Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the  Security of modes of transport
Date: 2005-12-14
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: ESC opinion, fight against crime, public safety, terrorism, transport safety

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Official Journal of the European Union

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Security of modes of transport’

(2006/C 65/06)

By letter of 2 June 2005, the Commission asked the European Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, to draw up an opinion on the Security of
modes of transport.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 24 November 2005. The rappor-
teur was Mr Simons.

At its 422nd plenary session, held on 14 and 15 December 2005 (meeting of 14 December 2005), the
European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion with 124 votes in favour and
four abstentions.

1. Introduction

— passengers (and staff employed in the transport chain);

Interest in the subject of security has increased enor-
1.1
mously since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (New
York), November 2003 (Istanbul), 11 March 2004 (Madrid),
7 July 2005 (London) and other attacks elsewhere. Preventive
and operational measures have been taken everywhere to
protect people, means of transport and goods as much and as
effectively as possible. Security has become a hot policy-
making issue.

— modes of transport, goods and infrastructure, with the ulti-
improving the security of persons, goods,

mate aim of
means of transport and infrastructure.

1.6
This opinion is focussed solely on the security of modes
of transport and not on transport safety. A complicating factor
is that there is no linguistic distinction in several European
Union countries between the two concepts.

1.2
In this context, the term ‘security’ is understood to mean
measures to prevent both terrorist attacks and ordinary crime,
and especially theft.

The Committee has been playing its part. Several
1.3
opinions have been adopted, including the exploratory opinion
of 24 October 2002 (1) (rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou),
which was particularly valuable as it dealt comprehensively
with security in shipping and civil aviation.

1.4
On 23 December 2003 the European Commission
published a Consultation Paper on Freight Transport Security,
in which it sought the views of interested parties with regard to
the subject of security. Furthermore, in a Communication to
the Council (2),
framework
programme in the field of security, and on 12 August 2005 a
work programme on combating terrorism was published in the
Official Journal (3). A number of points from these publications
have been of value in drawing up this exploratory opinion.

the Commission proposed a

1.7 With regard to the security of the infrastructure used by
the inland modes of transport, a distinction is to be made
between the TEN corridors, including nodes and the national
infrastructure, although it
is not always immediately clear
where subsidiarity in the inland modes of transport begins and
where it ends.

It must be realised, as far as security measures in the inland
modes of transport are concerned, that there is a considerable
degree of interdependence between all modes of transport in
the logistics chain, and not only inland modes. This requires a
great deal of coordination when adopting security measures.
An intermodal approach to security is in any case also neces-
sary to prevent distortion of competition between the different
modes, although we should realise that security costs can differ
sharply from one mode of transport to another.

Issues arising in connection with increased security measures
will also be looked at in detail. These include questions such as:

1.5
This exploratory opinion seeks above all to bring clarity
to the role and responsibility of the various actors, both nation-
ally and internationally, in the security field relating to:

— what is the impact of security measures on employees?

(1) OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.
(2) COM(2005) 124 final, 6.4.2005.
(3) OJ C 198, 12.8.2005, p. 1.

— should ‘crisis management’ be included in management

training courses?

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— who should meet the cost of security?

— what is the role of the insurance companies?

In view of the wide-ranging nature of this subject, it is advi-
sable to bring some order to bear and to indicate how this
exploratory opinion has been structured.
In chapter 2, the
General section, the broader issues of security are dealt with. It
covers subjects such as the division of responsibilities and
competences respectively of the European Union, the national
governments, the modes of transport themselves, the passen-
gers and management of the companies. In addition, the legisla-
tive aspect is discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3, the section
which deals with specific issues, begins with an outline of
initiatives taken at different levels to improve security. Closer
attention is then paid to the security of modes of transport
themselves. Chapter 4 examines the cost of security and the
question of who should meet this cost. The role of the insur-
ance companies is also discussed in this context. Chapter 5
presents a summary and draws the final conclusions.

2. General

2.1 Security: General

2.1.1
Ensuring the security of persons and goods in all
modes of transport is now high on the agenda of politicians,
policy makers and the business community. The term security
means measures against both terrorism and ordinary crime.
is hard to avoid the conclusion that no
Nevertheless,
adequate coordinated approach yet exists. And this is indeed
urgently needed because in a chain the weakest link determines
the strength of the whole.

it

2.1.2
The complexity of the subject matter makes it difficult
to define easily and unambiguously. The issue of subsidiarity is
fully relevant to the security of modes of transport. It concerns
both the demarcation of competences between the European
Union and the national governments as regards the measures
to be taken and their financing. But it also concerns the respon-
sibilities and competences of the modes of transport them-
selves: those of passengers, employees and management.

2.2 Security in maritime and air transport

Since 11 September 2001,

2.2.1
there has been some
improvement in the security of air and maritime transport. The
introduced measures partly on the basis
European Council

of the EESC report of 24 October 2002 which covered in par-
ticular security proposals in the aviation and maritime trans-
port sectors. Most noteworthy are the following: EU Regulation
2320/2002 on civil aviation security, EU Regulation EC
725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and
draft Directive COM(2004) 76 on enhancing port security. All
these measures make provision for EU inspections. These
involve quality checks in these sectors. These rules for shipping
were also laid down in a Directive adopted on 10 May 2005.

2.3 Security in inland modes of transport

2.3.1
The situation in the EU differs considerably from
country to country with regard to inland modes of transport.
In major cities such as Madrid and London, but also in Paris,
security measures have been taken on public transport partly
because of the terrorist attacks. Other cities and countries have
not yet reached this stage, but even there the recent attacks
the importance of security
have created an awareness of
measures (4).

2.3.2
The question which arises in the first instance is who
is authorised to adopt security measures which cover more
than one inland mode of transport? Is it the responsibility of
the European Union or of the national governments? And, if
the latter is the case, what is the role of the EU in this?

is the
The Committee takes the view that ‘security’
2.3.3
shared responsibility of the Member States and the European
Union, but that the Member States themselves are responsible
for ensuring that security measures are taken by the various
inland modes of transport. For this they need to create a frame-
work of minimum standards for the inland modes of transport
i.e. this should not be left to their own discretion. The national
governments should set up a specialist body to coordinate the
measures to be adopted by the inland modes of transport and
local authorities. The authority would also ensure implementa-
tion.

2.3.4
In the Committee's opinion, the role of the European
Union is above all to coordinate measures at international level.
At the same time, the Union should urge the Member States to
adopt a unified approach. Intensive cooperation between the
national governments and the European Union is necessary in
view of the cross-border nature of the transport of persons and
goods and the need to coordinate national security measures.

(4) For a wide-ranging discussion of the security of public transport
the
systems in the major cities,
Committee of the Regions on the Safety of all modes of transport,
financing (rapporteur: Mr Robert Neill,
including the the issue of
Member of the London Assembly (CdR 209/2005)).

see the outlook opinion of

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2.3.5
The national governments should realise that a great
deal of work remains to be done concerning the inland modes
of transport. A sense of urgency must be created. The national
governments should urge the modes to consider and adopt
security measures. A first step in this direction would be for
minimum security standards to be set at a European level for
the inland modes of transport. The individual modes of trans-
port need to realise that without security measures they are
extremely vulnerable.

example,

Furthermore,

2.3.6
it must be realised that cooperation is
coordination of
necessary. For
measures between train, underground and bus companies.
Information campaigns targeted at passengers and employees
on how to act in the event of emergency should be coordi-
nated.

there must be

2.3.7 With regard to goods transport, close attention will
have to be paid to vulnerable intersections such as terminals
and marshalling yards. Cooperation will be needed between
national
transport
branches and the managers of transfer installations and term-
inals.

and local government,

individual

the

2.4 The role of the various actors

2.4.1
The safeguarding of the physical infrastructure is, in
the Committee's view, a matter for national, regional or local
government.

2.4.2
The specialist body mentioned in point 2.3.3 should
act as the coordinating body. This would prevent fragmentation
at national level as well as promote the policy internationally
and would facilitate coordination at EU level.

The Committee has noted with satisfaction that,

2.4.3
in
addition to the EU's coordinating role, a sum of EUR 3,5
million has been made available at Community level, under the
6th Framework Programme,
for security measures in the
passenger and goods transport sectors as well as in the energy
sector.

Since modes of

transport are an abstract concept
2.4.4
which can only operate with the support of the people who
use the mode (passengers, customers) as well as those who
work there (employees), action specifically targeted at these
groups is indispensable. This should be expressed above all in a
continuous publicity campaign aimed at passengers and custo-
mers. The attitude of transport users should be transformed
from one of passivity to a more alert and conscious one. The
employees of a mode of transport are of crucial importance for
the development and application of security measures. In order
to fulfil their role properly, the Committee considers it to be of
great importance that the employees are offered special training
geared to their role in security.

The role of management

2.4.5
to integrate security
concepts into the company ethos and culture. Furthermore,
management must give employees an opportunity to undertake
training should
special
include crisis management.

training in this field. Management

is

2.5 Way in which security must be implemented

The question arises of the extent to which security
2.5.1
measures in inland modes of transport should be laid down in
a more informal way, such as in the form of a certificate or
quality mark, or alternatively in a more mandatory way, for
example by legislation.
the
subject is far too important to tackle in an informal manner.

In the Committee's judgement,

2.5.2
The Committee considers that in any event national
minimum standards for security measures should be laid down,
with a recommendation to go further than the minimum. It
should also be made compulsory to exchange information
about security measures adopted or planned. At international
level, countries should be obliged to harmonise measures and
to forward information to the international coordinating
bodies.

3. Specific comments

Before looking at any security measures that have been
3.1
or ought to be taken in the individual inland modes of trans-
port,
it is first advisable to have an overview of measures
which have been taken at an international level by the coordi-
nating organisations.

3.1.1

International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

The IMO is mentioned here because a number of measures
have already been taken in maritime transport which could
serve as a model for the inland modes of transport.

a. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted
the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
This Code puts into practice a framework for cooperation
between central government,
local government, shipping
companies and port authorities with the aim of pinpointing
It concerns security
security risks and taking measures.
requirements for ships and port facilities. The Code entered
into force on 1 July 2004.

b. Amendments made to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
(SOLAS). The amendments to this Convention also led to
changes to the mandatory International Maritime Dangerous
Goods (IMDG) Code. The IMDG code makes detailed recom-
mendations
labelling and storage of
dangerous substances.

the packing,

for

The amendments came into force on 1 January 2004.

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3.1.2

International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)

Since 1971 binding international agreements have been made
in the civil aviation sector in order to combat crime and
terrorism. As a result of a number of aircraft hijackings at the
end of the 1960s, the ICAO decided to draw up a basic agree-
ment regulating civil aviation. Thus it was laid down in Annex
17 to the Chicago Convention that all passengers on civil
commercial
flights should be systematically screened. This
measure has been in force since 1972 and it is difficult to
imagine now that things were once otherwise. Following the
attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 Annex 17 was radically
overhauled. New specifications were made mandatory,
for
instance with regard to the reinforcement and locking of
cockpit doors as well as air freight
In addition,
training and quality requirements for security checks were tigh-
tened.

transport.

tion. It is concerned with the simplification and harmonisa-
tion of customs procedures. An important aspect of the
revised Convention is the increased attention paid to trans-
parency and predictability in the chain. Important aspects of
the revised Convention include:

— the use of pre-arrival information to enable prior selec-

tions to be made

— risk management techniques

— maximum use of automated systems

— interventions coordinated with other bodies

— continuous monitoring and availability of information

regarding customs requirements, laws, and

3.1.3

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

— Directives.

b. WCO Customs Data Model

At European level too a policy on air transport security was
developed within the framework of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC). This was, of course, based on international
standards such as those laid down by the ICAO. This resulted
in a European security handbook, Document 30, which
contains
security regulations which, although regarded as
the
authoritative, are unfortunately not binding because of
ECAC's statute. That is why on 14 September 2001, three days
after 9/11, the European Council decided that the EU should
take on responsibility for aviation security. This decision
resulted in Regulation 2320/2002, establishing common rules
in the field of civil aviation security. The Regulation entered
into force on 19 January 2003. At the same Council of Minis-
ters of 14 September it was also decided that the Commission
would be empowered to carry out direct quality checks in the
Member States.

3.1.4

International Labour Organisation (ILO)

This concerns the revision of the Seafarers' Identity Documents
Convention. The purpose of
the revised Convention is to
improve the security of seafarers' identification so that passen-
gers and crew are better protected and the safety of ships
increased. At the same time seafarers' freedom of movement is
not restricted, so that they may freely go ashore. The revised
Convention is focused in particular on guidelines for the
composition and issue of identity documents for seafarers. The
ILO and the Convention are mentioned here as a model for
inland modes of transport.

This model contains a standardised international set of data
which meets the demands which governments place on
international transport. It means a step forward in the direc-
tion of harmonised customs information that is useable for
security purposes. The model has been designed to work in
a fully automated environment.

c. The WCO Unique Consignment Reference

The advantage is that every consignment is provided with a
unique number so that identification of the consignment
and the compiling of information on the consignment is
simplified.

d. The Advanced Cargo Information guidelines are, in accord-
ance with the revised Kyoto Convention, aimed at gathering
security-related information and provides guidelines
for
rapid compilation of data by Customs authorities.

e. The Customs Convention on Containers contains technical
specifications for containers used in international transport
with a customs seal and also procedures for the type
approval of such containers. At present the Convention,
which dates from 1972, is being revised in the light of the
increased attention paid to security.

This information on the World Customs Organisation could be
of benefit to the inland modes of transport. The important
thing is to focus on aspects of relevance to the inland modes.

3.1.6

International Standards Organisation (ISO)

3.1.5 World Customs Organisation (WCO)

In 2003 this organisation adopted guidelines with specifications
for the mechanical sealing of freight containers.

a. Revised WCO Kyoto Convention

In June 1999 the WCO Council adopted revisions to the
WCO Convention of 1974, known as the Kyoto Conven-

In addition, the organisation has developed a standard for the
radio-frequency identification tags fitted in freight
use of
containers;
it has also developed a joint communication
protocol for digital sealing.

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3.1.7

The European Union (EU)

3.1.8

The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

a. The EU has been particularly active in the field of security
of maritime transport, ports and air transport. Several exam-
ples were given in point 2.3.

In the field of intermodal transport, the European Commis-
sion published in December 2003 the consultation paper on
Freight Transport Security which noted the possible threats
and the measures that could be taken to protect the trans-
port chain.

The Working Party on Customs Questions affecting Transport
(WP30) and the Administrative Committee of TIR (Transports
Internationaux Routiers) reached an agreement
in February
2003 to gradually computerise TIR procedures, which are at
present still paper-based. With a TIR carnet, goods can be
transported to countries outside the EU with minimum delay at
borders, as the carnet is an internationally recognised customs
document.

This concerns the security of goods transported by road. The
Committee recommends a study of
to which
the extent
measures of this kind are applicable to other modes.

The Commission indicated in this document that for all
measures proposed, a risk profile should be drawn up for
each mode individually, and for the whole transport chain.

3.1.9 Measures taken by the USA

The measures proposed in the consultation paper are:

— the securing of infrastructure of European interest by the
Member States by a number of detailed measures (a
security plan to be updated annually, risk assessment,
the designation of a contact point and the appointment
of persons responsible for securing infrastructure, and
the designation of a public audit body);

— the development of security standards for service provi-
ders (at Community level the development of minimum
standards of security for international service providers,
the introduction of
the regulated agent and known
shipper concepts in the inland transport chain;

It goes without saying that, after the attacks of 11 September
2001, the United States took the lead in enacting security
measures. Thus, a Bioterrorism Act came into force in 2002.
This requires certain information relating to the import of food
products to be submitted prior to arrival in the United States.
In addition, food producers and storage facilities must be regis-
tered with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and they have to appoint a local representative in the USA.

3.1.10
In order to maintain the readability of this explora-
tory opinion, a number of measures are noted here without
going into further details.

When taking measures in Europe, it is of course recommended
that the experience acquired in the USA be studied and taken
into account. The following should be mentioned here:

— the use of the advanced information concept in elec-
tronic form; depending on a risk analysis, this could be
made compulsory for certain routes or shipments;

a. the Container Security Initiative (CSI),

— the use of special seals and locks for high-risk and, from

the security point of view, vulnerable shipments;

— ensuring that Member States do not adopt different stan-
the
a number of

dards which hinder the efficient
market. The Commission proposes
measures in this regard in its document.

functioning of

b. The Communication from the Commission of 24 July 2003
and the Proposal for a Regulation of the same date,
in
which the Commission proposed to amend the Community
Customs Code. This Proposal aimed to adapt the role of the
customs authorities at the EU's external borders to make
them able to deal with the increased security standards for
the import and export of goods.

b. the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT),

c. the 24 Hour Advance Manifest,

d. the Bio-Terrorism Act.

Initiatives taken by the industry either alone or in

3.2
conjunction with government

a. The Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition Programme,

b. The Memorandum of Understanding on Electronic Business,

c. Resolution of the International Road Transport Union (IRU)

on security in road transport,

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d. The Road Transport Security Guidelines drawn up by the

IRU,

The national railway companies should produce information
material in order to inform passengers and staff what to do in
the event of an emergency. This ought to become a standard
part of staff training.

e. The IRU Standard Security Plan currently being developed,

f. The Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) programme,

g. The Smart and Secure Tradelanes initiative.

The majority of

3.3
initiatives noted in the above para-
graphs are concerned with security measures for the transport
of goods in general and for container transport in particular. In
the Committee's opinion, a number of these measures could
also be applicable to passenger transport.

3.4
The security measures in the individual transport sectors
are rather diverse. As already noted, maritime transport/ports
and air transport are the modes which are furthest advanced in
the implementation of measures. This was excellently illustrated
in the Committee's Opinion of 24 October 2002 (5)
(rapporteur: Ms Bredima-Savopoulou). These modes of trans-
port will not therefore be further examined separately in this
exploratory opinion.

One point meriting attention is the position of vulner-
3.5
able inland terminals and transfer points. Pipelines can in this
context also be mentioned as a separate mode of transport. The
owners of the terminal operations indeed devote a great deal of
energy to securing their sites. However, the Committee has the
impression that
is
precisely the transfer points that are vulnerable and that coop-
eration is much needed with the modes that use the transfer
facilities.

is not sufficiently understood that

it

it

3.6
In the Committee's view, there is also an insufficient
sense of urgency concerning the dangers connected with the
transport and transfer via pipelines. The Committee points out
that this awareness needs to be fostered as a matter of urgency
and that
the competent authorities should adopt security
measures for both staff and infrastructure.

3.7
Traditionally, the railways have always attached high
importance to the safety of employees, passengers and equip-
ment alike. It is to be hoped that this will also apply to security.
Extra attention will have to be devoted to sensitive locations
such as stations and marshalling yards. The International Union
of Railways (UIC) should come up with some recommendations
for the necessary international coordination.

3.8
The inland waterways sector makes use of ports to load
and to unload. The ISPS (International Ship & Port Facility
Security) Code thus also applies to inland waterway transport.
In the Committee's view, a strict application of the Code would
not lead to disruption of the logistics chain. It is the responsi-
bility of the ports, shipping companies and inspection services
to ensure that the ISPS Code is complied with. The Committee
believes that security should form an integral part of
the
training of inland waterway workers.

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London
3.9
there is a general awareness of the vulnerability of public trans-
port. Measures have been taken in the form of surveillance and
checks in order to drastically increase the security level and
thus the sense of security of passengers and staff.

The road transport and haulage sector is extremely
3.10
vulnerable in view of the great number of coach and road
haulage companies: we are dealing with several hundred thou-
sand companies which are extremely mobile. This sector has
been plagued by crime for many years. Theft of vehicles,
loaded or unloaded, is an every day occurrence, frequently with
psychological consequences for the drivers. The IRU (Interna-
tional Road Transport Union) is doing all it can to persuade
governments and market players to adopt security measures.
One example is the call to increase the number of secure
parking areas. In view of the high-risk nature of the sector the
International Road Transport Union has, as indicated in point
3.2, drawn up Security Guidelines. These contain a number of
recommendations for managers, drivers and consignors.
In
addition, a framework has been drawn up for voluntary coop-
eration with the customs authorities.

3.11
lines mentioned in point 3.10 are:

The basic principles underlying these Security Guide-

— Security measures should not be so strict as to make

normal business impossible.

— Newly introduced security measures should be propor-
tionate to their purpose, the costs involved and the conse-
quences for traffic.

(5) OJ C 61, 14.3.2003, p. 174.

— Unilateral measures by states are not acceptable.

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— Security measures must be readily understood and reason-

a. costs incurred in drawing up and monitoring implementa-

able.

tion of the rules;

— In view of

the
the international nature of
measures to be taken should be applied uniformly, propor-
tionately and without discrimination, and little or no
disruption to the efficient business flows.

transport,

Generally speaking, before taking measures, it is essential that
the target group be aware of the need for security measures.
No measures should be taken as long as the target group is not
fully informed. The Committee therefore urges that this infor-
mation be distributed in good time.

As far as own-account

3.12
the
Committee recommends that, irrespective of the mode of trans-
port to be used, the person responsible within the company
should adopt appropriate security measures for staff, means of
transport and infrastructure.

is concerned,

transport

3.13
The Committee finds that there is an increasing aware-
ness on the part of governments and the inland modes of trans-
port that security measures must be incorporated into daily
working practices. However, consistency is still a long way off.
Of the individual modes of transport, a great deal has been
done in particular in maritime and air transport because of
their global nature. The public transport sector has become
more alert, but in the goods transport sector initiatives have for
the most part remained limited to measures within the branch
itself. Measures that involve the whole logistics chain have not
yet been taken, whilst vulnerability lies precisely at the inter-
changes between one mode and another. The Committee
advises governments to set up a coordinating body at national
level to cover the whole chain.

4. The cost of security measures

It is obvious to everyone that, under the impact of
4.1
increased crime and terrorism, measures must be taken to
protect passengers, staff, means of transport and cargoes. It is
less clear, however, who should meet the cost of the security
measures. And clearly the cost of security is high. Thus, it is
estimated that the security cost of transporting one container
overseas is between 30 and 40 US dollars.

4.2
In order to gain a clear understanding of who should be
responsible for costs, it is necessary to consider what types of
cost we are talking about. Costs can be categorised as follows:

b. cost of analysing the degree of threat and helping non-EU
countries to bring their security standards up to EU levels;

c. cost of investing in selection and training of security staff

and purchase of security equipment;

d. running costs, such as cost of security staff, maintenance of
insurance and

security equipment, security information,
public order measures to ensure compliance with the law.

there is

In addition,
the cost of measures preceding or
following an exceptional event such as a terrorist attack. A
separate solution will have to be found for the allocation of
these costs. In the Committee's view, the government should
meet these costs in the first instance.

Regarding the question as to who or which body should
4.3
be considered primarily responsible for the cost,
it seems
logical in the case of the first two categories to opt for the
national or local and regional authorities, whilst for categories
c and d the private sector could be involved to a greater extent.

4.4
From the economic point of view, the cost should ulti-
mately be met by the activity from which the costs arise, so
that it is incorporated into the price (a public transport ticket
or tariff for goods transport). After all, the prices of goods and
services should as far as possible cover the marginal social
costs, including the security costs. The measures to be taken
could, however, sometimes be of such great public interest that
the costs involved should be met by the whole community.

4.5
If this distinction is taken into consideration, it means
that ultimately the cost of security is borne by the consumer,
who pays for them in the form of a higher price for the end
product. However, in the case of government financing security
measures which are in the public interest, the cost will be met
by the taxpayer.

4.6
The role of the insurance companies is, in the Commit-
tee's view, a secondary one. For providing that policies do not
exclude terrorist acts, any payments will always be passed on
to the insured in the form of higher premiums. There is an
obvious causal connection between the degree of security and
the level of premium to be paid. As security measures are
enhanced, the premium should fall correspondingly.

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4.7
The role of the European Union can, from the point of
view of its duties and competences, only be a coordinating and
supervisory one. Financial resources can, at the most, be made
available for publicity campaigns and information. Thus, for
example, EUR 3,5 million has been set aside for security in the
6th Framework Programme.

5. Summary and recommendations

5.1
The Committee notes that, as a result of the terrorist
attacks of recent years, there has been an enormous increase at
all levels in the attention paid to security.

The required agreements, laid down under international
5.2
rules, have been reached in the maritime and air transport
sectors in particular. Implementation is via EU inspections.

transport,

In the inland modes of

5.3
the Committee
considers that the necessary work remains to be done, partly
because of the high degree of interdependence between the
modes and the vulnerable intermodal storage and transfer
points. A coordinated approach is urgently needed, because the
weakest link determines the strength of the whole chain.

5.4
The Committee points out that no distinction is made in
several European Union languages between the terms ‘security’
and ‘safety’. It notes that this leads to confusion and recom-
mends that unambiguous terminology be used.

In the Committee's judgement,

5.5
the responsibility for
adopting security measures lies with the Member States. They
should create a framework of minimum standards for the
modes of transport. To coordinate the measures to be taken,
the governments should set up a special body to ensure imple-
mentation.

the role of

In the Committee's view,

5.6
the European
Union lies in coordinating measures at Community and inter-
national level, while that of national and local government lies
more in actually taking measures, monitoring implementation,
providing information and promoting awareness of terrorism
and crime at all
levels. The national and local governments
should also promote cooperation between the modes of trans-
port and, in the Committee's view, the protection of physical
infrastructure should be part of their responsibilities.

Brussels, 14 December 2005

5.7
The users of the modes of transport play a vital role in
security. Passengers and customers must be encouraged by
publicity campaigns to be more active and alert; employees in
the inland mode of transport should receive special training
geared to their role in the security of the mode. In the Commit-
tee's opinion, the role of company management lies in making
security concepts an integral part of the company ethos and
culture, allowing employees to undertake training courses in
this field and ensuring that management training includes crisis
management.

transport

The Committee finds that the position in the various
5.8
remains diverse. There is an
inland modes of
increasing awareness on the part of governments and modes of
transport that security measures should be incorporated into
daily working practices. Consistency is still a long way off,
however. The situation in the public transport sector in this
respect is better than in the goods sector. Initiatives in the
latter sector are still chiefly limited to the sector itself. The
Committee therefore advises governments to establish one
coordinating organisation to cover the whole chain.

5.9
In the case of own-account transport, the Committee
believes that, irrespective of the mode used, the person respon-
sible within the company should adopt the necessary security
measures for employees, means of transport and infrastructure.

In the Committee's opinion, the cost of security should
5.10
be reflected in the price of
the
consumer pays for it directly or, if the measures are taken by
government, ultimately the public through taxes.

the end product, so that

5.11
In the view of the Committee, the role of the insurance
companies is a secondary one. Any payments will ultimately be
passed on to the insured in the form of higher premiums. As
security measures reach a higher level, the premiums to be
paid should fall. The level of the premiums will have to be
closely monitored to ensure that they reflect market risks.

5.12
mainly on research,
campaigns.

The financing role of the European Union will focus
awareness-raising
information and

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Anne-Marie SIGMUND