Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of  12 June 2006  on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Date: 2006-06-12
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: EU financing, International Atomic Energy Agency, common foreign and security policy, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety, the EU's international role

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(Acts adopted under Title V of the Treaty on European Union)

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/418/CFSP

of 12 June 2006

on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

the implementation of the EU Strategy against Prolif-
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in
particular Article 14 thereof,

(5)

Whereas:

the Council adopted Joint Action
On 18 July 2005,
2005/574/CFSP (3) on support
IAEA activities in
the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

for

(1)

(2)

(3)

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted
the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of
measures to combat such proliferation and which need
to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.

to the measures
particular

The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is
III
giving effect
in
thereof,
financial
releasing
specific projects conducted by
resources
to support
multilateral
International
the
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

listed in Chapter

institutions,

such as

through

On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted Common
Position 2003/805/CFSP (1) on the universalisation and
reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of
non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
inter
means of delivery. That Common Position calls,
IAEA
the conclusion of
alia,
comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional
Protocols and commits the European Union to work
towards making the Additional Protocol and compre-
hensive safeguards agreements
the
IAEA verification system.

the promotion of

the standard for

for

(4)

On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action
2004/495/CFSP (2) on support for IAEA activities under
its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

As far as the EU is concerned, the Council adopted on
22 December 2003 Directive 2003/122/Euratom (4) on
the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and
orphan sources, the strengthening of the control of high
activity radioactive sources in all
in
accordance with the G-8 statement and Action Plan on
securing radioactive
an important
objective to be pursued.

third countries,

sources,

remains

In July 2005, States Parties and the European Atomic
Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (CPPNM) with a view to expanding the scope
to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful
domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and will
oblige States Parties to put violations under criminal
sanctions.

In September 2005, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear
Terrorism Convention) was opened for signature. Once
entered into force, it will require States Parties to enact
legislation to criminalise these offences.

The IAEA pursues the same objectives as set out
in
Recitals (3) to (8). This is done through the implemen-
its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed
tation of
through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear
Security Fund,

(1) OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34.
(2) OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46.

(3) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44.
(4) OJ L 346, 31.12.2003, p. 57.

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HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 1

Article 2

1.
For the purposes of giving immediate and practical imple-
mentation to some elements of the EU Strategy against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall
the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security
support
and verification in order to further the following objectives:

1.
The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the
Council/High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), shall be
responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The
Commission shall be fully associated to this task.

— to work towards the universalisation of international non-
proliferation and nuclear security instruments,
including
comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional
Protocol,

The Commission shall supervise the proper implemen-

2.
tation of the financial contribution referred to in Article 3.

— to enhance the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials
and equipment and the relevant technology, provide legis-
lative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear
security and safeguards,

3.
The technical implementation of the projects referred to in
Article 1(2) shall be entrusted to the IAEA, which shall perform
its tasks under the responsibility of the Presidency and under
the control of the SG/HR. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall
enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.

— to strengthen the detection of and response to illicit traf-

ficking of nuclear and other radio-active materials.

The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of

2.
the EU Strategy, are the projects which aim at:

4.
The choice of the beneficiaries and actions shall be made,
on the basis of the initial assessment referred to in Article 1(2),
the
by
and
Commission will be consulted in the framework of
the
competent Council working group.

entity. Member

implementing

States

the

— strengthening national

and regulatory infra-
legislative
structures for the implementation of relevant international
instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification,
including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the
Additional Protocol,

Article 3

1.
The financial reference amount for the implementation of
the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 6 995 000.

— assisting States in strengthening the security and control of

nuclear and other radio-active materials,

— strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response
radio-active
trafficking in nuclear and other

to illicit
materials.

The management of

2.
the expenditure financed by the
general budget of the European Union specified in paragraph
1 shall be subject
the
Community applying to budget matters with the proviso that
any pre financing shall not
the
Community.

to the procedures and rules of

remain the property of

These projects will be carried out in countries needing assistance
in these areas after an initial assessment carried out by an expert
team.

For the purpose of implementing the expenditure referred
3.
to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall conclude a specific
financing agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the
Regulations and Rules of the IAEA. It shall stipulate that the
IAEA shall ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate
to its size.

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Article 4

Article 6

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report
to the
Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the
basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA. The Commission
shall be fully associated and shall provide information on the
financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred
to in Article 1(2).

Article 5

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of
adoption.

its

It shall expire on 12 September 2007.

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Union.

Done at Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

For the Council
The President

U. PLASSNIK

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ANNEX

EU support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the
implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. DESCRIPTION

The international community has recognized, notably in the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global
Directions for the Future, held in London in March 2005, that the risk of successful acts of nuclear terrorism remains
high. The international community has reacted strongly and taken several initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear or other
radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists.

Meanwhile, IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear
non-proliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.

Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments that are
relevant for nuclear security and verification. In July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the CPPNM; the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1540 dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction and non-State actors. UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1373 of 2001 calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.

As of to date, over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources (1). In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and Board of Governors of the IAEA
have adopted several resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system (2).

States' implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided
through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in
September 2005 (3). This is a continuation to the 2003-2005 Plan of Activities to protect against nuclear terrorism (4).
The new Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas:
(2)
It also includes a part referred to as ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear
Prevention, and (3) Detection and response.
Security’, which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards objectives but which are also
recognized for their important contributions to nuclear security.

(1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination,

International Safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represent key means of verifying the compliance by States with
their specific non-proliferation commitments and obligations. It is of utmost importance that the required national
legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and,
if applicable, an
Additional Protocol, is in place (5). The implementation requires that each State party to such agreements maintain an
effective State System for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). In September 2005, the IAEA Board of
Governors requested that the IAEA Secretariat assist States for which comprehensive safeguards agreements had small
quantities protocols attached, including non-members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment
and maintenance of such SSACs.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues the similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These provide a comprehensive approach to nuclear security including the
regulatory controls, accountability and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport,
‘from cradle to grave’, in the short term as well as in the long term. However, should the protection fail, backup measures
must be established to detect theft or attempts to smuggle the material across international borders and to respond to
malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, should they occur.

(1) GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9. Also the document: ‘Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport Safety
and Waste Management: Promoting Effective and Sustainable National Regulatory Infrastructure for the Control of Radiation Sources’
(GOV/2004/52-GC(48)/15) includes parts that are relevant to the IAEA-EU cooperation under the EU Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. These activities are also reflected in ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’ in the IAEA Nuclear Security
Plan for 2006-2009.

(2) In September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided that in order to strengthen the
safeguards system, the so-called ‘small quantities protocol’ (SQP) to NPT safeguards agreements should remain part of the Agency's
safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria; the 2005 IAEA General Conference
adopted a resolution in which it noted, inter alia, that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented
by an Additional Protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

(3) GOV/2005/50-GC(49)/17.
(4) GOV/2002/10.
(5) See the Agency's Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, as published by the

IAEA.

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The IAEA is in the process of completing the implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP, and is imple-
menting Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP. With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major
activities to support efforts of the recipient States in Caucasus, Central Asia, South-eastern Europe and Balkan regions, and
Northern Africa and the Mediterranean region in Middle East, to strengthen the nuclear security and the implementation
of international safeguards in these countries.

Support for these efforts continues to be in high demand in IAEA Member States as well as in States that are not
members of the IAEA. Countries eligible to receive support are:

— in South-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of

Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

— in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,

— in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,

— in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic, and

— in Africa (1): Altogether up to 20-25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades

under different projects. Additional countries may be involved in regional training events.

The final selection of those African countries to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase,
which will comprise assessment missions and evaluation of already existing information in headquarters. The support
activities for each project will be focused on those countries in the region that have major activities in each project area:

— physical protection upgrades are foreseen in four to six of the eight countries in the region that have nuclear reactors;
strengthening the security of radioactive sources is foreseen in five to seven of the 10 countries that have most
vulnerable sources in use and in storage;

— provision of support to upgrade the capability to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials is
foreseen in five to six countries which, on the basis of the information available to the IAEA, pose the highest risk of
illicit trafficking, taking into account the existence nuclear material and of radioactive sources in the country and its
neighbouring countries;

— provision of appraisal service and support regarding the radiation safety and security of radioactive sources regulatory
infrastructure is foreseen in 12 countries where the regulatory infrastructure improvements are deemed to be in most
need. Provision of legislative support is foreseen in six countries;

— training would be offered on a regional basis for as many participants as possible in Africa, subject to the funds

available.

Initially, needs for improved nuclear security will be evaluated in the countries identified in the EU Joint Action in order
to identify priorities for support. For that purpose, a team of recognised experts will evaluate the present status of nuclear
security system already in place in these countries and give recommendations on improvements. The recommendations
will constitute a platform for the definition of subsequent assistance, covering present status and need for improvement as
regards prevention, detection of and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials,
including those in non-nuclear use, and of nuclear facilities. Priorities will be set in identifying the countries for each
project that would be covered by the budget made available through EU support. The development of human resources
will be implemented as part of the established training programme of the IAEA, which, to a large extent, is based on a
regional approach. The participation of experts from as many eligible countries as possible will be supported, subject to
available financial resources.

(1) Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo
(Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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Subsequently, projects will be implemented in the selected countries in three fields:

1.

Legislative and Regulatory Assistance

The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises, in large part, international instruments and recognized principles
(treaties, conventions, agreements, norms, IAEA standards, codes of conduct and guidance documents, and recom-
mendations) that are implemented by national authorities to control nuclear material and other radioactive sources.
This broad range of norms (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using nuclear material,
other radioactive substances or their related facilities safely and securely — both those with large nuclear
programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities.

The existence of proper national legislation, and regulatory control infrastructure, is a precondition for a successful
nuclear security regime. National implementing legislation should provide a framework of principles and general
provisions that enables authorised governmental entities to exercise the necessary regulatory functions and that
regulates the conduct of any person engaged in regulated activities. In many States such legislation is inadequate and
the regulatory infrastructure is not in existence or is inadequate. Such gaps, combined with inefficient regulatory
control infrastructures result in a weakness of the global security regime. The aim should therefore be to strengthen
or establish adequate national
legislative and regulatory frameworks, and the effective application of relevant
measures.

Radioactive materials are often used in non-nuclear applications, e.g. in medical or industrial use. Some of these
sources are highly radioactive, and belong to categories 1 to 3, as defined in the IAEA document ‘Categorisation of
Radioactive Sources’. These sources, if not adequately under regulatory control and protected, may come into the
wrong hands and be used in malicious activities. The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of
radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with the international standards,
the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated
import/export guidance, and the best practices.

The conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA is an effective measure that
promotes stringent national and international control over nuclear material and related technologies.
is
important that national
installations, facilities and
implementing legislation clearly identify the nuclear activities,
material to which safeguards will be applied. In addition, States that have concluded an Additional Protocol need to
ensure that their national implementing legislation has been enhanced to enable the State concerned to comply with
the additional obligations under the Additional Protocol. In particular, the State's domestic legislation should be
revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body, designated for the purposes of imple-
menting and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.

It

States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security, when becoming parties to the
CPPNM, by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism
Convention.
In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) also obliges all States to
establish domestic controls including the establishment of appropriate controls over materials related to nuclear
weapons.

States' undertakings included in the aforementioned international instruments in the field of nuclear security have
resulted in a juxtaposition of commitments related to the security of nuclear material and facilities and other
radioactive sources. These commitments include measures for the establishment of a regulatory infrastructure for
radiation safety and security of radioactive sources; accountancy and control measures; physical protection measures;
import and export controls and the criminalisation of unlawful acts.

2.

Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The materials used or stored at nuclear facilities and locations must be adequately accounted for and protected in
order to prevent theft or sabotage. An effective regulatory system should identify those elements requiring imple-
mentation at the level of the State and of the operator respectively.

It is also of vital
importance that powerful and vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications are physically
protected against malicious acts when used or stored, and when no longer required, they should be dismantled
and stored, or disposed of as radioactive waste, in a safe and secure location.

All States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to establish and maintain SSACs subject to
safeguards. However, IAEA estimates that such systems are lacking or inadequate in many IAEA Member States
that are party to such agreements. This situation is particularly widespread among the 120 States or so that do not
operate any nuclear facilities.

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3.

Strengthening of States' Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking relates to the unauthorised receipt, provision, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear material and other
radioactive materials, whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders.

A terrorist-made, crude nuclear explosive device or a radiological dispersal device cannot be constructed without the
material having been acquired as a result of illicit trafficking. In addition, sensitive equipment and technology to
produce sensitive material for or to construct a crude nuclear explosive device may also have been acquired via illicit
trafficking. It may be assumed that cross-border movement of material or technology is necessary for the material to
reach its end destination. To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory systems to be in
place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures and information at
the border stations for detecting attempts at smuggling radioactive materials (including fissile, radioactive materials),
or unauthorised trade with sensitive equipment and technology.

Effective measures must also be in place to respond to such acts and also to seizures of any radioactive materials.
Law enforcement staff (customs, police, etc.) is frequently not trained in the use of detection equipment, and thus the
sensitive equipment and technology may be unfamiliar. Training of these officers is therefore critical to the success of
any measures put in place for detection of illicit trafficking. Different training should be offered to staff of different
categories, both in using detection instruments and in understanding the reading of the instrument, to be able to
decide on follow-up activities.

Support in this area is in great demand as a result of increased awareness of the threat involved and of the
availability of equipment and methodology for improved border-monitoring capability.

Overall objective: To strengthen nuclear security in selected countries.

2. OBJECTIVES

2.1. Evaluation Phase: Financing International Nuclear Security Missions

Evaluation will be carried out by the IAEA to identify needs to strengthen the nuclear security in the countries
concerned, in which such evaluation has not yet been completed. For the other identified countries, the evaluation
carried out earlier will be updated. The evaluation will cover, as appropriate, physical protection and security of
nuclear and non-nuclear applications, established measures to combat illicit trafficking as well as the necessary legal
and regulatory infrastructure. The results of the overall evaluation will be used as a basis in selecting the countries in
which the projects will be implemented.

The projects outlined above will:

— evaluate, in each country, the status of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and the
protection of any nuclear or research installation or location in which these materials are used or stored. Identify
a subset of facilities and locations containing these materials to be selected for subsequent upgrading and
support;

— evaluate, in each country, any needs with respect to the upgrading of the security of radioactive sources. Identify
any weaknesses and shortcoming against
requiring
international
improvement of regulatory infrastructure, and identify the need to provide additional protection of powerful,
vulnerable sources. The specific equipment needed to provide protection would also be determined as a result of
the evaluation;

standards and the Code of Conduct

— evaluate, in each country, the current status of the capability to combat illicit trafficking and identify needs for

the required improvements;

— evaluate, in each country, the status of the SSAC and identify needs for the required improvements.

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2.2.

Implementation of specific actions defined as priorities as a result of the evaluation phase

P r o j e c t 1 :

Legislative and Regulatory Assistance.

Project purpose:

— to strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material
taking into account relevant international instruments and recognised principles in the nuclear security field and
existing synergies with national systems of radiation safety;

— to strengthen national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional

Protocols concluded between States and the Agency;

— to strengthen the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources.

Project results:

— development and adoption of comprehensive, coherent and effective legislation at the national level, thereby

contributing to a harmonised, strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security;

— development and adoption (in national languages) of national legislation necessary to enable States to comply

with their obligations under Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols;

— establishment/upgrading of the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive
sources through the provision of the Radiation Safety, and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure
Appraisal (RaSSIA), advisory services, equipment and training, in accordance with the international standards,
the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the best practices.

P r o j e c t 2 :

Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Project purpose:

— to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear and other radioactive materials in nuclear

applications in the selected countries;

— to strengthen the control and physical protection of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications in the

selected countries and

— to strengthen SSACs for the implementation of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, including in

States with ‘small quantities protocols’.

Project results:

— physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations

upgraded;

— vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications protected or, as appropriate, dismantled and transferred to a safe

and secure storage in the selected countries;

— national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection improved through expert assistance;

— establishment and maintenance of effective SSACs capable of implementing safeguards agreements and Addi-

tional Protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’;

— staff training provided in the countries eligible to receive support.

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P r o j e c t 3 :

Strengthening of States' Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Project purpose:

— to strengthen the States' capacities for detection of and response to illicit trafficking in the selected countries.

Project results:

— enhanced information collected and evaluated on illicit nuclear trafficking, from open sources and from States'
Points of Contact, to improve the knowledge about and circumstances of illicit nuclear trafficking. This infor-
mation will also facilitate the prioritisation of the various activities undertaken to combat illicit trafficking;

— national frameworks established through expert assistance, to combat illicit trafficking and to improve the
national coordination of control cross-border movements of radioactive materials, sensitive nuclear equipment
and technology in the selected countries;

— border monitoring equipment upgraded at selected border crossings;

— training provided for law enforcement staff in countries eligible to receive support.

The evaluation will be performed within a period of three months after entering into force of the Contribution Agreement
between the Commission and the IAEA. The three projects will be performed in parallel during the 12 subsequent
months.

3. DURATION

The total estimated duration for the implementation of this Joint Action is 15 months.

4. BENEFICIARIES

The beneficiaries are the countries where the assessment and the subsequent projects will be implemented. Their
authorities will be helped to understand where there are weak points and receive support to bring solution and
increase security. The criteria for identifying the countries for the projects, the final choice of the beneficiaries and the
needs to be addressed in the selected countries shall be made in consultation between the implementing entity and the
Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR in close consultation with Member States and the Commission in the framework of the
competent Council working group. These decisions shall be based, where appropriate, on proposals made by the
implementing entity in accordance with Article 2(1) of this Joint Action.

5. IMPLEMENTING ENTITY

The IAEA will be entrusted with the implementation of the projects. The international nuclear security missions will be
performed following the standard mode of operation for missions of the IAEA, which will be carried out by IAEA and
Member States' experts. The implementation of the three projects will be done directly by the IAEA staff, IAEA Member
States-selected experts or contractors. In case of contractors, the procurement of any goods, works or services by the
IAEA in the context of this Joint Action shall be carried out in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures of the
IAEA, as detailed in the European Community Contribution Agreement with the IAEA.

The projects will be financed 100 % by this Joint Action. Experts of IAEA Member States may be considered as third
party participants. They will work under the standard rules of operation for IAEA experts.

6. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPANTS

7. SPECIFIC CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACTING AND PROCUREMENT

In some cases, to improve the security arrangements for nuclear and other radioactive materials, e.g. radioactive sources,
originally supplied by the Russian Federation, contracts for procurement of goods, works and services could be offered to
providers in the Russian Federation, which are familiar with the Russian technology.

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8. ESTIMATED REQUIRED MEANS

The EU contribution will cover the evaluation and the implementation of the three projects as described in point 2.2. The
estimated costs are as follows:

Nuclear security evaluation, including missions

EUR 140 000

Project 1

Project 2

Project 3

EUR 1 200 000

EUR 3 070 000

EUR 2 385 000

In addition, a contingency reserve of about 3 % of eligible costs (for a total amount of EUR 200 000) is included for
unforeseen costs.

9. FINANCIAL REFERENCE AMOUNT TO COVER THE COST OF THE PROJECT

The total cost of the project is EUR 6 995 000.