Communication from the Commission on rights-based management tools in fisheries {SEC(2007) 247}
Date: 2007-02-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: fisheries policy, fishery management, fishing regulations, fishing rights

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 26.2.2007 
COM(2007) 73 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

on rights-based management tools in fisheries 

{SEC(2007) 247} 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

on rights-based management tools in fisheries 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

The issue....................................................................................................................... 3 

Background .................................................................................................................. 3 

The Community context............................................................................................... 4 

Rights-based management (RBM) systems ................................................................. 5 

Next steps ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Initiating a debate......................................................................................................... 7 

Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 7 

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1. 

THE ISSUE 

The  Commission  Communication  on  improving  the  economic  situation  in  the  fishing 
industry1 stated that the current difficult economic situation of many parts of the Community 
fishing  fleet  calls  for  a  different  approach  to  fisheries  management.  The  emphasis  on 
sustainable fishing practices, with higher fish stock levels, should be explicitly linked to the 
objective  of  creating  an  environment  where  fishing  vessels  and  fleets  can  be  more  efficient 
from an economic point of view. 

It has been acknowledged that the large variety of management systems currently applied by 
the Community and by Member States lacks transparency, efficacy and in some cases overall 
coherence,  which  contributes  to  the  economic  difficulties  of  the  fishing  industry.  This 
Communication  seeks  to  examine  management  options  with  a  view  to  improving  the 
effectiveness  of  fisheries  management  while  facilitating  the  achievement  of  the  basic 
objectives  that  are  being  pursued  by  the  Community  and  by  Member  States  within  the 
framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) - such as the conservation of fish stocks, 
maintenance  of  the  “relative  stability”  of  fishing  possibilities  of  Member  States,  and  a 
competitive  fisheries  sector.  The  aim  is  to  launch  a  debate  between  Member  States  and  the 
Commission on the future of rights-based management systems within the CFP. 

In this Communication we define rights-based management (RBM) as a formalised system of 
allocating individual fishing rights to fishermen, fishing vessels, enterprises, cooperatives or 
fishing communities. 

2. 

BACKGROUND 

From  the  end  of  free  access  to  fishery  resources,  all  management  systems  have  introduced 
some  form  of  access  and/or  use  rights.  This  is  also  the  case  for  the  CFP  which  inter  alia 
provides for the granting of national licences and quotas, the limitation of “days at sea” for 
certain fisheries and various measures to limit fleet capacity. Although the basic mechanisms 
of the CFP for allocating fishing rights among the Member States have proved to be efficient 
and durable, in many other respects the CFP has fallen short of its objectives, as is shown by 
the  depleted  condition  of  many  fish  stocks,  particularly  demersal  stocks,  and  the  poor 
economic performance of some parts of the fleet.  

The  management  systems  set  up  at  Member  State  and  Community  levels,  imposing 
‘restricted’ access to fishing, have implicitly resulted in allocating an economic value to the 
right  to  fish.  This  economic  value  is  directly  or  indirectly  reflected  in  the  various  market 
transactions taking place in the fishing industry today. Examples of this are the sale or leasing 
of licences, fishing days and quotas in some Member States. More indirectly, the economic 
value  of  the  right  to  fish  is  reflected  in  the  difference  in  market  prices  of  vessels  with  and 
without a licence.  

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COM(2006) 103 final. 

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In  this  way,  markets  in  fishing  rights  de  facto  exist  in  most  Member  States.  The  economic 
value of these rights is at times substantial and can have a major effect on the development of 
the fisheries sector. Our aim should be a system that helps to formalise these economic values 
as individual fishing rights, so facilitating greater transparency, legal certainty, security, and 
ultimately  greater  economic  efficiency  for  fishermen,  which  will  also  mean  minimising  the 
costs to the rest of society.  

Against this background, it is necessary to open a discussion to share and improve knowledge 
in this field and to assess the need to act.  

These elements were raised in the Roadmap2 of the Commission’s proposal for the reform of 
the  CFP,  where  the  Commission  committed  itself  to  produce  a  report  on  the  scope  for 
provisions within Community and/or national fisheries management systems for a system of 
tradable fishing rights, whether individual or collective. 

3. 

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT 

The Community fisheries sector is characterised by a multiplicity of management instruments 
and mechanisms. Fairly comparable situations are dealt with in sometimes very different ways 
depending  on  the  Member  State,  the  region  or  the  fisheries  concerned.  These  different 
approaches,  even  inside  a  Member  State,  constitute  a  considerable  body  of  practical 
experience which should be evaluated and deserves to be shared.  

Fisheries  conservation,  which  is  a  pre-condition  for  the  sustainability  of  marine  ecosystems 
and continued economic activity in this sector, is at the present time the prime and immediate 
objective.  This  is  consistent  with  the  Community’s  commitment  to  both  the  Johannesburg 
(promoting  maximum  sustainable  yield)  and  Lisbon  agendas.  A  debate  on  rights-based 
management intends to examine whether better economic management of the fisheries sector 
can  help  to  achieve  this  objective  and,  in  particular,  whether  new  and/or  improved 
management systems for the economic aspects of fishing can be designed to promote greater 
effectiveness  and  efficiency.  For  example,  a  system  of  individual  fishing  rights  or  quotas, 
territorial use rights in fishing (TURFs) or effort rights can contribute to reducing the level of 
fishing capacity and thereby  fishing pressure. All such management systems  should  thus be 
assessed in the light of their contribution to the objective of the CFP, namely "exploitation of 
resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions" (Council 
Regulation (EC) n° 2371/2002). 

The Community is responsible for limiting the total fleet size and for fixing catch and fishing 
effort levels, as well as for deciding on technical measures such as vessel/gear restrictions to 
give additional protection to fish stocks. National authorities distribute and manage licences, 
quotas and effort at the national and regional level. All these management interventions thus 
already  help  to  define  and  characterise  the  rights  of  access  and  harvest  of  individual 
fishermen.  Economic  values  can  be  attached  to  these  rights  but  this  often  occurs  in  a  non-
transparent and unpredictable way. 

2 

Communication from the Commission on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (« Roadmap »), 
COM(2002) 181 final. 

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4. 

RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT (RBM) SYSTEMS 

There should be no confusion as to what a formalised RBM system can offer. It is no panacea 
for the problems facing fisheries. It is not a management tool in its own right, but a means to 
help fishermen perform better from an economic viewpoint. Hence, there will still be a need 
for conservation objectives to be sought through various fisheries management measures (e.g. 
quotas).  However,  formalising  fishing  rights  can  simultaneously  help  society  reach  these 
objectives  and  to  do  so  in  a  more  cost-effective  manner.  It  has  been  argued  that  economic 
sustainability will, in the longer term, also deliver improved biological sustainability, since a 
well-functioning  RBM  system  should  lead  to  an  increased  vested  interest  of  fishermen  and 
industry in the sustainability of the resource base. 

It should be acknowledged from the outset that in theory any barriers to normal and free trade 
of  rights  (such  as  quotas)  will  lead  to  a  situation  where  the  allocation  of  quota  will  not  be 
optimal in economic terms. Nevertheless, in political terms it is perfectly legitimate for each 
Member State to opt for a sub-optimal system that is compatible with its national goals. This 
can  allow  for  trade-offs  between  conflicting  objectives  such  as  in  the  short  term  economic 
efficiency and the maintenance of employment, or to influence the allocation of fishing rights 
between  different  sub-sectors  in  the  fishing  industry,  i.e.  between  artisanal  and  large  scale 
fleets. 

The most controversial aspect of RBM systems is the transferability of rights. The reasoning 
behind  the  tradability  of  rights  is  primarily  economic:  the  efficiency  of  fishing  enterprises 
improves following the exit of economically weaker vessels from the fleet while the transfer 
of  quotas  from  less  profitable  to  more  profitable  vessels  introduces  a  price  for  using  the 
resource.  The  introduction  of  a  resource  price  may  lead  to  large-scale  buying  of  rights, 
resulting in concentration of ownership of quotas, geographical distribution of fishing activity 
and fleet composition. It should be noted that such concentration has already occurred and can 
be  expected  to  continue  irrespective  of  the  existence  of  RBM  systems,  notably  because 
fishing  possibilities  have  been  reduced  to  a  level  that  makes  fishing  uneconomic  for  many 
vessels which are increasingly opting for national decommissioning schemes. 

To  counterbalance  the  risk  of  concentration,  RBM  systems  can  be  designed  to  deter 
concentrations  beyond  a  certain  threshold,  so  as  to  preserve  the  geographical  balance  of 
fishing activities and to maintain to a large extent the current cultural, social and professional 
fabric.  For  example,  when  RBM  systems  are  likely  to  affect  small-scale  inshore  fishing 
activities  which  exploit  the  same  resource  and  have  a  major  impact  on  the  local  economy, 
there  is  a  strong  argument  in  favour  of  a  prudent  approach.  Small-scale  fisheries  could  be 
protected as a political priority, by some form of community development quota system, with 
the  specific  aim  of  protecting  the  interest  of  this  part  of  the  fishing  industry  against  more 
capital-intensive competitors.  

However, any mechanisms established to limit the negative effects that might result from an 
unregulated market, mainly in terms of concentrations and relocations, should be compatible 
with Community single market and competition rules. Experience has shown that vigilance is 
needed in this respect, as various mechanisms can be contradictory to Community rules. Any 
such mechanisms would have to be systematically subject to examination by the Commission. 

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RBM  systems  may  also  contribute  to  “highgrading”  and  discard  problems  which  endanger 
resource sustainability and complicate assessment of the real level of catches. However, these 
challenges  also  exist  under  current  management  regimes  and  should  not  be  regarded  as 
exclusive  to  RBM  systems.  The  Commission  is  currently  preparing  a  policy  initiative  on 
discards which should help to mitigate any such effect of wider use of RBM systems. In this 
context, the need for improved enforcement and control of fishing activities is essential to the 
ultimate success of any management system that is in place. 

5. 

NEXT STEPS 

Given the recognition by the CFP of the principle of “relative stability” for the allocation of 
fishing possibilities between Member States, which is intended to ensure "a predictable share 
of the stocks for each Member State" (Council Regulation (EC) n° 2371/2002), there seems to 
be  no  possibility  of  moving  to  a  Community-level  RBM  system,  in  which  fishing  rights 
would be freely tradable between Member States, at this stage. Any use of RBM systems in 
the current CFP should be developed at the Member State level, focusing on the tradability of 
fishing  rights  within  the  Member  State.  This  would  not,  of  course,  prevent  a  Member  State 
from deciding that its own RBM system should allow for exchange in quotas with nationals of 
other Member States, as is already the case. 

Any Community-level debate on fisheries management systems has to focus on the analysis 
of current national systems and on the possibility of improving their efficiency by sharing best 
practice. It should be stressed again that each Member State is free to set its own objectives in 
terms of the economic, social and cultural dimensions of fisheries management. 

Based  on  national,  "bottom-up"  approaches  to  considering  whether  RBM  systems  are 
appropriate it is important for each Member State to examine how its various objectives can 
be reached and what trade-offs between objectives can be expected. In this regard, the debate 
should further draw on industry opinion through the involvement of the Advisory Committee 
for  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  (ACFA)  and  on  the  involvement  of  the  Social  Dialogue 
Committee  in  the  Sea  Fishing  Sector,  since  a  well  functioning  RBM  will  require  strong 
governance at all levels. 

More  fundamentally,  there  may  be  a  number  of  obstacles  within  Member  States  to  the 
establishment  of  relatively  uniform  RBM  systems.  Because  of  custom  and  tradition  some 
countries question the granting of access rights to a public resource to private interests, even 
temporarily.  In  addition,  these  rights  must  be  integrated  into  the  wide  variety  of  legal 
frameworks in Member States. 

Finally, a Community-level debate on RBM should also include consideration of transnational 
elements  such  as  seeking  synergies  between  Member  States  systems,  or  introducing 
exchanges of quotas between Member States. This raises the further concern of the potential 
impacts of any shift in geographical allocation of quota on the “relative stability” principle.  

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6. 

INITIATING A DEBATE 

The need for a Community-level debate on the economic aspects of fisheries management is 
underlined by the new orientation of the CFP, in particular in relation to long-term sustainable 
development goals (as reflected in the recent Commission Communication on implementing 
an  MSY  strategy),  recent  initiatives  to  improve  economic  profitability  of  fishing  fleets 
through rescue and restructuring aid, and the new European Fisheries Fund.  

Furthermore, selling and buying of fishing rights already occur in some Member States, either 
within established markets or indirectly. Fishing rights thus already exist de facto, with often 
unclear effects on the industry and fishing communities. To start a debate on these matters is 
both important and urgent. 

Commission discussions with industry and Member States have revealed particularly sensitive 
topics in the setting up of RBM systems. These include: 

–  The issue of "relative stability"; 

–  Transferability  of  fishing  rights,  which  may  involve  an  excessive,  and  often  irreversible, 

concentration of these rights;  

–  Initial allocation and durability of fishing rights; 

–  Possible  adverse  conditions  for  the  small-scale  fisheries  sector  when  it  coexists  with 

industrial fishing enterprises; 

–  “High grading” and discard problems; 

–  The need for efficient enforcement controls. 

These topics need to be addressed directly if a pragmatic debate on the future of rights-based 
management  within  the  CFP  is  to  be  constructive.  The  Commission  intends  to  inform  this 
debate,  within  the  limits  of  its  resources,  by  a  range  of  specific  studies  and  expertise.  The 
Commission  plans  to  sum  up  the  debate  and  assess  the  need  for  further  action  within  12 
months of the adoption of this Communication.  

The  Commission  will  then  report  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  and,  if  and 
when appropriate, make proposals or recommendations for follow-up. 

7. 

CONCLUSION 

The  Commission  considers  it  important  to  start  reflecting  on  the  issue  of  rights-based 
management  tools  in  fisheries.  Several  experiences  in  this  field  exist  in  various  Member 
States, and it is now important that we improve our understanding of how fishing rights are 
created  and  exist  within  the  Community,  that  we  share  and  discuss  knowledge  and  good 
practices  in  this  area  and  whether  adjustments  or  new  initiatives  may  be  warranted  with  a 
view  to  better  serving  the  general  objectives  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy.  The 
Commission  is  looking  forward  to  a  pragmatic,  transparent  and  fruitful  debate  amongst 
stakeholders and Member States. 

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