Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs
Date: 2005-11-24
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Information System, data protection, database, exchange of information, fight against crime, information system, terrorism

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 24.11.2005 
COM(2005) 597 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European 
databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs  

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European 
databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs  

1. 

CONTEXT 

On  several  occasions,  and  in  the  context  of  combating  terrorism  and  improving 
internal security, both the European Council and the Council of the European Union 
have  called  upon  the  Commission  to  submit  proposals  for  improved  effectiveness, 
enhanced interoperability and synergy among European databases (Declaration of 25 
March  2004  on  combating  terrorism1,  the  Hague  Programme2,  Council  Declaration 
of 13 July 2005 following the London bombings). 

The  European  Council  and  the  Council  have  also  repeatedly  underlined  the 
importance  of  using  biometrics  in  databases  and  travel  documents  to  enhance  the 
level of security of the European Union. 

2. 

DEFINITIONS AND PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION 

2.1. 

Purpose of this Communication  

The context in which the request to draft this Communication was made – combating 
terrorism  and  crime  –indicates  that  its  purpose  goes  further  than  substantially 
improving  technical  interoperability  and  synergy  of  information  technology  (IT) 
systems in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. 

The  purpose  of  this  Communication  is  to  highlight  how,  beyond  their  present 
purposes,  these  systems  can  more  effectively  support  the  policies  linked  to  the 
free  movement  of  persons  and  serve  the  objective  of  combating  terrorism  and 
serious crime. 

A  delicate  balance  between  the  pursuit  of  these  objectives  and  the  protection  of 
fundamental  rights  (notably  the  protection  of  personal  data),  as  embodied  in  the 
European Convention of Human Rights and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, must be found. It must also be borne in mind that IT systems 
can serve to protect and amplify the fundamental rights of the individual. 

This  Communication  should  trigger  in-depth  debate  on  the  long-term  shape  and 
architecture of IT systems. In identifying possible scenarios, including those that may 
be  far-reaching  in  ambition  and  impact,  this  Communication  does  not  prejudge  the 
results  of  an  in-depth  debate  by  passing  judgment  on  if,  when  and  under  which 

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Council of the European Union 7906/04 Declaration on combating terrorism 29 March 2004 
The  Hague  Programme:  strengthening  freedom,  security  and  justice  in  the  European  Union,  10  May 
2005 

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conditions  these  scenarios  should  be  implemented.  Also,  given  its  political  and 
strategic  approach,  it  does  not  address  or  assess,  in  detail,  the  legal3,  technical, 
organisational or societal impact of possible solutions. Prior to any legislative action, 
in-depth  impact  assessments  will  need  to  be  carried  out,  especially  with  regard  to 
proportionality. Such assessments should also address the impact on other existing or 
planned  means  of  cooperation  between  authorities  responsible  for  internal  security 
(e.g. via Europol). 

This  Communication  begins  with  a  short  description  of  the  current  situation  of 
existing and future pan-European IT systems and the gaps identified in the pursuit of 
their current objectives. Next, scenarios for using  these  systems  in  a  more  efficient 
manner  and  for  creating  possible  future  systems  will  be  presented.  Finally, 
technical  and  operational  possibilities  are 
consideration  as 
proportionate and compatible with the need to protect the rights of the individual is 
explored.  

to  whether 

the 

This  Communication  does  not  propose  measures  for  further  interoperability  and 
synergy at national level. Although measures adopted at European level are likely to 
have  an  effect  on  national  systems,  it  is  up  to  each  Member  State  to  analyse  how 
national systems could better interact. 

2.2. 

Concepts 

Before going into further detail, the following concepts should be clarified. 

“Interoperability”  is  the  “ability  of  IT  systems  and  of  the  business  processes  they 
support to exchange data and to enable the sharing of information and knowledge”4. 
“Interoperability”  is  a  technical  rather  than  a  legal  or  political  concept.  This  is 
disconnected from the question of whether the data exchange is legally or politically 
possible or required5.  

“Connectivity” is a generic term for connecting devices in order to transfer data. 

“Synergy”  encompasses 
technical,  economical  and  organisational  elements. 
Technically,  “synergy”  means  a  mutually  advantageous  conjunction  of  several 
elements. Economically, it means an increase in the value of assets or an economy of 
scale. Organisationally, “synergy” means combining previously distinct resources or 
streamlining the existing organisation so as to increase efficiency. 

The  “principle  of  availability”  means  that  authorities  responsible  for  internal 
security in one Member State or Europol officials who need information to perform 
their duties should obtain it from another Member State if it is accessible there.  

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Including the scope of participation of countries that do not (fully) participate in the “Schengen acquis”. 
European  Interoperability  Framework  for  Pan-European  eGovernment  Services,  Office  of  Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2004, point 1.1.2. 
The details of how organisations agree to technically interact with each other when exchanging data is 
usually  laid  down  in  an  interoperability  framework  that  can  be  defined  as  a  set  of  standards  and 
guidelines, see European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services, Office 
of Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004, point 1.1.2. 

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3. 

STATUS AND PURPOSE OF EXISTING AND FUTURE IT SYSTEMS  

This  Communication  focuses  on  SIS  II,  VIS  and  EURODAC  as  the  systems  that 
have  been  particularly  highlighted  by  the  European  Council  and  by  the  Council  in 
their  mandate.  Each  system  pursues  a  specific  objective;  the  personal  data  they 
process are not necessarily the same as they are limited to those that are relevant for 
the  objective  of  a  specific  system.  Equally,  the  authorities  empowered  to  access 
personal data are not always the same. 

3.1. 

SIS II  

The  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  will  make  border 
crossing  easier  in  the  enlarged  European  Union  without  compromising  security.  It 
allows authorities in the Member States to cooperate, by exchanging information, in 
order to establish an area without internal border controls. The information obtained 
will be used for controls of persons at external borders or on national territory and for 
the  issuance  of  visas  and  residence  permits,  as  well  as  for  police  and  judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters6. 

3.2. 

VIS 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  will benefit  bona  fide  travellers  by  improving 
visa  issuing  procedures.  It  will  improve  administration  of  the  common  visa  policy 
and  consular  cooperation  in  order  to:  prevent  threats  to  internal  security  and  ‘visa 
shopping’; facilitate the fight against fraud; assist in the identification and return of 
illegal immigrants; and facilitate application of the Dublin II Regulation7. 

On  7  March  2005,  the  Council  concluded  that  authorities  responsible  for  internal 
security  should  be  given  access  to  VIS.  The  Commission  will  table  a  proposal 
allowing both Europol and the authorities responsible for internal security to access 
the VIS for clearly defined purposes. 

3.3. 

EURODAC 

The  purpose  of  EURODAC  is  to  assist  in  determining  which  Member  State  is 
responsible  pursuant  to  the  Dublin  II  Regulation  and  to  facilitate  its  application. 
EURODAC is essential in ensuring the efficiency of the European Asylum System. 

4. 

IDENTIFIED SHORTCOMINGS  

Although  SIS  II,  VIS  and  EURODAC  are  the  focus  of  this  Communication,  other 
issues related to combating terrorism and crime are also discussed. 

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The  conditions  governing  the  processing  of  personal  data  will  be  defined  in  the  legal  instruments 
regulating SIS II. 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  343/2003  of  18  February  2003  establishing  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  for 
determining  the  Member  State  responsible  for  examining  an  asylum  application  lodged  in  one  of  the 
Member States by a third-country national, 0.J. L50 of 25.2.2003 

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4.1. 

Under-exploitation of existing systems 

Currently, all the existing systems are not fully exploited. This relates, e.g. to some 
categories  of  alerts  in  the  SIS,  such  as  alerts  issued  for  discreet  surveillance  or 
specific  checks  used  in  a  limited  and  heterogeneous  way.  Increased  and  more 
consistent  use  of  these  alerts  could  enhance  the  fight  against  terrorism.  Finally, 
besides  the  data  processed  in  common  systems,  many  Member  States  maintain 
separate  lists  for  the  same  purpose,  for  example  for  refusal  of  entry,  resulting  in 
duplication of effort for many Member States. 

The  EURODAC  Regulation  is  also  under-exploited.  Although  the  EURODAC 
Regulation  obliges  Member  States  to  take  fingerprints  of  all  persons  aged  over  14 
who cross their borders irregularly and cannot be turned back, the quantity of such 
data sent to EURODAC is a surprisingly low fraction of the total migratory flow. 

4.2. 

Limitations to alphanumeric searches 

An  alphanumeric  search  cannot  be  successful  unless  the  information  is  fairly 
accurate. As regards persons, the probability of not obtaining correct results increases 
with the size of the database. The more names there are in the database, the harder it 
is to find a person and the more likely it is to identify a person wrongly. Erroneous 
information  (e.g.  a  name  or  birth  date  from  a  forged  document,  or  different 
transliterations of the same name) gives false results. In addition, an alphanumerical 
search  with  data  that  are  not  unique  will  become  less  accurate  the  more  data  are 
stored  in  the  database,  resulting  in  long  “hit”  lists,  which  must  then  be  verified 
through  a  labour-intensive  process  that  is  sometimes  impossible  to  perform  in  a 
border-control environment.  

4.3. 

No benefits for frequent bona fide travellers 

Of all those applying for a Schengen visa, 20% are estimated to be regular travellers, 
i.e. applying for repeat visas. For these travellers, there is little scope for speeding up 
visa processing times. If travel documents are lost or stolen, bona fide travellers must 
complete a complicated process to acquire new travel documents.  

4.4. 

Identification of illegal immigrants is difficult 

Many apprehended illegal immigrants have no identification documents with them or 
use counterfeit or falsified documentation. In such cases, the identification process is 
time-consuming and expensive. If travel documents have been destroyed, authorities 
currently do not have a system to check identity. 

4.5. 

Inefficiencies in the application of the Dublin II Regulation 

This  Regulation  defines  the  criteria  for  determining  the  State  responsible  for 
examining  asylum  applications.  A  basic  criterion  is  whether  a  Member  State  has 
issued  or  extended  a  visa  to  the  asylum  seeker.  At  present,  Member  States  do  not 
have efficient means to check whether an asylum applicant has had a visa issued by 
another Member State, verify the identity of the person, and determine the validity of 
the visa. 

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4.6. 

No  possibility  to  use  asylum,  immigration  and  visa  data  for  internal  security 
purposes  

In  relation  to  the  objective  of  combating  terrorism  and  crime,  the  Council  now 
identifies  the  absence  of  access  by  internal  security  authorities  to  VIS  data  as  a 
shortcoming. The same could also be said for all SIS II immigration and EURODAC 
data. This is now considered by the law enforcement community to be a serious gap 
in the identification of suspected perpetrators of a serious crime. 

4.7. 

Not all categories of third-country nationals are checked 

VIS  currently  only  deals  with  third  country  nationals,  under  visa  obligation.  The 
control of the identity or the legality of the entry of other categories of third-country 
nationals who frequently cross borders, e.g. holders of a long-stay visa or a resident 
permit,  or  third-country  nationals  not  subject  to  a  visa  requirement  could  also  be 
more efficient. This has been identified as a shortcoming by the internal security and 
intelligence communities. 

4.8. 

Incomplete monitoring of entry and exit of third country nationals 

Although the VIS will allow the checking of visa application history and whether the 
person presenting the visa at the border is the one to whom it has been issued, VIS 
does not track entries of third-country national visa holders; nor does it track whether 
third-country  nationals  leave  before  the  end  of  their  right  to  stay  expires.  In  other 
words,  neither  VIS  (nor  SIS  II,  for  that  matter),  can  identify  persons  illegally 
remaining in the EU.  

4.9. 

Lack of biometric identification tools 

A basic requirement for authorities responsible for combating crime and terrorism is 
to identify persons for whom only biometric information is available, e.g. a photo, a 
fingerprint or a DNA code. Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and 
DNA  databases  allow  such  identification.  As  such  databases  now  exist  in  most 
Member  States,  the  Commission  services  are  currently  working  on  a  proposal  to 
interlink  national  DNA  databases.  The  Commission  also  intends  to  present  a  legal 
instrument as regards fingerprints next year. As currently developed, SIS II will only 
allow for the introduction of an alert if at least basic alphanumeric information can 
be entered in the system. The fact that the Treaty of Prüm, signed by seven Member 
States on 27 May 2005, will introduce an exchange of fingerprint and DNA data on a 
bilateral  basis,  pending  the  adoption  of  such  an  instrument  at  the  European  level, 
highlights this gap.  

4.10.  No registration of EU citizens at European level 

The identification of EU citizens on the basis of travel and identity documents will 
soon  be  improved  by  the  introduction  of  biometric  identifiers.  However,  although 
most  Member  States  will  have  a  central  repository  of  issued  documents  and 
biometric  identifiers  linked  to  a  certain  identity,  a  query  of  that  central  repository 
only allows a check as to whether in that same Member State a document has been 
previously issued to the same person under another name. In addition, it is currently 

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not possible to launch a query on a person who is, say, wanted for a terrorist crime on 
the basis of whether this person has ever been issued with a travel or ID document. 

This has also been identified as a gap in the fight against identity theft which causes 
internal  security  and 
increasing  concern  among  authorities  responsible  for 
substantially damages the European economy.  

4.11. 

Identification of disaster victims and unidentified bodies 

There  is  no  comprehensive  database  which  would  allow  for  the  identification  of 
disaster victims  and  unidentified bodies. The possibility to make use of an Interpol 
database  for  this  purpose  has  been  discussed  in  the  Council.  However,  such  a 
database will not be able to cover all cases.  

5. 

FURTHER POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS 

5.1. 

Better use of existing systems  

A  more  efficient  use  of  current  systems  can  first  and  foremost  be  achieved  by 
enhanced use of the possibilities that exist: better quality control of data in-put, more 
coherence as regards input of data categories and improved user-friendliness. In this 
respect, wider and more direct consultation of Member States and exchange of best 
practices would be useful. Although this consultation should be achieved primarily in 
existing  working groups and committees, regular user conferences could help. This 
additional  consultation  could  identify  where  there  is  need  for  improvement  and 
results could then be fed into the legislative process and/or daily practice.  

In addition, more consistent introduction and use of certain data (for example SIS II 
alerts on persons who are likely to commit serious criminal offences and EURODAC 
data on irregular border-crossers, etc.) should be made by Member States. 

5.2. 

Further development of existing systems and planned systems  

5.2.1.  Biometric searches in SIS II  

Identifying  persons  in  databases  with  millions  of  entries  has  been  solved  in 
EURODAC and will be addressed in the VIS by using biometric searches, allowing 
unprecedented  accuracy.  The  proposals  for  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments  allow  the 
processing of biometric information (photographs and fingerprints). However, as the 
SIS  II  is  being  developed  today,  biometrics  will  only  be  used  to  confirm  the 
identification of the wanted person (wanted persons meaning “persons for whom an 
alert has been issued”, including persons who should be refused entry) based on an 
alphanumerical search. 

When  available,  biometric  searches  would  allow  more  accurate  identification  of 
wanted persons. However, SIS II would only store biometric information that could 
be legally linked to an alert in SIS II.  

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5.2.2.  More comprehensive access to VIS and SIS II by asylum and immigration authorities  

Legislative proposals foresee access to VIS and SIS II by asylum authorities. On the 
one hand, VIS and SIS II will contain data which may indicate that one of the criteria 
for determining the Member State responsible is fulfilled: the issuance of a visa or an 
illegal stay in a Member State. On the other hand, VIS and SIS II may contain data 
that completes the assessment of an asylum application: visa data can help to assess 
the credibility of an asylum claim and SIS II data can indicate if the asylum seeker 
constitutes a threat to public order or national security. A check in EURODAC, SIS 
II  and  VIS  would  allow  asylum  authorities  to  check  the  data  simultaneously  in  the 
three systems. 

Access to VIS and certain biometric SIS II data would have a significant impact on 
the  fight  against  illegal  migration.  Undocumented  illegal  migrants  would  be  easily 
identified. This would help in checking whether persons entered lawfully and also in 
documenting persons for removal. 

5.2.3.  Access by authorities responsible for internal security  

As  regards  the  VIS,  a  draft  legal  instrument  extending  the  access  of  authorities 
responsible  for  internal  security  for  the  purposes  of  the  prevention,  detection  and 
investigation of terrorist offences is being presented by the Commission.  

As regards SIS II data related to refusal of entry, an extension of access for purposes 
linked  to  the  prevention,  detection  or  investigation  of  a  crime  should  be  envisaged 
for  authorities  responsible  for  internal  security.  This  should  be  articulated  in  the 
framework  of  other  existing  possibilities  to  process  data  related  to  persons  who 
represent a threat to security. Specific issues such as reciprocity with Member States 
that  do  not  fully  participate  in  the  policies  linked  to  the  free  movement  of  persons 
would also have to be addressed. 

As regards EURODAC, the only information available to identify a person may be 
the  biometric  information  contained  in  EURODAC  if  the  person  suspected  to  have 
committed a crime or an act of terrorism has been registered as an asylum seeker but 
is not in any other database or is only registered with alphanumerical, but incorrect 
data  (for  example  if  that  person  has  given  a  wrong  identity  or  used  forged 
documents).  Authorities  responsible  for  internal  security  could  thus  have  access  to 
EURODAC  in  well-defined  cases,  when  there  is  a  substantiated  suspicion  that  the 
perpetrator  of  a  serious  crime  has  applied  for  asylum.  This  access  should  not  be 
direct but through the authorities responsible for EURODAC.  

Access to these systems could also contribute to the identification of disaster victims 
and unidentified bodies. 

5.3. 

Long-term scenarios and further developments  

5.3.1.  Creation  of  a  European  criminal  Automated  Fingerprints  Identification  System 

(AFIS)  

Beyond  the  proposal  already  mentioned  on  the  comparison  of  DNA  profiles,  a 
European  AFIS  could  be  created,  combining  all  fingerprint  data  currently  only 

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available in national criminal AFIS systems. This AFIS could be either a centralised 
European  AFIS  or  a  de-centralised  solution  (linking  existing  AFISes).  It  would  be 
used for police investigation purposes and would go beyond the hit/no-hit biometric 
search described above for SIS II.  

It  would  again  contribute  to  the  identification  of  disaster  victims  and  unidentified 
bodies. 

5.3.2.  Creation  of  an  entry-exit  system  and  introduction  of  a  border-crossing  facilitation 

scheme for frequent border crossers 

The  main  purposes  of  an  entry-exit  system  are  to  ensure  that  people  arriving  and 
departing are examined and to gather information on their immigration and residence 
status.  When  entering  and  leaving  the  European  Union,  third-country  nationals 
would register, using biometric identifiers. However, the extension of such an entry-
exit system to EU citizens could not be envisaged as this would be incompatible with 
the principle of free movement.  

The  question  may  arise  as  to  whether  such  a  solution  is  feasible,  given  the  high 
volume  of  daily  travellers  crossing  the  borders  of  the  European  Union.  In  order  to 
reduce the checks, a programme could be introduced for known bona fide travellers 
(i.e.  commuters)  to  facilitate  and  automate  the  border-crossing  process.  A  similar 
programme is running between the United States, Canada and Mexico, where bona 
fide  travellers,  after  a  particularly  careful  background  check,  are  issued  a  “trusted 
traveller card” allowing border–crossings in an almost fully-automated fashion. Exit 
registration  could  be  via  a  self-registration  procedure;  the  incentive  to  do  so  being 
that  if  no  exit  has  been  registered,  future  entry  would  not  be  granted  or  would  be 
granted only after undergoing a specific procedure. 

Although  an  entry-exit  system  would  enable  much  more  efficient  and  effective 
border controls, it would be a huge organisational step and might therefore be risky 
and costly to implement. However, the situation could be reassessed when the VIS is 
operational. 

In  any  case,  impact  assessments  or  similar  measures  will  have  to  be  carried  out  in 
order to assess the proportionality of this and other scenarios presented. 

5.3.3.  European register(s) for travel documents and identity cards 

including  biometric 

Most Member States will create their own databases of issued travel documents and 
identity  cards, 
identifiers  enrolled  at  application.  The 
effectiveness  of  these  databases  could  be  significantly  enhanced  if  a  register  of 
indexes  is  established  at  European  level.  Alternatively,  national  databases  could  be 
interlinked. Whatever the adopted solution, these registers could contain only a very 
limited  set  of  data  (document  number  and  biometrics)  but  would  allow  a  check  on 
the  authenticity  of  every  travel  or  ID  document  issued  in  a  Member  State  and  to 
determine, using biometric information, the identity of any person to whom a travel 
or ID document was issued. 

This  approach  could  also  contribute  to  the  identification  of  disaster  victims  and 
unidentified bodies. 

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5.4. 

Architectural and organisational changes 

Without  going  into  a  detailed  analysis  of  technical  and  organisational  changes 
required to implement the above-mentioned scenarios, the development of a service-
oriented  architecture  of  European  IT  systems  would  help  maximise  synergies  and 
would  contain  investments  at  a  realistic  level.  A  service-oriented  architecture  is  a 
way  of  sharing  functions  in  a  flexible  and  cost-efficient  way  without  merging 
existing  systems.  In  concrete  terms,  one  example  would  be  to  use  the  highly-
performing  future  AFIS  part  of  the  VIS  to  deliver  AFIS–related  services  (i.e.  a 
biometric search for other applications, such as EURODAC or, possibly, a biometric 
passport register). Data storage and data flow could still be strictly separated.  

On  the  organisational  level,  it  goes  without  saying  that  bringing  the  daily 
management  (i.e.  not  necessarily  the  strategic  or  political  management)  of  these 
systems together in a single organisation would also bring about significant synergy 
effects. Managing applications in a single organisational environment is therefore an 
option that should be examined as a long-term goal. In relation to the objectives of 
the  proposed  Freedom  programme8,  the  question  of  entrusting  tasks  related  to  the 
management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  (EURODAC,  SIS  II,  VIS)  to  the  External 
Border Agency at a later stage is one of the alternatives to be explored. 

6. 

COMPATIBILITY  OF  POSSIBLE  MEASURES  WITH  HUMAN  RIGHTS  INCLUDING  DATA 
PROTECTION  

As regards the better identification of wanted persons whilst the storage of personal 
data in criminal databases is justified due to past and real or suspected behaviour of 
the individual (which must be substantiated), this is not the case for EURODAC or 
VIS. Neither the claiming of asylum nor a visa application indicates in any way that 
a hitherto innocent individual will commit a criminal or terrorist act. 

The proportionality principle therefore requires that these databases be queried only 
for the purpose of preventing and investigating serious criminal or terrorist crimes or 
identifying  the  perpetrator  of  a  suspected  criminal  or  terrorist  act  once  there  is  an 
overriding  public  security  concern,  i.e.  if  the  act  committed  by  the  criminal  or 
terrorist to be identified is so reprehensible that it justifies querying a database that 
registers  persons  with  a  clean  criminal  record.  The  threshold  for  authorities 
responsible for internal security to query EURODAC, SIS II immigration data or VIS 
must  therefore  always  be  significantly  higher  than  the  threshold  for  querying 
criminal  databases.  In  order  to  ensure  full  respect  for  the  rights  as  laid  down  in 
Articles  6,  7,  8,  48  and  49  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European 
Union, the scope for access should thus be limited to terrorist offences as defined in 
Council  Framework  Decision  2002/475/JHA  and  to  crimes  falling  within  the 
competence of Europol.  

8 

Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the European Refugee 
Fund  for  the  period  2008-2013  as  part  of  the  General  programme  “Solidarity  and  Management  of 
Migration Flows” 

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As far as the comparison of DNA profiles is concerned, the limitation to a hit/no hit 
check against the sole DNA profile (alphanumeric chain of number without any other 
personal information) allows the principle of proportionality to be respected fully.  

The  principle  of  proportionality  is  of  particular  relevance  when  it  comes  to  the 
creation  of  a  European  register  for  travel  documents  and  identity  cards.  It  must  be 
noted  that  all  relevant  data  protection  authorities  including  those  that  welcome  the 
creation  of  national  registers,  have  recommended  not  implementing  a  European 
register,  due  to  the  potential  for  abuse.  The  creation  of  such  a  register  should 
therefore only be envisaged if access is strictly limited and if searching the register is 
justified by an overwhelming and imperative public security interest.  

Last  but  not  least,  as  regards  all  possible  measures,  it  must  be  emphasised  that 
comprehensive  supervision  by  competent  data  protection  bodies  will  be 
indispensable.  In  any  case,  when  putting  forward  possible  future  proposals,  the 
Commission will proceed, in accordance with Communication COM (2005)1729, to 
a specific impact assessment on the respect of fundamental rights. 

9 

Comunication of 27 April 2005 COM (2005)172 final on the Compatibility of legislative proposals with 
the chargter of Fundamental Rights (setting out a methodology for the internal control of fundamental 
rights, their integration in impact assessment depending on the scope of the likely impacts and inclusion 
of a standard recital on the Charter) 

EN 

11 

   EN