Newsletter. n° 10, April 2004.
Date: 2006-01-03
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: international relations, international security, nationalism, political culture

Newsletter
n°10

April 2004

Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies

43 avenue du Président Wilson - 75775 Paris cedex 16 - France

phone: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30  (cid:127)  fax: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: institute@iss-eu.org

http:www.iss-eu.org

institute

European Union

for security
studies

institut

d’ études
de  sécurité

Union Européenne

editorial

Dispelling confusion

O ne year after the war in Iraq, the EU is still confronted

with two major challenges. The first is in Iraq itself, where
the US strategy of stabilisation and democratisation is
encountering dramatic setbacks. The second challenge arises from
the growing terrorist threat to Western interests and citizens, as seen
in the terrible attacks in Madrid on 11 March. If one thing is cer-
tain in this chaotic environment, it is that the war in Iraq has not
made the world safer or the terrorists weaker. 
The  EU  member  states  have  reacted  to  these  challenges  with
increased cooperation and reconciliation: a revised Action Plan
against terrorism on the one hand, a new global political strategy
vis-à-vis the Mediterranean and Arab countries on the other. The
election of a new Spanish government has helped to overcome the
European divisions of last year,  including the cleavages over the
relationship with the United States and the EU’s constitutional
future. But this process of EU reconciliation, possibly leading to a
more balanced transatlantic partnership, is also producing mas-
sive confusion.
(cid:81) First, there is confusion over the so-called ‘victory’ of terrorism.
Many have suggested that the downfall of José Maria Aznar’s gov-
ernment was a victory for the terrorists who, with a few terrible
bombings, have shown that they can affect and change European
policies. This is not only particularly unfair on Spanish citizens
(who have long suffered from ETA terrorism while strengthening
their democracy over the last twenty years); it is also just not true.
It was not the bombings that defeated the government but a mix-
ture of manipulation and intimidation, over three days, which
became unacceptable to millions of Spanish voters. Had the nor-
mal democratic rules of transparency been respected, it might well
have remained in power, in spite of the collective trauma, despair
and anger created by the attacks themselves. 

éditoNicole Gnesotto 

Director

(cid:81) The second confusion concerns Iraq. The announcement
by the new Prime Minister that Spain may withdraw its troops
from Iraq is also viewed, in some circles, as a defeat for democ-
racy and a victory for terrorism. This accusation presupposes
that the war in Iraq is key in the West’s fight against terror-
ism, which again is highly questionable: one may agree or dis-
agree with the reasons why the United States decided to attack
Iraq, but nobody can seriously maintain that it was because
Saddam Hussein had links with Osama bin Laden. Even the
US administration no longer dares use this argument. Decou-
pling the issue of Iraq from the fight against terrorism is there-
fore a question of honesty: being critical of the US interven-
tion in Iraq but at the same time deeply involved in fighting
international  terrorism  is  not  only  possible,  it  has  strong
rationale and legitimacy. 
(cid:81) This brings us to a third confusion, on the management of
postwar Iraq and transatlantic solidarity. Many of those criti-
cal of a Spanish withdrawal from Iraq tend to forget that the
United States is the first country likely to reduce seriously its
military presence in that country, for a complex variety of rea-
sons. Even more, it is precisely to allow some US withdrawal
from Iraq that the United States is pressing for international
support and involvement, possibly even including a NATO
mission there. It thus seems difficult to deny Spain the right to
do precisely what the United States would like to do, especially
when over 90 per cent of the Spanish population are convinced
that the war was not the right solution.
(cid:81) That said, it would be foolish to conclude that the Europeans,
especially those critical of America’s arguments for going to
war, can simply forget about Iraq. As a matter of fact, stabilis-
ing that country has become a security interest for the entire

... continued on back page

Institute Activities

Seminars
(cid:81) ESDP. ‘Flexibility for ESDP: what is
feasible, what acceptable, what desir-
able?’ was the title of a seminar held at
the  Institute  (Antonio  Missiroli)  on 
12 January. It took the form of a brain-
storming on the latest and future pos-
sible  developments  in  ESDP  seen
through the prism of ‘flexibility’, short-
hand for arrangements that may not
concern all members of the enlarged
EU. 
(cid:81) Information technology. The Insti-
tute (Gustav Lindstrom) organised a
first seminar on this subject, ‘Informa-
tion technology in the 21st century:
implications for the EU’, in Paris on 
5 March. Currents threats to IT struc-
tures were analysed, including potential
spillover effects on critical infrastruc-
tures.
Institute publications

Chaillot Papers
(cid:81) No. 68: One year on: lessons from Iraq, by Ron
Asmus, Christoph Bertram, Carl Bildt,
Esther Brimmer, Marta Dassu, Rob de Wijk,
James Dobbins, William Drozdiak, Nicole
Gnesotto, Philip H. Gordon, Charles Grant,
Gustav Gustenau, Pierre Hassner, John
Hulsman, Atis Lejins, Catherine McArdle
Kelleher, Andrew Moravcsik, Janusz
Onyszkiewicz, Jiri Sedivy, Narcis Serra and
Alvaro Vasconcelos; edited by Gustav
Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (March).
(cid:81) No. 67: From Copenhagen to Brussels.
European defence: core documents, Vol. IV,
compiled by Antonio Missiroli (December).
(cid:81) No. 66: Fighting proliferation - European
perspectives by Mark Smith, Bruno Tertrais
and Jean Pascal Zanders; edited by Gustav
Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt
(December).

Occasional Papers
(cid:81) No. 50: For our eyes only? Shaping an
intelligence community within the EU, by Björn
Müller-Wille, (January).

Forthcoming
(cid:81) Occasional Paper No. 51: Crisis management
in sub-Saharan Africa: the role of the European
Union, by Fernanda Faria.

The Institute and the Union

(cid:81) The  Institute  language  regime.
On 14 January this year the Institute’s
Board, meeting in Brussels, ruled that
from now on the Institute would adopt
the ‘CFSP language regime’. This means
that the Institute will continue to work
in either English or French, but will not
translate or interpret from one to the
other.  Publications,  including  this
Newsletter,  will  therefore  in  future
appear in one version only or contain
both English and French. However, to
reach a wider readership, the Institute
may  on  occasion  have  publications
translated into other languages, includ-
ing those used outside the EU.
(cid:81) European  Security  Strategy. The
Institute has published English, French,
German, Italian and Spanish versions of
Javier  Solana’s  document  ‘A  secure
Europe in a better world - European
Security Strategy’ adopted by the Euro-
pean Council on 12 December 2003.
Versions in the other six official lan-
guages of the Union will appear shortly.
(cid:81) Europe  and  Islam. The  reflection
group 
‘The  spiritual  and  cultural
dimension of Europe’ established by
Romano  Prodi  held  a  meeting  on
‘Europe and Islam’ on 9-10 January in
Paris. The meeting was organised by La
République des Idées (Paris) and the
Institut  für  die  Wissenschaften  vom
Menschen (Vienna), and hosted by the
EUISS on 10 January (Martin Ortega).
(cid:81) Research. A ‘Group of Personalities’
has been working on the foundations of
a  European  Security  Research  Pro-
gramme  from  2007  onwards.  On 
15  March,  Burkard  Schmitt,  the
Group’s rapporteur, presented its find-
ings to the President of the European
Commission, Romano Prodi.

Task forces

Institute publications
continued

(cid:81) Occasional Paper No. 52: Rethinking the
Euro-Mediterranean political and security
dialogue, by Rosa Balfour.
(cid:81) ESDP - five years , a book edited by the
Institute, with contributions by
M. Ahtisaari, M. Barnier, C. Bildt, E. Brok,
R. Cooper, J. Dempsey, L. Dini, J-L. Gergorin,
N. Gnesotto, P.H. Gordon, J-Y. Haine,
G. Lindstrom, A. Missiroli, A. Navarro,
M. Ortega, F. Riccardi, A. Rondos,
B. Schmitt, R. Schüwirth, T. Sommer and
L. Zecchini, and a preface by Javier Solana.

External publications
Jean-Yves Haine
Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d’alliés? (Paris:
Payot, 2004), 397 pp.

Gustav Lindstrom
‘The Moment of Truth for Galileo’, Security
Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 1, March 2004.

Dov Lynch
‘Russia’s  Strategic  Partnership  with
Europe’, The Washington Quarterly, Spring
2004.

Antonio Missiroli
‘European security in flux’ (with Gerrard
Quille), in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The future
of Europe - Integration and Enlargement (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2004), pp. 114-134.

Burkard Schmitt
‘Progress towards the European Defence
Agency’, New Defence Agenda, Fresh per-
spectives on Europe’s security, Winter 2004.

Research awards
Visiting Fellows
During the period January to March the follow-
ing studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:
— Elisabeth Dietl (German), whose research topic
was ‘Implementing the EU’s security strategy in
the Middle East’;
— Nicolas Jabko (French), ‘The EU and multi-
lateralism’;
— Rem Korteweg (Dutch), ‘The military dimen-
sion of the EU-NATO relationship’;
— Suzanne Niess (German) ‘Assessing Schengen
in an enlarged EU’;
— Gergana Noutcheva (Bulgarian) ‘Europeani-
sation  and  conflict  resolution:  the  cases  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro’;
— Lada Parizkova (Czech) ‘The EU’s institutional
framework for the fight against terrorism’;
— Odette Tomescu-Hatto (Romanian) ‘Roma-
nia, Moldova and the EU’s new border’.

(cid:81) The Institute’s Balkans Task Force (Judy Batt) met in Paris on 1 March for a conference entitled ‘Serbia and Croatia -
resurgence of nationalism?’. This brought together about 30 officials and leading experts from across Europe, including from
Croatia and Serbia, to assess the meaning of the recent elections in those countries for the prospects of continuing eco-
nomic and political reform, for the security and stability of the region, and for their relations with the EU.
(cid:81) A final meeting of the Institute’s European Defence Book Task Force (Jean-Yves Haine) was held on 26 January.

Analysis

Serbia and Croatia: after the elections

Parliamentary elections in Croatia and
Serbia in late 2003 brought the question
of nationalism in the Balkans back onto
the agenda. In Croatia, former President
Franjo  Tudjman’s  party,  the  HDZ,
returned to power, while in Serbia, the
Radical Party led by war crimes indictee
Vojislav Seselj won the largest share of the
vote. In neither case, however, are we faced
with a return to the nationalism of the
1990s, which mobilised peoples for vio-
lent  aggression  against  each  other.  In
both countries, extremism is fed by hope-
lessness due to acute economic distress
and disillusion with the outgoing gov-
ernments’ ineffectiveness, internal bick-
ering and corruption. 
In Croatia voters chose the HDZ because
they were looking for more effective gov-
ernment. The outgoing coalition was fail-
ing to deliver. The HDZ leadership has
made a convincing start on reforming the
party’s  image  and  removing  the  most
compromised politicians from its previ-
ous period in power. It also ran a very
good election campaign, presenting the
image of a modern party with a deter-
mined leader ready to pursue a strong
agenda of reform, prioritising the goals of
NATO and EU accession. Croatian public
opinion strongly supports these objec-
tives. Positive signs are the inclusion of
representatives of the Serbian minority in
the new government, and the HDZ is now
taking useful advice from West European
conservative and peoples’ parties on how
to revise its ideology and adapt to the
demands of ‘Europeanisation’. 
The results in Serbia are more troubling.
An optimist would point to the fact that
the democratic parties between them car-
ried off more than 60 per cent of the vote,

while the Radicals won 27 per cent, and in
absolute numbers no more votes than in
the  past.  Only  at  the  beginning  of  its
‘transition to democracy’, which began
late in 2000, Serbia could be compared
with, for example, Poland or Slovenia,
which both saw surprise electoral suc-
cesses of unknown ‘wild card’ outsiders in
early 1990s elections. The key problem,
however, is deep division and personal
animosity between the democratic par-
ties, which seem unable to work together.
So the new government – which took two
full months to form – is a coalition of
three partners led by Vojislav Kostunica’s
DSS. It is dependent on the parliamen-
tary  support  of  Slobodan  Milosevic’s
Socialists to survive, while the DS party of
assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Djind-
jic remains in opposition.
In both countries, the issue of coopera-
tion with the International Criminal Tri-
bunal (ICTY) in The Hague continues to
touch raw nerves in national sensibilities.
Croatia faces the key challenge of hand-
ing General Ante Gotovina over to the
court, but he is still widely regarded as a
war hero. The HDZ leaders claim to be
ready to comply, and unless they do, they
will  not  get  the  ‘green  light’  from  the
European Commission on their applica-
tion  for  EU  membership,  expected  in
April. But will they carry the party’s rank-
and-file with them? This will be the key
test of how far Croatia has gone in recali-
brating its national identity to match its
sense of a European vocation. The HDZ
could well be better placed to deliver on
this  (and  other  difficult  issues  on  the
reform agenda), precisely because of its
credibility and legitimacy as defender of
the ‘national interest’. 

The  new  government  in  Serbia  is  pro-
foundly ambivalent about cooperation
with the ICTY, reflecting Prime Minister
Kostunica’s long-held views. Other parties
in the coalition are more willing to coop-
erate, but for the moment they are priori-
tising coalition unity in the interests of
rebuilding the lost momentum of domes-
tic economic reform. None would bene-
fit  from  an  early  election.  Meanwhile,
another attempt to fill the long-vacant
post of President of Serbia will be sched-
uled for May/June. The Radicals are opti-
mistic about their chances of winning this
time – their candidate, Tomislav Nikolic,
came top in the last ballot on the Presi-
dency  in  November.  That  was  invalid,
however, due to a turnout of below 50 per
cent, but now the election law has been
amended to remove the turnout require-
ment. So it is absolutely vital for the dem-
ocratic parties to field a common candi-
date who can muster the support of all
their  voters.  This  has  become  much
harder after the bitter mud-slinging of the
past few months.
The government will be hard put to show
any success stories to impress the voters
by May. Reluctance to comply with the
ICTY will further delay integration with
the EU and NATO. And the economic sit-
uation will get worse before it gets better.
Even if it was poverty and an inchoate
sense of grievance that fuelled recent sup-
port for the Radicals, the old nationalist
agenda is not yet dead. The awful events
of this March in Kosovo have handed the
Radicals a further electoral asset that
they are ready to exploit to the full. (cid:93)

Judy Batt

On-line/http

Briefings

All of the Institute’s publications and
reports on seminars can be accessed
on the Institute’s website:

www.iss-eu.org

On 15 January the Institute hosted a discussion for a group of Turkish officials and
researchers, led by Philip H. Gordon (Brookings Institution), on ‘ESDP/NATO/
European security - what development for Turkey and Turkey-Europe relations?’.
The Institute’s research team discussed nuclear proliferation and security issues with a
delegation from North Korea visiting Europe, on 2 March.

Comment

Russia: quo vadis?
TT he results of Russia’s presidential

elections on 14 March held no sur-
prises. Turnout was registered at
61  per  cent.  The  incumbent  Vladimir
Putin received 71 per cent of the vote, fol-
lowed far behind by the Communist Party
candidate,  Nikolai  Kharitonov  (13.8),
Sergei Glazyev (4.1) and the liberal Irina
Khakamada (3.9). The victory confirmed
three points. First, the contrast between
the high emotion of the 1996 presidential
elections that led to Boris Yeltsin’s second
term and the striking calm of Putin’s bid
for a second term reaffirms that Russian
politics has become phlegmatic. Second,
the poll, however it is interpreted, con-
firms  the  undisputable  popularity  of
Vladimir Putin; he has the support of the
great majority of Russians. Third, there
is no opposition to speak of. The Duma
elections in December 2003 provided the
pro-Kremlin party United Russia with a
majority of seats in the parliament. Faced
with such loss, no opposition party put
forward  a  first-rank  candidate  for  the
presidential bid: Irina Khakamada was the
surprise liberal figure; Gennady Zyuganov
avoided  representing  the  Communist
Party, as did Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Putin
ran unchallenged. 
(cid:81) International views may be summed up
in one sentence: the elections may have
been free but they were not fair. The OSCE
concluded that the elections were ‘well
administered’ but lacked elements of a
‘genuine  democratic  contest’.  The  EU
Council noted its concerns over opposi-
tion candidates’ lack of fair access to the

media. Comments by pundits were less
restrained. Putin is everywhere presented
as Russia’s new Tsar, who has eliminated
all institutions that might check or bal-
ance his power, from Russia’s regions and
republics to the media, the oligarchs and
the Duma. Putin’s change of government
on 24 February confirmed the picture,
with  the  appointment  of  an  unknown
bureaucrat, Mikhail Fradkov, as the new
Prime Minister. Putin holds all the reins. 
While  the  substance  of  international
opinion  is  beyond  dispute,  the  tone  is
questionable. Developments in Russia do
raise worrying issues. The level of civil lib-
erties has declined since 1999, the war in
Chechnya  remains  a  blight  and  the
absence of any serious opposition to the
leadership is a concern. However, the elec-
tions did not produce a fraudulent result.
It  is  worth  reiterating  that  Russians
elected the man they wanted to elect. 
(cid:81)  With  good  reason,  many  Russians
argue. In 1999, when he became Prime
Minister, Putin inherited a Russia on the
verge of collapse, with restive regions and
republics, a separatist Chechnya, an econ-
omy barely recovering from the 1998 rou-
ble  crash  and  empty  coffers.  Consider
2004: the Russian state is no longer in
question, central power has been restored,
the economy has grown for the last four
years, the budget is balanced and salaries
are paid on time. Putin has brought sta-
bility to a new state that has been buffeted
by storms since 1992. Russians are aware
of the costs of the new order, and accept
‘democracy
them,  preferring  Putin’s 

within  limits’  to  Yeltsin’s  ‘democracy
without restraint’. 
(cid:81) Yet, in 2004, the questions remain the
same  as  in  December  1999.  Who  is
Vladimir Putin? Where is he taking Rus-
sia? The Russian president holds pre-emi-
nent  power  in  his  hands  and  faces  a
unique opportunity to transform Russia.
In his first term, he may have stabilised
Russia, but what does his second term
hold?  In  reply  to  a  question  about  his
place in history, at a press conference fol-
lowing the election, Putin admitted: ‘As
for whether I’m ready for my place in his-
tory - no I’m not’. His place in history is
uncertain.  Having  been  the  ‘great  sta-
biliser’,  will  he  become  a  ‘great  trans-
former’?  If  so,  all  of  his  work  remains
ahead.
(cid:81) Nor is Russia’s relationship with the EU
clearer.  The  presidential  elections
occurred simultaneously with a review of
the EU’s Russia policy. 2004 marks a turn-
ing-point in EU-Russian relations, with
enlargement, the expiry of the EU’s ‘Com-
mon Strategy’ and the launch of its ‘Wider
Europe’ project. The moment for a review
is opportune. Never have EU-Russian rela-
tions been so strained and never has the
lack  of  substance  at  the  heart  of  the
declared ‘strategic partnership’ been so
evident. The more Brussels and Moscow
realise the real – as opposed to the simply
declared – importance of the other, the
more their relations are marked by fric-
tion. A period of pushing and shoving in
the dark lies ahead as each works out the
place of the other in its own plans. 

Dov Lynch

editorial ... continued from front page

...

international community, and formulas must now be worked on,
with the UN and regional partners, which could help prevent all
types of worst-case scenarios, in and arising from Iraq. Still, again,
any further confusion between this unavoidable cooperation for the
sake of Iraq and some kind of ex post facto legitimation of the war
itself must be avoided.
(cid:81) For the United States, and the EU and its individual member
states, a final challenge emerges from all this: at a time when the 

terrorists themselves have their own communication strategy and
are eager to exploit the complexity inherent in all democracies,
could it be that our societies find themselves forbidden to express
their disagreement, to criticise their leaders or to peacefully impose
domestic or international changes just because such criticism or
changes could be perceived, erroneously, as a victory for terrorism?
Is it not precisely the honour of democracies to reject these most 
perverse arguments? (cid:93)

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