Report from the Commission on the operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA {SEC(2006) 502}
Date: 2006-04-21
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, Interpol, Schengen Information System, data protection, disclosure of information, fight against crime, passport, personal data, terrorism

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 21.4.2006 
COM(2006) 167 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 

on the operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA 

{SEC(2006) 502} 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 

on the operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA 

INTRODUCTION 

On 25th March 2004, the European Council, through its Declaration on combating terrorism, 
instructed  the  Council  to  take  forward  work  on  the  creation  of  an  integrated  system  for  the 
exchange  of  information  on  lost  and  stolen  passports  having  recourse  to  the  Schengen 
Information System (“SIS”) and the Interpol database. 

As  a  result  the  Council  issued  Common  Position  2005/69/JHA  as  a  first  response  to  that 
request,  and  it  was  envisaged  that  this  would  be  followed  up  by  the  establishment  of  the 
technical functionality in SIS II to achieve that aim. 

The  Common  Position  obliges  Member  States  to  ensure  that  their  competent  authorities 
exchange  data  on  issued  and  blank  passports  that  are  stolen,  lost  or  misappropriated  and 
formatted  for  integration  in  a  specific  information  system,  whilst  at  the  same  time  ensuring 
that the fundamental rights of data subjects are respected. 

1. 

KEY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMON POSITION 

Given the terms of the Common Position, the Commission has identified 5 distinct obligations 
that have been placed upon the Member States: 

–  To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol 

–  To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of protection 
for  personal  data  and  to  respect  the  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  regarding  the 
automatic processing of personal data 

–  To ensure that such data is exchanged with Interpol immediately after it has been entered 

into the national database or SIS 

–  To  ensure  that  their  competent  law  authorities  use  the  Interpol  database  to  access  such 

information when appropriate for performance of their task; 

–  To  ensure  that  they  set  up  relevant  infrastructures  to  facilitate  consultation  by  December 

2005 at the latest. 

2. 

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT AND METHOD OF EVALUATION 

As  a  result  of  Article  4  of  the  Common  Position,  the  European  Commission  has  been 
instructed to submit a report to the Council on the operation of the Common Position within 
the Member States. 

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On the basis of this report, the Council is to assess the extent to which Member States have 
complied with the Common Position and take appropriate action. 

Pursuant  to  this  task,  on  3rd  August  2005  the  Commission  sent  a  questionnaire  to  all  25 
Member  States.  This  questionnaire  was  designed  to  produce  answers  which  would  help 
ascertain the extent, mode and method of operation of the Common Position. 

Only 17 Member States returned answers to this questionnaire. 

Responses were received from: 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech Rep. 

Estonia 

Finland 

Germany  

Spain 

Italy 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Portugal 

Slovenia 

Slovak Rep. 

United Kingdom 

Poland 

Latvia 

Responses were not received from: 

Denmark 

Greece 

Hungary 

Malta 

France 

Sweden 

Ireland 

Cyprus 

It should be noted that this report is submitted mindful of the requirement in Article 4 of the 
Common  Position  that  the  Commission  provides  the  Council  with  a  report  by  December 
2005.  As  a  result  it  is  made  on  the  basis  of  a  majority  cross-section  of  the  Member  States, 
rather than a complete collection of responses from all 25 Member States. 

The quality of the national information received by the Commission inevitably influences the 
quality  and  value  of  this  report.  Some  of  the  information  received  by  the  Commission  was 
ambiguous,  incomplete,  makes  reference  to  domestic  law  and  other  provisions  without 
providing  further  details,  and  has  been  provided  the  basis  of  variable  interpretations  of  the 
questions  asked  depending  on  the  Member  State  in  question.  Likewise,  given  the  variable 
interpretations which can be given to the relatively broad terms of the Common Position, it is 
not  always  immediately  clear  from  the  answers  given  as  to  whether  implementation  of  key 
Articles  has  taken  place,  this  sometimes  being  a  question  of  extent  rather  than  an  absolute 
measure. 

3. 

RESPONSE SUMMARIES 

3.1. 

How did your MS implement the Common Position on exchanging certain data 
with Interpol (2005/69/JHA)? 

Responses  to  this  question  indicated  that  Member  States  were  at  a  variety  of  stages  of 
operation  of  the  Common  Position.  The  answers  demonstrate  that,  in  general  at  least,  there 
has been decent progress in the operation of the Common Position, albeit not in its entirety. 
The majority of answers suggest that implementation of the central provisions of Article 3(1) 
has  taken  place  for  many  Member  States,  the  central  provisions  of  Art  3(3)  have  posed  a 
much  greater  challenge.  In  most  cases,  relevant  data  has  been  (or  is  on  the  point  of  being) 

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provided  to  Interpol.  The  answers  appear  to  indicate,  however,  that  only  a  small  number  of 
Member  States  have  managed  to  establish  infrastructures  for  competent  law  authorities  to 
search relevant Interpol databases. 

3.2. 

Does  your  MS  exchange  all  passport  data  (as  defined  in  Article  2(1)  of  CP 
2005/69/JHA) with Interpol as required in Art. 3 (1) of CP 2005/69/JHA? 

Out of 17 respondents, 11 exchange passport data with Interpol, whilst 3 of the respondents 
will  be  doing  so  imminently.  Those  which  do  not  currently  exchange  such  information 
include  Spain,  Estonia  and  Slovakia.  The  type  of  data  that  is  exchanged  is  not  always  as 
complete as is required under the Common Position, with Poland, for example only providing 
data on passports which are lost or stolen as a result of crime. 

3.3. 

3.2Does  your  MS  pursuant  to  Art.  3  (3)  of  CP  2005/69/JHA  exchange  all 
passport data immediately also with Interpol after it has been entered in your 
relevant  national  data  base  or  the  SIS  if  you  participate  in  it?  Please  describe 
your  workflows,  in  particular  how  you  ensure  that  data  is  immediately 
exchanged  with  Interpol  after  having  been  entered  into  the  relevant  national 
data base or SIS. 

Very  few  of  the  respondents  claim  to  have  achieved  the  immediate  exchange  of  data  with 
Interpol. Only 3 Portugal, the Netherlands and Germany claim to have achieved this (though 
it is in fact unclear that the Netherlands is yet providing information at all), and in the case of 
Portugal, this is still by means of fax/email. However, 7 Member States exchange information 
daily, either on the same day that information is received at national level, or the following 
morning. 

3.4. 

Does  your  MS  distinct  between  Interpol  members  to  share  this  data  with  and 
those not to share this data with according Art. 3 (1) of the CP 2005/69/JHA? If 
so,  how  does  your  MS  distinct?  Did  you  require  reciprocity  in  the  data 
exchange? 

Out of 17 respondents, 14 do not distinguish between members of Interpol when exchanging 
information,  and  2  have  not  yet  decided  their  policy  in  this  regard.  This  leaves  the 
Netherlands  as  the  only  Member  State  which  does  distinguish  between  Interpol  members. 
Such an open approach on the part of the Member States is most likely on the basis of their 
being  no  exchange  of  personal/nominal  information  –  a  factor  pointed  out  by  the  UK, 
Germany,  Portugal  and  the  Czech  Republic.  If  searches  of  non-personal  information  on  the 
Interpol  database  give  rise  to  requests  for  further,  personal  information,  Member  States  are 
likely to be more discriminating in who they give this to. In the case of the UK, for example, 
it is noted that once information exchange did involve the exchange of personal information, 
each individual request would be risk assessed before such information was handed over. 

In terms of reciprocity, only 2 out of 17 respondents (Portugal and Slovakia) state that they 
require,  or  would  require,  reciprocity  of  exchange.  Portugal’s  response  makes  it  clear  that 
such  reciprocity  would  only  be  required  in  relation  to  the  bilateral  exchange  of  nominal 
information,  following  an  information  ‘hit’  by  the  searching  party  of  the  (non-personal) 
database information provided to Interpol. Again, this implies that reciprocity is more likely 
to  be  a  factor  in  Member  States’  willingness  to  exchange  information  once  personal  or 
nominal data is involved. 

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3.5.  What  modalities  has  your  MS  agreed  upon  with  Interpol  for  exchanging  all 
passport data in its possession pursuant to Art. 3 (2) of CP 2005/69/JHA? 

Out of the 17 respondents, 6 may, subject to the requirements set forth in paragraph 1, agree 
modalities for exchange with Interpol. Of the remainder, 2 simply cite the Interpol regulations 
as being the basis for exchange and 2 offer ambiguous answers. Otherwise, cited modalities 
include: 

–  exchange according to the Schengen Guidelines (Germany) 

–  An agreement to exchange using planned real time DATIREL system (Spain) 

–  Automatic  transfer  of  information  from  national  database  to  SIS,  and  thence  to 

Interpol ASF/STD system (Finland) 

–  Use of the I – 24/7 (Italy and Latvia) 

–  Ad hoc consultation at a central level (Luxembourg); and 

–  Provision of information electronically via NCIS to Interpol, and use of I – 24/7 to 

exchange subsequent sensitive information (UK). 

3.6. 

How  does  your  MS  ensure  that  the  competent  law  enforcement  authorities 
query  the  Interpol  database  for  the  purpose  of  this  CP  each  time  when 
appropriate  for  the  performance  of  their  tasks  according  Art.  3  (4)  of  CP 
2005/69/JHA? 

Answers given to this question were often of a very non-specific nature, and overall offer an 
ambiguous  general  response.  Overall,  very  few  Member  States  seen  to  have  taken  positive 
steps in the implementation of this Article, and where they have, they appear to have been of a 
relatively lightweight nature. 

Cited methods to monitor and regulate this type of data exchange include internal rules and 
guidelines, provision of information about Interpol and the provision of a code of connection 
agreement.  In  many  cases,  Member  States  have  simply  stated  the  means  by  which  such 
information can be accessed – for example through central contact points, ASF-mail/e-ASF, 
access of information via the EASYFORM application and through central contact points. 

The  nature  of  the  majority  of  the  responses  imply  that  Member  States  have  not  given  a 
particularly proactive interpretation to Article 3(4), and for the most part feel that the simple 
provision of potential access (in one form or another) to competent authorities is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement set out in the Article. This seems at odds with the text of the Article, 
and  particularly  with  Member  States’  obligation  to  “ensure”  law  enforcement  authorities 
consult the Interpol database where appropriate. 

3.7. 

How have these competent authorities been defined? 

Methods of definition vary, and have been made on the basis of national legislation, national 
consultations, ‘need to know’ evaluations, the Interpol Constitution/’Statutes’ or have not yet 
been decided. The range of authorities include: 

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–  Federal  Ministry  for 

internal  affairs,  security  directorates  and  regional 

administrative bodies and directorates of federal police (Austria) 

–  Authorities  likely  to  contribute  effectively  to  the  prevention  and  suppression  of 

ordinary law crime (Czech Republic) 

–  Federal criminal police, federal police directorate and the state offices of relevant 
Bundeslander. Customs criminological office to be included in future (Germany) 

–  National contact points or bureaus (Finland, Italy and Luxembourg) 

–  Those defined according to Interpol standards and national law (Poland) 

–  All law enforcement authorities including customs (Portugal) 

–  Police authorities only (Slovenia); and 

–  All law enforcement agencies or those having a legal requirement to access such 

data; includes Department for Work & Pensions, Trading Standards (UK). 

As such there are a variety of definitions made on a variety of bases. It is clear however that 
criminal law enforcement authorities (as the term is generally understood), will have access to 
exchange  information-even  if  such  access  is  only  of  an  indirect  nature  (i.e.  through  central 
contact points). 

3.8. 

Has  your  MS  developed  guidance  on  the  cases  where  consultation  of  the 
Interpol database is deemed appropriate? 

Out of the 17 respondents, 12 appear to have not developed such guidance (though of these, 4 
appear to be planning to do so in future, whilst 7 give the impression that the development of 
such guidance is neither necessary nor planned). The answers given by four of the Member 
States are unclear as to whether such guidance has been developed, or whether it is considered 
necessary.  The  nature  of  the  answers  given  by  these  Member  States  seem  to  imply  that  the 
simple  fact  of  potential  availability  satisfies  any  need  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to  be 
trained or guided in the use of the Interpol database. Only 1 of the 17 respondents (the UK) 
has developed specific guidance and training in this respect. 

As  such,  it  again  appears  that  the  Member  States,  in  general,  are  not  taking  a  particularly 
proactive  line  in  terms  of  training  their  law  enforcement  authorities.  The  development  of 
guidance  and  training  for  law  enforcement  authorities  does  not  seem  to  be  considered 
necessary by the majority for satisfaction of the general requirement set out in Article 3(3). 

3.9. 

Has  your  MS  already  set  up  the  infrastructure  required  to  facilitate 
consultation according Art. 3(4) of the CP 2005/69/JHA)? If so, how does it look 
like? 

Out of the 17 respondents, 7 state that they are in the process of developing or implementing 
such  infrastructures.  The  answers  given  by  6  Member  States  do  not  make  it  clear  as  to 
whether  such  infrastructures  have  been  developed  or  not.  It  appears  that  4  Member  States 
(UK, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg) have established such infrastructures. 

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Given the stated intentions of the largest part of the respondents, as well as the structures put 
in  place  by  the  UK,  Belgium,  Germany  and  Luxembourg,  it  is  clear  that  the  majority  of 
Member States are taking active steps to satisfy this particular requirement. Of the remaining 
Member States, some of the answers seem to imply a very non-demanding interpretation of 
what is meant by Article 3(4). 

3.10.  How  does  your  MS  ensure  an  adequate  level  of  protection  of  personal  data  in 
the  relevant  Interpol  member  country  and  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights 
and liberties regarding the automatic processing of personal data? 

Out  of  17  respondents,  9  cite  domestic  (and/or  international)  data  protection  as  forming  the 
basis  of  protection  for  the  exchange  of  such  information.  The  fact  that  no  personal  data  is 
exchanged is cited by a further 5 Member States. Austria is still in negotiation with Interpol 
over this issue, the Netherlands protects its data by restricting access to it, and no answer was 
received from Italy. 

3.11.  How does your MS ensure that if a positive identification (hit) occurs against the 
Interpol database the competent authorities take action in accordance with their 
national law? 

The  respondents  have  taken  two  different  interpretations  of  this  question.  On  the  one  hand 
some respondents have answered on the basis that they thought the question was focusing on 
their  own  ability  to  ensure  they  respond  to  hits  made  by  others.  Others  Member  States 
answered  on  the  basis  that  they  thought  the  question  was  focusing  upon  how  they  could 
ensure other Member States responded promptly when there was a hit. 

Of those looking at their own internal ability to respond effectively, the types of methods used 
included: 

–  the use of strict internal rules and procedures 

–  the development of verification procedures with BCN operators 

–  automatic hit indicators 

–  involving OCNs in the process; and 

–  NCI control and verification. 

The most commonly cited method of ensuring follow-up of information was vaguely defined 
internal  procedures  and  maintenance  of  proper  standards.  This  again  suggests  a  less  than 
proactive  approach  in  this  area.  Of  those  looking  at  the  ability  of  other  Member  States  to 
follow up a ‘hit’ with the appropriate information, the following approaches were taken: 

–  the taking into account of inappropriate actions in future dealings 

–  that the Interpol regulations would be relied upon; and 

–  demands for explanations and comments if a hit takes place. 

In  the  light  of  the  responses,  the  use  of  internal  procedures  and  automated  ‘hit’  alarms  will 
play the lead role in terms of ensuring internal effectiveness in following up ‘hits’. In terms of 

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the  external  context  (i.e.  measures  to  ensure  timely  responses  by  external  actors),  those 
Member  States  that  fail  to  provide  information  in  due  course  are  likely  to  be  subject  to 
informal sanctions or demands. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS-SPECIFIC 

In order to provide a general overview of the operation of the Common Decision, it is again 
necessary to return to the 5 core obligations identified 

4.1. 

To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol. 

Given  the  positive  responses  of  11  out  of  17  of  the  respondents,  and  the  imminent 
involvement of 3 more, there appears to have been solid progress in the exchange of Interpol 
of  national  data.  Those  which  have  not  exchanged  data  with  Interpol  (Spain,  Estonia  and 
Slovakia) have not provided explanations as to why such implementation has not taken place. 

The  relative  success  of  Member  States  in  implementing  this  part  of  the  Common  Position 
perhaps  reflects  a  perception  that  this  is  the  core  obligation  placed  on  the  Member  States  – 
and  one  that  must  be  satisfied  if  any  particular  Member  State  is  to  be  recognised  as 
implementing the Common Position. One potential area that attention should be paid to in this 
relatively successful area of exchange is the definition of passport data. Article 2(1) calls for 
the  exchange  of  “issued  and  blank  passports  that  are  stolen,  lost  or  misappropriated”.  In 
some cases Member States exceed this requirement by providing, for example, information on 
ID cards and driving licenses. This in itself is no bad thing, and indeed is desirable given the 
relatively free ability to travel within the EU using ID cards only. On the other hand however, 
Poland exchanges passport information, but only in respect of those lost or stolen as a result 
of crime. It is logical that a passport lost as a result of absent mindedness potentially presents 
just  as  many  dangers  to  the  security  of  the  Union  as  one  that  is  stolen.  As  such,  attention 
should be paid that the definition in Article 2(1) is adhered to by Member States, as gaps in 
the type of information being exchanged could be critical. 

Despite the fact that not all Member States have responded  to  the questionnaire sent  by the 
Commission, Interpol notes that 18 of the 25 Member States are currently participating in the 
stolen  travel  document  database.  According  to  Interpol  information  Austria,  Denmark, 
Hungary,  Latvia,  the  Netherlands,  Slovakia  and  Sweden  are  not  yet  contributing  to  the 
database. Interpol notes that some of these Member States are extremely close to taking part 
in exchange, though are currently in negotiation or in the process of implementation. 

The  fact  that  for  the  most  part  the  Member  States  have  satisfied  this  vital  requirement  is 
reflected  in  Interpol  figures,  which  show  that  data  from  the  EU  states  relating  to  6,394,305 
lost or missing travel documents were provided to the Interpol database. This compares to a 
figure  of  2,449,300  for  all  other  participants  in  Interpol  –  making  the  EU  the  greatest 
contributor of data by far. 1 
In 2002, the figure for the EU stood at 783. This demonstrates 
the huge growth in participation in this system, as well as the key role that EU states now play 
in enhancing Interpol’s capabilities. 

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Figures as at 23rd November 2005. 

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4.2. 

To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of 
protection for personal data. 

Ensuring  that  other  Interpol  participants  have  adequate  data  protection  measures  in  place  is 
problematic  for  Member  States.  In  most  situations,  contribution  to  or  consultation  of  the 
Interpol  STD  database  will  not  result  in  any  exchange  of  personal  data  except  for  passport 
numbers of issued passports2, thanks to the definition of ‘passport data’ under Article 2(1) of 
the  Common  Position.  On  the  face  of  it,  this  means  that  there  is  reduced  necessity  for  data 
protection  measures  at  this  stage  of  the  information  exchange  –  a  point  made  by  several 
Member  States  in  their  answers  to  the  questionnaire.  This  is  unless  some  of  the  Member 
States actually contribute personal data to Interpol’s STD database – in which case an explicit 
means of data protection is necessary. It should be noted that the majority of Member States 
have indicated that they do not consider passport numbers to constitute ‘personal data’. 

In only one case (the Netherlands) does a Member State definitely discriminate as to whom 
they  share  data  with.  Two  other  Member  States  are  yet  to  decide  this.  This  shows  great 
willingness on the part of the Member States to be relatively free with exchange of their data, 
and  a  certain  disinterest  as  to  whether  or  not  the  states  they  share  data  with  have  adequate 
personal data protection in place or not. Where no personal data is actually exchanged in the 
initial  phases  of  a  data  query,  then  it  seems  quite  fair  that  this  should  be  so.  Thus  several 
Member States make the explicit note that there is no discrimination because contributions to 
the Interpol STD database does not in itself involve the exchange of personal information. 

What is again left relatively mute, however, is whether such discrimination takes place once a 
‘hit’ has been made on the Interpol STD database, and the actual personal data attached to that 
‘hit’  then  comes  to  be  exchanged.  The  responses  of  the  UK  and  Portugal  allude  to  this 
situation, and note that each request for information would either be risk assessed before the 
dissemination of personal data (in the case of the UK), or would be subject to relevant data 
protections  provisions,  the  ‘need  to  know’  and  reciprocity  (in  the  case  of  Portugal).  This  is 
likely  to  be  the  type  of  approach  taken  by  most  Member  States  had  the  question  been 
specifically aimed at the post STD system ‘hit’ stage of personal data exchange. 

4.3. 

To  ensure  that  such  data  is  exchanged  with  Interpol  immediately  after  it  has 
been entered into the national database of SIS. 

This has been a relatively poor area of performance in terms of Member States ensuring that 
Interpol is immediately furnished with the relevant data as soon as it has been entered on the 
national  database  or  SIS.  It  is  true  that  a  good  proportion  of  the  Member  States  are 
exchanging  this  information  within  24  hours,  which,  on  the  face  of  it,  demonstrates  a 
respectable  administrative  turnover.  It  should  be  noted  however  that  in  the  realm  of  law 
enforcement,  time  is  absolutely  of  the  essence;  particularly  when  it  comes  to  regulating  of 
unauthorised persons across borders. The longer it takes for information to become available, 
the less its value is. As such, it is still advisable to stress the nature of the obligation, and the 
reasoning  behind  the  explicit  demand  for  immediate  information.  The  fact  that  immediate 
exchange  is  possible  has  been  demonstrated  by  Portugal,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany. 
Likewise, the fact that Portugal manages to do this through the simple use of email and/or fax 

2 

See  Directive  95/46/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  October  1995  on  the 
protection of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing of  personal  data and on  the free  movement  of 
such data  

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demonstrates that this kind of speedy information exchange can take place without expensive 
and sophisticated information technology systems. 

It is in all Member States’ interest that exchange with Interpol takes place as soon as possible, 
as  this  will  enhance  the  value  of  the  information,  and  collectively  the  value  of  the  entire 
exchange mechanism, to the advantage of all. 

4.4. 

To  ensure  that  their  competent  law  authorities  use  the  Interpol  database  to 
access such information when appropriate for performance of their task. 

This  has  been  one  of  the  weakest  areas  of  response,  with  Member  States  reflecting  a 
prevailing attitude that by simply providing access to the Interpol database, whether directly 
or  indirectly,  to  its  law  enforcement  authorities,  they  are  ‘ensuring’  that  this  valuable 
information resource is in fact used. The language of the Common Position seems to imply a 
more  stringent  and  pro-active  approach,  which  outs  in  place  systems  whereby  use  of  the 
Interpol database can at the very least be encouraged amongst law enforcement officers. 

Where  measures  have  been  taken,  they  are  of  a  relatively  lightweight  nature  –  for  example 
through simply informing officers that this information is potentially available. Most Member 
States have simply left this point mute and instead set out the means by which they have made 
information  available.  This  perhaps  implies  that  once  means  of  exchange  have  been  put  in 
place, no action has been taken in respect of making sure people actually use it. If people do 
not actually use the Interpol database, and it is effectively forgotten by rank and file officers, 
then  it  could  seriously  compromise  the  exploitation  of  the  true  utility  of  this  very  valuable 
information resource. As such it is surely advisable that Member States establish firm rules as 
to  the  use  of  the  STD  database,  and  remain  constantly  vigilant  in  ensuring  these  rules  are 
being followed. 

One other, potentially less onerous, way to improve the situation is the provision of education 
and guidance on the subject. Again, however, Member States have not been very proactive, 
with the clear majority not yet having developed any guidance on this subject, and almost half 
of the Member States not viewing such guidance as necessary in any case. Only the UK has 
felt the need to formulate explicit guidance of this nature. 

The  lack  of  action  in  this  area  is  puzzling,  as  the  Interpol  STD  database  offers  potentially 
important advantages to national law enforcement authorities, particularly in the key areas of 
organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism. It is in the Member States’ own interest 
that they should take a more proactive line on this. 

Interpol figures show that despite the EU being the biggest contributor of information to the 
lost travel document database, it carries out only a small proportion of the searches – 8520 in 
2005 as opposed to a total number of searches of 43,316. On a more positive note, Member 
States performed only 3955 in 2004, so there has clearly been a positive movement in terms 
of  database  use  in  the  intervening  period.  That  the  Member  States  using  the  database  get  a 
positive return for their effort is perhaps reflect by the fact that in 2005,  despite their  small 
relative portion of total searches, EU searches resulted in 381 positive ‘hits’ as opposed to 457 
‘hits’ coming about as a result of non-EU searches. 

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4.5. 

To ensure that they set up relevant infrastructures to facilitate consultation by 
December 2005 at the latest. 

As  far  as  can  be  gleaned  from  the  answers  to  the  questionnaire,  only  Belgium,  Germany, 
Luxembourg  and  the  UK  have  actually  managed  to  meet  this  obligation.  Seven  of  the 
remaining  Member  States  claim  that  they  are  on  the  point  of  satisfying  this  requirement  – 
because  they  are  in  the  very  process  of  developing  it,  or  they  are  implementing  it  at  the 
moment. Given that this is probably one of the more expensive and complicated obligations 
contained in the Common Position, it is understandable that progress has been slower than the 
simple handover of information to Interpol. It remains, however, an ostensible failure on the 
part of a large proportion of the Member States to put in place concrete infrastructure to let 
authorities get maximum value from the Interpol consultation facility. What remains unclear 
from the remaining answers is how many Member States have not satisfied this requirement 
at  all,  and  who  have  not  intention  of  doing  so  in  the  immediate  future  either.  This  position 
certainly requires further clarification on the part of the Member States. 

CONCLUSION-GENERAL 

The Member States have largely abided by the spirit of the Common Position, mainly through 
satisfaction of the most visible and in many ways easiest to fulfil requirement – the furnishing 
of the Interpol STD database with national information. Operation of the Common Position in 
the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  however,  is  still  incomplete  and  requires  a  more  proactive, 
comprehensive and energetic effort on the part of the Member States to bring about the kind 
of operation that will offer all of the Member States maximum return from their participation 
in the exchange of information with Interpol. 

Before  the  Common  Position  was  implemented,  data  relating  to  4,567,267  entries  from  EU 
Member States was entered on the Interpol STD database. After introduction of the Common 
Position these figures have risen to 6,394,305 and 18 respectively.3 Likewise  EU  searches  of 
the database rose from 3955 to 8520 over the same period, and the number of ‘hits’ rose from 
173  to  381.  Clearly  there  has  been  some  progress,  but  arguably  these  increases  still  do  not 
represent the optimal participation of the EU in the Interpol Stolen Travel Document database 
– to reach it, still greater commitment is required from some of the Member States. 

The tenor of this report of the Commission has been kept because it describes the situation at 
the  time  of  drafting  (end  of  2005).  Meanwhile  the  Commission  has  received  information, 
among others through a joint visit EU/US to the Secretariat General of the ICPO Interpol in 
January 2006 that the operation of the Common Position has considerably improved. 

Interpol informed the participants of the joint EU (PRES/COM) / US – visit to SG ICPO in 
Lyon on 25 January 2006 that all Member States had exchanged lost and stolen passport data 
with Interpol or had at least taken concrete measures in order to do so in the near future. In 
February 2006 the Secretariat General of the ICPO-Interpol provided up to date statistics that 
show  an  improvement  of  the  situation  in  particular  as  regards  searches  carried  out  by  the 
Member States in the Interpol Stolen Travel Document database. 

3 

Figures as at 23rd November 2005 

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Date  from  February  2006  it  can  be  stated  that  before  the  Council  Common  Position  was 
implemented,  data  relating  to  4,567,267  entries  from  15  EU  Member  States  was  entered  on 
the  Interpol  STD  database.  After  introduction  of  the  Common  Position  these  figures  have 
risen to 7,790,792 and 21 respectively in the end of 2005. 

According to these latest statistics from Interpol, Member States carried out 9087 searches in 
2005  (3955  in  2004)  as  opposed  to  a  total  number  of  211  033  (43  316  in  2004)  searches 
globally. 

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