reduction of fishing 
pressure  benefiting  especially  fish  stocks  in  need  of  recovery.  The  damages  caused  to  fragile 
marine  ecosystems  as  well  as  to  species  caught  as  by  catches  through  prohibited  techniques 
should also be reduced. 

This  approach  should  strengthen  the  management  and  conservation  regime  in  place  or  under 
development in all areas (under the auspices of RFMOs for high seas zones, or by coastal States 
for  EEZs).  A  reduction  of  IUU  fishing  would  indeed  reinforce  the  effectiveness  of  those 
measures, as this is usually a major cause for undermining their proper functioning. Moreover, 
the data collected via the fishing sector (for example on levels of catches for a given fishery) for 
the purpose of devising fisheries management measures should be more accurate with the end 
of  illegal  fishing,  and  should  provide  sounder  a  basis  for  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the 
stocks.  

This  option  should  entail  real  progress  in  the  reduction  of  the  important  damages  caused  by 
illegal operators in the waters of developing countries. The combination of Community bilateral 
or sub regional efforts to contribute to the establishment of regimes designed to improve MCS 
capacities  in  those  countries  with  the  certification  scheme  should  result  in  decrease  of  IUU 
fishing there. It should in the first place benefit Sub-Saharan African States, where a large part 
of IUU fishing is used to supply the Community market. 

4.4. 

Impact on the Community trade obligations and position 

Some  of  the  measures  promoted  under  this  option  (in  particular  the  certification  scheme 
applying  to  importation  of  fisheries  products;  trade  measures  like  import  bans  targeting 
fisheries  products  from  given  States  or  vessels,  or  prohibition  for  Community  operators  to 
maintain  trade  relations  with  those  identified  States  or  vessels;  provisions  on  access  to  ports) 
should be assessed against the international trade obligations agreed by the Community within 
the WTO.  

Similar measures have already been adopted within RFMOs. They have never been challenged 
before  the  WTO.  One  important  difference  is  that  those  measures  were  enacted  within  a 
multilateral context (RFMOs) while the Community would envisage, under option 4, to adopt 
unilateral measures. 

In order for such measures to be deemed compatible with WTO requirements, the Community 
would  need  in  the  first  place  to  follow  a  fair  and  transparent  procedure  in  respect  of  the 
authorities or operators targeted. This would in particular require that the relevant authorities of 

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the  third  countries  are  given  the  possibility  to  be  heard  on  the  facts  incriminated  before  any 
measure could be tabled by the Community. As to the content of the measures, the Community 
would have to demonstrate that they are not discriminatory against imported products or foreign 
services  suppliers,  are  justified  by  legitimate  policy  objectives  (like  the  conservation  of 
exhaustible natural resources ), are necessary and are not disguised restriction on trade.  

A  possible  legal  basis  for  the  adoption  by  the  Community  of  such  trade  measures  would  be 
Article XX(g) of the GATT agreement, which provides that: 

"Subject  to  the  requirement  that  such  measures  are  not  applied  in  a  manner  which  would 
constitute  a  means  of  arbitrary  or  unjustifiable  discrimination  between  countries  where  the 
same  conditions  prevail,  or  a  disguised  restriction  on  international  trade,  nothing  in  this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures (…) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". 

The case law of the WTO relating to those provisions should be considered by the Community, 
in particular the decisions on the two so-called "Tuna-Dolphin" (1991 and 1994) and "Shrimp-
Turtle" (1998 and 2000) cases.  

Against this background, one key element relates notably to the fact that the Community should 
be able to show that the regime applying to Community fishing operators is at least as strict as 
the  conditions  which  would  be  applied  to  operators  from  third  countries.  In  that  regard,  the 
question  of  the  level  of  compliance  of  Community  operators  with  the  rules  of  the  CFP  is  of 
crucial importance. Another important prerequisite to justify a unilateral Community initiative 
would be to clearly base it on the international commitments of the Community.  

Any measure by the Community would therefore have to be duly motivated in order to fulfil all 
those criteria. 

Beyond the question of the WTO-compatibility of unilateral trade measures by the Community, 
it can not be completely excluded that they give rise to the adoption of trade counter measures 
by  the  public  authorities  of  a  third  State  affected.  Such  action  might  harm  the  commercial 
relations of the Community.  

4.5. 

Impact on RFMOs and international position of the Community 

Posing  the  principle  that  the  Community  could  act  unilaterally  might  also  be  perceived  as  a 
departure from the traditional multilateral approach defended by the Community, undermining 
global  efforts  to  improve  the  regulation  of  fishing  activities  and  combat  IUU  fishing.  The 
rationale underpinning option 4 is however that the Community should rely in the first place on 
multilateral action (in particular within RFMOs); unilateral measures are not intended to replace 
this principle but should only be used in case multilateral solutions prove insufficient to address 
serious manifestations of IUU fishing. The Community measures might actually serve as useful 
precedents and be taken up by other international partners or organisations.  

In addition, the certification schemes established by RFMOs in relation to the trade of certain 
fish species should normally be considered as equivalent to the Community general certification 
scheme. 

EN 

69 

   EN 

 
4.6. 

Contribution to a simplification of the Community framework derived from the 
measures agreed by RFMOs 

Beyond the creation of new possibilities for action by the Community, this option also intends 
to  render  more  coherent  and  efficient  the  implementation  within  the  Community  of  measures 
against  IUU  fishing  decided  by  RFMOs.  After  their  adoption,  those  provisions  need  to  be 
implemented into the Community. In the current system, those measures are transposed into EC 
law  by  the  Council  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  via  regular  amendments  to  existing  regulations 
specific  for  each  RFMO  or  each  type  of  RFMOs.  This  results  in  a  proliferation  of  different 
regulations  and  a  very  complex  and  changing  regulatory  environment,  where  rules  differ  for 
Community operators depending on its location. 

The solution proposed under option 4 consists in harmonizing and generalizing the application 
of  the  most  far-reaching  measures  adopted  within  one  RFMO  to  all  Community  operators 
present in RFMOs areas. This would for example relates to provisions on sightings of fishing 
vessels suspected of carrying out IUU fishing (which have been initially developed within tuna 
RFMOs like ICCAT), provisions on nationals engaged in or supporting IUU fishing in relation 
with a fishing vessel flying the flag of a third State (initially created within the CCAMLR) or 
provisions on sanctions (which have been introduced within NAFO). 

This  harmonization  should  result  in  a  simpler  framework  for  the  fishing  sector  and  national 
administrations in charge of control of fishing activities. It would entail the repeal of numerous 
provisions of the existing framework and contributes to the efforts for better regulation within 
the Common Fisheries Policy. 

4.7. 

Administrative costs 

The main administrative costs generated by this option would relate to the establishment of a 
Community certification scheme applying to all imports of fisheries products. 

Within the Community, the costs will be supported by the marketing and processing industry 
trading  imported  products,  as  well  as  by  public  authorities  in  charge  of  controlling  the 
importation of goods into the Community. 

Importers  would  have  to  check  that  the  products  supplied  are  accompanied  by  the  certificate 
and  that  information  contained  in  this  certificate  is  accurate.  Formally,  this  would  only 
represent  the  addition  of  one  document  to  all  documents  already  required  for  importation 
operations  (certificate  for  health  conditions,  certificate  relating  to  the  origins  of  the  product, 
invoices,  bank  documents,  etc).  The  presentation  of  this  document  would  become  part  of  the 
normal  business  relationships  between  exporters  and  importers  and  not  trigger  particularly 
demanding tasks. 

For Member’s State control authorities, this new formality would also imply the verification of 
the presence of the certificate at the Inspection Border Posts, its coherence with other the other 
documents  required,  physical  checks  on  some  of  the  consignments  and,  in  some  cases,  the 
conduct of investigations a posteriori to cross check the conformity of the information provided 
in the certificate with other sources. The collaboration between authorities in charge of customs 
and  fisheries  will  be  instrumental  for  the  good  functioning  of  the  system.  Specific  training 
would have to be provided to the operational services. 

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The  target  group  would  be  the  Community  processing  and  marketing  industry.  It  is  assessed 
that it comprises roughly 6000 firms (50% being SMEs) with a turnover of 18 billion €. Spain, 
France, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, Poland and Germany are the countries where such 
firms are the most active.  

The operation would have to be conducted at each arrival a Community Inspection Border Post 
of  a  consignment  of  fisheries  products.  Taking  account  of  the  overall  volume  of  fisheries 
products  imported  each  year  into  the  Community  (4,5  million  tons)  and  the  mode  of 
transportation  (by  containers  for  the  vast  majority),  it  has  been  assessed  that  this  represents 
roughly 300 000 operations each year.  

The overall costs would be composed essentially by labour costs (i.e. time devoted to ensure the 
running of the system). No specific investments would be required. 

Taking account of the estimated time required to perform the  checks, the  average labour cost 
per hour and the number of operations, it is estimated that the overall administrative costs will 
amount  to  approximately  4  Million  €.  This  would  be  mainly  supported  by  the  Community 
marketing  and  processing  industry  (3  Million  €);  compared  to  the  size  and  turnover  of  the 
sector, this would represent a negligible amount (500 € per firm). The costs for public national 
administrations will represent 1 Million €, to be distributed within the 4000 Inspection Border 
Posts across the Community. 

The alert system will anyway contribute to rationalize the additional costs as it will assist the 
authorities to focus their verifications and the operators in detecting in advance possible risky 
products. 

Costs  generated  for  economic  operators  and  public  authorities  outside  the  Community  are 
difficult  to  assess,  due  to  the  diversity  of  situation  and  organisation  in  third  States  exporting 
fisheries products into the Community. For economic operators, the costs will result in the need 
to have their products certified by their national administrations. For those administrations, new 
mechanisms would have to be put in place to guarantee the legality of the catches and deliver in 
a timely manner this confirmation. For some countries, and notably some developing countries, 
this may imply important administrative reorganisations, with a view to improving their control 
system in particular. 

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SECTION 6:  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

The table below presents the efficiency of the various options with respect to their impact on 
the reduction of IUU fishing. To this end, their relevance is assessed against the three specific 
objectives  identified  in  section  3  which  should  be  reached  by  the  Community  with  a  view  to 
substantially improving its contribution to a reduction of IUU fishing. 

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Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Objectives 

Objective 1 

Reduce  the  vulnerability  of 
the  Community  market 
to 
imports  of  fisheries  products 
stemming from IUU fishing. 

Better 
implementation  of 
current  framework  within 
the  EC,  without  regulatory 
initiatives. 

Focus  on 
fishing  activities 
outside  the  EC,  through  action 
at international level and within 
RFMOs. 

Case  by  case  approach  focused  on 
fish stocks subject to important levels 
of IUU fishing. 

New  comprehensive  initiative  completing 
the  current  framework  and  ensuring  better 
compliance with applicable rules. 

Very  limited  impact  due  to 
the  reduced  efficiency  of 
certification 
private 
schemes. 

achieved 

Positive  but  limited  impact  as 
measures  will  depend  on 
by 
progress 
multilateral 
organisations, 
where  the  adoption  of  trade 
measures  and  sanctions  often 
serious 
against 
comes  up 
difficulties or delays. 

Positive  impact  on  stocks  subject  to 
specific 
(notably 
measures 
certification schemes), but high risks 
of  fraud  and  of  transfer  of  IUU 
fishing  to  stocks  not  covered.  This 
option  is  difficult  to  implement  in 
respect  of  IUU  fishing  in  waters  of 
developing States. 

Positive  impact  as  the  certification  scheme 
applying  to  all  imports  of fisheries products 
and  harmonized  Port  State  measures  should 
result  in  effectively  closing  the doors of  the 
Community  market  to  imports  of  fisheries 
products stemming from IUU fishing. 

Objective 2 

No impact. 

Improve 
identification  and 
sanction of vessels and States 
engaged in or supporting IUU 
fishing 
the 
Community. 

outside 

Objective 3 

Increase  compliance  with  the 
rules 
the  Common 
of 
Fisheries Policy. 

Overall 
reduction of IUU fishing. 

impact 

on 

left 

impact 

Positive 
but 
shortcomings  remain  with 
to 
wide  discretion 
Member  States  to  improve 
the  situation  and  variety  of 
sanctions pronounced within 
the  Community  (absence  of 
level playing field). 

out 

leave 

Limited impact as the option 
would 
the 
international  and  market-
related 
the 
aspect 
problem  and  only  address 
only  partly  its  Community 
dimension. 

of 

This  option  does  not  solve  the 
problem  posed  by  IUU  fishing 
developing 
of 
in  waters 
countries. 

Limited 
selective 
impact  as  a 
approach does not allow to target all 
actors responsible for IUU fishing. 

Positive  impact  with  combination  of  action 
within  RFMOs  and  possibility  to  enact 
unilateral measures against States or vessels 
if RFMOs action is insufficient. 

the  CFP 

Impact  limited  to  compliance 
with 
that 
internationally 
implement 
agreed 
and 
conservation 
management measures. 

rules 

Positive  impact  on  stocks  subject  to 
specific measures, but risk of transfer 
of IUU fishing to stocks not covered. 

to 

control 

improve 

Positive  impact  with  combination  of  strong 
commitment 
and 
enforcement within the Community and new 
regime  on  harmonized  maximum  levels  of 
sanctions  across 
the  Community  which 
would  address  one  of  the  most  tangible 
shortcoming of the current situation. 

Limited  impact  as  the  option 
relies  on  international  action, 
which  on  its  own  does  not 
deliver  results  efficient  and 
internal 
rapid  enough.  The 
aspect  of  the  IUU  problem  is 
not addressed either. 

The  impact  would  be  positive  but 
globally insufficient due to its lack of 
comprehensiveness: 
selective 
approach  is  difficult  to  put  in  place 
and does not allow to address all the 
manifestation of IUU fishing. 

a 

Positive  impact  as  this  option  covers  in  a 
comprehensive  manner  all  loopholes  of  the 
current Community system and provides for 
a  consistent  approach  on  all  facets  of  the 
problem. 

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The second table compares, in line with a cost-benefits analysis, the advantages and drawbacks of each option, taking into account the performance of 
each of them compared to the overall objective for reducing IUU fishing, and their associated costs. 

Options  

Option 1 

implementation 

Better 
framework  within 
regulatory initiatives. 

of 

current 
the  EC,  without 

Advantages  

Drawbacks 

-  demonstrates  commitment  of  the  Community  to  tackle  illegal 
fishing within the Community and reinforce the CFP framework; 

-  limited  impact  on  a  reduction  of  the  overall  level  of  IUU  fishing 
and on its associated socio-economic and environmental damages. 

- does not require the adoption of additional regulatory measures 
which would come in addition to the current framework. 

-  depends  to  a  large  extant  on  the  willingness  of  Member  States  to 
consider  enforcement  of  CFP  rules  as  high  priority  and  devote 
adequate  means  and  resources  to  this  end  and  does  not  bring  an 
answer  to  the  absence  of  level  playing  field  across  the  Community 
for sanctions. 

Option 2 

Focus  on  fishing  activities  outside  the 
EC, through action at international level 
and within RFMOs. 

-  promotes  multilateral  solutions  adapted  to  the  international 
nature  of  IUU  fishing,  which  corresponds  to  the  Community 
commitment for international governance of the oceans; 

- does not require the adoption of additional regulatory measures 
which would come in addition to the current framework. 

-  limited  impact  for  a  reduction  of  the  overall  level  of  IUU  fishing 
and on its associated socio-economic and environmental damages. 

-  efforts  against  IUU  fishing  depends  on  willingness  of  EC 
international partners to move forward. 

Option 3 

Case  by  case  approach  focused  on  fish 
stocks  subject  to  important  levels  of 
IUU fishing. 

- promotes solutions adapted to the various manifestations of IUU 
fishing; 

-  does  not  rely  on  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  and  requires 
initiatives only when this is justified by the specific features of a 
fishery. 

Option 4 

comprehensive 

New 
completing  current 
ensuring 
applicable rules. 

better 

initiative 
framework  and 
compliance  with 

-  this  option  provides  the  most  efficient  solution  against  IUU 
fishing,  due  to  its  comprehensive  approach  which  allows  the 
Community to meet the most important challenges it is facing to 
reduce IUU fishing;  

-  generalization  of  measures  adopted  within  RFMOs  contributes 
to simplification of current legislation. 

- lack of comprehensiveness seriously undermines the efficiency of a 
selective  approach  against  IUU  fishing  and  its  associated  socio-
economic and environmental damages. 

- imply the adoption of numerous different regulatory instruments. 

-  important  compliance  costs  for  economic  operators  and  EC  and 
third  countries  control  authorities  who  would  need  to  check 
systematically  whether  fisheries  products  are  subject  to  specific 
measures or not, as well as the compliance with those measures.  

-  non  negligible  compliance  costs  for  third  countries  which  would 
need  to  respect  requirements  for  imports  of  fisheries  products  into 
the EC; 

- requires a new important regulatory instrument.  
-  Community  action  might  be  perceived  as  a  departure  from 
traditional multilateral approach to IUU fishing; 

-  important  resistance  expected  from  Member  States  to  engage  on 
discussions on penal matters in the fisheries field. 

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As illustrated by the two tables, a comparison between all options demonstrates that option 4 
supports  the  most  efficient  strategy  for  the  future  Community  policy  against  IUU  fishing. 
Being  the  most  ambitious,  this  option  is  also  very  demanding  and  would  trigger  non 
negligible costs. 

The first and second options rely too much on a sectoral approach to IUU fishing (internal or 
external).  Even  combined,  they  would  not  bring  a  sufficient  reply  to  the  urgency  of  the 
problem, as well as to the most serious problems which harm the current system, namely the 
vulnerability  of  the  Community  market  against  the  importation  of  IUU  products  and  the 
persistence  of  fishing  activities  by  vessels  flying  flags  of  non  compliance.  Those  options 
would  simply  mean  that  the  Community  places  more  emphasis  on  the  need  to  fight  against 
IUU  fishing,  but  without  putting  in  place  the  instruments  required to  this  end.  There  is  real 
risk  that  those  options  only  result  in  declarations  of  good  will,  do  not  entail  substantial 
changes and solely perpetuate the status quo. 

The cost of implementing those two options would be limited. It may trigger an increase in 
means and resources devoted by Member States to control and inspection activities, but this 
remains uncertain as it will depend on their readiness to do so. The options should not result 
in additional regulatory prescriptions defined at Community level, as it would not require new 
regulation. 

The third option (case-by case approach) would not address the problem comprehensively 
either. It may appear as a proportionate solution to the various manifestations of IUU fishing 
and difficulties created for the Community, and could provide real progress with respect to the 
stocks  to  which  it  is  applied.  The  changing  and  clandestine  nature  of  the  IUU  phenomenon 
renders however its efficiency uncertain. There is a high risk that this option delivers solutions 
which  are  no  more  adapted  to  the  actual  problem  by  the  time  of  their  adoption,  and  finally 
misses the real targets. In particular, the difficulty to transpose this approach to IUU fishing in 
waters of developing countries is a serious weakness.  

This option would not be cost-free. Its implementation would translate into the adoption of a 
set of regulatory instruments specific to each of the situations to be covered. This would result 
in the creation of a complex and possibly growing regulatory environment. In addition, costs 
for  compliance  would  be  high,  and,  in  respect  to  the  specific  import  certification  schemes 
applying  to  a  limited  number  of  species,  possibly  even  higher  than  the  costs  of  a  general 
certification scheme applying to imports of all fisheries products (as advocated in option 4). 
For  the  fishing  industry  (notably  trade  and  processing  industry)  as  well  as  for  control 
authorities  (within  and  outside  the  Community),  this  would  imply  systematic  checks  to 
determine  if  fisheries  products  to  be  imported  need  to  be  certified  or  are  exempt  from  this 
obligation.  Incentives  to  circumvent  those  selective  measures  would  be  important,  and  their 
efficiency  therefore  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  increased  scrutiny  by  public  authorities  in 
charge of control, which is also costly. 

The efficiency of the fourth option lies in its comprehensive coverage of all the challenges 
posed by IUU fishing to the Community. Through a combination of ambitious measures, this 
option  provides  appropriate  answers  to  all  those  challenges.  Contrary  to  all  other  three 
options, it does not leave important loopholes in place.  

The  implementation  of  option  4  would  be  demanding  and  would  require  considerable 
changes.  It  implies  in  the  first  place  that  the  Community  adopts  a  substantial  regulatory 

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instrument. It would also generate new tasks  and costs, which should however be mitigated 
through various mechanisms.  

The establishment of a general certification scheme applying to all imports has been assessed 
to entail administrative costs of around 4 million € (cf. annex on this point), which would be 
mainly supported by the Community processing and trading sector. Compared to the size of 
the  sector,  those  costs  are  limited.  In  addition,  the  setting  up  of  a  Community  alert  system 
designed to warn operators and control authorities as to the risk associated with the trade of 
products  from  identified  countries  or  operators  should  allow  them  to  set  priorities  in  their 
control  and  purchase  policies,  and  thereby  avoid  that  they  operate  a  systematic  and  costly 
check  over  all  imported  products.  The  main  consequences  would  have  to  be  borne  by  third 
States  exporting  to  the  Community,  which  will  have  to  abide  by  its  new  import  standards. 
Some  developing  countries  may  face  real  difficulties  in  catching  up  with  those  standards. 
Here again, the approach defended in option 4 should permit to alleviate the costs generated, 
as the Community would clearly commit itself to intensify its efforts within its fisheries and 
development  policies  towards  those  coastal  developing  countries  wishing  to  reinforce  their 
capacities  for  management  and  control  of  their  waters.  This  should  greatly  improve  their 
ability to comply with the requirements from the certification scheme. 

The  possibility  for  the  Community  to  enact  unilateral  trade  measures  (certification  scheme, 
import ban) may also generate some risks. In the first place, such action may be challenged 
before  the  WTO  as  breaching  the  international  trade  obligations  of  the  Community.  In  that 
respect, one essential element is for the Community to be able to demonstrate that the level of 
compliance with international rules on fisheries conservation and management by Community 
fishermen is satisfactory. The adoption of the measures promoted within option 4 designed to 
apply to Community fishing operator are of great importance in that respect.  

The perception that the Community option to act unilaterally would weaken the multilateral 
framework (and in particular RFMOs) can not be totally excluded. It should however not be 
overstated, as the Community would continue to rely primarily on the multilateral approach 
and  only  foresee  to  develop  its  own  approach  in  well  delimitated  cases.  The  overall  future 
policy of the Community should actually serve as incentives for its international partners and 
regional organisations to step up their efforts against IUU fishing. 

Finally,  the  measures  proposed  to  improve  compliance  within  Community  waters  and  by 
Community  fishing  operators  might  come  up  against  the  reluctance  of  Member  States  to 
strengthen  their  control  and  inspection  policy  and  engage  into  the  possibility  that  levels  of 
sanctions  against  fisheries  offences  are  set  at  Community  level.  The  awareness  by  Member 
States of the imperative need for action and their vibrant calls for a vigorous policy against 
IUU fishing might however overcome those difficulties. 

The  expectations  are  high  that  the  Community  proposes  in  the  coming  months  an 
ambitious policy making a real difference in the fight against IUU fishing, which is one 
of the most serious environmental problems faced by the international community. The 
present impact assessment report shows that there is a possibility for the Community to 
adopt  a  comprehensive  and  far-reaching  approach  (option  4)  on  that  matter.  This 
strategy is not exempt from risk, but would actually be the only one commensurate with 
the scale of the problem. 

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SECTION  7:  HOW  COULD  FUTURE  MONITORING  AND  EVALUATION  BE 

ORGANISED? 

On the monitoring arrangements: 

The Commission will ensure that the Member States' compliance with obligations laid down 
in the "IUU package" is adequately monitored. 

Reporting obligations will provide information that can be used to check the extent to which 
the envisaged trade, control and enforcement measures have been adopted and implemented. 

The  Commission  will  inform  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  regularly  on  the 
implementation of the new initiative.  

1. 

TRADE MEASURES  

Benchmarks/indicators for assessing efficiency of the system: 

•  Number of certificates which are refused/number of operation and volume/value of imports 

not authorized/number of vessels which are refused access to ports; 

•  Number of notices issued under the alert system; 

•  Number of countries against which trade "sanctions" are implemented; 

•  Variation  of  trade  flows  of  fisheries  products  from  third  States  as  a  consequence  of  the 

entry into force of trade measures 

2. 

MEASURES  FOR  IDENTIFICATION  AND  SANCTION  OF  VESSELS  AND  STATES 
INVOLVED IN IUU ACTIVITIES 

2.1. 

Community action within RFMOs and towards developing States 

Benchmarks/indicators for assessing efficiency of the system: 

•  Extension  of  regulation  of  high  seas  areas  with  new  RFMOs,  or  of  new  species  within 

RFMOs; 

•  Adoption of new measures against IUU fishing within RFMOs (ex. trade measures); 

•  Implementation by RFMOs and Parties of existing measures in an efficient manner (for ex. 

effective use of black lists); 

•  Generalisation  at  Community  level  of  the  most  advanced  measures  against  IUU  fishing 

adopted within RFMOs; 

•  Full  integration  of  measures  agreed  within  the  Community  bilateral  fisheries  policy  or 
development policy designed to improve capacity of developing States to manage/monitor 
fishing activities in their EEZs; 

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•  Implementation of existing provisions within FPAs designed to fight against IUU fishing 
(for  ex.  rate  of  financial  use  in  reference  to  action  for  this  purpose  foreseen  in  the 
agreement; reality of implementation of the foreseen measures; assessment of the state of 
IUU fishing in the waters of those countries compared to situation before…); 

•  Number  of  FPAs  signed  compared  to  previous  kinds  of  bilateral  agreement  which  were 

focused on access to waters and did not contain specific anti-IUU measures; 

•  Number of areas covered by sub-regional approach on IUU fishing; 

•  Integration of IUU perspective in EPA approach. 

2.2. 

EC measures 

Benchmarks/indicators for assessing efficiency of the system: 

•  Effective establishment of Community lists of vessels and States (and timing for adoption), 

and number of vessels and States recorded on the lists; 

•  Number of vessels/States removed from the lists further to adequate action by third states 

(for ex. sanction by the Flag State, de-registration of the vessels concerned…); 

•  Number of action effectively implemented towards listed vessels/States (for ex. number of 
vessels  listed  which  have  been  refused  access  to  port  or  port  services,  number  of 
consignments  from  listed  States  which  have  been  barred  from  access  to  the  Community 
market at the Community border…); 

•  Member  States  with  adequate  policy  and  means  for  an  effective  enforcement  of 
Community  rules  and  sanctioning  those  who  carry  out  IUU  fishing  outside  the 
Community.  

3. 

COMPLIANCE WITHIN EC WATERS AND BY EC NATIONALS 

Benchmarks/indicators for assessing efficiency of the system: 

•  New  means  devoted  by  and/or  policy  carried  out  by  Member  States  for  the  control  of 

fishing activities in their waters and by their vessels and nationals; 

•  Change in national law of MS to incorporate new (harmonised and strengthened) levels of 

sanctions adopted at EC level for serious infringements against CFP rules; 

•  Data on average level of sanctions and number of sanctions pronounced by MS further to 
infringements  (trend  for  comparison  with  current  figures  from  annual 

serious 
communication); 

•  Data on the use of immediate enforcement measures (where/if available); 

•  Data on prosecution of nationals. 

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4. 

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE REGULATION 

Benchmarks/indicators for assessing efficiency of the system: 

•  estimation  of  level  of  IUU  fishing  occurring  within  and  outside  Community  water 

(comparison before and after implementation of the Regulation); 

•  state of fish stocks which are currently subject to IUU fishing; 

•  data  on  economic  situation  of  Community  fishing  industry  which  is  currently  facing 

competition from operators carrying out IUU fishing. 

On the evaluation arrangements:  

The Commission should undertake an intermediate evaluation of its new initiative within four 
years  of  its  adoption  assessing  the  extent  to  which  its  realisations,  results  and  impacts  on 
economy, society and environment are consistent with the objectives set. 

The  evaluation  results  will  be  used  for  decision-making  needs  on  the  future  of  and 
amendments to the regulatory framework if appropriate. 

The  Commission  will  communicate  the  evaluation  results  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council. 

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Annex 1 

Report on the public consultation 

on the initiatives envisaged by the Commission to improve the fight of the European 
Community against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing 

(15 January -12 March 2007) 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  European  Commission  set  out  as  a  priority  for  2007  to  strengthening  the  European 
Community's  effort  to  fight  against  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  (IUU)  fishing 
activities. 

The European Community adopted its own Action Plan against IUU fishing in 2002 as part of 
the Common Fisheries Policy59. 

In view of getting stakeholders' opinion on the opportunity to adopt and possible content of a 
new  Community  initiative  on  that  matter,  the  Commission  published  a  consultation  paper. 
The  stakeholders  were  questioned  about  the  appropriateness  of  engaging  in  such  a  new 
initiative, the relevance of adopting measures in nine fields of action, the concrete actions to 
be taken and their potential socio-economical impacts on the Community fishing industry as 
well as on third countries. 

The objective of this report is to present the main ideas, views and concerns arising from the 
contributions received and the report has no aim to asses the consultation process as such. 

2. 

CONSULTATION PROCEDURE 

The consultation paper prepared by DG Fisheries and Maritime Affaires to guide the debate 
presented a brief analysis of the problem and was structured on nine possible fields of action: 
(1) improve control of the legality of the activities of third country fishing vessels and of their 
catches  accessing  fishing  ports  of  the  European  Community,  (2)  improve  control  of 
compliance  with  conservation  and  management  measures  by  third  country  fishery  products 
imported into the Community by other means than fishing vessels, (3) close the EU market to 
IUU fisheries products, (4) address IUU activities carried out by nationals from the European 
Community  outside  its  territory,  (5)  improve  the  legal  means  to  ascertain  IUU  fishing 
activities, (6) introduce an efficient regime of penalties aiming to deter serious infringements 
to  fisheries  measures,  (7)  Improve  action  against  IUU  fishing  within  Regional  Fisheries 
Management Organisations, (8) support the policy and means of developing countries against 
IUU fishing and (9) increase synergies in the field of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance. 

The consultation paper was published on Europa web site (DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
and  Your  Voice  in  Europe)  on  the  15  January  2007.  Interested  parties  were  invited  to  send 
their  contributions  by  post  or  e-mail  by  12  March  2007.  Except  one,  all  the  respondents 
agreed to publish their contributions on the web site of DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs.  

Stakeholders  were  made  fully  aware  of  the  on-line  consultation  through  different  channels. 
Moreover, the consultation also included several meetings between the Commission services 
and key stakeholders: 

•  The  Advisory  and  Committee  on  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  (ACFA),  which  gathers  at 
Community level all stakeholders from the fishing sector (representatives of the extracting 

59 

Communication  from  the  Commission  "Community  action  plan  for  the  eradication  of  illegal, 
unreported  and  unregulated  fishing"  -  COM(2002)  180,  28.5.2002  -  and  Council  Conclusions  of 
7.6.2002. 

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sector,  the  processing  and  trade  industry,  trade  unions,  banks,  consumers,  NGOs..)  was 
invited to participate in the consultation and to disseminate the information to its members; 
the  staff  from  DG  FISH  took  part  in  several  working  group  meetings  and  discussed  the 
consultation paper to ACFA's members;  

•  Fisheries  National  administrations  were  gathered  in  a  seminar  organised  jointly  by  the 
Commission and Spanish Government in Santiago de Compostela (Spain) on the 6 and 7 
February 2007 to discuss the consultation paper;  

•  Non-governmental organisations were invited to a meeting held on the 28 February 2007 

in Brussels to express their views on the Commission's initiative; 

•  The upcoming consultation was announced to various stakeholders meetings (like sectoral 

groups, Regional Advisory Committees, parliamentary committees etc.); 

On  the  margins  of  this  consultation  process,  the  issue  was  discussed  during  an  informal 
meeting of Fisheries Ministers on 17th April 2007 in Luxembourg.  

The European Parliament passed a Resolution on that matter on 15 February 2007. This was 
preceded  by  discussions  between  the  Commission  and  the  EP’s  rapporteur  as  well  as  by 
participation of the Commission to meetings at the EP Fisheries Committee.  

3. 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

A total of 25 contributions were received, from a wide range of entities linked to the fisheries 
sector, notably the Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) with a wide 
representation  of  interests  at  Community  level,  European  and  national  fishing  organisations 
(France,  Spain,  Greece),  processing  industry,  retailers,  banks  and  consumers,  trade  unions, 
numerous NGOs, (specialised in environmental  and  development  matters)  public  authorities 
from Germany, United Kingdom, a Member of a national Parliament (Netherlands), as well 
public  authorities  from  Norway  and  the  World  Bank  and  one  company  specialised  in 
traceability. 

The initiative of the Commission received a very positive feedback from the participants of 
the consultation process. Almost all the contributions proved to have a good understanding of 
the IUU problematic and stressed the appropriateness for reinforcing the Community action in 
this  field.  They  generally  considered  as  the  relevant  the  field  of  actions  identified  by  the 
Commission in its consultation paper. 

One divergent point amongst the stakeholders related to the scope of the initiative. A part of 
the  fishing  extractive  sector  considered  that  the  initiative  should  not  cover  the  Community 
fishing fleet, which is subject to a comprehensive control regime, and can not be considered 
as  carrying  out  IUU  fishing.  Most  of  the  respondents  however  supported  the  idea  that  the 
initiative should be broad and encompass fishing activities by all fishing fleets (Community 
and non Community).  

There  were  also  concerns  expressed  by  some  stakeholders  about  the  problems  which  could 
result from the adoption by the Community of a uniform approach to the problem, ignoring 
the specificities of fisheries and regions affected by IUU fishing and producing unnecessary 

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new constraints. The fact that the Community should focus its future action toward the most 
serious breaches of fisheries law was underlined.  

Some  stakeholders  insisted  that  the  priority  should  relate  to  a  better  implementation  of  the 
existing  framework,  and  that  new  regulatory  initiatives  should  only  be  introduced  where 
needed. 

Another  important  concern  expressed  was  that  the  potential  negative  impacts  of  trade 
measures  on  developing  countries  and  the  need  for  an  in-depth  analysis  on  this  issue  was 
underlined. 

4. 

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION BY ISSUE 

4.1. 

Improve  control  of  third  country  vessels  and  their  catches  accessing  fishing 
ports of the European Community 

The  European  Community  is  encouraged  to  reinforce  its  Port  State  policy  with 
respect to landings of third countries. Reference is made to the need to implement the 
FAO  model  Port  State  scheme  endorsed  by  the  FAO  and  supports  future  work  at 
international  level  to  render  this  scheme  mandatory,  as  agreed  at  the  latest  FAO 
COFI meeting in March 2007.  

Most of respondents are in favour of denial of access to ports and port's facilities for 
vessels  flying  the  flag  of  a  state  blacklisted  by  any  country  and  regional  fisheries 
organisations or non-cooperating with the RFMOs or which have been identified as 
practising  or  supporting  IUU  fishing  activities.  There  is  a  general  support  for 
promoting  the  creation  of  "white"  and  "black"  lists  of  vessels  involved  in  IUU 
fishing as this measure is seen as an important control tool for Port authorities.  

Reinforcing the flag state responsibility represents a key role in fighting against IUU 
fishing but the point was made that the requirement to prove that the fish has been 
legally caught should also involve the vessel captain/owner, especially in developing 
countries where public authorities might not be in a position to certify the legality of 
the activities of their vessels.  

Some respondents advocated for the confiscation of fish products that are suspected 
to be illegal pending receipt of information from the Flag State or when fish products 
are proved to be illegal. 

This  option  raised  concerns  regarding  the  possible  bureaucratic  approaches  that 
might  obstruct  the  legal  activities.  Equally  the  need  for  a  good  communication 
network  among  control  services  of  Member  States  as  well  between  EU  and  third 
countries was stressed. 

4.2. 

Improve  control  of  compliance  of  conservation  and  management  measures  by 
third country fishery products transported by other means than fishing vessels 

The  majority  of  respondents  see  as  essential  that  the  approach  of  the  Community 
towards  import  of  fisheries  products  stemming  from  IUU  fishing  encompasses  all 
means  of  transport  (notably  products  in  containers  on  board  shipping  vessels,  but 

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also road and air transport), and is not limited to third country fishing vessels landing 
their catches in fishing ports. 

The  need  for  traceability  of  fish  products  from  the  point  of  capture  to  the  point  of 
consumption  was  emphasised.  While  a  large  part  of  respondents  found  the  idea  of 
catch certification interesting and a valid option, there were interrogations regarding 
who should deal with the burden of proof: the captain, the Flag State, wholesaler or 
seller.  The  definition  of  rules  of  origins  was  considered  in  some  contributions  as 
essential in that regard. 

The  certification  option  raised  important  concerns  with  regard  to  its  feasibility  and 
the  administrative  burden  that  might  be  created  for  developing  countries.  Some 
contributions insisted that a specific treatment should be awarded to those countries, 
and  notably  that  it  should  be  for  the  master  of  the  vessel  and  not  up  to  the  public 
authorities  to  certify  the  legality  of  the  catches.  Requests  were  made  on  analysing 
how specific traceability systems could be applied to fish products originating from 
small  scale  fisheries  in  ACP  countries,  where  small  quantities  of  fish  are  collected 
from several vessels. The importance of Community assistance to contribute to set up 
and reinforce capacity of developing countries was underscored. 

NGOs supported a prohibition of at-sea transhipment, except in specifically designed 
areas  or  ports  which  are  closely  monitored  and  reported  in  real  time  to  relevant 
management  authority.  Some  respondents  were  more  flexible  in  this  approach  and 
considered  that  transhipment  at  sea  could  be  allowed  provided  that  an  appropriate 
regime is in place to monitor how operations take place. 

There  was  also  a  general  acknowledgement  that  control  at  inspection  border  posts 
should  be  strengthened.  In  that  context,  a  formalised  cooperation  between  the 
fisheries  inspections  services,  veterinary  services,  customs  services  at  all  points  of 
entry  into  the  EU  would  maximise  the  effect  of  deterring  the  IUU  products  from 
acceding to the Community market. 

4.3. 

Close the EU market to IUU fisheries products 

There was a general support as to the idea that trade measures should be used by the 
Community  in  order  to  avoid  product  stemming  from  IUU  fishing  to  reach  the 
Community market.  

Notwithstanding,  clearly  defined  criteria  and  transparent  procedures  should  be  in 
place for identifying when a ban on fisheries products should be introduced.  

Also,  a  special  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  implications  of  introducing  an  import 
ban  without  warning  buyers  and  the  seriousness  of  impact  on  the  developing 
countries. If there is a suspicion that supplies of fish are derived from IUU activities, 
the importers should be informed of the possibility that their source of supplies may 
have been involved in IUU activities.  

Some NGOs insisted that the Community should be entitled to enact ban on import 
of  fisheries  products  from  identified  operators  and  vessels  but  should  refrain  from 
doing so in respect of a State, as this might harm legitimate operators from this State.  

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Related to this action, a special attention should be given to the developing coastal 
countries  providing  them  a  support  for  strengthening  the  Monitoring,  Control  and 
Surveillance (MCS) mechanisms and to encourage a steady and effective cooperation 
at regional level.  

A  part  of  respondents  called  for  more  measures  in  this  field,  like  considering  an 
infringement the commercial relations with companies involved in IUU fishing and 
banning the import of fish from vessels or companies involved in IUU fishing, on the 
model of the US legislation (Lacey Act). 

4.4. 

Address IUU activities carried out by nationals from the European Community 

The problem caused by Community nationals active on board fishing vessels flying 
Flags of Convenience and carrying out IUU fishing was considered as very serious 
by  all  respondents.  Equally,  there  was  an  agreement  on  the  principle  that  the 
Community  should  do  more  to  address  this  issue,  as  well  as  to  enhance  its  action 
against States hosting Flags of Convenience. 

An important scope of this option should be to discourage Community ship owners 
from  using  flag  of  convenience  and  prevent  them  from  engaging  in  IUU  fishing 
using  vessels  flying  flags  of  third  countries.  The  difficulty  to  obtain  sufficient 
evidence in order to prosecute the European citizens for presumed allegation of IUU 
activities carried out outside the Community territory is an important shortcoming of 
the existing system, which should be part of the future Community initiative. 

Some  respondents  pointed  out  that  financing  and  operating  vessels  under  flag  of 
convenience  by  Community  nationals  should  be  subject  to  legal  proceedings  in 
European  countries  when  the  purpose  of  such  arrangements  is  to  carry  out  IUU 
fishing. 

Some  reservations  were  expressed  with  regard  to  the  possible  new  administrative 
burden  which  may  result  from  new  provisions.  It  was  also  recalled  that  any  new 
Community measures should respect the principle of subsidiary.  

Some NGOs considered that it should be useful to negotiate legal instruments for the 
right to pursue delinquents outside national boundaries. 

4.5. 

Improve the legal means to ascertain IUU fishing activities 

This measure received a wide support and there is a consensus that this is a key point 
to be improved, both at the EU level and international level. 

The need to make the FAO guidelines on the marking of fishing vessels and support 
vessels compulsory and to support the creation of an international register that would 
be  available  to  the  public  and  regularly  up-dated,  listing  all  the  fishing  vessels and 
support  vessels  and  including  basic  information  on  former  and  current  owner  was 
highlighted. The inscription on this register would be a pre-requisite for obtaining a 
fishing licence. 

Another possible option in this field of action is to help the costal countries to obtain 
real  time  access  to  VMS  data  according  to  EU  law  while  always  guaranteeing 
confidentiality. 

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Control  and  inspection  could  be  made  more  efficient  via  exchange  of  data  and  the 
setting up of shared methodology and benchmarks at Community level. 

4.6. 

Introduce an efficient regime of penalties aiming to deter serious infringements 
to fisheries measures 

The  need  to  ensure  a  uniform  application  of  the  rules  of  the  CFP  across  the 
Community was highlighted in all contributions. 

NGOs  and  processing  industry  showed  a  strong  support  for  the  setting  up  at 
Community level of a list of serious infringements against the rules of the Common 
Fisheries  Policy  and  a  harmonisation  of  levels  of  sanctions  corresponding  to  those 
infringements.  

However, serious reservations came from most of fishing sector and many Member 
States on the competence of the Community in this field. The particularities and the 
different  nature  of  penal  systems  existing  in  the  Member  States  were  also 
emphasised  as  constituting  an  obstacle  to  a  Community  initiative.  The  principle  of 
subsidiary  was  invoked  as  argument  in  favour  of  maintaining  the  competence  of 
Member States to penalise its nationals based on the provisions of its own national 
legislation  for  IUU  fishing  activities  carried  out  by  fleets  flying  their  flag  or  by 
fishing vessels in their waters.  

NGOs pledged for harmonised minima of penalties of sufficient severity at EU and 
regional level to deprive offenders of the benefits of IUU activities. The risk of being 
caught  and  severely  penalized  is  indeed  crucial  to  deter  the  continuation  of  illegal 
practices.  Beyond  fines,  sanctions  should  include  supplementary  measures  like  the 
confiscation of catches, gear and/or vessels, as well as withdrawal of fishing licences. 
No public aid should be granted to offenders. The judicial authorities should be made 
aware  of  the  damages  caused  by  IUU  fishing  to  ensure  a  proper  application  of 
sanctions.  Some  NGOs  also  request  more  transparency  with  respect  to  the 
identification of offenders. 

The need for a similar level of sanctions is not a sole preoccupation of the fisheries 
sector,  therefore inspiration  on  how this can be achieved should be sought in other 
Community policy areas where measures have already been taken.  

4.7. 

Improve  action  against  IUU  fishing  within  Regional  Fisheries  Management 
Organisations 

A general consensus was noted for this measure. The Community is encouraged to 
continue  to  play  a  pro-active  and  major  role  in  RFMOs  and  to  support  the 
cooperation within and between the RFMOs.  

Stronger actions within the RFMOs in fighting against IUU fishing and the creation 
and up-dating regional list of vessels authorised to fish (white lists) and list of vessels 
known for their involvement in IUU fishing activities (blacklist) was advocated. The 
completion of inspection and control schemes within RFMOs was also supported, in 
view  of  notably  of  allowing  the  arrest  by  one  Party's  authority  of  the  vessel  of 
another Party in case of infringement.  

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Efforts should be undertaken to encourage developing countries to join RFMOs and 
participate fully in their discussions. 

Some contributions insisted that the implementation of RFMOs recommendations is 
of paramount importance. In some ACP countries, implementation may be deficient 
due to a lack of information or lack of coordination between public administration in 
charge  of  negotiations  within  RFMOs  and  public  administration  responsible  for 
control  and  management  of  fisheries  activities.  Implementation  also  a  logistic, 
financial  and  technical  support  to  make  sure  that  the  rules  agreed  are  effectively 
enforced on the ground. 

In preparing its initiative, it is important that the Commission take due notice of the 
forthcoming recommendations from RFMOs in relation to international cooperation 
between Parties but also the cooperation between RFMOs. 

4.8. 

Support the policy and means of developing countries against IUU fishing 

All  contributions  confirmed  the  crucial  need  to  strengthen  the  cooperation  with 
developing countries in order to improve the governance and management of fishery 
sector in those countries.  

In  the  framework  of  Fisheries  Partnership  Agreements  (FPA),  the  European 
Community should aim at increasing MCS capacities with a particular focus on the 
coastal  areas.  Satellite  surveillance  and  inspection  vessels  are  important  means  for 
fighting  against  IUU  fishing  and  those  could  be  provided  via  FPAs.  Low-cost  and 
low-tech systems should also be promoted.  

NGOs  pointed  out  the  necessity  to  include  such  aspects  in  the  framework  of 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) process. 

Cooperation  with  other  major  donors  (World  Bank,  national  development 
agencies…) should be reinforced. 

A national administration pointed out that the support to the developing countries for 
the  fight  against  IUU  should  not  be  limited  to  countries  with  whom  a  partnership 
agreement  was  concluded  and  all  the  developing  countries  should  benefit  of 
assistance to develop the its MCS capacities.  

Corruption is often the nub of the matter in respect to IUU fishing occurring in the 
EEZs  of  developing  country,  and  the  Community  should  also  promote  good 
governance as part of its policy against IUU fishing. 

Some  NGOs  and  representatives  of  the  ACP  insisted  that  a  policy  towards 
developing countries could also be developed at a regional scale, gathering all coastal 
States  for  a  given  region.  This  should  also  involve  Community  Member  States 
especially when their ports are used by operators responsible for IUU fishing.  

Better  synergies  with  the  services  responsible  for  fisheries,  health  conditions  and 
customs  within  the  Community  were  also  called  for  in  respect  of  the  treatment  of 
fisheries products and vessels from developing countries. 

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4.9. 

Increase synergies in the field of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 

A general support emerged from the contributions on this issue. 

The  need  to  ensure  better  cooperation  within  the  Community  and  in  relations  with 
third States in the field of MCS was considered globally necessary. 

The  key  role  attributed  to  the  Community  Fisheries  Control  Agency  on  that  matter 
was highlighted.  

Some  national  administrations  recalled  however  that  the  control  attributions  reflect 
different realities and traditions in Member States and expressed their reserve on the 
practical efficiency of increased synergies in the control field.  

The  Community  was  also  invited  to  look  for  the  reinforcement  of  the  International 
MCS  network  mainly  via  bilateral  arrangements  aimed  at  cooperation  on  MCS 
activities.  

5. 

NEW MEASURES ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENTS 

A few other proposals were put forward by the respondents to the consultation; they 
mainly  consist  in  completing  the  actions  presented  by  the  Commission  in  its 
consultation paper. The Commission was encouraged to:  

–  Pay  more  attention  to  the  problem  caused  by  flags  of  convenience.  Despite  its 
harmful consequences on human and labour rights, safety, environment, resources 
the  flag  of 
conservation  and 
convenience  issue  which  was  mentioned  in  the  introductory  part  of  the 
consultation paper was not included in any field of action envisaged. 

the  development  of  coastal  communities, 

–  Support  the  creation  of  publicly  available,  up  to  date  and  reliable  international 
register  listing  the  fishing  and  support  vessels  as  well  as  a  unique  vessel 
identifying system. 

–  Take  measures  that  establish  incentives  and  encouragements  for  industry 
operators  to  take  part  in  the  fight  IUU  fishing.  Foster  public  and  retail  sector 
awareness, including better engagement with retailers/cater on passing incentives 
back along the supply chain towards importers and vessel operators. 

–  Training on traceability measures for developing countries. 

–  Withhold  EU  funds  from  vessels  owners  (fishing  companies)  confirmed  to  have 

engaged in IUU fishing. 

–  Engage EUROPOL in the investigating organised transboundary crime involving 

IUU catches. 

–  Create a special label for Non-IUU products.  

–  Require the use onboard of electronic recording and joint centralised registration 
of catches for all vessels of a determined size, amongst others to ensure that catch 

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figures  are  translated  into  immediate  deductions  of  the  quota  of  the  vessel 
concerned. 

–  Take into account the link between IUU activities and labour law. 

6. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The main results of the public consultation on the initiatives envisaged by the Commission to 
improve  the  fight  of  the  European  Community  against  Illegal,  Unreported  and  Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing can be summarised as it follows: 

–  The  general  tone  of  the  contributions  received  its  very  supportive  of  the  Community's 

initiative. 

–  There is a general recognition that the Community needs to reinforce the tools for fighting 

against IUU fishing; 

–  All  the  field  of  actions  proposed  were  considered  important  or  very  important  by  an 

overwhelming majority of stakeholders. 

–  Reluctance  of  some  part  of  fishing  sector  to  see  the  scope  of  initiative  extending  to  the 

Community fleet. 

–  Concern from a part of the fishing sector and some administrations over the relevance to 
embark on a new far-reaching legislative proposal with a general scope, while the priority 
should  be  a  better  application  of  the  current  framework,  and  while  any  new  initiative 
against IUU fishing should not be general but specific to each fishery. 

–  Important  concern  expressed  by  some  NGOs  and  representatives  of  the  ACP  countries 
relating  to  the  impact  of  future  Community  trade  measures  and  requirements  on  coastal 
developing  countries,  which  could  create  tremendous  difficulties  for  them  to  continue  to 
export fisheries products into the European Community.  

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Annex 2 
Administrative costs 

Details on administrative costs generated by the establishment of a 
certification scheme applying to all imports of fisheries products into the 
Community 

This document sets out the methodology used by Océanic Développement (in the framework 
of  the  Specific  Convention  no.36/2006  linked  to  the  framework  contract  FISH/2003/02)  to 
assess the administrative costs generated by the certification scheme.  

1. 

LES COUTS ADMINISTRATIFS 

1.1. 

Incidence des nouvelles tâches induites par la mesure 

La  mesure  envisagée  par  la  Commission  prévoit  la  soumission  à  chaque  opération 
d’importation de produits de la pêche d’un certificat validé par l’autorité du pavillon du navire 
qui est à l’origine de la matière première. Cette mesure est soutenue par la création d’une liste 
de pays autorisés à exporter (ceux qui auront fourni les éléments indiquant qu’ils respectent 
les  mesures  de  gestion  internationales)  et  par  un  système  d’alerte  spécifique  qui  mettra  en 
garde  autorités  européennes  en  charge  du  contrôle  et  les  opérateurs  européens  contre  des 
risques d’introduction de marchandise d’origine INN. 

Les autorités des Etats membres en charge du contrôle aux frontières devront 

•  Réaliser  un  contrôle  documentaire :  vérifier  la  présence  du  certificat  dans  la  liasse  de 
pièces justificatives (qui inclut également selon les cas la facture, le certificat sanitaire, le 
certificat d’origine) et en contrôler la cohérence (entre les informations contenues dans le 
certificat de capture et celles présentes dans les autres documents d’importation) ; 

•  Effectuer  des  contrôles  physiques  des  lots :  par  sondage  dans  les  containers  suivant  une 
méthodologie  connue,  vérifier  la  cohérence  entre  le  contenu  et  les  déclarations.  Dans  le 
schéma prévu, ces contrôles physiques seront ciblés ; 

•  Des  enquêtes  a  posteriori :  vérifier  l’authenticité  du  document  par  investigation  et 
recoupement  après  soupçon  ou  information  extérieure  nouvelle.  Cette  action  peut 
impliquer la mise à contribution des autorités en charge de la pêche. 

Les autorités en charge de la pêche des Etats membres seront donc amenées à collaborer au 
cas par cas avec les autorités douanières pour des opérations relevant du contrôle. En outre, si 
l’on  considère  que  la  mesure  est  amenée  à  se  généraliser  et  que  les  autorités  européennes 
devront certifier les captures de leurs navires vendues à des Etats tiers, les administrations en 
charge de la pêche des Etats membres seront amenées à s’organiser de manière à répondre 

L’entrée en vigueur de la mesure demandera également une information et une formation des 
agents spécifiques. 

La  mesure  concerne  également  les  entreprises  privées  car  elle  ajoute  une  formalité 
supplémentaire. Sur le plan formel, l’acquisition d’un document supplémentaire de la part de 

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l’exportateur ou directement du navire de pêche ne représente pas une charge importante pour 
l’entreprise qui souhaite importer des produits de la mer, si ce document fait partie intégrante 
d’un système existant. Ce document sera simplement joint aux autres documents mentionnés 
(factures, certificat sanitaire, certificat d’origine etc.).  

La  fourniture  de  ce  nouveau  document  sera  intégrée  aux  procédures  déjà  négociées  entre 
fournisseurs de pays tiers et acheteurs européens concernant le respect d’un cahier des charges 
relatif au respect des règles hygiène, à la tracabilité des produits, et au suivi financier le cas 
échéant.  Ces  tâches  demandent  déjà  de  nombreux  échanges  entre  les  deux  partenaires 
commerciaux,  et  des  audits  techniques  et  financiers  impliquant  des  visites  sur  place. 
L’intégration de la fourniture du certificat de capture dans la démarche ne demandera pas la 
mise en œuvre de moyens supplémentaires substantiels pour les importateurs européens. 

Sur ces constats et sur les bases techniques explicitées dans ce rapport d’étude, l’évaluation 
des coûts administratifs peut être conduite conformément aux lignes directrices préparées par 
le Secrétariat Général de la Commission. La méthodologie recommandée conduit à obtenir les 
informations nécessaires au remplissage d’un tableau standardisé proposé sous format tableur. 

1.2. 

Etape 1 : identification et classification des obligations d’information 

•  Pour les importateurs (groupe cible), l’obligation consiste donc à vérifier la présence d’un 
certificat de capture et à en prévoir l’intégration lors des négociations commerciales. Dans 
la  typologie  des  types  d’obligations  proposés  dans  les  lignes  directrice,  on  propose  de 
sélectionner  le  cas  n°  5  « Demande  d’autorisation  ou  de  dérogation  ponctuelle »  dans  la 
mesure  ou  le  certificat  doit  être  présenté  lors  de  chaque  opération  d’importation.  On  ne 
trouve pas  dans la nomenclature d’autre possibilité, si ce n’est la catégorie 12 des divers 
« autre type d’obligation » (ligne 160) 

•  Pour  les  autorités  des  Etats  membres  en  charge  du  contrôle  à  l’entrée  des  frontières, 
l’obligation se rapproche du cas n° 9 « inspection » car il s’agit de vérifier la présence d’un 
document dans une liasse et d’en vérifier la cohérence avec les autres éléments disponibles, 
y compris le contenu des lots (ligne 2 et 3). 

•  Pour  les  autorités  des  Etats  membres  en  charge  de  la  pêche,  l’obligation  générée  par  la 
mesure  peut  se  rapprocher  dans  la  nomenclature  proposée  du  cas  n°8  «  certification  de 
produits  ou  de  processus »  car  il  s’agira  bien  de  valider  et  certifier  les  documents  de 
captures des navires communautaires qui vendent à des pays tiers (ligne 4). 

1.3. 

Etape 2 : Détermination des actions requises 

•  Pour les importateurs, on sélectionne le cas n° 11 « Présenter les informations (les envoyer 

à l’autorité compétente) » (ligne 1) 

•  Pour  les  autorités  des  Etats  membres  en  charge  du  contrôle  à  l’entrée  des  frontières,  la 
mesure génère deux types d’action : premièrement une action initiale de formation cas n° 2 
de la typologie (« Dispenser une formation sur les obligations d’information ») (ligne 3), et 

60 

Ligne  1  se  réfère  à  la  ligne  du  tableau  de  synthèse  des  coûts  administratifs  présenté  en  annexe.  Les 
autres renvois à des numéros de ligne suivent la même logique de présentation. 

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deuxièmement une action récurrente rattachable au cas n° 9 de la typologie « Inspecter et 
Contrôler » (ligne 2). 

•  Pour les autorités des Etats membres en charge de la pêche, l’action requise se rapproche 
du cas n°7 « Compléter des formulaires et des tableaux ». On pourrait également choisir de 
l’affecter  au  cas  n°3  de  la  typologie  « Extraire  des  informations  pertinentes  de  données 
existantes » (ligne 4). 

1.4. 

Etape 3 : Classification en fonction de la source de la réglementation 

L’analyse de l’origine de la mesure implique de se référer au contexte international. 

La FAO a adopté en 2001 un plan d’action international visant à prévenir, à contrecarrer et à 
éliminer  la  pêche  illicite,  non  déclarée  et  non  réglementée61.  Le  plan  détaille  une  série  de 
mesures que les Etats de pavillon, côtiers, ou de port devraient prendre lutter contre la pêche 
INN. Parmi celles-ci, le plan d’action prévoit que les Etats puissent coopérer, notamment par 
le biais des ORP, pour prendre des mesures contre le commerce international des produits de 
la pêche INN. 

Près  de  6  années  après  son  adoption,  force  est de  constater  que  les  mesures  adoptées  par  la 
communauté internationale pour faire obstacle au commerce de produits de la pêche INN sont 
insuffisantes.  Les  ORP  ont  réussi  à  mettre  en  place  des  schémas  de  documentation  / 
certification  mais  qui  ne  répondent  que  partiellement  aux  besoins  identifiés.  Le  mode  de 
décision  par  consensus  qui  prévaut  dans  les  ORP  ne  permet  pas  d’espérer  à  moyen  terme 
l’adoption de mesures réellement contraignantes, et sanctionnables, qui permettraient de faire 
passer  dans  le  droit  international  contraignant  les  dispositions  de  droit  mou  prévues  par  le 
plan d’action de la FAO.  

Compte-tenu de la difficulté d’œuvrer rapidement dans un cadre multilatéral, la Communauté 
européenne  décide  de  prendre  de  manière  autonome,  mais  dans  le  respect  de  différents 
accords internationaux existants, la mesure de certification des captures afin de lutter contre le 
commerce international des produits INN, et ce, dans l’attente que le reste de la communauté 
internationale  se  mette  d’accord  conformément  aux  principes  détaillés  dans  le  plan  d’action 
de la FAO.  

Pour les besoins de l’analyse des coûts administratifs, on prendra comme hypothèse que 99% 
de la mesure est d’origine UE. Le 1% restant est attribuable à des obligations internationales. 
Ce sont les divers documents / certificats pour les produits de la pêche qui sont imposés dans 
le  cadre  multilatéral  des  ORP.  Ces  documents  /  certificats  concernent  36 000  tonnes  de 
produits  importés,  sur  le  total  toutes  espèces  /  produits  de  4,3  millions  de  tonnes  (arrondi  à 
1%, d’où la part proposée).  

1.5. 

Etape 4 : les groupes cibles  

Il n’y a pas lieu de distinguer des groupes cibles parmi les opérateurs du secteur privé impacté 
par  la  mesure  de  la  Commission  (le  secteur  de la  commercialisation  et  de  la  transformation 
des produits de la pêche). La mesure est obligatoire pour toute la population d’entreprises. Les 
entreprises  qui  auront  le  moins  à  souffrir  du  poids  administratif  seront  celles  qui  seront  les 
mieux organisées, petites ou grandes. 

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Il y a peu de données sur ce secteur. On estime le nombre d’entreprises à environ 6 000, dont 
50%  de  SME  de  mois  de  20  salariés.  Sous  réserve  de  données  d’enquêtes  actualisées, 
l’Espagne, la France, l’Italie, la Grèce, le Royaume-Uni, la Pologne et l’Allemagne seraient 
les Etats membres qui concentreraient la majorité des entreprises actives dans ce secteur. 

1.6. 

Etape 5 : Fréquence des actions 

Pour  les  importateurs,  présenter  le  document  de  certification  des  captures  devra  se  faire  à 
chaque  opération  d’importation  d’un  lot.  On  ne  connaît  ni  le  nombre  total  d’entreprises 
européennes  susceptibles  d’importer,  ni  le  nombre  d’opérations  d’importation  qu’elles  sont 
susceptibles  de  faire  chacune.  En  ce  qui  concerne  le  contrôle  des  documents  réalisé  par  les 
autorités  douanières,  le  problème  est  le  même :  on  ne  peut  pas  estimer  la  fréquence  des 
opérations ni le nombre de points de contrôle concerné. 

Pour le calcul des coûts (étape suivante) supporté par ces deux groupes d’intervenants (lignes 
1 et 2), on propose de modifier la méthode de calcul du coût administratif présentée dans les 
lignes directrices : on estime le nombre d’opérations d’importation de produits de la pêche à 
partir  du  tonnage  total  importé  et  du  poids  unitaire  d’une  opération  que  l’on  peut 
raisonnablement  prendre  comme  hypothèse.  Sur  cette  base,  i)  constatant  que  86%  des 
importations  se  font  par  voie  maritime,  donc  essentiellement  par  container  d’un  contenu 
moyen  de  25  tonnes,  ii)  que  chaque  container  contient  en  moyenne  1,5  lots,  et  iii)  que  le 
volume total des importations de produits de la pêche approchait les 4,5 millions de tonnes en 
2005,  le  nombre  d’opérations  d’importation  est  estimé  à  4,5  millions  x  1.5  /  25  =  270 000 
opérations par an. Pour tenir compte des arrivages de lots de taille plus modeste par avion ou 
par route, on arrondi le nombre à 300 000. Ce nombre sera multiplié par le coût unitaire d’une 
opération pour obtenir le coût administratif de la mesure. 

Pour  les  autres  actions  requises,  la  fréquence  peut  être  estimée  de  manière  plus 
conventionnelle. 

En  ce  qui  concerne  la  formation  initiale  que  devront  assurer  les  autorités  responsables  du 
contrôle aux frontières, la fréquence est 1, reportée en italique pour souligner son aspect non 
récurrent (ligne 3). 

S’agissant  de  la  certification  des  captures  des  navires  communautaires  vendant  à  des  pays 
tiers par les autorités en  charge de la pêche (ligne 4),  on prendra comme  hypothèse  que les 
500  navires  potentiellement  concernés  font  des  marées  d’une  durée  moyenne  de  20  jours62. 
Compte-tenu d’un arrêt technique des navires d’au moins 60 jours par an, ces navires font en 
moyenne  15  marées  par  an  et  auront  besoin  d’une  certification  à  une  fréquence  équivalente 
(de 15).  

62 

Les thoniers senneurs, principale source d’exportation de matière première vers les pays tiers font des 
marées plus longues (60 jours). La fréquence retenue est par conséquent une hypothèse haute. 

EN 

93 

   EN 

 
                                                 
1.7. 

Etape 6 : Indication de facteurs de coûts pertinents 

2. 

COUT DE MAIN D’ŒUVRE 

Les coûts de main d’œuvre sont les seuls imputables à cette mesure. En effet, il n’y a pas de 
coût  d’investissement  identifiable.  Les  personnes  qui  auront  à  se  charger  des  formalités 
nouvelles sont estimées se placer au niveau de qualification employé. 

Le coût moyen horaire des salaires charges comprises pour l’ensemble des pays européens est 
de 21 € de l’heure en 2006 (données de 2004 Eurostat). Cependant il a été décidé de ne pas 
appliquer ce coût moyen car d’une part, les écarts moyens de salaires entre les 27 pays sont 
très  importants  allant  de  30.43  €  /  heure  pour  la  suède  à  13.37  €  pour  la  Grèce  et  4.01  €  / 
heure  pour  l’Estonie  et  la  part  des  pays  importateurs  n’étant  pas  homogène,  8  pays 
représentant 86% des importations de produits de la mer. 

Le  tableau  suivant  synthétise  ces  informations  et  permet  ainsi  de  valider  le  taux  horaire 
moyen finalement choisi  

PAYS 

Espagne 

Danemark 

Royaume-Uni 

France 

Allemagne 

Italie 

Pays-Bas 

Suède 

Coût moyen salaires/heure  

(en euros) 

14.21  

30.30  

23.56  

27.68  

26.05  

20.64  

25.19  

30.43  

d’importation 

Part 
produits de la mer (en %) 

des 

23 % 

13% 

10 % 

9 % 

9 % 

9 % 

7 % 

6 % 

En  prenant  en  compte  les  salaires  moyens  des  plus  gros  pays  importateur,  on  arrive  à  un 
salaire moyen supérieur au salaire moyen des 27 pays de l’Union Européenne. Une moyenne 
de  24  euros  /  heure  a  donc  été  validée  pour  cette  estimation  auquel  se  rajoute  les  frais 
généraux estimé à 25% ; soit un coût horaire définitif de 30 € de l’heure. Par convention, on 
considèrera des coûts identiques pour le secteur privé et le secteur public (lignes 1, 2 et 4). 

S’agissant de l’action de formation, on considèrera que les salaires à considérer se placent au 
niveau des cadres, avec une valeur moyenne de 35 € de l’heure, plus 25% de frais généraux, 
soi 44 € de l’heure (ligne 3). 

Enfin,  une  partie  des  formalités  seront  effectuées  par  des  entreprises  sous-traitantes  (type 
transitaire).  Dans  ce  cas,  on  considère  un  coût  horaire  double  du  coût  interne,  soit  60  €  de 
l’heure (ligne 1). 

EN 

94 

   EN 

 
 
3. 

NOMBRE  D’HEURES  DE  TRAVAIL  RENDU  NECESSAIRE  PAR  LA  MESURE  DE 
CERTIFICATION 

Importateurs européens de produits de la pêche (ligne 1) 

Concernant  l’action  de  présentation  des  certificats  pour  les  entreprises  importatrices,  on  a 
considéré que celle- ci nécessitait une part en tarif interne (action administrative exercée par 
l’entreprise elle-même) et une autre part en tarif externe (action administrative sous-traitée par 
une autre entreprise type transitaire en douanes) 

Tarif  interne :  l’action  administrative  étant  intégré  à  des  formalités  déjà  existante  ,  on 
considère que la présence  d’ un document supplémentaire ne représentera quasiment pas de 
charges  supplémentaires  hormis  le  signalement  lors  de  la  commande,  la  vérification  de  sa 
présence,  sa  transmission  et  son  classement  en  retour.  Ce  taux  a  été  estimé  à  6  mn 
supplémentaire sur un dossier de formalité pour un lot soit 0.10 heure. C’est une moyenne qui 
bien  entendu  ne  prend  pas  en  compte  la  gestion  des  dossiers  incomplets  et  la  période  de 
rodage consécutive à la mise en route de cette nouvelle obligation. 

Tarif  externe :  L’action  administrative  du  transitaire  étant  intégré  à  des  formalités  déjà 
existante,  la  présence  de  ce  document  complémentaire  ne  représentera  pas  une  charge  très 
importante  de  la  même  manière.  Cependant,  cela  nécessitera  néanmoins  des  tâches 
supplémentaires  de  vérification  et  de  contrôle  devant  les  2  administrations  concernées.  Le 
temps  de  traitement  supplémentaire  par  dossier  a  été  estimé  à  0,1  heure  également.  Apres 
enquête  auprès  de  transitaires,  le  temps  moyen  de  traitement  sur  le  plan  documentaire  d’un 
dossier d’importation de produit de la mer est 30 mn (estimation large) dont le traitement le 
plus fastidieux des listes de colisages. 

Autorités des Etats membres en charge du contrôle aux frontières (ligne 2) 

Concernant l’action de contrôle de la documentation par les services en charge de l’inspection 
aux  frontières,  on  va  considérer  qu’aucune  intervention  externe  n’est  nécessaire.  Le  tarif 
interne  ne  prendra  en  compte  que  la  partie  de  vérification  documentaire  supplémentaire, 
qu’elle soit exécutée au niveau des services douaniers ou des services vétérinaires. Ce travail 
de vérification et de cohérence des informations est estimé à 6 mn par lot soit 0,10 heure.  

Comme  indiqué  supra,  l’estimation  ne  prend  pas  en  compte  le  contrôle  d’identité  des 
marchandises déjà pris en compte pour d’autres contrôles. 

A titre indicatif, le traitement moyen d’un dossier d’importation sur le plan documentaire par 
les autorités est estimé, quelque soit l’administration, à une moyenne de 20 mn par lot (si le 
dossier est complet). 

Autorités des Etats membres en charge de la formation à la nouvelle procédure (ligne 3) 

On  estimera  que  la  rédaction  d’une  note  explicative  (type  circulaire  d’application)  et  la 
présentation de la procédure aux autorités en charge du contrôle demandera l’équivalent de 3 
semaines  de  travail  (soit  environ  120  heures)  pour  chacun  des  27  Etats  membres  (avec  une 
distribution inégale : les gros Etats membres importateurs auront besoin de plus de moyens, 
les petits Etats moins). 

Autorités des Etats membres en charge de la pêche (ligne 4) 

EN 

95 

   EN 

 
Ces  autorités  auront  à  valider  des  certificats  de  capture  pour  les  débarquements  de  leurs 
navires auprès de pays tiers. Normalement, cette tâche sera courte car les données nécessaires 
sont  le  plus  souvent  disponibles  dans  des  bases  de  données  centralisées  (licences  de  pêche, 
VMS, journaux de bord). On anticipe un temps moyen de 10 mn par déclaration à valider, soit 
0,17 heure. 

3.1. 

Conclusion : le coût administratif de la mesure 

Comme indiqué dans le tableau récapitulatif présentée en annexe 1, le coût administratif de la 
mesure  se  situera  aux  alentours  de  4  M€  par  an.  Ces  coûts  sont  essentiellement  des  coûts 
récurrents.  Ils  seront  supportés  à  près  de  70%  (un  peu  moins  de  3  M€)  par  le  secteur  privé 
européen. Ramené au nombre estimé d’entreprises (6 000) et au chiffre d’affaires du secteur 
(18  milliards  d’euros),  ce  coût  apparaît  faible (environ  500  €  par  entreprise  en  moyenne)  et 
d’un rapport modeste avec le chiffre d’affaires (quelques centièmes de %). Le solde du coût 
administratif  (1  M€)  est  à  la  charge  des  administrations  des  Etats  membres  en  charge  du 
contrôle  aux  frontières  pour  l’essentiel.  Il  existe  environ  4 000  PIF  en  Europe.  Si  le  coût 
administratif s’applique sur tous ces PIF, l’incidence de la mesure est également modeste. 

Le coût administratif de la mesure pour les pays tiers ne peut être estimé du fait de la diversité 
des situations. Son importance dépendra de l’existant en matière d’organisation administrative 
et  de  base  légale  pour  le  suivi  des  navires.  Il  pourra  être  de  quelques  dizaines  de  milliers 
d’euros pour les pays les mieux organisés à plusieurs centaines de milliers pour les Etats tiers 
pour  lesquels  l’introduction  de  la  mesure  demandera  des  réformes  importantes  du  système 
administratif. 

EN 

96 

   EN 

 
 (Projet) impact des mesures commerciales prévues dans le paquet INN 

 NIL / projet 

No.

Ass. 
Art.

Orig. 
Art.

Type of obligation

Description of required 
action(s)

1

/

/

Application for individual 
authorisation or 
exemption 

Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated 
recipient)

Inspection

Inspection

Inspecting and checking 
(including assistance to 
inspection by public 
authorities)

Training members and 
employees about the 
information obligations

Certification of products 
or processes

Filling forms and tables

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

EN 

Tariff
(€ per hour)

Time 
(hour)

Price
(per action or 
equip)

Freq 
(per year)

Nbr 
of 
entities

Total nbr
of 
actions

Total 
cost

Regulatory
origin
(%)

Target group

i

e

i

e

Int

EU

Nat Reg

importateurs et 
mandants  produits de 
la mer 

Administrations de 
contrôles aux frontières  

Administrations de 
contrôles aux frontières  

administration chargée 
de la pêche 

30

60

0,10

0,10

9,0

n.a. 

n.a.

300.000

2.700.000

1%

99%

30

44

30

0,10

3,0

n.a. 

n.a.

300.000

900.000

1%

99%

120,00

5.280,0

1,00

27

27

142.560

1%

99%

0,17

5,1

15,00

500

7.500

38.250

1%

99%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total administrative costs (€)

3.780.810

Administrative costs by origin (€)

3
.
7
4
3
.
0
0
2

3
7
.
8
0
8

0

0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

97 

OK

OK

OK

OK

Total not equal to 100%

Types of obligation

Notification of (specific) 
activities

Submission of (recurring) 
reports

Information labelling for 
third parties

Application for individual 
authorisation or exemption 

Application for general 
authorisation or exemption

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Registration

Certification of products or 
processes

Inspection

Cooperation with audits

Application for subsidy or 
grant

Other

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

Total not equal to 100%

EN 

 
  
 
Regulatory act refers to legislative and statutory acts  
For the reference of the proposal / act, use EU-Lex format (‘cut and paste’ of the reference given by http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/RECH_menu.do?ihmlang=en). 
No. = gives a number for each action.  
Ass. Art.= article and § detailing the obligation assessed on that line.  
Orig. Art. = if the act assessed is the transposition of an act adopted at another level, insert here the article and § of the 'original' act corresponding to the obligation assessed 
on that line  
(for ex., article of the EC directive at the origin of one specific obligation imposed by national law) 
i = internal tariff (administrative action carried by the enterprise itself). e = external tariff (administrative action contracted out).  
Price per action = (TAi*TIi) + (TAe*TIe). Total Nbr of actions = Frequency * Number of entities. Total cost per action = P*Q.  
For equipment, yearly cost based on the depreciation period must be put in the ‘price’ column; the ‘tariff’ and ‘time’ columns must be left empty column 
For one-off costs, put '1' in the frequency column in italics 

When the act amends existing provisions and diminishes the number of hours or frequency, negative figures corresponding to the burden reduction should be typed in the 
corresponding columns 

EN 

98 

EN