Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Green Paper — European Transparency Initiative COM(2006) 194 final
Date: 2006-10-26
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: access to EU information, administrative transparency, consultation procedure, fraud, operation of the Institutions, regulations for civil servants

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Official Journal of the European Union

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Green Paper — European Trans-
parency Initiative

COM(2006) 194 final

(2006/C 324/25)

On 12 May 2006, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social
Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the Green Paper —
European Transparency Initiative

Under Rule 19(1) of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee decided to establish a subcommittee to prepare
its work on the matter.

In view of the renewal of the Committee's term of office, the Plenary Assembly decided to vote on this
opinion at its October plenary session and appointed Ms Sánchez Miguel as rapporteur-general under Rule
20 of the Rules of Procedure.

At its 430th plenary session, held on 25 and 26 October 2006 (meeting of 26 October), the European
Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 132 votes to 7, with 12 abstentions.

1. Background

The European Commission is aware of the need to estab-
1.1
lish a framework for improving transparency between the EU
institutions and lobby groups, whilst providing the public with
better information on the beneficiaries of the funds that the EU
distributes under its various policies.

1.2
Against this backdrop, the Commission put in place the
European Transparency Initiative, although it must be said that
this concern had already been voiced in the White Paper on
European Governance and subsequently built on in:

— Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
documents;

— a special register for documents relating to the work of the

Committees;

— Commission databases providing information about consul-

tative bodies and advisory groups;

— the Commission's ‘Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’,
which sets the standards for its relations with the public.

The Green Paper thus puts forward three aspects to take
1.3
into account in a public debate on transparency in the activities
of the EU institutions, specifically:

— the need for a more structured framework for the activities

of lobbyists;

— feedback on the Commission's minimum standards for

consultation;

— mandatory disclosure of information about the beneficiaries

of EU funds under shared management.

ensure greater transparency in its relations with lobby groups or
with any other member of the public who turns to the Euro-
pean institutions, there must be a clear definition of what is
meant by ‘lobbyists’ and ‘lobbying’.

The basic framework for relations between the institu-
2.1.2
tions and lobbyists must, the Commission believes, contain a
number of essential components which, working from the basic
assumption that lobbying is a legitimate activity, promote trans-
parency in relations. Therefore, no questionable influence or
economic pressure on decision-making or financial, material or
personal inducements should be permitted under any circum-
stances. It is essential to prevent the distribution of deliberately
ambiguous or false information from doubtful sources. At all
events, it is the ‘general interest of the Community’ that must be
safeguarded, and not the specific interests of the lobbyists.

First and foremost, any lobbying practice which could
2.1.3
give rise to fraud or corruption, or which could be misleading,
either in the information it provides or in the legitimacy of the
lobbyists, must be considered to be unlawful. An important
issue is the representativeness of these groups.

2.1.4 Measures currently in place, especially those concerned
with external scrutiny, can improve transparency in relations
between the institutions and lobby groups. To this end, a
‘general principles and minimum standards for
number of
consultation’ were established,
improving communication by
means of
the CONECCS database on European civil society
organisations, which contains the data necessary to prove that
they are indeed representative.

2. Summary of the aims of the Green Paper

2.1 Transparency and lobbying

The Commission is of the view that, in order to better
2.1.1
assess the results of the standards that have been set, and to

2.1.5
At all events, there appears to be a need to step up
external scrutiny, even though some of the measures proposed
by the Commission to achieve this are already in force in many
Member States. The first measure suggested concerns the infor-
mation provided by lobby groups, which would be improved by
means of a dedicated questionnaire on the Commission website.

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tool

important

The most

is the voluntary Internet-
2.1.6
based register, which would help to provide the information
required for assessing organisations' stated aims and sources of
funding. It should be noted at this point that many of the Euro-
pean Commission's Directorates-General already have a system
for recognising accredited organisations, which helps to facilitate
relations with them.

2.1.7
Another issue worth highlighting is that of the codes
of conduct, which would apply equally to all lobby groups and
their representatives, regardless of their category. The idea is
that these codes, which would be adopted on a voluntary basis
and drawn up independently by the groups themselves, would
share a number of minimum requirements.

2.2 Feedback on the minimum standards for consultation

It should be pointed out that under its annual work
2.2.1
programmes,
the Commission has laid down a number of
minimum standards for consultation, in order to improve the
quality of
legislative proposals; hence the importance of the
final results for the impact assessment. Nevertheless, there is a
set of decisions that remain outside the scope of this consulta-
tion, such as the comitology procedure and social dialogue, as
set out in Articles 137 to 139 of the EC Treaty, referred to
below.

2.2.2
Since this procedure was put in place, the Commission
has found it satisfactory, not only in terms of the number of
proposals consulted on, but also in terms of the results, espe-
cially through its Internet portal.

2.3 Disclosure of beneficiaries of Community funds

2.3.1
To date, most Member States have developed informa-
tion channels for publishing lists of beneficiaries of Community
funds that they co-finance. The most noteworthy example is the
publication of beneficiaries of the CAP. Nevertheless, it is a fact
that the data obtained varies from one country to another, as
does the information concerning the use of funds in policies
directly funded by the EU.

The proposal is for the Commission to make this infor-
2.3.2
mation available centrally. The issue is the complexity of cate-
gorising the different beneficiaries and the administrative costs
that this might entail. One solution might be, whilst complying
with data protection standards, to establish minimum informa-
tion requirements.

3.1.3 Would there be unrestricted public access
register? Who would oversee this register?

to the

3.1.4
amended?

Should the codes of conduct currently in force be

3.1.5
tored and should it even be possible to impose sanctions?

Should compliance with the codes of conduct be moni-

As regards feedback received during the consultation

3.2
process, there is only one issue:

3.2.1
ples and minimum standards for consultation satisfactory?

Is the Commission's application of the general princi-

Disclosure of beneficiaries of EU funds

3.3
following questions:

raises

the

3.3.1
mation on the beneficiaries of EU funds?

Should all Member States be obliged to provide infor-

3.3.2
level and have a set content?

If the answer is yes, should this be done at national

4. General comments

4.1
The EESC welcomes the European Commission's Green
Paper on Transparency. The existence of many interests that
seek to influence Community policy requires the Commission
to establish standards regulating the way in which this influence
can be exerted and also the requirements that must be met by
the individuals and organisations representing these interests.

4.2
However, the term ‘lobbyists’ and the nature of their rela-
tionship with the Commission must be defined in advance and
this definition should leave no room for misunderstanding.

‘lobbyists’

trade associations, etc.,

The Green Paper's (1) definition of

4.2.1
is
confusing to say the least, because it lists socio-professional
organisations, NGOs,
that carry out
activities ‘with the objective of influencing the policy formula-
tion and decision-making processes of the European institu-
tions’. The EESC has already developed the concept of
‘civil
society organisations’ (2)
in order to differentiate these from
lobby groups. Furthermore, Articles 137 to 139 TEC lay down
the conditions under which ‘management and labour’ can enter
into social dialogue (3). Organisations which carry out lobbying
activities in the EU differ in their aims, their structures and in

3. The most important issues contained in the Green Paper

In relation to the first of the issues raised — transparency

3.1
and lobbying, the following questions arise:

3.1.1 Measures to improve transparency in the activities of
lobbyists.

3.1.2
feature on a register?

Are lobbyists to be consulted automatically if

they

(1) Green Paper II. 1. p. 5.
(2) See, in particular, the Committee Opinions on ‘The role and contribu-
tion of civil society organisations in the building of Europe’ of 23
September 1999 (OJ C 329, 17.11.1999), ‘Organised civil society and
European governance: the Committee's contribution to the drafting of
the White Paper’ of 26 April 2001 (OJ C 193 of 10.7.2001), ‘European
Governance — a White Paper’ of 21 March 2002 (OJ C 125 of
27.5.2002), and ‘The representativeness of European civil society orga-
nisations in civil dialogue’ of 14 February 2006 (OJ C 88 of
11.4.2006).

(3) It should be taken into account that Article I– 48 of the European
Constitution sets out the role of social partners and autonomous social
dialogue, differentiating it from consultation of the so-called interested
parties named in preceding articles.

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Industrial, employers' and
the interest groups they support.
employees' associations, which represent the interests of thou-
sands,
if not millions, of European companies or employees
should, therefore, not be counted amongst organisations and
interest groups that carry out lobbying activities in pursuit of
narrow commercial or other interests, given that they represent
a broad range of common, public interests in society and
enhance industrial and economic development, as well as
economic and social progress. These organisations are not profit
oriented. The public are well aware of their activities, which are
aimed at the common good; the press reports on these in detail;
and they themselves have an interest in ensuring that as much
information as possible is provided on their activities. These
organisations are, in fact, social partners who take part in social
dialogue at European level, together with state institutions.

4.2.2
It would therefore be advisable to state precisely who is
meant by the term ‘lobbyists’, and especially to acknowledge
that their existence is part and parcel of participatory democracy
in the EU.

In order

to ensure the principle of participatory
4.2.3
democracy, Article I-46.3 of
the draft Constitutional Treaty
states that ‘Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the
democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as
closely as possible to the citizen.’ In addition, Article I-47.3 recog-
nises that ‘The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with
parties concerned in order
the Union's actions are
to ensure that
coherent and transparent.’

4.2.4 With regard to the activities of ‘lobbyists’, a distinction
should be made between access to information and consulta-
tion. EU citizens have a right to information; this is an integral
part of the transparency that all EU institutions must demon-
strate. Consultation is limited to those that have a legitimate
interest in Community policies.

The Commission adopted ‘minimum standards

4.2.5
for
consultation’ (4) an attempt to establish a general transparent,
coherent and yet
flexible framework that would allow for
consultation on policies in specific areas, especially in those
requiring an impact assessment. The Green Paper takes a new
approach to, and improves some of, the conditions for the parti-
cipation and consultation of interested parties. This is reflected
in the transparent results of these processes.

5. Specific comments on the questions raised in the Green

Paper

Register. The registration requirement should be consid-
5.1
ered a precondition for the acquisition of a right, such as the
right to compulsory consultation of the interested parties on the
subjects that concern them. In this respect, the EESC considers

(4) COM(2002) 704 final — 11 December 2002.

that a compulsory register is a minimum requirement for the
transparency with which consultation on Community policies
should take place and above all to ensure that this is not done
to benefit in ways that run counter to the general interest.

regardless of

The public nature of any register is beyond question.
5.1.1
Furthermore, this register should be overseen by the Commis-
sion, its public nature excluding any other form of management.
Finally,
compulsory registration system
selected, the extent of the information to be provided by the
interested parties must be proportionate to the objective
pursued, namely enabling European citizens to be informed
about the interest groups which wish to influence the policies
and decisions of the Union.

the

5.1.2 With this in mind, it should be made clear what contri-
bution lobbying groups make to EU bodies and institutions,
who they represent, what objectives that pursue and how they
are financed. As a minimum requirement,
this information
should include, in addition to the organisation's name and head-
quarters, its business name, in line with the aims pursued by the
organisation in question, the names of the persons authorised
to represent it and to speak on its behalf, and any relevant infor-
mation which might shed light on its statutes and revised finan-
cial accounts.

5.2
Code of conduct. The existence of a code of conduct
should be linked to compliance with various minimum condi-
tions for the acquisition of a certain professional or political
status. This condition must be seen as an instrument related to
the compulsory nature of the register. Compliance with it by
those requesting inclusions will guarantee the right to consulta-
tion by the Commission and the other Community bodies.

5.2.1
The EESC is of the view that the Commission should
adopt a binding code of conduct, thereby ensuring de facto and
de jure equal treatment between all parties concerned,
linked
with a compulsory registration system, similar to the one estab-
lished by the European Parliament (5), adapting its content to
the type of consultation sought and in particular with regard to
the consequences of failure to comply.

(5) European Parliament Rules of Procedure, Annex IX. Article 3 : Code

of conduct
‘1.

In the context of their relations with Parliament, the persons
whose names appear in the register provided for in Rule 9(4)
shall:
(a) comply with the provisions of Rule 9 and this Annex;
(b)
state the interest or interests they represent in contacts with
Members of Parliament, their staff or officials of Parliament;
(c) refrain from any action designed to obtain information

dishonestly;

(d)
not claim any formal relationship with Parliament in any deal-
ings with third parties;
(e) not circulate for a profit to third parties copies of documents

obtained from Parliament;

(f) comply strictly with the provisions of Annex I, Article 2,

second paragraph;

(g) satisfy themselves that any assistance provided in accordance
with the provisions of Annex I, Article 2 is declared in the
appropriate register;

(h)
comply, when recruiting former officials of the institutions, with
the provisions of the Staff Regulations;
(i) observe any rules laid down by Parliament on the rights and

(j)

responsibilities of former Members;
in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest, obtain the
prior consent of
the Member or Members concerned as
regards any contractual relationship with or employment of
a Member's assistant, and subsequently satisfy themselves
that this is declared in the register provided for in Rule 9(4).
2. Any breach of this Code of Conduct may lead to the withdrawal
of the pass issued to the persons concerned and, if appropriate,
their firms.’

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Feedback on the minimum standards for consulta-
5.3
tion: every DG is obliged to undertake an impact assessment of
the consultation, accompanied by a list of those who have been
consulted, but only for the Commission's strategic proposals.
The EESC considers that this evaluation or feedback should be
provided for all proposals on which public consultation takes
place. To improve
the Commission should
address certain important issues, such as:

consultations,

— the languages in which the consultations are carried out

— the neutrality of questions asked

— the weighting of individual positions and comments of orga-
nisations taking part in the consultations according to their
representativeness.

5.3.1 We believe that the information on general consulta-
tion is insufficient,
that each organisation consulted should
receive the relevant specific information, and that longer dead-
lines should be established to allow for debate within the organi-
sations themselves. Broad consultation via the Internet could
result in the same weight being given to the opinions of indivi-
duals or non-representative organisations as to those of organi-
sations whose viewpoint reflects a position shared by member
organisations in a number of countries.

Brussels, 26 October 2006

Disclosure of beneficiaries of Community funds The
5.4
EESC proposes that, just as the beneficiaries of funds managed
by the Commission are disclosed, the beneficiaries of funds
managed by all
should also be
the European institutions
disclosed, as should the beneficiaries of funds jointly managed
by the Member States, as the latter are responsible for allocating
these funds.

5.4.1
Some Member States are exemplary in the way they
comply with current publishing obligation, in the area of EU
agricultural assistance for example; others less so. The EESC
calls for it to be made compulsory for all Member States to
disclose all information relating to beneficiaries in the frame-
work of the EU funds under shared management and also to
publish this information on the internet.

The EESC would like the Commission to consider
5.5
whether
the
it would be advisable for any monitoring of
outcome of the consultation procedure also to apply to the
members of the Commission performing these tasks, as set out
in Article 213(2) TEC; it also calls for strict compliance with
Articles 11 and 16 of the Staff Regulations. All parties involved
in a consultation and decision-making procedure must be
considered, so as to ensure transparency and that the institu-
tions act correctly.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS