Commission Decision of 16 May 2006 on State aid C 26/2004 (ex NN 38/2004) implemented by Germany for Schneider Technologies AG (notified under document number C(2006) 1857) (Text with EEA relevance)
Date: 2006-05-16
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Germany, State aid, control of State aid, electronics industry, loan, research and development

6.2.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 32/49

COMMISSION DECISION

of 16 May 2006

on State aid C 26/2004 (ex NN 38/2004) implemented by Germany for Schneider Technologies AG

(notified under document number C(2006) 1857)

(Only the German text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/56/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Additional information was submitted on 6 February 2006,
registered as received on 7 February 2006.

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity, and in particular Article 88(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments (1)
pursuant to the provisions cited above and having regard to their
comments,

Whereas:

I.

PROCEDURE

(1) On 24 March 2003, the Commission received a complaint
concerning a number of alleged state aid measures in favour
of Schneider Technologies AG (‘Schneider AG’). The
complainant, Gebrüder Schneider GmbH & Co. KG, is a
holding company which held the shares in Schneider AG
and which is owned by two Schneider brothers.

(2) On 14 July 2004, the Commission initiated the formal
investigation procedure with respect to three loans granted
für Aufbaufinanzierung
by the Bayrische Landesanstalt
(Bavarian State Institute for Development Financing —
‘LfA’) and two grants from the Bayrische Forschungsstiftung
(Bavarian Research Foundation — ‘BFS’) for research and
development (‘R&D’). The Commission's decision to initiate
the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the
European Union on 22 February 2005 (2). The Commission
invited interested parties to submit comments on the
suspected aid. No such third party comments were
submitted (3). Germany's response to the initiation of the
formal
investigation procedure was submitted by letters
dated 16 and 24 September 2004, registered as received on
the same respective days.

(3)

The Commission requested further information on 6 Sep-
tember 2005, which Germany submitted by letter dated
5 October 2005, registered as received on 6 October 2005.

(1) OJ C 46, 22.2.2005, p. 12.
(2) See footnote 1.
(3) Some submissions received during and after the period concerned
cannot be considered formal comments (being mainly unrelated
press articles without further comments and an offer to provide
case-related consultancy services to the Commission without any
actual comments).

II.

DESCRIPTION

1.

THE BENEFICIARY

(4)

(5)

Schneider AG, a large undertaking, was a German producer
television sets headquartered in Türkheim,
of colour
Bavaria.
In addition to its manufacturing activities, the
company had embarked in the 1990s on an ambitious
project concerning the development of a laser display
technology which was expected to deliver sharper images,
higher brightness, unlimited screen size and flexibility in
terms of projection surface. Between 2000 and 2002, these
two main areas of activity were allocated to two newly
created subsidiaries of Schneider AG: Schneider Electronics
AG (‘SE’), which continued the television set production,
and Schneider Laser Technologies AG (‘SLT’).

The LfA, a public bank having as its object the promotion
of regional economic development, had held shares in
Schneider AG since 1998. In 1999/2000, the LfA was the
biggest shareholder, holding 35,6 % of the shares. Lehman
Brothers, a private investment bank, held 26,6 %, Gebr.
Schneider GmbH & Co. KG 14,6 % and other private
investors 23,2 %.

(6) At that time, the market had high expectations of Schneider
AG's future success as a result of its leading role in laser
display technology. Between 1998 and 2000, Schneider
AG's share price increased almost tenfold, and between
1999 and 2000 it increased by about two and a half times.
This positive view of the company's future was shared by
the second biggest investor, Lehman Brothers, as evidenced
by a study issued in April 2000 which explained that break-
even in the field of production of consumer electronics was
expected by the end of 2000, whereas break-even in laser
display technology was expected for Q4 of 2001. Lehman
Brothers bought [...] (*) shares from the LfA between mid-
1999 and mid-2000.

(*) Business secret

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(7) However, the companies did not perform as expected. SE
produced television sets of a lower quality range and could
not compete with low-price products imported mainly
from Asia. Since no income could be derived from the
television set business, Schneider AG ran out of funds
needed by SLT to continue its laser technology activities,
which progressed much more slowly than originally
expected. A first prototype was available only in May
2000, much later than scheduled, and it was suitable only
for industrial use. By 2002, the company had not succeeded
in developing a product suitable for the private consumer,
the actual economic aim of SLT.

(8)

In March 2002, three separate sets of insolvency proceed-
ings were initiated in respect of Schneider AG and its two
subsidiaries. The insolvency administrator sold the assets of
Schneider AG and SE to the Chinese electronics company
TCL, and the assets of SLT to Jenoptik Laser, Optik, Systeme
GmbH (‘LOS’). TCL and LOS had made the highest
respective offers.

loan 3 was also
In December 2000,
loan 2 to [...] %.
prolonged until 30 September 2002 and the interest rate
was increased to [...] %.

(13) Loan 1 was secured by several collateral items such as a
charge on land, the cession of receivables and a product
property transfer by way of security. These collateral items
were ranked below the securities granted to the pool banks,
whose loans had been granted earlier. Loans 2 and 3 were
not secured by any collateral. Germany explained that
securities had been replaced by a higher interest rate. The
actual value of securities for the LfA as a shareholder was
very limited because it was likely that the shareholder loan
would be treated as equivalent to a capital injection under
German law (Section 30 of the Law concerning Companies
with Limited Liability).

(14) The contributions by the private parties to the package

were as follows:

2.

THE FINANCIAL MEASURES

(9)

In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission
expressed doubts as to the compatibility of the following
two sets of measures.

2.1. THE THREE LFA LOANS

(10) The three LfA loans were part of a package agreed in
autumn 1999 between the LfA, Lehman Brothers,
the
complainant and a pool of banks. Germany explained that,
in 1998, the company had to face losses because the
attempt to increase sales of television sets through the
specialised retail channel had failed. The management
therefore decided to restructure the company and to
reinforce the OEM (original equipment manufacturer)
business. Liquidity was needed to finance the restructuring,
prefinance the production for large-scale orders and cover
the losses.

(11) The first LfA loan (‘loan 1’) amounted to EUR 2,1 million
and was granted in September 1999. The interest rate was
[...] %. The second loan (‘loan 2’) amounted to EUR 5,1 mil-
lion and was also granted in September 1999. The interest
rate was [...] %. The third loan (‘loan 3’) amounted to
EUR 5,6 million, was granted in February 2000 and the
interest rate was [...] %. The first two loans were granted for
a duration of one year, while loan 3 was granted until
31 December 2001, i.e. for almost two years.

(a)

Lehman Brothers first injected EUR 25 million into
the firm at the end of 1999 to purchase the shares in
SLT until then held by Daimler Chrysler and (ii) was
lead investor in a further capital increase in February
2000 by an additional EUR 46 million for
the
financing of the further development of the laser
business.

(b) The pool of private banks had granted Schneider AG a
credit line of EUR 31 million in 1998. The agreed
interest rate was [...] %. This credit line was expressly
upheld in September 1999 as part of the package. In
addition,
the pool banks accepted a short-term
exceeding of the credit line up to EUR [...]. In the
same month, the pool leader increased its interest rate
to [...] %. Germany explained that it had no informa-
tion as to any deviation by the other pool banks from
the originally agreed interest rate of [...] %.

(c)

complainant provided a

The
loan
amounting to EUR 7,7 million on the same conditions
as the pool banks.

shareholder

2.2. THE R&D SUBSIDIES

(15)

In 1994 and 1997,
Schneider AG totalling EUR 9 050 121,88. (4)

the BFS provided two grants to

Project 1 (‘Laser-Display-Technologie’)

(16) The first subsidy amounted to EUR 6 498 468,68. (5) It was
granted on 16 December 1994 with the aim of co-
financing the ‘Laser-Display-Technologie’ project (‘project

(12)

In September 2000, the first two loans were prolonged
until 30 September 2002, i.e. by two further years, and the
interest rates were increased for loan 1 to [...] %, and for

(4)

(5)

Including a grant for the ‘blue laser’ project carried out by the
University of Würzburg.
Including the grant for the ‘blue laser’ project carried out by the
University of Würzburg.

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1’). The aid was disbursed in several instalments over the
lifetime of the project, i.e. between January 1995 and June
1997. Eligible costs amounted to EUR 12 484 972,74,
while the aid intensity amounted to 48,9 %.

components into an overall system. It comprised studies
into image production with picosecond impulse lasers, laser
resistance of the individual components and basic research
into the miniaturisation of monochrome laser systems.

(17) Project 1 focused on creating the bases for new working
methods for the projecting of large, high-resolution colour
images for different applications and the scientific and
technological bases for the individual components of the
future system.

(24) The following project costs were taken into account when

granting the aid:

(18) The following project costs were taken into account when

Personnel costs

Project element

granting the aid: (*)

Project element

Cost in EUR

Personnel costs (incl. travelling expenses)

4 304 566,36

Other operating expenses (material and
supplies)

Cost of instruments and equipment

Cost of research by third parties

Additional overheads

4 399 666,63

667 235,91

2 296 459,41

817 044,43

Total costs

12 484 972,74

(19) Germany has confirmed that

the costs were incurred

directly as a result of the research project.

(20)

In accordance with the grant agreements, the results of the
project were presented to a broad public and made
generally available.

(21) The BFS also financed 100 % of a ‘blue laser’ research
project carried out by the University of Würzburg. The
project costs were EUR 0,26 million. At the BFS's request,
project 1 and the ‘blue laser’ project were associated with
each other in the expectation of a mutual know-how
exchange.

Project 2 (‘Laser-Display-Technologie —
Systemintegration und Prototypen’)

(22) The second grant amounted to EUR 2 551 653,20 and was
awarded on 23 July 1997. It was intended to finance the
‘Laser-Display-Technologie — Systemintegration
project
(‘project 2’), which followed project 1.
und Prototypen’
The aid was disbursed in several
instalments over the
project's lifetime, i.e. between April 1997 and September
1999. The planned eligible costs amounted to EUR 5 103
293,22, with the result that the aid intensity amounted to
50 %.

(23) Project 2 concerned further elaboration on the results of
project 1 and the attempt to integrate the individual key

Other operating expenses (material and
supplies)

Cost of research by third parties

Additional overheads

Total costs

Cost in euro

2 584 273,68

1 061 850,98

1 123 308,26

817 044,43

5 103 293,22

(25) Germany has confirmed that

the costs were incurred

directly as a result of the research project.

(26)

In accordance with the grant agreements, the results of the
project were presented to a broad public and made
generally available. Upon request, user rights had to be
granted at market rates.

III.

REASONS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL

INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE

(27) As regards the three loans, the Commission expressed its
initial view that they probably fulfilled the market economy
investor test. However, more detailed information was
missing in order to enable to Commission to finalise its
assessment. The Commission further doubted that the R&D
technology projects were
grants
compatible with the state aid rules.

two laser

the

for

IV.

COMMENTS FROM THIRD PARTIES

(28) No comments were submitted by third parties.

V.

COMMENTS FROM GERMANY

(29)

In its comments on the initiation of the formal investiga-
tion procedure, Germany argued that the loans did not
constitute state aid because they fulfilled the market
economy investor test.

(*) The table contains only the costs of the research carried out by
Schneider AG, and not the EUR 0,26 million grant for the ‘blue laser’
project carried out by the University of Würzburg and associated
with the Schneider project at the BFS's request.

(30) As regards the R&D grants, Germany expressed the opinion
that both projects qualified as industrial research and that
their subsidisation to the tune of up to 50 % of the eligible

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cost was therefore compatible with the state aid rules
applicable to R&D grants at the time the respective aid
awards were made. With regard to project 2, Germany
emphasized that
the project — ‘system
integration and prototypes’ — was misleading and that
the project had the aim of further deepening research into
individual components of the project.

the title of

VI.

ASSESSMENT

1.

THE LFA LOANS

(33) Nevertheless, some doubts persist as to the nature of the
loans. Due to the role of the LfA in promoting the regional
economy and on the basis of the information currently
available, the Commission cannot exclude that the purpose
of
the investment was to bridge a difficult period for
Schneider AG and to save jobs in the region. Further, it is
unclear whether the higher interest rates were sufficient to
compensate for the lack of collateral. Schneider AG was in a
difficult
the time the loans were
granted and it was not impossible that the laser technology
might fail. But the question whether the increased interest
rates were sufficient to counterbalance this risk is difficult
to assess.

financial situation at

1.1. STATE AID

1.2. DECISION WITHOUT OBJECT

(31) Pursuant to Article 87 of the EC Treaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through state resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competi-
tion by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between
Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
In order to determine whether shareholder loans granted by
a public authority constitute state aid within the meaning of
it is necessary to consider
Article 87 of the EC Treaty,
whether
in similar circumstances a market economy
investor might have provided loans on conditions compar-
able to the ones granted by the public authority.

(32) The Commission considers that there are strong indicators
that the three loans did not constitute state aid because the
market economy investor test is fulfilled. The information
available to the Commission indicates that granting loans to
Schneider AG with interest rates of between [...] %, [...] %
and [...] % (Commission reference rate 4,76 %),
later
increased to [...] %, [...] % and [...] % (Commission reference
rate 5,7 %), was not economically irrational in the given
circumstances of 1999/2000. The trust of the market in
future profits by Schneider AG, mainly through a leading
position in the laser technology business, is evidenced for
instance by the almost tenfold increase in the price of
Schneider shares between 1998 and 2000 and by the very
favourable study by the strategic investment bank Lehman
Brothers, which purchased an additional [...] shares in
Schneider AG during that period. In July 2000, about 50 %
of the capital was held by about 40 strategic investors.
the private
Secondly, compared with the behaviour of
shareholder Lehman Brothers, the behaviour of the LfA was
much more cautious. Lehman Brothers increased the capital
of Schneider AG by EUR 25 million in December 1999 and
was lead investor in the EUR 46 million capital increase of
February
about
EUR 8,74 million to the February capital increase (which
was already accepted as complying with the market
economy investor
in the decision to initiate the
procedure), the LfA provided a further EUR 12,8 million
only in the form of a reimbursable loan with interest.
Thirdly, the LfA interest rates were higher than the rates of
the pool banks, both at the time of the original grant of the
loans (September 1999 and February 2000) and at the time
the loans' prolongation (September and December
of
2002).

from contributing

2000. Apart

test

(34) The Commission is of

the opinion that

the question
whether the LfA loans qualified as state aid can be left open.
Even if they had to be considered incompatible state aid, a
negative decision ordering the aid's recovery would be
without object since there is no undertaking existing any
more which would have benefited, either directly or
indirectly, from the alleged state aid.

(35) The formal beneficiary of the loans was Schneider AG. SE
and SLT were created only after the loans had been granted,
but there is no reason to exclude that they benefited from
the loans. The insolvency proceedings against the three
Schneider companies were initiated in March 2002, and all
three companies were liquidated. The loan debt was
included in the insolvent estate.

(36) The three companies' assets were sold by the insolvency
administrator, under the supervision of
the insolvency
courts. The Commission considers that the market price
was paid for the respective assets, as a result of which the
benefit of
the
purchasers.

the aid was not passed on to any of

(a)

(b)

The assets owned by Schneider AG at the time of its
liquidation consisted of trade marks. After a world-
wide search for potential investors through an M&A
consultant, the insolvency administrator sold the trade
marks to the Chinese consumer electronics producer
TCL for a purchase price of EUR 3,48 million. At the
same time, a second consultant had been asked to
value the trade marks. He received several offers which
were significantly lower than that made by TCL. The
Commission therefore considers that the trade marks
were sold at their market price.

SE's assets, consisting of the television production line
and stocks, were sold by the insolvency administrator
to TCL for a total purchase price of EUR 5 745 480.
According to the information submitted by Germany,
the insolvency administrator had conducted extensive
investors.
discussions with a number of potential
However, there was very limited interest in purchasing

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a television set production line tailor-made for
Schneider AG which was already several years old,
and no interest at all in the stock of television sets for
which no guarantee and no service could be provided.
TCL made the highest bid and is therefore considered
to have paid the market price.

(c) As regards SLT,

the insolvency administrator had
the
commissioned an M&A consultant who sent
purchase documentation to about 150 potential
investors.
In-depth discussions took place with a
number of potentially interested parties. However,
owing to technical problems linked to the develop-
ment of
the actual
the laser display technology,
interest turned out to be very limited. No higher bid
than the one by LOS was submitted, not even when an
attempt was made to sell the existing patents and the
registrable patents separately. SLT's assets were sold in
a two-step procedure (6) to LOS for a total purchase
price of EUR 6 025 000. The Commission therefore
considers that the market price was paid also for the
assets of SLT.

2.

THE R&D PROJECTS

2.1. STATE AID

(37) Public funding is provided by the Land of Bavaria through
the BFS. It thus stems from state resources and is imputable
to the State. The funding of the part of project 1 which was
carried out by SLT and of project 2 provided an advantage
to Schneider AG. Since consumer electronics are traded
between Member States, the measure threatens to distort
competition and affects trade between Member States. The
subsidisation of projects 1 and 2 therefore constitutes state
aid.

(38) As regards the financing of the ‘blue laser’ project which
was carried out by the University of Würzburg,
the
Commission considers that the public funding does not
qualify as state aid. The project concerned fundamental
research which was designed to generally increase scientific
and technical knowledge. According to point 2.2 of the
1986 Community framework for state aid for research and
development (7) (applicable in 1994 at the time of grant),
the funding of
fundamental research is not normally
considered state aid. ‘However, in exceptional cases where
such research is carried out in or for particular firms, the
Commission cannot rule out the possibility that the aid
does fall within Article 92(1) [now 87(1)]’. This is not such

a case. In particular, the project was not carried out for
Schneider. The funding request had been made indepen-
dently by the University of Würzburg and the grants were
disbursed directly to the university. Germany informed the
Commission that the results of the university's research
were not relevant for Schneider AG, which had its own
scientific approach to solving the issues related to the blue
laser. Schneider AG continued its research and development
activities independently of the blue laser project and did not
use the results of
for its own
technical solution. The association of both projects had
been done by the BFS in the hope of synergies which did
not take place.

the university's project

2.2. DEROGATION UNDER ARTICLE 87(3) OF THE EC TREATY

(39) The R&D grants fall to be assessed under the Community
framework for state aid for research & development (‘R&D
framework’) of 1986 (8) and 1996 (9), which allows state aid
for fundamental research, (basic) industrial research and
precompetitive development.

Project 1

Stage of R&D — Aid intensity

(40) Project 1 can be qualified as a project of basic industrial
research within the meaning of Annex 1 to the R&D
framework of 1986 (10). The research activities were
focused on acquiring,
theoretical and
experimental work, entirely new knowledge in the field of
the projecting of large, high-resolution colour images for
different applications and on elaborating the scientific and
technological bases for the individual components of a
future laser display system.

through original

(41) The BFS subsidised the project to the tune of 48,98 %, i.e.
below the ceiling of 50 % allowed for basic industrial
research.

Incentive effect

(42) The Commission considers that

the R&D aid had an
incentive effect because the project would not have been
carried out without public support. The project involved a
very high technical and economic risk and the technology
was very innovative: it required very basic research and a
high amount of input. This was confirmed by an external
study commissioned by the BFS before deciding on the aid

(6) As a first step, a joint venture was set up to which SLT's assets were
transferred. LOS owned 60 % and the insolvent estate 40 % of the
joint venture. The purpose of this intermediate step, which lasted
one year, was to try to find a strategic investor who would purchase
the 40 % owned by the insolvent estate. No such investor was found,
and LOS was able to acquire 100 % ownership.

(7) OJ C 83, 11.4.1986, p. 2.

(8) See footnote 8.
(9) OJ C 45, 17.2.1996, p. 5.
(10) In Annex 1 to the R&D framework of 1986, basic industrial research
is defined as ‘original
theoretical or experimental work whose
objective is to achieve new or better understanding of the laws of
science and engineering as they might apply to an industrial sector
or the activities of a particular undertaking’.

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grant. The consulted experts were of the opinion that, in
view of the high complexity and the demanding overall aim
of the project, it could only be carried out if substantial
support was provided. The highest
technical risk was
estimated to be the exact reproduction of the image. The
this completely new
experts
technology contained a high number of single issues which
could only be tackled through an intensive, concentrated
and financially well-equipped R&D project.

further confirmed that

unlikely that the television set producer SE benefited from
the R&D aid for research into laser technology, which was
entirely spent in the approved manner. SLT might have
benefited from the aid. However, the companies have since
been liquidated, the R&D grants were included in the
insolvent estate (13) and the assets were sold at their market
price (see paragraph 36).

Project 2

Stage of R&D — Aid intensity

(43) As regards project 2, Germany claims that the project must
also be qualified as a project of industrial research (11).
Germany argues that, despite the misleading subtitle of the
project (‘Systemintegration und Prototypen’), the activities
carried out during the project were such as to fall under the
above definition. Germany explained that the aim of the
project was
individual
components of the technology. Therefore, in the eyes of
the BFS, the project was entirely classified as industrial
research. Furthermore, the first prototype was developed a
couple of months after the end of project 2 and the
prototype was for professional use and not for consumer
use, which had been the aim of the project. The actual
precompetitive research was carried out only after project 2
and without further public funding.

elaborate on the

to further

(44) The Commission is more convinced that the project should
rather be qualified as a project of precompetitive develop-
ment (12) — at least partially. Pursuant to points 5.5 and
5.9 of the R&D framework of 1996, the funding would be
limited to 25 %, or would have to represent the weighted
average of the permissible aid intensities. The Commission
considers that the integration of individual components
into an overall system could fall under the definition of
precompetitive development. Furthermore, the first proto-
type was finalised just a few months after the end of project
2, which is an indicator that the project was aimed at the
creation of an initial prototype.

Incentive effect

(46) The Commission considers that

the technological and
economic risk of project 2 was still very high and that SLT
would not have been in a position to carry out the project
without the support of the BFS. Like the first project before
it, the second project had a highly innovative character and
required a significant amount of input.

VII.

CONCLUSION

(47) The Commission concludes that the R&D aid for project 1
amounting to EUR 6 498 468,68 and 50 % of the R&D aid
for project 2, i.e. EUR 1 275 826,60, were compatible with
the Community's state aid rules.

the R&D aid for project 2,

(48) As regards the three loans totalling EUR 12,8 million and
50 % of
the Commission
considers that the information available is not sufficient for
it to reach a conclusive assessment. However, the decisive
questions as to whether the loans constituted state aid and
how far project 2 was a project of industrial research can be
left open. Any incompatible state aid could not be
recovered since, following the liquidation of all actual or
potential beneficiaries and the sale of their assets at their
market price, the aid would no longer distort the market.

(45) However, a further analysis of

the question would be
without object since any incompatible aid would not distort
the market any more. The R&D grants were provided to
Schneider AG. SE and SLT were set up only later. It is highly

The Commission accordingly concludes that the formal
investigation procedure initiated under Article 88(2) of the
EC Treaty in respect of the three loans and part of project 2
no longer serves any purpose,

(11) In Annex 1 to the R&D framework of 1996, industrial research is
defined as ‘planned research of critical investigation aimed at the
acquisition of new knowledge,
the objective being that such
knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes
or services or in bringing about a significant
in
existing products, processes or services’.

improvement

(12) In Annex 1 to the R&D framework of 1996, precompetitive
development is defined as ‘the shaping of the results of industrial
research into a plan, arrangement or design for new, altered or
improved products, processes or services, whether they are intended
to be sold or used, including the creation of an initial prototype
which could not be used commercially. This may also include the
conceptual formulation and design of other products, processes or
services and initial demonstration projects or pilot projects, provided
that such projects cannot be converted or used for industrial
applications or commercial exploitation’.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The aid granted to Schneider AG, Türkheim, in the amount of
EUR 6 498 468,68 for
‘Laser-Display-
Technologie’ and in the amount of EUR 1 275 826,60 for the

the research project

(13) After it became clear that the assets of SLT would be sold outside
Bavaria, one of the formal preconditions for the grants was no
longer fulfilled.

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R&D project
und Prototypen’ is compatible with the common market.

‘Laser-Display-Technologie — Systemintegration

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 2

investigation procedure is closed in so far as it
The formal
concerned the loans from the Bayrische Landesanstalt
für
Aufbaufinanzierung totalling EUR 12,8 million and the grant
of EUR 1 275 826,60 for
‘Laser-Display-
Technologie — Systemintegration und Prototypen’.

the R&D project

Done at Brussels, 16 May 2006.

For the Commission
Neelie KROES
Member of the Commission