Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings {SEC(2005) 1767}
Date: 2005-12-23
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: criminal law, mutual recognition principle, penalty

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 23.12.2005 
COM(2005) 696 final 

GREEN PAPER 

On Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings 

(presented by the Commission) 

{SEC(2005) 1767} 

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GREEN PAPER 

On Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings 

The purpose of this Green Paper is to launch a wide-ranging consultation of interested parties 
on issues of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal matters, including the principle of ne bis in 
idem.  The  Green  Paper  identifies  problems  that  may  arise  under  the  current  situation  and 
suggests possible solutions. The attached working paper provides a more detailed analysis. 

The Commission invites interested parties to submit comments before 31 March 2006 to the 
following address: 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security 
Unit D3 – Criminal Justice 
Office LX46 3/20 
B - 1049 Brussels 

E-mail: JLS-criminaljustice@cec.eu.int 

Fax: +32-2/296 76 34 

Interested parties are requested to mention explicitly if they do not wish their comments to be 
published on the Commission’s website. 

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1. 

BACKGROUND 

With crime becoming more international in scale, EU criminal justice is increasingly 
confronted with situations where several Member States have criminal jurisdiction to 
prosecute  the  same  case.  Moreover,  multiple  prosecutions  on  the  same  cases,  or 
“positive” conflicts of jurisdiction, are currently more likely to occur as the scope of 
many  national  criminal  jurisdictions  has  been  extended  considerably  in  the  past 
years.  

Multiple  prosecutions  are  detrimental  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  individuals  and 
can lead to duplication of activities. Defendants, victims and witnesses may have to 
be summoned for hearings in several countries. Most notably, repeated proceedings 
entail  a  multiplication  of  restrictions  on  their  rights  and  interests,  e.g.  of  free 
movement.  They  increase  psychological  burdens  and  the  costs  and  complexity  of 
legal  representation.  In  a  developed  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  it  seems 
appropriate  to  avoid,  where  possible,  such  detrimental  effects;  by  limiting  the 
occurrence of multiple prosecutions on the same cases. 

Currently, national authorities are free to institute their own parallel prosecutions on 
the same cases. The only legal barrier is the principle of ne bis in idem, laid down in 
Articles  54-58  of  the  Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  (CISA). 
However,  this  principle  does  not  prevent  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  while  multiple 
prosecutions are ongoing in two or more Member States; it can only come into play, 
by  preventing  a  second  prosecution  on  the  same  case,  if  a  decision  which  bars  a 
further prosecution (res judicata) has terminated the proceedings in a Member State.  

More importantly, without a system for allocating cases to an appropriate jurisdiction 
while proceedings are ongoing, ne bis in idem can lead to accidental or even arbitrary 
results: by giving preference to whichever jurisdiction can first take a final decision, 
its effects amount to a “first come first served” principle. The choice of jurisdiction is 
currently left to chance, and this seems to be the reason why the principle of ne bis in 
idem is still subject to several exceptions.  

An adequate response to the problem of (positive) conflicts of jurisdiction would be 
to  create  a  mechanism  for  allocating  cases  to  an  appropriate  jurisdiction.  Where 
prosecutions  are  concentrated  in  a  single  jurisdiction,  an  issue  of  ne  bis  in  idem 
would no longer arise. Moreover, such a mechanism would complement the principle 
of mutual recognition, which provides that a judicial decision taken in one Member 
State is recognised and - where necessary – enforced by other Member States. 

In  this  Green  Paper,  the  Commission  outlines  the  possibilities  for  the  creation  of  a 
mechanism which would facilitate the choice of the most appropriate jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings, and also for a possible revision of the rules on ne bis in idem. 
It  responds  to  point  3.3  of  the  Hague  Programme,  and  to  the  Mutual  Recognition 
Programme  of  29.11.2000  (in  particular,  points  2.3,  and  measures  1  and  11  of  the 
latter). Relevant EU measures could be adopted as a framework decision, based on 
Article  31(1)(d)  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU),  according  to  which 
common  action  shall  include  preventing  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  between  Member 

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States. If deemed necessary, letter c of Article 31(1) could serve as a complementary 
basis  to  ensure  compatibility  in  rules  applicable  in  the  Member  States  as  may  be 
necessary to improve judicial cooperation.  

2. 

CREATING A MECHANISM FOR THE CHOICE OF JURISDICTION  

2.1. 

Prerequisites  

A mechanism aiming to allocate cases to an appropriate jurisdiction should avoid red 
tape,  while  guaranteeing  a  balanced  approach  with  due  respect  to  the  rights  of  the 
individuals concerned. To make it function, two fundamental prerequisites need to be 
met.  

Firstly, the competent authorities should become aware of proceedings and/or related 
decisions in each  others’  jurisdiction:  they should be allowed, and perhaps even be 
obliged, to exchange the relevant information. 

Secondly,  once  they  become  aware  of  proceedings  in  other  Member  States,  the 
prosecuting  authorities  of  a  Member  State  should  have  the  ability  to  refrain  from 
initiating  a  prosecution,  or  to  halt  an  existing  prosecution,  on  the  mere  ground  that 
the same case is being prosecuted in another Member State.  

Refraining  from  initiating  a  prosecution  (or  halting  an  existing  one)  could  raise 
problems to the legal order of Member States which adhere to the legality principle, 
where  the  competent  authorities  have  a  duty  to  prosecute  every  crime  which  falls 
within their competence. This could raise problems, in particular, when the principle 
is provided for in a national Constitution. Therefore, an exception to the application 
of this principle could be provided for in a future instrument. In this respect, it can 
validly  be  argued  that  in  a  common  area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice  this 
principle is satisfied when another Member State prosecutes such a case.  

2.2. 

Procedure  

Once the above prerequisites are fulfilled, the following procedural steps could form 
part of the suggested mechanism. 

Step 1: identification and information of “interested parties”  

At  first,  it  seems  useful  to  identify  and  inform  the  Member  States  which  could  be 
interested to participate in the process of choosing the most appropriate jurisdiction 
for a specific case. To this end, an EU rule could provide that the national authorities 
of  a  Member  State  which  has  initiated  or  is  about  to  initiate  a  criminal 
prosecution ("initiating State") in a case which demonstrates significant links to 
another  Member  State,  must  inform  the  competent  authorities  of  that  other 
Member State, in due time. Such an obligation could apply to prosecuting authorities, 
and/or  to  other  judicial/  investigating  or  law  enforcement  authorities  depending  on 
the particular characteristics of the criminal justice systems of the Member States. In 
turn, the informed authorities could indicate their interest in prosecuting the case in 
question.  One  might  envisage  that  this  expression  of  interest  should  be  declared 
within  a  fixed  period  of  time.  However,  the  system  could  also  allow  for  reactions 
outside  the  deadline  on  an  exceptional  basis.  If  no  Member  State  expresses  an 

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interest, the initiating State could continue with the prosecution of the case without 
further consultation – unless new facts change the picture.  

Step 2: consultation/discussion  

When two or more Member States are interested in prosecuting the same case, their 
respective competent authorities should be able to examine together the question of 
the “best place” to prosecute the case. An option would be to create a duty to enter 
into discussions so that the opinions of all the interested Member States can be taken 
into account. At this stage, direct contacts among them seem to be the most efficient 
means of discussion. If need be, they could ask for the assistance of Eurojust and/or 
other Union mechanisms of assistance.  

Step 2 might often lead to an early consensus on the choice of the most appropriate 
jurisdiction to prosecute a case which raises issues of conflicts of jurisdiction. As a 
result,  some  national  authorities  will  close  or  halt  their  proceedings  voluntarily  (or 
will  refrain  from  initiating  proceedings),  while  another  authority  would  initiate  or 
continue with its proceedings on the case. In such a scenario the competent national 
authorities could simply proceed according to their national law. Therefore, it seems 
that there is no need for binding rules on EU level for such arrangements. Under the 
suggested  mechanism,  such  domestic  decisions  could  be  revised  by  the  Member 
States  concerned  if  new  findings  change  the  picture.  Nonetheless,  in  certain  cases, 
the domestic authorities might prefer to conclude a binding agreement to ensure legal 
certainty  and  to  avoid  the  reopening  of  a  debate.  If  they  wish  to  do  so,  they  may 
make  use  of  an  EU  model  agreement,  which  could,  inter  alia,  provide  common 
rules for the denunciation of such agreements.  

Step 3: dispute settlement/mediation 

Where an agreement cannot be easily found, a mechanism for dispute resolution will 
be needed. This step should offer the opportunity for a structured dialogue between 
the  interested  parties which  would  allow  for  an  objective  consideration  of  the 
interests involved. To this end, it seems appropriate to involve a body at EU level to 
act  as  a  mediator  by  assisting  the  Member  States  concerned  to  reach  a  voluntary 
agreement  using  the  criteria  outlined  below.  Eurojust  appears  to  be  well  placed  to 
take  over  this  role.  It  would  also  be  conceivable  to  create  a  new  body  for  dispute 
resolution,  for  instance  a  board  or  panel  composed  of  senior  national  prosecutors 
and/or judges.  

This  third  step  could  be  initiated  on  the  request  of  any  Member  State  which  has 
expressed an interest in prosecuting the case. It would also be valid to argue that a 
dispute settlement procedure should be compulsory after a period of time has elapsed 
in step 2, to ensure that cases of disagreement will be promptly transferred to an EU 
assisted/centred  stage.  Where  a  consensus  is  reached  in  step  3,  the  competent 
authorities  should  then  have  the  same  options  as  in  step  2  (voluntary  halting  of 
proceedings  in  some  Member  States  with  a  view  to  prosecution  in  another  one,  or 
conclusion of a binding agreement). 

A  sound  adherence  to  the  rules  of  the  suggested  three-step  mechanism,  combined 
with a set of criteria for the choice of jurisdiction as outlined below (point 2.5.), is 
likely to lead to a consensus in many, if not most cases. It can be established in the 

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short term, and may be considered sufficient unless further experience would reveal a 
need  for  further  steps.  In  the  absence  of  a  consensus,  the  ne  bis  in  idem  principle 
would come “back” into play. 

Possible additional step: binding decision by an EU body? 

In the long run, for cases in which the suggested dispute settlement would fail, one 
might consider as a further step whether a body on EU level should be empowered to 
take  a  binding  decision  as  to  the  most  appropriate  jurisdiction.  This  additional  step 
would however be very difficult to realise with the current Treaty framework. First, a 
new body would have to be set up, since the roles of a mediator and of an instance 
taking binding decisions do not appear compatible. Secondly, difficult questions on 
the judicial review of a decision on EU level would arise, as outlined hereafter.  

2.3. 

Role of individuals and judicial review 

During the pre-trial stage, the suggested mechanism focuses on consultation among 
the  competent  prosecuting  authorities.  Discussing  jurisdiction  issues  with  the 
concerned individuals might often reveal facts which could jeopardise a prosecution 
or  affect  the  rights  and  interests  of  victims  and  witnesses.  Whether  such  a  risk  is 
present in a specific case could probably be left to be decided by the national courts. 
If no such risk is identified, the competent authorities could be required to promptly 
inform  the  defence  and  the  concerned  victims  on  the  determination  of  the  most 
appropriate  jurisdiction.  In  any  case,  the  concerned  individuals  will  have  to  be 
informed of the main reasons for the choice of a certain jurisdiction at the latest when 
an indictment is being sent before a court.  

In  contrast  to  the  pre-trial  phase  where  normally  the  role  for  the  concerned 
individuals  is  rather  limited,  at  the  trial  phase  (and/or  at  an  intermediary  phase)  a 
national  court  which  receives  an  indictment  usually  examines  whether  it  has 
jurisdiction to try the case. It is also conceivable that an EU provision could require 
the  jurisdiction  which  is  chosen  through  the  use  of  the  suggested  mechanism  to 
examine  whether  it  is  an  appropriate  forum  for  dealing  with  the  case.  National 
courts  seem  well  placed  to  carry  out  such  a  review.  An  extensive  review  of  every 
aspect  possibly  playing  a  role  in  an  allocation  would  seem  neither  feasible  nor 
necessary.  Therefore,  judicial  review  could  amount  to  adjudication  on  whether  the 
principles of reasonableness and of due process have been respected. A choice of 
jurisdiction  could  thus  be  set  aside  by  the  competent  tribunal  if  it  finds  that  the 
choice made is arbitrary. This review could be made on the basis of doctrines which 
are  known  to  the  national  legal  order  of  the  Member  States,  such  as  'abuse  of 
process'.  In  accordance  with  Article  35  TEU,  questions  of  interpretation  of  Union-
wide rules on the procedural mechanism and the criteria for the choice of jurisdiction 
could be presented to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings. 

On the request of concerned individuals, a judicial review of jurisdiction allocations 
seems  to  be  necessary,  at  least,  when  a  case  is  allocated  to  a  specific  jurisdiction 
through a binding agreement. This is because such binding agreements would fetter 
the ability of the concerned Member States to denounce the jurisdiction allocation at 
a later stage. The question of whether judicial review should also be made available 
in  the  situations  where  no  binding  agreements  takes  place  could  possibly  be  left  to 
the discretion of the Member States and their national laws. (I.e. where authorities in 

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certain Member States have simply closed down, or not initiated, a prosecution with 
a view to another Member State prosecuting the case)  

More  complex  questions  would  arise  if,  as  an  additional  step,  a  power  to  take 
decisions would be conferred on an EU body. Judicial review would be indispensable 
in  this  case.  However,  giving  national  courts  the  task  of  reviewing  decisions  by  an 
EU  body  is  inappropriate  and  currently  legally  impossible.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
current Treaties do not contain a legal basis for giving such a power of review to the 
ECJ.  The  Treaty  Establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe  provides  a  legal  basis  for 
such a review in Article III-359.Within the current Treaty framework, the possibility 
for a comparable Treaty amendment could be explored. 

2.4. 

Priority for prosecution in the “leading” Member State 

Alongside the allocation mechanism, an EU provision could oblige Member States to 
concentrate  proceedings  on  the  same  case  in  one  “leading”  jurisdiction.  From  a 
certain procedural stage onwards, the other Member States could be obliged to halt 
their  prosecutions  and  refrain  from  initiating  new  ones.  The  application  of  such  a 
priority rule would have to run parallel to the mechanism outlined above; otherwise 
the results would depend on chance.  

Since new findings can often change the picture of what at first might seem the “best 
place” to prosecute, it may not be wise to force the competent authorities to make a 
definitive  choice  of  jurisdiction  at  an  early  stage.  The  most  appropriate  stage  for  a 
rule  requiring  all  parallel  prosecutions  to  be  concentrated  in  a  single  jurisdiction 
appears to be the moment of the sending of an accusation or indictment before a 
national court, as at this stage, the necessary information which would be needed for 
a  thorough  assessment  of  jurisdiction  issues  will  be  available  to  the  competent 
authorities.  Besides,  the  main  burdens  for  the  individuals  concerned  often  follow 
after  the  accusation  and  multiplication  of  those  burdens  can  thus  still  be  largely 
avoided if the rule applies from this stage onwards.  

To avoid a circumvention of the procedural mechanism, it should not be permitted to 
bring  an  indictment  before  a  court  while  a  consultation  and/or  dispute  settlement 
procedure  is  still  ongoing.  In  other  words,  before  national  authorities  bring  an 
accusation/indictment,  they  will  have  to  meet  their  information  and  consultation 
duties. Where they have not done so, they would have to halt court proceedings on 
the request of another Member State. 

In  no  case,  however,  should  a  priority  rule  prevent  other  Member  States  from  any 
possible  form  of  support  to  the  leading  state,  by  means  of  the  existing  EU  and 
international arrangements. On the contrary, they should afford assistance even pro-
actively. 

2.5. 

Relevant Criteria  

Together with a procedural mechanism and a priority rule, a list of criteria to be used 
by the Member States in choosing the leading jurisdiction should be the third element 
of a complete strategy to prevent and resolve conflicts of jurisdiction. It is feasible to 
define a number of relevant criteria, which are to be applied and weighted on a rather 

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flexible case-by-case  approach,  i.e. the  competent authorities  would  need to have a 
considerable scope of discretion. 

Those criteria, or relevant factors, which will influence the process of determining an 
appropriate  jurisdiction,  should  be  objective  and  could  be  listed  in  a  future  EU 
instrument.  In  particular,  the  list  could  include  territoriality,  criteria  related  to  the 
suspect or defendant, victims’ interests, criteria related to State interests, and certain 
other criteria related to efficiency and rapidity of the proceedings. Perhaps, certain 
factors which should not be of relevance could also be identified.  

As  a  further  step,  Member  States  could  agree  on  some  basic  principles  on  the 
prioritisation or sequencing within the list of criteria, if this proves to be necessary. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  more  flexible  approach  could  be  preferred.  Irrespective  of 
whether such a prioritisation or sequencing among the relevant criteria would be laid 
down  in  an  EU  instrument,  it  seems  feasible  and  necessary  to  at  least  agree  on  a 
general  guiding  principle  for  jurisdiction  allocation.  For  example,  such  a  principle 
could  refer  to  reasonableness  and/or  due  process.  In  other  words,  the  competent 
authorities  could  be  obliged  to  take  into  account  the  interests  of  the  concerned 
individuals.  The  yardstick,  as  well  as  the  leading  question  for  a  possible  judicial 
review,  should  be  a  fair  administration  of  justice,  based  on  a  comprehensive 
consideration of the relevant facts and a balanced weighting of the relevant criteria. 

3. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF NE BIS IN IDEM  

Articles  54  to  58  of  CISA  on  the  ne  bis  in  idem  principle  are  currently  binding 
throughout the Schengen Area, in the ten EU Member States which acceded in 2004, 
in  Iceland  and  Norway  and  in  the  United  Kingdom;  an  extension  to  Ireland  should 
follow  soon.  The  mutual  recognition  programme  of  December  2000  called  for  a 
reconsideration  of  those  provisions,  particularly  of  the  exceptions  to  the  principle. 
The  Council  could  not  agree  on  the  related  initiative  by  Greece  for  a  Framework 
Decision,1 but it stressed that work should continue, “in the light of the publication of 
the Commission’s Communication on Conflicts of Jurisdiction in order to ensure that 
proven added value could be achieved”. 

If  a  mechanism  which  would  lead  to  balanced  choices  of  jurisdiction  can  be 
established,  instead  of  conferring  an  exclusive  effect  to  the  “fastest”  prosecution 
(“first come, first served”), discussions on ne bis in idem could be re-launched with 
increased  prospects  of  success.  In  this  context,  the  following  questions  could  be 
addressed. 

First, further consideration should be given to whether there is a need for clarifying 
certain elements and definitions, for instance regarding the types of decisions which 
can have a ne bis in idem effect, and/or what is to be understood under idem or “same 
facts”.  

Secondly,  in  case  of  a  conviction  the  principle  currently  applies  only  where  the 
imposed penalty “has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or 

1 

OJ C 100, 26.4.2003, p. 24. 

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can no longer be enforced…” This condition was justified in a traditional system of 
mutual  assistance,  where  enforcing  a  penalty  in  other  Member  States  sometimes 
proved  to  be  difficult.  It  is  questionable  whether  it  is  still  needed  in  an  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice,  where  cross-border  enforcement  now  takes  place 
through the mutual recognition EU instruments. 

Thirdly, it is questionable whether the current possibilities for derogations from the 
principle  of  ne  bis  in  idem  are  still  necessary.  Currently,  Article  55  CISA  enables 
Member States to provide for exceptions, which are related to interests in prosecuting 
specific cases in a certain jurisdiction (e.g. territoriality, national security offences or 
acts of officials of a Member State). Those exceptions might become obsolete with 
the creation of a balanced mechanism for the choice of jurisdiction.  

4. 

STRENGTHENING THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 

The  suggested  measures  could  also  enable  the  Union  to  reduce  the  number  of 
grounds for non-execution of judicial decisions from other Member States which are 
currently found in EU instruments. Because of the existing situation on conflicts of 
jurisdiction  in  criminal  matters,  some  of  these  grounds  for  non-execution  may  be 
considered necessary. For example, this seems to be the  case for  grounds  based  on 
the fact that an act took place on the territory of the executing state, as e.g. in Article 
4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.  

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Questions  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Is there a need for an EU provision which shall provide that national law must allow 
for proceedings to be suspended by reason of proceedings in other Member States? 

Should  there  be  a  duty  to  inform  other  jurisdictions  of  ongoing  or  anticipated 
prosecutions  if  there  are  significant  links  to  those  other  jurisdictions?  How  should 
information  on  ongoing  proceedings,  final  decisions  and  other  related  decisions  be 
exchanged?  

Should  there  be  a  duty  to  enter  into  discussions  with  Member  States  that  have 
significant links to a case? 

Is  there  a  need  for  an  EU  model  on  binding  agreements  among  the  competent 
authorities?  

Should there be a dispute settlement/mediation process when direct discussions do not 
result  in  an  agreement?  What  body  seems  to  be  best  placed  to  mediate  disputes  on 
jurisdiction?  

Beyond dispute settlement/mediation, is there a need for further steps in the long run, 
such as a decision by a body on EU level? 

(7)  What sort of mechanism for judicial control or judicial review would be necessary and 

appropriate with respect to allocations of jurisdiction?  

(8) 

(9) 

Is there a need for a rule or principle which would demand the halting/termination of 
parallel  proceedings  within  the  EU?  If  yes,  from  what  procedural  stage  should  it 
apply? 

Is there a need for rules  on consultation and/or transfer of proceedings in relation to 
third  countries,  particularly  with  parties  to  the  Council  of  Europe?  What  approach 
should be taken in this respect?  

(10)  Should a future instrument on jurisdiction conflicts include a list of criteria to be used 

in the choice of jurisdiction?  

(11)  Apart  from  territoriality,  what  other  criteria  should  be  mentioned  on  such  a  list? 

Should such a list be exhaustive?  

(12)  Do you consider that a list should also include factors which should not be considered 

relevant in choosing the appropriate jurisdiction? If yes, what factors?  

(13) 

Is  it  necessary,  feasible  and  appropriate  to  "prioritise"  criteria  for  determining 
jurisdiction? If yes, do you agree that territoriality should be given a priority? 

(14) 

Is there is a need for revised EU rules on ne bis in idem ?  

(15)  Do you agree with the following definition as regards the scope of ne bis in idem: “a 
decision  in  criminal  matters  which  has  either  been  taken  by  a  judicial  authority  or 
which has been subject to an appeal to such an authority”?  

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(16)  Do  you  agree  with  the  following  definition  of  “final  decision”:  “...a  decision,  which 
prohibits  a  new  criminal  prosecution  according  to  the  national  law  of  the  Member 
State  where  it  has  been  taken,  unless  this  national  prohibition  runs  contrary  to  the 
objectives of the TEU?  

(17) 

(18) 

Is  it  more  appropriate  to  make  the  definition  of  "final  decision"  subject  to  express 
exceptions? (e.g. "a decision which prohibits a new criminal prosecution according to 
the law of the Member State where it has been taken, except when…")  

In  addition,  to  the  elements  mentioned  in  question  16  and  17,  should  a  prior 
assessment of the merits be decisive on whether a decision has an EU wide ne bis in 
idem effect?  

(19) 

Is it feasible and necessary to define the concept of idem, or should this be left to the 
case law of the ECJ? 

(20)  Do you see any situations where it would still be necessary to retain an enforcement 
condition, and if yes, which ones? If yes, can the condition be removed if a mechanism 
for determining jurisdiction is established?  

(21)  To what extent can the derogations in Article 55 CISA still be justified? Can they be 
removed if a mechanism for determining jurisdiction is established, or would you see a 
need for any further measures to “compensate” for a removal of the derogations under 
these circumstances?  

(22)  Should ne bis in idem be a ground for mandatory refusal of mutual legal assistance? If 

yes, which EU law provisions should be adapted?  

(23) 

Is there a need for a more coherent approach on the ne bis in idem principle in relation 
to third countries? Should one differentiate between parties of the Council of Europe 
and other countries? 

(24)  Do you agree that with a balanced mechanism for determining jurisdiction?  

(a) 

(b) 

certain  grounds  for  non-execution  in  the  EU  mutual  recognition  instruments 
could become unnecessary, at least partly? Which grounds, in particular? 

certain  grounds  for  optional  non-execution  should  be  converted  into  grounds 
for mandatory non-execution or vice versa? Which grounds, in particular? 

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