Proposal for a Council Decision approving the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Date: 2006-09-21
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: international convention, international transport, nuclear fuel, nuclear safety, radioactive materials, transport of dangerous goods

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 21.9.2006 
COM(2006) 518 final 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL DECISION 

approving the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 

(presented by the Commission) 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material  (“CPPNM” 
thereinafter)  was  signed  in  1980  under  the  auspices  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and entered into force in 1987. 118 states and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (“Euratom” thereinafter) are parties to the CPPNM1. All 
the Member States of the European Union are parties of the CPPNM. 

In  accordance  with  Article  18.4a)  of  the  CPPNM,  Euratom  signed  the  CPPNM  on 
13. 6. 1980 and acceded to it on 6.10 19912. 

The  objective  of  the  CPPNM  is,  in  particular,  to  apply  the  measures  of  physical 
protection during the international transport of nuclear materials. 

In 1999 a number of countries indicated that the CPPNM was not comprehensive and 
in  need  of  a  revision,  mainly  because  it  did  not  cover  certain  major  aspects  of 
physical  protection.  Shortcomings  were  identified  in  the  protection  of  material  for 
domestic  use,  storage,  and  transport.  Moreover  the  CPPNM  was  found  not  to  deal 
adequately with the protection of nuclear facilities against malicious acts. In order to 
answer  these  concerns  the  Director  General  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency (IAEA) set up in June 2001 an “Open-Ended Group of Legal and Technical 
Experts to Prepare a draft Amendment of the CPPNM” to discuss whether there is a 
need to revise the CPPNM. 

An Amendment  Conference took  place in Vienna at the Headquarters of the IAEA 
from  Monday,  4  to  Friday,  8  July  2005.  The  Conference  adopted  on  8  July  the 
Amendment to the CPPNM.  

The  Council  by  its  Decision  of  28  June  20053  had  authorized  the  Commission  to 
negotiate amendments to the CPPNM with regard to matters covered by Community 
competence. The Euratom Community therefore participated fully in the Amendment 
Conference.  The  Final  Act  of  the  Amendment  Conference  was  signed  by  the 
Commission representative on behalf of Euratom on 8 July 2005. 

2. 

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CPPNM 

The  amendments  to  the  CPPNM  are  designed  to  significantly  strengthen  its 
effectiveness.  

This becomes already clear by the description of the objectives in the new article 1A 
of  the  Convention:  “The  purposes  of  this  Convention  are  to  achieve  and  maintain 
worldwide  effective  physical  protection  of  nuclear  material  used  for  peaceful 

1 
2 

3 

Status of 27 June 2006 
Council  Decision  of  9  June  1980  approving  the  conclusion  by  the  Commission  of  the  International 
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, Official Journal L 149, 17.6.1980 p. 41 
doc. 1024/05 ATO 62 CONOP 33 =C 438 

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purposes and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat 
offences  relating  to  such  material  and  facilities  worldwide;  as  well  as  to  facilitate 
cooperation among States Parties to those ends”.  

The  amendments  therefore  extend  the  scope  of  the  Convention  beyond  nuclear 
materials  during  international  transport  to  cover  nuclear  material  within  country 
boundaries, while in use, transport or storage. 

Moreover, to achieve a more comprehensive physical protection of nuclear materials 
the  amended  CPPNM  not  only  covers  the  materials  as  such,  but  also  the  relevant 
nuclear  facilities.  The  CPPNM  has  therefore  been  renamed  the  Convention  on  the 
physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. 

The  amended  CPPNM  describes  in  detail  what  is  meant  by  “nuclear  facility”:  a 
facility  in  which  nuclear  material  is  produced,  processed,  used,  handled,  stored  or 
disposed of, if damage to or interference with such facility could lead to the release 
of significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material, it also includes associated 
buildings  and  equipment  which,  if  interfered  with,  could  release  radiation  or 
radioactive material (Article 1 (d)). 

The  new  text  also  requires  the  establishment  of  an  appropriate  physical  protection 
regime  (Article  2A  §  1)  legislative  and  regulatory  frameworks  (Article  2A  §2  (a)) 
and competent authorities for their implementation (Article 2A §2 (b)). 

Furthermore it sets out 12 “fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear 
material  and  nuclear  facilities”  that  state  parties  to  the  new  Convention  shall  apply 
(Article 2A § 3). 

The amended Convention has direct implications relating to the Safeguard regime as 
it  is  defined  in  Chapter  VII  of  the  Euratom  Treaty4.  In  particular,  it  should  be 
highlighted the statement of responsibility for the establishment, implementation and 
maintenance of a physical protection regime (Principle A); for ensuring that nuclear 
material  is  adequately  protected  extends  to  the  international  transport  thereof,  until 
that  responsibility  is  properly  transferred  to  another  State,  as  appropriate  (principle 
B); for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern 
physical  protection  (Principle  C);  to  establish  or  designate  a  competent  authority 
which  is  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  legislative  and  regulatory 
framework (Principle D); to clearly identify the responsibilities for implementing the 
various elements of physical protection within a State (Principle E) and to establish 
Contingency  (emergency)  plans  to  respond  to  unauthorized  removal  of  nuclear 
material  or  sabotage  of  nuclear  facilities  or  nuclear  material,  or  attempts  thereof, 
which  should  be  appropriately  exercised  by  all  license  holders  and  authorities 
concerned. (Principle K). 

The amended CPPNM also specifically requires from State parties protection against 
theft, smuggling and sabotage (Article 2A § 1). 

4 

Articles 77-85 Euratom Treaty 

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It  also  provides  for  expanded  cooperation  between  and  among  States  and 
international  cooperation  regarding  rapid  measures  to  locate  and  recover  stolen  or 
smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and 
prevent and combat related offences (Article 5). 

A  further  highly  important  amendment  is  the  new  requirement  stipulated  in  the 
Convention,  that  the  intentional  carrying  out  of  different  acts,  threats  and  attempts 
“shall  be  made  a  punishable  offence  by  each  State  Party  under  its  national  law” 
(Article 7 paragraph 1). 

3. 

THE  ROLE  AND  COMPETENCES  OF  EURATOM  ALONGSIDE  THE 
MEMBER STATES IN THE CONVENTION 

Article 101 paragraph 1 Euratom Treaty foresees that “the Community may, within 
the  limits  of  its  powers  and  jurisdiction,  enter  into  obligations  by  concluding 
agreements with … an international organisation …”. 

The  role  and  competences  of  Euratom  within  the  framework  of  the  CPPNM  were 
confirmed in 1978 by the Court of Justice5: 

“…Article  2(e)  (of  the  Euratom  Treaty)  gives  the  Community  the  task  of  making 
certain,  by  appropriate  supervision,  that  nuclear  materials  are  not  diverted  to 
purposes other that those for which they are intended, without making any distinction 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  such  diversions  and  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
might take place and finally that the very expression “safeguards” which the Treaty 
uses  to  characterize  the  provisions  of  chapter  VII  has  a  wider  scope  than  the  mere 
substitution  of  a  different  destination  for  the  one  declared  by  a  user  of  nuclear 
materials.  The  Treaty  here  envisages  all  diversions  of  nuclear  materials  entailing  a 
security  risk  that  is  to  say  the  danger  of  interference  with  the  vital  interests  of  the 
public  and  the  states.  Consequently  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  concept  of 
“safeguards”  within  the  meaning  of  the  Treaty  is  sufficiently  comprehensive  to 
include also measures of physical protection.” 

The Court concluded that “the participation of the Member States in the CPPNM …. 
is  compatible  with  the  provisions  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  only  subject  to  the 
conditions  that,  in  so  far  as  its  own  powers  and  jurisdiction  are  concerned,  the 
Community as such is a party to the CPPNM on the same lines as the States”. And 
that  certain  commitments  of  the  CPPNM  can  only  be  implemented,  where  the 
Community is concerned, by means of close association between the Community and 
the Member States, both in negotiation and  conclusion process and in fulfilment of 
the commitments assumed. 

Having in mind the modernising approach as the overall objective of the amendment 
of  the  CPPNM  to  better  respond  to  new  threats  and  to  achieve  greater  nuclear 
security  by  combating,  preventing,  and  ultimately  punishing  those  who  would 
engage in nuclear theft, sabotage or even terrorism, the conclusions of the Court has 

5 

Ruling  of  the  Court  of  14  November  1978,  Ruling  1/78  ,  Ruling  delivered  pursuant  to  the  third 
paragraph  of  Article  103  of  the  EAEC  Treaty,  ECR  1978,  p.  2151,  in  particular  §§  21,  34  and  First 
operative part of the Ruling 

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to be interpreted in a new light, which implies that also the scope of application of 
the Convention to Euratom will have to be adapted accordingly. In an anology to the 
recent  judgement  of  the  Court6  related  to  the  protection  of  the  environment,  the 
requirement to establish sanctions by the Member States cannot per se be excluded 
from  Euratom  competence.  In  this  judgment  the  Court:  confirmed,  that  there  is  a 
Community  competence  in  principle  to  require  the  Member  States  to  lay  down 
criminal penalties for the protection of essential objectives of the Community 

It is common ground that the physical protection of nuclear materials constitutes one 
of the essential objectives of the Community as it is expressed by the comprehensive, 
legally binding and enforceable Euratom safeguards system. 

In that regard, Article 2e Euratom Treaty states that the Community has as its task to 
“make certain, …, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purpose other than those 
for which they are intended”. 

Therefore to ensure a high level of safeguards it could prove necessary for Euratom 
to take measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States.  

Therefore  the  important  amendments  inserted  in  Article  7  paragraph  1  of  the 
Convention,  that  the  intentional  commission  of  different  acts,  threats  and  attempts 
“shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party under its national law”, are 
not per se excluded to apply also to Euratom. 

When acceding to the CPPNM the Commission will have to declare on behalf of the 
Community  to  the  depository,  as  Article  18.4.c)  requires  from  an  regional 
organisation of  an  integration  or other nature which accedes to the CPPNM, which 
articles do not apply to it. 

Taking  into  account  the  above  guidelines  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  Declaration 
shall  state  that  Articles  8-137  are  not  applicable  to  the  Community  as  opposed  to 
individual Member States. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

In view of the proposed amendments to the CPPNM described above, and the cited 
ruling  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  it  is  necessary  that  the  Community  continues  to 
participate  fully  in  the  Convention,  particularly  with  the  view  to  ensuring 
compatibility between the implementation of the Convention and the Euratom Treaty 
and its secondary legislation. 

Therefore the Commission proposes to the Council to adopt, in accordance with Article 101 
paragraph  2  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  the  enclosed  Decision  approving  the  conclusion  of  the 
Convention by the Commission. 

6 

7 

Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-176/03 of 13 September 2005, Commission of the European 
Communities v Council of the European Union, in particular §§ 47 and 48 
Articles 8-13 of the CPPNM deal with the definition of legal regimes for criminal offences, pursuit and 
extradition of offenders and related matters. 

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Proposal for a 

COUNCIL DECISION 

approving the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  and  in 
particular the second paragraph of Article 101 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission8, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Article  2  e)  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  states  that  the  Community  shall  make  certain,  by 
appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purpose other than 
those for which they are intended. 

The  Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material  (CPPNM)  was 
adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1987. 118 states and the European Atomic 
Energy Community are parties to the CPPNM9. All the Member States are Parties to 
the CPPNM. 

An  Amendment  Conference  in  accordance  with  Article  20  of  the  CPPNM  was 
convened on 4 July 2005 under the auspices of the IAEA. The final act regarding the 
amendments  to  the  Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material  was 
signed  by  the  European  Commission  on  behalf  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community on 8 July 2005. 

(4)  When  “regional  organisations  of  an  integration  or  other  nature”  become  party  to  the 
Convention,  it  has  to  communicate  to  the  Depositary  a  declaration  indicating  which 
States are members thereof and which articles of this Convention do not apply to it, in 
accordance with Article 18 of the said Convention. 

(5) 

8 
9 
10 

The  Court  of  Justice10  decided  that  the  participation  of  the  Member  States  in  the 
CPPNM is compatible with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty only subject to the 
conditions  that,  in  so  far  as  its  own  powers  and  jurisdiction  are  concerned,  the 
Community as such is a party to the CPPNM on the same lines as the Member States. 
And  that  certain  commitments  of  the  CPPNM  can  only  be  implemented,  where  the 

OJ C , , p. . 
Status of 27 June 2006 
Ruling  of  the  Court  of  14  November  1978,  Ruling  1/78,  Ruling  delivered  pursuant  to  the  third 
paragraph of Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty, ECR 1978, p. 2151, in particular First operative part of 
the Ruling and § 34 

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Community is concerned, by means of close association between the Community and 
the Member States, both in negotiation and conclusion process and in fulfilment of the 
commitments assumed. 

(6) 

The Court of Justice11 confirmed further that Article 2(e) of the Euratom Treaty gives 
the  Community  the  task  of  making  certain,  by  appropriate  supervision,  that  nuclear 
materials  are  not  diverted  to  purposes  other  that  those  for  which  they  are  intended, 
without  making  any  distinction  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  such  diversions  and  the 
circumstances  in  which  they  might  take  place  and  finally  that  the  very  expression 
“safeguards” which the Treaty uses to characterize the provisions of chapter VII has a 
wider scope than the mere substitution of a different destination for the one declared 
by a user of nuclear materials. 

(7) 

Therefore the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the amended 
Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material  and  Nuclear  Facilities 
should be approved. 

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 

Sole Article 

The accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as amended by the Final Act signed on 
8 July 2005 is hereby approved. 

The  text  of  the  amended  Convention  and  of  the  declaration  by  Euratom  according  to  the 
provisions of Article 18 (4) of the Convention is attached to the present Decision. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the Council 
The President 

11 

idem, § 21 

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ANNEX  

Declaration by the European Atomic Energy Community According to the provisions of 
Article 18 (4) of the Convention 

The following States are presently members of the European Atomic Energy Community: the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French 
Republic,  Ireland,  the  Italian  Republic,  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  the  Republic  of  Latvia,  the 
Republic  of  Lithuania,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg,  the  Republic  of  Hungary,  the 
Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic 
of  Finland,  the  Kingdom  of  Sweden,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland. 

The Community declares that Articles 8 to 13 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities do not apply to it. 

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CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND 
NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, 

RECOGNIZING  the  right  of  all  States  to  develop  and  apply  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful 
purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful 
application of nuclear energy, 

CONVINCED  of  the  need  to  facilitate  international  co-operation  and  the  transfer  of  nuclear 
technology for the peaceful application of nuclear energy, 

BEARING IN MIND that physical protection is of vital importance for the protection of public 
health, safety, the environment and national and international security, 

HAVING  IN  MIND  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
concerning  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security  and  the  promotion  of  good-
neighbourliness and friendly relations and co-operation among States, 

CONSIDERING that under the terms of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United 
Nations,  “All  members  shall  refrain  in  their  international  relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” 

RECALLING  the  Declaration  on  Measures  to  Eliminate  International  Terrorism,  annexed  to 
General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, 

DESIRING  to  avert  the  potential  dangers  posed  by  illicit  trafficking,  the  unlawful  taking  and 
use of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and noting 
that  physical  protection  against  such  acts  has  become  a  matter  of  increased  national  and 
international concern, 

DEEPLY CONCERNED by the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, and by the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime, 

BELIEVING  that  physical  protection  plays  an  important  role  in  supporting  nuclear 
nonproliferation and counter-terrorism objectives, 

DESIRING  through  this  Convention  to  contribute  to  strengthening  worldwide  the  physical 
protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities use for peaceful purposes, 

CONVINCED  that  offences  relating  to  nuclear  material  and  nuclear  facilities  are  a  matter  of 
grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures, or to 
strengthen  existing  measures,  to  ensure  the  prevention,  detection  and  punishment  of  such 
offences, 

DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation to establish, in conformity with the 
national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical 
protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, 

CONVINCED  that  this  Convention  should  complement  the  safe  use,  storage  and  transport  of 
nuclear material and the safe operation of nuclear facilities, 

RECOGNIZING that there are internationally formulated physical protection recommendations 
that  are  updated  from  time  to  time  which  can  provide  guidance  on  contemporary  means  of 
achieving effective levels of physical protection, 

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RECOGNIZING also that effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities 
used for military purposes is a responsibility of the State possessing such nuclear material and 
nuclear facilities, and understanding that such material and facilities are and will continue to be 
accorded stringent physical protection, 

HAVE AGREED as follows: 

For the purposes of this Convention: 

Article 1 

(a) “nuclear material” means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% 
in  plutonium-238;  uranium-233;  uranium  enriched  in  the  isotope  235  or  233;  uranium 
containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-
residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; 

(b) “uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233” means uranium containing the isotope 235 or 
233  or  both  in  an  amount  such  that  the  abundance  ratio  of  the  sum  of  these  isotopes  to  the 
isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature; 

(c) “international nuclear transport” means the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material by 
any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the State where the shipment 
originates beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that State and ending 
with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate destination; 

(d) “nuclear facility” means a facility (including associated buildings and equipment) in which 
nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of, if damage to or 
interference  with  such  facility  could  lead  to  the  release  of  significant  amounts  of  radiation  or 
radioactive material; 

(e) “sabotage” means any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in 
use,  storage  or  transport  which  could  directly  or  indirectly  endanger  the  health  and  safety  of 
personnel,  the  public  or  the  environment  by  exposure  to  radiation  or  release  of  radioactive 
substances. 

Article 1A 

The  purposes  of  this  Convention  are  to  achieve  and  maintain  worldwide  effective  physical 
protection  of  nuclear  material  used  for  peaceful  purposes  and  of  nuclear  facilities  used  for 
peaceful  purposes;  to  prevent  and  combat  offences  relating  to  such  material  and  facilities 
worldwide; as well as to facilitate co-operation among States Parties to those ends. 

Article 2 

1.  This  Convention  shall  apply  to  nuclear  material  used  for  peaceful  purposes  in  use,  storage 
and  transport  and  to  nuclear  facilities  used  for  peaceful  purposes,  provided,  however,  that 
articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 4 of article 5 of this Convention shall only apply to such nuclear 
material while in international nuclear transport. 

2.  The  responsibility  for  the  establishment,  implementation  and  maintenance  of  a  physical 
protection regime within a State Party rests entirely with that State. 

3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties under this Convention, 
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State. 

2

 
4.  (a)  Nothing  in  this  Convention  shall  affect  other  rights,  obligations  and  responsibilities  of 
States Parties under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations and international humanitarian law. 

(b) The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under 
international  humanitarian  law,  which  are  governed  by  that  law,  are  not  governed  by  this 
Convention,  and  the  activities  undertaken  by  the  military  forces  of  a  State  in  the  exercise  of 
their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not 
governed by this Convention. 

(c) Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as a lawful authorization to use or threaten to 
use force against nuclear material or nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. 

(d)  Nothing  in  this  Convention  condones  or  makes  lawful  otherwise  unlawful  acts,  nor 
precludes prosecution under other laws. 

5. This Convention shall not apply to nuclear material used or retained for military purposes or 
to a nuclear facility containing such material. 

Article 2A 

1. Each State Party shall establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection 
regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction, with the aim 
of: 

(a) protecting against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material in use, storage 
and transport; 

(b)  ensuring  the  implementation  of  rapid  and  comprehensive  measures  to  locate  and, 
where  appropriate,  recover  missing  or  stolen  nuclear  material;  when  the  material  is 
located outside its territory, that State Party shall act in accordance with article 5; 

(c) protecting nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage; and 

(d) mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage. 

2. In implementing paragraph 1, each State Party shall: 

(a)  establish  and  maintain  a  legislative  and  regulatory  framework  to  govern  physical 
protection; 

(b)  establish  or  designate  a  competent  authority  or  authorities  responsible  for  the 
implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework; and 

(c)  take  other  appropriate  measures  necessary  for  the  physical  protection  of  nuclear 
material and nuclear facilities. 

3.  In  implementing  the  obligations  under  paragraphs  1  and  2,  each  State  Party  shall,  without 
prejudice  to  any  other  provisions  of  this  Convention,  apply  insofar  as  is  reasonable  and 
practicable  the  following  Fundamental  Principles  of  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material 
and Nuclear Facilities. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE A: Responsibility of the State 

The  responsibility  for  the  establishment,  implementation  and  maintenance  of  a  physical 
protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State. 

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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE B: Responsibilities During International Transport 

The responsibility of a State for ensuring that nuclear material is adequately protected extends 
to the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another 
State, as appropriate. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE C: Legislative and Regulatory Framework 

The State is responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework 
to  govern  physical  protection.  This  framework  should  provide  for  the  establishment  of 
applicable physical protection requirements and include a system of evaluation and licensing or 
other procedures to grant authorization. This framework should include a system of inspection 
of  nuclear  facilities  and  transport  to  verify  compliance  with  applicable  requirements  and 
conditions  of  the  license  or  other  authorizing  document,  and  to  establish  a  means  to  enforce 
applicable requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE D: Competent Authority 

The  State  should  establish  or  designate  a  competent  authority  which  is  responsible  for  the 
implementation  of  the  legislative  and  regulatory  framework,  and  is  provided  with  adequate 
authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities. 
The  State  should  take  steps  to  ensure  an  effective  independence  between  the  functions  of  the 
State's  competent  authority  and  those  of  any  other  body  in  charge  of  the  promotion  or 
utilization of nuclear energy. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE E: Responsibility of the License Holders 

The responsibilities for implementing the various elements of physical protection within a State 
should  be  clearly  identified.  The  State  should  ensure  that  the  prime  responsibility  for  the 
implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the 
holders of the relevant licenses or of other authorizing documents (e.g. operators or shippers). 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE F: Security Culture 

All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the 
security  culture,  to  its  development  and  maintenance  necessary  to  ensure  its  effective 
implementation in the entire organization. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE G: Threat 

The State's physical protection should be based on the State's current evaluation of the threat. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE H: Graded Approach 

Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the 
current  evaluation  of  the  threat,  the  relative  attractiveness,  the  nature  of  the  material  and 
potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with 
the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE I: Defence in Depth 

The State's requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several layers and 
methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and organizational) that have to 
be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order to achieve his objectives. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE J: Quality Assurance 

A  quality  assurance  policy  and  quality  assurance  programmes  should  be  established  and 
implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements far all activities 
important to physical protection are satisfied. 

4

 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE K: Contingency Plans 

Contingency  (emergency)  plans  to  respond  to  unauthorized  removal  of  nuclear  material  or 
sabotage  of  nuclear  facilities  or  nuclear  material,  or  attempts  thereof,  should  be  prepared  and 
appropriately exercised by all license holders and authorities concerned. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE L: Confidentiality 

The  State  should  establish  requirements  for  protecting  the  confidentiality  of  information,  the 
unauthorized disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear material 
and nuclear facilities. 

4. (a) The provisions of this article shall not apply to any nuclear material which the State Party 
reasonably  decides  does  not  need  to  be  subject  to  the  physical  protection  regime  established 
pursuant to paragraph 1, taking into account the nature of the material, its quantity and relative 
attractiveness  and  the  potential  radiological  and  other  consequences  associated  with  any 
unauthorized act directed against it and the current evaluation of the threat against it. 

(b)  Nuclear  material  which  is  not  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  article  pursuant  to  sub-
paragraph (a) should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. 

Article 3 

Each  State  Party  shall  take  appropriate  steps  within  the  framework  of  its  national  law  and 
consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear 
transport,  nuclear  material  within  its  territory,  or  on  board  a  ship  or  aircraft  under  its 
jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State, is 
protected at the levels described in Annex I. 

Article 4 

1. Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material unless the State 
Party  has  received  assurances  that  such  material  will  be  protected  during  the  international 
nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I. 

2. Each State Party shall not import or authorize the import of nuclear material from a State not 
party to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will 
during the international nuclear transport be protected at the levels described in Annex I. 

3.  A  State  Party  shall  not  allow  the  transit  of  its  territory  by  land  or  internal  waterways  or 
through  its  airports  or  seaports  of  nuclear  material  between  States  that  are  not  parties  to  this 
Convention unless the State Party has received assurances as far as practicable that this nuclear 
material  will  be  protected  during  international  nuclear  transport  at  the  1evels  described  in 
Annex I. 

4. Each State Party shall apply within the framework of its national law the levels of physical 
protection described in Annex I to nuclear material being transported from a part of that State to 
another part of the same State through international waters or airspace. 

5.  The  State  Party  responsible  for  receiving  assurances  that  the  nuclear  material  will  be 
protected at the levels described in Annex I according to paragraphs 1 to 3 shall identify and 
inform  in  advance  States  which  the  nuclear  material  is  expected  to  transit  by  land  or  internal 
waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter. 

6. The responsibility for obtaining assurances referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, by 
mutual agreement, to the State Party involved in the transport as the importing State. 

5

 
7. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the territorial sovereignty 
and jurisdiction of a State, including that over its airspace and territorial sea. 

Article 5 

1.  States  Parties  shall  identify  and  make  known  to  each  other  directly  or  through  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  their  point  of  contact  in  relation  to  matters  within  the 
scope of this Convention. 

2.  In  the  case  of  theft,  robbery  or  any  other  unlawful  taking  of  nuclear  material  or  credible 
threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law, provide co-operation 
and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of such material 
to any State that so requests. In particular: 

(a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other States 
which  appear  to  it  to  be  concerned,  of  any  theft,  robbery  or  other  unlawful  taking  of 
nuclear  material  or  credible  threat  thereof,  and  to  inform,  where  appropriate,  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations; 

(b) in doing so, as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information 
with  each  other,  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  and  other  relevant 
international  organizations  with  a  view  to  protecting  threatened  nuclear  material, 
verifying the integrity of the shipping container or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear 
material and shall: 

(i) co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels; 

(ii) render assistance, if requested; 

(iii)  ensure  the  return  of  recovered  nuclear  material  stolen  or  missing  as  a 
consequence of the above mentioned events. 

The  means  of  implementation  of  this  co-operation  shall  be  determined  by  the  States  Parties 
concerned. 

3. In the case of a credible threat of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility or in the 
case  of  sabotage  thereof,  States  Parties  shall,  to  the  maximum  feasible  extent,  in  accordance 
with  their  national  law  and  consistent  with  their  relevant  obligations  under  international  law, 
co-operate as follows: 

(a) if a State Party has knowledge of a credible threat of sabotage of nuclear material or 
a  nuclear  facility  in  another  State  the  former  shall  decide  on  appropriate  steps  to  be 
taken  in  order  to  inform  that  State  as  soon  as  possible  and,  where  appropriate,  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  and  other  relevant  international  organizations  of 
that threat, with a view to preventing the sabotage; 

(b) in the case of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility in a State Party and if 
in  its  view  other  States  are  likely  to  be  radiologically  affected,  the  former,  without 
prejudice to its other obligations under international law, shall take appropriate steps to 
inform as soon as possible the State or the States which are likely to be radiologically 
affected and to inform, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
other relevant  international organizations, with a view to minimizing or mitigating the 
radiological consequences thereof; 

(c) if in the context of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), a State Party requests assistance, each 
State Party to which a request for assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify 

6

 
the requesting State Party, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested and the scope and terms of 
the assistance that may be rendered; 

(d)  co-ordination  of  the  co-operation  under  sub-paragraphs  (a)  to  (c)  shall  be  through 
diplomatic or other agreed channels. The means of implementation of this co-operation 
shall be determined bilaterally or multilaterally by the States Parties concerned. 

4. States Parties shall co-operate and consult, as appropriate, with each other directly or through 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a 
view to obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical 
protection of nuclear material in international transport. 

5. A State Party may consult and co-operate as appropriate, with other States Parties directly or 
through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, 
with  a  view  to  obtaining  their  guidance  on  the  design,  maintenance  and  improvement  of  its 
national system of physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport 
and of nuclear facilities. 

Article 6 

1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the 
confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions 
of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out 
for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties provide information to international 
organizations  or  to  States  that  are  not  parties to  this  Convention  in  confidence,  steps  shall  be 
taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State Party that has 
received  information  in  confidence  from  another  State  Party  may  provide  this  information  to 
third parties only with the consent of that other State Party. 

2. State Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they 
are  not  permitted  to  communicate  pursuant  to  national  law  or  which  would  jeopardize  the 
security  of  the  State  concerned  or  the  physical  protection  of  nuclear  material  or  nuclear 
facilities. 

1. The intentional commission of: 

Article 7 

(a)  an  act  without  lawful  authority  which  constitutes  the  receipt,  possession,  use, 
transfer,  alteration,  disposal  or  dispersal  of  nuclear  material  and  which  causes  or  is 
likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or 
to the environment; 

(b) a theft or robbery of nuclear material; 

(c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; 

(d) an act which constitutes the carrying, sending, or moving of nuclear material into or 
out of a State without lawful authority; 

(e) an act directed against a nuclear facility, or an act interfering with the operation of a 
nuclear facility, where the offender intentionally causes, or where he knows that the act 
is likely to cause, death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property 
or  to  the  environment  by  exposure  to  radiation  or  release  of  radioactive  substances, 

7

 
unless the act is undertaken in conformity with the national law of the State Party in the 
territory of which he nuclear facility is situated; 

f) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any 
other form of intimidation; 

(g) a threat: 

(i)  to  use  nuclear  material  to  cause  death  or  serious  injury  to  any  person  or 
substantial damage to property or to the  environment or to  commit  the offence 
described in subparagraph (e), or 

(ii)  to  commit  an  offence  described  in  sub-paragraphs  (b)  and  (e)  in  order  to 
compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to 
refrain from doing any act; 

(h) an attempt to commit any offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e); 

(i) an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) 
to (h); 

(j) an act of any person who organizes or directs others to commit an offence described 
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (h); and 

(k)  an  act  which  contributes  to  the  commission  of  any  offence  described  in  sub-
paragraphs  (a)  to  (h)  by  a  group  of  persons  acting  with  a  common  purpose;  such  act 
shall be intentional and shall either: 

(i) be made with he aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of 
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence 
described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g), or 

(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence 
described  in  sub-paragraphs  (a)  to  (g)  shall  be  made  a  punishable  offence  by 
each State Party under its national law. 

2. Each Stale Party shall make the offences described in this article punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature. 

Article 8 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  establish  its  jurisdiction 
over the offences set forth in article 7 in the following cases: 

(a)  when  the  offence  is  committed  in  the  territory  of  that  State  or  on  board  a  ship  or 
aircraft registered in that State; 

(b) when the a1leged offender is a national of that State. 

2.  Each  State  Party  shall  likewise  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  establish  its 
jurisdiction over these offences in cases where the alleged offender is presented in its territory 
and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 11 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 
1. 

3.  This  Convention  does  not  exclude  any  criminal  jurisdiction  exercised  in  accordance  with 
national law. 

8

 
4.  In  addition  to  the  States  Parties  mentioned  in  paragraphs  1  and  2,  each  State  Party  may, 
consistent with international law, establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 7 
when it is involved in international nuclear transport as the exporting or importing State. 

Article 9 

Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant , the State Parties in whose territory the 
alleged  offender  is  present  shall  take  appropriate  measures,  including  detention,  under  its 
national  law  to  ensure  his  presence  for  the  purpose  of  prosecution  or  extradition.  Measures 
taken according to this article shall be notified without delay to he States required to establish 
jurisdiction pursuant to article 8 and, where appropriate, all other States concerned. 

Article 10 

The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite 
him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of 
that State. 

Article 11 

1.  The  offences  in  article  7  shall  be  deemed  to  be  included  as  extraditable  offences  in  any 
extradition  treaty  existing  between  States  Parties.  States  Parties  undertake  to  include  those 
offences in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at 
its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of those offences. 
Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 

3.  States  Parties  which  do  not  make  extradition  conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  treaty  shall 
recognize those offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions 
provided by the law of the requested State, 

4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as 
if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of 
the  States  Parties  required  to  establish  their  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  paragraph  1  of 
article 8. 

Article 11A 

None of the offences set forth in article 7 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or 
mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence 
or  as  an  offence  inspired  by  political  motives.  Accordingly,  a  request  for  extradition  or  for 
mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it 
concerns  a  political  offence  or  an  offence  connected  with  a  political  offence  or  an  offence 
inspired by political motives. 

9

 
Article 11B 

Nothing  in  this  Convention  shall  be  interpreted  as  imposing  an  obligation  to  extradite  or  to 
afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing 
that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 7 or for mutual legal assistance 
with  respect  to  such  offences  has  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  punishing  a 
person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion 
or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of 
these reasons. 

Any  person  regarding  whom  proceedings  are  being  carried  out  in  connection  with  any  of  the 
offences set forth in article 7 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings. 

Article 12 

Article 13 

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with 
criminal  proceedings  brought  in  respect  of  the  offences  set  forth  in  article  7,  including  the 
supply of evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceeding. The law of the State requested 
shall apply in all cases. 

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not affect obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or 
multilateral,  which  governs  or  will  govern,  in  whole  or  in  part,  mutual  assistance  in  criminal 
matters. 

Article 13A 

Nothing in this Convention shall affect the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes 
that  is  undertaken  to  strengthen  the  physical  protection  of  nuclear  material  and  nuclear 
facilities. 

Article 14 

1. Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to 
this Convention. The depositary shall communicate such information periodically to all States 
Parties. 

2.  The  State  Party  where  an  alleged  offender  is  prosecuted  shall,  wherever  practicable,  first 
communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the States directly concerned. The State 
Party shall also communicate the final outcome to the depositary who shall inform all States. 

3. Where an offence involves nuclear material in domestic use, storage or transport, and both 
the alleged offender and the nuclear material remain in the territory of the State Party in which 
the  offence  was  committed,  or  where  an  offence  involves  a  nuclear  facility  and  the  alleged 
offender remains in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, nothing 
in  this  Convention  shall  be  interpreted  as  requiring  that  State  Party  to  provide  information 
concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offence. 

10

 
The Annexes constitute an integral part of this Convention. 

Article 15 

Article 16 

1. A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary five years after the entry 
into  force  of  the  Amendment  adopted  on  8  July  2005  to  review  the  implementation  of  this 
Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the 
annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation. 

2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of States Parties may obtain, 
by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of further conferences 
with the same objective. 

Article 17 

1. In the event of a dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention, such States Parties shall consult with a view to the settlement of 
the dispute by negotiation, or by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to all 
parties to the dispute. 

2. Any dispute of this character which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 
shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the 
International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within 
six  months  from  the  date  of  the  request,  the  parties  to  the  dispute  are  unable  to  agree  on  the 
organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International Court of 
Justice  or  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  to  appoint  one  or  more  arbitrators.  In 
case of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations shall have priority. 

3.  Each  State  Party  may  at  the  time  of  signature,  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval  of  this 
Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both 
of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall 
not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2, with respect to a 
State Party which has made a reservation to that procedure, 

4.  Any  State  Party  which  has  made  a  reservation  in  accordance  with  paragraph  3  may  at  any 
time withdraw that reservation by notification to the depositary. 

Article 18 

1.  This  Convention  shall  be  open  for  signature  by  all  States  at  the  Headquarters  of  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United Nations 
in New York from 3 March 1980 until its entry into force. 

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States. 

3. After its entry into force, this Convention will be open for accession by all States. 

4. (a) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by international organizations 
and regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any such organization 
is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion 
and application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention. 

11

 
(b)  In  matters  within  their  competence,  such  organization  shall,  on  their  own  behalf,  exercise 
the rights and fulfill the responsibilities which this Convention attributes to States Parties, 

(c)  When  becoming  party  to  this  Convention  such  an  organization  shall  communicate  to  the 
depositary a declaration indicating which States are members thereof and which articles of this 
Convention do not apply to it. 

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member States. 

5.  Instruments  of  ratification,  acceptance,  approval  or  accession  shall  be  deposited  with  the 
depositary. 

Article 19 

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the 
twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary. 

2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the date of 
deposit  of  the  twenty-first  instrument  of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval,  the  Convention 
shall  enter  into  force  on  the  thirtieth  day  after  the  deposit  by  such  State  of  its  instrument  of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 

Article 20 

1. Without prejudice to article 16 a State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. 
The  proposed  amendment  shall  be  submitted  to  the  depositary  who  shall  circulate  it 
immediately  to  all  States  Parties.  If  a  majority  of  States  Parties  request  the  depository  to 
convene  a  conference  to  consider  the  proposed  amendments,  the  depository  shall  invite  all 
States  Parties  to  attend  such  a  conference  to  begin  not  sooner  than  thirty  days  after  the 
invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted the conference by a two-thirds majority of all 
States Parties shall be promptly circulated by the depository to all States Parties. 

2.  The  amendment  shall  enter  into  force  for  each  State  Party  that  deposits  its  instrument  of 
ratification,  acceptance  or  approval  of  the  amendment  on  the  thirtieth  day  after  the  date  on 
which  two  thirds  of  the  States  Parties  have  deposited  their  instruments  of  ratification, 
acceptance or approval with the depositary. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for 
any other State Party on the day on which that State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval of the amendment. 

Article 21 

1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the depositary. 

2.  Denunciation  shall  take  effect  one  hundred  and  eighty  days  following  the  date  on  which 
notification is received by the depositary. 

Article 22 

The depositary shall promptly notify all States of: 

(a) each signature of this Convention; 

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession; 

(c) any reservation or withdrawal in accordance with article 17; 

12

 
(d) any communication made by an  organization  in  accordance  with  paragraph  4(c)  of  article 
18; 

(e) the entry into force of this Convention; 

(f) the entry into force of any amendment to this Convention; and 

(g) any denunciation made under article 21. 

Article 23 

The  original  of  this  Convention,  of  which  the  Arabic,  Chinese,  English,  French,  Russian  and 
Spanish  texts  are  equally  authentic,  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Director  General  of  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies thereof to all States. 

13

 
Annex I 

Levels of Physical Protection to be Applied in International Transport of Nuclear 
Material as Categorized in Annex II 

1. Levels of physical  protection  for  nuclear  material during storage incidental to international 
nuclear transport include: 

a. For Category III materials, storage within an area to which access is controlled; 

b.  For  Category  II  materials,  storage  within  an  area  under  constant  surveillance  by 
guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of 
points of entry under appropriate control or any area with an equivalent level of physical 
protection; 

c.  For  Category  I  material,  storage  within  a  protected  area  as  defined  for  Category  II 
above,  to  which,  in  addition,  access  is  restricted  to  persons  whose  trustworthiness  has 
been  determined,  and  which  is  under  surveillance  by  guards  who  are  in  close 
communication  with  appropriate  response  forces.  Specific  measures  taken  in  this 
context  should  have  as  their  object  the  detection  and  prevention  of  any  assault, 
unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material. 

2. Levels of physical protection for nuclear maleria1 during international transport include: 

a.  For  Category  II  and  III  materials,  transportation  shall  take  place  under  special 
precautions including prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior 
agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of 
exporting  and  importing  States,  specifying  time,  place  and  procedures  for  transferring 
transport responsibility; 

b.  For  Category  I  materials,  transportation  shall  take  place  under  special  precautions 
identified  above  for  transportation  of  Category  II  and  III  materials,  and  in  addition, 
under  constant  surveillance  by  escorts  and  under  conditions  which  assure  close 
communication with appropriate response forces; 

c.  For  natural  uranium  other  than  in  the  form  of  ore  or  ore-residue;  transportation 
protection  for  quantities  exceeding  500  kilograms  uranium  shall  include  advance 
notification  of  shipment  specifying  mode  of  transport,  expected  time  of  arrival  and 
confirmation of receipt of shipment. 

14

 
ANNEX II 

TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 

Material 

Form 

1. Plutonium a/ 

Unirradiated b/ 

2. Uranium-235 

Unirradiated b/ 

Uranium enriched to 20% 235U 
or more 

Uranium enriched to 10% 235U 
but less than 20% 

enriched 

Uranium 
above 
natural, but less than 10% 235U 
Unirradiated b/ 

3. Uranium-233 

4. Irradiated fuel 

I 
2 kg or 
more 

Category 
II 
Less than 2 kg but 
more than 500g 

III c/ 
500 g or less but 
more than 15 g 

5 kg or 
more 

Less than 5 kg but 
more than 1 kg 

1 kg or less but 
more than 15 g 

Less than 10 kg 
but more than 
1 kg 

10 kg or more 

500 g or less but 
more than 15 g 

10 kg or more 

2 kg or 
more 

Less than 2 kg but 
more than 500g 
Depleted or natural 
uranium, thorium 
or low-enriched 
fuel (less than 10% 
fissile content) d/ e/ 

a/ All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238. 
b/ Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level 
equal to or less than 1 gray/hour (1 00 rads/hour) at one metre unshielded. 
c/ Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium should be protected in accordance 
with prudent management practice. 
d/ Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation 
of the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection. 
e/ Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I and 
II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel 
exceeds 1 gray/hour (100 rads/hour) at one metre unshielded. 

15