2006/599/EC: Commission Decision of 6 April 2005 on the aid scheme which Italy is planning to implement for ship financing (notified under document number C(2005) 844)   (Text with EEA relevance)
Date: 2005-04-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Italy, State aid, control of State aid, investment protection, shipbuilding

7.9.2006

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 244/17

COMMISSION DECISION

of 6 April 2005

on the aid scheme which Italy is planning to implement for ship financing

(notified under document number C(2005) 844)

(Only the Italian text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2006/599/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty
establishing the European
Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article
88(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
pursuant to the provisions cited above,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

I. PROCEDURE

On 26 November 1998 the Commission approved the
Italian shipbuilding guarantee scheme provided for in
Article 5 of Law No 261 of 31 July 1997, and
considered that the aid intensity provided for by the
scheme amounted to 1 %.

the adoption of a decree of

That Article was amended by Law No 413 of 30
November 1998. On 16 May 2001 Italy notified the
Commission of
the
Minister for the Treasury,
the Budget and Economic
Planning, which supplemented the guarantee scheme,
arguing that, with these modifications and additions,
the scheme should be considered free of aid. It is this
notification which is the subject of the present decision.

Following the notification there was
corre-
spondence with Italy in order to obtain further infor-
mation.
the Commission had numerous
informal contacts with the Italian authorities and with
their consultant, and met them on two occasions.

In addition,

some

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

By letter dated 30 April 2003, the Commission informed
Italy that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid
down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of
the notified measure.

The Commission Decision to initiate the procedure was
published in the Official Journal of the European Union (1).
The Commission invited interested parties to submit their
comments on the aid.

The Commission received no comments from interested
parties.

By letters dated 4 June 2003, 22 July 2003 and 3 June
2004 the Italian authorities submitted their observations
on the Commission’s Decision to initiate the procedure.
A meeting between the Italian authorities and the
Commission took place on 27 January 2004.

By letter dated 3 November 2004 the Italian authorities
asked the Commission to define its position on the case.
The Commission replied to that letter on 22 December
2004; it did not receive any further correspondence from
Italy.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHEME

The Special Guarantee Fund for Ship Financing (Fondo
speciale di garanzia per il credito navale — ‘the Fund’) was
provided for in Article 5 of Law No 261 of 31 July
1997. Following a tender procedure,
the financial,
administrative and technical management of the Fund
was entrusted to Mediocredito Centrale SpA (‘Medio-
credito’). The Fund is intended to cover the risk of
construction and
failure
conversion of ships granted by banks to Italian and
foreign shipowners
in Italian
shipyards. For
this purpose the Fund is to provide
second-priority end-financing guarantees to the ship-
owners. The Italian authorities have confirmed that the
Fund is not yet operative, so that no guarantees have yet
been granted.

for work carried out

to recover

loans

the

for

(1) OJ C 145, 21.6.2003, p. 48.

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(10)

The financing loan must have a duration of no more
than 12 years and amount to no more than 80 % of
the contract price; the interest rate must be no lower
than that referred to in the resolution of
the OECD
Council of 3 August 1981, as amended, or may be
equal to the market rate in the event that the financing
does not receive any other public assistance aimed at
reducing the burden of
the
financing is to be secured by a first mortgage on the
vessel.

In addition,

interest.

(11)

The scheme provides guarantees to shipowners assessed
as being economically and financially sound by Medio-
credito on the basis of the criteria specified in the decree.

(12) A guarantee can be given on a sum no greater than 40 %
of the loan and — within this limit — may cover up to
90 % of the final loss incurred by the banks for capital,
contractual interest and interest on arrears, at a rate no
higher than the reference rate in force on the date of
legal proceedings for recovery of the debt, and costs,
including court and out-of-court expenses incurred.

(13)

(14)

(15)

The one-off premium to be paid by the beneficiaries of
the Fund is fixed, and was originally set at 1,6 % of the
guaranteed amount, independently of the duration of the
subsequently
guaranteed loan. The Italian authorities
informed the Commission that
intended to
they
redefine the one-off premium, which would now be a
maximum of 2,3 % of the guaranteed amount for a 12-
year loan, and proportionally less for shorter loans. This
one-off 2,3 % premium is equivalent to a premium of
0,5 % per annum on the outstanding guaranteed amount
of a 12-year loan.

Italian

authorities

considered

introducing

The
a
mechanism of
risk differentiation, whereby different
premiums
charged
projects would
according to the risk involved in financing the project.
However, this system was only briefly outlined, and no
other detail or information on its operation has been
provided to the Commission.

different

be

III. GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE PROCEDURE

In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission
expressed doubts as to whether the scheme satisfied all
the tests in point 4(3) of the notice of 11 March 2000
on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty
to State aid in the form of guarantees (the ‘Guarantees
Notice’) (2), which would have allowed the Commission
to conclude that there was no aid involved.

(2) OJ C 71, 11.3.2000, p. 14.

(16) Among other things, the Commission wondered whether
a State-provided guarantee scheme which charged the
same premium to all users independently of the indi-
the financed project — in a sector
vidual
where there was a market willing to offer such gua-
rantees — could be considered likely to be self-financing.

risks of

(17) Also, the Commission had doubts that the premiums
paid by the beneficiaries were in line with the market,
or sufficient to cover all the costs of the scheme.

(18)

Last,
the Commission could not be certain that a
percentage of only 10 % of the most risky part of the
loan would be enough to ensure that the lender assessed
the creditworthiness of
the borrower properly and
minimised the risks associated with the transaction.

IV. COMMENTS FROM ITALY

(19)

The Italian authorities submit that the Fund does not
involve aid, for the following reasons:

(i)

the rules of the Fund permit guarantees to be granted
only to shipowners of meeting strict economic
criteria, with a risk profile below the average; these
beneficiaries have similar risk profiles, and thus no
substantial differentiation of guarantee premiums
appears necessary;

(ii) a market survey conducted among several credit insti-
tutions operating in Italy has shown that the average
market premium for similar guarantees is substan-
tially equivalent
to that proposed by the Italian
authorities.

(20)

financial

Essentially,

according to the

Thereafter, by letter of 3 June 2004, the Italian autho-
rities indicated their readiness to adopt a system of risk
charged
differentiation whereby projects would be
different premiums
risk
involved. This system takes as its point of departure
the original 0,5 % p.a. premium.
the
premiums would vary according to the length of the
loan and the risk of the project. Three different risk
profiles would be established. For a 12-year loan, the
one-off premium to be paid by the beneficiaries would
to
amount
2,603 % for the medium risk category, and to 3,142 %
for the highest risk category. This would correspond to a
premium ranging between 0,4563 % p.a. of the guar-
anteed amount for the least risky projects to 0,6562 %
p.a. for the most risky ones.

to 2,065 % for the lowest risk category,

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(21)

for

the

The authorities would establish different ranges of values
according to six financial parameters which the autho-
rities would have to assess when a potential beneficiary
overall
applied
scheme. The
in it
performance in these parameters would result
being placed into one of the three different risk cate-
this system has never been further
gories. However,
elaborated,
concrete details on its
possible operation have been submitted by the Italian
authorities.

and no other

applicant’s

V. ASSESSMENT

1. Existence of State aid within a meaning of Article
87(1) of the Treaty

(22) Article 87(1) of the Treaty states that any aid granted by
a Member State or through State resources which distorts
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain
undertakings is incompatible with the common market
in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

(26)

aid review, and on the basis of the provisions outlined
above, it is evident that the underlying principle of the
Guarantees Notice is that the benchmark for assessing
whether a guarantee is free of State aid is the market.
If the State obtains a remuneration for the guarantee that
is equivalent to what a private market operator would
charge to equivalent beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are
not being granted any advantage, and the State is
acting like any private investor or creditor operating on
the financial market. If, however, the price paid by the
beneficiaries and the conditions applied to the guarantees
are more favourable than those available in the market,
then there is a clear economic advantage to the benefi-
ciaries, and therefore (assuming the other conditions are
met) State aid within the meaning of the Treaty.

the Guarantees Notice lays down six
Point 4.3 of
conditions on the basis of which the Commission will
assess whether a State guarantee scheme constitutes State
aid. In the first place, therefore, the Commission must
consider whether
these
the Commission can conclude
conditions;
immediately that there is no aid element involved.

the notified scheme

it does,

fulfils

if

The measure to be assessed here consists of a guarantee
fund providing cover for the financing of loans granted
by banks to shipowners for shipbuilding or conversion
work carried out in Italian shipyards. The Commission
outlined its approach to such securities in the Guarantees
Notice (3).

(27)

Point 4.3 states that a State guarantee scheme that fulfils
all the following conditions does not constitute State aid
under Article 87(1):

The Guarantees Notice explains why — under certain
conditions — a State guarantee can constitute State aid:
‘The State guarantee enables the borrower to obtain
better financial terms for a loan than those normally
available on the financial markets. Typically, with the
benefit of the State guarantee, the borrower can obtain
lower rates and/or offer less security. In some cases, the
borrower would not, without a State guarantee, find a
financial institution prepared to lend on any terms (…).
The benefit of a State guarantee is that the risk associated
with the guarantee is carried by the State. This carrying
of a risk by the State should normally be remunerated by
an appropriate premium. Where the State forgoes such a
premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and
a drain on the resources of the State. Thus, even if no
payments are ever made by the State under a guarantee,
there may
under
Article 87(1)’ (4).

nevertheless

State

aid

be

a

(a) Economic advantage

(25)

The main question in the present case is whether the
premiums charged for the guarantee reflect an adequate
market price. In light of the general principles of State

(3) See footnote 2.
(4) Points 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of the Notice.

(a)

the scheme does not allow guarantees to be granted
to borrowers who are in financial difficulty;

(b) the borrowers would in principle be able to obtain a
loan on market conditions from the financial markets
without any intervention by the State;

(c)

the guarantees are linked to a specific financial trans-
action, are for a fixed maximum amount, do not
cover more than 80 % of each outstanding loan or
other
for bonds and
similar instruments) and are not open-ended;

financial obligation (except

(d) the terms of the scheme are based on a realistic
assessment of the risk so that the premiums paid
by the beneficiary enterprises make it,
in all prob-
ability, self-financing;

(e)

the scheme provides for the terms on which future
guarantees are granted and the overall financing of
the scheme to be reviewed at least once a year;

(23)

(24)

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(f)

the premiums cover both the normal risks associated
with granting the guarantee and the administrative
including, where the State
costs of
provides the initial capital
for the start-up of the
scheme, a normal return on that capital.

the scheme,

bank guarantee amounts, in their view, to 0,915 % p.a.
This is much higher than the annual premium that would
correspond to the one-off premiums proposed by the
Italian authorities initially or in the premiums proposed
in their letter of 3 June 2004.

(28)

(c) and (e) are
In the present case conditions (a),
fulfilled, but conditions (d) and (f) are not, as the risk
carried by the State is not remunerated by an appropriate
premium.

(b),

(34)

(29)

(30)

(31)

Point 4.3(d) and (f) of the Notice require that the terms
of the scheme be based on a realistic assessment of the
risk, so as to make the system in all probability self-
financing, and that the premiums collected be sufficient
to cover the normal risks associated with granting the
guarantees and the administrative costs of the scheme,
including, where the State provides the initial capital for
the start-up of the scheme, a normal return on that
capital. Italy has not been able to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of
the premiums
the Commission that
provided for in the scheme can make it self-financing
and cover all administrative costs.

(i) I n a d e q u a c y o f

t h e p r o p o s e d p r e m i u m

Credit
institutions operating on the financial market
would charge their clients higher premiums for similar
guarantees, given that a one-off premium of 2,3 % does
not appear sufficient to ensure that in all likelihood all
costs due to possible defaults and to administrative
expenses will be covered. This is also true for
the
range of premiums between 2,065 % and 2,603 %
mentioned in the Italian authorities’
letter of 3 June
2004.

(35)

The Italian authorities have not had any similar guarantee
schemes in operation in the past, and consequently do
not possess any reliable historical or empirical data (on
e.g. industry defaults, the revenues of the scheme, or the
actual administrative costs of running the scheme) which
might have enabled them to demonstrate that the scheme
would be self-financing.

the inadequacy of

the proposed premium is
Second,
confirmed by more recent data likewise provided to the
Commission by the Italian authorities themselves.
In
2003 the Italian authorities conducted a market survey
with the aim of
investigating how much credit insti-
tutions would charge their clients for similar guarantees.
According to the letters received from the Italian banks
and submitted to the Commission, all banks questioned
would charge premiums higher than 0,5 % p.a., or a
range of premiums higher than that proposed by Italy
in its letter of 3 June 2004. The premiums suggested by
the banks are as follows:

Banca CARIGE

between 0,50 % and 0,75 % p.a.

BNL

Unicredit

Citigroup

ca 0,60 % p.a.

0,60 % p.a.

0,60 % p.a.

Deutsche Bank

between 0,70 % and 0,80 % p.a.

ABN Amro

between 0,70 % and 0,75 % p.a.

Banca Intesa

ca 0,75 % p.a.

Banca di Roma

between 0,75 % and 1,25 % p.a.

experience

the inadequacy of

the proposed premium is
Third,
the Commission has
confirmed by the
gained in assessing ship financing schemes in Germany,
which, unlike the Italian Fund, have been running for
In December 2003 the Commission
several years.
approved the guarantee
schemes operated by the
German Länder (State aid measure No N 512/03 (5)) on
the grounds that the notified measures did not constitute
State aid within the meaning of the Treaty.

(32)

The Italian authorities argue that the premium proposed
is derived from a comparable market benchmark, and
should therefore be considered adequate. This is not
borne out by the Commission’s information.

(36)

The German case showed that, to ensure that the default
risks (and the administrative costs) were in all probability
the German
covered, higher premiums were needed:
schemes carried premiums which varied between 0,8 %
and 1,5 % p.a., depending on the creditworthiness of the
beneficiary.

(33)

First, the Italian authorities themselves in their letter of 7
October 1998 state that the average market price of a

(5) OJ C 62, 11.3.2004, p. 2.

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issues,

(37) As the German scheme and the Italian scheme are
substantially analogous and raise similar
the
Commission suggested that the Italian authorities give
careful consideration to the Decision in the case of the
German Länder guarantee schemes, especially because, as
already mentioned, the Länder had already had various
guarantee schemes for shipbuilding in place in the past.
While the Italian authorities had not been able to
produce any evidence to show that the scheme would
be ‘in all probability self-financing’, the German autho-
rities had extensive and reliable historical data on which
to base their estimates (6).

(38)

The Commission accordingly provided Italy with a non-
confidential copy of the Commission Decision on the
guarantee schemes operated by the German Länder. In
addition, when the Italian authorities expressed their
desire to have more complete and detailed information
on the German case, if possible from the German autho-
rities themselves, the Commission provided the Italian
authorities and their consultant with contact details for
the German authorities and their consultant.

premium guarantee system at issue cannot be held to
be ‘in all probability self-financing’.

(42) As mentioned above, however, in their submission of 4
June 2004 the Italian authorities manifested a willingness
to adopt a system whereby different projects carrying
different risks would be charged different premiums.
But that willingness has never been transformed into a
concrete proposal. The new system was briefly outlined
in that letter, but no other details or information on its
operation have been provided since, although the autho-
this was an issue of crucial
rities were aware that
importance for the Commission’s Decision.

(43)

In any event, even if it were to be held that such a
system could ensure a realistic assessment of the risks,
the premiums proposed (see above)
the low level of
would still
the measure was capable of
conferring an economic advantage on shipowners using
the scheme.

indicate that

(ii) L a c k o f r i s k d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n

(39)

In addition, the Commission considers that the Fund is
not based on a realistic assessment of
the risks and
would therefore not in all probability be self-financing.

(44)

(40)

that

scheme
if

The information available to the Commission indicates
that ship financing is a sector in which it is possible to
assess and price individual risks, and that a functioning
market for the granting of end-financing guarantees for
shipbuilding does exist. It appears, therefore, that a ship
financing guarantee
same
charges
it functions under the same
premium to all users,
conditions and restrictions as market operators, will
not
so
in all probability be self-financing. This
because it would always be possible for beneficiaries
with lower
than average risk to find a guarantor
willing to cover their risk at premiums cheaper than
the average premium. Unless the system was compulsory,
this would leave the guarantee scheme offered by the
public authorities with the higher than average risks, so
that the system would not be adequately financed.

the

is

(41)

The information supplied indicates that
the guarantee
scheme for ship financing provided by Italy carries a
fixed premium, and that the use of the scheme is not
compulsory. At the same time, Italy confirms that it is
possible to assess individual risks and that a market to
provide such guarantees does exist. On this basis, the

(6) It should be pointed out that the market for shipbuilding appears to
be global, and the market for finance to shipbuilding appears to be
at least pan-European. Therefore, important lessons could be learnt
from the German case irrespective of the fact that the schemes there
assessed did not concern Italy.

(iii) C o v e r a g e o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s

Finally,
the Italian authorities have not provided the
Commission with reliable and detailed estimates of all
the administrative costs related to the planning,
the
setting-up and the running of the scheme, despite the
fact
the Commission raised the issue in the
decision initiating the procedure.

that

(45)

The Commission considers that if the premiums collected
may prove insufficient to cover all the losses due to
defaults, then they are even less likely to be sufficient
to cover all the administrative costs as well.

(46)

(47)

Italian authorities have
that

the
Lastly,
the
Commission
EUR
258 228 449,54 (LIT 500 billion) for the operation of
the Fund, which the State has earmarked in the budget;
no return on this capital is provided for.

Law has

informed

allocated

the

(iv) C o n c l u s i o n

It follows from the argument set out so far that the
premium or the range of premiums proposed by the
Italian authorities are not capable of ensuring that the
scheme is self-financing and that all administrative costs
are covered. In addition, the terms of the scheme are not
based on a realistic assessment of the risks. A fortiori,
therefore, the private investor test is not met.

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(48) On this basis, the Commission believes that the proposed
measure is capable of conferring an economic advantage
on the beneficiaries of the Fund.

taking a decision by qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission.

(b) Use of State resources and selectivity of the measure

(49)

It is clear that State resources are to be used, given that
the measure is a scheme providing public guarantees and
that the financing will be provided by the State budget.
State guarantees may constitute a drain on the resources
of the State if the State takes a financial risk and forgoes
an appropriate premium payable by the beneficiaries.

(55) At the time of the notification, aid to the shipbuilding
sector was regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No
1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on
(the ‘Shipbuilding Regulation’).
aid to shipbuilding (7)
According to the Shipbuilding Regulation aid could be
granted to the industry only under the conditions and for
the objectives which the Regulation laid down. Operating
aid was not permissible
shipbuilding contracts
concluded after 31 December 2000.

for

(50)

It is likewise evident that the measure is selective, as
these State guarantees are to be available only to ship-
owners who intend to have shipbuilding or conversion
work carried out in Italian shipyards (and who meet the
criteria set out in the Italian legislation).

(51)

(c) Distortion of competition and effect on intra-Community

trade

these undertakings

The economic advantage conferred by the Fund on
specific undertakings may, by its very nature, distort
the State guarantees may facilitate
competition, as
access by
to certain activities
otherwise not open to them. The granting of the guar-
antees by the State, without an adequate remuneration
on the part of the beneficiaries, may give these under-
takings and the Italian shipbuilding industry a compe-
advantage over European and non-European
titive
competitors who have not got
the benefit of similar
measures.

(52)

There is ample intra-Community trade within the global
shipbuilding market. The measure is thus capable of
affecting trade between Member States.

(53)

In conclusion, as all the criteria of Article 87(1) are met,
the proposed measure constitutes State aid within the
meaning of the EC Treaty.

(56) On 1 January 2004 the new Framework on State Aid to
Shipbuilding (the ‘Shipbuilding Framework’) (8) entered
into force:
any
operating aid within this sector. Consequently, only aid
in compliance with the requirements indicated and for
the purposes provided for in the Framework could be
considered compatible.

confirmed the prohibition of

it

(57) According to the case-law of the Court of
specified in transitional

Justice (9),
unless otherwise
transitory
rules, notified State aid measures have to be assessed
according to the rules in force at the time the decision
on their compatibility is adopted. In the case at issue,
therefore, the aid has to be assessed under the Ship-
building Framework.

(58)

(59)

The decision to initiate proceedings was adopted when
the Shipbuilding Regulation was in force, and it was
accordingly based on the Shipbuilding Regulation. But
there is no need to initiate the administrative procedure
afresh when the relevant provisions of two consecutive
legislative
substantially different. This
requirement is clearly fulfilled in the present case (10).

are not

acts

In the Shipbuilding Framework and the Shipbuilding
Regulation, aid to shipbuilding includes all aid granted
directly or indirectly to shipyards, to shipowners or to
third parties which are available as aid for the building or
conversion of ships, such as credit facilities, guarantees
and tax concessions (11).

2. Compatibility of the aid

(54)

The conditions under which aid is compatible or may be
considered compatible with the common market are set
out in Article 87(2) and (3). Article 87(3)(e) enables the
Council
to specify categories of aid that may be
considered compatible with the common market by

(7) OJ L 202, 18.7.1998, p. 1.
(8) Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding

(OJ C 317, 30.12.2003, p. 11).

(2003/C 317/06)

(9) See judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-176/01
Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission of the European Communities
[2004] ECR, 18 November 2004, not yet reported,
in particular
paragraphs 134 to 140.

(10) See also Case T-136/01 Ferriere Nord, paragraphs 74 to 82.
(11) See Article 2(2) of the Shipbuilding Regulation and paragraph 11 of

the Shipbuilding Framework.

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shipbuilding industry is applicable in the present case,
and consequently that
the measure, which constitutes
is not compatible with the common market.
State aid,

VI. CONCLUSION

(65)

The Commission concludes that the Fund scheme is a
State
incompatible with the
common market,

aid scheme which is

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The State aid for ship financing which Italy is planning to
implement on the basis of Article 5 of Law No 261 of 31
July 1997, as amended by Article 1 of Law No 413 of 30
November 1998 and supplemented by the Decree of
the
Minister for the Treasury, the Budget and Economic Planning
dated 14 December 2000, is incompatible with the common
market.

The aid may accordingly not be implemented.

Article 2

Italy shall inform the Commission, within two months of noti-
fication of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with
it.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic.

Done at Brussels, 6 April 2005.

For the Commission

Neelie KROES
Member of the Commission

(60) As regards the compatibility of the aid with the common
market, the decision to initiate proceedings was based on
the fact that the aid was operating aid and as such was
incompatible under the Shipbuilding Regulation since 1
January 2001 (12). The same rule continues to apply
under
the Shipbuilding Framework, which does not
allow the granting of operating aid.

(61)

(62)

The decision to initiate proceedings also considered the
possibility of assessing the compatibility of the aid in the
light of the OECD rules on credit facilities granted for the
building and conversion of vessels (13).
It stated that
although the OECD Arrangement and Sector Under-
standing made provision for guarantees, the provisions
of the Arrangement in relation to minimum premium
benchmarks did not apply until such time as they had
been reexamined by the parties to the Sector Under-
standing. This is still the case (14).

is likewise obvious that

The initiating decision did not assess the aid in the light
the Shipbuilding
of other compatibility provisions of
the aid was not
Regulation, as it was obvious that
closure aid, rescue or restructuring aid,
innovation aid,
aid for research and development or environmental aid.
the aid does not aim at
It
the
favouring these objectives within the meaning of
Shipbuilding
the
even though
slightly different.
provisions of
Similarly,
the aid does not pursue
other horizontal objectives now authorised under the
Shipbuilding
employment, or
promotion of SMEs).

Framework
the Framework are

is obvious that

Framework

(training,

either,

it

(63)

It should also be stressed that the Italian authorities have
never argued that
the measure should be considered
compatible. They have consequently never provided any
information to the Commission in order to allow it to
the
the aid qualifies
consider whether
exemptions from the general prohibition laid down in
Article 87(1) of the Treaty.

for any of

(64)

The Commission accordingly takes the view that none of
the exemptions from the prohibition of State aid to the

(12) See Article 3(1) of the Shipbuilding Regulation.
(13) See Article 3(4) of the Shipbuilding Regulation.
(14) See paragraph 23 of the Shipbuilding Framework, which refers to
the same OECD provisions as the decision initiating proceedings.