Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules {SEC(2005) 1732}
Date: 2005-12-19
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, competition law, control of restrictive practices, damages, dominant position, single market

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 19.12.2005 
COM(2005) 672 final 

GREEN PAPER 

Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 

(presented by the Commission) 

{SEC(2005) 1732} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

2 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

Background and objectives of the Green Paper ........................................................... 3 

Damages claims as part of the enforcement system of Community antitrust law ....... 3 

Outline of the problem ................................................................................................. 4 

Objectives..................................................................................................................... 4 

Main issues................................................................................................................... 4 

Access to evidence ....................................................................................................... 5 

Fault requirement ......................................................................................................... 6 

Damages....................................................................................................................... 7 

The passing-on defence and indirect purchaser’s standing.......................................... 7 

Defending consumer interests ...................................................................................... 8 

Costs of actions ............................................................................................................ 9 

Coordination of public and private enforcement ......................................................... 9 

Jurisdiction and applicable law .................................................................................. 10 

Other issues ................................................................................................................ 11 

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GREEN PAPER 

Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 

Vigorous competition on an open internal market provides the best guarantee that European 
companies  will  increase  their  productivity  and  innovative  potential.  Competition  law 
enforcement  is  therefore  a  key  element  of  the  “Lisbon  strategy”,  which  aims  at  making  the 
economy of the European Union grow and create employment for Europe’s citizens.  

As part of an effort to improve the enforcement of competition law after the modernisation of 
the procedural law on the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, this Green Paper 
and  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  attached  to  it  address  the  conditions  for  bringing 
damages  claims  for  infringement  of  EC  antitrust  law.  They  identify  obstacles  to  a  more 
efficient  system  for  bringing  such  claims  and  propose  options  for  solving  these  problems. 
Facilitating  damages  claims  for  breach  of  antitrust  law  will  not  only  make  it  easier  for 
consumers  and  firms  who  have  suffered  damages  arising  from  an  infringement  of  antitrust 
rules to recover their losses from the infringer but also strengthen the enforcement of antitrust 
law. 

1 

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE GREEN PAPER 

1.1 

Damages claims as part of the enforcement system of Community antitrust law 

The antitrust rules in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are enforced both by public and private 
enforcement. Both forms are part of a common enforcement system and serve the same aims: 
to  deter  anti-competitive  practices  forbidden  by  antitrust  law  and  to  protect  firms  and 
consumers from these practices and any damages caused by them. Private as well as public 
enforcement of antitrust law is an important tool to create and sustain a competitive economy. 

With regard to public enforcement, both the Commission and the competition authorities of 
the  Member  States  (NCAs)  apply  Community  competition  law  in  individual  cases.  Under 
Regulation  1/2003,  the  Commission  and  NCAs  constitute  a  network  of  competition 
authorities responsible for public enforcement of the applicable Community antitrust rules. As 
part  of  their  enforcement  activities,  these  authorities  adopt,  among  other  things,  decisions 
finding  that  an  undertaking  has  infringed  antitrust  law  as  well  as  decisions  imposing  fines. 
Public  enforcement  is  indispensable  for  effective  protection  of  the  rights  conferred  and 
effective enforcement of the obligations imposed by the Treaty.  

All parts of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are directly applicable. From the outset private 
enforcement  has  also  played  a  role  in  the  enforcement  of  Articles  81  and  82  of  the  Treaty. 
Private enforcement in this context means application of antitrust law in civil disputes before 
national courts. Such application can  take  different  forms.  Article 81(2) of the  Treaty  states 
that agreements or decisions prohibited by Article 81 are void. The Treaty rules can also be 
used in actions for injunctive relief. Also, damages awards can be awarded to those who have 
suffered a loss caused by an infringement of the antitrust rules.  

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This  Green  Paper  focuses  on  damages  actions  alone.  Damages  actions  for  infringement  of 
antitrust law serve several purposes, namely to compensate those who have suffered a loss as 
a  consequence  of  anti-competitive  behaviour  and  to  ensure  the  full  effectiveness  of  the 
antitrust  rules  of  the  Treaty  by  discouraging  anti-competitive  behaviour,  thus  contributing 
significantly to the maintenance of effective competition in the Community1 (deterrence). By 
being able effectively to bring a damages claim, individual firms or consumers in Europe are 
brought closer to competition rules and will be more actively involved in enforcement of the 
rules.  The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities  (ECJ)  has  ruled  that  effective 
protection  of  the  rights  granted  by  the  Treaty  requires  that  individuals  who  have  suffered  a 
loss arising from an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 have the right to claim damages.2 

1.2 

Outline of the problem 

While  Community  law  therefore  demands  an  effective  system  for  damages  claims  for 
infringements of antitrust rules, this area of the law in the 25 Member States presents a picture 
of “total underdevelopment”.3  

The ECJ has ruled that, in the absence of Community rules on the matter, it is for the legal 
systems of the Member States to provide for detailed rules for bringing damages actions. As 
the  Community  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  in  the  matter  (outside  the  procedure  for 
preliminary  rulings),  the  courts  of  the  Member  States  will  generally  hear  these  cases. 
Significant  obstacles  exist  in  the  different  Member  States  to  the  effective  operation  of 
damages actions for infringement of Community antitrust law. 

1.3 

Objectives 

The purpose of this Green Paper and of the Commission Staff Working Paper is to identify 
the  main  obstacles  to  a  more  efficient  system  of  damages  claims  and  to  set  out  different 
options for further reflection and possible action to improve damages actions both for follow-
on  actions  (e.g.  cases  in  which  the  civil  action  is  brought  after  a  competition  authority  has 
found an infringement) and for stand-alone actions (that is to say actions which do not follow 
on from a prior finding by a competition authority of an infringement of competition law). 

2 

MAIN ISSUES 

The main issues are summed up below and dealt with in greater detail in the Working Paper. 
All  interested  parties  are  invited  to  study  the  considerations  put  forward  there.  See  the 
attached Working Paper for a more detailed account of the sources of information taken into 
consideration. 

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3 

See Courage v. Crehan, Case C-453/99, judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001, paragraphs 26 
and 27.  
See Courage judgment in footnote 1.  
See  study  on  the  conditions  of  claims  for  damages  in  case  of  infringement  of  EC  antitrust  rules, 
available on the Commission’s website at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/index_en.html. 

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The Commission invites all interested parties to comment on the issues discussed and on the 
options  formulated  with  regard  to  these  issues,  as  well  as  on  any  other  aspects  of  damages 
claims for infringements of antitrust law. The comments will help the Commission to decide 
whether measures need to be taken at Community level to improve the conditions for antitrust 
damages claims.  

2.1 

Access to evidence 

Actions  for  damages  in  antitrust  cases  regularly  require  the  investigation  of  a  broad  set  of 
facts. The particular difficulty with this kind of litigation is that often the relevant evidence is 
not  easily  available  and  is  held  by  the  party  committing  the  anti-competitive  behaviour. 
Access by claimants to such evidence is the key to making damages claims effective. It must 
therefore  be  considered  whether  obligations  to  turn  over  documents  or  otherwise  provide 
access  to  evidence  should  be  introduced.  This  is  particularly  important  for  stand-alone 
actions. 

In  a  similar  vein,  consideration  could  be  given  to  placing  an  obligation  on  the  defendant  to 
disclose documents submitted to a competition authority. In cases in which the Commission 
or an NCA has undertaken an investigation, it is likely to hold relevant evidence which could 
be  important  for  a  claimant  in  follow-on  cases.  Use  of  those  materials  in  subsequent  civil 
actions  could  be  helpful  in  proving  the  damages  claim.  In  order  to  limit  the  administrative 
burden on competition authorities, access to those documents should be arranged between the 
parties. 

Rules on burden and standard of proof can also help the claimant in this respect. The question 
of the evidentiary value of NCA decisions is of particular importance. 

Question A:  Should  there  be  special  rules  on  disclosure  of  documentary  evidence  in 
civil proceedings for damages under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty? 
If so, which form should such disclosure take? 

Option 1: 

Option 2: 

Option 3: 

Option 4: 

Option 5: 

Disclosure should be available once a party has set out in detail the relevant 
facts of the case and has presented reasonably available evidence in support 
of its allegations (fact pleading). Disclosure should be limited to relevant and 
reasonably identified individual documents and should be ordered by a court. 

Subject  to  fact  pleading,  mandatory disclosure of  classes  of  documents 
between the parties, ordered by a court, should be possible. 

Subject  to  fact  pleading,  there  should  be  an  obligation  on  each  party  to 
provide the other parties to the litigation with a list of relevant documents in 
its possession, which are accessible to them. 

Introduction  of  sanctions  for  the  destruction  of  evidence  to  allow  the 
disclosure described in options 1 to 3. 

Obligation to preserve relevant evidence. Under this rule, before a civil action 
actually  begins,  a  court  could  order  that  evidence  which  is  relevant  for  that 
subsequent  action  be  preserved.  The  party  asking  for  such  an  order  should, 
however,  present  reasonably  available  evidence  to  support  a  prima  facie 
infringement case. 

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Question B:  Are  special  rules  regarding  access  to  documents  held  by  a  competition 
authority helpful for antitrust damages claims? How could such access be 
organised? 

Option 6: 

Option 7: 

Obligation on any party to proceedings before a competition authority to turn 
over  to  a  litigant  in  civil  proceedings  all  documents  which  have  been 
submitted to the authority, with the exception of leniency applications. Issues 
relating to disclosure of business secrets and other confidential information as 
well as rights of the defence would be addressed under the law of the forum 
(i.e. the law of the court having jurisdiction). 

Access  for  national  courts  to  documents  held  by  the  Commission.  In  this 
context, the Commission would welcome feedback on (a) how national courts 
consider they are able to guarantee the confidentiality of business secrets or 
other  confidential  information,  and  (b)  on  the  situations  in  which  national 
courts  would  ask  the  Commission  for  information  that  parties  could  also 
provide. 

Question C:  Should  the  claimant’s  burden  of  proving  the  antitrust  infringement  in 

damages actions be alleviated and, if so, how? 

Option 8: 

Option 9: 

Option 10: 

Infringement  decisions  by  competition  authorities  of  the  EU  Member  States 
to be made binding on civil courts or, alternatively, reversal of the burden of 
proof where such an infringement decision exists.  

Shifting or lowering the  burden of  proof in cases of  information  asymmetry 
between  the  claimant  and  defendant  with  the  aim  of  redressing  that 
asymmetry. Such rules could, to a certain extent, make up for the non-existent 
or weak disclosure rules available to the claimant.  

Unjustified refusal by a party to turn over evidence could have an influence 
on  the  burden  of  proof,  varying  between  a  rebuttable  presumption  or  an 
irrebuttable presumption of proof and the mere possibility for the court to take 
that  refusal  into  account  when  assessing  whether  the  relevant  fact  has  been 
proven. 

2.2 

Fault requirement 

As  a  tortious  action,  damages  claims  in  many  Member  States  require  fault  to  be  proven.  In 
some of these Member States, fault is presumed if an action is illegal under antitrust law. In 
others, however, no such presumption exists. Consideration should therefore be given to the 
standard of fault required for damages claims.  

Question D:  Should  there  be  a  fault  requirement  for  antitrust-related  damages 

actions? 

Option 11: 

Proof of the infringement should be sufficient (analogous to strict liability). 

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Option 12: 

Proof  of  the  infringement  should  be  sufficient  only  in  relation  to  the  most 
serious antitrust law infringements.  

Option 13: 

There  should  be  a  possibility  for  the  defendant  to  show  that  he  excusably 
erred  in  law  or  in  fact.  In  those  circumstances,  the  infringement  would  not 
lead to liability for damages (defence of excusable error). 

2.3 

Damages 

Several issues concern the actual scope of the damages claim. Firstly, the amount of the award 
has  to  be  defined.  Several  definitions  are  possible,  notably  founded  on  the  idea  of 
compensation or recovery of illegal gain. It has also to be considered whether any damages 
award should include interest on it, as well as the amount of interest to be paid and how it is 
calculated.  Furthermore,  doubling  of  damages  at  the  discretion  of  the  court,  automatic  or 
conditional, could be considered for horizontal cartel infringements. 

Beside the legal definition of the damages to be awarded, the quantification of damages is a 
key issue. Several economic models have been developed for calculating damages in complex 
situations. Use of these models in claims litigation should be considered.  

Question E:  How should damages be defined? 

Option 14: 

Definition of damages to be awarded with reference to the loss suffered by the 
the  defendant 
claimant  as  a  result  of 
(compensatory damages).  

infringing  behaviour  of 

the 

Option 15: 

Definition of damages to be awarded with reference to the illegal gain made 
by the infringer (recovery of illegal gain). 

Option 16: 

Double  damages  for  horizontal  cartels.  Such  awards  could  be  automatic, 
conditional or at the discretion of the court. 

Option 17: 

Prejudgment interest from the date of the infringement or date of the injury. 

Question F:  Which method should be used for calculating the quantum of damages? 

Option 18: 

What  is  the  added  value  for  damages  actions  of  use  of  complex  economic 
models for the quantification of damages  over  simpler  methods?  Should  the 
court  have  the  power  to  assess  quantum  on  the  basis  of  an  equitable 
approach? 

Option 19: 

Should the Commission publish guidelines on the quantification of damages? 

Option 20: 

Introduction  of  split  proceedings  -  between  the  liability  of  the  infringer  and 
the quantum of damages to be awarded - to simplify litigation.  

2.4 

The passing-on defence and indirect purchaser’s standing 

The “passing-on defence” concerns the legal treatment of the fact that an undertaking which 
purchases  from  a  supplier  engaged  in  anti-competitive  behaviour  could  be  in  a  position  to 
mitigate its economic loss by passing the overcharge on to its own customers. The damages 
caused  by  anti-competitive  behaviour  could  therefore  be  passed  down  the  supply  chain  or 
even suffered in entirety by the ultimate purchaser, the final consumer. As a matter of law, it 

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has  to  be  considered  whether  the  infringer  should  be  allowed  to  raise  such  a  pass-on  as  a 
defence. Similarly, the standing of indirect purchasers – to whom the overcharge may or may 
not have been passed on – has to be considered.  

The  “passing-on  defence”  substantially  increases  the  complexity  of  damages  claims  as  the 
exact distribution of damages along the supply chain could be exceedingly difficult to prove. 
Evidentiary problems also burden actions of indirect purchasers, as they might be unable to 
prove the extent of their damages and the causative link with the infringing behaviour. 

Question G:  Should there be rules on the admissibility and operation of the passing-
on defence? If so, which form should such rules take? Should the indirect 
purchaser have standing? 

Option 21: 

Option 22: 

Option 23: 

Option 24: 

The passing-on defence is allowed and both direct and indirect purchasers can 
sue  the  infringer.  This  option  would  entail  the  risk  that  the  direct  purchaser 
will be unsuccessful in claiming damages as the infringer will be able to use 
the  passing-on  defence  and  that  indirect  purchasers  will  not  be  successful 
either because they will be unable to show if and to what extent the damages 
are passed on along the supply chain. Special consideration should be given 
in this respect to the burden of proof. 

The  passing-on  defence  is  excluded  and  only  direct  purchasers  can  sue  the 
infringer. Under this option direct purchasers will be in a better position as the 
difficulties  associated  with  the  passing-on  defence  will  not  burden  the 
proceedings.  

The  passing-on  defence  is  excluded  and  both  direct  and  indirect  purchasers 
can sue the infringer. While the exclusion of the passing-on defence renders 
these  actions  less  burdensome  for  the  claimants,  this  option  entails  the 
possibility of the defendant being ordered to pay multiple damages as both the 
indirect and direct purchasers can claim.  

A  two-step  procedure,  in  which  the  passing-on  defence  is  excluded,  the 
infringer can be sued by any victim and, in a second step, the overcharge is 
distributed  between  all  the  parties  who  have  suffered  a  loss.  This  option  is 
technically difficult but has the advantage of providing fair compensation for 
all victims.  

2.5 

Defending consumer interests 

It will be very unlikely for practical reasons, if not impossible, that consumers and purchasers 
with small claims will bring an action for damages for breach of antitrust law. Consideration 
should  therefore  be  given  to  ways  in  which  these  interests  can  be  better  protected  by 
collective actions. Beyond the specific protection of consumer interests, collective actions can 
serve to consolidate a large number of smaller claims into one action, thereby saving time and 
money. 

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Question H:  Should special procedures be available for bringing collective actions and 
protecting  consumer  interests?  If  so,  how  could  such  procedures  be 
framed? 

Option 25: 

A  cause  of  action  for  consumer  associations  without  depriving  individual 
consumers of bringing an action. Consideration should be given to issues such 
as  standing  (a  possible  registration  or  authorisation  system),  the  distribution 
of damages (whether damages go to the association itself or to its members), 
and the quantification of damages (damages awarded to the association could 
be  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  illegal  gain  of  the  defendant,  whereas 
damages awarded to the members are calculated on the basis of the individual 
damage suffered). 

Option 26: 

A  special  provision  for  collective  action  by  groups  of  purchasers  other  than 
final consumers. 

2.6 

Costs of actions 

Rules on cost recovery play an important role as incentives or disincentives for bringing an 
action. In view of the fact that Community law as well as the European Convention on Human 
Rights  demand  effective  access  to  courts  for  civil  claims,  consideration  should  be  given  to 
how cost rules can facilitate such access. 

Question I: 

Should  special  rules  be  introduced  to  reduce  the  cost  risk  for  the 
claimant? If so, what kind of rules? 

Option 27: 

in  a  manifestly  unreasonable  manner  by  bringing 

Establish a rule that unsuccessful claimants will have to pay costs only if they 
the  case. 
acted 
Consideration could also be given to giving the court the discretionary power 
to order at the beginning of a trial that the claimant not be exposed to any cost 
recovery even if the action were to be unsuccessful. 

2.7 

Coordination of public and private enforcement  

Public and private enforcement complement each other and therefore should be coordinated in 
an optimum way. Decisions by competition authorities can have a significant impact on the 
actual  possibility  of  claimants  to  prove  their  case  (see  Section  2.1,  Question  C,  Option  8). 
Optimum  coordination  between  private  and  public  enforcement  is  especially  important  for 
coordination  between  leniency  applications  in  public  enforcement  and  damage  claims.  Both 
leniency  programmes  and  civil  liability  contribute  by  their  effects  to  the  same  aim:  more 
effective deterrence from entering into cartels. Consideration should be given to the impact of 
damages claims on the operation of leniency programmes so as to preserve the effectiveness 
of the programmes. In this respect it should be taken into account that operation of leniency 
programmes  is  generally  helpful  for  private  litigants  in  damages  actions,  as  leniency 
programmes uncover secret cartels.  

Question J:  How  can  optimum  coordination  of  private  and  public  enforcement  be 

achieved?  

Option 28: 

Exclusion  of  discoverability  of  the  leniency  application,  thus  protecting  the 
confidentiality  of  submissions  made  to  the  competition  authority  as  part  of 
leniency applications.  

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Option 29: 

Option 30: 

Conditional rebate on any damages claim against the leniency applicant; the 
claims  against  other  infringers  –  who  are  jointly  and  severally  liable  for  the 
entire damage - remain unchanged 

Removal  of  joint  liability  from  the  leniency  applicant,  thus  limiting  the 
applicant’s exposure to damages. One possible solution would be to limit the 
liability of the leniency applicant to the share of the damages corresponding 
to the applicant’s share in the cartelised market. 

2.8 

Jurisdiction and applicable law 

Jurisdiction of courts to hear cases brought against defendants domiciled in Member Statesis 
governed  by  Regulation  44/2001.4  Such  defendants  can  either  be  sued  in  the  courts  of  the 
state where they are domiciled or – at the choice of the claimant – in the courts of the state 
where the harmful event occurred. The place where the harmful event occurred can be either 
(a) the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred or (b) the place where the 
damage itself occurred (at the choice of the claimant). Articles 6, 27 and 28 of the Regulation 
allow coordination of different, but linked, actions.  

With  regard  to  the  issue  of  applicable  law,  reference  should  be  made  to  the  Commission’s 
proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (the “Rome II 
Regulation”).5  As  damages  claims  are  generally  torts,  they  fall  under  the  scope  of  this 
proposal. In this respect consideration must be given to whether the general rule contained in 
Article 5 of the proposal is appropriate for antitrust cases or whether a clarifying special rule 
is necessary. Such a clarifying rule could make clear that an effects-based approach should be 
followed. Alternatively, the law of the forum could be the applicable law in all cases. Special 
consideration should be given to cases in which the territory of more than one state is affected 
by the anti-competitive behaviour.  

Question K:  Which substantive law should be applicable to antitrust damages claims? 

Option 31: 

Option 32: 

The  applicable law  should be determined by the general rule in Article 5 of 
the  proposed  Rome  II  Regulation,  that  is  to  say  with  reference  to  the  place 
where the damage occurs. 

There should be a specific rule for damages claims based on an infringement 
of  antitrust  law.  This  rule  should  clarify  that  for  this  type  of  claims,  the 
general  rule  of  Article  5  shall  mean  that  the  laws  of  the  states  on  whose 
market the victim is affected by the anti-competitive practice could govern the 
claim.  

Option 33: 

The  specific  rule  could  be  that  the  applicable  law  is  always  the  law  of  the 
forum. 

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Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in  civil  and  commercial  matters,  OJ  2001,  L  12,  p.1.  In  Denmark,  jurisdiction  is  governed  by  the 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
[OJ 1990, C 189, p. 2] as amended, which is substantially equal to Regulation 44/2001. 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  law  applicable  to  non-
contractual  obligations  (“Rome  II”),  COM(2003)  427  final  as  amended  by  the  modified  proposal 
(Reference not available). 

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Option 34: 

In cases in which the territory of more than one state is affected by the anti-
competitive  behaviour  on  which  the  claim  is  based  and  where  the  court  has 
jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of the loss suffered by the claimant, it could 
be considered whether the claimant should be given the choice to determine 
the law applicable to the dispute. This choice could be limited to choose one 
single  applicable  law  from  those  laws  designated  by  the  application  of  the 
principle of affected market. The choice could also be widened so as to allow 
for  the  choice  of  one  single  law,  or  of  the  law  applicable  to  each  loss 
separately or of the law of the forum. 

2.9 

Other issues 

Given the complexity of damages actions for infringement of antitrust law, use of expertise in 
court  is  particularly  important  to  ensure  efficient  proceedings.  If  experts  were  appointed  by 
the  court,  cost  savings  might  result  since  fewer  experts  would  be  required.  This  would  also 
reduce  the  multitude  of  experts  giving  conflicting  evidence,  depending  on  their  client’s 
standpoint. 

Question L: 

Should an expert, whenever needed, be appointed by the court ? 

Option 35: 

Require the parties to agree on an expert to be appointed by the court rather 
than by themselves. 

Suspension  of  or  longer  limitation  periods  play  an  important  role  in  guaranteeing  that 
damages claims can effectively be brought, especially in the case of follow-on actions. 

Question M:  Should limitation periods be suspended ? If so, from when onwards ? 

Option 36: 

Suspension  of  the  limitation  period  for  damages  claims  from  the  date 
proceedings  are  instituted  by  the  Commission  or  any  of  the  national 
competition  authorities.  Alternatively,  the  limitation  period  could  start 
running after a court of last instance has decided on the issue of infringement. 

Causation  is  a  necessary  requirement  of  any  damages  claim.  While  proof  of  a  causal  link 
between  the  infringement  and  a  loss  may  be  particularly  difficult  to  achieve  due  to  the 
economic  complexity  of  the  issues  involved,  the  legal  notions  of  causation  in  itself,  as 
developed by the case law in the Member States, arguably do not pose a significant obstacle 
for claimants. However, application of the causation requirement should not lead to exclusion 
of  those  who  have  suffered  losses  arising  from  an  antitrust  infringement  from  recovering 
those losses.  

Question N: 

Is  clarification  of  the  legal  requirement  of  causation  necessary  to 
facilitate damages actions? 

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Question O:  Are  there  any  further  issues  on  which  stakeholders  might  wish  to 

comment ? 

The Commission invites comments on this Green Paper, in particular on the questions and the 
options listed above, in order to consider whether it is necessary and appropriate to take action 
at Community level to improve the conditions for stand-alone and follow-on actions. 

To facilitate an exchange of views, a Green Paper website is open at: 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp.html 

Until 21 April 2006, comments may be sent either by e-mail to: 

comp-damages-actions@cec.eu.int 

or by post to:  

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Competition 
Unit A 1 – Antitrust policy and strategic support 
Review of damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
B-1049 Brussels. 

It is standard practice of DG Competition to publish the submissions received in response to a 
public consultation. However, it is possible to request that submissions or parts thereof remain 
confidential.  Should  this  be  the  case,  please  indicate  clearly  on  the  front  page  of  the 
submission that it should not be made publicly available and also forward a non-confidential 
version of the submission to DG Competition for publication. 

EN 

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   EN