Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhancing supply chain security
Date: 2006-02-27
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: carriage of goods, land transport, safety standard, security of supply, terrorism, transport safety

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 27.2.2006 
COM(2006)79 final 

2006/0025(COD) 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

on enhancing supply chain security 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on enhancing supply chain security 

(SEC(2006)251) 

. 

(presented by the Commission) 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

on enhancing supply chain security 

1. 

1.1 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4. 

1.5. 

The need for transport security 

Terrorism  is  one  of  the  greatest  threats  to  democracy  and  freedom.  The  risk  of  a 
terrorist  attack  targeting  freight  transport  remains  high.  The  potential  damage  in 
terms of lives and economic activity is unfathomable and incalculable.  

Transport  security  has  become  a  vital  worldwide  issue.  It  concerns  the  European 
Union  whose  role  as  trading  partner  relies  on  effective  and  secure  transport  by  all 
modes and at all levels. Its trading partners are beginning to address freight transport 
security  issues.  Indeed  the  United  Stats  has  already  introduced  certain  security 
measures for imports which have an impact on European supply chains.  

Recently considerable improvements have been made to transport security in Europe: 
aviation and airport security have been given a European framework1, maritime and 
port  terminal  security  have  been  strengthened2,  and  security  within  the  entire  port 
areas  can  be  expected  to  improve  considerably  following  the  recent  completion  of 
the legislative process on security measures for seaports3. 

In  2003  the  Commission  already  pointed  to  the  need  for  enhanced  security  in  land 
freight  transport4.  There  are  currently  no  rules  in  place  for  the  European  land 
transport supply chain in its entirety. The supply chain is defined as comprising all 
the  transport  and  transport  related  operations  and  processes  beginning  at  the 
production site and ending at the cargo's point of destination. 

The threat of terrorist attacks has highlighted the vulnerabilities of the supply chain 
and  the  need  to  act:  citizens  expect  to  see  security  measures  taken  for  the  supply 
chain  on  which  their  daily  lives  depend  and  businesses  can  no  longer  afford  to 
disregard  security  in  order  to  protect  their  employees,  their  companies,  their 
customers and the public from a terrorist attack. 

1.6. 

To combat terrorism, the EU Heads of State called for “the strengthening of all forms 
of  transport  systems,  including  the  enhancement  of  the  legal  framework  and  the 
improvement of preventive mechanisms.”5  

1 
2 
3 
4 

5 

Regulation (EC) No °2320/2002, OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004, OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6. 
Directive (EC) N°65/2005, JO L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 28. 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament,  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on enhancing  maritime  transport 
security, COM(2003) 229 final of 16.5.2003, p. 18. 
Council of the European Union Declaration of 25 March 2004 on Combating Terrorism, document of 
Conseil 7906/2004 of 29 March 2004. 

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1.7. 

To  do  nothing  is  not  an  option.  The  Commission  therefore  proposes  Community 
action  to  enhance  the  security  in  the  land  transport  supply  chain  to  complement 
existing Community transport security rules. This proposal does not cover passenger 
transport security, in particular in mass transport systems, which could be addressed 
at a later stage if necessary.  

2. 

Towards improving supply chain security  

2.1. 

2.2. 

In view of the need for urgent action and of the conclusions of the European Council, 
the  Commission  is  submitting  this  Communication  and  a  legislative  proposal  on 
enhancing supply chain security. 

The Communication sets out the essential facts about freight transport security which 
any  initiative  in  this  area  must  take  into  account.  It  discusses  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  certain  options  and  the  reasons  why  the  legislative  measure 
proposed is the most realistic and focused approach to enhance security for European 
freight transport. 

2.3 

The  goal  of  the  proposal  is  to  enhance  supply  chain  security  in  order  to  provide 
greater protection for all European freight transport against possible terrorist attacks. 

2.4. 

The objectives of the Commission’s proposal are: 

•  to increase the level of security along the supply chain without impeding the free 

flow of trade; 

•  to  establish  a  common  framework  for  a  systematic  European  approach  without 

jeopardising the common transport market and existing security measures; 

•  to  avoid  unnecessary  administrative  procedures  and  burdens  at  European  and 

national levels. 

2.5. 

The measure proposed by the Commission: 

•  establishes  a  mandatory  system  requiring  Member  States  to  create  a  security 
(“secure operator”) quality label which can be awarded to operators in the supply 
chain  meeting  European  minimum  security 
thus  allowing  mutual 
recognition of the label on the internal market; 

levels 

•  introduces,  within  the  mandatory  provisions  for  the  Member  States,  a  voluntary 
scheme  under  which  operators  in  the  supply  chain  increase  their  security 
performance in exchange for incentives ; 

•  makes operators in the supply chain responsible for their security performance in 

European freight transport; 

•  allows “secure operators” to benefit from facilitations where security controls are 
carried out and to distinguish themselves positively from other competitors in the 
area of security, giving them a commercial and competitive advantage; 

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•  allows  regular  updating  and  upgrading  of  security  requirements,  including 
recognised  international  requirements  and  standards,  through  the  committee 
procedure. 

3. 

Key questions and the Commission’s answers 

What level of security is needed? 

3.1 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

3.5. 

Two key links in many supply chains, namely air transport together with airports and 
maritime transport with seaports, have put in place intense  levels of  security in the 
form of rules and measures with detailed, legally binding specifications and checks. 
A  similar  approach  for  the  remaining  links  in  the  supply  chain  would  undoubtedly 
enhance security of the entire supply chain. 

However, comparison of maritime and air transport with the supply chain as a whole 
reveals fundamental differences. The maritime and air transport markets are marked 
by  a  limited  number  of  operators  which,  above  all,  operate  in  geographically 
confined and defined controllable areas. They are used to security arrangements. 

The land transport supply chain as a whole has quite different dimensions. More than 
half  a  million6  companies  are  involved  in  transport  and  ancillary  services  alone, 
ranging from major multinationals to tiny service companies rooted in a wide variety 
of  cultures  and  business  settings.  They  cover  the  entire  Community.  Most  have  no 
security  management  at  present  and,  generally,  security  levels  are  only  starting  to 
develop. 

The security awareness of all actors involved in the intra-EU supply chain should be 
increased.  Depending  on  the  goods  transported,  the  position  of  the  operator  within 
the chain and the vulnerability of the infrastructure, the level of security needed can 
be defined. Highly prescriptive new security measures for all operators would lead to 
a  breakdown  of  the  supply  chain.  Yet  an  increasing  number  of  companies  are 
establishing their own security management standards not only to protect their own 
operations and brand but also as a tool for selecting their partners in the supply chain. 

In view of the above, it is therefore impossible in practice to establish, in a single all-
embracing operation, security rules and measures for the land transport supply chain 
comparable  to  those  in  air  and  maritime  transport.  Instead  it  is  more  realistic  to 
establish a framework of minimum security requirements which can gradually evolve 
in  line  with  technological  progress  and  risk  developments  to  ensure  satisfactory 
security levels in an operational environment. 

Security rules for containerised cargo only? 

3.6. 

It  is  acknowledged  that  most  current  initiatives  and  deliberations  are  concentrating 
on containerised intermodal transport, both at national and international level and at 
the level of certain companies. This is understandable given the fears that a container 

6 

Estimate according to EU Energy and Transport in Figures, Statistical Pocketbook 2004, chapter 3.1.12. 
This figure (for EU-25) does not include producers of goods which are at the start of a supply chain. 
Inclusion of them would take the total up to approx. 4,7 million companies in the supply chain. 

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might be misused for smuggling terrorist weapons or even as a delivery vehicle for a 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon. 

3.7. 

However, containers are not the only potential targets. Intra-European trade relies on 
various loading units which are all equally susceptible to terrorist interference. The 
same  concern  in  fact  applies  to  all  types  of  cargo  transport  which,  in  one  way  or 
another, are at risk of misuse.  

Security rules for specific areas or for the entire supply chain? 

3.8. 

3.9. 

3.10. 

It  is  tempting  to  concentrate  efforts  on  improving  supply  chain  security  levels  in  a 
limited number of clearly identified key areas: devices are being developed to make 
seals more resistant to tampering; most logistics centres have tightened access rules 
and  many  operators  have  introduced  background  checks  and  identity  cards  for 
employees. Risk awareness is growing.  

All these developments are welcomed. But they are limited in scope and do not offer 
the  systematic  approach  to  supply  chain  security  necessary  to  respond  to  potential 
terrorist risks or attacks as promptly and effectively as possible. 

The supply chain is made up of a number of operations, beginning at the production 
site  and  ending  at  the  cargo’s  point  of  delivery,  and  the  processes  accompanying 
them. These operations are interdependent, as are the operators which carry them out. 
All the individual elements, including the flows of information, have to pull together 
to ensure high levels of security along the entire supply chain. 

3.11.  However,  improving  security  in  well-defined  key  areas  risks  losing  its  impact  if 
taken  in  isolation.  The  introduction  of,  e.g.,  secure  seals  would  serve  little  useful 
purpose if not combined with appropriate developments in, e.g., security attitudes by 
personnel.  Indeed,  a  fully  secure  part  of  the  multi-operator  supply  chain  where  a 
specific security feature is of paramount importance would lose its security benefit if 
another part of the supply chain, with other security features, was allowed to remain 
insecure.  At  international  level,  only  complete,  secure  supply  chains  receive 
recognition. The multitude of specific security features require tailor-made measures 
in response to the specificities of operators and supply chains.  

3.12. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  it  is  considered  more  appropriate  to  focus  on  the 
development  of  a  Community  security  framework  for  the  supply  chain  instead  of 
opting  for  a  patchwork  approach.  This  choice  by  no  means  precludes  detailed 
Community-wide minimum requirements or even detailed rules for certain areas. As 
will  be  explained  later,  the  framework  should  contain  such  minimum  requirements 
for  all  the  individual  links  in  the  supply  chain  and  specific  technical  rules  where 
warranted. In all cases, however, the framework should allow regular, easy updates.  

3.13.  A  framework  would  offer  guidance  to  operators,  which  often  make  considerable 

investments into upgrading their security.  

Who should be responsible for security ? 

3.14. 

It has to be established whether one of the operators involved should be responsible 
for  security  of  the  entire  supply  chain  or  whether  each  operator  should  bear 

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responsibility  for  the  security  of  its  part  of  the  supply  chain.  This  point  is  relevant 
because the supply chain consists of a considerable number of operators. 

3.15. 

The supply chain normally begins at the manufacturing site with the preparation for 
shipment.  They  may  be  loaded  into  containers  or  otherwise  packed.  They  may  be 
collected from the manufacturing site to be transported by a single mode to their final 
destination.  They  may  be  taken  to  warehouses,  storage  areas  or  inland  terminals, 
where  they  may  change  transport  modes.  The  operation  may  involve  freight 
forwarders and agents or brokers. Every link in the supply chain is accompanied by 
often sophisticated information processes. 

3.16. 

It is tempting to impose responsibility for the security of the complete supply chain 
on a single operator. This would be simple. But it would not reflect the reality of the 
market. It may well be that specialised manufacturers, due to their size and type of 
operation,  carry  out,  or  at  least  fully  control,  the  transport  operations.  Their 
responsibility for the security of the entire supply chain may well be established. 

3.17.  However,  in  normal  commercial  circumstances,  a  manufacturer  of  goods  does  not 
carry  out  the  complete  transport  operation.  Specialised  companies  do  that:  railway 
companies  are  but  one  example.  Indeed,  manufacturers  often  do  not  know,  nor  do 
they even need to know, which operator transports their goods and by what means. 
The  same  considerations  apply  to  other  operators  in  the  supply  chain.  They  may 
control more than one link in the chain, or even, more rarely, the entire chain, except 
the  first  stage  on  the  manufacturing  site.  Their  responsibility  may  thus  cover  more 
than one stage. 

3.18. 

These market realities point to only one practical conclusion: each operator of each 
link in the supply chain assumes responsibility for the security of its own – but only 
its  own  –  activities.  The  individual  security  measures  add  up  to  the  security  of  the 
complete chain. 

3.19.  Analysis of the supply chain identifies four groups of activities, each of which has its 

own security-relevant characteristics: 

–  preparation of goods for shipment and shipment from the production site; 

–  transport of goods; 

–  forwarding of goods; 

–  warehousing, storage and inland terminal operations. 

How can existing EU concepts be used to increase security in the supply chain? 

3.20. 

The  Community  customs  rules7  work  with  the  concept  of  “authorised  economic 
operator”.  Operators  which  comply  with  certain  reliability  criteria  can  be  granted 
“authorised  economic  operator”  status  which  allows  them  to  benefit  from 
facilitations with regard to safety and security-related customs controls and/or from 
simplifications  provided  for  under  customs  rules.  The  latter  is  of  particular 

7 

Regulation (EC) N 648/2005, OJ L 117, 4.5.2005, p. 13. 

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commercial value to operators which can then control their material flow according 
to their own needs. 

3.21.  Under the Community’s airport security regulation8 a “regulated agent” or air carrier 
may  recognise  a  consignor  as  a  “known  consignor”  if  the  latter  fulfils  certain 
security-relevant criteria. As a result, certain security controls need not be applied to 
cargoes received from a “known consignor”.  

3.22.  Both concepts are based on the underlying principle that operators which voluntarily 
comply  with  certain  requirements  and  which  have  been  vetted  by  the  authorities 
should  benefit  from  certain  facilitations.  They  are  regularly  inspected.  The  same 
concept,  with  the  appropriate  changes,  lends  itself  to  supply  chain  security  in  the 
form of a “secure operator”. 

3.23. 

Specific  minimum  requirements  should  be  set  for  operators  involved  in  the  four 
groups of activities: 

–  preparation of goods for shipment and shipment from the production site; 

–  transport of goods; 

–  forwarding of goods; 

–  warehousing, storage and inland terminal operations. 

3.24.  A “secure operator” scheme set up in the Member States would allow for operators 
in the supply chain to prove their compliance with minimum security requirements. 
The  status  of  “secure  operator”  would  be  awarded  to  operators  found  to  be  in 
compliance  with  the  requirements.  For  this  purpose,  Member  States  may  avail 
themselves of existing systems or procedures or wish to create a system specifically 
earmarked for supply chain security. The implementation will need verifying; there 
cannot be trust without verification. 

3.25.  As it is impossible for the very substantial number of operators in the supply chain to 
implement the specific minimum requirements and for Member States to ensure that 
implementation is adequately verified, implementation will be on a voluntary basis. 
No operator will be forced to join the “secure operator” scheme. 

3.26. 

In  order  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  common  market,  each  Member  State  will 
have to recognise the “secure operator” status awarded by any other Member State, 
when the “secure operator” does business on its territory. 

3.27.  Where  warranted,  Member  States  may  decide  to  limit  access  to  installations  and 

infrastructure to “secure operators”. 

8 

Regulation (EC) N° 2320/2002, OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 

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What advantages does the “secure operator” scheme offer? 

3.28. 

Successful  implementation  of  the  “secure  operator”  scheme  depends  on  tangible 
practical  advantages  for  authorities  and  for  those  operators  opting  to  make  the 
financial investments:  

3.28.1. Use of public resources. Authorities responsible for security would be able to 
concentrate their control resources on those operators which do not take part in the 
scheme without, however, forfeiting their right to control “secure operators”, where 
warranted.  The  same  approach  proved  successful  when  applied  by  customs 
authorities  to  their  “authorised  economic  operators”.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe 
that security authorities would not benefit from being able better to focus their work. 

3.28.2. Europe-wide co-ordinated security drive. Authorities will be able, for the first 
time,  to  address  Europe-wide  supply  chain  security  initiatives  on  the  basis  of 
common awareness, common objectives and common criteria. 

3.28.3.  Interconnectivity  with  secure  maritime  and  air  transport.  Airports  and 
seaports,  including  port  facilities,  which  come  under  stringent  Community  security 
rules,  can  be  confident  that  cargo  entering  their  perimeter  from  a  chain  of  “secure 
operators” has been adequately secured all along the chain. Such operators should be 
given preferential treatment, e.g. by being authorised to use “fast track treatment”.  

3.28.4.  Europe-wide  recognition.  Europe-wide  recognition  of  a  “secure  operator” 
status  awarded  by  a  national  authority  has  advantages  for  the  operators  and  the 
Member  States:  the  operator  will  benefit  from  recognition  throughout  the  EU.  The 
Member States will be able to rely on awards by other Member States, knowing that 
the status has been granted on the basis of uniform European rules, applying agreed 
minimum European security requirements. 

3.28.5.  Integration  into  global  supply  chain  security.  With  comparable  security 
provisions,  the  customs  authorities  in  charge  of  security  controls  at  the  external 
borders, both for exports and imports, will recognize for their “authorised economic 
operator”  scheme,  the  status  of  a  “secure  operator”  granted  by  the  supply  chain 
security  authority.  The  supply  chain  security  authority  will  do  likewise  with  the 
“authorised  economic  operator”.  Current  work  by  customs  authorities  and  the 
conditions under the proposal annexed to this Communication, if implemented, will 
lead  to  compatibility  and  mutual  recognition.  The  “secure  operator”  scheme  would 
allow European exporters to benefit from current US import facilitation schemes, but 
also  anticipates  international  developments.  In  fact,  a  European  scheme  could 
become  a  model  for  a  rapid  worldwide  implementation  of  the  global  supply  chain 
security recommendations developed by the World Customs Organisation.  

3.28.6. Business security performance. The “secure operator” can demonstrate to its 
clients and its partners in the supply chain its ability to keep the supply chain free of 
security  breaches.  It  will  find  it  easier  to  identify  responsible,  security-conscious 
business partners to the detriment of others which are not security-conscious. 

3.28.7. Business efficiency and resilience. Experience in adjacent areas points to the 
conclusion  that  operators  can  reap  benefits  from  participating  in  the  “secure 
operator”  scheme.  Implementation  of  the  CSI  scheme  (US  Container  Security 

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Initiative)  in  maritime  transport,  although not specifically designed for  operators to 
benefit from, is widely acknowledged to have had a number of positive commercial 
side-effects,  notably  better  operational  systems  and  better  control  over  and 
predictability  of  transport  and  other  processes,  as  well  as  more  reliable  processing 
times and reduced loss through theft. Trends in recently published research9 indicate 
that  a  number  of  cost  factors,  both  of  the  transport  chain  and  of  the  businesses 
involved would draw positive collateral benefits in a number of areas from improved 
security measures.  

Is a Community framework necessary? 

3.29.  Member  States  authorities  wish  to  be  assured  that  the  same  minimum  security 
requirements apply in all Member States and that they are effectively implemented. 
After  all,  with  the  common  market  for  supply  chain  operators  a  reality,  every 
national  authority  will  be  confronted  with  operators  having  been  granted  “secure 
operator” status in another Member State expecting to be allowed to avail themselves 
of  facilitations  granted  to  national  operators.  National  authorities  must  rely  on 
uniform implementation of rules across Europe.  

3.30.  Although  a  high  percentage  of  transport  operations  will  always  be  restricted  to  the 
geographic confines of the European Union, a substantial portion also involve other 
European  countries  or  countries  outside  Europe.  Moves  are  already  under  way  in 
non-EU  countries  with  the  aim  of  increasing  supply  chain  security.  Although  the 
external dimension will necessarily involve custom authorities of both trade partners, 
national security systems will inevitably come under scrutiny. A uniform European 
system, implemented as soon as possible, is likely to have a considerable bearing on 
developments  in  non-EU  countries  and  certainly  more  so  than  a  disorganised 
patchwork of national rules. 

3.31. 

The  global  aspects  of  supply  chain  security  makes  a  Community  framework 
necessary.  

4. 

Conclusion 

The  Commission  considers  that  a  first  step  towards  improving  the  security  of  the 
entire supply chain is needed. In view of the size and complexities of the market, a 
voluntary,  but  controlled  framework  for  land  transport  supply  chain  security  is  the 
most appropriate course of action.  

The  framework  will  stimulate  interconnectivity  between  the  various  modes  of 
transport  and  operators,  thereby  enhancing  security  along  the  supply  chain  as  a 
whole.  “Fast  track  treatment”  can  stimulate  national  authorities  to  enhance  co-
operation  between  various  administrative  institutions  and  with  industry,  thus 
reducing administrative burdens.  

9 

i.e. James B. Rice, Jr. and Philip W. Spayd, ‘Investing in Supply Chain Security: Collateral Benefits’, 
May  2005  (Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology)  and  Hau  L.  Lee  and  Seungjin  Whang,  ‘Higher 
supply chain security with lower cost: Lessons from total quality management’, International Journal of 
Production Economics, 2004. 

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The framework has to be put in place and can be further developed over time in line 
with the assessed security risks and the level of acceptance by commercial operators. 
It will encourage supply chain operators to introduce new security management tools 
and to improve existing ones in accordance with specific minimum requirements.  

The  voluntary  element  is  underpinned  by  practical  advantages  in  security  controls, 
including  those  carried  out  by  customs.  It  encourages  innovative  measures  and 
allows participants to increase their competitiveness. 

The proposal does not rule out stringent measures if it is shown that the market does 
not accept the proposed approach. 

At legislative level, a proposal for a Regulation is enclosed. 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

Context of the proposal 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

The  EU  Council  identified  transport  as  a  key  area  in  its  fight  against  terrorism.  It  therefore 
called for "the strengthening of all forms of transport systems, including the enhancement of 
the  legal  framework  and  the  improvement  of  preventive  mechanisms10".  This  proposal  is 
made in response to the needs identified and the Council’s request. 

•  General context 

Recently considerable improvements have been made to transport security in Europe: aviation 
and airport security have been given a European framework11; maritime transport12 and port 
security13 have been strengthened.  

There  are  currently  no  rules  in  place  for  the  Community  land  transport  entire  supply  chain 
which is defined as comprising all the transport and transport-related operations and processes 
beginning at the production site and ending at the cargo's point of destination.  

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

There are no existing provisions in the area of the proposal.  

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

The proposal links up with existing transport security legislation. It is fully compatible with 
customs  measures  to  increase  transport  security  at  the  external  borders  and  supports  the 
objectives of the Lisbon agenda.  

2. 

Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Consultation methods, main sectors targeted and general profile of respondents 

In December 2003 Member States, transport associations, trade unions, and other associations 
with a particular interest in transport and security, e.g. trade associations, were consulted on 
the  basis  of  a  consultation  paper.  Respondents  represent  a  cross-section  of  industries  both 
directly and indirectly concerned by transport security. 

The  open  consultation  was  conducted  over  the  internet  from  23  December  2003  to  27 
February  2004.  The  Commission  received  65  responses.  The  results  are  available  on 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/security/intermodal/consultation_en.htm 

10 

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13 

Council of the European Union Declaration of 25 March 2004 on Combating Terrorism, document of 
Conseil 7906/2004 of 29 March 2004. 
Regulation (EC) N° 2320/2002, OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1 
Regulation (EC) N°725/2004, OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6. 
Directive (EC) N°65/2005, OJ L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 28. 

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The open consultation over the internet was followed by further consultations with Member 
States and industry during 2004 and the first half of 2005. 

Summary of responses and how they have been taken into account 

The key conclusions of the consultation process can be summarised as follows:  

1) 

2) 

3) 

4) 

5) 

6) 

7) 

supply chain security has become a serious issue which needs addressing; 

possible  EU  security  measures  should  focus  on  terrorism  rather  than  on  crime  in 
general; 

risk assessment is important and should be further studied; 

no guarantee of absolute security is likely to be achieved in the medium term; 

the measures must take into account the realities of the market; 

any measure should be EU wide so as to avoid distortion between markets and, as far 
as feasible, apply to all modes; 

a  single  window  approach  for  effective  and  similar  control  between  various 
organisations  and  traders  is  appreciated,  i.e.  voluntary  systems  like  the  “regulated 
agent” and “known shipper” schemes. 

These key conclusions are in line with the Commission approach to combat terrorism14 form 
the bedrock of the Commission's proposal. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

The  commission  received  expert  advice  from  many  sources:  operators,  business 
representatives, security and transport specialists and authorities in the Member States.  

representatives, security and transport specialists and authorities in the Member States.  

•  Impact assessment 

Alternative  options  have  been  investigated.  A  wide-ranging  external  study,  ‘The  impact  of 
possible  European  legislation  to  improve  transport  security’,  identified  the  fundamentals  of 
is  available  at 
the  proposal  as  offering  best  value 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/security/intermodal/doc/2005_finalreport_im
pact_assessment_transport_security.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks 

for  money.  The 

study 

Member States 

The  proposal  imposes  an  obligation  on  Member  States  to  put  in  place  a  national  system  to 
award  “secure  operator”  status  to  applicant  operators  which  meet  minimum  requirements. 
Member States may either establish a new safety and security system or make use of existing 
ones.  Although  creation  of  a  national  scheme  will  require  financial  resources,  it  should  be 

14 

See notes 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
                                                 
possible  to  harness  synergies  with  existing  security  measures.  The  proposal  allows  the 
national authorities to operate the schemes on a cost-neutral basis. 

Industries 

The  proposal  contains  no  obligatory  measures  for  supply  chain  operators.  The  “secure 
operator”  scheme  proposed  is  voluntary;  its  users  can  expect  to  benefit  from  security 
facilitations  and  simplifications  of  customs  controls  as  well  as  portraying  themselves  as 
operators with high security standards to supply chain partners which require such standards. 
Other operators which believe that their activities do not require high security standards may 
decide not to take part in the new scheme. 

Commission 

None, except its obligation as guardian of the Treaties. 

3. 

Legal elements of the proposal 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

The Commission proposes that the European Parliament and the Council should adopt as soon 
as  possible  this  Regulation  on  enhancing  supply  chain  security.  The  proposal  complements 
other transport security measures already in place.  

The measures required for enhancing land transport supply chain security would follow these 
principles: 

–  supply  chain  security  requires  an  active  security  partnership  between  Member  State 

authorities and industry; 

–  supply  chain  security  complements  transport  security  measures  already  in  place  in  the 

fields of aviation and maritime transport, including airports and seaports; 

–  an  obligation  for  Member  States  to  set  up  a  national  scheme  to  increase  supply  chain 

security which are compatible with each other; 

–  a voluntary framework for operators setting minimum requirements with which operators 
in four identified categories of supply chain operations must comply in order to be awarded 
the “secure operator” status; 

–  “Secure  operators”  should  benefit  from  “fast  track  treatment”  security  facilitations  and 
simplification of customs controls, and will enjoy enhanced standing with their commercial 
partners; 

–  Member States must designate a competent authority for supply chain security for granting 
“secure  operator”  status.  They  may  appoint  recognised  organisations  for  supply  chain 
security for this purpose provided these meet certain specified conditions; 

–  Member States must appoint a national focal point for supply chain security to handle the 

necessary communication both with other Member States and with the Commission; 

EN 

13 

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–  “Secure operator” status awarded by authorities in one Member State will be recognised by 

authorities in the other Member States; 

–  a procedure is laid down for adapting the provisions to technical change. 

•  Legal basis 

Articles 71 and 80 (2) of the Treaty.  

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The  subsidiarity  principle  applies  insofar  as  the  proposal  does  not  fall  under  the  exclusive 
competence of the Community. The objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States for the following reasons: 

•  Common  rules  including  a  common  framework  are  necessary  to  fight  transnational 

terrorist risks effectively. 

•  Completion  of  the  common  transport  market  coupled  with  the  Treaty’s  four  freedoms 
requires a common European approach to supply chain security. A multitude of different 
national supply chain security schemes would risk recreating internal borders; 

•  Isolated  initiatives  taken  by  one  or  more  Member  States  and  necessarily  resulting  in 
diverging  security  levels  between  Member  States  would  inevitably  be  interpreted  by 
Europe's trading partners as unwillingness to address security issues or would be used to 
play off one Member State against another. 

Community  action  will  better  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  proposal.  A  Europe  wide 
framework  with  identical  minimum  requirements  for  operators  from  all  Member  States  will 
maintain a common security approach for the supply chain and avoid re-nationalising supply 
chain security. 

This proposal is limited to what is necessary for a Community-wide framework:  

–  an  identical  approach,  mandatory  for  the  Member  States  to  establish  the  common 
Community  framework  necessary  to  ensure  the  continued  functioning  of  the  transport 
market and voluntary for operators but clearly pointing to the necessity for all supply chain 
operators to improve security management; 

–  common minimum security requirements for the groups of operators working in the land 
transport  supply  chain;  mutual  recognition  of  “secure  operator”  status  thus  allowing  all 
“secure  operators”  to  benefit  from  facilitations  and  simplifications  at  national  level  and 
avoiding the risk of discrimination; 

–  a system that complements existing Community customs rules and allows updates to take 

account of international developments, e.g. in standardisation. 

The proposal therefore complies with the subsidiarity principle. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal is in line with the proportionality principle for the following reasons. 

EN 

14 

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•  The  proposal  is  built  on  the  realities  of  the  supply  chain.  It  avoids  large  scale  highly 
prescriptive  measures  which  would  have  been  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible  for 
Member States, to implement and control. Instead, it invites operators to invest in supply 
chain  security  knowing  that  their  investment  is  in  line  with  uniform  Europe-wide 
requirements  and  offers  the  volunteers  facilitations  for  security  related  controls  and 
simplifications of possible procedural barriers; 

•  Member States, through the Council, have acknowledged the necessity to improve supply 

chain security; 

•  Member  States  can  keep  costs  to  the  minimum.  Member  States  would  have  to  set  up  a 
scheme  for  awarding  “secure  operator”  status  for  which  they  could,  however,  rely  on 
already  existing  models  in  land  transport  safety  and  customs.  They  may  seek  practical 
assistance  from  recognised  organisations  for  supply  chain  security.  They  may  wish  to 
decide  to  make  the  award  procedure  cost-neutral  for  the  authorities.  Regional  and  local 
authorities will not be involved, unless a Member State decides otherwise.  

The costs are negligible for the Community: the Commission would only have to exercise its 
duties  as  guardian  of  the  Treaty.  Operators  wishing  to  invest  in  security  measures  will  now 
know  that  their  investments  are  in  line  with  Community-wide  requirements.  Trends  in 
recently published research indicate that a number of cost factors, both of the transport chain 
and of the businesses involved would draw positive collateral benefits from improved security 
measures. 

•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed  instruments:  Regulation.  Other  means  would  not  be  adequate  for  the  following 
reasons. 

Consideration  was  given  to  whether  the  Commission  should  propose  a  Regulation  or  a 
Directive. The choice of Regulation is fully in line with the security legislation: on maritime 
transport,  aviation  and  airports.  It  is  in  line  with  the  custom  legislation  which  it  could 
complement where the supply chain meets customs requirements.  

The  transnational  risks  of  terrorism  require  a  uniform,  parallel  and  concurrent  approach  by 
Member  States  to  establish  a  scheme  which  effectively  counters  the  terrorist  threat.  A 
Regulation is the most effective tool. 

Taken  in  isolation,  the  proposal  is  very  simple;  there  is  no  need  for  general  objectives  and 
principles  which  could  be  fleshed  out  by  Member  States.  The  key  elements  can  be 
implemented  immediately  to  remedy  the  unsatisfactory  security  situation  and,  if  based  on  a 
Regulation, without national implementing legislation.  

A Regulation was therefore the most appropriate choice.  

3. 

Budgetary implication 

None. 

4. 

Additional information 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
•  European Economic Area 

The proposed act is of EEA relevance and should therefore extend to the European Economic 
Area. 

•  Detailed explanation of the proposal 

The  Commission  proposes  to  base  the  Regulation  on  Article  71  of  the  EC  Treaty  without 
prejudice  to  Member  States’  national  security  legislation  and  any  measures  that  might  be 
taken on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.  

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: 

Article 1: 

This article sets out the objective of the Regulation. 

Article 2: 

This article defines ‘supply chain’. 

Article 3: 

This article sets out the scope of the Regulation. 

Article 4 

This article imposes on Member States the obligation to designate a competent authority for 
supply chain security. 

Article 5: 

This article imposes on Member States the obligation to establish a national scheme to grant 
“secure operator” status to supply chain operators.  

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
Article 6: 

This article introduces the benefits of the “secure operator” status (“fast track treatment”) and 
the possibility to refuse a “secure operator” the application of these benefits.  

Article 7: 

This article imposes the obligation of mutual recognition between Member States.  

Article 8:  

This article sets out the conditions under which “secure operator” status may be granted. 

Article 9: 

This article provides for the possibility to withdraw or suspend “secure operator” status. 

Article 10: 

This article places an obligation on Member States to set up award procedures, either directly 
through a public authority or through recognised organisations for supply chain security, and 
to make the list of “secure operators” accessible to national authorities, focal points and the 
Commission. 

Article 11: 

This article provides for appointing a focal point for supply chain security as the contact point 
for Member States and the Commission. 

Article 12: 

This article places an obligation on Member States to ensure adequate and regular supervision 
of their national schemes leading to granting “secure operator” status.  

Article 13: 

This  article  provides  that  the  technical  requirements  contained  in  the  Annexes  to  this 
Regulation  may  be  amended  or  supplemented  by  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Decision 
1999/468/EC. 

Article 14: 

This  article  stipulates  that  the  Commission  will  be  assisted  by  a  committee  composed  of 
representatives of the Member States. 

Article 15: 

This article concerns the confidentiality of security related information. 

Article 16: 

This article contains the details on entry into force. 

EN 

17 

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Annex 1 - 4: 

Contain the detailed requirements for a shipper, a transport company, a forwarding company, 
and a warehouse, storage facility or inland terminal to be awarded “secure operator” status. 

Annex 5:  

Contains the detailed requirements for operators to conduct a risk assessment. 

Annex 6:  

Contains the detailed conditions to be fulfilled by a recognised organisation for supply chain 
security. 

EN 

18 

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2006/0025(COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on enhancing supply chain security 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 
71 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission15, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee16, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions17, 

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty18, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

15 
16 
17 
18 
19 

20 
21 
22 

Security  incidents  and  terrorism  are  among  the  greatest  threats  to  the  ideals  of 
democracy and freedom and to the values of peace, which are the very essence of the 
European Union. 

The  supply  chain  should  be  protected  against  security  incidents.  Such  protection 
would benefit transport users, workers, the economy and the society as a whole. 

The European Council called for “the strengthening of all forms of transport systems, 
including the enhancement of the legal framework and the improvement of preventive 
mechanisms”19. 

Recently considerable improvements have been made to transport security in Europe 
for aviation20 and maritime transport.21 Further improvements are expected following 
the recent adoption of security measures for ports22. 

OJ C […], […], p. […]. 
OJ C […], […], p. […]. 
OJ C […], […], p. […]. 
OJ C […], […], p. […]. 
Council of the European Union Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 25 March 2004, document of 
Conseil 7906/2004 of 29 March 2004. 
Regulation (EC) N°2320/2002, OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 
Regulation (EC) N°725/2004, OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6. 
Directive (EC) N°65/2005, OJ L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 28. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

Supply chain security levels outside the above-mentioned areas remain unsatisfactory 
without Community rules in place. 

It  is  necessary  to  improve  the  security  level  of  the  European  land  transport  supply 
chain. This should be achieved by adopting appropriate measures without prejudice to 
the rules of the Member States in the fields of national security and measures which 
might be taken on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 

Any measure must take account of the supply chain markets which are made up by a 
vast number of operators and operating models which render measures comparable to 
those in aviation and maritime transport inappropriate in the short term. 

Any  measure  should  ensure  a  free  flow  of  trade  whilst  allowing  tightening  of 
minimum security requirements. 

(9)  Member States should introduce a scheme under which they award “secure operator” 
status to Community-based operators in the supply chain provided the operators meet 
certain  minimum  security  requirements.  This  scheme  should  be  compatible  with 
supply chain security programmes being developed for global supply chains.  

(10)  Supply chain operators fall into one of the following groups: preparation and shipment 
of  goods  from  the  production  site;  transport  of  goods;  forwarding  of  goods; 
warehousing, storage and inland terminal operations. 

(11)  Minimum security requirements should be specified for each of the groups of supply 
chain  operators.  Member  States  may  introduce  higher  requirements  for  operators 
established on their territory. 

(12)  A “secure operator” scheme would provide advantages for authorities and commercial 

operators.  

(13)  A  “secure  operator”  scheme  would  allow  authorities  responsible  for  security  to 
concentrate  their  control  resources  on  those  operators  not  ready  to  meet  minimum 
security requirements and to do so in the context of a common Europe-wide security 
drive. 

(14)  The “secure operator” status shall be recognised throughout the European Union. 

(15)  Member  States  should  grant  “secure  operators”  facilitations  in  the  area  of  security 
controls plus simplifications of security controls at external borders, including where 
available,  the  use  of  “fast  track  treatment”,  without  losing  the  right  to  carry  out 
security controls on “secure operators”. 

(16) 

“Secure  operators”  would  furthermore  be  able  to  demonstrate  to  the  market  their 
ability  to  keep  the  supply  chain  free  of  security  breaches,  to  distinguish  themselves 
positively  from  other  operators  and  to  establish  a  positive  trend  in  business  security 
performance. 

(17)  Member  States  should  ensure  that  a  list  of  “secure  operators”  is  made  accessible  to 

other Member States’ authorities and the Commission. 

EN 

20 

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(18) 

“Secure  operator”  status  should  be  recognized  throughout  the  European  Union  but 
could be withdrawn by the Member State which awarded it if the operator were found 
to  be  in  serious  breach  of  the  conditions  under  which  it  was  awarded.  The  status 
should  be  for  a  limited  time  but  renewable.  A  Member  State  may  refuse  to  grant 
facilitations and simplification where it finds that a “secure operator” which has been 
awarded  this  status  by  another  Member  State  is  in  breach  of  the  minimum  security 
requirements. 

(19)  Member  States  could  appoint  recognised  organisations  for  supply  chain  security  for 
the  purpose  of  assessing  whether  an  applicant  “secure  operator”  meets  the  required 
conditions. 

(20)  Member States should appoint a competent authority for supply chain security. 

(21)  Member  States  should  ensure  that  a  focal  point  assumes  the  role  of  contact  point 

between the Commission and the Member States. 

(22)  Member States should monitor implementation among supply chain operators.  

(23)  The measures needed to implement this Regulation should be adopted in accordance 
with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for 
the  exercise  of  implementing  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission23.  A  procedure 
should be defined for adaptation of this Regulation to take account of developments in 
international  instruments  and,  in  the  light  of  experience,  to  adapt  or  supplement  the 
detailed  provisions  of  the  annexes  to  this  Regulation,  without  changing  the  scope  of 
this Regulation. 

(24)  The objectives of the proposed action, namely the introduction of a common approach 
to  supply  chain  security,  a  common  “secure  operator”  scheme  and  the  necessity  to 
ensure recognition of nationally awarded “secure operator” status throughout the entire 
common transport market can, by reason of the European scale of this Regulation, be 
better achieved at Community level. Therefore, the Community may adopt measures 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  set  out  in  Article  5  of  the  Treaty.  In 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  proportionality  set  out  in  the  same  Article,  this 
Regulation  is  limited  to  the  minimum  security  requirements  required  to  achieve  the 
objectives of supply chain security and does not go beyond what is necessary for that 
purpose. 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

Objective 

1. 

2. 

23 

This Regulation establishes common rules for enhancing land transport supply chain 
security in the face of threats of security incidents. 

The objective set in paragraph 1 shall be achieved by means of: 

OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
                                                 
a) 

b) 

setting  up  a  scheme  which  enables  Member  States  to  award  the  “secure 
operator” status to operators in the supply chain; 

setting  minimum  security  requirements  which  operators  have  to  meet  before 
they can be awarded the “secure operator” status; 

c) 

setting up appropriate monitoring mechanisms. 

Article 2 

Definition 

For  the  purpose  of  this  Regulation  supply  chain  means  all  the  processes  and  operators 
involved in the preparation for transport and the land transport of goods from the production 
site to the point of delivery within the territory of the European Community. 

Article 3 

Scope 

1. 

2. 

This  Regulation  shall  apply  to  supply  chain  security  and  addresses  the  security  of 
cargo,  transport  and,  where  appropriate,  infrastructure  related  to  the  supply  chain 
within the territory of the European Community. 

The  measures  laid  down  in  this  Regulation  shall  apply  to  any  operator  involved  in 
one of the following activities: 

a) 

preparation of goods for shipment and shipment of goods from the production 
site; 

b) 

transport of goods; 

c) 

forwarding of goods; 

d)  warehousing, storage or inland terminal operations. 

3. 

The Regulation shall apply without prejudice to:  

a) 

Community rules in the field of civil aviation security24; 

b)  Community rules on enhancing ship and port facility security25; 

c) 

Community rules on port security 26; 

d)  Community and international rules on the transport of dangerous goods27 and 

nuclear material28; 

24 
25 
26 

Regulation (EC) N° 2320/2002, OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 
Regulation (EC) N° 725/2004, OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6. 
Directive (EC)N°65/2005, OJ L 310, 5.11.2005, p. 28. 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
                                                 
e) 

Community customs rules29. 

Article 4 

Competent authority for supply chain security  

Member States shall designate a competent authority for supply chain security to coordinate, 
implement  and  monitor  application  of  the  supply  chain  security  measures  laid  down  in  this 
Regulation.  

Article 5 

“Secure operator” 

Within 18 months of the adoption of this Regulation, Member States shall establish a 
scheme to award “secure operator” status to operators in the supply chain. 

An operator may apply to be awarded “secure operator” status provided it is involved 
in one of the following activities in the supply chain: 

a) 

preparation of goods for shipment and shipment of goods from the production 
site; 

b) 

transport of goods; 

c) 

forwarding of goods; 

d)  warehousing, storage or inland terminal operations. 

The  application  shall  be  addressed  to  the  competent  authority  for  supply  chain 
security in the country where the applicant is established. 

“Secure  operator”  status  demonstrates  the  ability  of  the  operator  to  which  it  is 
awarded to keep the part of the supply chain under its responsibility free of security 
breaches. 

Member States shall inform the European Commission once their scheme to award 
“secure operator” status is in place. 

Council Directive 94/55/EC of 21 November 1994, as amended, on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by road - OJ L 319, 12.12.1994, p. 7. 
Council  Directive  96/49/EC  of  23  July  1996  on  the  approximation  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States 
with  regard  to  the  transport  of  dangerous  goods  by  rail  –  OJ  L  235,  17.9.1996,  p.  25. 
Council  Directive  1999/36/EC  of  29  April  1999  on 
transportable  pressure  equipment  - 
OJ L 138, 1.6.1999, p. 20. 
EC Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed 
radioactive sources and orphan sources, OJ L 346, 31.12.2003, p. 57. 
Regulation (EC) No. 648/2005, OJ L 117, 4.5.2005, p. 13. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

27 

28 

29 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
Article 6 

“Secure operator’s” benefits 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Member  States  shall  allow  “secure  operators”  to  benefit  from  facilitations  and 
simplifications related to security control measures (“fast track treatment”). 

Facilitation  and  simplifications  shall  include  permission  for  “secure  operators”  to 
move their cargoes following procedures which set them aside from operators which 
are not secure. These shall include a reduced level of security controls. 

Member  States  may  verify  the  authenticity  of  “secure  operator”  status  with  the 
competent focal point.  

A  Member  State  may  refuse  application  of  article  6(1)  and  6(2)  to  a  “secure 
operator”  of  another  Member  State  when  this  operator  is  found  to  be  in  serious 
breach of security rules. It shall inform the other Member States and the Commission 
forthwith  and  shall  bring  the  matter  before  the  committee  set  up  by  Article  14. 
Articles 9 and 12 shall apply. 

Article 7 

Mutual recognition 

“Secure operator” status awarded in one Member State shall be recognised by the authorities 
in all Member States.  

Article 8 

Award of status 

1. 

An operator shall be awarded “secure operator” status if it shows that 

a) 

b) 

it  has  established,  implemented,  and  documented  a  security  management 
system; 

it ensures that resources to counter possible security risks are made possible to 
that part of the supply chain for which it bears responsibility; 

c) 

its security management system allows continuous improvements; 

d) 

it meets the specific requirements provided for in the annexes. 

e) 

it  meets  the  requirements  under  the  rules  referred  to  in  article  3(3),  where 
applicable. 

2. 

“Secure operator” status shall be awarded for periods of three years. The status may 
be  renewed  where  the  “secure  operator”  continues  to  meet  the  minimum 
requirements of this Regulation. 

EN 

24 

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3. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

If  an  operator  has  been  granted  the  status  of  “authorised  economic  operator”  in 
accordance  to  article  5a  of  EC  Regulation  No.  648/200530,  the  competent  authority 
for  supply  chain  security  shall  consider  the  criteria  described  in  paragraph  1  met, 
under the condition that the criteria for granting the “authorised economic operator” 
status are identical or comparable.  

Article 9 

Withdrawal or suspension of status  

Member  States  shall  introduce  rules  which  allow  withdrawal  of  “secure  operator” 
status  where  the  operator  is  found  to  be  in  serious  or  repeated  breach  of  the 
conditions under which the status was awarded. 

“Secure  operator”  status  may  also  be  withdrawn  as  a  result  of  implementation  and 
conformity checks carried out in accordance with Article 12. 

Where  the  “secure  operator”  status  is  withdrawn,  the  operator  may  re-apply  only 
after two years. 

Member  States  shall  introduce  rules  which  allow  for  the  suspension  of  “secure 
operator” status where the operator is found to be in other breaches of the conditions 
under which the status was awarded.  

The suspension shall be lifted when the competent authority for supply chain security 
is satisfied that the breaches have been remedied.  

Article 10 

Award procedures 

The competent authority for supply chain security shall be responsible for awarding 
“secure  operator”  status.  Member  States  shall  establish  a  register  of  all  “secure 
operators”.  The  register  shall  be  accessible  to  the  Member  States’  competent 
authorities for supply chain security and focal points and to the Commission. 

Each  “secure  operator”  shall  be  given  an  identification  number  beginning  with  the 
Member State’s country code. 

Member  States  may  appoint  recognised  organisations  for  supply  chain  security  for 
the purpose referred to in paragraph 1. The recognised organisations for supply chain 
security shall meet the conditions set out in Annex 6. 

30 

OJ L 117, 4.5.2005, p. 13. 

EN 

25 

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Article 11 

Focal point for supply chain security 

1. 

2. 

Member States shall appoint a focal point for supply chain security. 

The  focal  point  shall  serve  as  the  contact  point  for  the  Commission  and  other 
Member  States  and  shall  facilitate,  follow  and  inform  on  the  application  of  supply 
chain security measures. 

Article 12 

Implementation and conformity checking 

Member  States  shall  ensure  adequate  monitoring  of  the  “secure  operator”  scheme  including 
the supervision of the recognised organisations for supply chain security. 

Article 13 

Adaptation 

The  provisions  of  the  annexes  may  be  amended  or  supplemented  by  detailed  technical 
requirements in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 14, without changing the 
scope of this Regulation. 

Article 14 

Committee procedure 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of representatives of the 
Member States and chaired by a representative of the Commission. 

Where  reference  is  made  to  this  paragraph,  Articles  5  and  7  of  Decision 
1999/468/EC31 shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.  

The  period  laid  down  in  Article  5(6)  of  Decision  1999/468/EC  shall  be  set  at  one 
month. 

The committee shall adopt its rules of procedure. 

31 

OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Article 15 

Confidentially and dissemination of information 

1. 

2. 

In  applying  this  Regulation,  the  Commission  shall  take  appropriate  measures,  in 
accordance  with  Commission  Decision  2001/844/EC,  ECSC,  Euratom32,  to  protect 
information  subject  to  the  requirements  of  confidentiality  to  which  it  has  access  or 
which is communicated to it by Member States. 

The  Member  States  shall  take  equivalent  measures  in  accordance  with  relevant 
national legislation. 

Article 16 

Entry into force 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

32 

OJ L 317, 3.12.2001, p. 1. 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
                                                 
ANNEX 1 

Shipper  

(preparation of goods for shipment and shipment from the production site) 

For  a  shipper  to  be  awarded  “secure  operator”  status,  its  security  management  system 
must be based on a risk assessment and address the following: 

Physical security: All buildings and premises should be protected against unauthorised 
entry and protect against outside intrusion. Physical security should include: 

•  Locking devices for external and internal doors, windows, gates, and fences; 

•  Lighting inside and outside the facility, including parking areas; 

•  Parking area for private vehicles separate from the shipping, loading, and cargo areas; 

•  Internal/external  communications  systems  to  contact  internal  security  personnel  or 

local law enforcement agencies. 

Access controls: Unauthorised access to the shipping, loading and cargo areas should be 
prohibited. Controls should include: 

•  Systematic fail-proof identification of all employees, visitors and business contacts; 

•  Procedures for challenging unauthorised/unidentified persons. 

Procedural  security:  Measures  for  handling  incoming  and  outgoing  goods  should 
include  protection  against  the  introduction,  exchange  or  loss  of  material.  Security 
procedures should include: 

•  A designated security officer to supervise the introduction/removal of cargo; 

•  Properly marked, weighed, counted, and documented cargo; 

•  Controlling the integrity of seals or other security devices of incoming cargo; 

•  Procedures for putting seals or other security devices on outgoing cargo; 

•  Detecting and reporting shortages and surpluses; 

•  Tracking the movement of incoming and outgoing goods; 

•  Proper storage of empty and full loading units to prevent unauthorised access; 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
•  Procedures to  address  anomalies  or  illegal  activities  which  are  detected  or  suspected 

by the company. 

Personnel  security:  Companies  should  establish  an  internal  process  to  screen 
prospective  employees,  and  verify  applications,  in  full  respect  of  the  legislation  in  the 
areas  of  equal  treatment  and  personal  data  protection.  Such  an  internal  process  could 
include background checks and other tests depending on the particular employee function 
involved. 

Documentation procedures: Companies should ensure that documentation is complete, 
legible, accurate and submitted in time. 

Information  security:  All  information  processes  in  the  context  of  supply  chain 
operations must be secured.  

Education  and  training  awareness:  A  security  awareness  programme  should  be 
provided to employees including recognizing possible security risks, maintaining product 
integrity, and determining and addressing unauthorised access. These programmes should 
encourage active employee participation in security controls. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 2 

Transport company 

For a transport company to be awarded “secure operator” status, its security management 
system must be based on a risk assessment and address the following: 

Physical  security:  All  buildings,  premises  and  means  of  transport  should  be  protected 
against unauthorised entry and protect against outside intrusion. Physical security should 
include: 

•  Locking devices on external and internal doors, windows, gates and fences; 

•  Perimeter  fencing,  adequate  lighting  inside  and  outside  the  facility,  including  the 

parking areas; 

•  Parking area for private vehicles separate from the shipping, loading, and cargo areas; 

•  Internal/external  communications  systems  to  contact  internal  security  personnel  or 

local law enforcement agencies; 

Access  controls:  Unauthorised  access  to  facilities  and  means  of  transport  should  be 
prohibited. Controls should include: 

•  Systematic fail-proof identification of all employees, visitors, and business contacts; 

•  Procedures for challenging unauthorised/unidentified persons; 

Procedural  security:  Procedures  should  be  in  place  to  protect  against  undocumented 
material being introduced aboard the means of transport and into cargoes and to protect 
against unauthorised personnel being allowed access. Security procedures should include: 

•  Properly marking, counting, and documenting of cargo/cargo equipment; 

•  Controlling the integrity of seals and other security devices when cargo is accepted for 

transport; 

•  Procedures for assuring the integrity of seals and other security devices when cargo is 

handed over; 

•  A system for detecting and reporting shortages; 

•  Tracking the movement of incoming and outgoing goods and means of transport; 

•  Procedures to  address  anomalies  or  illegal  activities  which  are  detected  or  suspected 

by the company. 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
In cases where undocumented materials or signs of tampering are discovered, a physical 
inspection  of  accessible  parts  of  the  means  of  transport  and  of  readily  accessible  areas 
near  the  means  of  transport  should  be  carried  out.  Procedures  for  reporting  these  cases 
should be in place. 

Personnel  security:  Companies  should  establish  an  internal  process  to  screen 
prospective  employees,  and  verify  applications,  in  full  respect  of  the  legislation  in  the 
areas  of  equal  treatment  and  personal  data  protection.  Such  an  internal  process  could 
include background checks and other tests depending on the particular employee function 
involved. 

Documentation procedures: Companies should ensure that documentation is complete, 
legible, accurate and submitted in time. 

Information  security:  All  information  processes  in  the  context  of  supply  chain 
operations must be secured.  

Secure  freight  flow  provisions:  Companies  may  upgrade  cargo  being  offered  by  non 
“secure operators” as secure when inspection of the content allows them to do so. If such 
inspections  do  not  take  place  or  do  not  allow  cargo  to  be  considered  part  of  a  secure 
supply chain “fast track treatment” may be refused. 

Education  and  training  awareness:  A  security  awareness  programme  should  be 
provided to employees including recognising possible security risks, maintaining product 
integrity, and determining and addressing unauthorised access. These programmes should 
encourage active employee participation in security controls. 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 3 

Forwarding company  

For  a  forwarding  company  to  be  awarded  “secure  operator”  status,  its  security 
management system must be based on a risk assessment and address the following: 

Access  Controls:  Unauthorised  access  to  the  facilities  should  be  prohibited.  Controls 
should include the positive identification of all employees, visitors, and business contacts 
as well as procedures for challenging unauthorised and unidentified persons. 

Procedural Security: Procedures should address anomalies or illegal activities which are 
detected or suspected by the company. 

Documentation  Processing:  Forwarding  companies  should  make  their  best  efforts  to 
ensure  that  all  documentation  provided  and  used  in  the  clearing  of  cargo  is  legible  and 
protected  against  the  exchange,  loss  or  introduction  of  erroneous  information. 
Documentation procedures should include: 

•  Maintaining the accuracy of information received, including the shipper and consignee 
name  and  address,  first  and  second  notify  parties,  description,  weight,  quantity  and 
unit of measure (i.e. boxes, cartons, etc.) of the cargo; 

•  Recording, reporting, and investigating shortages and surpluses of cargo; 

•  Tracking the movement of incoming and outgoing cargo; 

•  Safeguarding computer access and information. 

Personnel  security:  Companies  should  establish  an  internal  process  to  screen 
prospective  employees,  and  verify  applications,  in  full  respect  of  the  legislation  in  the 
areas  of  equal  treatment  and  personal  data  protection.  Such  an  internal  process  could 
include background checks and other tests depending on the particular employee function 
involved. 

Documentation  procedures:  Companies  should  ensure  that  loading  lists,  manifests 
and/or other transport related documents are complete, legible, accurate and submitted in 
time. 

Information  Security:  All  information  processes  in  the  context  of  supply  chain 
operations must be secured.  

Secure freight flow provisions: Companies may upgrade cargo being offered by non –
“secure operators” as secure when inspection of the content allows them to do so. If such 
inspections  do  not  take  place  or  do  not  allow  cargo  to  be  considered  part  of  a  secure 
supply chain “fast track treatment” may be refused. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
Education  and  training  awareness:  A  security  awareness  programme  should  be 
provided  to  employees  including  recognizing  possible  security  risks,  maintaining  cargo 
integrity, and determining and addressing unauthorised access. These programmes should 
encourage active employee participation in security controls and should provide: 

•  Recognition for active employee participation in security controls; 

•  Training in documentation fraud and computer security controls. 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 4 

Warehouse, storage facility or inland terminal operations (including inland ports*) 

For a company operating a warehouse, storage facility, inland terminal or an inland port 
to be awarded “secure operator” status, its security management system must be based on 
a risk assessment and address the following: 

Physical  Security:  All  buildings  should  be  constructed  of  materials,  which  resist 
unauthorised entry and protect against outside intrusion. Physical security should include: 

•  Locking devices for external and internal doors, windows, gates and fences; 

•  Lighting provided inside and outside the facility, including parking areas; 

•  Parking area for private vehicles separate from the shipping, loading, and cargo areas; 

•  Internal/external  communications  systems  in  place  to  contact  internal  security 

personnel or local law enforcement police. 

Access controls: Unauthorised access to facilities should be prohibited. Controls should 
include: 

•  Systematic fail-proof identification of all employees, visitors, and business contacts; 

•  Procedures for challenging unauthorised/unidentified persons. 

Procedural  security:  Procedures  should  be  in  place  to  protect  against  undocumented 
material  being  introduced  into  the  warehouse,  storage  facility  or  inland  terminal  (incl. 
inland ports). Security procedures should include: 

•  A designated security officer to supervise the introduction/removal of cargo; 

•  Properly  marked,  counted,  and  documented  cargo  and  equipment  verified  against 

manifest documentation; 

•  Controlling the integrity of seals and other security devices on incoming cargo; 

•  Procedures for putting seals and other security devices on outgoing cargo; 

•  Procedures for detecting and reporting shortages and surpluses; 

•  Procedures to  address  anomalies  or  illegal  activities  which  are  detected  or  suspected 

by the company; 

•  Proper storage of empty and full loading units to prevent unauthorised access; 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
•  Prevention of access to cargo or empties.  

Personnel  security:  Companies  should  establish  an  internal  process  to  screen 
prospective  employees,  and  verify  applications,  in  full  respect  of  the  legislation  in  the 
areas  of  equal  treatment  and  personal  data  protection.  Such  an  internal  process  could 
include background checks and other tests depending on the particular employee function 
involved. 

Information  security:  All  information  processes  in  the  context  of  supply  chain 
operations must be secured.  

Secure freight flow provisions: Companies may upgrade cargo being offered by non –
“secure operators” as secure when inspection of the content allows them to do so. If such 
inspections  do  not  take  place  or  do  not  allow  cargo  to  be  considered  part  of  a  secure 
supply chain “fast track treatment” may be refused. 

Education  and  training  awareness:  A  security  awareness  programme  should  be 
provided  to  employees  including  recognizing  possible  security  risks,  maintaining  cargo 
integrity, and determining and addressing unauthorised access. These programmes should 
encourage active employee participation in security controls. 

* Provided Regulation (EC) 725/2004 does not apply. 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 5 

Risk assessment 

The risk assessment of an operator should lead to a security management system. The risk 
assessment  must  be  based  on  the  general  situation  of  the  company,  not  on  a  specific 
transport operation, and address at least the following steps: 

Step one - Identifying the types of threat: 

•  The actual news coverage of the current national and international climate, or current 

terrorist campaigns; 

•  The  security  authorities’  advice  on  the  risk  of  a  terrorist  attack  on  facilities  or 

operations; 

•  The  attractiveness  of  the  organisation’s  building,  operations  or  staff  for  a  terrorist 

attack; 

•  The possibility of collateral damage in view of  the operator’s location in a  high-risk 

neighbourhood. 

Step  two  -  Identifying  what  is  to  be  protected  and  in  particular  how  it  is  vulnerable  to 
terrorist attack. 

Step three - Identifying what should be done to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 6 

Conditions to be met by a recognised organisation for supply chain security 

A recognised organisation for supply chain security should be able to demonstrate: 

•  An  unblemished  corruption  and  anti-fraud  record,  both  for  the  organisation  and  its 

employees; 

•  Expertise in relevant aspects of supply chain security; 

•  An  appropriate  knowledge  of  supply  chain  operations,  including  knowledge  of 

operational requirements; 

•  An  appropriate  knowledge  of  other  security  relevant  operations  potentially  affecting 

supply chain security; 

•  The capability to assess the likely supply chain security risks; 

•  The  ability  to  maintain  and  improve  the  supply  chain  security  expertise  of  its 

personnel; 

•  The ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness of its personnel; 

•  The  ability  to  maintain  appropriate  measures  to  avoid  unauthorised  disclosure  of,  or 

access to, security-sensitive material; 

•  Knowledge  of 
requirements; 

relevant  national  and 

international 

legislation  and  security 

•  Knowledge of current security threats and patterns; 

•  Knowledge  of  recognition  and  detection  of  weapons,  dangerous  substances  and 

devices; 

•  Knowledge  of  recognition,  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis,  of  characteristics  and 

behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten supply chain security; 

•  Knowledge of techniques used to circumvent security measures; 

•  Knowledge of security and surveillance equipment and systems and their operational 

limitations. 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 

1. 

NAME OF THE PROPOSAL : 

Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  enhancing  supply  chain 
security. 

2. 

ABM / ABB FRAMEWORK 

Policy area(s) concerned and associated Activity/Activities: 

Policy area(s): Inland, air and maritime transport policy 

Activit(y/ies): Implementation and monitoring of supply chain security measures.  

3. 

BUDGET LINES 

3.1. 

Budget  lines  (operational  lines  and  related  technical  and  administrative 
assistance lines (ex- B.A lines) including headings : 

06 02 03 02 Transport security 

06 02 11 03 Committees 

3.2. 

Duration of the action and of the financial impact: 

Indefinite, starting in 2008 

3.3. 

Budgetary characteristics (add rows if necessary) : 

Budget 
line 

Type of expenditure 

New 

EFTA 
contribution 

Contributions 
from applicant 
countries 

Heading in 
financial 
perspective 

NDA 

NDA 

Non-
comp 

Non-
comp 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No  

No  

4. 

SUMMARY OF RESOURCES 

4.1. 

Financial resources 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1.  Summary of commitment appropriations (CA) and payment appropriations (PA) 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Section 
No. 

Expenditure type 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 
and 
later 

Total 

Operational expenditure33 

Commitment 
appropriations (CA) 

8.1 

Payment 
(PA) 

appropriations 

0 

0 

a 

b 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0. 

0. 

0.5 

0.5 

0 

0 

0.5 

0.5 

Administrative expenditure within reference amount34 

Technical 
& 
administrative  assistance 
(NDA) 

8.2.4 

c 

TTOOTTAALL  RREEFFEERREENNCCEE  AAMMOOUUNNTT  

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Commitment 
appropriations 

Payment appropriations 

a+c  0 

b+c  0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0. 

0. 

0.5 

0.5 

Administrative expenditure not included in reference amount35 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0.5 

0.5 

0 

Human 
associated 
(NDA) 

resources 

and 
expenditure 

Administrative  costs,  other 
than  human  resources  and 
associated 
not 
included in reference amount 
(NDA) 

costs, 

0 

0 

8.2.5 

d 

8.2.6 

e 

Total indicative financial cost of intervention 

TOTAL  CA 
including 
cost of human resources 

TOTAL  PA 
including 
cost of human resources 

0 

0 

a+c
+d+
e 

b+c
+d+
e 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0.056  0.037  0.037  0.037  0.168 

0.056  0.037  0.537  0.037  0.668 

0.056  0.037  0.537  0.037  0.668 

33 
34 
35 

Expenditure that does not fall under Chapter xx 01 of the Title xx concerned. 
Expenditure within article xx 01 04 of Title xx. 
Expenditure within chapter xx 01 other than articles xx 01 04 or xx 01 05. 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Co-financing details 

If the proposal involves co-financing by Member States, or other bodies (please specify 
which),  an  estimate  of  the  level  of  this  co-financing  should  be  indicated  in  the  table 
below (additional lines may be added if different bodies are foreseen for the provision of 
the co-financing): 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Co-financing body 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 
and 
later 

Total 

…………………… 

TOTAL CA including co-
financing 

f 

a+c
+d+
e+f 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

4.1.2.  Compatibility with Financial Programming 

X 

Proposal is compatible with existing financial programming. 

Proposal  will  entail  reprogramming  of  the  relevant  heading  in  the  financial 

(cid:133) 
perspective. 

Proposal  may  require  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Interinstitutional 

(cid:133) 
Agreement36 (i.e. flexibility instrument or revision of the financial perspective). 

4.1.3.  Financial impact on revenue 

X 

(cid:133) 

Proposal has no financial implications on revenue 

Proposal has financial impact – the effect on revenue is as follows: 

NB:  All  details  and  observations  relating  to  the  method  of  calculating  the  effect  on 
revenue should be shown in a separate annex. 

36 

See points 19 and 24 of the Interinstitutional agreement. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Budget line 

Revenue 

EUR million (to one decimal place) 

Situation following action 

[Yea
r n] 

[n+1] [n+2] [n+3

] 

[n+4]  [n+5]

37

Prior to
action 
[Year 
n-1] 

a) Revenue in absolute terms 

b) Change in revenue 

 ∆ 

(Please  specify  each  revenue  budget  line  involved,  adding  the  appropriate  number  of 
rows to the table if there is an effect on more than one budget line.) 

4.2. 

Human Resources FTE (including officials, temporary and external staff) – see 
detail under point 8.2.1. 

Annual requirements 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

Total 
number 
human resources 

of 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

5. 

CHARACTERISTICS AND OBJECTIVES 

Details  of  the  context  of  the  proposal  are  required 
in  the  Explanatory 
Memorandum.  This  section  of  the  Legislative  Financial  Statement  should  include 
the following specific complementary information: 

5.1. 

Need to be met in the short or long term 

In  its  Anti-Terrorism  Declaration  of  25  March  200438,  the  European  Council  “calls  for 
the  strengthening  of  all  forms  of  transport  systems,  including  the  enhancement  of  the 
legal  framework  and  the  improvement  of  preventive  mechanism.”  This  proposal  is  in 
response to the needs identified and the Council’s request. 

In recent years, the European Union has made considerable progress towards protecting 
its transport operations from the terrorist threat. European security legislation is in place 
for aviation, including airports, and maritime transport. Legislation on securing seaports 
has reached the end of the legislative process. There is no European legislation covering 

37 
38 

Additional columns should be added if necessary i.e. if the duration of the action exceeds 6 years. 
Council of the European Union Declaration of 25 March 2004 on Combating Terrorism, document 
of Conseil 7906/2004 of 29 March 2004. 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the  supply  chain  outside  the  areas  referred  to  above.  This  proposal  bridges  the  existing 
security gaps between the various transport modes.  

5.2. 

Value-added  of  Community  involvement  and  coherence  of  the  proposal  with 
other financial instruments and possible synergy 

In order to avoid the re-emergence of national transport markets, due to national supply 
chain security rules, a Community approach is required, as has been the case for maritime 
transport, seaports, aviation and airports. 

5.3. 

Objectives, expected results and related indicators of the proposal in the context 
of the ABM framework 

None, except existing function as guardian of the Treaties. 

5.4. 

Method of Implementation (indicative) 

Show below the method(s)39 chosen for the implementation of the action. 

ٱ 

Centralised Management 

ٱ 

ٱ 

Directly by the Commission 

Indirectly by delegation to: 

ٱ 

ٱ 

ٱ 

Executive Agencies 

Bodies set up by the Communities as referred to in art. 185 of 
the Financial Regulation 

National  public-sector  bodies/bodies  with  public-service 
mission 

ٱ Shared or decentralised management 

ٱ  With Member states 

ٱ  With Third countries 

ٱ Joint management with international organisations (please specify) 

Relevant comments: 

None. 

39 

If more than one method is indicated please provide additional details in the "Relevant comments" 
section of this point. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
6. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

6.1. 

Monitoring system 

The Commission will have to carry out conventional monitoring work as guardian of the 
Treaties. 

6.2. 

Evaluation 

6.2.1.  Ex-ante evaluation 

The  European  Council’s  Anti-Terrorism  Declaration  of  25  March  200440  set  the 
imperative political context of this Commission initiative.  

From  2004  a  consultation  process  took  place.  This  process  sharpened  the  focus  of 
possible EU measures to enhance land transport supply chain security was developed and 
was verified with Member States and stakeholders. 

The consultation process and the impact assessment41 indicate that EU measures should 
take account of the following: 

•  Supply chain security is about thinking the unthinkable. Security risks relate 
to  cargo,  transport  modes  and  infrastructure.  Total  security  can  never  be 
guaranteed by public authorities. 

•  Many companies are increasingly implementing their own security standards. 
Their  supply  chain  partners  have  to  adjust  to  these  procedures.  Transport 
service providers and other suppliers who work for a number of clients face 
being subjected to multiple assessments, which is unnecessary, disruptive and 
costly. 

•  The  challenge  is  to  achieve  the  highest  possible  level  of  security  for  the 
supply  chain  without  jeopardizing  trade  whilst  keeping  administrative 
requirements to the minimum. 

•  Public  authorities  and  industry  need  to  co-operate  to  enhance  supply  chain 
security.  The  guiding  principle  is  that  operators  which  voluntarily  comply 
with  certain  requirements  and  which  have  been  vetted  by  the  authorities 
should benefit from certain facilitations and simplifications. 

40 

41 

Council  of  the  European  Union  Declaration  on  Combating  Terrorism,  document  of  Conseil 
7906/2004 of 29 March 2004. 
DNV  Consulting,  ‘Study  on  the  impacts  of  possible  legislation  to  improve  transport  security’. 
Costs under 2004 budget. 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  A  uniform  supply  chain  framework  approach  will  reduce  security  related 
competition  within  EU  boundaries.  Certification  of  companies  might  be  an 
option. 

6.2.2.  Measures  taken  following  an  intermediate/ex-post  evaluation  (lessons  learned 

from similar experiences in the past) 

The Commission intends to order a study to evaluate the impact and the effectiveness of 
the measures adopted. Such a study should be conducted in 2010, and then every three 
years. Such regular evaluation is necessary to enable the Commission to propose, via the 
committee  procedure,  any  adjustments  to  the  proposed  system  which  might  prove 
necessary. The unit cost of each study is estimated at €500.000. 

6.2.3.  Terms and frequency of future evaluation 

See 6.2.2. 

7. 

ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES  

Under annex 6 to the proposed Regulation a recognised security organisation for supply 
chain  security  must  demonstrate  an  unblemished  corruption  and  anti-fraud  record,  both 
for the organisation and its employees.  

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
8. 

DETAILS OF RESOURCES 

8.1. 

Objectives of the proposal in terms of their financial cost 

(Headings  of  Objectives, 
actions  and  outputs  should 
be provided) 

Type of 
output 

Av. 
cost 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

TOTAL 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

No. 
outputs 

Total 
cost 

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

OPERATIONAL 
OBJECTIVE No.1 42 

Action 1 

Output 1 

Output 2 

Action 2. 

Output 1 

Sub-total Objective 1 

OPERATIONAL 
OBJECTIVE No.2 1 

Action 1 

Output 1 

Sub-total Objective 2 

OPERATIONAL 
OBJECTIVE No.n 1 

Sub-total Objective n 

TOTAL COST 

42 

As described under Section 5.3. 

EN 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2. 

Administrative Expenditure 

8.2.1.  Number and type of human resources 

Types of 
post 

Staff to be assigned to management of the action using existing and/or additional 
resources (number of posts/FTEs) 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

A*/AD 

B*, 
C*/AST 

Officials 
or 
temporary 
staff43 
(XX 01 
01) 

Staff  financed44  by 
art. XX 01 02 

staff45 
Other 
financed  by  art.  XX 
01 04/05 

TOTAL 

8.2.2.  Description of tasks deriving from the action 

Not applicable. 

8.2.3.  Sources of human resources (statutory) 

(When more than one source is stated, please indicate the number of posts originating from 
each of the sources) 

Posts currently allocated to the management of the programme to be replaced 

(cid:133) 
or extended 

(cid:133) 

(cid:133) 

Posts pre-allocated within the APS/PDB exercise for year n 

Posts to be requested in the next APS/PDB procedure 

Posts  to  be  redeployed  using  existing  resources  within  the  managing  service 

(cid:133) 
(internal redeployment) 

Posts required for year n although not foreseen in the APS/PDB exercise of the 

(cid:133) 
year in question 

8.2.4.  Other  Administrative  expenditure  included  in  reference  amount  (XX  01  04/05  – 

Expenditure on administrative management) 

43 
44 
45 

Cost of which is NOT covered by the reference amount. 
Cost of which is NOT covered by the reference amount. 
Cost of which is included within the reference amount. 

EN 

46 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Budget line 

(number and heading) 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Year 
n 

Year 
n+1 

Year 
n+2 

Year 
n+3 

Year 
n+4 

Year 
n+5  

and 
later 

TOTAL 

Technical 

1 
and 
assistance (including related staff costs) 

administrative 

Executive agencies46 

Other 

technical 

and 

administrative 

assistance 

intra muros 

extra muros 

Total  Technical  and  administrative 
assistance 

8.2.5.  Financial cost of human resources and associated costs not included in the reference 

amount 

Type of human resources 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Officials and temporary staff (XX 01 
01) 

Staff  financed  by  Art  XX  01  02 
(auxiliary, END, contract staff, etc.) 

(specify budget line) 

Total cost of human resources and 
associated costs (NOT in reference 
amount) 

Calculation–Reference should be made to Point 8.2.1, if applicable 

46 

Reference should be made to the specific legislative financial statement for the Executive Agency(ies) 
concerned. 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.6 Other administrative expenditure not included in reference amount 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011  TOTAL 

XX 01 02 11 01 – Missions 

XX 01 02 11 02 – Meetings & Conferences 

01  02  11  03  –  Compulsory  committees 
(27C730) 

XX 01 02 11 04 – Studies & consultations 

XX 01 02 11 05 - Information systems 

2 

Total 

Other  management 

expenditure (XX 01 02 11) 

0.056 

0.0375 

0.0375 

0.0375 

0.168 

3  Other 

expenditure 

administrative 
including reference to budget line) 

nature 

of 

an 
(specify 

Total administrative expenditure, 
other than human resources and 
associated costs (NOT included in 
reference amount) 

0.056 

0.0375 

0.0375 

0.0375 

0.168 

Calculation – 3 meetings of a supply chain security representatives committee in the first year. 
-  2  meetings  in  subsequent  years.  Reimbursement  of  national  experts’  travel  expenses, 
estimated at 25 times an average of Euro 750/expert. 

EN 

48 

   EN