Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Second Report on the implementation of regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 on civil aviation security
Date: 2007-09-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU control, air safety, airport, civil aviation, report, safety standard, technical regulations

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 20.9.2007 
COM(2007) 542 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  

SECOND REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION (EC) 
No 2320/2002 ON CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  

SECOND REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION (EC) 
No 2320/2002 ON CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Terrorism  still  poses  a  real  threat  to  air  transport.  The  unsuccessful  plot  in  the  United 
Kingdom in August 2006, involving the use of liquid explosives smuggled in hand luggage to 
blow up several aircraft in flight, show – if proof were needed – that it would be foolhardy for 
the European Union to relax its efforts in the field of aviation security. It is still essential to 
ensure that the security measures adopted by the EU in Regulation (EC) No 2320/20021 are 
applied properly.  

In  September  2005,  the  Commission  adopted  its  first  report2  on  the  implementation  of 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2320/2002  covering  the  period  February  2004-June  2005.  This  second 
report  covers  the  period  July  2005-December  2006  and  is  based  more  particularly  on  the 
conclusions drawn from some fifty new inspections carried out by the Commission. It enables 
a  comprehensive  evaluation  to  be  made  of  the  state  of  security  in  the  European  Union  four 
years after the entry into force of the European legislation.  

This report confirms in particular that the introduction of Community rules has significantly 
improved security at EU airports. Air travellers enjoy a high level of security. The EU system 
has  proven  capable  of  maintaining  and  developing  common  rules  which  facilitate  travel  by 
minimising cumbersome variations of security rules between Member States.  

LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE COMMISSION'S INSPECTIONS IN 2005/2006 

Since February 2004 when inspections began, the Commission has carried out 89 inspections, 
including 47 new inspections conducted between July 2005 and December 2006 in EU-25 and 
Switzerland3 (see Annex 1). To date, all Member States have been inspected between two and 
five times, with visits either to the national appropriate authorities for civil aviation security or 
to airports themselves4.  

2.1. 

Inspections of national appropriate authorities 

It is now possible to provide a full picture of how all Member States fulfil their quality control 
obligations since the 10 national authorities of the new Member States, which had not been 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 
establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security. OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 
COM(2005)  428  of  22  September  2005.  First  report  on  the  implementation  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2320/2002 on civil aviation security. 
The  Commission  has  powers  to  conduct  inspections  in  Switzerland  under  a  bilateral  EU-Switzerland 
agreement.  A  total  of  11  inspections  similar  to  those  conducted  by  the  Commission  have  also  been 
carried out in Norway and Iceland by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, will be inspected for the first time in 
2007. 

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inspected  when  the  first  report  was  drawn  up,  have  now  been  inspected5.  The  initial 
conclusions drawn in 2005 can be confirmed: while transposition of the regulatory obligations 
is more or less satisfactory, the effectiveness of the Member States' national quality control is 
not. 

2.1.1.  Transposition of regulatory obligations in national regulations 

The  national  civil  aviation  security  authorities  are  inspected  to  check  that  regulatory 
obligations  have  been  properly  transposed  in  national  regulations,  in  other  words  that  a 
Member  State's  national  civil  aviation  security  programme6,  its  national  quality  control 
programme7,  its  airports'  and  air  carriers'  security  programmes8  and  its  national  training 
programme9  properly  comply  with  European  legislation.  The  inspections  have  in  particular 
revealed that: 

–  the  national  civil  aviation  security  programmes,  some  of  whose  provisions  have 
occasionally  needed  adjusting,  should  be  regularly  brought  into  line  with  the  new 
Community requirements arising from the amendment of Regulation No 622/2003; 

–  the  overall  contents  of  the  national  control  programmes  conform  to  Community 

requirements in legal terms; 

–  requirements regarding the common methodology to be used for national audits (whether 
or not unannounced, diversity of audits, classification of results) are properly provided for 
in most Member States; 

–  the  airports'  security  programmes  are  being  satisfactorily  validated;  most  of  the 
programmes  examined  by  the  Commission's  inspectors  have  been  revised  following  the 
entry into force of the new European legislation; 

–  the airlines' security programmes are not being uniformly monitored by all Member States 

and priority is going to companies whose licence is issued by the State concerned; 

–  the  development  and  implementation  of  national  security  training  programmes  are 

generally satisfactory. 

2.1.2.  Effectiveness of national quality control 

However, the operational implementation of national quality programmes has been found to 
have  numerous  deficiencies  which  are  often  considered  by  inspectors  to  be  serious;  the 
effectiveness  of  national  quality  control  is  at  present  structurally  inadequate  in  ten  or  so 
Member States. 

5 

6 
7 

8 
9 

Luxembourg  has  not  been  the  subject  of  an  inspection  by  the  national  authority  as  it  has  no  national 
quality control programme; infringement proceedings has therefore been initiated. 
Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. 

Article 5(3) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1217/2003  of  4  July  2003  laying  down  common  specifications  for  national  civil  aviation  security 
control programmes, OJ L 169, 8.07.03, p.44. 

Article 5(4) of Regulation No 2320/2002. 

Article 5(5) of Regulation No 2320/2002. 

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–  In  many  Member  States,  audits  are  neither  regular  enough  nor  comprehensive  enough  to 
respond  to  the  challenge  of  security  on  the  ground,  to  encourage  operators  to  apply 
procedures in full and to give an objective and complete view of the situation at national 
level. Some national authorities do not use the powers they have been granted to vary the 
audit methods used (security audits, inspections, tests, follow-up actions).  

–  Many  of  the  Member  States  do  not  have  enough  national  inspectors  to  carry  out  quality 
control tasks with adequate frequency10; too many inspectors, for example, are assigned for 
a significant part of their working time to other tasks, in particular regulatory issues. This 
has a direct adverse impact in terms of the level of compliance, the number of audits and 
areas covered, and the risk that auditors will have little experience. 

–  The performance of the rectification process, i.e. the speed at which deficiencies found are 
required  to  be  put  right,  varies.  In  most  Member  States,  the  implementing  powers 
conferred on the national authority are not applied with adequate force. In some Member 
States,  sanctions  are  imposed  only  in  exceptional  circumstances,  even  when  no 
rectifications are made. This weakness is paralleled by the insufficient number of follow-
up inspections on the ground. 

This finding  obviously has  an impact  on  the level  of compliance found  during  Commission 
inspections at airports. 

2.2. 

Inspections at airports  

2.2.1.  A representative sample 

Since  February  2004,  the  Commission  has  carried  out  65  airport  inspections  in  all  the 
Member  States  and  Switzerland.  These  inspections  took  place  in  49  different  airports, 
corresponding  to  about  10%  of  the  500  or  so  airports  which  have  commercial  traffic.  16  of 
these  initial  inspections  led  to  follow-up  inspections  to  check  that  deficiencies  previously 
identified  had  been  rectified.  During  the  period  July  2005-December  2006,  36  new  airport 
inspections were carried out (generally airports which play a key role in the airport system of 
the Member States concerned), 13 of them being follow-ups. This sample is clearly small in 
total, but it is in keeping with the plan for Community quality control of the Member States, 
as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. 

To  conduct  these  inspections,  the  Commission  had  ten  or  so  full-time  inspectors  at  its 
disposal, but it could also call upon the services of national auditors who were made available 
on specific occasions11. 

2.2.2.  Overview of deficiencies found 

The  results  of  the  23  new  initial  inspections  carried  out  since  July  2005  confirm  the  main 
points highlighted in the Commission's first report. In overall terms,  the  level of  security in 
the European Union is high. This is because the European legislation in several areas is more 
demanding and more detailed than the international regulations laid down by the International 

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11 

Broadly speaking, there are today about 350 national security inspectors (full-time and part-time) drawn 
from the competent national authorities (EUR 25). 
On  the  basis  of  Article  5  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1217/2003,  some  70  national  auditors  are  now 
qualified to take part in one-off Commission inspections. During the period July 2005-December 2006, 
58 national auditors were thus able to take part in initial inspections; during the period February 2004-
June 2005, the number was 32. 

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Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO)12.  However,  the  level  of  security  is  not  uniform 
throughout the Union as there are substantial differences between airports: Europe is therefore 
not  totally  protected  against  threats.  The  basic  principles,  such  as  100%  screening  of 
passengers, hand luggage and hold luggage, are being soundly applied. 

The  inspections  carried  out  in  2006  also  confirm  that  the  trend  towards  improvement  has 
continued: overall, the cases of non-compliance observed fell by 21 % and their seriousness 
by 17% compared with 200413. However, measures are not always applied in compliance with 
the  European  legislation  and  deficiencies  are  still  regularly  found  which  compromise  the 
general quality of the security measures. It is therefore a question of doing better rather than 
more.  

–  Recurring deficiencies of minor or average seriousness were found in respect of essential 
procedures  concerning  access  control,  aircraft  protection,  the  screening  of  passenger  and 
the protection of hold luggage. 

–  The cases of non-compliance with European regulations are often more serous as regards 
the  screening  of  staff,  aircraft  searches,  and  the  screening  of  hand  luggage  and  cargo. 
Within  the  same  airport,  for  example,  identical  procedures  might  not  be  used  for  the 
screening of staff and passengers, the methods applied to staff being more flexible and not 
allowing the systematic detection of prohibited articles.  

–  The  tests  carried  out  during  inspections  confirm  the  need  for  technical  harmonisation  of 
security equipment; this process has been initiated and 2 regulations have been approved 
(see section 3.1). 

–  Lastly,  some  operators  find  the  regulations  unclear,  and  further  provisions  have  been 

drafted in this respect too (see section 3.2). 

There are several reasons for these deficiencies: the human factor clearly explains many of the 
cases  of  non-compliance,  e.g.  failure  to  detect  prohibited  articles  when  cabin  baggage  is 
subjected  to  X-ray  examination.  Continuous  supervision,  training  and  raising  of  awareness 
about the terrorist threat is therefore needed. The need to carry out the various security checks 
in a minimum of time and the fast pace of aircraft rotations, which are also major operational 
constraints,  also  explain  many  of  the  deficiencies.  Finally,  some  of  the  deficiencies  are 
directly  attributable  to  the  inadequacy  and  sometimes  the  simple  lack  of  national  quality 
control since the European legislation entered into force, given that effective quality control 
does require checks on the ground. 

2.2.3. 

Seriousness of deficiencies and activation of Article 15 of Regulation No 1486/2003 

The seriousness of the deficiencies found must not be underestimated: nine initial inspections 
out of ten are still pointing to serious deficiencies which have repercussions on the security 
chain.  Given  the  principle  of  one-stop  security  which  underpins  Regulation  No  2320/2002, 
the deficiencies are often likely to have a direct negative impact on security at other European 
Union airports. 

12 
13 

Annex 17 to the Montreal Convention. 
These statistics take account of the security areas listed in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. 

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This  is  why,  in  accordance  with  the  rules14,  the  Commission  requires  the  Member  States 
concerned to rectify the situation immediately if the seriousness of a deficiency warrants this. 
If  deficiencies  are  not  rectified  immediately,  all  other  Member  States  have  to  take 
compensatory measures, often costly ones, at their airports. Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 
1486/2003 has thus been activated by the Commission on 17 occasions since 2004, but only 4 
of these were during the period covered by this report. This confirms that the Member States 
are now more willing to rectify the most serious deficiencies as quickly as possible once they 
have been detected. This is a major achievement. 

2.2.4.  Follow-up inspections and rectification process 

As  noted  in  the  2005  report,  it  is  pleasing  to  see  that  the  Member  States  welcome  the 
Commission's inspection reports. With a view to measuring the performance of the process of 
rectifying cases of non-compliance found during inspections, this being the last phase of each 
inspection, the Commission carried out 13 follow-up inspections in 13 Member States during 
the  eighteen-month  period  covered  by  this  report.  These  inspections  allow  the  following 
conclusions to be drawn: 

–  the  level  of  rectification  is  far  too  low:  Member  States  announce  that  rectifications 
requested by the Commission have been made and national audits are carried out, but it is 
often  found  that  only  some  of  the  serious  deficiencies  have  actually  been  rectified  in  a 
satisfactory manner; 

–  the security measures that most difficult to rectify are often those relating to the screening 

of staff and aircraft security; 

–  the average time taken to rectify deficiencies is quite long, at just over one year; sometimes 
this  period  is  much  shorter,  though,  often  reflecting  the  determination  shown  by  the 
competent national authority and the operators concerned. 

If  the  rectification  process  is  found  to  be  unsatisfactory  (level  of  compliance  too  low, 
rectification period too long), it is only right, once all other means have been exhausted, that 
the  Commission  should  initiate  infringement  proceedings  against  the  Member  State 
concerned.  The  Commission  had  to  take  such  action  twice  in  2005  and  2006  to  prompt  the 
national  appropriate  authorities  concerned  to  use  the  implementing  powers  at  their  disposal 
under their national quality control programmes15. 

3. 

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006 

Article  4(2)  of  Regulation  2320/200216  provides  that  the  Commission  shall  adopt  the 
necessary  measures  for  the  implementation  and  technical  adaptation  of  the  common  basic 
standards  laid  down  in  the  annex  to  that  regulation  in  accordance  with  the  comitology 
procedure provided in Article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468/EEC17 (Regulatory Committee 
procedure).  The  Commission  is  assisted  by  a  Committee  of  representatives  of  the  Member 

14 

15 
16 
17 

Article 15 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1486/2003 of 22 August 2003 laying down procedures 
for conducting Commission inspections in the field of civil aviation security states that "if an inspection 
discloses a serious deficiency which is deemed to have significant impact on the overall level of civil 
aviation  security  in  the  Community,  the  Commission  shall  immediately  inform  the  appropriate 
authorities". OJ L 213, 23.08.2003, p.3. 
Proceedings initiated against Luxembourg and Finland. 
OJ L355, 30.12.2002, p.1. 
OJ L184, 17.7.1999, p.23. 

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States established under Article 9 of Regulation 2320/2002. This procedure allows measures 
to be taken swiftly as and when needs arise. 

This  Committee  met  on  12  occasions  between  July  2005  and  December  2006,  assisting  the 
Commission in preparing aviation security legislation. During 2006 in the course of its work 
the  Committee  gave  favourable  opinions  on  the  adoption  by  the  Commission  of  six 
implementing  regulations.  As  part  of  the  adoption  process,  the  European  Parliament  was 
informed 
the  requirements  of  Article  7  of  Council  Decision 
1999/486/EC18. 

in  accordance  with 

3.1. 

Standards for all major types of security equipment 

Two  regulations  were  part  of  the  Commission’s  on-going  work  to  include  in  Regulation 
622/2003  performance  standards  for  all  major  types  of  security  equipment  used  at  EU 
airports.  Such  requirements  will  ensure  a  baseline  standard  for  such  equipment  in  use 
throughout  the  EU  and  contribute  to  improving  the  results  of  tests  carried  out  during 
inspections. 

–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1448/200619, which was adopted on 29 September 2006 
and came into force on 20 October 2006, lays down performance standards for explosive 
detection systems (EDS) used at Community airports. 

–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1862/200620, which was adopted on 15 December 2006 
and came into force on 5 January 2007, lays down performance standards for walk-through 
metal detectors (WTMDs) used at Community airports. 

3.2. 

Gaps in the existing legislation highlighted by Commission inspections 

Two  regulations  stemmed  in  part  from  the  results  of  Commission  inspections  highlighting 
deficiencies  or  weaknesses  in  the  existing  legislation.  In  this  regard  feedback  from 
Commission inspectors and analysis of inspection results by the Commission has highlighted 
the need for more precise requirements in a number of cases. 

–  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  240/200621,  adopted  on  10  February  and  which  came 
into  force  on  3  March  2006,  gives  greater  precision  on  security  procedures  for  those 
vehicles that are entering ‘security restricted areas’ of airports; 

–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 831/200622, which was adopted on 2 June 2006 and came 
into force on 1 January 2007, lays down more harmonised rules on air cargo security.  

3.3. 

Technological development in the field of aviation security 

Technological  developments  in  the  field  of  aviation  security  should  not  be  hindered  by  the 
Community legal requirements. A regulatory solution was instigated at the wishes of industry, 
with  the  full  support  of  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  Commission  Regulation 
(EC) No 65/200623 allows, under defined conditions, for Member States to deviate from the 
technical standards laid down in the legislation in order to trial new technologies. Such trials 

18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 

OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p.23. 
OJ L271, 30.09.2006, p.31. 
OJ L358, 16.12.2006, p.36. 
OJ L40, 11.2.2006, p.3. 
OJ L150, 3.6.2006, p.4. 
OJ L11, 17.1.2006, p.4. 

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would be permitted for an absolute maximum of 30 months, after which a decision should be 
taken whether or not to incorporate the new technology into Community law as an accepted 
security method. 

3.4. 

Risk of liquid explosives 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1546/200624,  which  was  adopted  on  4  October  2006  and 
came into force on 6 November 2006, arose from the events of 10 August 2006 in the United 
Kingdom. On that date, the UK intelligence services detected a plan by terrorists to blow up 
several  aircraft  during  flight  using  liquid  explosives  that  were  home-made  from  household 
chemicals. 

The  Commission's  services  then  consulted  with  Europe's  leading  technical  and  scientific 
experts  in  aviation  security  on  how  best  to  address  the  threat.  Dialogue  took  place  with  the 
Member  States  and  the  stakeholder  associations  representing  airports,  airlines  and  airport 
retailers  in  order  to  minimise  the  negative  effects  that  any  new  rulemaking  on  this  subject 
could  have  on  air  travel  in  the  Community.  Of  particular  concern  was  the  absence  on  the 
market of any form of proven equipment/technology that could swiftly and accurately analyse 
the  contents  of  a  sealed  bottle  for  liquid  explosives.  This  Regulation,  which  limits  the 
individual  quantities  of  liquids  allowed  to  be  carried  by  passengers  to  100  ml  per  container 
and requires that the number of containers fit in one transparent re-sealable plastic bag of a 
maximum  size  of  1  litre,  should  be  reviewed  every  6  months  in  the  light  of  technical 
developments, operational implications at airports and the impact on passengers. 

Studies on the creation of an air cargo database for known consigners, the use of sniffer dogs 
and  a  'trusted  traveller'  concept  have  also  been  launched  by  the  Commission  in  order  to 
undertake preparatory technical work. 

4. 

ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE  

In 2007, several lines of action in particular should be pursued: 

–  Action  to  strengthen  the  performance  of  quality  control  by  the  appropriate  authorities  of 

the Member States 

Member States' performance of quality control has so far been identified as the weak link in 
the civil aviation security chain. Strengthening it should therefore have a lever effect. It is in 
particular  essential  that  Member  States  carry  out  quality  control  in  line  with  Community 
requirements and make the lessons drawn known at all their airports. This means combining 
the  mobilisation  of  human  resources  in  the  form  of  the  inspectors  needed  with  the  use  of 
adequate implementing powers. Cooperation between Member States on auditing with a view 
to the regular evaluation of operators with business activities throughout the EU should also 
be  encouraged.  The  Commission  for  its  part  will  continue  to  conduct  inspections  and 
infringement proceedings will be brought where necessary. 

–  Actions to improve the present regulatory framework 

In  order  to  strengthen  the  complementarity  between  Community  and  national  audits, 
Regulations (EC) Nos 1486/2003 and 1217/2003 should be revised. Requirements regarding 

24 

OJ L286, 17.10.2006, p.6. 

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national  audit  procedures,  the  rectification  of  deficiencies  and  the  proportionality  of  quality 
control with the national airport system will have to be defined more clearly. 

Secondly,  given  the  importance  of  the  human  factor  for  the  quality  of  the  security  control 
process,  the  Commission  is  examining  proposals  for  improving  training  requirements  for 
security staff. 

Finally  it  is  the  Commission’s  intention  that  Regulation  (EC)  No  622/2003  should  be 
developed further on a regular basis in order to revise security requirements either whenever 
technical developments or the need for additional precision at the Community level justifies 
it. 

More generally, the Commission intends to re-assess the continued necessity of the range of 
regulatory requirements in the field of aviation security based on operational experience and 
on  updated  risk  assessments.  Successive  incidents  over  past  years  have  necessitated 
emergency  action  to  respond  to  immediate  threats,  putting  considerable  strains  on  available 
security  control  resources  and  on  operational  requirements  at  airport  level.  It  is  clear, 
however,  that  reviewing  and  subsequently  removing  or  redefining  some  of  the  current 
requirements  will  necessitate  prior  adoption  of  the  Commission's  proposal  for  a  new, 
simplified  and  more  flexible  framework  Regulation  which  is  currently  in  the  legislative 
process. 

There would  be  considerable potential for operational facilitation if ways could be found to 
extend  the  intra-EU  concept  of  one-stop  security  to  like-minded  third  countries  with 
equivalent  high  standards  of  security.  The  Commission  is  actively  working  on  this  concept 
and  is  expecting  first  results  in  due  course  following  adoption  of  the  new  framework 
Regulation. 

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Annex 1. Commission inspections by Member State on 31.12.2006 

Member State 

Number of inspections 
2004 - 06/2005 
(including follow-ups) 

Number of inspections 
07/2005 - 12/2006 
(including follow-ups) 

Total number of inspections
2004/2006 
(including follow-ups) 

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

United Kingdom 

Switzerland 

2 

1 

2 

3 

- 

3 

3 

3 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

1 

- 

1 

2 

2 

- 

1 

1 

2 

3 

2 

3 

1 

3 

2 

3 

2 

2 

2 

- 

1 

1 

1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

2 

3 

1 

2 

1 

3 

2 

4 

6 

2 

6 

4 

6 

4 

5 

3 

3 

3 

2 

2 

2 

3 

5 

4 

3 

3 

2 

4 

3 

4 

1 

TOTAL: 

42* 

47* 

89 

* These data do not take account of the two technical evaluations which took place in Bulgaria and Romania one after the 
other as part of the preparation of these countries' accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. 

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