Communication from the Commission on measures to ensure greater security in explosives, detonators, bomb-making equipment and fire-arms
Date: 2005-07-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Commission, cooperation policy, explosive, fight against crime, marketing, private sector, storage, traceability, transport of dangerous goods

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 18.07.2005 
COM(2005) 329 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

ON MEASURES TO ENSURE GREATER SECURITY IN EXPLOSIVES, 
DETONATORS, BOMB-MAKING EQUIPMENT AND FIRE-ARMS 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

ON MEASURES TO ENSURE GREATER SECURITY IN EXPLOSIVES, DETONATORS, 
BOMB-MAKING EQUIPMENT AND FIRE-ARMS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  use  of  explosives  to  harm  innocent  citizens  has  been  the  most  common  method  used  by 
terrorists to instil fear in populations accustomed to living in democratic, free and open societies. In 
October  2003  the  JHA  Council  had  concluded  there  was  no  need  to  introduce  new  measures  on 
storage and transport of explosives. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in Madrid 
on 11 March 2004 a consensus started to emerge within EU Member States for the need to explore a 
more harmonised system  that  would  prevent explosives, detonators,  bomb-making equipment and 
fire-arms  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  terrorists.  In  its  25th  March  2004  Declaration,  the 
European Council recognised the “need to ensure terrorist organisations and groups are starved of 
the  components  of  their  trade”.  In  particular  it  recognised  “the  need  to  ensure  greater  security  of 
firearms,  explosives,  bomb-making  equipment  and  the  technologies  that  contribute  to  the 
perpetration  of  terrorist  outrages”.  Furthermore,  the  revised  Plan  of  Action  on  Combating 
Terrorism  of  June  2004  called  upon  the  Council  and  the  Commission  to  examine  the  scope  for 
measures to ensure greater security of explosives (Action 3.6.1). 

The Commission, in its October 2004 Communication on Prevention, preparedness and response 
to  terrorist  attacks1  signalled  its  intention  to  present  proposals  if  necessary  to  ensure  the  highest 
possible  security  level  in  Europe.  Indeed,  the  “Hague  Program  -  Strengthening  freedom, 
security and justice in the EU”, endorsed by the European Council in November 2004, explicitly 
invites  the  Commission  to  make  proposals  aimed  at  improving  the  storage  and  transport  of 
explosives  as  well  as  at  ensuring  traceability  of  industrial  and  chemical  precursors.  The 
Commission  strongly  welcomes  this  invitation  and  hereby  presents  its  proposals  in  the  present 
Communication.  

The Commission believes that all interested parties, in particular the industry (including producers, 
end-users, transporters, researchers), the Member States and Europol must contribute to improve the 
security  of  explosives  and  firearms.  While  their  industrial  usefulness  is  beyond  doubt,  policy-
makers must ensure the security of citizens by reducing and eliminating the possibility of their 
misuse.  In  the  same  way  that  manufacturers  of  explosives  and  firearms  in  the  past  embraced  the 
notion of safety and made it a routine feature of their products, the same approach should be taken 
towards  internal  security.  The  Commission  would  like  to  see  a  drastic  change  in  thinking  by  all 
stakeholders concerned and move from a logic of “whether” to one of “how” this can be achieved. 
The  Commission  is  thus  willing  to  engage  in  a  structured  dialogue  with  the  private  sector  in 
order  to  see  an  enhancement  of  the  security  features  (most  importantly  regarding  storage, 
commercialisation,  transport  and  traceability)  of  component  and  end  products  all  along  the 
production  and  supply  chain.  The  Commission  can  draw  on  its  experience  in  other  fields  –  for 
instance,  traceability  with  regard  to  the  food  production  and  supply  chain  for  purposes  of  health 
protection – when devising ways of guaranteeing the security of explosives and firearms.  

1 

COM (2004) 698 final; 20.10.2004 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
                                                 
2. 

THE EU PLAN FOR ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF EXPLOSIVES 

The  Commission  plans  to  bring  together  all  the  major  stakeholders:  the  manufacturers  of,  and 
traders in, explosives, experts from Europol and SitCen, national experts from the Member States, 
Commission  and  the  Council  Terrorism  Working  Party.  Subsequently,  the  Commission  will 
consider  setting  up  an  expert  group  (an  Explosives-Security  Expert  Group)  and  task  it  with 
elaborating and submitting to the Commission an EU Plan for the enhancement of the security of 
explosives  and  firearms.  The  Plan  would  have  to  ensure  complementarity  between  public  and 
private measures in the field and set defined targets. A work method for the plan and for monitoring 
its success would need to be defined. The expert group could assess the needs in any of the fields 
related to enhancing the security of explosives and firearms, identify the detection and intervention 
capability gaps in the EU that need to be addressed and analyse the costs involved. 

3. 

STORAGE, TRANSPORT AND TRACEABILITY 

As  The  Hague  program  suggests,  the  focus  of  this  Communication  is  storage,  transport  and 
traceability.  Security  arrangements  for  the  storage  of  explosives  through,  for  instance,  physical 
means and efficient accounting and auditing standards, are self-evidently crucial in preventing 
terrorists from gaining possession of legally produced products through theft or misappropriation. 
Transparency is key to allowing the careful scrutiny of transfers of such products while traceability 
techniques  (like  tagging  or  marking)  are  useful  in  following  the  life-cycle  of  explosives  and  for 
detecting dangerous transfers and suspicious possession. Methods for placing obligations on those 
trading  in  explosives  to  report  any  suspicious  transactions  should  also  be  explored.  Furthermore, 
dangerous  products  in  transit  –  such  as  explosives  and  all-bomb-related  equipment  and  devices  - 
may  be  either  subject  to  a  direct  attack  or  illicitly  diverted  to  a  destination  other  than  the  one 
intended.  Security  arrangements  and  traceability  must  thus  also  become  a  key  aspect  at  all 
stages of the supply chain.  

Measures to combat terrorism should address all possible sources. A comprehensive approach to the 
problem  is  necessary  since  enhanced  detectability  of  some  explosives/detonators  could  push 
terrorists to use other devices or substances instead, which might be even more difficult to detect.  

A  comprehensive  analysis  of  detection  techniques  and  their  respective  success  rates  for 
different types of explosives would be a major asset to identify major risks. An approach towards 
reducing  the  risks  of  explosives  being  misused  by  terrorists  or  criminals  should  be  extensive  and 
involve  regulation  of  commercial  explosives  (including  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions), 
marking of explosives, stronger security constraints for transport and storage, the use of technology 
to detect, tag and track explosive material, information sharing and investigative support. The EU, 
while in all respects wishing to maintain the mutually fruitful cooperation with the United States, 
must not allow a transatlantic technology gap to develop, particularly insofar as concerns the use of 
detection equipment in transportation points.  

In  addition,  so-called  ‘homemade’  explosives  made  out  of  widely  available  chemicals  present  a 
threat of the same scale as commercial explosives and thus research to improve their detectability 
should also be considered a priority.  

Demilitarised explosives coming on the market also present a major risk. Since military explosives 
are normally not marked, the chance of detecting them might be less than that for civil ones. The 
official or parallel trade of surplus military explosives and the extent of involvement of organised 
crime networks in Europe in illicit transfers are, therefore, a major cause of concern and must be 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
tackled  head-on.  A  United  Nations  Report2  notes  that  several  states  in  Eastern  Europe  cited 
concerns  regarding  the  trafficking  of  surplus  military  explosives  and  devices  from  former  Soviet 
stockpiles. Huge stockpiles of military explosives exist in Central and Eastern Europe. Programs to 
destroy those stocks are in place but have shown a limited success rate so far and thus need to be 
drastically improved. 

4. 

STATE OF PLAY / PROPOSED MEASURES 

4.1. 

Trade in fertilisers 

The  Fertiliser  Regulation3,  in  Articles  25  to  28,  foresees  some  security  measures,  controls  and 
special testing requirements for ammonium nitrate fertilisers. It also obliges manufacturers to keep 
records of production sites and their operators. 

The  Commission  is  considering  a  modification  of  this  Regulation  in  order  to  introduce  the 
appropriate requirements to sell ammonium nitrate fertiliser only to authorised persons and upon 
proof  of  use  for  solely  agricultural  purposes.  In  addition,  a  proposal  to  oblige  companies  selling 
such  material  to  notify  law  enforcement  authorities  of  any  suspicious  transactions  could  also  be 
explored.  Member  States  should  also  be  encouraged  to  take  similar  measures  with  regard  to 
fertilisers not falling within the scope of the Regulation. 

4.2. 

Storage of explosives 

The  storage  of  explosives  falls  under  the  Seveso  II  Directive4.  Its  scope  is  not  focused  on 
explosives as such, but on fixed installations storing higher quantities  of dangerous substances. It 
basically  addresses  the  safety  of  installations  rather  than  their  “security”.  The  Directive  does  not 
require security analyses, nor does it impose additional security measures for installations that are 
either  particularly  vulnerable  to  terrorist  attacks  or  that  are  potential  targets  of  attacks.  It  should, 
nevertheless,  be  noted  that  all  requirements  related  to  the  mitigation  of  the  consequences  of 
accidents, and in particular the formulation in advance of emergency plans, will equally help with 
the  consequences  of  a  terrorist  attack  targeting  a  Seveso  installation.  Moreover,  part  of  the 
information needed for a risk assessment is already available through the safety reports. 

The Commission is addressing security issues for establishments covered by the Seveso II Directive 
where dangerous substances like explosives or ammonium nitrate are present, such as analysis of 
the consequences of possible intentional adversary acts, deliberate major accidents and measures 
to  prevent  them.  Results  of  a  joint  workshop  on  the  protection  of  hazardous  installations  from 
intentional  adversary  acts,  Budapest,  28-29  April  2005  can  be  found  on  the  website  of  the 
Commission: 

http://europa.eu.int:8082/comm/environment/seveso/conf_events.htm 

The Seveso II Directive applies mainly to chemical and petrochemical plants where huge quantities 
of chemicals are present. The directive does not distinguish between “normal” dangerous goods and 

2 

3 

4 

The United Nations Report on Illicit Manufacturing of and trafficking in explosives by criminals and their use 
for criminal purposes (of 23rd January 2002); E/CN.15/2002/9/Add.1 
Regulation  (EC)  2003/2003  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  October  2003  relating  to 
fertilizers. 
Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) on the control of major-accident hazards (OJ No L 10 of 14 January 1997). 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
“high  consequence”  dangerous  goods  (i.e  whose  misuse  can  result  in  mass  casualties  or 
destruction). Provisions to reduce the increased risk should, therefore, apply especially to these high 
potential dangerous substances such as explosives.  

The Commission will address recommendations to Member States to take initiatives to improve the 
security  in  all  companies  and  personnel  responsible  for  or  dealing  with  high  consequence 
dangerous goods; Security will be increased by the creation and implementation of security plans 
which could contain a number of elements identified by the Commission. 

4.3. 

Transport of explosives and other dangerous goods (TDG) 

EU Member States are obliged to amend the TDG security provisions in their domestic road and rail 
transport  legislation  by  1  July  2005.  However,  most  Member  States  have  additional  regulations 
concerning the control of certain categories of dangerous goods. Appropriate industrial associations 
have  prepared  guidelines  to  the  Transport  of  Dangerous  Goods  security  provisions,  covering  all 
relevant  sectors.  The  Commission  has  supported  this  work  and  the  guidelines  were  completed  in 
April 2005. Dialogue with the industry is a key element in improving explosives transport security 
since the industry could develop stricter guidelines for improving transport security. 

The Commission adopted improved controls on the transfer of explosives between Member States in 
April  2004,  as  a  step  to  make  their  cross-border  transport  safer.  The  controls  are  contained  in 
Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC  harmonising  the  information  required,  and  procedures  to  be 
followed during such cross-border transfer.  

The improved controls on the transfer of explosives between Member States should make it easier 
to trace explosives and to check that their movement has been approved by national authorities. The 
document also includes details of which companies or organisations are involved in which type of 
explosives  and  an  itinerary  for  the  transfer  and  authorisations  by  all  Member  States  over  whose 
territory the explosives will move. Such measure should make it easier to trace explosives as they 
move from the manufacturer to the user. 

In  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  established  in  the  EU  Plan  of  Action  on  combating  terrorism 
(point  4.2),  the  Commission  has  started  to  develop  a  policy  on  supply  chain  security,  in  order  to 
complement  already  existing  legislation  in  various  areas  of  transport  security  (air,  maritime  and 
port security) and increase security on land transport. 

The  major  focus  of  this  policy  process  is  to  develop  initiatives  and  security  measures,  legal  and 
operational,  for  business  to  increase  the  security  awareness  within  the  EU  national  supply  chain 
without hampering trade and, by doing so, countervailing possible terrorist threats. 

Supply  chain  security  will  be  an  evolutionary  process.  Making  security  thinking  a  daily  routine 
(awareness)  in  EU  transport  operations  helps  to  upgrade  business  quality  performance  and 
resilience to incidents. In international trade, the success of a transport security policy depends on 
reciprocity. 

4.3.1.  Detection of explosives and fire-arms at airports 

Following the September 11 attacks and other air-craft related incidents, airport security has been 
increased. The Framework Regulation 2320/2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil 
aviation  security  considers  fire-arms  and  explosives  as  prohibited  articles  and  requires  that  all 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
passengers  and  their  baggage  (cabin  or  hold)  are  screened  by  a  set  of  acceptable  methods.  The 
Commission carries out inspections to verify, inter alia, the implementation of these requirements. 

The  Commission,  assisted  by  the  Aviation  Security  Committee  (AVSEC),  is  currently  working  on 
controlling  the  implementation  of  the  technical  specifications  and  the  performance  criteria  of  the 
different families of detection equipment employed at Member State airports. 

4.4. 

Production, commercialisation and traceability of explosives 

Council Directive 93/15/EEC on the harmonisation of the provisions relating to the placing on 
the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses5 (for example for quarrying or demolition 
works) defines the essential requirements which must be met by explosive conformity tests in order 
to  ensure  the  free  movement  of  these  products  without  lowering  optimum  levels  of  safety  and 
security.  It  also  covers  the  supervision  of  transfers  of  explosives  and  ammunition.  Due  to  the 
obvious limitations of this legislation in the light of the increased terrorist risk, the Commission has 
started  a  dialogue  on  security  issues  with  the  industry.  New  practices  might  be  envisaged  for  a 
variety  of  domains:  marking  of  explosives  and  detonators,  stronger  storage  and  transportation 
security as well as the reporting of suspicious transactions.  

Following the discovery of explosives, finding their origin is of crucial importance for investigators. 
Swiss legislation on the matter for example is very strict and requires explosives to be marked prior 
to  their  commercialisation.  The  rate  of  successfully  solved  cases  relating  to  marked  explosives  in 
Switzerland,  however,  has  not  been  dramatically  higher  than  successfully  solved  cases  with 
unmarked ones. 

The  Commission  suggests  the  assessment  of  the  cost-benefit  of  marking  explosives  with  an 
electromagnetic code.  

4.5. 

Detection of explosives 

The  detection  of  explosives  can  be  achieved  with  various  techniques  (e.g  X-ray,  sniffer  dogs, 
vapour  detection  systems).  No  single  technique  allows  a  satisfactory  detection  of  explosives;  a 
combination  of  methods  is  always  necessary.  However,  making  one  marking  substance  or  agent 
compulsory in the EU for all explosives could make their detection easier since the sensors would 
mainly have to detect one substance. However, due to the presence of foreign-made explosives, it is 
necessary that detection equipment is still able to detect other marking agents as well as unmarked 
explosives. 

Extensive research programs are conducted on electronic noses and other technologies. The NOSE 
II  program  (second  network  of  excellence  on  artificial  olfactory  sensing)  of  the  European 
Commission has already enabled the creation of a network of scientists in that domain. However, a 
first  important  step  would  be  to  conduct  an  extensive  study  of  existing  detection  techniques, 
assessing  precisely  their  success  rate,  detection  time  and  cost  for  each  type  of  explosive. 
Technology  gaps  could  be  identified  in  that  way  and  be  taken  into  consideration  by  research 
programs. Best combinations of equipment should also be properly evaluated since it is impossible 
to detect explosives properly with a one step system.  

The  Commission  will  launch  such  an  integrated  analysis  of  detection  techniques.  This  work  will 
constitute  solid  grounds  to  build  legislative  initiatives  in  this  field.  Meanwhile  the  Commission 

5 

OJ L 121 of 15 May 1993  

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
recommends  setting  up  appropriate  measures  to  make  it  compulsory  to  use  detection  devices  in 
certain strategic locations (e.g. at airports). 

4.6. 

Detonators 

Due  to  their  small  size,  detonators  present  a  major  risk  of  theft  and  non-detection.  Thus,  making 
detonators  easier  to  detect  would  be  an  important  improvement  to  the  security  chain.  The  Joint 
Research Centre of the Commission  could analyse  some of the options available to enhance their 
detectability. Depending on the results of analysis from the JRC, the Commission could propose to 
modify  Council  Directive  93/15  EEC  in  order  to  make  some  mark,  detection  agent  or  device 
mandatory. 

4.7. 

Law enforcement cooperation in the field of explosives 

The identification of capability gaps in terms of human resources, techniques and materials devoted 
to  detect,  intervene  and  neutralise  improvised  and  non-conventional  explosive  devices  within  the 
EU  will  require  serious  reflection  on  a  method  for  bridging  them.  The  Commission  has  gathered 
information  from  the  Member  States  through  a  questionnaire  it  presented  to  the  Council  in  2004. 
Following an analysis, any gaps that might result could be resolved by a variety of ways including 
directing research in a specific way and developing structures that allow solidarity between Member 
States  to  be  expressed,  for  example  through  initiatives  for  mutual  assistance  on  a  bilateral  or 
multilateral basis. 

4.7.1.  Europol Bomb Database 

Europol is currently managing an EU database on explosive devices used by terrorist and criminal 
organisations.  European  law  enforcement  services  and  in  particular  their  Explosive  Ordnance 
Disposal  (EOD)  Units  need  to  have  24-hour  access  to  available  data  on  explosives,  explosive 
devices  and  their  components  in  order  to  exchange  this  information  immediately  in  the  light  of 
terrorist bomb incidents or threats. 

Europol  is  already  exploring  the  possibility  of  having  a  central  computerised  system  in  which 
bomb-related data consisting of written texts, structured data and multi-media information such as 
images of electronic parts and electronic circuits, would be stored.  

The  exchange  of  information  via  the  Europol  database  will  be  of  great  importance  in  relation  to 
“homemade  explosives”  and  the  network  would  be  an  ideal  instrument  to  produce  a  list  of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and assess their impact. 

Europol  should  promote  the  use  of  its  database  on  explosive  devices  used  by  terrorists  by  the 
competent services in the Member States and the Commission by reporting every six months about 
the inputs provided by Member States to the database.  

4.7.2. 

Inventory of Capacities of the Member States 

Last  year,  the  Commission  presented  to  the  Council  a  questionnaire  to  assess  Member  State 
capabilities  and  future  co-ordination  of  their  EOD  Units.  The  results  of  the  questionnaire  have 
facilitated  the  assessment  of  the  capacities  in Member  States  of  human  resources,  techniques  and 
materials  devoted  to  detect,  intervene  and  neutralize  improvised  and  non-conventional  explosive 
devices.  This  inventory  also  assesses  their  capabilities  in  terms  of  forensic  investigation  in  bomb 
attacks  and  will  also  be  a  first  step  for  a  future  application  of  solidarity  mechanisms  amongst 
Member States in case of major terrorist events. 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
4.7.3.  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units Network 

Following  the  capability  assessment,  the  setting  up  of  a  Network  of  Member  State  EOD  Units 
should be considered, following examples already developed in other fields, such as the Network of 
Protection  of  Public  Figures.  The  Network  could  be  a  channel  for  an  open  and  fluid  exchange  of 
information  on  techniques  and  operational  tactics.  Furthermore,  the  improvement  of  detection 
capabilities should be a priority for the Network. 

The Commission is currently working on establishing a network of EOD Units following analysis of 
the answers to the questionnaire submitted by the Commission to the Member States.  

4.7.4. 

Improvised Explosive Devices Forensic Network 

During a second phase, the proposed EOD Units Network would enlarge its capacity to exchange 
information  on  the  forensic  aspects  of  improvised  explosive  devices  (IEDs).  The  creation  of  a 
Forensic  Network  could  be  a  starting  point  to  develop  a  common  strategy  on  investigation  and 
research policies and for the harmonisation of techniques in this field.  

4.8. 

Research and technological development 

Research and technological development can reduce the risks linked to the production, transport and 
storage  of  firearms,  explosives,  bomb-making  equipment  and  technologies  that  contribute  to  the 
perpetration of terrorist acts. Research can also contribute to better detecting, tagging and tracking 
systems. 

A three year Preparatory Action (2004-2006) was launched with the aim of fostering the conditions 
and the environment favourable to the improvement  of  the  European  scientific, technological and 
industrial  capacities  and  to  test  the  ground  for  a  fully  fledged  European  Security  Research 
Programme to be launched in 2007. The Preparatory Action covers 5 main priority research areas, 
including the fight against terrorism. 

As a follow up to the Preparatory Action, the multi-annual European Security Research Programme 
would conduct mission oriented technological research, taking into account final user needs. Under 
the 6th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, the Commission has 
opened  a  call  for  research  proposals  on  nanotechnological  approaches  for  improved  security 
systems including detectors for explosives. 

4.9. 

Law enforcement cooperation in the field of fire-arms 

Several  initiatives  have  already  been  launched  with  the  aim  of  improving  law  enforcement  co-
operation  in  the  fight  against  illicit  firearms  that  will  reap  results  in  2005.  As  part  of  the  counter 
proliferation programme of its Counter-Terrorism Unit, Europol will be offering operational support 
to Member State investigations and disseminate strategic products. Europol is currently undertaking 
a feasibility study in the area of illicit trafficking in firearms in order to decide whether an analysis 
work file on illicit firearms can be opened in 2005. Moreover, the development of an EU capability 
for the tracing of illicit firearms is part of the Europol Work Programme for 2005. 

A  legislative  instrument  laying  down  common  standards  for  the  reporting  of  seized  or  recovered 
firearms  used  for  crime,  or  firearms  that  have  been  diverted,  lost  or  stolen  could  be  considered. 
This would facilitate the exchange of information for the purpose of investigation and provision of a 
common denominator for a method to analyse intelligence.  

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
4.10. 

Firearms - Import/export licensing regime and other aspects of implementation of the 
UN Protocol 

The  Commission  will  present  a  proposal  for  a  Council  regulation  on  an  import/export  licensing 
system  for  firearms  by  2007,  after  an  internal  consultation  process  with  the  Member  States  and 
stakeholders. 

This regulation will aim to implement Article 10 of the UN Protocol on the illicit manufacturing 
of  and  trafficking  in  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition  into  Community 
legislation.  As  the  implementation  of  this  UN  Protocol  covers  a  wide  range  of  issues  such  as 
customs, trade, explosives, internal market and external relations, the proposal will take due account 
of all these elements.  

Also, a technical modification of Directive 91/4776 will be proposed by the Commission in 2005, in 
order to integrate the appropriate provisions required by the Protocol as regards intra-Community 
transfers  of  weapons  concerned  by  the  Directive,  and  more  particularly  article  10  of  that  same 
Protocol  relating  to  general  requirements  for  export,  import  and  transit  licensing  or  authorization 
systems.  The 
important 
control/monitoring tool of the export/import of firearms from and into the EU and, therefore, will 
contribute to the prevention and investigation mechanisms of terrorism. 

licence  system  shall  serve  as  an 

functioning  export/import 

However,  the  improved  import/export  regime  is  only  one  element  of  the  prevention  of  illegal 
trafficking  of  firearms  and  must  be  seen  in  combination  with  effective  border  management, 
including an active neighbourhood policy in this area. 

6 

Council Directive of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (91/477/EEC). 

EN 

9 

   EN