Green Paper - The Presumption of Innocence
Date: 2006-04-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU Member State, European Convention on Human Rights, fundamental rights, human rights, judicial proceedings, rights of the defence

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 26.4.2006 
COM(2006) 174 final 

GREEN PAPER 

The Presumption of Innocence 

(presented by the Commission) 

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GREEN PAPER 

The Presumption of Innocence 

The presumption of innocence is a fundamental right, laid down in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Charter of 
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  (CFREU).  Article  6  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union (TEU) provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to Member States.  

The Commission is interested in whether the presumption of innocence is understood in the 
same  way  throughout  the  EU.  The  Green  Paper  will  examine  what  is  meant  by  the 
presumption of innocence and what rights stem from it. If consultation suggests that there is a 
need, we will consider including them in a proposal for a Framework Decision on evidence-
based safeguards. 

The Green Paper lists a number of questions (in boxes). Responses should be sent, preferably 
by 9 June 2006, to: 

European Commission 
Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security 
Unit D3 - Criminal Justice  
B-1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
Fax: + 32 2 296 7634 

marked “FAO Peter-Jozsef CSONKA, Head of Unit (ref.: CMO)” 

or by email to: 

jls-justicepenale@cec.eu.int 

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1. 

WHY IS THE EU EXAMINING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE? 

1.1. 

Background 

One of the EU’s objectives is the creation of an "area of freedom, security and justice" (TEU, 
Article  2).  In  Tampere,  in  1999,  the  EU’s  justice  priorities  were  decided  for  the  next  five 
years1.  Of  vital  importance  was  that  mutual  recognition  would  be  “the  cornerstone”  of  that 
area  and  the  main  form  of  judicial  cooperation.  Mutual  recognition  of  judicial  decisions 
involves criminal justice systems at all levels. It only operates effectively if there is trust in 
other  justice  systems,  if  each  person  coming  into  contact  with  a  foreign  judicial  decision  is 
confident that it has been taken fairly. Tampere Conclusion 33 stated that “enhanced mutual 
recognition  of  judicial  decisions  […]  would  facilitate  cooperation  […]  and  the  judicial 
protection of individual rights”. An area of freedom, security and justice means that European 
citizens  should  be  able  to  expect  safeguards  of  an  equivalent  standard2  throughout  the  EU. 
More  effective  prosecution  achieved  by  mutual  recognition  must  be  reconciled  with  respect 
for rights.  

The  Programme  of  Measures  to  Implement  the  Principle  of  Mutual  Recognition3  indicated 
areas  in  which  European  legislation  to  implement  mutual  recognition  was  desirable.  It  was 
“designed  to  strengthen  cooperation  between  Members  States  but  also  to  enhance  the 
protection  of  individual  rights”.  Mutual  recognition  depends  on  mutual  trust.  Through 
consultation, the Commission identified rights in respect of which increased visibility would 
enhance that trust. In 2003, a Green Paper on procedural safeguards was adopted4, followed in 
2004  by  a  proposal  for  a  Framework  Decision5.  Evidence-based  safeguards,  a  subject  not 
covered in those texts, were to be examined in a second consultation phase. This Green Paper 
on  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  part  of  that  consultation  on  evidence.  How  the 
presumption  of  innocence  is  classified  depends  on  the  legal  system.  The  Commission  has 
included it under evidence–based safeguards. This is because some rights associated with the 
presumption  of  innocence  are,  in  many  legal  systems,  linked  to  evidence  (such  as  oral 
testimony and documentary evidence).  

The  Commission’s  interest  is  two-fold,  to  assess  whether  cross-border  cases  present  a 
particular problem in this area and also whether EU legislation would enhance mutual trust. 
The  Commission  plans  a  further  Green  Paper  later  this  year  more  specifically  focused  on 
gathering/  handling  evidence  and  criteria  for  admissibility.  An  experts’  meeting  will  be 
convened in 2006 to discuss both Green Papers. 

1 
2 

3 
4 
5 

Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 October 1999 
Commission  Communication,  Towards  an  Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice:  “procedural  rules 
should  respond  to  broadly  the  same  guarantees,  ensuring  that  people  will  not  be  treated  unevenly 
according to the jurisdiction dealing with their case” and “the rules may be different provided that they 
are equivalent”. COM(1998)459, 14 July 1998 
Council and Commission’s Programme of Measures - OJ. C 12, 15.1.01 
COM (2003) 75 of 19.02.03 
COM (2004) 328 F of 28.04.04 

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In  2004,  the  Commission  arranged  for  a  study  of  the  Member  States’  laws  on  evidence  in 
criminal proceedings (“the Evidence Study”)6. Where national legislation is referred to here, 
the information is from that study.  

1.2. 

Legal Basis 

The EU’s criminal justice powers are conferred by Articles 297 and 31of the TEU.  

Art. 31:  

“Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: 

[…]; 

c) 

ensuring  compatibility  in  rules  applicable  in  the  Member  States,  as  may  be 
necessary to improve such cooperation;[…];” 

Since  judicial  cooperation  increasingly  means  mutual  recognition,  it  is  necessary  to  explore 
whether  having  common  evidence-based  safeguards  would  help  to  ensure  compatibility  in 
rules, increase trust and thus improve cooperation.  

1.3. 

The Hague Programme  

In  2004,  the  European  Council  adopted  the  Hague  Programme,  devoted  to  strengthening 
freedom,  security  and  justice  in  the  EU.  One  of  its  objectives  is  “to  improve  the  common 
capability of the Union […] to guarantee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards 
and access to justice […]”8. It concludes that “the further realisation of mutual recognition as 
the  cornerstone  of  judicial  cooperation  implies  the  development  of  equivalent  standards  for 
procedural  rights  in  criminal  proceedings”.  This  Green  Paper  is  listed  in  the  Action  Plan  to 
implement the Hague Programme9 under plans to strengthen justice.  

In  2005,  the  Commission  adopted  a  Communication  on  mutual  recognition  of  judicial 
decisions in criminal matters and the strengthening of mutual trust between Member States10 
whereby  it  concluded  that  reinforcing  mutual  trust  was  the  key  to  the  smooth  operation  of 

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The  study,  “The  Laws  of  Evidence  in  Criminal  Proceedings  throughout  the  European  Union”,  is 
available  from  the  European  Commission,  DG  JLS/D3,  Criminal  Justice  Unit,  B-1049  Brussels,  ref 
CMO. 
Art 29 TEU: “[…] the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an 
area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the 
fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters […]. 
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and 
illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud, through: 
- […]; 
- closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States […] in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 31and 32; 
- […].” 
Hague Programme, European Council Conclusions, 4/5 November 2004. 
Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the 
European Union, (OJ C 198, 12.8.2005, p.1), point 4.2.  
COM (2005) 195 f of 19.05.2005 

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mutual recognition. Proper protection of individual rights is a Commission priority and should 
give legal practitioners a stronger sense of belonging to a common judicial culture. 

1.4. 

European Evidence Warrant  

A draft Framework  Decision on the European Evidence Warrant is under negotiation. Point 
(o) of The Hague Programme Action Plan, under “Pursuing implementation of the principle 
of  mutual  recognition”  (Judicial  Cooperation  in  Criminal  Matters),  timetables  a  second 
proposal  “completing”  the  European  Evidence  Warrant  in  2007.  Once  these  proposals  are 
adopted,  evidence  will  cross  borders  using  simplified  request  procedures.  Should  certain 
common  minimum  safeguards  be  in  place  to  guarantee  the  rights  of  individuals,  especially 
those involved in cross border criminal proceedings?  

A  proposal  on  evidence-based  safeguards  is  planned  for  2007  in  the  Hague  Programme 
Action  Plan11.  The  Commission  wants  to  know  whether  evidence-based  safeguards  are 
essential for mutual trust where exchange of evidence across borders is concerned.  

2. 

WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE? 

The  “presumption  of  innocence”  is  mentioned  in  Art.  6(2)  ECHR (The right  to a fair  trial): 
“Everyone  charged  with  a  criminal  offence  shall  be  presumed  innocent  until  proved  guilty 
according to law” and Art. 48 CFREU (Presumption of innocence and right of defence): “1. 
Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.  2.  Respect  for  the  rights  of  the  defence  of  anyone  who  has  been  charged  shall  be 
guaranteed.” 

Guidance  is  found  in  the  case-law  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  as  to 
what constitutes the presumption of innocence. It can only benefit a person who is “subject to 
a criminal charge12”. The accused must be treated as not having committed any offence until 
the  State,  through  the  prosecuting  authorities,  adduces  sufficient  evidence  to  satisfy  an 
independent and impartial tribunal that he is guilty. The presumption of innocence “requires 
[…], that members of a court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has 
committed  the  offence  charged”13.  There  should  be  no  judicial  pronouncement  of  his  guilt 
prior  to  a  finding  of  guilt  by  a  court.  He  should  not  be  detained  in  pre-trial  custody  unless 
there  are  overriding  reasons.  If  he  is  detained  in  pre-trial  custody,  he  should  benefit  from 
detention conditions consistent with his presumed innocence. The burden of proving his guilt 
is  on  the  State  and  any  doubt  should  benefit  the  accused.  He  should  be  able  to  refuse  to 
answer questions. He should generally not be expected to provide self-incriminating evidence. 
He should not have his property confiscated without due process. 

1.  Do  you  agree  with  the  list  of  what  constitutes  the  presumption  of  innocence  given 
here? Are there any other aspects not covered? 

11 

12 
13 

Point  (h)  under  "Approximation",  Proposal  on  minimum  standards  relating  to  the  taking  of  evidence 
with a view to mutual admissibility (2007). 
X v. FRG N° 4483/70 – application held inadmissible. 
Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, A146 (1989) para 77. 

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2.1. 

Pre-trial pronouncement of guilt  

A court or public official may not state that the accused is guilty of an offence if he has not 
been tried and convicted of it. “The presumption of innocence will be violated if, without the 
accused’s having previously been proved guilty according to law and […] without his having 
had  the  opportunity  of  exercising  his  rights  of  defence,  a  judicial  decision  concerning  him 
reflects  an  opinion  that  he  is  guilty”14.  However,  the  authorities  may  inform  the  public  of 
investigations and voice a suspicion of guilt15, as long as the suspicion is not a declaration of 
the accused’s guilt16 and they show discretion and circumspection.  

2.2. 

Pre-trial detention 

This  is  covered  in  the  Green  Paper  on  mutual  recognition  of  non-custodial  pre-trial 
supervision measures17 and will not be dealt with here. Detaining a suspect does not violate 
the  presumption  of  innocence.  Articles  5(1)(c)  and  5(3)  ECHR  lay  down  exceptions  to  the 
right  to  liberty  where  this  is  for  the  purposes  of  bringing  a  detained  person  to  court  “on 
reasonable  suspicion  of  having  committed  an  offence”  if  the  detention  is  for  a  reasonable 
period only. The ECtHR held that there is no automatic right to detention conditions different 
from  those  under  which  convicted  persons  are  held18,  as  long  as  the  conditions  are 
reasonable19. 

2. Are there special measures in your Member State during the pre-trial stage in order 
to safeguard the presumption of innocence? 

2.3. 

The burden of proof 

Generally,  the  prosecution  must  prove  the  accused’s  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  The 
ECtHR held that “the burden of proof is on the prosecution and any doubt should benefit the 
accused.  It  also  follows  that  it  is  for  the  prosecution  […]  to  adduce  sufficient  evidence  to 
convict him”20. 

From  the  ECtHR  case-law,  the  Commission  has  identified  3  situations  where  the  burden  of 
proof does not rest wholly on the prosecution: (a) strict liability offences, (b) offences where 
the burden of proof is reversed and (c) when a confiscation order is made.  

(a)  Here,  the  prosecution  must  adduce  evidence  to  prove  that  the  accused  committed  the 
physical act (actus reus) of the offence but does not have to show that he intended to act in 
that  way  or  to  produce  that  result.  Such  offences  comply  with  the  ECHR  even  though  the 
State is exempt from proving that the accused had “a guilty intention” (mens rea). The ECtHR 
recognised  that  States  have  offences  of  strict  liability  in  their  criminal  law21.  For  these 
offences,  only  the  fact  that  the  accused  committed  the  act  has  to  be  proved,  and  if  that  is 
proved,  there  is  a  presumption  which  may  operate  against  the  accused  person.  It  noted  that 

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Minelli v. Switzerland A62 (1983) para 38. 
Krause v. Switzerland N° 7986/77, 13DR 73 (1978) 
Allenet de Ribemont v. France A 308 (1995) paras. 37, 41. 
COM(2004)562, 17.8.2004 
Skoogström v. Sweden N° 8582/72 (1982) 
Peers v. Greece N° 28524/95 
Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, A146 para 77 (1989). 
Salabiaku v. France A 141-A para 28 (1988). 

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such  presumptions  should  be  “within  reasonable  limits  which  take  into  account  the 
importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence”.  

(b) Here, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted in a certain way and the accused 
must show that there is an innocent explanation for his actions. This is a heavier burden for 
the  accused  than  (a)  above.  The  ECtHR  has  said  that  this  is  acceptable  for  “less  serious” 
offences22.  

The Evidence Study showed that whilst the prevailing position in the EU was that the onus of 
proving an accused’s guilt rests on the prosecution, sometimes, in exceptional cases, such as 
document or regulatory offences, once the prosecution had proved the existence of a duty, the 
accused had a reverse burden to prove that he had complied with it. There were also occasions 
where the accused  had  to  raise  a  defence (such as self defence, insanity or alibi) before the 
prosecution was required to disprove it. 

(c)  In  the  recovery  of  assets  from  an  accused  or  third  party,  there  may  be  a  reversal  of  the 
burden of proof in the assumption that the assets are the proceeds of crime, which the owner 
of  the  assets  must  rebut,  or  there  is  a  reduction  in  the  standard  of  proof  to  the  balance  of 
probabilities,  rather  than  the  usual  test  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Any  recovery  of 
assets must be open to challenge in court, reasonable and proportionate23. Clearly, this applies 
also  to  cross  border  recovery  of  assets.  Claims  of  bona  fide  third  parties  must  be  taken 
seriously  where  their  right  to  property  is  jeopardised  and  States  must  ensure  that  there  are 
mechanisms to protect them.  

3.  (a)  In  what  circumstances  is  it  acceptable  for  the  burden  of  proof  to  be  reversed  or 
altered in some way?  

(b)  Have  you  experienced  cross  border  cooperation  situations  in  which  the  burden  of 
proof created a problem? 

2.4. 

Privilege against self-incrimination  

The presumption of innocence includes the privilege against self-incrimination which is made 
up of the right of silence and not to be compelled to produce inculpating evidence. The maxim 
nemo  tenetur  prodere  seipsum,  (“no  person  is  to  be  compelled  to  accuse  himself”)  applies. 
The accused may refuse to answer questions and to produce evidence. The ECtHR24 held that, 
although not specifically mentioned in the ECHR, the privilege against self-incrimination is a 
generally  recognised  international  standard  which  lies  “at  the  heart  of  the  notion  of  a  fair 
procedure”.  It  protects  the  accused  against  improper  compulsion  by  the  authorities,  thus 
reducing the risk of miscarriages of justice and embodying the equality of arms principle. The 
prosecution  must  prove  its  case  without  resort  to  evidence  obtained  through  coercion  or 
oppression. Security and public order cannot justify the suppression of these rights25.They are 
linked rights, any compulsion to produce incriminating evidence being an infringement of the 
right  of  silence.  The  State  infringed  an  accused’s  right  of  silence  when  it  sought  to  compel 
him  to  produce  bank  statements  to  customs  investigators26.  Coercion  to  co-operate  with  the 

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Ibid. 
Welch v. UK N° 17440/90 (9 February 1995), Philips v. UK N° 41087/98, (5 July 2001). 
Heaney and McGuiness v. Ireland N°. 34720/97 (21 December 2000) 
ibid. 
Funke v France A 256-A (25 February 1993). 

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authorities  in  the  pre-trial  process  may  infringe  the  privilege  against  self-incrimination  and 
jeopardise the fairness of any subsequent hearing.  

2.5. 

Right of silence 

The right of silence applies to police questioning and in court. The accused should have the 
right not to testify and, arguably, the right not to disclose the nature of his defence before trial.  

The laws of Member States recognise the right to remain silent during the investigative phase 
when being interviewed by police or an investigating judge. However, the way in which the 
accused is made aware of the right differs and an important aspect of protecting the right is 
that he should be aware of it. According to the Evidence Study, in most Member States, there 
is  an  obligation  to  advise  him  of  his  right  to  remain  silent.  That  obligation  is  enshrined  in 
legislation,  case-law  and  constitutional  provisions.  A  few  Member  States  indicated  that 
evidence obtained where the obligation had not been met might be regarded as inadmissible. 
Others stated that failure to advise an accused of his rights might constitute an offence or a 
ground of appeal against conviction.  

However, the right is not absolute. There are factors determining whether fair trial rights are 
infringed  if  a  court  draws  adverse  inferences  from  an  accused’s  silence.  Inferences  should 
only  be  drawn  after  the  prosecution  has  made  out  a  prima  facie  case.  The  judge  then  has  a 
discretion to draw inferences. Only ‘common sense’ inferences are permissible. The reasons 
for drawing them must be explained in the judgment. The evidence against the accused must 
be  overwhelming;  in  that  case,  evidence  obtained  using  indirect  pressure  may  be  used.  The 
leading case on the subject is Murray v UK27. The ECtHR concluded that, if there was a prima 
facie case and the burden of proof remained on the prosecution, adverse inferences could be 
drawn from a failure to testify. Requiring the accused to testify was not incompatible with the 
ECHR,  although  it  would  be  if  any  conviction  were  based  solely  or  mainly  on  a  refusal  to 
testify.  Whether  the  drawing  of  adverse  inferences  from  an  accused's  silence  infringes  the 
right to be presumed innocent is determined having regard to the weight attached to them by 
the national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the degree of compulsion involved. 
The prosecution evidence must be sufficiently strong to require an answer. The national court 
cannot conclude that the accused is guilty merely because he chooses to remain silent. Only if 
the evidence against him “calls” for an explanation which he ought to be in a position to give, 
then a failure to do so “may as a matter of common sense allow the drawing of an inference 
that there is no explanation and that the accused is guilty”. Conversely, if the prosecution case 
has  so  little  evidential  value  that  it  calls  for  no  answer,  a  failure  to  provide  one  could  not 
justify an inference of guilt. The ECtHR points out that the drawing of reasonable inferences 
from the accused's behaviour does not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the 
defence so as to infringe that aspect of the principle of the presumption of innocence. 

The ECtHR has not ruled on whether the right applies to legal persons. The European Court 
of  Justice  (ECJ)  has  held  that  a  legal  person  has  no  absolute  right  to  remain  silent.  Legal 
persons  must  answer  factual  questions,  but  may  not  be  compelled  to  admit  to  an 
infringement28 

4. (a) How is the right of silence protected in your Member State? 

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Murray v. UK, N° 18731/91 (8 February 1996). 
Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, ECR 3283, paras 34-35 

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(b) Is there any difference in cross border situations? 

(c) To what extent are legal persons protected by the right? 

2.6. 

Right not to produce evidence  

The principle that a tribunal should have access to all the evidence is overridden by the need 
for fairness and to minimise the risk that the accused will be convicted on his testimony29. In 
defining  the  scope  of  the  right,  the  ECtHR  distinguished  between  material  compulsorily 
acquired  and  that  which  exists  independently  of  the  suspect’s  will:  “the  right  not  to 
incriminate oneself is primarily concerned…with respecting the will of an accused person to 
remain  silent.  As  commonly  understood…it  does  not  extend  to  the  use  in  criminal 
proceedings  of  material  which  may  be  obtained  from  the  accused  through  the  use  of 
compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, 
inter alia, acquired pursuant to warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for 
the purpose of DNA testing.”30 

Where an order has been issued to produce a document or authorising a search and/or seizure 
of  items,  the  order  should  specify  the  subject  matter  of  the  item  in  order  to  avoid  general 
requests being used to justify “fishing expeditions” where a vague suspicion only exists. 

The  question  arises  whether  the  right  not  to  produce  evidence  applies  to  legal  persons.  The 
Community  Courts  (ECJ  and  Court  of  First  Instance)  have  held  that  it  does  not.  The 
production of documents may be requested31.  

5. (a) How is the right against self-incrimination protected in your Member State? 

(b) Is there any difference in cross border situations? 

(c) To what extent are legal persons protected by the right? 

2.7. 

In absentia proceedings 

Art. 6 ECHR confers the right on the accused “to defend himself in person”. Definitions of in 
absentia  vary.  Several  Member  States  have  legislation  allowing  trials  to  take  place  in  the 
absence  of  the  accused,  others  make  it  mandatory  for  the  accused  to  attend  the  trial  and 
breaches of this obligation may be punished. The Commission will devote a Green Paper to in 
absentia proceedings and in the meantime, wishes to establish the circumstances in which it is 
possible for such proceedings to comply with the presumption of innocence. 

6. (a) Are in absentia proceedings possible in your jurisdiction? 

(b)  Do  these  proceedings  raise  specific  problems  with  regard  to  the  presumption  of 
innocence, in particular in cross border situations? 

29 
30 
31 

Saunders v United Kingdom (N° 19187/91). 
Ibid. 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke v. Commission, Case T-112/98, ECR 729, para 65; Opinion of AG in Case 
C-301/04 P, Commission v. SGL 

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2.8. 

Terrorism 

An increase in terrorism in the EU has led to new national legislation to combat it in several 
Member States. Such counter-terrorist legislation must comply with the ECHR. On July 2002, 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Guidelines on Human  Rights 
and  the  Fight  against  Terrorism32  and  invited  States  to  ensure  that  they  were  “widely 
disseminated  among  all  authorities  responsible  for  the  fight  against  terrorism”.  Art.  IX  (2) 
provides “a person accused of terrorist activities benefits from the presumption of innocence”. 
The commentary points out that the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a 
judge but also by other public authorities33. The Guidelines specify restrictions to the rights of 
defence that are compatible with the ECHR and consistent with the presumption of innocence. 
These are restrictions on access to and contacts with counsel, arrangements for access to the 
case-file  and  use  of  anonymous  testimony.  However,  “such  restrictions  must  be  strictly 
proportionate  to  their  purpose  and  compensatory  measures  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
accused  must  be  taken  so  as  to  maintain  the  fairness  of  the  proceedings  and  to  ensure  that 
procedural rights are not drained of their substance”. 

7. Does legislation in your Member State lay down special rules for terrorist offences? If 
so,  please  describe  the  provisions  inasmuch  as  they  relate  to  the  presumption  of 
innocence. Does this regime apply to other offences? 

2.9. 

Duration 

The  presumption  of  innocence  generally  ceases  upon  a  court’s  finding  of  guilt.  The 
Commission is interested in when this point is reached in different Member States. This could 
be after a first instance trial or only when a final appeal has failed. 

8. At what point does the presumption of innocence cease in your Member State? 

General questions 

9. (a) Are you aware of problems in a cross-border context linked to the presumption of 
innocence other than those referred to above? 

(b)  To  what  extent  are  these  problems  related  to  differences  in  approach  in  other 
jurisdictions? 

(c) Could EU proposals add value in this area? If so, in what way? 

32 
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Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002. 
Allenet de Ribemont v. France, see footnote 16, para. 36 

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