Case C-260/05 P: Appeal brought on 20 June 2005 by Sniace SA against the judgment delivered on 14 April 2005 by the Fifth Chamber (Extended Composition) of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-88/01 between Sniace SA and the Commission of the European Communities
Date: 2005-08-06
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: Austria, General Court (EU), State aid, admissibility, appeal, competition, judicial proceedings, man-made fibre

C 193/22

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

6.8.2005

Appeal brought on 20 June 2005 by Sniace SA against the
judgment delivered on 14 April 2005 by the Fifth
Chamber (Extended Composition) of the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities in Case T-88/01
between Sniace SA and the Commission of the European
Communities

(Case C-260/05 P)

(2005/C 193/34)

(Language of the case: Spanish)

the European Communities

An appeal against the judgment delivered on 14 April 2005 by
the Fifth Chamber (Extended Composition) of the Court of First
in Case T-88/01
Instance of
between Sniace SA and the Commission of
the European
Communities was brought before the Court of Justice of the
European Communities on 20 June 2005 by Sniace SA, repre-
sented by D.J. Baró Fuentes, abogado.

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

(1) annul the judgment of 14 April 2005 of the Court of First

Instance in Case T-88/01;

(2) allow the claims made at first instance or, if appropriate,
refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for the
latter to give a decision on the merits of the case;

(3) allow the appellant's request for measures of organisation
of procedure made on 16 October 2001, and the request
for the parties to appear in person, for witnesses to give
evidence and for an expert's report, made by the appellant
on 20 April 2001;

(4) order the respondent (the defendant at first instance) to pay

the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its claims the appellant pleads:

1. An error of law in that the appellant's application was held
to be inadmissible because it had not adduced pertinent
reasons to show that the contested decision might adversely
affect its legitimate interests by seriously jeopardising its
position on the market. Here, the Court of First Instance fell
into various errors of assessment of the information in the
file, in particular in relation to direct competition between
the cellulose fibres (lyocell, sub-standards of
lyocell and
proviscose) manufactured and marketed by the undertaking

which is the recipient of the State aid and the cellulose
fibres (viscose) manufactured and marketed by the appellant.
Both fibres compete for certain uses and applications on the
same market. Likewise, the Court of First Instance failed to
make a proper assessment of various matters in the file that
constituted legal evidence of the existence of a set of specific
circumstances identifying the appellant
(closed circle of
addressees and over-capacity on the market for cellulose
fibres etc.). Finally, the Court of First Instance made an
incorrect assessment of the matters in the file that prove the
considerable adverse effect on the appellant's position on
the market.

the

appellant was not

2. An error of law in that the application was declared inad-
missible because
individually
concerned, having played only a minor role in the pre-litiga-
tion procedure. On this point, the European Commission
gave the appellant notice to submit comments as an inter-
ested third party for the purposes of Article 88(2) EC. The
appellant made effective use of its procedural rights and
submitted comments directed at the aid granted to Lenzing
Lyocell. Nonetheless, that participation could serve no prac-
tical purpose because the Commission considered it expe-
dient not to reveal certain information during the adminis-
trative procedure.

3. As a subsidiary matter, breach of the fundamental right of
effective legal protection. The Court of First Instance's deci-
sion to declare the action inadmissible, without undertaking
any evaluation of the merits of the case, constitutes an
infringement of the right to a fair hearing and a denial of
justice. It implies a retrograde step in Community case-law
which has made more flexible the conditions on which
third parties concerned in proceedings concerning State aid
may bring an action.

4. As a further subsidiary matter, infringement of Community
law. This plea may in turn be divided into two parts. First,
breach of the principle of procedural equality, given that
comparative examination supports the conclusion that the
Fifth Chamber (Extended Composition) of the Court of First
to two comparable
Instance afforded different
situations. Second, infringement of Articles 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, in that
the Court of First Instance did not grant the request for
measures of organisation of procedure and for evidence
sought at first instance by the appellant.

treatment