Communication from the Commission - Green Paper “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations”
Date: 2005-03-16
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European social policy, demographic analysis, employment policy, health care, labour market, pension scheme, population ageing

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 16.3.2005 
COM(2005) 94 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

Green Paper “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the 
generations” 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

Green Paper “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the 
generations” 

Europe  is  facing  today  unprecedented  demographic  change.  In  2003,  the  natural  population 
increase in Europe was just 0.04% per annum; the new Member States, with the exception of 
Cyprus  and  Malta,  all  saw  falling  populations.  In  many  countries,  immigration  has  become 
vital to ensure population growth. The fertility rate everywhere is below the threshold needed 
to  renew  the  population  (around  2.1  children  per  woman),  and  has  even  fallen  below  1.5 
children per woman in many Member States. 

Europeans would like to have more children. But they are discouraged from doing so by all 
kinds of problems that limit their freedom of choice, including difficulties in finding housing. 

It is also the case that families — the structure of which varies but which still constitute an 
essential  part  of  European  society  —  do  not  find  the  environment  in  which  they  live 
conducive to child-rearing. If Europe is to reverse this demographic decline, families must be 
further encouraged by public policies that allow women and men to reconcile family life and 
work.  Furthermore,  the  family  will  continue  to play  an  important  role  in  solidarity  between 
the  generations.  The  Union  therefore  needs  to  find  out  more  about  families  in  the  various 
Member States, in particular with regard to employment and income in single-parent families, 
access to housing, social benefits and care for the elderly.  

The  Union’s  population  is  set  to  grow  just  slightly  up  until  2025,  thanks  to  immigration, 
before starting to drop1: 458 million in 2005, 469.5 million in 2025 (+ 2%), then 468.7 million 
in 2030. Yet 55 of the 211 regions of the EU-15 already saw a fall in population during the 
second  half  of  the  1990s.  This  is  also  the  case  in  most  of  the  regions  of  the  new  Member 
States (35 out of 55 regions), because of natural decrease and net emigration2.  

This  trend  is  even  greater  when  just  the  total  working  age  population  (15-64  years)  is 
considered: between 2005 and 2030, it is due to fall by 20.8 million.  

The report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok emphasised the importance of the 
demographic challenge for the Lisbon Strategy: ageing could cause potential annual growth in 
GNP  in  Europe  to  fall  from  2-2.25%  today  to  1.25%  in  2040,  with  all  that  entails  for 
entrepreneurship and initiative in our societies. 

To  meet  this  challenge,  the  Lisbon  Agenda  must  be  resolutely  implemented,  in  particular 
those  policies  focusing  on  getting  people  into  jobs  -  especially  certain  groups  in  the 
population such as women and both younger and older people – on innovation and increasing 
productivity. 

1 
2 

Eurostat’s baseline scenario, used for population forecasting, provisional results – December 2004. 
Regions NUTS 2. Source: Third report on cohesion, February 2004. 

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It is also necessary to continue modernising social protection systems, especially pensions, to 
ensure their social and economic sustainability and to enable them to cope with the effects of 
demographic ageing. 

For  several  years  now,  the  Union  has  been  developing  policies3  to  help  anticipate  these 
changes4  and  recent  initiatives,  such  as  the  Green  Paper  on  an  EU  approach  to  managing 
economic migration, contribute to the discussion. 

These demographic changes are the result of three basic trends: 

•  Continuing  increases  in  longevity  as  a  result  of  considerable  progress  made  in 
health  care  and  quality  of  life  in  Europe:  healthy  life  expectancy  is  still  rising. 
This trend should continue, with the gap between male and female life expectancy 
closing.It  will  not  be  uncommon  to  see  four  surviving  generations  of  the  same 
family.  But  the  individual  members  will  move  about  more  and  will  not  always 
live as close to each other as they did in the past. 

•  The  continuing  growth  in  the  number  of  workers  over  60,  which  will  stop  only 

around 2030, when the baby-boomer generation will become "elderly". 

•  Continuing low birth rates. The baby-boomer generation has had fewer children 
than previous generations, as a result of many factors: difficulties in finding a job, 
the  lack  and  cost  of  housing,  the  older  age  of  parents  at  the  birth  of  their  first 
child,  different  study,  working  life  and  family  life  choices.  Almost  everywhere, 
fertility is below the population replacement level. In certain southern and eastern 
European countries, it is less than 1.3 children per woman. 

The structure of society is also changing radically. Family structures are changing: there are 
more  “older  workers”  (55-64),  elderly  people  (65-79)  and  very  elderly  people  (80+),  fewer 
children, young people and adults of working age. The bridges between the various stages of 
life  have  become  more  complex:  this  is  particularly  the  case  for  young  people,  who  are 
experiencing certain life events later (e.g. graduation, first job, first child). 

European  and  national  level  public  policies  must  take  these  demographic  changes  into 
account.  This  is  the  goal  of  the  preparatory  action  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  in 
20045 which  seeks  to  better take into  account  the  impact  of  demographic  changes  in  all  the 
relevant policies.  

In  a  growing  number  of  Member  States,  adapting  to  these  trends  has  already  become  a 
political  priority.  To  compensate  for  the  predicted  fall  in  the  working  age  population,  the 
Union advocates greater employment participation, particularly by women and older people, 
encourages  investment  in  human  resources  and  higher  productivity  through  economic 
reforms, research and innovation. Greater efforts are needed to integrate young people into the 
labour  market  and  to  support  them  as  they  pursue  ‘non-linear’  careers,  alternating  between 
employment, study, unemployment and retraining or the updating of skills. 

3 
4 

5 

See Annex 1. 
Towards  a  Europe  for  All  Ages  -  COM(1999)  221,  25.2.1999;  Europe’s  response  to  World  Ageing  - 
COM(2002) 143, 18.3.2002. 
Budget heading 25 04 01 - OJ L 53, 23.2.2004, Volume 47, p. II/1281. 

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In  the  context  of  the  Union’s  new  social  agenda,  a  more  in-depth  debate  is  needed  which 
respects the various powers of different levels of governance. Many issues associated with 
demographic  change  come  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Member  States  or 
their regional authorities, or social partners. But these are also urgent issues of common 
interest to which all the Member States need to respond. 

The  fact  is  that  the  demographic  dependency  ratio6  will  rise  from  49%  in  2005  to  66%  in 
2030. We will have to not only reach but to exceed the objective in the Lisbon Strategy – an 
employment  rate  of  70%  –  to  compensate  for  the  expected  drop  in  the  working  age 
population: employment participation will have to increase, and the retirement age will have 
to  continue  to  rise.  It  will  be  important  to  assess  and  discuss  how  best  to  mitigate  the  most 
damaging effects of these trends. 

Do you  take the view that  the discussion of demographic trends  and  managing their impact 
should take place at European level?  

If so, what should be the objectives, and which policy areas are concerned? 

1. 

THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHY 

The three causes of demographic ageing mentioned above can be found throughout Europe, 
but the situations are very different, as summarised below7: 

•  The  Union  no  longer  has  a  “demographic  motor”.  Those  Member  States  whose 
population  is  not  set  to  fall  before  2050  represent  only  a  small  share  of  Europe's  total 
population. Of the five largest Member States, only the populations of Britain and France 
will grow between 2005 and 2050 (+ 8 % and + 9.6% respectively)8. The population will 
start to drop in some cases before 2015, and in some cases the fall will by more than 10-
15% by 2050.  

•  Immigration has recently mitigated the impact of falling birth rates in many countries. 

•  The situation in the candidate countries accentuates the demographic contrasts. Forecasts 
for Bulgaria and Romania show negative growth (-21% and -11% respectively by 2030), as 
do  UN  forecasts  for  Croatia  (-19%).  However,  the  population  of  Turkey  is  set  to  rise  by 
more than 19 million between 2005 and 2030 (+25%). 

Eurostat base scenario, EU-25 
(in thousands) 
Total population 

Children (0-14) 

Young people (15-24) 

Young adults (25-39) 

Adults (40-54) 

Older workers (55-64) 

2005-2050  2005-2010  2010-2030  2030-2050 

-2.1% 
(-9642) 
-19.4% 
(-14415) 
-25.0% 
(-14441) 
-25.8% 
(-25683) 
-19.5% 
(+19125) 
+8.7% 

+1.2% 
(+5444) 
-3.2% 
(-2391) 
-4.3% 
(-2488) 
-4.1% 
(-4037) 
+4.2% 
(+4170) 
+9.6% 

+1.1%  
(+4980) 
-8.9% 
(-6411) 
-12.3% 
(-6815) 
-16.0% 
(-15271) 
-10.0% 
(+10267) 
+15.5% 

-4.3%  
(-20066) 
-8.6% 
(-5612) 
-10.6% 
(-5139) 
-8.0% 
(-6375) 
-14.1% 
(-13027) 
-14.1% 

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8 

The ratio of the population aged 0 to 14 and over 65 to the population aged between 15 and 64 years. 
See Annex 2 . 
Spain will see growth of 5.7 % between 2005 and 2030, and a drop of 0.8 % between 2005 and 2050. 

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Elderly people (65-79) 

Very elderly people (80+) 

(+4538) 

(+5024) 

(+8832) 

(+9318) 

+44.1% 
(+25458) 
+180.5% 
(+34026) 

+3.4% 
(+1938) 
+17.1% 
(+3229) 

+37.4% 
(+22301) 
+57.1% 
(+12610) 

+1.5% 
(+1219) 
+52.4% 
(18187) 

These developments are part of a wider trend: all parts of the world will witness demographic 
ageing  over  this  century.  Our  main  partner, the  United  States,  may  see  its  population  rising 
between  2000  and  20509.  In  China  it  will  be  fast,  with  a  falling  population  from  2025. 
However, the populations of our neighbouring regions in Europe, Africa and the Middle East 
will start to age much later: their populations are much younger, with an average  age  of  20 
years or less, compared to 35 in Europe.  

1.1. 

The challenge of a low birth rate 

In this context, a low birth rate is a challenge for the public authorities. Never in history has 
there been economic growth without population growth. Increasing productivity, in particular 
through access to lifelong learning, and increasing employment participation, in particular by 
creating a real European labour market and a higher level of occupational mobility, are two 
important ways of doing this, as are increasing the birth rate and immigration. 

Europeans have a fertility rate which is insufficient to replace the population.  Surveys have 
revealed the gap which exists between the number of children Europeans would like (2.3) and 
the number that they actually have (1.5)10. This means that, if appropriate mechanisms existed 
to allow couples to have the number of children they want, the fertility rate could rise overall, 
even though the desired family size varies considerably from one Member State to another. 

The low fertility rate is the result of obstacles to private choices: late access to employment, 
job instability, expensive housing and lack of incentives (family benefits, parental leave, child 
care,  equal  pay).  Incentives  of  this  kind  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  birth  rate  and 
increase  employment,  especially  female  employment,  as  certain  countries  have  shown. 
However,  84%  of  men  surveyed  by  Eurobarometer  in  2004  said  that  they  had  not  taken 
parental leave or did not intend to do so, even when informed of their rights.  

Over  many  years,  the  Union  has  been  making  considerable  efforts  to  achieve  equality 
between men and women and has coordinated national social protection policies.  

How can a better work/life balance help to tackle the problems associated with demographic 
ageing? 

How  can  a  more  balanced  distribution  of  household  and  family  tasks  between  men  and 
women be encouraged?  

Should  the  award  of  certain  benefits  or  advantages  (leave,  etc.)  be  linked  to  an  equal 
distribution  of  tasks  between  the  sexes?  How  best  to  ensure  an  adequate  income  for  both 
parents on parental leave? 

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10 

UN forecasts, 2002. 
Report  of  the  High-level  Group  on  the  future  of  social  policy  in  an  enlarged  European  Union,  May 
2004. 

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How  can  the  availability  of  child  care  structures (crèches, nursery schools, etc.) and elderly 
care structures be improved by the public and private sectors? 

Can a reduced rate of VAT contribute to the development of care services? 

How can parents, in particular young parents, be encouraged to enter the labour market, have 
the career that they want and the number of children they want? 

1.2. 

The possible contribution of immigration 

Immigration from outside the EU could help to mitigate the effects of the falling population 
between  now  and  2025,  although  it  is  not  enough  on  its  own  to  solve  all  the  problems 
associated  with  ageing  and  it  is  no  substitute  for  economic  reforms.  As  stated  in  the  recent 
Commission  Green  Paper11,  ever  larger  migrant  flows  may  be  needed  to  meet  the  need  for 
labour and safeguard Europe’s prosperity. Given the demographic situation in Europe and its 
geographical environment, this immigration will also be intended to reinforce the population 
in general, and not only to supply manpower. This means that the admission mechanisms for 
third  country  nationals  must  be  managed  effectively  and  transparently,  and  proactive 
integration  and  equal  opportunities  policies  must  be  ensured,  in  order  to  achieve  a  balance 
between the respective rights and responsibilities of migrants and host societies12. The option 
of a wider recourse to immigration as part of the response to demographic ageing needs to be 
discussed at national and European levels, as well as with the countries of origin.  

The Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 declared that an EU integration policy [for 
immigrants]  should  help  to  meet  the  new  demographic  and  economic  challenges  currently 
facing the EU. This is the debate initiated by the Green Paper adopted last January.  

To what extent can immigration mitigate certain negative effects of demographic ageing?  

What policies should be developed for better integrating these migrants, in particular young 
people? 

How  could  Community  instruments,  in  particular  the  legislative  framework  to  combat 
discrimination, the structural funds and the Employment Strategy, contribute? 

2. 

A NEW SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE GENERATIONS 

Demographic changes are creating a new society, and these changes are set to speed up from 
2010  onwards:  ever  fewer  young  people  and  young  adults,  ever  more  older  workers, 
pensioners and very elderly people. Our societies will have to invent new ways of liberating 
the potential of young people and older citizens. Dealing with these changes will require the 
contribution  of  all  those  involved:  new  forms  of  solidarity  must  be  developed  between  the 
generations, based on mutual support and the transfer of skills and experience. The European 
initiative  for  youth  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  the  Communication  on  the  mid-term 
review of the Lisbon strategy should contribute to this. 

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12 

COM(2004) 811, 11.1.2005. 
Communication from the Commission on immigration, integration and employment - COM(2003) 336.  

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2.1. 

Better integration of young people 

Today’s children and young people will have to take over from larger numbers of individuals 
in the previous generations. Their level of education and training is certainly markedly higher 
than that of their elders: for example, in the EU-15, nearly 28% of 25-34 year olds had been 
educated  to  degree  level  in  2003,  compared  to  16%  of  55-64  year  olds.  This  points  to  a 
potential  for  higher  productivity  and  greater  adaptability  than  was  the  case  for  previous 
generations. However, the Union must accept that young people are becoming a rare and yet 
undervalued  resource.  The  fact  is  that  young  people  are  finding  it  hard  to  integrate  in 
economic life: 

•  The  unemployment  rate  for  under  25s  was  17.9%  in  December  2004,  compared  to  7.7% 

for those aged 25 or over.  

•  Young  people  are  at  particular  risk  of  poverty13:  this  applies  to  19%  of  16-24  year  olds, 
compared to 12% of those aged 25-6414. This proportion is also higher than that for people 
aged 65 years or above (17%). 

•  Young  people  are  sometimes  faced  with  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  their  age  and 
lack of occupational experience, accentuated by other factors such as gender, social origin 
or  race,  all  of  which  make  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  integrate  into  economic  life  and 
society. 

•  The skills learnt at school are not always in line with the requirements of the knowledge 
society and the level of school failure is still a source of concern. In 2002, some 16.5% of 
18-24  year  olds  left  school  with  no  qualifications.  There  are  many  reasons  for  this. 
Measures  to  support  families  and  their  school-age  children,  associated  with  the 
modernisation of teaching systems, should reduce school failure rates. 

•  Moreover, children are also at risk of poverty: this is the reality for 19% of under 15s. The 
risk is even worse for those living in single-parent families. One consequence of this is that 
children are forced to drop out of school early, which may, in the medium term, accentuate 
the risk of poverty amongst young people. 

The education system will have to meet a significant challenge: it needs both to raise the level 
of initial training and to offer more flexible pathways, in which, for example, young people 
would  be  more  likely  to  alternate  education  at  college,  work  and  work-linked  training,  in 
order  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  economy.  They  should  also  have  greater  access  to  the 
opportunities provided by distance learning.  

Demographic  ageing  does  not  of  course  mean  an  automatic  solution  to  the  problems  of 
unemployment and integration. The social partners, the school system, public authorities and 
local players will have to reflect on how best to improve integration pathways and combat the 
discrimination which can affect young people.  

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I.e. with a net income less than 60% of the average. 
Joint 
incl/joint_rep_fr.htm 

Inclusion : 

Report 

on 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-prot/soc-

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European  objectives  have  been  laid  down  for  the  prevention  of  long-term  youth 
unemployment,  combating  school  drop-out  and  raising  the  level  of  initial  training.  The 
structural funds help to attain them at grass roots level. 

How can Community policies contribute more to combating child poverty and poverty among 
single-parent families and to reducing the risk of poverty and exclusion among young people?  

How  can  initial  training  and  adult  training  schemes  be  improved?  What  can  non-formal 
education  and  voluntary  activities  contribute?  How  can  the  structural  funds  and  the 
instruments for achieving better access to the knowledge society contribute? 

How  can  the  bridges  between  school  and  working  life  and  the  quality  of  young  people’s 
employment  be  improved?  What  role  should  social  dialogue  play?  What  can  dialogue  with 
civil society, in particular youth organisations, contribute? 

What forms of solidarity can be fostered between young people and elderly people? 

2.2. 

A global approach to the “working life cycle” 

The number of young adults (25-39 years old) will begin to fall in 2005 and this trend is set to 
accelerate significantly after 2010 (-16% between 2010 and 2030). The number of 40-54 year 
olds will start to fall in 2010. In parallel, the number of people aged 55 and over will grow by 
9.6% between 2005 and 2010, and by 15.5% between 2010 and 2030, before falling sharply in 
its  turn.  Companies  will  therefore  have  to  rely  increasingly  on  the  experience  and  skills  of 
older  workers,  whilst  actively  preparing  those  younger  than  55  to  replace  them.  Despite  a 
certain  degree  of  progress,  the  employment  rate  for  people  aged  55+  (40.2%  in  2003,  or 
around 20.5 million people in employment) is far below the European objective of 50%.  

Young employed people may want to spend more time with their children and work more at 
another  time  in  their  life.  These  demographic  changes  may  therefore  lead  to  a  new,  more 
adaptable and flexible organisation of working time. Technological developments are another 
way of better balancing family life and work.  

The quality of jobs and the working environment will also make a significant contribution to 
keeping  people  at  work,  by  reducing  the  risk  of  occupational  accidents  and  improving 
workers’ health, in particular the health of the oldest workers. Anticipating these changes will 
help us to manage the working life cycle better. It will also be necessary to develop incentives 
to change people's behaviour with regard to older workers and to combat discrimination. 

In  order  to  promote  the  transition  to  a  knowledge  society,  EU  policies  promote  the 
modernisation of work organisation, the definition of lifelong learning strategies, the quality 
of the working environment and “active ageing”, in particular raising the average retirement 
age.  Demographic  changes  reinforce  the  importance  of  these  policies,  whilst  raising  new 
questions:  

How can the organisation of work be modernised, to take into account the specific needs of 
each age group? How can young couples’ integration in working life be facilitated and how 
can we help them to find a balance between flexibility and security to bring up their children, 
to train and update their skills to meet the demands of the labour market? How can we enable 
older people to work more?  

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How  can  work  organisation  best  be  adapted  to  a  new  distribution  between  the  generations, 
with fewer young people and more older workers? 

How  can  the  various  stakeholders  in  the  Union  contribute,  in  particular  by  way  of  social 
dialogue and civil society? 

2.3. 

A new place for “elderly people” 

The  number  of  elderly  people  aged  65-79  will  increase  significantly  after  2010  and  until 
around  2030  (+  37.4%).  They  will  be  more  active  and  in  better  health  if  current  trends 
continue. They will also be better off, having been more likely to build up a full pension, and 
will have more savings than their predecessors and their children.  

Elderly  people  in  certain  countries  are  increasingly  choosing  to  move  to  another  region  or 
abroad: mobility is not the reserve of the young or of employed people. They are consuming 
more new goods and services and want to participate actively in social life, in particular in the 
voluntary  sector.  They  may  wish  to  continue  working  or  to  combine  part-time  work  with 
retirement, a trend that is developing in the USA. The employment rate of 65-74 year olds in 
the EU was 5.6% in 2003, compared to 18.5% in the USA. Some of them will also want to 
help  their  children  and  grandchildren  and  ensure  that  their  wealth  is  passed  down  to  the 
younger generations.  

The European coordination of retirement scheme reforms is promoting more flexible bridges 
between work and retirement.  

Should  there  be  a  statutory  retirement  age,  or  should  flexible,  gradual  retirement  be 
permitted? 

How can elderly people participate in economic and social life, e.g. through a combination of 
wages  and  pensions,  new  forms  of  employment  (part-time,  temporary)  or  other  forms  of 
financial incentive?  

How can activities employing elderly people in the voluntary sector and the social economy 
be developed? 

What should be the response to pensioner mobility between Member States, in particular with 
regard to social protection and health care? 

How should we be investing in health promotion and prevention so that the people of Europe 
continue to benefit from longer healthy life expectancy?  

2.4 

Solidarity with the very elderly 

With life expectancy increasing all the time, our societies are witnessing the presence of an 
ever-rising number of very elderly persons (80+): +17.1% between 2005 and 2010, +57.1% 
between  2010  and  2030.  On  that  timescale,  very  elderly  people  would  number  nearly  34.7 
million,  compared  with  approximately  18.8  million  today.  The  proportion  of  people  living 
alone,  particularly  women,  will  increase  owing  to  female  widowhood  resulting  from  the 
difference  in  length  of  survival  between  the  sexes.  Retirement  pensions  for  women  are 
significantly  less  generous  than  for  men.  Women  also  have  shorter  careers  and  earn  less 
during their working lives. 

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Families will not on their own be able to solve the matter of caring for these people, however 
dependent  or  independent  they  are.  The  improved  health  profile  of  today’s  younger 
generations holds out the hope that the very elderly of the future will remain self-sufficient for 
longer,  and  that  they  will  wish  to  remain  in  their  own  homes.  High  intensity  care  will  be 
increasingly concentrated towards the end-of-life period. Nevertheless, there will also be more 
people  than  today  who  will  need  such  high  intensity  care  as  a  result  of  the  loss  of  their 
independence. 

In either case, appropriate care will be needed, and this today is provided in many countries 
by  families  and  particularly  by  women.  Yet  these  women  are  increasingly  in  employment. 
Furthermore, more grown-up children live far away from their parents.  

Families  must  therefore  be  supported  to  a  greater  extent.  This  is  where  social  services  and 
networks of solidarity and care within local communities come in.  

The coordination of national social protection policies is due to be extended to long-term care 
for the elderly in 2006. How can this help to manage demographic change? 

In  particular,  should  a  distinction  be  drawn  between  retirement  pensions  and  dependency 
allowances? 

How do we train the human resources needed and provide them with good quality jobs in a 
sector which is often characterised by low salaries and low qualifications? 

How do we arrive at a balanced distribution of care for the very old between families, social 
services  and  institutions?  What  can  be  done  to  help  families?  What  can  be  done  to  support 
local care networks? 

And  what  can  be  done  to  reduce  inequality  between  men  and  women  when  they  reach 
retirement age?  

How can new technologies support older people? 

3. 

CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE BE? 

In order to face up to demographic change, Europe should pursue three essential priorities: 

•  Return to demographic growth. We must ask two simple questions: What value do we 
attach  to  children?  Do  we  want  to  give  families,  whatever  their  structure,  their  due 
place  in  European  society?  Thanks  to  the  determined  implementation  of  the  Lisbon 
agenda  (modernisation  of  social  protection  systems,  increasing  the  rate  of  female 
employment  and  the  employment  of  older  workers),  innovative  measures  to  support  the 
birth  rate  and  judicious  use  of  immigration,  Europe  can  create  new  opportunities  for 
investment, consumption and the creation of wealth. 

•  Ensure a balance between the generations, in the sharing of time throughout life, in the 
distribution of the benefits of growth, and in that of funding needs stemming from pensions 
and health-related expenditure.  

•  Find new bridges between the stages of life. Young people still find it difficult to get into 
employment.  An  increasing  number  of  “young  retirees”  want  to  participate  in  social  and 

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economic life. Study time is getting longer and young working people want to spend time 
with their children. These changes alter the frontiers and the bridges between activity and 
inactivity.  

Should  the  European  Union  be  promoting  exchanges  and  regular  (e.g.  annual)  analysis  of 
demographic change and its impact on societies and all the policies concerned? 

Should  the  Union’s  financial  instruments  –  particularly  the  structural  funds  –  take  better 
account of these changes? If so, how? 

How could European coordination of employment and social protection policies better take on 
board demographic change? 

How  can  European  social  dialogue  contribute  to  the  better  management  of  demographic 
change? What role can civil society and civil dialogue with young people play? 

How can demographic change be made an integral part of all the Union’s internal and external 
policies? 

In  July  2005,  the  Commission  will  be  organising  a  conference  bringing  together  all  the 
players  concerned  and  which  will  offer  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  issues  raised  in  this 
Green  Paper.  The  objective  of  this  conference  and  the  Green  Paper  is  to  collect  the  best 
practices  of  the  Member  States  and  other  players.  The  debate  could  also  contribute  to  the 
European Youth Initiative proposed in the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy15. 

4. 

HOW TO TAKE PART IN THE CONSULTATION 

The period of public consultation will commence on 16 March and end on 1 September 2005. 

We invite you to submit your contribution using the electronic form which you can find on 
the European Commission site at the following address: 

http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm. 

All  information  of  a  personal  nature  will  remain  anonymous.  Organisations  are  asked  to 
identify themselves. 

We encourage you to  use  the  electronic response form  which will make  it easier to process 
your opinions during this consultation. 

You may, however, also send us a written contribution to the following address:  

Green Paper on Demographic Change 

DG EMPL/E/1 

J-27 01/122 

European Commission 

15 

Youth Ministers agreed at the Council on 21 February 2005 to the use of the name "European Pact for 
Youth .  

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B-1049 Brussels.  

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ANNEX 1  

For  several  years  now,  many  Community  policies  have  been  helping  to  anticipate 
demographic change: 

•  The  European  Employment  Strategy  and  education  and  vocational  training  policy  have 
mobilised  those  involved  to  combat  school  drop-out  and  to  raise  the  level  of  young 
people’s initial training16, as well as to promote “active ageing”, the gradual raising of the 
average retirement age17 and an improvement in the quality of jobs. Here too, the Union is 
far from achieving the objectives set. 

•  The reform of social protection systems. The common objectives for the reform of pension 
schemes, adopted in 2001, call for the solidarity between the generations to be preserved 
and  for  a  balance  between  retired  and  working  people  to  be  maintained.  Extending  the 
coordination of  national  health  care  and  long-term  elderly  care  policies  will  help  to 
develop  this  approach.  The  European  Strategy  on  Social  Inclusion  has  set  objectives  for 
tackling child and family poverty. 

•  Respecting  the  principle  of  equality  between  men  and  women  and  taking  this  dimension 
into  account  in  all  the  Union’s  policies  (“gender  mainstreaming”).  Measures  to  help 
achieve  a  better  work/life  balance  play  a  vital  role  in  raising  the  employment  rate.  For 
example,  the  Barcelona  European  Council  called  in  2002  for  Member  States  to  develop 
child care structures. The social dialogue has concluded agreements on parental leave and 
part-time  working  which  have  been  implemented  by  way  of  directives.  Despite  this 
progress,  much  remains  to  be  done,  as  demonstrated  by  the  low  take-up  rate  of  parental 
leave  among  men  and  the  persistence  of  obstacles  to  women’s  access  to  high  quality 
employment.  

•  Combating  discrimination.  Since  2000,  a  legislative  framework  has  covered  all 

discrimination in employment and has promoted diversity.  

•  The  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  call  for  growth  to  be  made  more  sustainable  by 
reducing public debt and implementing sound policy. The multilateral surveillance of the 
implementation  of  the  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  and  the  Stability  and  Growth 
Pact  includes  the  evaluation  of  the  sustainability  of  public  finances.  Work  has  been 
undertaken in the Economic Policy Committee to measure the medium-term and long-term 
economic and budgetary impact of ageing.  

•  A  common  approach  to  immigration  policy  including  economic  immigration  has  been 

developing for several years. 

•  The Social Fund, as a tool to support the Employment Strategy, and the European Regional 
Development Fund promote the development of child care and better “age management” in 
companies. 

16 
17 

Guideline 4, Council Decision of 22 July 2003 (OJ L 197, 5.8.2003, p.13). 
Guideline 5. 

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•  The  research  framework  programme  supports  many  projects  associated  with  ageing  and 
demographic  change,  focusing  especially  on  clinical  research  into  diseases  affecting  the 
very  elderly  and  their  impact  on  health  care  systems.  The  framework  programme  also 
includes studies on demographic trends in Europe. 

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ANNEX 2 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

3. 

4. 

The challenges of European demography .................................................................... 4 

The challenge of a low birth rate.................................................................................. 5 

The possible contribution of immigration.................................................................... 6 

A new solidarity between the generations ................................................................... 6 

Better integration of young people............................................................................... 7 

A global approach to the “working life cycle”............................................................. 8 

A new place for “elderly people”................................................................................. 9 

Conclusion: what should the European Union’s role be? .......................................... 10 

How to take part in the consultation .......................................................................... 11 

Graph 1: the European Union in the world .............................................................................. 16 

Graph 2: old age dependency ................................................................................................... 17 

Graph 3: share of the youngest and the oldest in the European population ............................. 18 

Graph 4: the ageing of the European population...................................................................... 19 

Graph 5: size of the youngest (15-24) and oldest (55-64) working age groups....................... 20 

Graph 6: change in the median and average age in the EU-25 1950-2050 .............................. 21 

Graph 7: ageing patterns across the Union............................................................................... 22 

Graph 8: trends in fertility........................................................................................................ 23 

Graph 9:fertility trends in the EU between 1960 and 2003...................................................... 24 

Graph 10 & 11: trends in life expectancy at birth .................................................................... 25 

Graphs 12 & 13: life expectancy at the age of 60 (1960-2002) ............................................... 26 

Graph 14: trends in net migration ............................................................................................ 27 

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GRAPH 1: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD 

Share of world regions in the world's total population 1970-2000-2030

1970

2000

2030

25

20

15

10

5

0

EU25

CC-4

Other
Europe

Nth
America

Latin
America

Africa

Japan

China

India

Other
Asia

Oceania

World population (billion)        1970:  3,7           2000:  6,1           2030:   8,1

Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2002 Revision (Medium Variant); For EU25, BG and RO: Eurostat 2004 Demographic 
Projections (Baseline scenario)

Graph 1 shows that the share of the EU-25 in world population between 2000-2030 is likely 
to fall from 12 to 6%. Other regions are also affected. Africa is likely to become one of the 
new  giants.  The  shares  of  India  and  Other  Asia  are  also  expected  to  rise.  The  increasing 
demographic size of these other regions could diminish Europe's influence in the world. 

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GRAPH 2: OLD AGE DEPENDENCY 

Old dependency ratio 
( age group 65+ as share of  age group 15-64)

1970

2000

2030

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0,0

EU25

CC

Other
Europe

Nth
America

Latin
America

Africa

China

India

Japan

Oceania WORLD

Other
Asia

Source: UN World Population prospects (2002 Rev. - Medium Variant); For EU25 : Eurostat 2004 Demographic Projection 
(Baseline scenario); CC= BG, RO, HU, TR

Graph 2 shows that old age dependency is going to be a global challenge over the next three 
decades  with  the  exception  of  Africa.  The  pressure  is  going  to  be  the  highest  in  Japan  and 
Europe.  This  means  that  the  problem  does  not  only  exist  in  EU-25  and  that  all  developed 
regions  of  the  world  are  forced  to  redesign  their  policies  and  institutional  arrangements  in 
order to resolve the problems associated with ageing. 

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GRAPH 3: SHARE OF THE YOUNGEST AND THE OLDEST IN THE EUROPEAN POPULATION 

Share of age group 0-14 and age group 0-24 in the total
population, EU-25, USA and Japan, 2000-2050

Share of age group 65 and over and 80 and over in the 
total population, EU-25, USA and Japan, 2000-2050
40

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

USA

0-24

EU25

JP

EU25

USA

JP

0-14

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

JP

EU25

65+

USA

JP

EU25

80+

USA

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

So urce: Euro stat 2004 Demo graphic P ro j. (B aseline scen.); UN Wo rld 
P o pulatio n P ro spects (2002 Rev. - M edium variant)

So urce: Euro stat 2004 Demo graphic P ro j. (B aseline scen.); UN Wo rld 
P o pulatio n P ro spects (2002 Rev. - M edium variant)

Graph 3 presents the shares of the two youngest and the two oldest age groups between 2000-
2050  for  Japan,  USA  and  EU-25.  In  all  three  cases  an  important  decline  in  the  share  of 
younger  cohorts  is  observed  while  the  share  of  the  older  cohorts  has  increased.  The  main 
implication of these trends is that the overall demand for care will increasingly have to shift 
from  the  young  to  the  elderly.  The  only  way  to  cope  with  this  potentially  huge  increase  in 
demand from old age groups is to develop active ageing policies.  

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GRAPH 4: THE AGEING OF THE EUROPEAN POPULATION 

Distribution of the population (EU25) per age group (1950-2050)

1,2

7,9

15,2

35,0

15,8

24,9

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2,0

10,7

15,4

32,7

15,5

23,7

1950

1975

3,4

12,3

17,2

36,9

13,0

17,1

2000

6,5

16,2

21,3

31,1

10,5

14,4

2025

80+

65-79

50-64

25-49

15_24

0_14

11,8

18,5

18,5

28,2

9,7

13,3

2050

Source: UN World Population Prospects (2002 Revision) and Eurostat 2004 Demographic Projections (Baseline scenario)

Graph 4 shows that ageing is having an important effect on the age structure of the European 
population.  As  the  baby  boom  generation  moves  through  the  age  pyramid,  older  cohorts 
become more numerous than the younger ones. The total EU-25 population has grown from 
350  million  in  1950,  to  418  million  in  1975  to  450  million  in  2000.  In  2025,  population  is 
expected to grow to 470 million persons but after this, it is likely to decrease to 449 million in 
2050.  In  other  words,  it  will  take  two  more  decades  before  ageing  starts  to  have  a  negative 
effect on the absolute size of the population. On the other hand the effect of ageing on the age 
composition comes at much earlier stage and is therefore of much importance for the labour 
market and the health and long-term care sector. 

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GRAPH 5: SIZE OF THE YOUNGEST (15-24) AND OLDEST (55-64) WORKING AGE GROUPS 

Absolute size in millions of young and old age groups for EU25, 1995-2030

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

15_24

55_64

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Source Eurostat; 2004 onw ards: 2004 Demographic Projections (Baseline scenario)

Graph  5  shows  that  around  2009  the  size  of  the  youngest  cohort  of  the  working  age 
population will dive below the size of the oldest cohort. In 2050 there are expected to be 66 
million  persons  of  55-64  and  only  48  million  of  15-24.  This  means  that  the  working  age 
population  will  start  declining  soon  after  2010  and  that  the  labour  market  will  increasingly 
have to rely on older workers. The graph illustrates that it has become very urgent to improve 
the employability of our older workers in order to prepare our labour markets for the onset of 
ageing. 

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GRAPH 6: CHANGE IN THE MEDIAN AND AVERAGE AGE IN THE EU-25 1950-2050 

50

48

46

44

42

40

38

36

34

32

30

0
5
9
1

0
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

0
3
0
2

0
4
0
2

0
5
0
2

Median Age

Average Age

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GRAPH 7: AGEING PATTERNS ACROSS THE UNION 

Y ear at w hich total population and w orking population, 
Y ear at w hich total population and w orking population, 
is expected to stop grow ing/start declining
is expected to stop grow ing/start declining

IE, M T , C Y, LU , S E, T R
IE, M T , C Y, LU , S E, T R

Total 
Total 
P opulatio n
P opulatio n

F R
F R

U K
U K

B E
B E
N L
N L

SI
SI

D K
D K

AT
AT
FI
FI
EU 15
EU 15

EU 25
EU 25

ES
ES

G R
G R

P T
P T
D E
D E

IT
IT

LV, BG , R O ,E E, LT, C Z, 
LV, BG , R O ,E E, LT, C Z, 
S K, P L, H U
S K, P L, H U

2050
2050

2045
2045

2040
2040

2035
2035

2030
2030

2025
2025

2020
2020

2015
2015

2010
2010

2005
2005

2000
2000

W ork ing  ag e
W ork ing  ag e
pop ulatio n
pop ulatio n

SE , LU
SE , LU

C Y
C Y

M T
M T
T R
T R

IE
IE

AT
AT
EU 15, EU 25, SI, N L, BE, U K, FR , PL
EU 15, EU 25, SI, N L, BE, U K, FR , PL
FI, EL, E S, SK
FI, EL, E S, SK

D K , PT
D K , PT
C Z
C Z
LT , EE
LT , EE

H U
H U

IT , D E, LV , BG , R O
IT , D E, LV , BG , R O

Source: Eurostat 2004 D em ogr. Projection (Baseline scenario); F or C roatia (H R ) and Turk ey 
Source: Eurostat 2004 D em ogr. Projection (Baseline scenario); F or C roatia (H R ) and Turk ey 
(T R ): U N  W PP  (2002 R ev.)
(T R ): U N  W PP  (2002 R ev.)

The pattern of ageing is different across the Union. Graph 7 shows on a timeline the years at 
which the total population and the working age population in each of the Member States are 
expected to stop growing and start declining. All Member States will have to deal with ageing 
challenge  but  not  at  the  same  time  and  not  to  the  same  degree.  The  decline  in  the  total 
population  of  the  EU-25  is  expected  by  2025  and  it  will  be  preceded  by  a  decline  in  the 
population of working age starting already in 2011. 

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GRAPH 8: TRENDS IN FERTILITY 

Total fertility rate, 2003 and change between 1960* and 2003

Change 1960-2003

2003

4

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

1960

2003

5
2
U
E

5
1
U
E

E
B

K
D

E
D

R
G

S
E

R
F

E

I

T

I

U
L

L
N

T
A

I

T F
P

E
S

K
U

Y
C

Z
C

E
E

U
H

T
L

V
L

T
M

I

L S
P

K
S

Source: Eurostat; * Except Estonia and Latvia 1970

Level needed for the 
replacement of generations

Graph 8 shows that in 1960 fertility in almost all Member States laid above the replacement 
level of 2.1 with a high margin, while today (2003) the rate has almost everywhere dropped 
well  below  replacement  levels.  What  is  also  striking  is  the  present  gap  in  fertility  between 
some  of  the  new  Member  States  and  the  rest  of  the  EU.  Most  demographers  expect  that  a 
catch up towards the average level in the EU-15 will be the most likely scenario. 

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GRAPH 9:FERTILITY TRENDS IN THE EU BETWEEN 1960 AND 2003 

Total fertility rate - 1960-2003
Central/Western Europe

Total fertility rate - 1960-2003
Central/Eastern Europe

EU25

CZ

EE

HU

LT

LV

PL

*

EU25

FR

LU

NL

AT

BE

DE

*

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1
1960

1970
* Level needed fo r the replacement o f generatio ns
So urce: Euro stat 

1980

1990

2000

1
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

* Level needed fo r the replacement o f generatio ns
So urce: Euro stat 

Total fertility rate - 1960-2003
Southern Europe

Total fertility rate - 1960-2003
Northern Europe

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

EU25

DK

FI

SE

UK

IE

*

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

EU25

GR
ES

IT

PT
CY

SI

MT
*

1990

2000

1
1960

1970
* Level needed fo r the replacement o f generatio ns
So urce: Euro stat 

1980

1990

2000

1
1960

1970
* Level needed fo r the replacement o f generatio ns
So urce: Euro stat 

1980

Graph 9 shows the different patterns of fertility decline in Europe. The drop in fertility took 
place  firstly  in  Northern  and  Western  Europe,  and  was  followed  by  Southern  Europe  with 
almost a 10 year delay and with a 20 year delay for Central Europe. Despite these time lags 
fertility in Southern and Central Europe is today lower than in Western and Northern Europe. 
This means that the various parts of the EU are basically following the same transition albeit 
with important phase differences. 

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GRAPH 10 & 11: TRENDS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH 

85

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

85

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

Males

2002

1960

T
P

I

F

T
A

U
L

T
R I
F

R
G

S
E

E
B

K
U

E

I

E
D

K
D

E
S

L
N

Z
C

E
E

Y
C

"
V
L

T
L

U
H

T
M

I

L S
P

K
S

5
2
-
U
E

5
1
-
U
E

1960

Change 1960-2002

Females

2002

1960

T
P

E

I

S
E

T
U I
L

I

R F
G

T
A

E
B

R
F

K
U

K
D

E
S

L
N

E
D

Z
C

E
E

Y
C

V
L

T
L

U
H

T
M

I

L S
P

K
S

5
2
-
U
E

5
1
-
U
E

1960

Change 1960-2002

Source: Eurostat 

Important  gains  in  life  expectancy  have  been  realised  between  1960  and  2002,  with  the 
exception of men in the Baltic States. The graphs also show that the average life expectancy 
of  women  is  6  years  higher  than  that  of  men.  For  the  future,  demographers  expect  that  the 
difference in life expectancy between men and women will narrow and that life expectancy of 
men in the Baltic States will within a few decades improve towards the EU. The increase in 
life expectancies is the result of drops in the mortality of all age groups and is not limited to 
the very old. 

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GRAPHS 12 & 13: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT THE AGE OF 60 (1960-2002)18 

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Males

2002

1960

2002

1960

5
2
-

U
E

5
1
-

U
E

E
B

Z
C

K
D

E
D

E
E

R
G

S
E

R
F

E

I

T

I

Y
C

'

V
L

T
L

U
L

U
H

T
M

L
N

T
A

L
P

T
P

I

S

'
'

K
S

I

F

E
S

K
U

1960

2002

Change 1960-2002

LV: decrease from 16,5 in 1970 tp 15,2 in 2002  
SK: decrease from 16,6 in 1960 to 16,4 in 2002  
Source: Eurostat 

Females

5
2
-

U
E

5
1
-

U
E

E
B

Z
C

K
D

E
D

E
E

R
G

S
E

R
F

E

I

T

I

Y
C

'

V
L

T
L

U
L

U
H

T
M

L
N

T
A

L
P

T
P

I

S

I

F

E
S

K
U

'
'

K
S

1960

2002

Change 1960-2002

According to graphs 12 and 13, life expectancy at the age of 60 between 1960 and 2002 has 
increased almost everywhere, except for men in Latvia and Slovakia. The differences at the 
age of 60 are smaller than at birth for both men and women. It is also clear that during this 
period the gap in life expectancy between men and women has further increased. Nevertheless 
the new baseline projection assumes that this gap, measured in terms of life at expectance at 
birth, will start to shrink from 6.3 years in 2002 to 5.2 in 2050. 

18 

No 1960 figures exist for DE, CY, HU, MT, SI and FI. 

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GRAPH 14: TRENDS IN NET MIGRATION 

Graph  14  demonstrates  the  growing  importance  of  migration  as  a  source  of  population 
growth.  Furthermore,  without  migration  our  total  population  would  have  already  started  to 
decline. To the extent that migrants have higher fertility rates than the indigenous population, 
migration may boost the natural increase. 

Net immigration (x1,000) to the EU15 and main countries of destination, Annual average

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

-200

Source: Eurostat

Other

FR

UK

DE

IT

ES

1985-89

1990-94

1995-99

2000-03

Graph 14 also shows that in the past, Germany was always a favourite destination of migrants 
who often came from Eastern Europe. However, its position has recently been taken over by 
the UK, Italy and Spain. A large share of the recent migrants to Spain comes from Southern 
America  whilst  the  UK  and  Ireland  are  also  popular  destinations  for  migrants  coming  from 
Asia. A large share of migration comes about as a result of family reunification. 

EN 

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