Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Report on Competition Policy 2004  (SEC(2005) 805 final)
Date: 2006-03-15
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: competition policy, control of State aid, dominant position, economic concentration, free competition, merger control, report

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Opinion

of

the

European

Economic

and
Competition Policy 2004

Social Committee

on

the Report

on

(SEC(2005) 805 final)

(2006/C 110/02)

On 17 June 2005 the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social
Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the: Report on
Competition Policy 2004.

The Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption, which was responsible for preparing the
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 21 February 2006. The rapporteur was Mr
Malosse.

At its 425th plenary session, held on 15 and 16 March 2006, (meeting of 15 March), the European
Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 138 votes to one, with two abstentions.

1. Introduction

1.1
EU competition policy has for a long time been consid-
ered to be the flagship of European integration and an unques-
tionable achievement. During the debate on the Constitutional
Treaty, however, the justification for a policy aimed at ensuring
free and undistorted competition raised a number of questions.
Following the reform of mechanisms for controlling cartels and
abuses of dominant positions,
the European Commission
carried out a reform of state aid arrangements by means of an
action plan. The presentation of the 2004 report gives the
EESC the opportunity to conduct an overall assessment of the
aims and methods of Community competition policy, in par-
ticular against the following background:

— the globalisation of trade;

— EU enlargement, with the greater disparities between levels

of development that this entails;

— the way in which the European Union is falling further and
further behind its main economic competitors in terms of
growth and employment;

— enlargement, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation at

international level.

2004, the year of Europe's enlargement to encompass ten new
Member States, was marked by the entry into force of the
reform of Community competition law, on 1 May.

2. Considerations on EU competition policy

employment

revised Lisbon Strategy:

The report underlines the link between competition
2.1
competitiveness,
policy and the
growth,
and sustainable development.. The
Commission wishes in this way to focus its action on key
sectors for the internal market and the Lisbon agenda, with the
emphasis on removing obstacles to competition in the recently
liberalised sectors as well as certain other regulated sectors such
as telecommunications, postal services, energy and transport.
This link with the Lisbon agenda should be better explained
and clarified.

— the general public's legitimate concern for better govern-
ance, greater legitimacy for the policies that are imple-
mented and greater involvement in decision-making.

2.2
The first question that needs to be asked is whether
competition policy should reflect the political priorities of a
given moment or instead adopt its own independent approach.
The EESC favours the latter option for the following reasons:

1.2
Following an introduction to the political background
by the Director-General of DG Competition, the report gives an
overview of the Commission's activities on:

— cartels and abuses of dominant positions (Articles 81 and
82 of the Treaty) together with a number of judgments
handed down by the Community courts and by national
courts in the EU Member States;

— mergers, with a sector-by-sector evaluation;

— state aid control, including legislative and interpretive rules
and a number of judgments handed down by the Com-
munity courts;

2.2.1
Businesses, consumers and economic and social actors
need a stable and predictable legal framework. If competition
policy is forced to change according to the priorities of the
moment, it will be a source of legal instability and consequently
will not favour investment and employment.

2.2.2
Establishing free and undistorted competition is a
fundamental aim in itself, not as part of an economic strategy,
but in order to ensure that the single internal European market
functions properly. Unless this happens, this market will lose
all meaning as well as all the advantages it might bring to the
European economy, such as stimulating demand,
increasing
supply, and the power of a market of 450 million consumers.

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2.2.3
In today's enlarged Union, the disparities between the
economic and social conditions in the different Member States
are considerable. Against this background, competition policy
is particularly important. In other words, establishing genuinely
free and undistorted competition is crucial to ensuring that the
economic and social actors, from the least developed countries
as well as from the richest, are guaranteed equal opportunities
and treatment and that
strengthening
economic and social cohesion in the Union are met.

the conditions

for

2.2.4
The independence of competition policy must be
maintained and strengthened. It must also be linked to other
EU policies, such as those aimed at supporting consumers,
economic development, innovation, growth, employment and
economic and social cohesion. The reforms that competition
policy has undergone and will undergo in future must give it
this outward-looking vision. With this in mind, the Commis-
sion must endeavour to strike a constant balance, in order to
give consumers, businesses and the general
the
Union the highest possible degree of protection. Consequently,
guidelines for handling disputes should be drawn up on the
basis of a number of imperatives, such as:

interest of

— continuing to apply competition rules strictly, on state aid
in particular, in order to avoid bias towards national poli-
cies to support national flagship companies or companies
holding a monopoly, which could stifle competition at
national and European level, to the detriment in particular
of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Instead, support
should be given to public innovation and research efforts,
in order to favour large-scale projects which bring Europe
together and to support the innovation potential of small
and medium-sized enterprises. Similarly, job-creation poli-
cies should give preference to support for individuals, such
as lifelong learning, childcare, mobility and combating all
forms of discrimination, rather than direct aid that could
distort competition;

— attacking new anti-competitive practices such as replacing
public monopolies with private ones and de facto dominant
positions held by one economic activity; e.g. distribution's
dominant position in relation to producers and vice versa;
Greater account must thus be taken of the specific charac-
teristics of small and medium-sized enterprises, which are
the motor for growth in Europe but whose efforts to start
up and grow are often hampered by practices that discrimi-
nate against them, such as state aid, monopolies and domi-
nant positions. What
is needed more than anything is
support for cooperation between SMEs and for groupings
of such businesses, which often constitute the only way in
which such companies can meet their competitors on a
level playing field;

— ensuring that consumers really benefit from economies of
scale and from the potential of the single European market.

2.2.5
Account must be taken of the specific characteristics
of services of general interest, in particular in the health, social

protection and education sectors, whilst respecting the values
of social justice and transparency, in line with national tradi-
tions and practices. Where public services of general economic
interest are entrusted fully or partially to private actors, compe-
tition authorities must ensure that equal
for all
potential actors and the efficiency, continuity and quality of the
service are guaranteed. In this regard, the Committee welcomes
the Commission's work, which has, since the Altmark judg-
ment, consisted of clarifying the rules for financing public
service obligations. This will make the management of SGEI
more transparent.

treatment

2.2.6 More generally, the problem with Community compe-
tition policy is that it is based on the assumption that the
single market operates in the best possible way — actors are
given complete and free information, companies are free to
enter and leave the market as they wish, there are as many
markets as the actors concerned are able or wish to create, no
increasing returns to scale, and no dominant positions. The
reality is quite different, however, in particular as regards the
behaviour of certain Member States, who continue to think
nationally.

2.2.7
DG Competition should carry out economic and social
assessments to follow up the cases on which it is working. It
should also carry out impact studies of its most important deci-
sions, at the economic level, including the Union's competitive-
ness in the world, at the social level and, lastly, in terms of
sustainable development.

3. Comments on the implementation of competition

policy in the EU in 2004

The report's presentation would be clearer and the
3.1
system would be easier to understand if it included, in particu-
lar in the field of state aid, a list of decisions in which no objec-
tions were made to aid being granted, explaining why,
in
certain cases, the aid was not covered by Article 87(1). This
table would form the framework of good practice for Member
States when granting aid.

Furthermore, given that the defining event of 2004 was
3.2
enlargement, it is to be regretted that the report provides rela-
tively little information about the new Member States' imple-
mentation of Community competition policy. The Committee
thus hopes that the 2005 report will provide more complete
and up-to-date information.

3.3 Implementation of legislation against cartels

3.3.1
The report reveals that economic analysis has become
an integral part of competition policy, which is something the
EESC has consistently called for. In this context, changes in
competition law (Articles 81 and 82) have been marked by a
specific and pragmatic advance, consisting of better defining
the market and of refining the approach regarding both hori-
zontal and vertical practices.

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3.3.1.1
Under Article 81(3) (exception from the prohibition
on restrictive agreements), it can be seen that economic analysis
has gained in particular from taking efficiency gains into
account. Companies can thus demonstrate that they are making
use of new technologies, more
suitable manufacturing
methods, synergies arising from integrating staff and economies
of scale. They can also promote technical and technological
progress through common research and development agree-
ments, for example.

3.3.2 L e n i e nc y p oli c y

3.3.2.1
As shown by the cases referred to in the report,
leniency policy has been a success. It will be recalled that this
mechanism is based on encouraging businesses forming a cartel
to inform the competition authorities about this agreement,
which in turn allows them to be exempted, in part or in full,
from any fines incurred. To this end, the Commission and
some Member States have established leniency programmes
applying these conditions. These are of particular importance
to businesses because, even if they have not colluded in a
genuine cartel, they often discover that they have unwittingly
created a de facto cartel, largely as a result of faxes or emails
exchanged between their commercial agents and those repre-
senting other companies.

give

report does not

The
enough emphasis,
3.3.2.2
however,
to a number of underlying problems: existing
leniency programmes in the EU vary widely, both in terms of
the basic requirements for receiving leniency and in terms of
their procedures;
furthermore, not all national competition
authorities have set up leniency programmes; only 18 authori-
ties (plus the Commission) have done so (1).

Lastly, a request

3.3.2.3
for leniency submitted to one
authority does not apply to the others. This being the case, if
the company concerned wishes to obtain immunity,
is
obliged to apply to all the competent competition authorities.
The EESC therefore considers that it is of crucial importance to
upgrade the mechanism to cater for multiple requests from
companies. The procedures in place must, therefore, be simpli-
fied so that a harmonised system can be implemented for
‘informing’ on a cartel, which would automatically stop all
involvement in such an arrangement.

it

3.3.3 T h e E u r op e a n Comp e ti ti on N e tw or k (E CN )

restricting competition and helps to eliminate those that abuse
market rules and cause considerable damage to competition
and to consumers.

3.3.3.3
One fundamental issue concerns the confidentiality
of information. This is guaranteed by a specific service, the
ADO (Authorised Disclosure Officer), which allows one or
more persons to intervene in the transmission of confidential
information. These mechanisms have been implemented on
several occasions since 1 May 2004, mainly with the Commis-
sion and apparently with success.

3.3.3.4
Although the economic players claim that the ECN
has been a great success, the EESC nevertheless wishes to warn
the Commission of the potential long-term problem — with
there being many more cases to handle — of ensuring that
confidential
is
exchanged.

fully protected when it

information is

3.4 Article 82 — Abuse of a dominant position

3.4.1
Article 82 of the Treaty prohibits the abuse of a domi-
nant position by a company (in the form of imposing unfair
prices, dividing up markets by means of exclusive sales agree-
ments or loyalty rebates which discourage customers from
using competing suppliers). Furthermore, merger control
is
subject to this provision whenever a merger involves an abuse
the company
which strengthens the dominant position of
launching the operation. This interpretation of
the article,
which is an essential component of antitrust legislation, has
been ambiguous in some respects, as can be seen from an
analysis of companies' behaviour and the implications of their
commercial practices. In other words, the concept of abuse of a
dominant position has yet to be properly defined and conse-
to
quently companies sometimes find it extremely difficult
know what they are or are not allowed to do. With regard to
price abuses, such as predatory or discount pricing, a particular
form of behaviour can have different effects; a very efficient
competitor might be able to prosper in a market in which the
dominant company maintains prices at a certain level, whilst a
‘less efficient’ competitor might find itself excluded from the
market. Should competition policy protect this second category
of company? Would it not be more productive to develop rules
based on the principle that only excluding efficient competitors
constitutes an abuse?

3.3.3.1
According to the report, the initial results of the
ECN appear to be satisfactory. The European Commission and
the national competition authorities in all EU Member States
cooperate with one another by informing each other of new
cases and decisions through the network. Where necessary,
they coordinate investigations, providing assistance and exchan-
ging evidence.

3.3.3.2
This cooperation creates an effective mechanism to
counter companies which engage in cross-border practices

The Commission recently published draft guidelines
3.4.2
concerning the implementation of Article 82, which meet with
the EESC's approval. In so doing, the Commission wishes to
establish a method for assessing some of the most common
practices, such as tied goods and rebates and discounts likely to
undermine competition (2). The EESC welcomes the Commis-
sion's efforts, which aim to direct maximum resources towards
those practices most likely to harm consumers,
in order to
provide clarity and legal certainty, with a clear definition of
what might constitute abuse of a dominant position. The

(1) Belgium, Cyprus,

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

(2) DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82
of the treaty to exclusionary abuses. Public Consultation, December
2005.

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Committee hopes that the guidelines now under consideration
will enable businesses in a dominant position to make a clear
assessment of whether their behaviour is legal and points out
to complete the discussion, dialogue with the players
that
concerned,
the
social partners, etc.) must be guaranteed.

in particular SMEs, consumers,

(businesses,

3.5 Merger control

The EESC welcomes the pragmatic development of
3.5.1
setting up a ‘one-stop shop’
for notifications of proposed
mergers and of providing much-needed clarification for the
competitiveness test, bringing this further into line with the
reality of the economic situation and making it more compa-
tible with the rules in force in the main merger investigation
systems across the world. Lastly, although it is still difficult in
practice to prove the efficiency gains resulting from mergers, it
is to be hoped that, against this healthier background, merger
control may be of lasting benefit to European consumers.

3.5.2 With regard to relations between the retail giants and
local shops, an enormous number of mergers has taken place
in the last few years, reducing the market share of local busi-
nesses, to the benefit of the large retail sector. As a result of
commercial practices that are sometimes highly restrictive,
pricing policies, and discounts tied to the size of purchases,
local businesses struggle to compete on price given the large
margins available to the retail giants, which makes the latter
even more attractive to consumers. Similarly, producers are
the
also subject
increased number of mergers must lead to the aims of competi-
tion policy being brought into line with those of consumer
policy in order to ensure that market supply remains constant,
that what is on offer is diverse in terms of positioning and the
quality of the range. At the same time, no limits should be
imposed on cooperation between small businesses as long as
they do not have a significant market share in the sector
concerned.

to sometimes excessive pressure. Lastly,

3.6 The reorganisation of DG Competition

The EESC also approves of

3.6.3
the appointment of a
Consumer Liaison Officer to represent consumers vis-à-vis DG
Competition but regrets that, almost a year after this appoint-
ment was made, the report does not provide any details on the
real dialogue opened with European consumers. The EESC thus
hopes that the 2005 report will provide practical information
that will help to gauge the effectiveness of this dialogue. The
Committee has also launched an own-initiative opinion on the
matter.

3.6.4
Recent EESC opinions have highlighted the issue of
the European Commission's resources, in particular for moni-
toring mergers, which are deemed to be too limited, given the
funds likely to be mobilised by the players involved. This issue
has yet to be resolved. It appears that DG Competition does
not have enough qualified staff to examine cases involving
certain states and, in particular, the new Member States. The
Committee is concerned and puzzled at this lack of foresight in
the Commission's human resource management and at
its
potential consequences and calls for remedial measures to be
adopted as a matter of urgency.

Despite recent efforts to improve transparency, the
3.6.5
Committee notes that
there is no real policy for actively
consulting the actors concerned; in fact, regarding the cross-
sectoral cases that DG Competition has opened, the limited
information on mergers provided on the Commission website
cannot be considered to be an adequate means of gathering the
informed opinions of civil society and of the various organisa-
tions concerned, as part of the process of good governance.

3.6.6 With regard to the publication of national judgments
on the Commission's Internet site for competition, it must be
noted that the stated aims of informing and educating have not
been met (Article 15(2) of Regulation EC 1/2003). The system
used on the Commission website only provides some of the
information it is supposed to. Specifically, the new Member
States do not — or rarely — post judgments handed down by
their national courts. This impairs understanding of the way in
which competition law is applied in those countries and
obstructs the desired harmonisation of this law. Furthermore,
these national judgments are available only in the language of
the country of origin, which means that very few people, if
any, read them even though they are of considerable practical
importance due to the new problems that they highlight.

The report expresses satisfaction at the reorganisation
3.6.1
of DG Competition in response to public criticism of
the
Commission concerning a number of cases (Airtours/First
Choice, Tetra Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand).

Creating the post of Chief Competition Economist —
3.6.2
to be assisted by a team of economists — appointing a group
of experienced officials to take a fresh look at the conclusions
of DG Competition's investigators into sensitive mergers and
strengthening the role of the Hearing Officer in the merger
control procedure are all measures that share a common goal:
to make the merger investigation procedure more rigorous and
transparent. The measures thus respond to the repeated calls of
the EESC and are to be welcomed.

3.7 State aid control

The European Council of March 2005 stated the aim of conti-
nuing working towards a reduction in the general level of State
aid, while making allowance for any market failures.

3.7.1
On 7 June 2005, the European Commission presented
an action plan for state aid, on which the EESC delivered an
opinion (3), to which the reader is referred. Our examination of
the 2004 report does, however, give rise to the following
general comments:

(3) OJ C 65, 17.3.2006.

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3.7.2
It is crucial to improve transparency concerning infor-
mation given to companies receiving individual aid (such as the
date of notification and the reasons given by the Member
States). This transparency is all the more necessary because the
risk that illegal aid will be recovered weighs heavily on busi-
nesses,
in particular on small and medium-sized enterprises,
even very small companies, even if the notification procedure
has been engaged by their own Member State!

4.1 Technical aspects

4.1.1
The Commission should pay particular attention in its
forthcoming reports to the effects of enlargement and even
devote a specific chapter to taking stock of changes in legisla-
tion and in the way the implementation of Community law is
monitored.

The national authorities

3.7.3
responsible for assessing
whether or not aid meets the required criteria do not always
have the necessary knowledge to carry out an economic
analysis as part of the notification procedure: regional or local
authorities often grant aid for job-creation or the environment,
for example, without undertaking a thorough market-share
analysis and this imposes considerable financial uncertainty on
companies, should the aid prove to be illegal.

4.1.2
To improve legal security, simplifying the leniency
system would appear to be crucial. Given the sensitive nature
of the information that must be provided and the constraints
imposed by having to conduct the same procedure with the
different authorities concerned (a cartel can affect a number of
Member States), a reform undertaken by means of mutual
recognition or even a ‘one-stop shop’ would be appropriate.

3.7.4
In examining aid for restructuring or rescue, it is a fact
that Community policy focuses mostly on the economic conse-
quences for the competitors of a beneficiary of state aid and, in
particular, on resources for ‘compensating’ them. Indeed, out of
concern to prevent distortions of competition occurring, the
Commission imposes certain restrictions on beneficiary compa-
nies, such as restricting the percentage of market share in a
given geographical area, as happened in the Thomson Multi-
media case, or obliging the beneficiary to forge partnerships
with its competitors.

3.7.5
The EESC deplores the fact that this concern conceals
another, equally crucial aspect: the effects of these actions on
the end consumer
taxpayer), with the
(the customer as
Commission not considering carefully enough whether state aid
will or will not prevent a fall
in prices, a wider choice of
products and services or even higher quality. Consumers' inter-
ests lie at the heart of competition policy, however, and the
right
to the same
requirements for rigour, in the form of long-term analyses, as
cartels or mergers.

to state aid must necessarily be subject

terms,

In general

the EESC wishes to express its
3.7.6
unease at distortions of competition that could arise from
differences in the way state aid is granted in the different
Member States. Above all, the EESC is concerned at the often
highly discriminatory nature of state aid. States often rally
large companies, whilst
round to invest
neglecting small and medium-sized enterprises (which actually
account for four out of five jobs in the Union) and give certain
sectors or types of business preferential treatment. This situa-
tion does nothing to encourage entrepreneurship and contri-
butes to paralysing the economic climate, which is not suffi-
ciently dynamic and conspires against new entrants to the
market.

in and rescue

4. Proposals for a stronger competition policy

The EESC's analysis thus leads it to make the following recom-
mendations:

It would also be highly desirable for national
4.1.2.1
leniency programmes to be brought closer into line with one
another by means of a flexible and indirect harmonisation that
could take the form of best practice.

4.1.3
As part of the current review of Commission policy
on abuse of a dominant position, on the basis of the draft
guidelines, a number of questions must be clarified in order to
refocus assessment of such abuses on their harmful effects on
the consumer. The Commission must clarify what is to be
understood by ‘dominant position’, and especially what consti-
tutes an abuse and what the different types of abuse are. It
must ultimately draw a clearer dividing line between legitimate
competition based on performance and abusive competition
that undermines the way in which competition operates and
thus attacks consumers.

As regards merger control,

4.1.4
in order to assess how
useful taking into account the efficiency gains has been, the
Commission report could in future look at what has been
happening in the operations concerned and the effects on
consumers.

4.1.5
To ensure a fairer balance between production and
distribution and within distribution itself (ensuring that busi-
nesses in rural areas, disadvantaged urban areas or sparsely-
populated regions do not disappear altogether), a study should
be carried out on the competition, commercial regulation or
aid measures to small businesses, so as not to prevent potential
players from accessing the market and to enable SMEs to
benefit from state aid.

It would be useful

4.1.6
forthcoming reports could
if
contain a description listing any links between the Consumer
Liaison Officer and consumer organisations when examining
cases: if necessary, could these organisations have delivered an
opinion or forwarded information to the Commission on
mergers, cartels or abuses of a dominant position? It is crucial
to show that the work of the person responsible for consumer
relations is effective.

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4.1.7
In order to improve the system of publishing judg-
ments handed down by national courts, it would be useful to
set up a network of correspondents entrusted with the task of
compiling legal rulings in order to make the current system
more effective in real time. This measure would need to be
given more substantial human and financial resources.

Union's economic players. Accordingly, the Commission must
also carry out economic and social analyses of the overall
impact of its policy decisions and call on the Council and the
Member States to ensure that changes take place in behaviour
and practices which result in a partitioned market, adversely
affecting the interests of all economic and social players.

4.2 Political and economic aspects

4.2.3 E nsu r i ng th e be st i nfor ma ti on a nd th e br oa de st

4.2.1 Imp r ov i ng a na ly si s of th e most se r i ou s di st or -

c onsultati on

4.2.3.1
The EESC offers its services to the Commission to
discuss ways of ensuring greater transparency — within the
limits imposed by the need to respect business confidentiality
— with regard to the actors affected by competition policy:
businesses, economic and social partners, consumers and other
civil society actors. With regard to mergers in particular,
consideration should be given to ensuring that the latter are
more actively involved, through a consultation procedure and
hearings, which would satisfy the concern for good governance
and participatory democracy. More generally, a local informa-
tion network should be established, better to publicise the prio-
rities of competition policy and to inform companies and
consumers of their rights and obligations. This would be based
on DG Enterprise's Euro Info Centres and on all of
the
networks of chambers of commerce and industry and of
consumer organisations. Making this information available effi-
ciently and on an ongoing basis is of vital importance, in par-
ticular in the new Member States and the candidate countries.

4.2.4 E nsu r i ng th a t comp e ti ti on p oli c y a s a w h ole i s

c onsi ste nt wi th othe r Un i on poli c i es

4.2.4.1
Competition policy is crucial to ensuring that the
European internal market operates effectively. Its failings under-
line the urgent need to ensure the completion of the single
market and to bring an end to practices that tend automatically
to carve up the market. This policy on its own will not be
enough, however; there must be coordination with all of the
Union's policies, in order to ensure the success of the revised
Lisbon strategy and the efficacy of consumer protection policy.
In any event, a blueprint for economic and social cohesion
must be drawn up for the Union, giving competition policy a
specific role and providing a new legitimacy, ensuring equal
opportunity of access for all to the single market, so that
consumers, businesspeople and employees genuinely benefit
from the advantages of the world's largest market.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Anne-Marie SIGMUND

ti ons

4.2.1.1
Assessing how competition policy works must help
to determine whether it genuinely favours free and undistorted
competition in the EU and to measure the effectiveness of the
fight against de facto monopolies and abuses of a dominant
position, their impact on the creation of new businesses and on
entrepreneurship. The Commission should not impose limits
on agreements between SMEs, so that they can combat compe-
tition from large integrated groups and should provide more
resources so that the most serious distortions can be combated
effectively.

are

the

liberal professions

concerned,
4.2.1.2 Where
following its communication of 9 February 2004, the Commis-
sion published a report on competition in this sector (4), setting
out the progress that had been made on removing unnecessary
restrictions on competition such as price regulation, rules on
advertising, entry barriers to the profession and reserved tasks.
The EESC calls on the Commission to honour its commitment
and reiterates the point of view expressed with unanimous
support in its opinion on the report on competition policy
2003, which states that introducing mechanisms that are more
favourable to competition will help the liberal professions to
improve the quality and range of their services, which will
directly benefit consumers and businesses.

4.2.2 Comba ti ng th e p a r ti ti oni ng of t h e ma r ke t a nd
dr awi ng u p e c onomi c a nd soci al i mpa ct stu di e s

4.2.2.1
The EESC considers that competition-related issues
should be studied in the context of the EU's overall cohesion
and that the question should be raised as to whether behaviour
that is still too nationally-focused (state aid, whether direct or
‘disguised’, to national flagship companies, aid to attract invest-
ment, discriminatory behaviour, the continuing presence of de
facto monopolies and abuses of a dominant position, etc.) does
not partition the market or hinder closer links between the

Brussels, 15 March 2006.

(4) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions COM(2004) 83, of 9 February 2004,
(SEC(2005) 1064).