Outlook Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Safety of all modes of transport, including the issue of financing
Date: 2005-11-17
Institutions: European Committee of the Regions
Subjects: civil defence, common transport policy, means of public conveyance, terrorism, transport infrastructure, transport safety

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Official Journal of the European Union

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Outlook Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Safety of all modes of transport,
including the issue of financing

(2006/C 115/17)

THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,

Having regard to the letter of referral of 3 June 2005 from Commissioner Wallström to President Straub
requesting the CoR's opinion on the ‘safety of all modes of transport, including the issue of financing’, under the
first paragraph of Article 265 of the Treaty establishing the European Community;

Having regard to the White Paper on European Governance which the European Commission presented in
2001 and which urges the Committee of the Regions to ‘play a more proactive role in examining policy,
for example through the preparation of exploratory reports in advance of Commission proposals’;

Having regard to the Protocol of Cooperation of September 2001 between the European Commission and
the Committee of the Regions which encourages ‘the Committee of the Regions to draw up strategic docu-
ments reviewing matters which the Commission regards as important; these “outlook reports” shall explore
in greater depth problems in areas where the Committee of the Regions has the appropriate local informa-
tion resources’;

Having regard to the decision of its President of 25 July 2005 to instruct its Commission for Territorial
Cohesion Policy to draw up an opinion on this subject;

Having regard to its opinion on the Communications from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks Prevention of and the fight
against terrorist financing through measures to improve the exchange of information, to strengthen transparency
and enhance the traceability of financial transactions Preparedness and consequence management in the fight
against terrorism Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism COM(2004) 698 final —
COM(2004) 700 final — COM(2004) 701 final — COM(2004) 702 final — CdR 465/2004 fin;

Having regard to its draft opinion (CdR 209/2005 rev. 1) adopted on 30 September 2005 by its Commis-
sion for Territorial Cohesion Policy (rapporteur: Mr Robert Neill, Member of the London Assembly (UK,
EPP).

Whereas:

1)

2)

3)

4)

The safety of transport systems has always been a primary concern of transport operators and of
key stakeholders such as public authorities and passengers. However, the recent terrorist outrages in
London and Madrid provide a stark reminder of the need for an increased focus on the security of
transport systems across the EU. The Committee of the Regions welcomes the intention of the Euro-
pean Commission to publish a Communication on this subject, including the issue of financing
security measures, towards the end of 2005. Member States and their regional and local authorities
should, as a priority, consider how to respond to this Communication when it is produced.

The CoR also welcomes the measures that are being taken or envisaged at EU and national level in
the fields of aviation, maritime and freight security.

Advice from EU Member State governments is that the threat of terrorist attacks on civilian targets
will be with us for the foreseeable future. This threat applies in particular to transport systems
because this is where people are present in large numbers on a regular basis, often without the
possibility of systematic security checks.

Given their responsibility for a range of transport matters, regional and local governments and asso-
ciated public authorities have a key role to play in seeking to mitigate this threat and the conse-
quences of any terrorist incident.

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5)

6)

7)

No transport system can ever be completely secure. There will always be a risk of terrorist attack so
strategies must be developed and/or updated to reduce and manage that risk. Risk management
expertise exists around the world, having been developed in response to terrorist attacks of the past
decades as well as to the attacks of 9/11 and later. The challenge is how to make use of this exper-
tise in complex networks like transport systems, which may involve many different public and
private sector players, and how to fund the changes to existing practices which this implies.

Ease of access to efficient and reasonably priced transport infrastructure is an essential part of life in
EU Member States. EU citizens may be frequent users of local transport systems, but also rely on a
global transport and logistics network which provides not only employment and business opportu-
nities but is essential for the supply of basic commodities, including food. Further measures must be
taken to address the terrorist threat, but these must not result in disproportionate disruption to the
transport network. Major ongoing disruption, which is what the terrorists are trying to cause, would
have serious consequences for the economic and social life of the EU.

This report does not in any way attempt to cover the whole range of actions that would comprise a
counter-terrorism strategy. It focuses on those issues that are within the competence of regional and
local authorities and in particular those, which concern the operation of public transport services.
More specifically, this report seeks to identify some of the issues that those authorities should focus
on (and in many cases are already focussing on) and to identify what value can be added to these
efforts through collaboration with other Member States at EU level.

unanimously adopted the following opinion at its 62nd plenary session, held on 16-17 November
2005 (meeting of 17 November).

The views of the Committee of the Regions

railway stations), they should be fully involved in security stra-
tegies.

Key issues to be addressed

1. Cooperation

1.3
This cooperation must also be extended between the
regions of a Member State and across borders in the EU, so
that best practice can spread, and so that all relevant agencies,
from the emergency services to transport authorities, are imme-
diately informed if there is an terrorist incident and can take
the appropriate action.

1.1
Effective security on transport networks depends on the
closest cooperation between all the agencies involved, ranging
from staff on the ground operating transport services, their
managers and the politicians (local, regional or national) to
whom they are accountable, through to the police and intelli-
gence services. This is essential to ensure that there is a consis-
tent approach to deterrence and effective action in the case of
an incident, for example to ensure that, in parallel, assistance
can be given to passengers, evidence can be protected and
services can be restored as soon as possible. The involvement
of senior management in all agencies is essential.

1.4
In addition to looking at previous incidents in the EU,
and in particular the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the EU
should seek to learn from other countries around the world
who have also experienced terrorist attacks, such as New York,
Tokyo and Moscow (1). In addition, efforts should be made to
make use of experience in other sectors (e.g. to compare the
responses of the airline and surface transport sectors).

1.2
Such collaboration must achieve a balance between
information
confidentiality where necessary
between agencies, between Member States and with the public
where possible. Where the private sector
for
example as a provider of transport services, or of services that
are provided in close proximity to transport hubs (e.g. cleaning
retailers/other businesses occupying space on
services or

and sharing

is present,

(1) See Annex 1 for a list of recent terrorist incidents.

1.5
The basic elements of European cooperation on trans-
port security are already in place but these efforts should be
enhanced. Transport operators collaborate through fora such as
the UITP (The International Association of Public Transport)
working group on security. Railway police forces and railway
companies in Europe co-operate through COLPOFER (Colla-
boration des services de police ferroviaire et de sécurité) which
is an associated body of the International Union of Railways

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(UIC) (2). Railway and subway police forces of the Netherlands,
Germany, Belgium, Italy and the UK share information and
best practice and seek areas for cooperation through RAILPOL.
The Dutch police provide the chair and secretariat or RAILPOL,
which receives some funding from the EU for its activities. A
number of other Member States are eager to join this group
and this process should be encouraged.

attack. This information should be made available in summary
on the transport system itself and in greater detail on relevant
websites. In addition, strategies are needed to reassure passen-
gers about the safety of the network, for example through
visible staff/police presence or advertising campaigns (3).

2. Training and planning

It seems that

2.1
Transport and emergency services dealing with the
recent attacks in London received praise for their well-orga-
nised response.
this was due to appropriate
training and contingency planning across different services.
Using human resources effectively may involve building up
teams of specialist staff, including dedicated policing of trans-
port networks, or
transport or police personnel specially
trained to monitor CCTV images.

Regular training for transport staff, including exercises
2.2
simulating terrorist
the relevant
incidents and involving all
agencies, is invaluable, especially in dealing with the immediate
aftermath of an attack.

2.3
Contingency planning might range from operational
recovery following a specific incident to wider business conti-
nuity. These plans can be regularly rehearsed and updated as a
result of day-to-day incidents such as equipment failures or
third party events (e.g. burst water mains or serious road traffic
accidents). Similarly, contingency planning should have a cross-
border aspect, for example to allocate clear responsibilities in
the event of an incident at or near a border crossing, or to
make specialist help available to a Member State which may
not have such assets.

It would be appropriate,

2.6
in schools, other educational
establishments and businesses, to provide courses and to hand
out
information sheets and other educational materials on
possible terrorist attacks and how to act during such attacks.
This would make people more vigilant and reduce the conse-
quences of any panic that may occur.

3. Use of information technology

Effective closed-circuit

3.1
television (CCTV) systems and
monitoring have proved to be of critical importance both for
deterrence and detection of crime. These systems need to be
subject to certain standards and clear operational requirements
to enable, for example, downloading of data while still allowing
the system to carry out its monitoring function. In addition,
companies in and around stations or part of the transport infra-
If properly
structure may have their own CCTV systems.
briefed and trained, these resources can become additional ‘eyes
and ears’ to enhance the security of the vicinity of transport
systems with little additional impact on the normal operation
of the businesses.

3.2
Resilient mobile phone networks are also vital. Although
there might be a need in certain circumstances to disable
mobile networks or reserve their use to emergency services,
they will normally play a significant role in dealing with inci-
dents. For example, transport staff on the ground in areas
affected by an incident may need to use mobile phones to
communicate with a control centre. Equally, passengers may
need to communicate urgently with friends or relatives, some-
thing that may contribute to reducing concern and confusion
in the event of an incident.

Risk assessment is an essential part of planning and
2.4
training. This encompasses monitoring of global
threats,
systematic analysis of past incidents in order to learn lessons
and assessment of
incidents (such as unattended
luggage) as they occur in order to minimise unnecessary
disruption.

individual

4. Design

Passengers using public transport services, and indeed
2.5
business users of
transport, also have a key role to play.
However, they need clear and readily available information on,
for example, how to avoid causing alerts, what to do if they
observe suspicious behaviour and what to do in the event of an

It

is important when providing or procuring public
4.1
transport services and infrastructure, that full consideration is
given to security obligations in the contract specifications. Flex-
ibility to amend these obligations in light of a changing security
situation, should also be considered.

(2) See, for example, the joint declaration of UITP and UIC on public
transport and anti-terrorism security: http://www.uitp.com/media-
room/june-2004/full-declaration-geneva-en.cfm.

(3) An example of this from the US is the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority campaign featuring their staff's role in main-
taining safety. See Public Transport International, May 2004.

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4.2
Transport authorities and other occupants of transport
premises should be encouraged to consider the design of
existing facilities, such as transport terminals and vehicles, in
order to make it harder to hide bombs, to make evacuation
easier and to reduce casualties and damage in the event of an
explosion or other form of terrorist attack. As an example, the
widespread use of glass and lightweight materials in recent
building developments, particularly where a mix of operational
and retail areas are involved, may no longer be considered
appropriate. At the same time there is evidence that provision
of good sight lines and elimination of hiding places has proved
to be effective.

5. Financing and resources

5.1 Measures to improve the security of transport networks
will require extra resources. In many cases these resources will
be significant and/or long term, e.g. more sophisticated infor-
mation technology, additional rail reversing points, more buses,
more transport staff and dedicated policing, more training and
more extensive information campaigns. Such new initiatives
may well be over and above pre-existing investment plans
focussing primarily on renewal of transport infrastructure and
networks. Indeed, it is possible that in some cases the current
financial processes for approving transport investment may not
be well suited to obtaining funding for resilience measures.

5.2 While the operators of transport networks in the public
and private sector, and other relevant agencies, must decide
exactly what is the best response for them, it is essential that,
implementation is not delayed
once priorities are agreed,
because of disagreement about
financing. The Commission,
Member States and regional and local authorities should play a
role in ensuring that this key issue is properly addressed.

5.3
The question of financing must therefore be addressed
at the start, in parallel with other issues. Further work must be
done to assess the potential costs, but it is possible that the
scale of the necessary response will make it impossible to pass
on the entire cost of security measures to passengers without
seriously damaging the attractiveness of public transport.
Significant increases in fares must be avoided at a time when,
for a range of policy reasons (environmental, health, economic),
it is essential to encourage the use of public transport.

5.4 When undertaking this assessment of cost, Member
States and public authorities should take into account the cost
of not making every effort to reduce the threat and conse-
quences of a terrorist attack. Apart from the direct costs of
injuries and damage as a result of an attack, these costs may
also include the loss of revenue from reduced tourism, travel,
investment and other economic activity over a sustained
period.

5.5
Potential consequences can be increased enormously by
co-ordinated, possibly simultaneous, attacks on selected critical
parts of one or more infrastructures with intention to maximise
disruption and/or loss of life and panic. The reach and signifi-
cance are clearly demonstrated in the table below.

Value Losses from Security Incidents

Description

Cost

Estimated cost on the entire supply chain of a
weapon of mass destruction shipped via
container

EUR 770 billion

Drop in the European markets (FTSE) immedi-
ately following the Madrid bombings

EUR 42 billion

Cost of cyber attacks against
worldwide in 2003

companies

EUR 9.6 billion

Cost of September 11 attacks on the two
World Trade Centre buildings
(direct and
indirect)

EUR 64 billion

Source: Deloitte Research (figures converted EUR 1=$1.3)

5.6
It should be noted, however, that there are potential
benefits associated with improvements in the security of trans-
port systems. Measures to deter terrorists also deter others
intending to commit crimes of theft and vandalism as well as
offences of aggression. Better designed and monitored transport
terminals lead to increased user and passenger confidence,
potentially leading to greater use of public transport overall.
Improved contingency planning and exercises
to practice
response to large-scale incidents will also be of use in the case
of non-terrorist emergencies.

The Committee of the Regions' Recommendations

The CoR calls on the Commission and all Member States
1.
to give the issue of transport safety the highest priority. The
CoR believes that all levels of public authority — EU, national,
regional and local — must have integrated and compatible stra-
tegies, according to their responsibilities, for addressing threats
to security and mitigating incidents that do occur.

2.
The CoR emphasises that while security strategies must
be created or improved, it is essential to allow public transport
systems to continue to operate efficiently, given the damaging
social, economic and environmental consequences
they
cannot.

if

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3.
The CoR calls on the EU and Member States to encourage
public transport operators and all the responsible agencies to
develop greater cooperation within and between Member
States, building on the existing networks of transport operators
and transport police forces.

4.
The CoR believes such cooperation could focus on estab-
lishing information sharing principles in order to raise aware-
ness of terrorism threats, enable carrying out of risk assess-
ments and learning from previous incidents and best practice
in a range of sectors.

5.
The CoR congratulates the emergency services, the trans-
port operators and the public for their response to recent
terrorist atrocities. The CoR emphasises that this response was
made possible not least because of good training, contingency
planning and sharing of information and believes that, along
with good design and use of appropriate information tech-
nology, these elements are an essential part of any transport
security strategy.

6.
The CoR calls on the Commission and Member States to
work with mobile phone network providers and public trans-

port operators to encourage the development of more resilient
mobile phone services in the case of serious incidents, for the
benefit of the operators and of passengers. In addition, any EU
proposals on electronic and telephony data storage for security
purposes should not serve to weaken existing relevant Member
State legislation.

The CoR reminds the EU and the Member States of the
7.
vulnerability of the road transport sector to terrorist attack, of
the need to apply the above recommendations, where appro-
priate to this sector, and notes that it is the intention of EESC
to address this area in detail in an opinion currently in prepara-
tion.

The CoR believes

8.
that, given the likely continuing
terrorist threat, sufficient improvements to transport security
strategies are unlikely to be possible without substantial extra
resources. The CoR therefore calls on the Commission and
Member States to consider this issue as a matter of urgency in
order to ensure that essential improvements to security are not
delayed due to lack of financial planning.

Brussels, 17 November 2005.

The President

of the Committee of the Regions

Peter STRAUB

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Recent examples of dramatic and high impact terrorist attacks in public transport systems include (excluding
the latest attacks in London):

Appendix 1

1986

Paris

RER line A, a device loaded inside a gym bag exploded after a rider hurled the bag off
the train.

1994

Baku

Two bomb attacks in the metro led to 19 dead and 90 wounded

1995

Tokyo

Paris

Paris

1996

Metro system experienced a sarin-gas attack that killed 12 people and injured 5 600
more.

A bomb attack at the Saint Michel station caused 8 dead and 120 wounded passengers.

An explosion in the Port-Royal station killed 4 persons and injured 91 others.

Moscow

An explosion in a metro car killed 4 passengers and injured 12 others

2000

Moscow

An explosion in the pedestrian subway street near the metro station resulted in 11 dead
and 60 injured persons

2003

Daegu

A milk container containing flammable liquid was set on fire in a carriage. The fire led
to 120 dead and 100 wounded passengers.

2004

Moscow

A suicide bomb attack destroyed a metro train during the morning rush hour and
resulted in 40 casualties and about 140 injured passengers.

2004

Madrid

10 bombs concealed in rucksacks exploded within a few minutes in commuter trains
during the morning rush hours. The explosion killed 190 passengers and injured about
1 400. Three more bombs have been found and destroyed.