Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft law on the supervision of financial institutions (CON/2006/15)
Date: 2006-03-09
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Poland, financial stability, financial supervision, institutional activity, national law, payment system, supervisory power

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 9 March 2006 

at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance  

on a draft law on the supervision of financial institutions 

(CON/2006/15) 

On  7  February  2006  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Polish  Minister  of 

Finance  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  on  the  supervision  of  financial  institutions  (hereinafter  the  ‘draft 

law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third, fifth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) 

of  Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29  June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by 
national  authorities  regarding  draft  legislative  provisions1,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  a  national  central 

bank (NCB), namely Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), the oversight of payment and settlement systems and 

rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial 

institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of 

the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The draft law proposes to establish a new institutional framework for the supervision of banking, 
capital  markets,  insurance  and  pension  funds  in  Poland2.  Under  the  current  model  financial 

supervision  is  conducted  by  three  separate  collegiate  bodies:  (i)  for  banking  supervision:  the 

Banking  Supervision  Commission  (Komisja  Nadzoru  Bankowego)  (hereinafter  the  ‘Banking 
Commission’)3, which is chaired by the NBP’s President and which operates with the assistance of 

its executive arm, the General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision, a separate organisational unit 
within  the  structure  of  NBP4;  (ii)  for  capital  markets  supervision:  the  Securities  and  Exchange 

Commission 

(Komisja  Papierów  Wartościowych 

i  Giełd) 

(hereinafter 

the 

‘Securities 

1  
2  
3  

4  

OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
Article 1 of the draft law. 
Article 25(1) of the Law on NBP of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dz. U. 2005 No 1, 
Item 2, as amended) (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’). Entities operating on the basis of the Law on cooperative savings 
and loan associations of 14 December 1995 (Dz. U. 1996 No 1, Item 2, as amended) are not included within the scope of 
the Banking Commission’s supervision.  
Articles 25(1) and 29(1) of the Law on NBP. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Commission’)5;  and  (iii)  for  insurance  and  pension  funds  supervision:  the  Insurance  and  Pension 

Funds  Supervisory  Commission  (Komisja  Nadzoru  Ubezpieczeń  i  Funduszy  Emerytalnych) 
(hereinafter the ‘Insurance Commission’)6.  

1.2  Under  the  draft  law,  it  is  proposed  to  ultimately  dissolve  all  three  of  the  abovementioned 
supervisory  bodies7  and  transfer  their  competences  to  a  newly  established  integrated  supervisor, 

namely the President of the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘FSA President’ and 
the ‘FSA’, respectively)8. The FSA President will be the central  government administrative body 
responsible for the supervision of financial institutions9, i.e. a single-person decision-making organ, 

with  the  FSA  functioning as  its  executive  arm.  The  FSA  is  to  be  financed  by contributions  from 
supervised entities10. In the case of banking supervision, this is a change from the current regime 

under which banking supervision is financed by NBP. 

1.3  The  draft  law  will  transfer  supervisory  responsibilities  from  the  current  supervisors  to  the  FSA 

President  in  two  stages,  beginning  with  the  integration  of  the  supervision  of  capital  markets, 
insurance and pension funds from 1 April 200611 and concluding with the transfer of responsibility 

for  banking  supervision  from 
the  FSA  President  from 
the  Banking  Commission 
1 January 200812. The delay in the transfer of responsibility for banking supervision is related to the 
implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive in the Polish banking sector13. 

to 

1.4  The  draft  law’s  provisions  for  the  organisational  merger  of  the  supervisory  authorities  are  not 

accompanied by any provisions for integrated supervisory methods or procedures; it is stated that 

such measures are not necessary in view of the existing level of financial market consolidation in 
Poland14.  However,  the  declared  aim  of  the  supervisory  reform  is  to  pursue  the  following 

advantages:  (i)  improved  efficiency  of  the  supervisory  authority’s  operations,  (ii)  facilitation  of 

Poland’s  participation  in  EU-level  supervisory  structures,  (iii)  lower  operational  costs  for  the 

integrated  supervisor,  (iv)  decreased  administrative  burdens  for  the  supervised  entities,  and 
(v) facilitated supervision over financial conglomerates15. 

5  
6  

7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  

Article 3(1) of the Law of 29 July 2005 on supervision of the capital market (Dz. U. 2005 No 183, Item 1537). 
Article  2(3)  of  the  Law  of  22  May  2003  on  insurance  and  pension  funds  supervision  and  the  Insurance  Ombudsman 
(Dz. U.  2003  No  124,  Item  1153,  as  amended).  The  interests  of  the  insurance  and  pension  fund  beneficiaries  are 
represented  by  the  Insurance  Ombudsman  (Article  5(1)  of  this  law),  a  function  which  is  also  covered  by  the  current 
reform (Article 44(1) of the draft law). 
Article 44 of the draft law. 
Article 2(2) of the draft law. 
Article 2(1) of the draft law. 
Articles 16 and 18 of the draft law. 
Article 56 of the draft law. 
Article 56(2) in conjunction with Article 53(1)(2) of the draft law. 
As stated in the fifth paragraph of the consultation request from the Minister for Finance of 7 February 2006. 
As stated in the fourth paragraph of the consultation request from the Minister for Finance of 7 February 2006. 
As stated in the first, third and fourth paragraphs of the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft law. 

2 

 
 
                                                 
2. 

Financial stability and prudential role of a central bank 

2.1  General observations 

2.1.1  The ECB notes that Article 105(5) of the Treaty establishing the European Community assigns to 

the European System of Central Banks the task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies 

pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 

the stability of the financial system. 

2.1.2  In  line  with  the  above,  the  ECB  has  consistently  favoured  the  involvement  of  central  banks  in 

prudential  supervision,  expressing  the  view  that  an  institutional  framework  in  which  the 

Eurosystem’s responsibilities for monetary policy in the euro area are coupled with extensive (i.e. 

both  micro  and  macro-prudential)  supervisory  responsibilities  of  NCBs  in  domestic  markets,  and 

with enhanced cooperation at a euro area-wide level, is most appropriate for tackling the changes 
triggered  by  the  introduction  of  the  euro16.  Past  ECB  opinions  on  draft  national  legislation 

reforming  the  institutional  framework  for  prudential  supervision  in  Member  States  have  noted: 

(i) central  banks  have  traditionally  been  closely  involved  in  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit 

institutions due  to  their pivotal  role  in the  financial  system,  in  particular  regarding  implementing 
monetary policy and ensuring the proper functioning of payment systems17; and (ii) maintaining a 

close  involvement  of  NCBs  in  prudential  supervision  is  an  important  condition  for  allowing  the 
Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area18, 

in accordance with Article 105(5) of the Treaty, and to safeguard a smooth coordination between 

the  central  banking  functions  exercised  at  the  Eurosystem’s  level  and  the  supervisory  functions 
carried out at national level19. 

2.1.3  The  ECB  recognises  that  the  nature  and  scope  of  risk  in  the  financial  sector  is  widening,  due  to 

closer links between credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds. 

The  traditional  borders  between  the  banking,  securities  and  insurance  sectors  of  the  financial 

market  are  becoming  increasingly  blurred,  as  demonstrated  by  the  emergence  of  hybrid  financial 

products,  the  increased  use  of  risk  transfer  instruments  and  distribution  agreements  between  the 

three  sectors,  and  the  growing  role  of  financial  conglomerates.  In  this  context,  the  ECB  has 

welcomed institutional frameworks established in Member States that recognise the essential role 

of central banks in promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the stability of 
the financial system as a whole20.  

16  

17  

18  

19  

20  

Cf. European Central Bank, ‘The role of central banks in prudential supervision’, 30 March 2001, available on the ECB 
website (www.ecb.int). 
See, e.g. paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/23 of 24 October 2003 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the 
Netherlands  on  a  draft  law  on  provisions  concerning  the  merger  of  De  Nederlandsche  Bank  and  the  Pensions  and 
Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation.  
See, e.g. paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/10 of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance 
on a draft Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority [title shortened]. 
See,  e.g.  paragraph  5  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2001/35  of  8  November  2001  at  the  request  of  the  German  Ministry  of 
Finance on a draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision. 
See, e.g. paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/16 of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings. 

3 

 
                                                 
2.1.4  Maintaining NBP’s close involvement in prudential supervision will be all the more desirable as it 

is  necessary  for  Poland’s  adoption  of  the  euro,  to  enable  NBP  to  contribute  adequately  to 

monitoring  the  risks  to  financial  stability  in  the  euro  area.  This  is  of  particular  importance  in  a 

context in which the nature and scope of these risks are affected by the introduction of the single 

currency  and  the  consequent  enhanced  integration  of  financial  markets.  As  already  noted  by  the 

ECB  in  the  specific  context  of  Member  States  preparing  for  the  introduction  of  the  euro,  the 

independence, credibility and experience that NCBs can contribute to the monitoring of financial 
stability should be recognised as an important institutional asset21. Also, given that banking activity 

accounts for a large proportion of the Polish financial market, and that banks remain key agents of 

financial  intermediation  in  Poland,  providing  most  of  the  credit  to  the  economy  and  channelling 
most  of  the  population’s  savings,  while  the  role  of  the  capital  markets  remains  secondary22,  the 

ECB believes that the systemic arguments in favour of maintaining a strong involvement by NBP 

in banking supervision are relevant. In this context, the draft law is seen as a proposal to create a 

body functioning as chiefly a banking supervisor, from whose operations NBP would be insulated.  

2.1.5  In  line  with  its  previous  opinions,  the  ECB  considers  that  more  effective  coordination  between 

supervision of all financial sectors could be pursued also with means that do not imply a reduced 
role of the central bank in this field23. 

2.2  Legislative recognition of the central bank’s financial stability role  

2.2.1  With  the  establishment  of  an  independent  FSA,  it  becomes  important  to  delineate  the  financial 

stability  role  of  NBP  more  explicitly.  Under  the  existing  provisions  of  Polish  law,  the  financial 

stability role of NBP is implicitly reflected in its objective to ‘establish the necessary conditions for 
the development of the banking system’24. In practical terms, NBP’s financial stability role is also 

implicitly  reflected  in  the  existing  institutional  arrangements  linking  NBP  with  the  Banking 

Commission.  

2.2.2  In  keeping  with  the  position  taken  by  the  ECB  in  previous  opinions  on  draft  national  legislation 

proposing  supervisory  reforms,  the  ECB  considers  that  central  banks  are  in  general  in  the  best 

position to take on responsibility for financial stability, given their insight into money and financial 

market developments and  involvement  in payment systems and  monetary policy operations. This 
applies  both  to  the  normal  conduct  of  business  and  in  crisis  situations25.  Central  banks’  remit  on 

systemic stability means that they concentrate on the potential impact of macro-economic shocks or 

21  

22  

23 
24  
25  

See paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/31 of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a 
draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws. 
Cf. European Central Bank, ‘Financial Sectors in the EU Accession Countries’, 19 August 2002, p. 171; and ‘Banking 
structures in the new EU Member States’, 31 January 2005, p. 38. Both publications are available on the ECB website 
(www.ecb.int). 
See paragraph 4 of the ECB Opinion CON/2001/10. 
Article 3(2)(6) of the Law on NBP. 
See, e.g. paragraph 7 of Opinion CON/2001/10. 

4 

 
                                                 
disturbances and of other common factors influencing the stability of financial system as a whole26. 

Explicit  legislative  recognition  of  NBP’s  financial  stability  role  would  be  consistent  with  the 

approach  taken  in  many  Member  States  which  have  adopted  a  supervisory  model  based  on  an 
independent financial supervisory authority27. Hence, the ECB recommends amending the draft law 

to  clarify  that  NBP  has  formal  responsibility  for  contributing  to  financial  stability  by  monitoring 

and assessing the financial system as a whole, as a separate function from hands-on supervision and 

financial regulation. 

2.3  Duty of cooperation between central bank and FSA  

As a general point, the ECB notes the emphasis placed by the Basel Core Principles for Effective 
Banking  Supervision28  on  the  maintenance  of  a  system  of  cooperation  and  sharing  of  relevant 

information  among  the  various  official  agencies,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  responsible  for  the 
safety  and  soundness  of  the  financial  system29.  As  noted  in  its  previous  opinions30,  the  ECB 

considers that it would be helpful to state in the draft law the basic principle that, in order to carry 

out their respective responsibilities effectively, there should be close cooperation between the FSA 

and  NBP  in  all  fields  of  common  interest.  This  principle  should  be  further  reflected  in  a  general 

provision  stipulating  a  duty  of  cooperation,  whose  ultimate  purpose  would  be  to  put  in  place 

effective and practical arrangements for cooperation and information-sharing between NBP and the 

FSA. Such legislative provisions have been introduced in a number of Member States which have 

adopted supervisory models based on an independent financial supervisory authority, including, for 
example,  Belgium31,  Germany32,  Estonia33,  Hungary34  and  Austria35.  For  this  reason,  the  ECB 

26  
27  

28  

29  
30  
31  

32  

See, e.g. paragraph 10 of Opinion CON/2004/31. 
Belgium:  Article  23  of  the  Statutes  of  the  Nationale  Bank  van  België/Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique;  Estonia:  Article 
2(5) of the Law on Eesti Pank; Ireland: Section 6A(2)(a) of the Central Bank Act 1942; Hungary: Article 4(7) of Law No 
LVIII of 2001 on Magyar Nemzeti Bank; Malta: Section 4(2)(c) of the Central Bank of Malta Act; Finland: Point 3 of the 
Section 3(2) of the Law on Suomen Pankki (214/1998). 
Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  ‘Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision’,  September  1997, 
available on the Bank for International Settlements website (www.bis.org). 
See Section II, Principle 1 fifth indent of the Basel Core Principles (see footnote 28). 
See, e.g. paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/10. 
The  Commissie  voor  het  Bank,  Financie-  en  Assurantiewezen/Commission  bancaire,  financière  et  des  assurances  (the 
Banking,  Finance  and  Insurance  Commission)  and  the  Nationale  Bank  van  België/Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique 
collaborate closely on all issues of common interest and in particular with regard to international cooperation in respect 
of  prudential  matters,  inter-sectoral  aspects  of  prudential  policy  relating  to  the  providers  of  financial  services,  macro-
prudential analyses and legal studies. See Article 117 § 1 of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial 
sector and on financial services. 
The  Bundesanstalt  für  Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht  (Federal  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  or  BaFin)  and  the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  are  required  to  work  together,  and  this  cooperation  includes  ongoing  monitoring  of  credit 
institutions  by  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  including  analysing  and  assessing  documents,  audit  reports  and  annual 
accounts submitted by credit institutions, conducting and analysing banking audits to determine the capital adequacy and 
risk management procedures of credit institutions and evaluating audit findings. See Article 7(1) of the German Law on 
banking (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG).  

5 

 
                                                 
recommends subjecting in the draft law the FSA President to an express duty of co-operation with 

NBP on all issues of common interest. 

2.4 

Information-sharing between central bank and FSA 

2.4.1  Central  bank  access  to  prudential  information  is  essential  for  the  conduct  of  macro-prudential 

monitoring, the oversight of payment systems and the safeguarding of other market infrastructures, 

which  are  essential  for  the  smooth  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  In  particular  from  a  financial 

stability perspective, should there be a crisis in financial markets, the central bank would inevitably 

be  involved.  In  that  context,  the  ready  availability  of  relevant  information  and  the  ability  to 

interpret it are important. The Consolidated Banking Directive provides that information subject to 

confidentiality  and  professional  secrecy  requirements  may  be  shared  between  supervisory 

authorities  and  central  banks,  and  vice  versa,  for  the  purposes  of  the  exercise  of  their  respective 
tasks36.  As  emphasised  in  previous  ECB  opinions37,  central  banks  provide  valuable  input  to  the 

supervisory process, while access by central banks to supervisory information benefits the conduct 

of  monetary  policy  operations,  the  oversight  of  payment  systems  and  the  pursuit  of  financial 

stability.  Provisions  authorising  the  exchange  of  information  between  central  banks  and 

supervisory  authorities  have  therefore  been  included  in  the  legislation  of  virtually  all  Member 

States  which  have  adopted  supervisory  models  based  on  an  independent  financial  supervisory 
authority38. 

33  

34  

Eesti Pank is required to cooperate with the Financial Supervision Authority in order to ensure financial stability and it 
has the right to obtain information necessary for the performance of its functions. See Section 2(5) of the Eesti Pank Act. 
The  Supervision  Authority  may  enter  into  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  for  cooperation  with  Eesti  Pank,  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  or  any  other  state  agency,  if  such  cooperation  is  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  the  objectives  of 
financial  supervision.  The  Financial  Supervision  Authority,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Eesti  Pank  are  required  to 
cooperate, on the basis of a written agreement, in the collection and analysis of reports, the drafting of legislation and the 
exchange of information on events which have a substantial impact on the financial sector. See Section 50 of the Law on 
the Financial Supervision Authority. 
In course of performing its tasks, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority is required to cooperate with Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank. See Article 6/C(1) of Law No CXXIV of 1999 on the Financial Supervisory Authority. This cooperation 
is curried out on the basis of a signed Memorandum of Understanding, updated every year.  

36  

37  
38  

35   Within the scope of its federal statutory duties and its duties within the ESCB, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) 
is  required  to  cooperate  with  the  Finanzmarktaufsicht  (Financial  Market  Authority  or  FMA)  by  providing  mutual 
assistance. Both the OeNB and the FMA are required to report to each other observations and findings of a fundamental 
nature or of particular importance in the area of banking. See Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Federal Law on the institution and 
organisation of the Financial Market Authority; and Sections 79(1) and 80(1) of the Federal Law on banking. 
Article 30(8) of Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1). 
See, e.g. paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/10. 
See, e.g. Belgium: Article 56 of the Statutes of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique; Denmark: 
Article 354(5) of the Law on financial services; Article 22 of the Law on deposit guarantees and investors; Article 20 of 
the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank; Estonia: Section 2(5) of the Law on Eesti Pank; Sections 48(2), 54(2) of the Law on 
the  Financial  Supervision  Authority;  Ireland:  Sections  33C(1)(c)  and  33C(8)  of  the  Central  Bank  Act  1942;  Latvia: 
Article  6  of  the  Law  on  Latvijas  Banka;  Article  10  of  the  Law  on  the  Financial  and  Capital  Market  Commission; 
Luxembourg:  Article  33(2)  of  the  Law  of  23  December  1998  concerning  monetary  status  and  the  Banque  centrale  du 
Luxembourg; Article 16, third paragraph of the Law of 23 December 1998 on the establishment of a commission for the 
supervision  of  the  financial  sector;  Hungary:  Article  44  of  Law  No  LVIII  of  2001  on  Magyar  Nemzeti  Bank;  Malta: 
Section 38A of the Central Bank of Malta Act; Section 18 of the Malta Financial Services Act; Austria: Articles 79 to 80 
of the Law on banking; Finland: Section 26 of the Law on Suomen Pankki, No 214/1998. 

6 

 
                                                                                                                                                             
2.4.2  It is understood that there is currently no specific legal framework for the exchange of information 

between  NBP  and  the  Banking  Commission  since,  as  a  practical  matter,  NBP’s  President  chairs 

both institutions. While the draft law provides, for example, that the FSA President is responsible 

for performing periodic assessments of the financial condition of banks and presenting these to the 
body responsible for monetary policy39, it does not provide for an ongoing exchange of information 

between  NBP  and  the  FSA.  Since  the  draft  law  plans  a  new  supervisory  authority  separate  from 

NBP, the ECB recommends expressly providing in the draft law for the exchange of information 

between NBP and the FSA. Furthermore, the ECB recommends expressly removing possible legal 

obstacles to information sharing between the independent financial supervisor and NBP, stipulating 

that  information  subject  to  confidentiality  and  professional  secrecy  requirements  may  be  shared 

between  the  supervisory  authority  and  the  central  bank,  and  vice  versa,  for  the  purposes  of  the 

exercise of their respective tasks. In drafting the provisions relating to the exchange of information 

between NBP and the FSA, it may be helpful to use, as a minimum standard, the example of the 

existing  Polish  provisions (which  are  retained  under the  draft  law)  regarding  information-sharing 
between NBP and the Securities Commission or the Insurance Commission, respectively40, in the 

context  of  the  supplementary  supervision  of  financial  conglomerates  (implementing  the  relevant 
Community legislation41). 

2.4.3  Following  Poland’s  adoption  of  the  euro,  information-sharing  may  involve  a  cross-border 

dimension,  since  information  concerning  Eurosystem-related  tasks  may  need  to  be  conveyed  to 

other NCBs of the Eurosystem and to the ECB. A provision reflecting this particular aspect would 

be  welcome.  This  suggestion  is  in  line  with  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Economic  and 
Financial  Committee  in  its  ‘Report  on  financial  crisis  management’42,  to  remove  any  legal 

impediments  to the cross-border exchange of information between supervisors and central banks. 

The continuity of current arrangements with foreign supervisors should also be secured. 

3. 

Institutional relationship between NBP and the FSA 

3.1  The existing institutional model for prudential supervision in Poland 

3.1.1  The ECB would like to express its very positive assessment of the existing institutional model for 

the prudential supervision of credit institutions in Poland. In particular, the following institutional 

elements  ensure  that  there  is  the  necessary  degree  of  involvement  in  banking  supervision  on  the 

39  
40  

41  

42  

Article 3(1)(a)(c) of the draft law. 
Articles 22 to 23 of the Law on supervision of the capital market (see footnote 5 above) and Article 17(6) of the law on 
insurance supervision (see footnote 6 above), respectively. 
Articles  12  of  the  Directive  2002/87/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  December  2002  on  the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate 
and  amending  Council  Directives  73/239/EEC,  79/267/EEC,  92/49/EEC,  92/96/EEC,  93/6/EEC  and  93/22/EEC,  and 
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1).  
Economic  Paper  No  156,  the  Economic  and  Financial  Committee,  ‘Report  on  financial  crisis  management’, 
17 April 2001, available on the European Commission website (www.europa.eu.int). 

7 

 
 
                                                 
part  of  the  central  bank:  (i)  NBP’s  President  chairs  the  seven-person  Banking  Commission43; 

(ii) the  Banking  Commission’s  decisions  are  implemented  and  coordinated  by  the  General 

Inspectorate  of  Banking  Supervision,  which  is  structured  as  the  executive  arm  of  the  Banking 

Commission  and  is  a  separate  organisational  unit  of  NBP,  institutionally  autonomous  and 
subordinate  to  the  Banking  Commission44;  (iii)  the  General  Inspector  of  Banking  Supervision  is 
appointed  and  dismissed  by  NBP’s  President  in  agreement  with  the  Minister  of  Finance45;  and 

(iv) there  are  staff  cooperation  arrangements  in place  between  NBP  departments  and  the  General 

Inspector of Banking Supervision. This structure greatly facilitates the flow of information between 

NBP  and  the  Banking  Commission,  allowing  NBP  to  fulfil  its  role  of  promoting  the  safety  and 

soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. From a more 

specific Eurosystem perspective, this structure, which shares a number of institutional features with 
the  French  banking  supervisory  model46,  is  particularly  well  designed  to  facilitate  an  NCB’s 

contribution  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  the  stability  of  the  financial 

system, as required, also in the future euro accession context, under Article 105(5) of the Treaty.  

3.1.2  Assuming, nevertheless, that an independent financial supervision authority will be established in 

Poland without the benefit of the existing institutional relationship between NBP and the Banking 

Commission,  the  ECB  wishes  to  point  out  that  Member  States  which  have  adopted  supervisory 

models based on an independent financial supervisory authority have used a variety of institutional 

arrangements  to  ensure  that  the  NCB  can  make  its  necessary  contribution  to  the  conduct  of 

prudential  supervision  and  financial  stability.  The  ECB  considers  that  these  institutional 

arrangements  make  an  important  contribution  towards  ensuring  the  smooth  interaction  between 

central banks and supervisory authorities.  

3.2  Central bank appointment of members to the FSA’s decision-making body  

3.2.1  The  ECB  understands  that  under  the  draft  law,  the  FSA  President,  in  his  capacity  as  the  central 

government administrative body responsible for the integrated supervision of the banking, capital 

markets  and  insurance/pension  funds  sectors,  will  be  a  single-person  decision-making  body  for 
virtually all financial supervisory matters in Poland47. The FSA President is to be appointed, from 
among qualified persons, by the Council of Ministers’ President for a six-year term in office48, with 
narrowly  defined  grounds  for  possible  dismissal49.  The  appointment  of  the  FSA  President  is  not 

43  
44  
45  

46  

47  
48  
49  

Article 26(1)(1) of the Law on NBP. 
Articles 25(1) and 29(1) of the NBP Law on NBP.  
Article  29(3)  of  the  Law  on  NBP.  The  General  Inspector  of  Banking  Supervision  is  a  member  of  the  Banking 
Commission, see Article 26(1)(7) of the Law on NBP. 
In  France,  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  is  carried  out  by  the  Commission  Bancaire.  The  Banque  de 
France’s Governor chairs the Commission Bancaire, and the Banque de France provides the General Secretariat of the 
Commission  Bancaire  with  staff  and  resources  necessary  for carrying  out  on-site  inspections  of credit  institutions.  See 
Articles L. 613-3 and L. 613-7 of the French Financial and Monetary Code. 
Article 2 of the draft law. 
Article 4(1) of the draft law. 
Article 5 of the draft law. Such grounds include cases where the FSA President: (1) has received a final sentence for an 
intentionally  committed  offence;  (2)  has  received  a  final  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  an  unintentionally  committed 

8 

 
                                                 
subject  to  the  provisions  regulating  open  competitions  for  management  positions  in  the  Polish 
government50.  From  the  draft  law  provisions,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  to  whom  and  how  the  FSA 

President  will  be  accountable  –  a  single  reference  to  annual  reports  to  be  issued  by  the  FSA 
President51  is  not  linked  to  any  procedure  for  submitting  or  reviewing  such  reports.  The  legal 

framework  proposed  by  the  above  quoted  provisions  does  not  provide  for  conformity  with  the 

applicable  institutional  standards  that  a  market  supervisor  such  as  the  FSA  President  needs  to  be 

embedded in; further consideration in this regard is recommended. A particular concern that needs 

to be expressed in this context relates to the prosecutorial powers that the FSA President is to have 
in civil proceedings related to the banking, capital market, insurance and pension funds markets52. 

3.2.2  The  ECB  further  understands  that  the  tasks  of  the  FSA  President  will  be  carried  out  with  the 
assistance  of  the  FSA  staff  and  the  FSA  Vice-Presidents53.  The  FSA  Vice-Presidents  will  be 
appointed by the Council of Ministers’ President upon the nomination of the FSA President54 and 
may  apparently  be  dismissed  at  the  sole  discretion  of  the  Council  of  Ministers’  President55.  The 

FSA  Vice-Presidents  will  not  form  a  board  or  any  other  collegiate  body  and  will  not  have  the 

powers  of  an  organ  of  the  government  administration.  As  regards  banking  supervision 

responsibilities  during  the  transitional  period  in  which  the  FSA  will  exist  alongside  the  Banking 

Commission,  i.e.  until  31  December  2007,  the  FSA  President  will  be  a  member  of  the  Banking 

Commission in the capacity of Deputy Chairman and will also appoint one additional person as a 
Banking Commission member56. 

3.2.3  In line with the position taken by the ECB in previous opinions57, and in light of the widespread 

practice in the European Union on decision-making in supervisory matters, it would be desirable to 

allow for the establishment of a formal board acting on the basis of collegiality in the draft law. In 

this respect, the ECB notes that in many Member States which have adopted supervisory models 

based on an independent financial supervisory authority, the central bank either provides members 

of  the  decision-making  body  of  the  supervisory  authority  or  plays  an  institutional  role  in  the 

appointment and dismissal of its members. In some cases there is cross-membership between the 

decision-making  bodies  of  the  central  bank  and  the  supervisory  authority.  Such  provisions  have 

offence; (3) has resigned from office; (4) has lost Polish citizenship; or (5) has become unable to fulfill duties in office 
because of prolonged illness lasting more than nine months. 
Article 11(2)(1) of the draft law. 
Article 4(2) of the draft law. 
Article 3(2) of the draft law. 
Article 6(1) of the draft law. 
Article 6(2) of the draft law. 
Article 6(3) of the draft law. 
Article 53(4) of the draft law. 
See,  e.g.  paragraph  14  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2005/34  of  6  October  2005  at  the  request  of  the  Italian  Ministry  of 
Economy and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the protection of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia. 

50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56 
57  

9 

 
                                                                                                                                                             
been introduced, for example, in Belgium58, Estonia59, Latvia60, Austria61, and Finland62. Such an 

approach  would  retain  some  of  the  advantages  of  the  existing  institutional  framework  for  the 

supervision  of  credit  institutions  in  Poland,  and  provide  a  practical  means  of  exchanging 
information between NBP and the FSA63.  

3.2.4  Having  regard  to  the  above,  the  ECB  proposes  considering  the  inclusion  in  the  draft  law  of 

provisions establishing a collegiate decision-making body as the FSA’s sole organ and a body of 

central  government  administration.  The  ECB  also  proposes  including  an  appropriate  number  of 

NBP representatives in such a collegiate body, with the full right to participate in its meetings and 

deliberations,  to  vote  and  to  share  in  all  information  available  to  the  FSA.  Such  inclusion  of  the 

NBP  representatives  in  the  FSA’s  collegial  body  would  need  to  be  effected  with  appropriate 

consideration  given  to  the  independence  safeguards  relating  to  the  members  of  the  NBP  staff  or 

governing bodies. 

3.3  Central bank involvement in major supervisory decisions  

In a number of Member States which have adopted supervisory models based on an independent 

financial  supervisory  authority,  the  central  bank  has  been  given  an  explicit  role  in  major 

supervisory  decisions,  including  decisions  relating  to  issuing  or  revoking  authorisations  and 
licences.  Such  legislative  provisions  have  been  introduced,  for  example,  in  Denmark64,  Ireland65, 
and Hungary66. Such provisions would assist NBP in the performance of its financial stability tasks.  

58  

59  

60  

61  

62  

63  
64  

Three  of  the  seven  members  of  the  Management  Committee  of  the  Commissie  voor  het  Bank,  Financie-  en 
Assurantiewezen/Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission) 
are  required  to  be  appointed  from  among  the  members  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  Nationale  Bank  van 
België/Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique.  See  the  third  indent  of  Article  49  §  6  of  the  Law  of  2  August  2002  on  the 
supervision of the financial sector and on financial services. 
Of the six members of the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority’s Supervisory Board, the Governor of Eesti Pank is 
an ex officio member and two of the remaining five members are appointed and removed by the Executive Board of Eesti 
Pank on the Governor’s proposal. See Section 8 of the Law on the Financial Supervision Authority. 
The Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Council of the Latvian Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC) are 
appointed by the Parliament for a period of six years upon a joint proposal of the Governor of Latvijas Banka and the 
Minister for Finance. One of the grounds for dismissal of the Chair and their Deputy by the Parliament is if an application 
for dismissal is submitted jointly by the Governor of Latvijas Banka and the Minister for Finance. The FCMC’s Chair 
appoints  and  removes  the  other  members  of  the  FCMC  Council,  and  is  required  to  co-ordinate  their  decision  with  the 
Latvijas  Banka’s  Governor  and  the  Minister  for  Finance.  The  Governor  or  Deputy  Governor  of  Latvijas  Banka  may 
participate  in  FCMC  Council  meetings.  See  Articles  13(3),  13(4),  14(4)  and  16(2)  of  the  Law  on  the  Financial  and 
Capital Market Commission. 
The  Oesterreichische  Nationalbank  (OeNB)  nominates  the  Deputy  Chair  of  the  Supervisory  Board,  as  well  as  two 
additional members of the eight-member Supervisory Board and one member of the two-member Executive Board of the 
Austrian  Finanzmarktaufsicht  (Financial  Market  Authority  or  FMA),  who  are  appointed  by  the  Federal  Minister  for 
Finance (in the case of the Supervisory Board members) and the Federal Government (in the case of the Executive Board 
members). The Federal Minister for Finance is required to consult the OeNB prior to the dismissal of a member of the 
FMA Supervisory or Executive Boards nominated by the OeNB, except in case of imminent danger. See Sections 5, 7 
and 8 of the Federal Law on the establishment and organisation of the Financial Market Authority. 
Suomen  Pankki  proposes  to  nominate  one  of  the  six  members  and  one  of  the  three  deputy  members  of  the  Board  of 
Directors  of  the  Finnish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority.  See  Section  9  of  the  Law  on  the  Financial  Supervisory 
Authority. 
See paragraph 5 of Opinion CON/2001/10. 
A  representative  of  Danmarks  Nationalbank  is  a  member  of  the  Financial  Business  Council  which,  inter  alia,  takes 
decisions in supervisory cases of importance as well as in cases which are significant for financial entities and holding 
companies in general. See Article 345 of the Law on financial services (LBKG 2005-06-21, No 613). 

10 

 
                                                 
3.4  Financial Stability Committee 

Another  institutional  mechanism  for  encouraging  cooperation  between  central  banks  and 

independent financial supervisory authorities which the ECB has welcomed in past opinions is the 

establishment  of  a  financial  stability/  market  committee  as  a  body  to  foster  cooperation  and 

information-sharing  between  the  authorities,  including  the  finance  ministry,  which  are  jointly 
responsible for financial system stability and regulation67. 

3.5  Operational involvement of central banks in financial supervision 

Yet  another  mechanism  which  has  been  used  in  some  Member  States  to  encourage  cooperation 

between central banks and independent financial supervisory authorities involves the allocation of 

certain operational tasks to the central bank, including on-site inspections and reviews of the capital 
adequacy and risk management systems of supervised institutions68. 

4. 

Oversight of payment and securities settlement systems 

4.1   The ECB notes that NBP enjoys exclusive licensing and supervisory rights over payment systems 
in  Poland69.  Additionally,  the  legislation  currently  in  force  grants  to  a  representative  of  NBP’s 

President  the  right  to  participate,  without  the  right  to  vote,  in  meetings  of  the  Securities 

Commission  whenever  issues  concerning  the  supervision  of  securities  settlement  systems  (SSSs) 
are discussed70. NBP’s President also has a right to give an opinion at any time when the approval 

of  the  establishment  of  a  new  SSS  (with  certain  exclusions)  is  issued  by  the  Securities 
Commission71. The impact of the draft law on these NBP competences is not entirely clear. While 

winding  up  the  Securities  Commission  (and  hence  eliminating  NBP’s  right  to  participate  in  its 

meetings),  the  draft  law  appears  to  retain  the  advisory  role  of  NBP’s  President,  even  though  the 

relevant reference to the Securities Commission in the current legislation is not explicitly replaced 

65  

The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority is required to consult the Governor of the Central Bank and Financial 
Services  Authority  of  Ireland,  and  may  act  only  with  the  agreement  of  the  Governor  on  any  matter  relating  to  the 
financial stability of the state’s financial system, including (but not limited to) the issue, revocation and suspension of a 
licence or other authority. See Sections 33C(9), (9A) and (9B) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. 

68  

67  

66   Where  prescribed  by  law,  the  Hungarian  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  must  consult  with  or  obtain  the  consent  of 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank prior to issuing or revoking authorisations and licences. See Article 6/C(2) Law No CXXIV of 
1999 on the Financial Supervisory Authority. 
See  paragraph  7  of  Opinion  CON/2001/10  (Austria).  Similarly,  Hungary  created  a  Financial  Stability  Committee 
comprising  its  newly  established  Financial  Services  Authority,  Magyar  Nemzeti  Bank  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  to 
cooperate actively and discuss financial stability issues. 
Germany: Law on banking (numerous provisions); Austria: Law on banking (numerous provisions). Also, in Ireland the 
Governor  of  the  central  bank  has  been  given  independent  powers  to  investigate  businesses  and  carry  out  on-site 
inspections of licensed credit and financial institutions. See, e.g. in the case of banks, Section 17A of the Central Bank 
Act 1971.  
Article 16(1) of the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and on the supervision of 
such systems (Dz. U. 2001 No 123, Item 1351, as amended). 
Article  8(6)  of  the  Law  on  supervision  of  capital  markets.  At  the  same  time,  the  General  Inspector  of  Banking 
Supervision is a member of Securities Commission, see Article 8(5)(5) of the Law on supervision of capital market (see 
footnote 5). 
Article 16.2 of the Law on settlement finality (see footnote 69 above). 

71  

69  

70  

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
by  a  reference  to  the  FSA  President.  The  ECB  recommends  clarifying  the  NBP’s  role  in  SSS 

oversight, in accordance with the principles set out below.  

4.2  As  noted  in  previous  ECB  opinions72,  payment  systems  and  SSSs  are  interlinked,  particularly  in 

view of the use of the ‘delivery versus payment’ mechanism, under which settlements of securities 

and transfers of funds take place simultaneously. There is therefore a strong argument in favour of 

the  model  used  in  some  Member  States  of  integrating  the  oversight  of  payment  and  securities 

settlement  systems,  and  for  the  NCB  to  perform  this  function.  Settlement  of  both  legs  of  such 

transactions  should  be  subject  to  similar  safeguards  in  order  to  avoid  asymmetries  with  systemic 

implications. In order to safeguard the effectiveness of monetary policy and the overall stability of 

the financial system, the NCBs’ oversight responsibilities mean that they must ensure that SSSs are 

sufficiently protected against systemic disruptions. The framework for the NCBs’ conduct of this 

function, although informal, has been effective and successful. A growing number of NCBs see a 

benefit  in  formalising  their  oversight  role.  The  majority  of  NCBs  carry  out  this  function  on  the 

basis  of  their  general  statutory  laws,  without  any  explicit  detailed  legal  provisions.  At  the 

Community level, the general legal basis for this activity is provided by the Treaty and the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank73, with more detailed 

policies  introduced  by  the  Eurosystem’s  common  oversight  policy,  as  defined  by  the  Governing 

Council.  

4.3 

In  view  of  the  widespread  practice  of  Member  States  referred  to  above,  the  ECB  recommends 

giving NBP responsibility for the oversight function over SSSs, including access to all information 

and data relevant for the performance of such oversight tasks.  

5.  Monetary financing and monetary policy independence 

5.1  Monetary financing 

5.1.1  According to the relevant Polish provisions, as amended by the draft law, the FSA President will 

have  the  competence  to  request  a  supervised  bank  to  commission  an  audit  from  an  indicated 

external auditor in cases where irregularities are established in the audit conducted on the bank’s 

own behalf. The costs of such an audit ordered by the FSA President will be borne by NBP, unless 

the  audit  reveals  relevant  irregularities  (in  which  case  the  costs  of  the  audit  will  be  borne by  the 
supervised bank)74. Similarly, audit costs will be borne by NBP where an audit is demanded by the 

FSA President to clarify doubts as to the credibility of financial statements of dependent entities or 

72  

73  
74  

See, e.g. paragraphs 10 to 14 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/14 of 7 August 2003 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on a 
draft  regulation  on  payment  systems,  payment  infrastructures  and  payment  instruments;  paragraphs  13  to  16  of  ECB 
Opinion CON/2005/24 of 15 July 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic on a draft law on 
the integration of financial market supervisors. 
Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Articles 3.1 and 22 of the Statute. 
Article  135(2)(3)  of  the  Law  on  banking  of  29  August  1997  (consolidated  text:  Dz.  U.  of  2002,  No  72,  Item  665,  as 
amended), as amended by Article 23 of the draft law. 

12 

 
 
                                                 
of entities having close links with a domestic bank operating in a holding structure and where the 
results of the audit do not support such doubts75.  

5.1.2  By  virtue  of  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  established  under  Article  101  of  the  Treaty, 

overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with NCBs in favour of public sector bodies 
is  prohibited76.  In  this  regard,  the  ECB  wishes  to  recall  its  position77  that  in  assessing  the 

compatibility of any financing arrangement with the prohibition of monetary financing, not only is 

a strict literal interpretation relevant, but it is also relevant to consider the purpose of the provision. 

The  overall  aim  of  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  is  to  prevent  NCBs  from  financing  the 
public  sector.  Further,  in  line  with  relevant  secondary  Community  law78,  any  financing  of  the 

public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties constitutes an ‘other type of credit facility’ for the 

purposes  of  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing.  Consequently,  the  monetary  financing 

prohibition  applies  to  national  legislation  conferring  on  central  banks  the  task  of  financing  third 

parties where such financing does not relate to any of the tasks and functions of the central bank, 

but  is  a  responsibility  of  the  State.  The  prohibition  of  such  financing  arrangements  must  be 

interpreted strictly, subject only to certain express and limited exemptions contained in Community 
law79. For an NCB to bear the costs of audits independently ordered by a financial supervisor, in 

circumstances where the NCB has no meaningful involvement in the supervisory decision-making 

process, must be considered an instance of the NCB’s financing of the public sector’s obligations 
vis-à-vis third parties, which is not covered by any of the statutory exemptions80. In this context, 

the ECB recommends that appropriate amendments be made to the draft law so that this activity of 

the FSA President will not be financed by NBP. 

5.2  Monetary policy competence of NBP 

Under the draft law, the FSA President will be responsible for evaluating the impact of monetary, 
tax and supervisory policies on the development of banks81. In order to avoid any ambiguity with 

respect  to  NBP’s  exclusive  competences  in  the  area  of  monetary  policy,  it  is  suggested  that  the 

reference to monetary policy in this provision should be deleted. 

75  
76  
77  

78  

79  

80  
81  

Article 141h(2)(3) of the Law on banking, as amended by Article 23 of the draft law. 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute. 
See paragraph 9(i) of ECB Opinion CON/2003/27 of 2 December 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development. 
Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  the  definitions  for  the 
application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 
See  paragraph  6  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2005/1  of  3  February  2005  at  the  request  of  the  Italian  Ministry  of  Economic 
Affairs  and  Finance  on  a  draft  law  amending  Law  Decree  No  7  of  25  January  1999,  as  converted  by  Law  No  74  of 
25 March 1999, concerning urgent provisions on Italian participation in the International Monetary Fund’s interventions 
to confront severe financial crises of its member countries. 
Article 101(2) of the Treaty and Articles 2 and 5 to 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93. 
Article 3(1)(1)(c) of the draft law. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
6. 

Specific issues 

6.1 

Implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive 

The ECB notes that a smooth transposition of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) is taken 

into  account  by  the  draft  law  proposal  as  a  factor  affecting  the  implementation  of  the  proposed 

supervisory reform; it is for this reason that the transfer of banking supervision responsibilities to 
the FSA President is only foreseen as of 1 January 200882. In this context, the ECB wishes to recall 

the  long-term  and  far-reaching  nature  of  the  CRD  reform,  the  residual  uncertainty  about  its 

influence  on  the  level  of  capital  in  the  banking  system  and  the  need  to  develop  appropriate 

supervisory guidance over time in line with evolving industry practices and experiences of national 

supervisors.  The  resulting  institutional  challenges  in  implementing  the  CRD  are  not  expected  to 

end  with  the  CRD’s  transposition  into  national  law,  since  continuing  challenges  for  national 

supervisors may be expected to arise beyond that date. Against this background, the ECB assumes 

that all precautionary measures are arranged by the Polish authorities so that the implementation of 

the supervisory reform does not affect negatively the implementation of the new capital adequacy 

regime. 

6.2  Advisory committee membership 

The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  plans  to  include  within  the  FSA  an  advisory  committee,  a  15-

member  body  appointed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers’  President,  with  at  least  six  members 
recommended  by  the  Tripartite  Commission  for  Social  and  Economic  Issues83,  which  is  a  body 

consisting of representatives of employers, employees and government administration with a basic 
task of conducting social dialogue regarding labour remuneration and social benefits84. Assuming 

that  the  draft  law’s  proposed  reform  is  implemented,  the  ECB  recommends  including  in  the 

Advisory Committee, in order to provide the Advisory Committee with a broad range of banking 

and  financial  expertise,  the  representatives  of  banking,  financial,  insurance  and  consumer 

protection bodies. Under the same assumption, the ECB recommends that the Advisory Committee 

members should be covered by the same confidentiality requirements as would apply to the FSA 
management and staff under the draft law85. 

6.3  Continuity of staff experience 

The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  provides  for  the  transfer  of  the  staff  of  the  current  supervisory 

bodies to the FSA, whereby these employees are to become employees of the FSA (in accordance 
with  the  proposed  timing  for  the  transfer  of  the  supervisory  responsibilities)86.  However,  the 

82  
83  
84  

85  
86 

As stated in the fifth paragraph of the consultation request from the Minister of Finance of 7 February 2006. 
Article 12(1) of the draft law. 
Articles 1(3) and 4(1) of the Law of 6 July 2001 on the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Issues (Dz. U. 
2001 No 100, Item 1080, as amended). 
Article 10 of the draft law. 
Article 43(1)(2) of the draft law. 

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
employment relationship of such employees is to expire after six months from the last day of the 

month in which the FSA is established (or in the case of the employees of the General Inspectorate 

of  Banking  Supervision,  on  30  June  2008),  unless  they  receive  an  offer  of  new  employment  and 
remuneration conditions within such period and accept it87. While not commenting in any way on 

the  legal  safeguards  for  the  stability  of  employment  in  national  supervisory  administration,  the 

ECB would like to recall the Polish legislator’s declared aim of finding, under the newly proposed 

structure,  the  appropriate  application  for  the  accumulated  competences  and  experiences  of  the 
existing supervisory bodies88. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 March 2006. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Jean-Claude TRICHET 

87 
88  

Article 50 of the draft law. 
As stated in the third paragraph of the consultation request from the Minister for Finance of 7 February 2006. 

15